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PREFACE

Đông-du (Go East) is the name referring to the movement initiated and led by Phan Bội Châu (1867-1940) to bring Vietnamese youth to Japan to study at the turn of the twentieth century. Although the movement was short-lived, lasting from 1905 to 1909, it occupies a unique and important place in modern Vietnamese history. First, the movement quickly captured the imagination of the Vietnamese populace and set the stage for a series of political movements in the following decades. Secondly, it constituted the first anti-colonial activity which seriously looked into the question of modernization. Thirdly, it marked the first time that the Vietnamese were engaged in activities on a transnational scale beyond their adjoining neighbouring countries. Finally, it was the last resistance movement before the differences in political orientation began to divide the Vietnamese anti-colonial movement.

Over the last three decades or so, Vietnamese and foreign scholars have made a substantial contribution to the study of Phan Bội Châu and the Đông-du Movement; however, further inquiries are called for continually, owing to the broad scope and highly complex nature of the movement, and the desirability of assessing it from a wide variety of perspectives. The primary purpose of this collection of essays is thus both to present some of such assessments and to serve as a catalyst for further inquiries.

I also would like to express my sincere thanks to the contributors, Professors Furuta Motoo, Huỳnh Sanh Thông, Nguyên Khắc Kham, Nguyễn Thế Anh, and Shiraishi Masaya, for their kind and enthusiastic co-operation, in spite of their busy schedule (and even health conditions as in the case of Professor Nguyên Khắc Kham).

Two disclaimers should be made explicitly here. First, the contributors in this collection of essays represent only a
fraction of the scholars who have an interest in Phan Bội Châu and the Đông-du Movement. Because of the time factor, I was unable to get in touch with all interested scholars in various parts of the world, but I sincerely hope that this small collection of essays may contribute in some way to widening the range of discussion on the subject. Second, the authors of these essays represent diverse disciplines and interests; they were free to select the material they considered best for their particular contribution. There is thus no single dominant interpretation that runs through the essays.

I would like to thank Charles Burton, Ernest LeVos, Nicholas Wickenden, who have read parts of the manuscripts and offered valuable suggestions.

A final word about the romanization in the volume. Vietnamese and other East Asian names are given in their customary order, with the family name first and the personal name last. Chinese words and names are transliterated according to the Wade-Giles system, and Japanese words and names according to the Hepburn system.

Vinh Sinh
À l'intérieur de la collectivité nationale vietnamienne, la classe dirigeante des lettrés confucéens a été la première catégorie sociale à se trouver en situation de conflit avec le colonialisme. Après l'échec de la résistance armée du mouvement Cân-vụông qui l'avait mobilisée depuis 1885 contre les Français, elle a dû tenter de mettre à jour une nouvelle problématique politique et culturelle, afin de sortir de l'impasse dans laquelle elle a été placée par l'installation du régime colonial. Sous l'effet des "idées nouvelles" du mouvement réformiste qui bouillonnent en Chine dans les dernières années du XIXe siècle, nombre de ses membres concluent à l'urgence des transformations sociales et politiques pour sauver la nation du déclin. Parmi les théories introduites par les "écrits modernes" (tân-thiode) des réformistes chinois, certaines idées-force éveillent des résonnances profondes. En premier lieu, la croyance en l'existence d'une sélection historique entre les nations, suivant la doctrine de l'évolution du darwinisme que, hanté par le problème de la survie d'une nation opprimée dépourvue d'État, le milieu des lettrés vietnamiens est tout disposé à accepter comme une loi universelle. Elle donne naissance à la conviction selon laquelle la connaissance des moyens de la lutte pour l'existence n'est le privilège exclusif d'aucun peuple, mais qu'elle peut être révélée à quiconque prendrait la peine de la quérir. Le Japon de l'ère Meiji et de la victoire sur la Russie à Tsushima acquiert ainsi une valeur exemplaire: en apportant la preuve éclatante des possibilités d'un pays d'Asie, il fournit le modèle à suivre. Beaucoup voient dans le Japon le champion de la cause de la race jaune contre les Occidentaux, et l'opinion s'accrédite...
rapidement chez eux que l'indépendance politique du Viêt-Nam pourrait être réalisée grâce à lui.

Toutefois, tout au début du XXe siècle, ces lettres en sont encore, dans leur effort pour déterminer d'autres bases à leur mission et à leur existence en tant que groupe social, à s’interroger sur la définition de leur ligne de combat, sur le choix entre l’action violente et l’offre d’une collaboration loyale à la puissance coloniale qui respecterait l’esprit et la lettre du protectorat et aiderait à la modernisation du pays. Très rapidement, un nom émerge dans ce premier courant d’un nationalisme qui cherche ses voies et son renouvellement: homme d’action par excellence, Phan Bội Châu, reçu premier au concours de Ngã-an en 1900, tout en étant persuadé de la nécessité des réformes sociales et politiques, penche pour l’organisation immédiate de la résistance armée. Son programme se présente, sous certains aspects, comme un prolongement de l’ancien mouvement Cãn-viông: maintien du principe monarchique, affranchissement du pays par tous les moyens et notamment par la destruction du régime colonial grâce à l’intervention armée du Japon, qu’il escompte en sa faveur au nom du sentiment de fraternité des races jaunes. Dès 1903, dans un écrivain intitulé Lưu-câm huyệ̂t le tán thù (Lettre nouvelle écrit en des larmes de sang sur les Ryôkyû), Phan Bội Châu a déjà exprimé l’espoir que son pays, en se modelant sur le Japon, échappera au sort des Ryôkyû, privés de leur souveraineté. Lors qu’après la guerre russo-japonaise, on en vient dans des conciliabules à examiner le moyen de faire connaître aux Japonais les espoirs qu’on met en eux et de susciter leurs sympathies et leur appui éventuel pour une guerre d’indépendance, Phan Bội Châu prend la décision de se rendre au Japon. Au mois de janvier 1905, il part pour Tokyo. Il est conduit par Tông Ba Hô, qui appartient à la suite de l’ancien régent Tôn-thất Thuyệt, réfugié en Chine du sud, et qui, faisant le courrier entre Canton et Huê, vient périodiquement renseigner certains personnages de Huê sur les événements d’Extrême-Orient. Son départ a donc été décidé après de longues et mûres réflexions, au sein de ce que les autorités françaises appellent "un clan de conspirateurs qui songent à entreprendre une œuvre de longue haleine".

Au Japon, Phan Bội Châu entre en relations avec le chef de file du mouvement de réforme nationaliste chinois, Liang Chi-ch’ao, qui poursuit dans ce pays sa propagande en faveur d’une révision constitutionnelle en Chine, permettant de conserver la monarchie. Ce dernier approuve son projet d’entrainer au Japon un des pretendants éventuels à la couronne viêt-namienne, autour duquel serait groupée la phalange de ceux qui deviendraient plus tard les artisans de l’indépendance nationale. En effet, tous les deux tombent d’accord sur ce point que, pour mener à bien l’œuvre envisagée, il est nécessaire de la placer sous le patronage occulte d’un groupe important de hauts mandarins. Or, ils pensent que ceux-ci ne peuvent favoriser que des entreprises dans lesquelles le principe de la constitution monarchique du royaume et les institutions traditionnelles ne seraient pas mis en discussion. L’avenement d’un prétendant au trône, qui serait rendu populaire par une habile propagande, leur apparaît non seulement utile pour se concilier l’accord des grands personnages, mais comme étant au surplus un excellent moyen pour coordonner et utiliser les forces insurrectionnelles au moment voulu. Cet argument est décisif: Phan Bội Châu s’engage à ramener un prince de sang royal au Japon. Liang Chi-ch’ao donne son concours le plus complet. Il écrit la préface de l’ouvrage dans lequel Phan Bội Châu fait l’analyse des facteurs politiques, économiques et sociaux qui ont fait la décadence de son pays, le Viêt-Nam vong quốc sâh. Il introduit Phan Bội Châu auprès des hommes politiques japonais, il le met en rapport avec les jeunes réformistes chinois les plus en vue au Japon à cette époque. Chose la plus précieuse, il lui donne des recommandations pour les maisons de commerce de la firme que dirige Kang Yu-wei et qui a des succursales dans tous les ports d’Extrême-Orient. C’est ainsi que, depuis 1905, la maison Kwang Cheng-hsiang (Quảng Trinh Tướng) à Hong Kong, qui appartient au célèbre banquier policien, rend toutes sortes de bons offices aux révolutionnaires viêt-namien.
Au cours de ce premier séjour à Tokyo, Phan Bội Châu fait aussi imprimer, à la maison Bịnh Nghệ Hiền, son premier appel, le célèbre ouvrage "Hải ngoại huyền thư" (Livre écrit avec du sang à l’étranger). Il se compose d’un texte en caractères chinois, d’une traduction de ce texte en caractères démotiques (chữ nôm), et d’une transcription en quốc-ngữ du texte précédent. Il se divise en deux parties ;


- le roi vit dans le luxe et les plaisirs tandis que le peuple travaille et est pressuré. L’empereur du Japon contre a le plus grand souci de ses sujets et s’occupe de tout ce qui peut contribuer à leur bonheur ou soulager leurs souffrances. Aussi le souverain du Viêt-Nam est-il responsable de tous les malheurs du peuple. Un tel homme ne vaut pas plus qu’un de ses simples sujets. Le pays est l’héritage légué d’âge en âge par les ancêtres. Le roi s’en est emparé illégalement en profitant de la stupidité du peuple. Les sujets doivent donc s’efforcer de rentrer dans leur propriété et s’unir dans cette même pensée. Pour réaliser ce but, il suffirait de ne pas payer l’impôt et de ne pas répondre à la conscription. L’union des riches, des nobles, des fonctionnaires, des interprètes, des soldats, des chrétiens, de tout les braves, est aussi nécessaire. L’union de tous ne pourrait cependant pas à elle seule accomplir de grandes choses. Il faut qu’elle s’assure de plus le concours des Chinois et des étrangers...

Phan Bội Châu revient à Huế vers le milieu de 1905 avec Tăng Bạt Hòe et rend compte à ses amis du résultat de ses démarches. Certains sont d’avis qu’il faut faire partir clandestinement le roi Thành-Thai. Mais celui-ci, dont la santé morale est de plus en plus chancelante, refuse semble-t-il d’accueillir les discrètes suggestions qui lui sont faites. Ceux qui songent à une restauration légitimiste font donc pencher le choix, pour suivre Phan Bội Châu au Japon, vers un membre de la famille royale, le prince Cường-Dệ. Celui-ci, qui a alors vingt-sept ans environ, est le représentant direct de la branche aînée de la descendance de Gia-Long. Après la mort vers 1896 de son père, le prince Anh-Nhự, il a hérité du titre de Kỳ-ngoại-hầu. Homme modeste, discret, pondéré, il encourt néanmoins l’inimitié de Thành-Thai, qui l’aurait fait fusiger au Collège des fils de l’État (Quốc Tự Giám). Sa situation précaire à Huế le décide à s’enfuir en janvier 1906, accompagné par Đặng Tự Kính. Tous les détails du départ sont réglés à Huế par Tăng Bạt Hòe, qui ne s’expatrie plus, et qui meurt d’ailleurs peu de temps après.

Cường-Dệ retrouve Phan Bội Châu à Canton en janvier 1906. C’est alors que, avant d’amener le prince au Japon, le leader révolutionnaire formule le programme de la ligue Viêt-Nam Duy-Tân Hội (Société pour la modernisation du Viêt-Nam). Le texte rédigé préconise la restauration de l’indépendance par l’établissement d’une monarchie constitutionnelle. Bientôt va être constituée au Japon une association pour organiser politiquement les étudiants qu’on va s’efforcer d’y amener : Hội Công Hiền (Association constitutionnaliste), qui doit constituer une sorte de contre-gouvernement, cependant qu’un réseau de liasons est progressivement mis en place.

Commence alors le mouvement Đông-du (Exode vers l’Est), par le moyen duquel est organisé le départ clandestin dans l’archipel nippon de jeunes gens pour y recevoir une formation générale et, dans certains cas, une instruction militaire : ils doivent constituer l’encadrement du mouvement insurrectionnel lorsque celui-ci éclatera. Des organisations mises sur pied au pays, même en Cochinchine, ont pour double but de réunir des souscriptions et de recruter les candidats au voyages. Une agence intermédiaire fonctionne à Hong Kong et délivre aux émigrants des lettres d’introduction et des subsides nécessaires à la continuation de leur voyage, au moment de leur
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embarquement. Arrivés au Japon, les étudiants ainsi recrutés sont pris en charge par l'officier Tōa Dōbunkai (Association des pays de même culture de l'Asie orientale), dont le président est l'ancien ministre des Affaires étrangères, le vicomte Aoki. Cuông-Dệ et Phan Bội Châu les font entrer au collège Dōbun Shoin. Ces étudiants portent un uniforme de couleur sombre (dolman bleu ou noir, col officier, avec une rangée de cinq boutons de cuivre, une étoile figurant en relief sur le bouton). Leur casquette de coupe militaire porte sur son milieu un émbleme brodé où figurent les caractères dōbun[大] (đông-văn). Les élèves suivent aussi, en qualité d'externes, dans un autre collège de Tokyo, des cours d'art militaire. Une rente de 20 à 30 dollars par mois est faite aux élèves pauvres; pour les autres, ce sont leurs parents demeurés en Indochine qui pourvoient à leur entretien. Ils prennent leur repas, se réunissent et couchent dans trois bâtiments de grande dimension, bâtis sur pilotes et couverts de chaume, situés dans le voisinage de la résidence de Cuông-Dệ (Koishikawa-ku, Tokyo). Une action de tous les instants est exercée sur eux. D'autre part, Cuông-Dệ reçoit les gens venus en pèlerinage politique lui apporter des subsides, et se pose en prétendant au trône 7. Une active propagande ne tarde pas à s'exercer au moyen de manifestes, de pamphlets et brochures répandus à profusion dans toute l'Indochine, appelant à la délivrance du pays du joug étranger pour lui donner des institutions capables d’en faire une grande nation comme le Japon. Des photographies représentant Cuông-Dệ en uniforme d'officier japonais sont distribuées largement.

L'année 1906 est ainsi marquée par une propagande par la plume, avec l’arrivée au Viêt-Nam d’un nombre considérable d’écrits envoyés par colis postaux ou sous enveloppe aux mandarins, lettrés et gens riches. Vers juin et juillet, apparaissent deux manifestes du Kỳ-nghiái-hâu. Le premier est adressé aux membres de la famille royale, et commençant par les mots: "đảm tắc hầu Cuông-Dệ tinh cáo u nga tổn nhân phai liêpri tổn" (Cuông-Dệ, descendant de ceux qu’on appelle ennemis du peuple, aux membres de la famille royale). Ce manifeste dénonce avec véhémence la situation médiocre dans laquelle se trouve la classe aristocratique. Le second écrit, intitulé “Kính cáo quốc dân” (Manifeste du peuple), peut être ainsi résumé:

Nos protecteurs, les Français, se montrent impitoyables à notre regard. Sous prétexte de nous protéger, ils nous oppriment. Ils ont feint de laisser un roi sur le trône pour mieux assujettir le pays. Faut-il supporter ce joug plus longtemps? Je suis impuissant à agir seul; mais j'ai confiance en vous, car vous êtes encore fidèles aux vieilles traditions. J'ai confiance en nos mandarins, que je vois avec peine être obligés de servir respectueusement l'étranger. Tous ensemble nous pourrons reconquérir notre pays. Temporisons pour être mieux armés. Lorsque le moment sera venu, nous accomplirons notre devoir. Mais préparons-nous à ce coup de main dès à présent. Demandons au Japon de nous enseigner le moyen de devenir forts, demandons-lui de nous instruire...

D'autres brochures portent la signature de Phan Bội Châu. C'est d'abord le Khuyên Nam nhân xuất đường du học (Engager les Vietnamiens à sortir de leur pays pour aller étudier), qui dit qu'on ne peut faire son éducation d'homme libre qu'au Japon, puisque le gouvernement français fait fumer l'opium à la population pour lui enlever la mémoire et la force physique, lui cache ce qu'il y a d'essentiel dans les études, et l'empêche de s'émanciper. C'est ensuite le poème "A-tê-d", qui fait l'apologie d'une Asie délivrée de la tutelle des hommes blancs, glorifie le prestige militaire du Japon, préconise la création de sociétés mutuelles et de coopératives pour servir de bases à l’organisation insurrectionnelle en vue de la reconquête de l’indépendance. Ce poème doit préparer les voies, en faisant naître dans les esprits l’espoir d’une prochaine libération favorisée par l’appui du Japon. Les bruits se propagent peu à
peu que le jour du soulèvement, présenté comme devant être très proche, les Japonais, déjà vainqueurs d’une puissance européenne, accourraient en armes pour aider à l’affranchissement des Vietnamiens, leurs frères de race.

L’exode des jeunes gens vers le Japon ne tarde pas à attirer l’attention des autorités françaises. Le gouverneur Paul Beau doit écrire dans son rapport du 7 février 1907:

L’inquiétude née des victoires des Japonais, dont ceux-ci furent éry pour se poser en libérateurs éventuels de tous les peuples d’Extrême-Orient, est entretenue par les récits que les Annamites attris à Japon envoient à leurs compatriotes. L’exode vers le pays du Soleil levant n’a peut-être pas augmenté; mais, fait à retenir, la qualité des indigènes qui se laissent séduire par l’originalité du voyage, ou même par la perspective d’être appelés plus tard à jouer un rôle en Indochine, est déjà plus relevée. Les premiers partis n’étaient guère que des aventuriers. Aujourd’hui, ce sont des fils de mandarins qui s’expatrient ou cherchent à s’expatrier momentanément. La présence au Japon du prince Cương Đê n’a point été confirmée, mais paraît certaine. Est-elle une attraction pour ces jeunes gens? Ceux-ci sont-ils simplement désireux de se rendre compte, de visu, de la puissance du Japon? L’une et l’autre de ces hypothèses est vraisemblable.10

Au même moment, les autorités s’inquiètent de la multiplication des sociétés coopératives agricoles ou commerciales et des sociétés d’enseignement mutuel, mises sur pied par les lettrés progressistes afin de faciliter la diffusion des connaissances scientifiques et des concepts politiques de l’Occident, et de prêter le développement de l’agriculture, du commerce, et de l’industrie. Faisant l’amalgame entre le parti de Phan Bội Châu et ces réformistes, tous confondus sous l’appellation de “pseudo-nationalistes” qui s’obstinent par esprit de caste à fomenter contre l’autorité française une source hostilité, on considère toutes ces sociétés comme des foyers de complot, formés pour masquer des desseins inavoués de rébellion, pour recueillir des souscriptions et réunir des subsides dans le but d’entretenir les gens envoyés au Japon. Ainsi, la société Đông-kinh Nghĩa-thục est soupçonnée de se livrer, sous prétexte de diffuser parmi les jeunes gens désireux de s’instruire les méthodes et les programmes de l’enseignement occidental, à une active propagande antifrançaise. On en conclut que ce sont ses membres qui, soit par des conférences dans lesquelles l’administration française est violemment prise à partie, soit par la mise en circulation des brochures de Phan Bội Châu, répandent dans la population les bruits d’une intervention d’une escadre japonaise, d’une insurrection des soldats de la garde indigène, de l’entrée en campagne du soumissionnaire Hoàng Hoà Thâm, de l’avènement prochain du prince Kỳ-ngoai-hâu, afin de jeter le pays dans une agitation favorable à l’éclosion d’une révolte générale. Par décision administrative, la Đông-kinh Nghĩa-thục est fermée à la fin de 1907. On croit alors qu’elle se réincarne dans la Đông Lợi Tế, la Đông Thanh Xương et la Hồng Tấn Hướng, autant d’associations présentant la façade de sociétés commerciales, en fait autant de groupements de conspirateurs unissant leurs efforts en vue de favoriser l’exode vers le Japon de jeunes étudiants et de préparer le terrain pour la révolution future.11

Dans les provinces du sud, on constate que les agents de Phan Bội Châu se sont efforcés de capter la force latente résidant dans la puissante organisation secrète de la Société du Ciel et de la Terre (Thiền Địa Hội) pour la mettre au service de leur cause. Il s’avère que le plus actif artisan de cette œuvre est Bùi Chí Nhưân, dont le quartier général est tantôt à Saigon, tantôt à Bangkok. Originaire de Nhết-tảo (province de Tận-an), ce lettré semble être le premier émissaire en Cochinchine de Phan Bội Châu. Par son entremise, un tri-phù honoraire
naturalisé français, Gilbert, Trần Chánh Chiêu, est gagné à la cause. Après avoir effectué un voyage à Hong Kong en juillet 1907, ce dernier s’applique avec ardeur à mettre en pratique les préceptes que Phan Bội Châu vient d’énoncer dans son ouvrage Tân Việt-Nam (Le nouveau Viêt-Nam) en vue de la reconstruction de l’édifice social du pays. C’est ainsi qu’une société industrielle, la Minh-tân Công-nghệ, est constituée, destinée, selon les autorités, à masquer la propagande des idées subversives qu’elle a pour but réel de provoquer, et à préparer l’envoi de jeunes gens au Japon. Sont aussi créés deux hôtels, le Nam-trung Khách-san à Saïgon, et le Minh-tân Khách-san à Mȳ-tho, qui doivent faciliter les réunions et les déplacements des affiliés. Gilbert Chiêu se livre d’autre part à une active propagande, en faisant paraître des articles antifrançais dans le journal Luc-tinh Tân-văn, dont il est le rédacteur en chef, et en distribuant les différentes brochures de Phan Bội Châu, ainsi que le livre Hướng-càng nhân vật, qu’il a rédigé lui-même et qui donne une description du voyage de Hong Kong, escale obligatoire sur la route du Japon, et l’alphabet de la langue japonaise. À partir de ce moment, le nombre des gens à destination de Hong Kong augmente dans de telles proportions (en 1908, il y a semble-t-il plus de deux cents étudiants vietnamiens à Tokyo) que les autorités françaises croient devoir prescrire une étroite surveillance. Un interprète chinois, Trần Điều Nguyễn, reçoit l’ordre de s’embarquer pour Hong Kong et d’infiltrer l’organisation des révolutionnaires. L’imprudence d’un conjuré lui permet de mettre la main sur des documents d’une importance capitale, dévoilant toutes les entreprises et toute l’organisation du mouvement, qui parviennent ainsi à la connaissance des autorités. Par la suite, un agent de Cường-Dệ, Trần Công Hồn, tombe dans les filets de la police. Ses déclarations, faites le 28 octobre 1908 et les jours suivants, entraînent de nombreuses arrêtations à Mȳ-tho, Căn-thơ et Saïgon. Gilbert Chiêu lui-même fut arrêté le 31 octobre. L’instruction de l’affaire, dite du complot "Gilbert Chiêu", aboutit à convaincre les autorités de l’existence d’une vaste organisation séditieuse en faveur du prétendant Cường-Dệ, d’un

mouvement collectif s’étendant tout à la fois du Tonkin à l’Annam et à la Cochinchine.

En effet, le mouvement de protestation contre les impôts, qui vient de mettre les provinces du centre en ébullition entre avril et juin 1908, a été considéré comme l’émergence au grand jour de machinations et d’intrigues menées de longue main et participant d’un plan d’ensemble mis en œuvre pour tenir le protectorat en échec par la désorganisation systématique de la vie administrative du pays. Ensuite, la découverte le 27 juillet 1908 de la tentative d’empoisonnement de la garnison de Hà-nội, prélude, croît-on, au coup de main préparé par les partisans de Phan Bội Châu en vue de déclencher l’insurrection générale, renforce les autorités françaises dans la conviction d’être en présence d’une conjuration dont les ramifications s’étendent dans le pays tout entier. L’instruction dévoile les relations existantes entre d’une part les auteurs directs de la tentative d’empoisonnement, et d’autre part les grands chefs du mouvement de rébellion se trouvant à l’extérieur du territoire. La répression est d’une extrême sévérité. Elle frappe non seulement les organisateurs immédiats du complot, mais aussi "les lettrés, professeurs de caractères, gradés universitaires qui se sont faits, par leurs discours et leurs écrits, les promoteurs de l’insubordination contre l’autorité du protectorat."

La certitude de se trouver en face d’une "organisation méthodique et savante qui cherche à saper la domination française en Indochine en préparant pour la libération future déjà annoncée une armée d’auxiliaires fanatiques" détermine les autorités à agir pour empêcher la reconstitution du parti d’agitation, en traquant ses chefs refugiés à l’étranger, et en prenant, à l’intérieur, les mesures de police et de surveillance nécessaires. À la suite de démarches diplomatiques entreprises à Tokyo, le gouvernement français obtient du gouvernement japonais des assurances de ne plus permettre les menées de nature à compromettre la sécurité de l’établissement français en Indochine, et de disperser les étudiants vietnamiens, jusque-là pris en charge par la Tōa Dōbunkai. Phan Bội Châu lui-même doit quitter Tokyo à la date du 8 mars 1909, après avoir reçu non
seulement un sérieux avertissement, mais l’avis précis de s’éloigner du territoire nippon. De son côté, la cour de Huế est invitée à rendre, le 29 janvier 1909, une ordonnance qui doit faciliter la rentrée dans leur province d’origine des personnes qui se sont enfuies à l’étranger, en annonçant des mesures de clémence à l’égard de ceux qui auront rejoint leurs foyers avant un délai de six mois (à l’exception toutefois d’individus comme Cùong-Déc, Phan Bội Châu et leurs proches collaborateurs, considérés d’ores et déjà comme des rebelles).

Son expulsion du Japon fait comprendre à Phan Bội Châu que son programme politique, axé sur l’émigration sélective de jeunes gens doués et courageux et le renforcement économique et moral de la nation, est désormais impraticable. S’installant dans une position de repère et d’attente en Chine du Sud, où vont le rejoindre les plus irréductibles de ses partisans, il va se tourner vers l’opposition la plus radicale. Une nouvelle étape s’ouvre dans l’évolution idéologique du leader révolutionnaire: abandonnant toute intention de restauration monarchique, il va adopter à la fois l’option républicaine et les méthodes d’action anarchiste.

APPENDICE


Dans mon rapport politique pour la période juillet-aôut, j’ai eu l’honneur d’attirer votre attention sur plusieurs factums semblant émaner de lettrés annamites émigrés au Japon et répandus au Tonkin pour critiquer notre administration et inciter contre nous les fonctionnaires et populations indigènes. Je vous ai en même temps entretenu de la propagande faite par certains indigènes dans le but d’envoyer au Japon des jeunes gens qui s’y introduiraient et reviendraient plus tard pour combattre notre influence dans la colonie.

Le nombre des papiers séditieux qui depuis cette époque sont parvenus à la résidence supérieure, les indications qui m’ont été fournies par certaines menées dirigées contre le gouvernement, m’ont conduit à m’enquérir aussi exactement que possible des faits qui nous étaient ainsi révélés....

La propagande aurait pour principal agent au Tonkin le sieur Đào Nguyễn Tố, rédacteur en chef du journal en caractères “Dai Việt tần báo”. Ce lettré se serait assuré le concours d’un assez grand nombre d’employés de l’administration qui le renseigneraient sur les actes de celle-ci. Il serait également le correspondant des propagandistes résidant en Annam et il y aurait lieu de croire que c’est par ses soins qu’ont été répandus certains des libelles envoyés par les Annamites expatriés au Japon et dont le principal récepteur au Tonkin serait le lettré qui est au service du bazar japonais de la rue vieille des Tasses.

La propagande s’exercerait d’ailleurs sous différentes formes. C’est ainsi que la société indigène de bienfaisance dite “Hợp Thiện” récemment fondée à Hanoi ne servirait qu’à en masquer l’action. Des gradus universitaires parcourraient certaines régions et sous le masque de commerçant prêcheraient l’hostilité contre nous. D’autres auraient ouvert au no 4 de la rue du Chanvre une maison de commerce dont les gains sont envoyés aux indigènes actuellement au Japon. Un nommé Nguyễn Chí Sĩ originaire de la province de Hùng-yan récemment revenu du Japon où il aurait passé plusieurs années et parlant le japonais cherchera aussi à nous nuire dans l’esprit crédule des habitants, et s’occuperait à relever les emplacements des forces et des défences de l’Annam et du Tonkin.

Enfin le concours de Nam-dình serait également, paraît-il, pour les lettrés gagnés à cette cause, l’occasion de faire de la propagande et des collectes parmi les candidats, les fonds ainsi recueillis étant destinés à être envoyés au Japon. Certains gradués se seraient rendus à Nam-dình dans l’intention de
La Cochinche elle-même n’aurait pas été épargnée par la contagion de ce mouvement. Des Cochinchois se rendraient aussi au Japon en assez grand nombre, sous prétexte d’y faire du commerce et un doc-phu, premier interprète de Monsieur le Lieutenant-gouverneur, se chargerait de faciliter leur départ.

Tels sont en résumé les renseignements qui me sont parvenus et dont, certes, je me garde de garantir l’exactitude....

Dans mon rapport politique précitée, je vous signalais, comme remède éventuel à cet état de choses, la possibilité de reprendre les anciens règlements indigènes portant l’interdiction aux sujets annamites de se rendre à l’étranger et d’édicter certaines règles, certaines formalités à imposer aux émigrants indigènes.

Dans le cas où le mouvement d’émigration vers le Japon s’accéntuerait encore et où il serait nécessaire pour l’administration d’avoir en mains un moyen effectif pour l’enrayer, la mesure préconisée ci-dessus pourrait faire l’objet d’une ordonnance royale; elle aurait, en effet, peut-être ainsi plus de force et plus d’influence sur la population. Cette ordonnance où l’on pourrait tout d’abord faire allusion au but de notre protectorat, aux progrès déjà réalisés tant dans l’ordre politique que dans le domaine économique et à ceux vers lesquels tendent encore nos efforts, ferait appel aux sentiments de la population et à ses devoirs envers l’État, puis blâmerait ceux qui les méconnaissent au point de fomenter à l’étranger des menées séditéuses contre le gouvernement et se terminerait en rappelant les règlements anciens sur l’interdiction de s’expatrier sans autorisation préalable. Portée avec soin à la connaissance de la population et particulièrement de la classe lettrée et des mandarins, elle nous permettrait aussi d’exiger des fonctionnaires indigènes une surveillance plus soutenue et plus étroite de leurs administrés à ce sujet et d’engager leur responsabilité en cas de disparitions restant inexplicées et non signalées.
NOTES


3 Cet ouvrage est imprimé pour la première fois à Canton en 1905.

4 Par des extravagances que certains prétendent avoir été à l'origine intentionnelles, Thành-Thai encourage en effet les espoirs mis en lui par ceux qui pensent pouvoir attacher une signification à ses gestes et à ses attitudes. En butte aux tracasseries du résident supérieur en Annam, il va même jusqu'à souhaiter une victoire des Japonais sur les Français, qui les obligerait à évacuer le royaume. L'interception de sa correspondance avec des émigrés établis dans le Foukien révèle le rêve qu'il aurait poursuivi d'obtenir du gouvernement français l'autonomie d'un royaume amputé du Tonkin et des provinces nord et sud de l'Annam, qui seraient cédées définitivement à la France (Arch. Aff. étrangères, Papiers d'Agents 11, carton 6). C'est sans doute là l'origine de la légende d'un Thành-Thai patriote, en relations avec les Japonais, refusant de signer un traité qui lui aurait été imposé lors de son voyage à Hà-noi en 1906, au retour duquel il aurait formé le projet de s'enfuir à l'étranger, mais aurait été dénoncé aux autorités françaises par un fils de l'ancien roi Hiệp-Hòa (Dépôt des Arch. d'Outre-Mer, Gov. gén. Indo., d. 53542).

5 Le projet d'amener Cuông-Dệ au Japon et d'en faire le porte-drapeau du parti national en voie de formation est désapprouvé par les deux lettrés Phan Chu Trinh et Phan Thúc Diễn, avec lesquels Phan Boi Chau a de chaudes discussions. Phan Chu Trinh commence à dénoncer avec véhémence les abus du mandarinate et la logique de son raisonnement de réformateur le conduit à condamner le régime monarchique, qu'il juge incompatible avec les intérêts du pays. Il estime que Cuông-Dệ roi ne vaudrait pas mieux que ses prédécesseurs, et que le salut du Viêt-Nam réside dans une révolution démocratique.

6 D'après les autorités françaises, Cuông-Dệ aurait fait deux voyages à Saigon, avant de partir définitivement, et y aurait trouvé un appui spontané auprès de personnalités influentes: "L'un des agents me disait qu'il était allé trouver le doc-phu của Cholon [Đo'Hù Phượng] qui lui aurait fourni l'argent pour le voyage, et une pacotille d'ivoires et de bibelots pour que le prince ait l'air d'un commerçant circulant pour ses affaires. Une autre agent m'a déclaré savoir que dans un voyage à Saigon le prince Cuông-Dệ s'était mis en relations avec le président du comité xénophobe de Saigon, l'ancien interprète [Diệp Văn] Cuông... Celui-ci lui aurait procuré les fonds du voyage." (Arch. nat., Section Outre-Mer, Indochine NF, 368/2922).


8 À l'occasion du concours du doctorat de 1904, des lettrés, dont Phan Chu Trinh, auraient tenu des conférences au cours desquelles celui-ci, en développant ses idées politiques, aurait maîtrisé fort le gouvernement royal et le roi, désigné par les
mots "dân tặc". Cương-Dê relève ainsi l’outrage dans son manifeste. Dans la suite, Phan Chu Trinh écrit à Cương-Dê une lettre qui contient cette phrase: "Như đặc biết thông nhất học sinh, kỳ vô quốc hà sô vi dán, kỳ vô dân hà sô vi chú" (Vous n’êtes qu’un médiocre étudiant. Puisque vous n’avez pas de pays, qu’appelez-vous vos sujets? Puisque vous n’avez pas de sujets, pourquoi vous dites-vous le maître?) Cf. Arch. nat., Section Outre-Mer, Indochine NF, 8/28(2).

9 Arch. nat., Section Outre-Mer, Indochine NF, 8/28(2).

10 Arch. nat., Section Outre-Mer, Indochine AF, 9/A 20(54).


12 Arch. nat., Section Outre-Mer, Indochine NF, 8/28(2).

13 Ibid.

14 Arch. nat., Section Outre-Mer, Indochine AF, 22/A 30(115).
DISCREPANCIES BETWEEN NGUC TRUNG THU AND PHAN BỘI CHÂU NIÊN BIEU IN THEIR RECORDS OF SOME IMPORTANT EVENTS OF THE ĐÔNG-DU MOVEMENT: A FEW PRELIMINARY REMARKS AND A TENTATIVE RE-INTERPRETATION

Nguyễn Khắc Kham

The so-called Đông-du Movement (1905-1908) was the underground anti-French colonialist movement initiated and led by the famous Vietnamese patriot Phan Bội Châu (1867-1940). Its main purpose was to try and bring out as many Vietnamese students as possible to the East, that is to Japan, for study. All the Vietnamese Đông-du students earnestly hoped that their acquired knowledge in technology and military science would eventually contribute to overthrowing the French colonial rule in Vietnam.

Despite its being short-lived and the ultimate failure of its objectives, the Đông-du Movement has marked a momentous turning point in the revolutionary career of its venerable leader and an important epoch in the history of Vietnamese anti-French colonialism.

The events involved in its making were recorded by Phan Bội Châu himself in his two successive chronological autobiographies respectively known as the Nguc Trung Thu (henceforth NTT) and the Phan Bội Châu Niên Biểu (henceforth PBCNB). Unfortunately, a great deal of discrepancies have been found between these two documents and interpreted in various ways by specialists in the field.

In this paper, we will first present a few preliminary remarks on the NTT and the PBCNB by focusing on some of their most controversial features which may have been additional factors of discrepancies between their records. We will later try to re-interpret some of the most important events of the Đông-du Movement differently recorded in Phan Bội Châu’s two autobiographies.

The NTT was written in classical Chinese by Phan Bội Châu in 1913 while he was in a Kwangtung jail (1913-1917). It was published for the first time in 1914 and reissued in 1936 along with an appendix, a letter from Prince Cường-Dực to Emperor Khải Định. Its first quốc-ngữ translation in 1945 by Đào Trịnh Nhật was published the same year by the Nippon Bunka Kaikan, and republished in 1950 by Tân-Việt in Saigon. Another quốc-ngữ translation by Phùng Triện dated from 1946. The PBCNB, also in classical Chinese, was clandestinely written by its author sometime during his house arrest in Huế (1925-1940). According to Trần Huy Liệu, it may have been compiled at the time of the French Popular Front (Front Populaire Français). In the preface by Huỳnh Thúc Kháng to the quốc-ngữ translation published by Anh Minh in Huế (1956), 1929 was given as its compilation date. In his 1964 article, Trần Minh Thứ, sharing Trần Huy Liệu’s view, put forward the date 1937-1940, but Chuông Thâu observed that the PBCNB could reasonably have been written only prior to 1937 when Huỳnh Thúc Kháng received from Tokyo a copy of NTT, written by Phan Bội Châu in 1913. Otherwise, he explained, there would not have been so many discrepancies between the two autobiographies. According to Georges Boudarel, no accurate date can be given concerning the compilation of PBCNB, which may have taken sometime between 1929 and the middle of 1937. It was not until 1976 that due credit was finally given to Nguyễn Khắc Ngu’s 1973 hypothesis that the latter autobiography of Phan Bội Châu may have been compiled sometime prior to 1928-1929 as suggested by the following sentence about Hoàng Đình Tấn from PBCNB: "Six years ago, Phan Bử Ngọc and his men would attempt to seduce him [Hoàng Đình Tấn] into returning to the country for a position of teacher offered to him at the Normal School." As Phan Bử Ngọc, Nguyễn Khắc Ngu argued, was assassinated on February 11, 1922, the above-quoted sentence must have been written by Phan Bội.
Original version of *Ngọc Trưng Thu'*
(from Nagaoka Shinjirō and Kawamoto Kunie, eds, *Betonamu bōkoku hoka*)
Châu around 1928, an assumption which fits in perfectly with the testimony by Huỳnh Thúc Kháng, according to which in 1929 Phan Bội Châu had shown him his second clandestine autobiography written in classical Chinese*1.

Like its compilation date, the number of its extant basic manuscripts has been also a subject of much controversy until early in the seventies when it could be ascertained through Phan Bội Châu’s relatives as including the following:

(1) The basic manuscript in Chinese characters handed over in 1940 by Huỳnh Thúc Kháng to Phan Nghĩa Huynh, Phan Bội Châu’s eldest son who then brought it to Nghệ-an. That manuscript was later sent to the Library of Social Sciences (Hanoi), where it was deposited with the call number VHV 2138 along with several copies of it made by the library*12.

(2) The basic manuscript also in Chinese characters owned by Võ Mạnh Phá, an intimate friend of Phan Nghĩa Đê, Phan Bội Châu’s younger son. Its owner restored it to the Phan family on October 29, 1975, date of Phan Bội Châu’s death anniversary, after keeping it for forty years at Hả-lam (Thăng-bình, Quảng-nam). An important detail: this second basic manuscript in Chinese characters bears at its end the date of its compilation by Phan Bội Châu*13.

Of these two basic manuscripts several hand-recopied versions have been made. Let us mention, among others, the following: (1) the hand-recopied version in slight cursive script by Huỳnh Thúc Kháng, (2) the hand-recopied version owned by Nguyễn Thúc Định, (3) the hand-recopied version owned by Hoàng Xuân Hán which has been made from that of Nguyễn Thúc Định, (3) the hand-recopied version sent in 1962 by its owner Phạm Lão to Viện-Dương Nhật-Bảo in Chợ-lớn, and (5) the hand-recopied version owned by S. Utsumi in Myoto, Nagano Prefecture, Japan*14.

Given their peculiar importance for devotees of, and researchers on Phan Bội Châu, there have been so far not only a great deal of hand-recopies but also a fair number of translations of the above basic manuscripts or their hand-recopied versions. To mention only their quốc-ngữ
translations, they include the four following:

(1) The first one which appeared in Huế under the title *Tự Phán* (Self Judgment), Part I, copyright by Phan Nghị Để and published by Tâm Tâm Thư Xưa in 1946. There was no mention of the translator’s name, but according to Huỳnh Thúc Kháng and Phan Bội Châu’s relatives, the translator was Phan Bội Châu himself.

(2) The second one by Phạm Trọng Diệm and Tôn Quang Phát published in 1955 and reissued in 1957 in Hanoi. According to Chuồng Thâu, it may have been made from a hand-recopy of some basic manuscript in Chinese characters as attested to by the omission of a number of passages and important notes which can be respectively found in the version deposited in the Library of Social Sciences in Hanoi and in the quốc-ngữ translation made by Phan Bội Châu himself.

(3) The third one which was published by Anh-Minh in Huế in 1956 with a preface by Huỳnh Thúc Kháng dated from 1946.

(4) The fourth one which was annotated by Nguyễn Khắc Ngu and published in 1973 by Nhóm Nghiên cứu Sũ-Dĩa in Sài Gòn.

From the peculiar circumstances of their compilation and publication, there have resulted many discrepancies not only between the NTT and the PBCNB but also between some of their hand-recopied or translated versions.

These discrepancies can be brought under the two following categories: (1) those consisting of a few words or phrases whether mistranslated from the Chinese original or resulting from mere misprints, and (2) those of greater importance lying either in the dates or in the very substance of the events differently recorded.

Like most of Phan Bội Châu’s works, the NTT and the PBCNB were compiled in classical Chinese and later translated into quốc-ngữ by different people with varying success. As a result, some of their quốc-ngữ translations have not been free of mistranslations or mistakes, not to mention a few misprints which, sometimes, have proved to be regrettably misleading.

Following are two most illustrative instances of the former kind of discrepancies. They are respectively concerned with some events of 1906 when Phan Bội Châu, coming back to Japan for the second time, was staying in Yokohama, and with some events of 1908 when the Vietnamese Đông-du students were living in Tokyo.

During the last few months of 1906, Phan Bội Châu, pursuing actively his propaganda for promoting the Đông-du movement, wrote several prose articles in Chinese for the Yunnan tsa-chih (Sino-Vietnamese Văn-nam Tạp-chi). None of these contributions of his has been alluded to in the NTT while in the PBCNB or, more accurately, in some of its quốc-ngữ translations mention has been made of the two of them, namely Ai Viết điều Diên and the Việc vong thâm trang. The first researcher on Phan Bội Châu to be fortunate enough in having at his disposal the Chinese original of the articles contributed by the revolutionary patriot to the Yunnan tsa-chih was Chuồng Thâu. In his 1963 article on Phan Bội Châu’s influence upon some Chinese revolutionary organizations of the early twentieth century, he has mentioned as contributions by Phan the following articles: “Hải-ngoại huyết thư”, “Độc Nhạt-bản tình thơn Trung-quốc chi văn kỳ”, “Việt-nam-chí-sách thâm két cuộn”, and “Hoa lệ công ngôn”. The last article was signed with the pseudonym Phúc Quốc Tang Giả, a pseudonym which, according to Chuồng Thâu and to David Marr, “present-day scholars, both Chinese and Vietnamese, believe to be that of Phan Bội Châu”. Its title was given by Chuồng Thâu in Sino-Vietnamese transliteration as “Hoa lệ công [our emphasis] ngôn” without the corresponding Chinese characters. In Part II of his same article, however, where was just published his integral quốc-ngữ translation of the article concerned, we have found the Sino-Vietnamese title “Hoa lệ công [our emphasis] ngôn” instead of “Hoa lệ công ngôn” as previously. In Boudarel’s bibliography, on p. 160 we have read these lines: “18. Hoa lệ công ngôn 和 流 衎 Una exhortation baignée de larmes. NCLS, no. 56, XI-1963, p. 41-44. Texte paru dans le Văn Nam Tập Chí no. 7. Appel aux 6.500 candidats aux concours (1906)”.
Finally, in *Vietnamese Anti-colonialism, 1885–1925* by David Marr, the article title was given in Sino-Vietnamese as *Hoa Le Cong Ngon* (without diacritical marks) and transliterated in the Wade-Giles system as *Ho-li kung-yen*. In a footnote, reference was made to Chuồng Thâu’s November 1963 article where *Hoa le cong ngon* was found instead of *Hoa le cong ngon* as in his October 1963 article. However, in the "Glossary" at the end of his book, Marr did give the Sino-Vietnamese title *Hoa le cong ngon* with full diacritical marks. So many variances in the Sino-Vietnamese transliterations of the Chinese article title must have occasioned great confusion for many a reader. This writer himself did at first misbelieve that the correct transliteration was *Hoa le cong ngon*, but later has changed his mind after finding a few clues to the problem: He has been advised by Prof. Vĩnh Sính that all the bibliographies on Phan Bội Châu available to him did give *Hoa le cong ngon*. *Cong ngon* has been well-defined in many Chinese-English dictionaries as meaning "to offer a word of advice". Furthermore, we did find *Hoa le cong ngon* in Chuồng Thâu’s October 1963 article where *cong ngon* was correctly translated as "gửi lũi...", in Boudarel’s bibliography where it was calligraphed in Chinese by Nguyễn Trần Huấn and in the glossary of Marr’s above-mentioned book. Thus, the difficulties for a reader to choose between *Hoa le cong ngon* and *Hoa le cong ngon* merely derive from a regrettable misprint in Chuồng Thâu’s November 1963 article, a misprint which would have been easily identified if the title of Phan Bội Châu’s article had been given in Chinese script along with its Sino-Vietnamese transliteration.

The other illustrative instance of the first kind of discrepancies between the NTT and PBCNB is concerned with a mutual association set up in Tokyo by Phan Bội Châu for the Vietnamese Đồng-du students in 1908. With regard to the name of that association, let us note a first discrepancy related to it between the NTT and the PBCNB, i.e., *Tân Việt Nam Công Hiến Hội* in the former and *Việt-Nam Công Hiến Hội* in the latter. As far as the term *công hiến* in *Tân Việt Nam Công Hiến Hội* is concerned, Boudarel has rightly observed that in some books *công hiến* (to offer) has been mistaken for *công hiền*? Although he did not specify in what books, there is no doubt that some *quốc-ngữ* translations of NTT have been alluded to. Concerning the *quốc-ngữ* translations of NTT there have been so far, as mentioned above, two: one by Đào Trình Nhất (1945, repr. 1950) and the other by Phùng Triển (1946). According to Chuồng Thâu’s opinion, Đào Trình Nhất’s *quốc-ngữ* translation is better than that of Phùng Triển in matter of accuracy. For that reason, he argued, the latter should neither be quoted nor be used for scholarly references. We do agree with him that Đào Trình Nhất’s translation is superior in quality to that of Phùng Triển. Nevertheless, the latter does have some merits of its own. We would like to cite hereafter two among others: (1) Phùng Triển did not add as did Đào Trình Nhất such subtitles which do not exist in the Chinese original of NTT; and (2) concerning the Vietnamese Đồng-du students’ mutual association, we have found the correct one in his translation as *Tân Việt Nam Công* [our emphasis] Hiến Hội instead of *Tân Việt Nam Công* [our emphasis] Hiến Hội in Đào Trình Nhất’s translation. The fact that *công hiến* instead of *công hiền* has been found in the 1950 *quốc-ngữ* translation by Đào Trình Nhất does not necessarily mean that it should be blamed on the translator himself. No doubt, the latter must have forgotten the grasp of the political nature of the Vietnamese Đồng-du students’ mutual association set up in 1908, as evidenced by the subtitle "The Provisional Government of New Vietnam" given by himself to Chapter XIV in his *quốc-ngữ* translation. Under these conditions, *công hiến* (offering) would not have matched well with that subtitle. In another respect, the 1938 Chinese manuscript used by Đào Trình Nhất for his *quốc-ngữ* translation published in 1945 by Nippon Bunka Kaikan had been very likely provided to him by the above Japanese publishing agency. This Chinese manuscript must have not differed substantially from those previously used for Japanese translations. Concerning especially the term *công hiến*, it has not been, to our knowledge, found in any Japanese translation of NTT. Instead, we have always found *công hiền*. 
For instance, in *Nguyệt Trung Kỳ* translated by Minami Jūjisei in 1932 and reprinted by Ōiwa Makoto in his *Annan minzoku undōshi gaisetsu* and the same Japanese translation was reprinted in *Betonamu bōkokushi hoka* edited by Nagaoka Shinjirō and Kawamoto Kunie.

We have just dealt with the former category of discrepancies between the NTT and the PBCNB. Some of these have proved to be rather confusing and misleading. However, they have involved far less consequences than those of the latter category, which, as we have stated above, were concerned with the dates or the very substance of the events. Following are a few instances of these discrepancies we have deliberately taken from the events more or less related to the Đông-du Movement.

Let us first quote a few instances of discrepancies in the dates of the events:

1. The visit by Phan Bội Châu to Hoàng Hoa Thám at the latter's Phơn-Xương mountain redoubt:

   Both the NTT and the PBCNB did record Phan's visit to Phơn-Xương with some details; however, there was a discrepancy between these two autobiographies concerning the date of this visit. According to the NTT, it was on the eighth of the eighth lunar month of the year Kuei Mao (s.v. Quý Mao; i.e. 1903), but according to the PBCNB it was the eleventh lunar month of the year Jen Yin (s.v. Nhậm Dần; i.e. 1902). Thus according to the PBCNB, Phan Bội Châu came to Phơn-Xương eight months earlier than was recorded in the NTT. What is noteworthy is that, according to the NTT, Phan came to Phơn-Xương after meeting with Nguyễn Thành and even with Cường-Dệ while, according to the PBCNB, he came there before meeting with Nguyễn Thành and Cường-Dệ. In other words, he started his secret revolutionary activities in North Vietnam before going to Central and South Vietnam, thus following a direction quite opposite to that recorded in the NTT.

2. The meeting for setting up the Duy Tân Hội or Association for Modernization of Vietnam, with Cường-Dệ as President and leader:

   The date of that meeting was not found in the NTT but, according to the reasoning by Trần Minh Thư, it may have occurred either in the fourth or the fifth lunar month of the year Kuei Mao (1903) because, as recorded in the NTT, in the third lunar month of the same year, Phan met with Prince Cường-Dệ, and following that meeting, in the sixth lunar month, he returned to Nghê-an. According to the PBCNB, however, before the fourth lunar month of the year Chia Ch'ên (s.v. Giáp Thìn; i.e. 1904), Phan did come to Nguyễn Thành's house several times, but did not yet attend any important meeting with Prince Cường-Dệ's participation. It was not until early in the fourth lunar month of the year Chia Ch'ên (1904) that was held the important meeting with Prince Cường-Dệ's participation at Tíêu-La (Nguyễn Thành)'s house and where Prince Cường-Dệ was made the President and leader of the association.

   Thus, there has been a discrepancy of one year between the NTT and the PBCNB with regard to the date of the creation of the Duy Tân Hội.

3. The meeting with Liu Yung-fu (s.v. Lưu Văn Phúc) and Nguyễn Thiên Thất:

   Both the NTT and the PBCNB have recorded similar details on the meeting. Its date, however, was not the same in the two autobiographies. According to the NTT it was about the second lunar month of the year I Szu (s.v. Ất Ty; i.e. 1905) after Phan arrived in Kwangtung on the occasion of his first trip abroad whereas according to the PBCNB it was sometime in the first ten days of the eighth lunar month of the year I Szu (1905), that is on the occasion of Phan's second escape abroad after his return from Japan.

   In addition to the three above instances of discrepancies in the dates of the events, we would like to quote hereafter two instances of discrepancies in the very substance of the events.

   1. Seeking an enlightened leader among the members of the royal family:

      According to the NTT, following Nguyễn Thành's advice, Phan Bội Châu sought out an enlightened leader among
the direct descendants of Emperor Gia-Long and finally by March 1903 his choice fell upon Prince Cường-Đệ, direct descendant of Gia-Long's eldest son Prince Cảnh. The same event was differently recorded in the PBCNB, according to which, prior to the meeting with Nguyễn Thành, one of the three points of Phan's revolutionary strategy was just to seek out an enlightened leader among the members of the royal family\(^9\).

(2) Phan Bội Châu's meeting with Lý Tự Trọng:

As recorded in the NTT, after secretly going to Japan where he met with Liang Ch'i-ch'ao and Japanese politicians, Phan resolved to return to Vietnam in order to bring out Prince Cường-Đệ. During this trip back home, he was helped by a Vietnamese steward with making it safely from Peihai (Bắc-Hải) to Hải-phòng harbor. No name was given of the above gallant steward. It was not until Phan escaped abroad for the second time that Phan met with Lý Tự Trọng, the steward who helped him with ensuring his safety during his clandestine trip\(^6\).

As for the PBCNB, it recorded that Phan made acquaintance with Lý Tự Trọng right during his first trip by sea to abroad. Phan met Lý Tự Trọng again in Hong Kong during his trip back home from Japan a few months later and, then, Phan received the latter's secret protection aboard a French ship bound for Hải-phòng\(^3\).

How to deal with those two categories of discrepancies? There has been so far no consensus about that problem. Some researchers have adopted the dates as found in the PBCNB. Concerning the events themselves, sometimes they have given credit to the PBCNB, sometimes they have made a combined use of both the PBCNB and the NTT\(^4\).

Differently from these researchers, Trần Minh Thu has found that "because of the far earlier date of its compilation, the NTT would deserve more credit than the PBCNB with regard to the dates of the events and the motivation of the people involved, although the latter autobiography was sometimes more specific about the event concerned or revealed keener and ripe judgments by Phan Bội Châu on the same events." According to
Trần Minh Thủ, "both the NTT and the PBCNB always have their own merits and demerits. Under these conditions, it would be against all reason to give credit exclusively to either of those documents. It would be not only safer but even necessary to make combined references to both of them. However, making a combined reference does not mean simply adding together such data as found in the two autobiographies. It would require making a judicious selection out of a variety of the facts recorded therein and eliminating all those which would not be consonant with the historic truth."

In 1965, also dealing with discrepancies between the NTT and the PBCNB, Chương Thâu, after reviewing Trần Minh Thủ's 1964 article, suggested that "we should, with a few exceptions, rely essentially on the NTT for the dates of the events and, in principle, on the PBCNB for the events themselves with cross-references, however, to the NTT if needed. The NTT does deserve more credit than the PBCNB for the dates of the events; nonetheless, this does not mean that the PBCNB should be absolutely denied all credit in this respect. As a matter of fact, the latter autobiography did sometimes record with a remarkable accuracy the dates of a few supremely important events of which the septuagenarian Phan Bội Châu may have preserved an exceptionally vivid memory." Concerning discrepancies in the accounts of the events themselves, Chương Thâu suggested that "in case the discrepancies are not too great, we should strike an average, by focusing on what has been similarly recorded in both autobiographies; e.g., when Phan Bội Châu first went to South Vietnam and to go to North Vietnam later, was he advised to do so by Đặng Thái Thân or did he do so by himself? Was the selection of an enlightened leader a suggestion by Tiểu La or an initiative of Phan Bội Châu himself? When Phan Bội Châu came back to China in the wake of the Hsin Hai [s.v. Tân-Hội] Revolution, was he invited by Chi'en Chi-mei (Trần Kỳ Mỹ) and Chang Ping-lin (Chương Bình Lân), or was he advised by Phan Bá Ngọc, or did Phan do so on his own initiative? On these three occasions, the most essential fact common to them all and to be retained for consideration is Phan Bội Châu's role as the ultimate performer."

The above approaches in dealing with the discrepancies as suggested by Trần Minh Thủ and Chương Thâu have considerably improved on those adopted by Tôn Quang Phiet. However, as acknowledged by Chương Thâu himself, they are not sufficient enough for a full assessment of the autobiographical value of both the NTT and the PBCNB. For that purpose, we still need further supplementary research not only on the NTT and the PBCNB but also on other works by Phan Bội Châu. Under those conditions, all the ways of dealing with the discrepancies as just outlined above are not expected to bring about notable results, and consequently, it is no surprise to us to find over and over again various and even contradictory interpretations of the same discrepancies. Let us cite here only one of the most typical instances.

By 1904 Phan Bội Châu and his comrades had managed to set up in Quảng-nam the Duy Tân Hội with Prince Cường-Chấp as President. One of the most pressing objectives of that underground revolutionary organization was to seek foreign assistance in restoring independence to Vietnam. At the very first formal meeting of the Duy Tân Hội, Phan was selected to be sent to Japan in quest of weapons. The above events and the chain of their subsequent episodes have been recorded almost similarly in their main lines by both the NTT and the PBCNB. However, the records of these two Phan Bội Châu's autobiographies have not been free from discrepancies.

In the foregoing pages we have made mention of some variance in the dates of the creation of the Duy Tân Hội as found respectively therein. This discrepancy along with the varying numbers of the details involved has been used by some researchers as an argument in support of their own interpretations of Phan's attitude toward the problem of weapons to be sought for. Let us examine two opposing views held by Trần Minh Thủ and Georges Boudarel.

In his 1964 article concerning the question of how to deal with discrepancies in the dates and discrepancies in
the events themselves, Trần Minh Thuỷ found that, compared with the NTT, the PBCNB has some weak points, particularly in matter of accuracy. Because of its date of compilation being too far from the dates of the actual events, it could not relate them along with their motivation as faithfully and vividly as the NTT. In support of his view, Trần Minh Thuỷ cited the problem of weapons, which according to him, was in close connection with the activist Phan Bội Châu’s reliance on armed struggle to overthrow the French colonial rule. According to him, violence was always the distinctive feature of both Phan and most of the Duy Tân Hội members. As such, the problem of weapons was necessarily a very pressing one and a matter of everyday concern for all of them. As illustration of this assertion, Trần Minh Thuỷ cited the following excerpts from the NTT:

We worried all the time, and were so disorganized that we wasted many days without resolving the problem of weapons. Every time we thought of the old story of Châu Lang who, if he had never had the east wind, could never have fought the battle of Xich-Bich.... After the beginning of the Russo-Japanese hostilities in the year of the Dragon [1904] the competition and struggle between the Europeans and the Asians, between the white-skinned people and the yellow-skinned people forced us to wake up with a start. We became increasingly enthusiastic and intense in our commitment to our ideals. The only problem we still sought to overcome was that of obtaining weapons....

All the leaders said that without the help of some foreign country the problem of weapons could not be resolved....

We discussed with each other the fact that the only country from which we might seek support was Japan....

After some further deliberation, everyone decided that we would do as we had discussed. We selected one person to be our plenipotentiary representative to take a letter to Japan from our leader, Prince Cường-Dęk, and see to the problem of weapons46.

Thus, Trần Minh Thuỷ concluded, as recorded in the NTT, the problem of weapons was unquestionably the chief motive of Phan Bội Châu’s first escape abroad. In the PBCNB we did also find recorded Phan’s concern for the problem of weapons through Nguyễn Thành’s discussions, and through the conversations exchanged by Phan with Liang Ch’i-ch’ao and Japanese statesmen. However, phan Bội Châu’s above concern was not so emotionally striking and thought-provoking for the readers as that in the NTT47.

Another interpretation of Phan’s attitude toward the problem of weapons was incidentally given by Georges Boudarel in a footnote to a passage from his French translation of PBCNB which was concerned with phan Bội Châu’s second trip back to Vietnam for meeting with Hoàng Hoa Thám. According to the French researcher, this Phan Bội Châu’s second trip was presented by him under a rather different light in the NTT which emphasized more than the PBCNB the evolution of his views about the matter. As a result of his contact with Japan and important Japanese statesmen, he seemed to have changed his mind about the problem of weapons, as evidenced by the following passage:

I realized again that the level of political understanding of our people was still terribly low and we were lacking in individual skills and proficiency. I was to regret that we had concentrated so much energy on the problem of weapons without stopping to consider whether or not this was the best stratagem to
win our country’s independence.

Such was Phan Bội Châu’s state of mind about the problem of weapons. When he received a letter from the extremist faction of Duy Tân Hội in Nghệ-an which urged him with more insistence to resolve the problem of weapons, his first reaction as recorded in the NTT was as follows:

While I admired the ardor of the militants, their minds were too fixed or reckless in pursuing one course of action: that of violence. Before I had gone abroad, I had exactly the same idea. Not until I had left the country, broadened my knowledge and learned from foreigners did I understand that the task of reconquering our country should have a truly stable foundation or else should not be attempted at all.

However, after recalling his attempt to promote the patriotism of the Vietnamese through education, Phan added: "Nevertheless, in spite of the fact that I now had some such strategy, I still could not turn my face away in indifference to the request from those in the militant faction, and so I decided that I must return to Vietnam for a second time." According to Boudarel, such an explanation indicates that Phan gave less importance to his reliance on armed insurrection than asserted later by himself in PBCNB. As a matter of fact, his stay in Hanoi and in the Tonking delta during his second clandestine return to Vietnam was longer than his exploratory trip through Kwangtung and Kwangsi, and his visit to Phồn-Xường. This may have accounted for its being likely dedicated to resolving the divergences caused by Phan Chu Trinh’s propaganda and to setting up some economic and educational plan by Phan Bội Châu.

Discrepancies between Ngọc Trung Thu and Phan Bội Châu

As can just be seen, Phan Bội Châu did attach a special importance to the problem of weapons at his first escape abroad as a representative of the Duy Tân Hội in charge of seeing to this problem. However, after his contacts in Japan and his meetings with Liang Ch'î-ch'ao Phan changed his mind and conceived a new strategy in which the problem of weapons yielded priority to the question of how to raise the economic, political, and educational level of the Vietnamese.

In this respect, we deem it useful to quote a few more passages from the NTT in addition to those previously quoted by Trần Minh Thu and Boudarel:

When I first went abroad I tried to focus my attention on the problem of weapons. But during the several months that I spent in Tokyo eating in restaurants and sleeping in hotels I came to understand more clearly the story of the Russo-Japanese War and observe the workings of Japanese politics, education, foreign relations and industry....

I had made this trip to Japan on a mission entrusted to me by the Association. Yet I left the work only half-completed. Surely I could not avoid the responsibility for the failure. Nevertheless, there were two tasks I did accomplish that might exculpate me. One was arranging for Cương Đê to go abroad.... The second was bringing the tales of all the marvelous new things I had seen and heard back to my compatriots at home. Certainly this would prove useful in making progress towards our modernization in the future. For these two reasons, I had no misgivings about returning....

One day, I came to the house of Liang Ch'î-ch'ao and during a brush-conversation I told him of my idea. He
said to me: "A strategy for the independence of your honorable country should have three main components. The first is the strength of your own countrymen in your own country. The second is aid from the two provinces Kwangtung and Kwangsi. The third is Japanese aid. Kwangtung and Kwangsi can only help you with weapons. And Japan can only help you in the area of foreign relations. Ultimately you must rely on the strength of your own country...."

Liang continued: "The most important strength is that of individual knowledge and expertise [nhan tao]. And so I think the first stratagem for your country should be to endeavor to cultivate that above all...." Thus our most urgent task was to nourish and develop our knowledge — we needed to talk about it no longer. But if we wanted nourish our skills and abilities, how were we to go about it, for the real power of education rested in the hands of the French Protectorate government? Yet in spite of all this, there was no way that we could have reconciled ourselves to having our hands tied as we waited for death. There remained only one way, an appeal to the youth of Vietnam to wake up and risk their lives in coming abroad to study. In this way, we would gain the freedom to develop our intellects and the country would quickly develop the skills it needed for the work that lay ahead....

Alas! In the task of saving the country there is nothing more urgent than developing the skills and abilities of the people. And to develop the skills and abilities of the people there would be nothing more important than having a way to organize a group of students. But having fallen into this situation, we did not have the ability or the strength to organize the students any more!...

With a situation as bad as this, there was no way I could keep myself from turning to the way of violence. I already know that violence and suicide were acts committed by those of narrow learning with no ability to plan for the future. But if circumstances force us towards suicide, then I would prefer to die a violent death. For in violence perhaps there is one chance in a thousand that one might find success. In any case, as I thought it over I realized that if I were to give up violence at that time there would be nothing more worth doing.

Concerning the last paragraph, let us note that violence was again resorted to by Phan Bội Châu only when the Đồng-du Movement had failed because of the eviction from Japan of Vietnamese Đồng-du students.

The above typical instance of divergent interpretations given to the problem of weapons viewed as a concern for Phan Bội Châu shows how difficult it would be to deal successfully with discrepancies between the NTT and the PBCNB.

With respect to the major ones resulting mostly from the unavailability of the NTT to Phan Bội Châu while he was clandestinely compiling his Nien Bien, comparative studies of these two autobiographies alone would not be enough to resolve them.

In another respect, research on Phan Bội Châu has been so far carried out on the basis of the quoc-ngu translations of his works, translations which are of varying quality and reliability. As a result, a great deal of minor but no less important discrepancies have arisen. Given such a situation, it
would be highly desirable that in a near future, basic documents in Chinese original could be made available to the researchers.

NOTES

1 Dong du, is a Sino-Vietnamese term meaning "to go East", that is to Japan, for study. It was not, to our knowledge, until about the mid-1930s that it appeared, or at least was more frequently used in quoc ngu documents dealing with Vietnamese modern history. Prior to that date, had been found instead the Sino-Vietnamese term Dong do which meant "to take a sea voyage eastward", especially "referring to a trip to Japan." (Cf. Liang Shih-ch'iu, A New Practical Chinese-English Dictionary, Hong Kong, The Far East Books, 1971, p. 507). Let us note that Dong du has been found neither in Gian yeu Han-Viet Tu dien by Dao Duy Anh (1st edition: Hue, Quan-hai Tung-thu, 1931) nor in Viet-nam Tu dien by Hoi Khai-tri Tien-duc (AFIMA) (1st edition: Hanoi, 1931-1937). Only in the former dictionary have we found instead of Dong du, another Sino-Vietnamese term Dong do in the phrase Dong do dang, defined by Dao Duy Anh as follows: "Tien goi nhung nguoí chi-si Viet-nam di du-hoc tai Nhat-Ban de mau duy tan nuoc nha" (said of Vietnamese patriotic scholars going to study in Japan with as purpose the modernization of their country). We have also found used by Huynh Thuc Khang, a contemporary of Phan Bội Châu, the terms Dong hoc (Eastern study, Eastern learning) and Phong trieu [sic; trao] Dong hoc (The Eastern Learning Movement) in some issues of his newspaper Tieng Dan, particularly in early 1935.


4 Tai lieu gop vao lich su cuc giai phong dan toc Viet Nam. Sao Nam Tu, Phan Boi Chau. Nguc Trung Thuc (Ru thi viet trong nguc), trans. by Phuong Trien (Hanoi: Quang Trung Thuc xuat, 1946); Nguc Trung Thuc (nguyen Han van cua cu Phan Boi Chau. Doi cach menh Phan Boi Chau. Ban dich cua Dao Trinh Nath. Phuc luc Ru the cua Ky Ngoai Hau Cuong-De gui vua Khai-Dinh nam 1924 (Australia: Nxb Vi Nuoc, 1983; courtesy of Ta Quoc Tuan).

5 Tran Huy Luu, "Nho lai Ong gia Ben Ngoc", NCLS, 47 (Feb. 1963), pp. 40-44; (courtesy of Prof. Vinh Sinh).

6 Diao cao cu Phan Boi Chau: Tu Phan, Lich su Ca cach mang cu Phan Sao Nam do ray cu tu viet (Chinh dung cu Sao Nam ngày bi bat ve nuoc) (Hue: Nxb Anh Minh, 1956; courtesy of Ha Mai-Phi Long).

7 Tran Minh Thu, op. cit., p. 50.

8 Chu long Thau, op. cit., pp. 40-41.

9 Georges Boudarel, op. cit., pp. 265-266.

11 PBCNB (annotated by Nguyễn Khắc Ngư), "Preface by the annotator", pp. 5-7.


14 Ibid., note 13, p. 86.

15 Chương Thâu, "Về hai tập tự truyện", p. 41; Chương Thâu, "Bàn thêm về cuốn Phan Bội Châu Niên Biểu", pp. 86-88. Let us note that in his former article, p. 41, Chương Thâu gave 1955 and 1957 as the dates of publication for the first and second editions of PBCNB translations in quốc-ngữ by Pham Trọng Điểm and Tôn Quang Phúệt, but in his later article, entitled "Tính hình nghĩa ngữ cụ Phan Bội Châu tự trước đến nay" (NCLS, 104, Nov. 1967; courtesy of the British Library, Vietnamese Section), p. 6, column 2, he gave respectively the dates 1955 and 1956.

16 Tự Phán, ed. by Anh-Minh, see note 6.

17 See note 10.


19 Chương Thâu, "Ánh hưởng cách mèn Trung Quốc đối với sự biến chuyển của tư tưởng Phan Bội Châu", NCLS, 55, p. 35.


21 Chương Thâu, article cited in note 19, pp. 39-40.

22 Article cited in note 19, Part II, NCLS, 56, pp. 37, 41.


Đông thời chúng tôi lại đăng lên Tân Việt Nam Công [our emphasis] Hien, bài chúc làm như mới chính phủ làm thời của nước Nam ở hải ngoại [our emphasis]. Tuy là cách thức sắp đặt còn sơ sài, nhưng có änner-hướng tôi dẫn khi trong nước mai làm".

The excerpt quoted above from Đào Trịnh Nhất’s quốc-ngữ translation of NTT has been translated in English as
follows by Christopher Jenkins and Trần Khánh Tuyết who have rectified the misprint "công hiến" in their translation: "From the spring of the year of the Goat (1907) to the winter of the year of the Monkey (1908) was the period during which the greatest number of students went abroad to study. The responsibility I bore during that period was difficult and we were not well organized. I had to select those who would enter school. I had to take care of public relations. I had to raise money and build solidarity within our group — alone I had to shoulder all these responsibilities. All of a sudden, it was as if I had become an envoy of Vietnam abroad as well as holding the office of Inspector-General. The well is deep but my arms short; the task is great but my skill feeble — I was incapable of continuing to bear my responsibilities."

At the same time we set up the Tân Việt Nam Cộng Hiến [Vietnamese Constitutionalist Association] as a kind of provisional government of Vietnam overseas [our emphasis]. Although the organization was a very modest one it had a very quick influence on the people's spirit at home." Cited from "Phan Bội Châu's "Prison Notes" (trans. by Christopher Jenkins and Trần Khánh Tuyết) in Reflections from Captivity, trans. by Christopher Jenkins, Trần Khánh Tuyết and Huỳnh Sanh Thông. Ed. by David G. Marr (Athens: Ohio, 1978), p. 44.

28 Tân Việt Nam Công Hiến in NTT, Việt Nam Cộng Hiến Hội in PBCNB.


This writer would like to add hereafter the following brief remark to Boudarel's note above:

A clear distinction should be made between công hiến (kung hsieh 貢獻 — meaning "to offer or contribute" (oneself to the national cause, etc.), or "contribution" — and công hiến (kung hsieh 公誼, i.e., a public charter or public constitution). If công hiến (kung hsieh) may be easily mistaken for công hiến (kung hsieh), this is because of the Chinese homonyms kung, kung, hsieh, hsieh, and the Vietnamese homonyms công, công, hiến, hiến. Under these conditions, it would be advisable to cautiously add the corresponding Chinese characters next to their Chinese and Vietnamese transliterations.

30 Nguc Trung Thu trans. by Đào Trịnh Nhất, p. 58, line 13; Nguc Trung Thu trans. by Phùng Triền, p. 39, line 1.

31 That is Tân Việt Nam Cộng Hiến Hội instead of Tân Việt Nam Cộng Hiến Hội.

32 According to Chuông Thủ, Đào Trịnh Nhất may have used for his quoc-ngu translation of NTT the 1936 Chinese basic manuscript (See Chuông Thủ, "Về hai tập từ truyện...", p. 38). However, in his preface to his quoc-ngu translation, Đào did make mention of a 1938 manuscript as follows: "Anh em Việt Nam đồng chí ở Châu từng đam mê với mọi lần. Năm 1938 lại mơ in lần nữa. Ai cũng phải nhìn nhận là tập văn cổ giả trị cả về lịch sử và văn chương. Chứng tôi dịch ra đây để công hiến dòng bao xem cho biết tiến sinh hoạt dòng cách mạng ở hai ngoài gian-nan, nguy hiến ra sao." Nguc Trung Thu trans. by Đào Trịnh Nhất (Saigon: Tân-Việt, 1958), "Thay lời từa", p. VII.

33 Öiwa Makoto, Annan minzoku undōshi gaisetsu (Tokyo: Guroria Sosaete, 1941).

34 Minami Jūjise 南十世 (s.v. Nam Thập Tự Tịnh) was the pseudonym of a Japanese shishi (s.v. chi-si; a scholar of purpose) who, according to Öiwa Makoto, translated into
Japanese the *Nguc Trung Ky* by Phan Bội Châu in 1932 (Shōwa 7th year). See Ōiwa Makoto, op.cit., pp. 6-9.

35 Tokyo: Heibonsha, 1966. Cf. p. 140 and footnote 1 on p. 142. See also p. 241 for further information about the Tấn Việt Nam Công Hiến Hội. From Nagaoka Shinjirō and Kawamoto Kunie, we have learnt the following interesting details: (1) Minami Jūjisei may have been the pseudonym of a Japanese scholar named Ga Morizō (Cf. op. cit., p. 92, note 1 and p. 279), (2) the Japanese translation of Phan Bội Châu’s *Nguc Trung Ky* dated from Shōwa 4th year (1929) instead of Shōwa 7th year as has been found in Ōiwa Makoto’s book. This writer would like to add the following noteworthy feature in the Japanese translation of *Nguc Trung Ky* by Minami Jūjisei: The subtitles given to his quoc-ngu translation of NTT are quite reminiscent of those found in the Japanese translation.

36 Trần Minh Thủ, op. cit., pp. 46-47.

37 Ibid., p. 47.

38 Ibid.

39 Ibid., pp. 48-49.

40 Ibid., p. 49.

41 Ibid.


43 Trần Minh Thủ, op. cit., p. 51.

44 Chương Thu, "Về hai tập tự truyện...", pp. 43-45.
PHAN BÔI CHÂU IN JAPAN

Shiraishi Masaya

It was before the end of the Russo-Japanese War (1904-1905) that Phan Bội Châu decided to visit Japan, where he arrived in early 1905 and started the Đồng-du Movement.

Many Japanese authors have discussed Phan Bội Châu's activities, especially those in Japan (1905-1909). The first group of writers consisted of those who had pan-Asianist tendencies. In 1935 the famous Black Dragon Society (Kokuryūkai) compiled a three-volume series of biographies of "pioneer patriots of Asia", which included Kashiwabara Buntaro's contacts with Vietnamese students. In 1941 Oiwa Makoto published a book on the "Annamese" nationalist movement, and in 1955 Komatsu Kiyoshi wrote a book in a somewhat semi-fictional style concerning Phan Bội Châu and Cường-Dệ.2

It was in the mid-1960s that more scholarly works appeared in Japan. The key pioneer publication was a book edited by Nagaoka Shinjirō and Kawamoto Kunie. The main part was the translation of Phan's several works, including Ngục Trung Thu (Prison Notes). The book also contained some important articles written by the editors: Kawamoto, focusing on Phan's two autobiographies, wrote the latter's short biography, and Nagaoka, utilizing Japanese diplomatic documents as well as Phan's earlier autobiography, discussed the Vietnamese students in Japan. With the publication of this book, several researchers became interested in the Đồng-du Movement. Terahiro Akio, a specialist of modern Chinese history, wrote an essay in 1966 on the Vietnamese nationalists' contacts with Chinese and Japanese revolutionaries.3 In 1967, Tanigawa Yoshihiko, one of Japan's pioneer scholars on Southeast Asian nationalism, wrote an article about Vietnamese intellectual movements in the early twentieth century. In this article, Tanigawa introduced, for the first time to the Japanese academic world, the Vietnamese historians' viewpoint on the subject.4

In the 1970s new factors were added to the existing conditions for the development of the study in Japan: Vietnamese books became much more easily available and a few major Western works (by Georges Boudarel and David Marr for instance)5 were introduced. In 1972, Sakai Izumi wrote a long essay on Phan Bội Châu. Shiraishi Masaya published his first article in 1975. Kawamoto also developed his study in a series of essays.6

During the period after 1979, Japanese researchers made some further remarkable progress. In 1979 Gotō Kimpei published an excellent book on the Đồng-du Movement and Shibata Shizuo discovered and introduced Phan Bội Châu's inscription commemorating Asaba Sakitarō's support of the Vietnamese students in Japan. Gotō and Kawamoto used diplomatic documents.7 Shiraishi tried an extensive cross examination among Vietnamese, Chinese, and Japanese primary source materials.8 He also studied the activities of Cường-Dệ and his supporters in the 1930s and 1940s (basing on Vietnamese and Japanese sources)9 and more recently, fully utilizing Japanese and French official documents as well as Vietnamese sources, worked on the last days of the Đồng-du Movement in Japan.10

The Japanese contribution to the study of Phan Bội Châu and his movement in Japan has been manifold. First, Japanese researchers have discovered and introduced various primary source materials — including official documents, newspaper articles, school records, tombstones and inscriptions, and personal memoirs — located in Japan. Some of the researchers have further discovered and introduced various Chinese and even French documents. Secondly, on the basis of these discoveries, they have written studies concerning various levels of contacts and relations between the Japanese and the Vietnamese in the first decade of the twentieth century, and
further looked into the Vietnamese view of Japan and the Japanese view of "Annam" and Asia in general. Thirdly, a few of them have also worked on the Franco-Japanese official relations vis-à-vis the Vietnamese nationalists in Japan. This area of study does not merely concern the history of Vietnamese nationalism, but also the worldwide history of colonial powers in East Asia during the decade following the Russo-Japanese War. Fourthly, some of the researchers have also tried studying various contacts and/or cooperation of the Vietnamese nationalists with the Chinese and other Asian émigrés in Tokyo and Yokohama. By so doing, they have sought to understand Phan Bội Châu's and other Vietnamese nationalists' idea of independence, revolution, and solidarity among the Asians.

Thus, the Japanese researchers, while providing indispensable information and verification, have developed various aspects of the study about the Đồng-du Movement.

In the following sections, the present author, summarizing what he has discussed in his previous works, will mainly analyze Phan Bội Châu's idea of Japan and his argument for the necessity of cooperation among the Asian nations.

1. PHAN BỘI CHÂU’S IDEA OF JAPAN

1. Japan as a nation of the "same culture". Why did Phan Bội Châu come to Japan? This question should be divided into two parts: Why he thought it necessary to seek foreign aid, in other words, why he considered it impossible to accomplish a revolution solely with Vietnam's domestic human and material resources; and why he chose to obtain support from Japan.

As for the first part of the question, one should take into consideration the fact that Phan had witnessed the failure of anti-French attempts which the generation of his father had experienced at the end of the nineteenth century. Phan Bội Châu, who believed that national independence could be obtained only through armed struggle, learned a lesson from his predecessors’ failure (and his own abortive plot of a revolt in 1900) that, even if he could gather men of the same determination, he would not be able to succeed in a revolution without modern weapons, which were not obtainable inside Vietnam. Thus, Phan and his colleagues concluded that it was most urgent to secure military aid from abroad.

When then did he choose Japan? It was during the latter half of 1904 that Phan entertained the idea of visiting Japan, even though by that time he had not learned of Japan's victory in the naval battle on the Japan Sea, which was only to be placed in May of the following year. According to his first autobiography Ngục Trung Thù (Prison Notes), however, he was deeply impressed by the news of the outbreak of Japan's war against Russia and the former's offensive operations at Port Arthur and in Liaotung. Phan's second autobiography Phan Bội Châu Nien Biệu (Year to Year Activities) states that it was only from the countries of the "yellow race in Asia" or of "the same culture and the same race" (đồng văn, đồng châu) that the Vietnamese could expect assistance; among them China must have been the first country to count on — if one were to consider the historical, geographical, and ethnic relations between Vietnam and China —, but China had already abandoned her suzerainty over Vietnam since the Franco-Chinese War (1884-1885) and her national power weakened day by day. In contrast, Japan was a "newly rising country of the yellow race". She seemed to have a "desire to be the master (bá chủ) of all Asia" or an "ambition" (đaudiêm) and "interests" (lớn hải) toward Vietnam.

In 1905 right after his arrival in Japan, Phan wrote a letter to Okuma Shigenobu, in which he pointed out two major reasons why Japan should help Vietnam: First, Japan, as a country of the "same race, same culture, and same continent" (đồng chủng, đồng văn, đồng châu) should have a duty (nghiêm lý) to do so; and secondly, Japan could promote her interests (lớn hải) by checking the French and the Russian expansion into the Chinese continent.

The first thing to note here concerns Phan's idea of the "same race, same culture, and same continent". This idea
contains three different levels of notions about the entity in which the Vietnamese could, or should, seek mutual contacts with their neighbours. Among these, Phan regarded the notion of the "same culture" (đồng văn) as the most important.

Đồng văn is a Sino-Vietnamese term equivalent to t'ung-wen in Chinese and dō bun Japanese. It can be translated into English as "same script" and/or "same culture". Phan belonged to the generation of Vietnamese intellectuals who were educated in literary Chinese and identified themselves as a part of the East Asian sinicized scholarship. Even though he regretted in his memoirs that he had spent half of his lifetime studying for the preparation of traditional examinations (khóa cụ), it is also true that, due to his success in this study and consequently in the examinations, he was able to read and understand Chinese literature, including the writings of K'ang Yu-wei and Liang Ch'i-ch'ao, and to acquire the prestige of being a great scholar among his compatriots.

Furthermore, when he went abroad, it was knowledge of literary Chinese that enabled him to communicate with his Chinese and Japanese colleagues through "brush conversation" (bút dân). In his memoirs, he often described how efficiently he could carry on conversation "in writing" when he met the Chinese and/or the Japanese in Hong Kong, on a boat from Shanghai to Kobe, on a train from Kobe to Yokohama, or at the Yokohama station. Even though he could not speak Chinese or Japanese, he could communicate with the people because he shared a common script with them. But it is not a mere knowledge of Chinese characters of which Phan made efficient use when he stayed in China and Japan.

Generally speaking, in the traditional world of the Chinese script (chữ nho or hán văn), written words were not only a practical vehicle to convey meanings and information, but also had literary and aesthetic functions as well. In order to be a man of culture in the traditional sense, a scholar must have a profound and comprehensive grasp of Chinese classical literature and historical allusions. He should have sufficient vocabulary and phraseology and be able to manipulate them in proper contexts. In addition, he should be a good calligraphist.

Phan was a qualified man of culture in this respect. Owing to his talents and accomplishments, he was warmly accepted and highly regarded by influential Chinese and Japanese. In his memoirs, for instance, he proudly recalled that when he met Okuma Shigenobu and Inukai Tsuyoshi for the first time, his written words deeply impressed them as well as Kashiwabara Buntarō, who was present there; and that he complied with a request by Mrs. Inukai for writing on her fan. Prior to that, when he met Liang Ch'i-ch'ao in Yokohama, his conversation in writing moved Liang so strongly that the latter agreed to publish his manuscript of Việt Nam vong quốc sử (History of the Loss of Vietnam). To recapitulate, Phan was a man of culture in the world of classical Chinese, and owing to his knowledge and accomplishments in this field, he was able to communicate smoothly with the Chinese and the Japanese. This personal experience helped him to further confirm his feeling that he was a member of the sinicized cultural club.

In an essay entitled Ai Việt Diêu Điền (Grief over Vietnam and Condolence for Yunnan; 1907), Phan wrote that among Vietnam's neighbours, Siam, which was located to the west of the Mekong river, was clearly separated from Vietnam, because "it completely differs from our Vietnam in language and script", and Cambodia, which had been destroyed by the French and whose ethnic stock had been extinct, now hardly deserves the name of "our neighbouring country". Therefore, Phan continued, "we have no other neighbours than Kwangtung and Yunnan in the area between the island of Poulo Condore in the South and the mountains of Wuling in the North". Here, Phan clearly divided the nations of the "same continent" into two parts, i.e. the sinicized nations and the others; and evidently identified his nation as a part of the former, namely the nations of the "same script/culture".

2. Phan Bội Châu: A Social Darwinist. In 1903 or 1904, a few years before his departure for Japan, Phan wrote an essay entitled Lưu Cầu Huyết Lễ Tận Thải (New Letter with Blood and Tears on the Ryūkyūs). The original text, unfortunately, has
been lost, but according to his autobiographies, he wrote this essay in order to alarm his compatriots about the fact that the Vietnamese nation, which had already lost her sovereignty, was being destroyed by the French, just as the Ryūkyūs had been completely annexed by Japan.²⁴

Phan also recalled in his memoirs that around 1900 he read various Chinese "new books" (tân thư), among which were the Trung Đông Chiến Ký and the Mẫu Thần Chính Biên Ký.²⁵ The first book, the full title of which in Chinese transliteration must have been Chung-Tung Chan-chí Pen published in 1896 or 1897, described the 1894-1895 war between China (Chung) and Japan (Tung). The second book, written by Liang Ch'i-ch'ao, mentioned the fact that after losing the war, China had to cede Taiwan and a huge amount of indemnities to Japan.²⁶

In this way, well before leaving Vietnam for Japan, Phan had known of the fact that Japan, an Asian country of the yellow race, had fought and/or annexed its neighbours that belonged to the "same race" and the "same continent". Despite this knowledge, why then did he decide to go to Japan to seek military aid? Kawamoto, in his article published in 1972,²⁷ raised this puzzling question; but the present writer did not completely agree with him, and developed arguments, in a series of articles, in the context of social Darwinism.²⁸

Social Darwinist ideas were introduced to Vietnamese intellectuals around 1900 through Chinese literature, and had a great influence on Phan as well as on his contemporaries.²⁹

For example, Phan made the following arguments in a pamphlet entitled Hậu Ngoại Huyệt Thư Sổ Biên (Letter Inscribed in Blood from Abroad, Part I; 1907). First, just as the former example of Lâm Ẩp and Chỉm Thánh (the countries of the Chams which were destroyed by the Vietnamese) showed, "it is not rare that a nation disappears completely". "In this light, it is quite possible that the Vietnamese will follow the same path and will be annihilated, unless they are quickly awakened". Secondly, "the French are systematically trying to stamp out the Vietnamese, but for that purpose, they do not apply a plain policy of massacre, but a more cunning method of aggravating the Vietnamese 'stupidity and weakness' (ngu nhục) and killing them slowly". Thirdly, "if the Vietnamese looked on idly, then they must be totally destroyed, because only those who strengthen themselves can save themselves."³⁰

These arguments clearly show that Phan was a social Darwinist.³¹ The example of the Chams which he cited here is evidently equivalent to that of the Ryūkyūs to which he referred in the earlier essay. In short, Phan understood that the Chams and the Ryūkyūs were destroyed because they were losers in the relentless struggle for survival, and he feared that the Vietnamese would also share the same fate in the near future. This, however, does not necessarily mean that Phan was a believer in Darwinistic fatalism, fatalism in the sense that the French were racially superior in nature to the Vietnamese and therefore the latter must be inevitably destroyed by the former. He instead appreciated social Darwinism as a positive theory to explain that a nation's present strength was nothing but the result of its historical development and therefore any nation could alter its lot by improving and developing its wisdom and power. In other words, a nation's survival would depend on its own efforts.³²

This argument also led Phan to conclude that should the Vietnamese fail to improve themselves, they then would be annihilated by France. In that case, the result would have stemmed from their own faults, and they should not resent French cruelty but blame themselves. "Even if the Vietnamese were annihilated," Phan plainly concluded, "I would not dare to think ill of the French."³³

As a result of his social Darwinist view, Phan did not hesitate to choose Japan as a country to rely on, despite his knowledge that Japan had defeated and annexed "its brother countries". He hoped his nation would avoid the same fate as that of the Chams and the Ryūkyūs, and to identify it with a strong and successful Japan. His nation, however, would never become as powerful as was Japan, should the people sit idly. They must try hard and look for their way. To achieve this aim, according to Phan, the first thing was to start a movement to
Phan Bội Châu's Hải ngoại huyệt thư (1906) and its first page
(From Gotō Shimpei, Nihon no naka Betonamu and Nagaoka Shinjiro and Kawamoto Kunie, eds. Betonamu bōkokushi hoka)

Copy of Phan Bội Châu's letter to Japan's Foreign Minister Kamura Jutarō (1855-1911)
(From Gotō Shimpei, Nihon no naka no Betonamu)
study in Japan.

In the Hải Ngoại Huyết Thư Tục Biện (Letter Inscribed in Blood from Abroad, Part II; 1907), Phan wrote explicitly: "In this age when strong powers are competing against each other and the world is engaged in a struggle for survival, we would be a loser unless we absorb civilization from abroad, acquire sympathy from a strong neighbour, and pit our small nation against a big enemy." 14 "A strong neighbour" here is Japan, "a big enemy" is France, and to "absorb civilization" is to study in Japan.

3. Japan as a Civilized Nation. Phan Bội Châu came to Japan in order to seek military aid. 15 However, through contacts with Liang Ch’i-ch’ao and several influential Japanese, he soon realized that he could not easily achieve this goal, because, first, Japan, exhausted by the war against Russia, had neither capacity nor willingness to fight the French, and second, Phan’s group at home, which did not have sufficient men of talents (nhân tài) nor a solid organization, had no possibility of succeeding in an anti-French revolution, even if they were able to obtain weapons. Thus, Phan gave up his original plan and instead started a movement to invite Vietnamese youth to come to Japan to be trained as future cadres for revolutionary activities, and to establish the headquarters of a revolutionary organization in Tokyo. 16

The main purpose of the Đông-du Movement was to create young and capable men of revolution. In other words, Phan was strongly interested in military education. 17 However, he gradually acknowledged the fact that there were more important factors than the mere military strength that had made Japan a powerful and successful nation. These factors were, in a word, what made Japan a "civilized" nation. 18

In various articles which Phan wrote during his stay in Japan and also in his autobiographies, he admired Japan as a developed and civilized nation, which had reached the same level as that of Western Europe and the Unites States, and contrasted it with miserable and backward Vietnam. 19

Why, then, did he admire Japan and contrast it with Vietnam? Was it only to lament the underdevelopment of his country? Evidently not.

To discuss this question, I will begin with an examination of Phan’s ideas on development. In the first chapter of Việt Nam Quốc Sử Khảo (An Inquiry into the History of Vietnam; 1908), Phan, citing Western ethnologists’ theories, stated that all human societies were following a linear path of development from the stage of animals (động vật), through those of barbarians (đồ man) and civilizing process (khai hóa), to the stage of civilized state (văn minh). In this evolutionary path, according to Phan, Vietnam had entered the stage of civilizing process only for a few years and might reach the "great epoch" in several decades, just as Japan had reached the climax of civilization (văn minh) forty years after the Restoration (duy tàn). 20

Thus it is evident that Phan believed in a linear and monistic evolution of civilization. 21 He agreed that Vietnam was a backward country, while Japan and Western Europe were developed and civilized. But his intention here never was to envy the developed countries and lament the miserable state of Vietnam. Instead, he maintained that Vietnam must and could follow and catch up with Japan and Europe. But how?

In order to realize that, Vietnam must undergo a duy tàn. In the pamphlet Tên Việt Nam (The New Vietnam; 1907), Phan depicted an image of Vietnam after duy tàn: the country would be rich and strong and the people would enjoy democracy and a developed civilization. While for the Japanese duy tàn (ishin in Japanese) meant the restoration of imperial rule after the overthrowing of the Tokugawa Shogunate, duy tàn for the Vietnamese meant the future recovery of national independence through armed struggle against the French. 22

How then should the Vietnamese attain this goal? Phan indicated to his compatriots about the first urgent task to undertake. In Khuyên Quốc Dân Tộc Trợ-Du Học Văn (An Appeal to the Nation to Support Financially Students Studying Abroad; 1905), he referred to a great gap currently existing
between Japan and Vietnam, and stated: "If you study the history of renovation (dựu tần) in Meiji Japan, you can clearly understand that the Japanese have been aware of the fact that they could not have achieved a great success without sending students abroad to develop the people's knowledge (đần trí) and cultivate men of talents (nhân tài). At the beginning in Japan, there was only Yoshida Shōin, but he was soon followed by hundreds and eventually thousands of Yoshida Shōin." Since Vietnam was as large and populated as Japan was, Phan continued, there was no reason to consider that Vietnam was unable to do what Japan had accomplished during and after the duy tần. "Why do our compatriots," he asked, "shrink from the first task of renovation (duy tần) tried by Yoshida Shōin?" Yoshida Shōin was a famous scholar in the late Tokugawa era who educated many heroes of the Meiji Restoration, but he himself was arrested and executed before the Restoration because of his abortive attempt to illegally get out of the country to study in the United States.

In summary, Phan appealed to his countrymen to join him to study in Japan, and regarded the Đông-du Movement as a first step of renovation (dựu tần) in the civilizing process (khai hòa), which would eventually develop Vietnam to reach the level of a civilized state (văn minh) that Japan and Europe already actually enjoyed.44

II. PHAN BÔI CHÂU'S CONTACTS WITH THE YUNNANSE NATIONALISTS IN JAPAN

During his stay in Japan, Phan had various levels of contacts with Japanese as well as Chinese and other Asian émigrés, among them were Yunnanese nationalists.

In his memoir Year to Year Activities, Phan frequently mentioned his contacts with them, and according to my careful research of Japanese and Chinese primary source materials, his description in the memoir is almost correct except for several inaccuracies, especially with regard to dating.45 In this short section, however, I shall omit a detailed description and confine myself to an examination of the common ideas Phan and his friends from Yunnan shared in their mutual contacts.

The main question to be discussed here is why they did have close contacts with one another in Tokyo. The first apparent reason for this is the geographical closeness between Vietnam and Yunnan. Phan expected to utilize Yunnan in the future as a route through which to smuggle himself into his home country and ultimately as a base from which to send his soldiers to attack the French colonialists on Vietnamese territory. For the Chinese in general and the Yunnanese in particular, Vietnam, especially its northern part, Tonkin, was important as a route and as a revolutionary base through and from which they could gain access to the southern provinces in China.46 Thus, the geographical factor was significant, but it was not the single reason to join the Vietnamese and the Yunnanese.

One of more important and deeper reasons was their common recognition of the international circumstances under which their home country and province were placed. Vietnam was a French colony, and Yunnan was threatened by French (as well as British) imperialism. In other words, they had a common enemy, the French. At the same time, this fact also implies that they encountered similar difficulties. Vietnam had lost her sovereignty, and Yunnan was facing the crisis of being colonialized.

The Yunnanese nationalists published a periodical Yunnan in Tokyo. Its issues contained a substantial number of articles concerning Vietnam (and Burma).47 Their concerns about Vietnam (and Burma) had two aspects: First, Vietnam (and Burma) as a colonialist base from which the French (or the British) would invade Yunnan; and second, as a past example to demonstrate how they conquered Asian countries.

As for the first aspect, one article in the Yunnan mentioned: "In 1883 Vietnam was destroyed by the French and as a result Yunnan has faced a danger just as lips being gone teeth are cold. In 1885 Burma surrendered herself to the British and consequently Yunnan has faced a threat from what is as far
away as a bull's body is from its horns."  

The Yunnanese nationalists were especially concerned about the future construction of railroads which would connect Yunnan directly with Vietnam and Burma. "The French have obtained a right to extend the Annam-Tonkin Railway to Yunnanfu; and the British have frequently made a claim for the concession [of land to construct] the Yunnan-Burma Railway.... A few years ago, when the East China Railway was constructed, three Eastern provinces in China became a battlefield. In the same vein, if the Yunnan-Vietnam and the Yunnan-Burma Railways are completed, the Yunnanese cannot easily sleep even a single night."  

As for the second aspect of their concern about Vietnam, an article in the Yunnan said: "The past example of failure in [China's] three Eastern provinces and Vietnam's present state of misery will soon be repeated in Yunnan province as well." Also in a pamphlet entitled Alarmed Yunnan, the author wrote: "In this pamphlet I will describe the history of the Vietnamese lost sovereignty (wang-kuo in Chinese; vong quóc in Vietnamese) and the present state of the French rule in Vietnam in order to foresee the future destiny of our Yunnanese province."  

It is clear from these descriptions that the Yunnanese nationalists felt that their home province and Vietnam shared a common fate. This recognition led them to regard their province and "Annam" as "suffering from the same sickness" (t'ung-ping; Đông bênh).  

Phan expressed a similar opinion in his Grief over Vietnam and Condolence for Yunnan, which was first published in the sixth issue of the Yunnan (1907). He recalled the long history during which "both Yunnan and Vietnam were ruined and destroyed because of the "same sickness": Soldiers of the Mongolian Yuan, Chinese Ming and Manchurian Ch'ing dynasties all invaded Vietnam after pacifying Yunnan. And at present, both Vietnam and Yunnan were being destroyed by the Europeans.  

Needless to say, the common recognition of "fellow-sufferers" is a logic which should not be necessarily confined to the relations between Vietnam and Yunnan, but could be extended to all the relations among countries/regions which had been or were being colonized. However, the Vietnamese and the Yunnanese had an idea that they had a special relationship of mutual reliance between "lips and teeth" or between "a cart and poles"; and therefore "once the lips are gone, the teeth are cold". Here the lips meant Vietnam and the teeth meant Yunnan.  

In this way, Phan and his Yunnanese friends shared a realization that their country and province had a common enemy; they were faced with the same fate and therefore suffered from the same "sickness". Because of this common realization, they paid special attention to and had maintained close contacts with one another in Tokyo.  

Furthermore, from the above realization, Phan reached the conclusion that the Vietnamese and the Yunnanese should support one another. In the same essay cited above, he thus held that in order to resolve the crisis, the Yunnanese should have great heroes like Napoleon and Alexander the Great, and the Vietnamese would help them by attacking the French; but, should this kind of military resistance be difficult at present, the Yunnanese should at least "cultivate the people's knowledge (dân tri) by opening schools, encourage the people's mind (dân tâm) by developing military troops and industrial enterprises; stop thinking of depending on others, promote their self-reliance spirit, and secretly associate with the Vietnamese to conclude an offensive and defensive alliance... Thus, whenever the international circumstances change [in the future], the South [i.e., Vietnam] and the North [i.e., Yunnan] will become intimate brothers: While the Vietnamese grip the French throat, the Yunnanese hit their back: while the Yunnanese restrain the French arms, the Vietnamese hold their shoulders. [By so doing,] the Yunnanese will maintain and the Vietnamese will recover their independence."
Phan’s message here was very clear. But, what about the opinions of his Yunnanese counterparts?

One of them noted in an article which appeared in the Yunnan that “We cannot maintain China, unless we preserve Yunnan; we cannot maintain Yunnan, unless we recover Burma and Vietnam.” The author implicitly accepted the idea that all suffering countries/provinces should help each other so that they could survive the crisis.

Another author, however, displayed a slightly different opinion in a declaration of the “Do-or-Die society”, a Yunnanese nationalist organization: “We should help Annam, Burma, and India to recover their independence by sending our five million soldiers with a do-or-die spirit, after our province has adequately achieved people’s knowledge, people’s spirit, and people’s power [min chih, min chi, and min li in Chinese; dân trí, dân khí, and dân lực in Vietnamese].” It should be noted here that the author only mentioned a one-way support from the Yunnanese to their neighbouring countries, but not one of mutual support.

Another Yunnanese went further in an article published in the Yunnan: “We have to cancel the treaty concerning the French and the British concessions of seven mines [in the province], retrieve the French concession of the Yunnan-Vietnam Railway, construct by ourselves the Yunnan-Burma and the Yunnan-Vietnam Railways, establish various systems of local self-government, education and universal conscription, develop many industries, and evict the British and French from the Hung and Hungpang Rivers. In addition, we have to retrieve Annam and recover Burma.” The view in the last sentence of this statement is echoed by another author, who wrote: “We have let others occupy Annam and Burma.”

Thus, although the Yunnanese nationalists thought that they had common enemies (the French and the British) and shared a common fate with the Vietnamese and other neighbours, they showed an ambivalent attitude concerning the problem of their “solidarity” with the adjacent nations which suffered from the “same sickness”. Why, then, did they display this ambivalence?

One possible answer to this question is that the Yunnanese nationalists were very Chinese in the sense that they were not free from sino-centricism. Phan seems to have been aware of this; he emphasized in the essay cited above that, in the long history, it was always Yunnan which had been first pacified by invaders and it was only in recent history that Vietnam was conquered by foreigners prior to Yunnan. By arguing in this fashion, Phan implicitly told his Yunnanese counterparts that Vietnam was traditionally by no means inferior to Yunnan.

Another possible answer is that the Yunnanese nationalists were social Darwinists, who believed that any nation’s existence mainly depended on its own efforts to survive and therefore a nation without the people’s will and capacity to make self-efforts could not survive, even if it obtained support and alliance from outside. From this point of view, whether a nation became a loser or a victor was entirely its own responsibility. Therefore, social Darwinists in an extreme case tended not to be sympathetic towards the peoples who, due to the lack of their own efforts, lost their own country. Sometimes the Yunnanese nationalists perceived that the Yunnan province should be different from Annam or Burma, which had lost their sovereignty and was menaced by the crisis of the nation’s total extinction. In other words, only where the peoples with the “same sickness” proved to have sufficient will and capacity to make self-efforts, would their mutual help and collaboration become meaningful.

In light of the above, the Yunnanese image of Vietnam and the Vietnamese was ambivalent. On the one hand, they knew personally that Phan and his followers in Japan were men of strong will and sincere purpose. Yet on the other hand, they regarded Vietnam as a nation which had lost its sovereignty because of its own fault or “sickness”.

Furthermore, the social Darwinist view of nationalism did not necessarily exclude an expansionist idea. On the contrary, it tended to regard a nation’s expansion even as an
evidence of her success in the contest for existence. As a matter of fact, the young nationalists from Yunnan dreamed of future Southward expansion. In the same vein, Phan and his compatriot intellectuals praised their nation’s past glory as displayed by the historical fact that Vietnam had conquered its Southern neighbours. Here again Phan and the Yunnanese nationalists shared a similar idea concerning nationalism; this fact explains why they had an ambivalent image of Japan, as we shall see next.

On the one hand, they regarded Japan as a developed and civilized nation, whose level of development had reached that of Western Europe and North America, and whose example they should learn. In Section 1-(3), we have already discussed how positively Phan viewed Japan. In this section, we have to look only into the views of the Yunnanese nationalists. The following statement is made in an essay published in the 19th issue of the *Yunnan*: "In pre-Meiji Japan the people’s knowledge was backward and their industries were underdeveloped. Since their success in the Restoration (ishin), however, the Japanese have been no longer inept but become smart. In the past, they were not enlightened. But once they awake, they become far different from what they used to be. On the contrary, the people in our country [China] now suffer from the sickness because they prefer inactivity to endeavour. Unless they revitalize their spirit and abandon their old customs, it will be difficult to attain the prosperity that Japan and Western Europe are enjoying."  

This is the positive side of their image of Japan. But, they held a negative image as well. In the same essay, the same author noted: "The French declare to respect Annam’s independence, while the Japanese declare to maintain Korea’s. In actuality, however, they placed the kings in captivity, oppress the people, usurp the administration, and restrict freedom in Annam and Korea respectively. Those are the real contents of their declaration of preserving independence. Now, the Franco-Japanese and the Russo-Japanese treaties promise to maintain peace in China. This means, however, that they will preserve our country, just as they have preserved Annam and Korea."

As we have seen in Section 1-(2), Phan was also aware of the Japanese aggressiveness towards their neighbouring nations.

To recapitulate, The Yunnanese nationalists as well as Phan held an ambivalent image of Japan. This ambivalence, however, was not necessarily self-contradictory to the social Darwinist point of view. Japan and the Western powers were successful in the competition for existence. They were so rich and strong that they inevitably expanded their influence over the rest of the world. Weak and poor nations, on the other hand, were faced with the crisis of being ruined. If they wished to survive this crisis, they had to make their own efforts. Self-help was essential; only after that would mutual support among the weak nations be meaningful. What were, then, the efforts that were to be undertaken? These were the efforts to make their country and nation stronger and wealthier, just as Japan and other great powers had done.

III. PHAN BỘI CHÂU AND THE CHINESE AND JAPANESE ANARCHISTS

According to his memoirs, Phan joined an organization called the Đông-Â Đông-Minh Hội (Tōa Dōmeikai in Japanese pronunciation), or the League of East Asia, in Tokyo in October of 1908. The League consisted of Chinese revolutionaries and Japanese socialists, as well as Indian, Korean, and Filipino activists residing in Japan.  

Students of Vietnamese nationalism, relying exclusively on Phan’s memoirs, have concluded that the League was created when the Japanese authorities, under pressure through French diplomatic channels, began to suppress the Vietnamese movement in Japan, causing Phan to become disillusioned with Japan. Thus Phan, realizing that they could not rely on Japan any longer, now inclined towards the Chinese revolution and
Phan Bội Châu and the Đồng-du movement placed his hope on the people of the "same sickness". However, according to the present writer's research of Japanese and Chinese primary source materials, four of the most important participants in the League, whom Phan has listed in his memoirs had either left Japan or were in prison by the fall of 1908. Chang Chi, afraid of being arrested, left Japan in February. Ching Mei-chu went back to China well before the moon festival of 1908. Ōsugi Sakae and Sakai Toshihiko were sent to jail in September 1908 and were not released until 1910. In addition, the Japanese authorities began their surveillance against and interference with the Vietnamese émigrés only at the beginning of 1909. In summary, Phan's memoirs are not consistent with the information revealed by Japanese and Chinese sources, as far as the dates and the sequence of events are concerned. The next question, then, should be whether or not did Phan join an organization identical to the League, and if the answer is yes, when and why.

Various Japanese and Chinese sources indicate that Japanese and Chinese activists in Tokyo established an organization called Ashū Washinkai, or the Asian Friendship Association, in the fall of 1907, in which the Vietnamese as well as Indians, Koreans, and Filipinos were also involved. This organization was quite identical to the League mentioned in Phan's memoirs, in terms of its participants. Furthermore, a Chinese source suggests that the Association was also called the Tùng-Ya Wang-kuo T'ung-meng Hui (Đồng-Á Vong-Quốc Đồng-Minh Hội in Vietnamese pronunciation), or the League of the East Asian Lost Countires. Many Japanese and Chinese sources also indicate that a number of Chinese revolutionaries in Japan had close contacts with Japanese socialists and Indian activists during the latter half of 1907, but their activities declined by mid-1908 because of their internal antagonism and the Japanese authorities' suppressive policy.

Thus, it is reasonable to conclude that Phan's League was quite identical to the Ashū Washinkai and that it was established in the fall of 1907 (but not in the tenth month of 1908), and its activities stopped by mid-1908. In other words, Phan decided to join the League well before Japan's policy turned against the Vietnamese émigrés. Therefore, the reason which Phan has suggested in his memoirs for his decision to participate in the League is inaccurate. We should seek other reasons.

The year 1907 saw a crucial change in official Japanese policy towards her Asian neighbours and the Western colonial powers, which drew criticism from émigrés from other Asian nations residing in Japan. Through a series of treaties with the Western powers, the Japanese government publicly displayed its willingness to cooperate with the colonialists at the expense of the Asian peoples. Two years earlier, after the Russo-Japanese War, many Asian nationalists tended to regard Japan as the champion of the yellow race against the white colonialists. Yet in 1907, the Chinese revolutionaries, Indian and Korean activists, as well as the Japanese socialists, increasingly expressed the idea that Japan was not a friend of Asia but a "common enemy", who belonged to the white imperialist camp. By the summer of 1907, the Chinese, Indian, and Japanese activists were in close contact with one another, as well as with the Korean, Filipino, and Vietnamese émigrés.

Liu Shih-p'e, the de facto conceptual and theoretical promoter in the creation of the Ashū Washinkai, published an article entitled "On the Present Situation in Asia" in the periodical T'ien I in 1907. This periodical was an organ of the Chinese feminist movement in Japan and was jointly edited by Liu and his wife, Ho Chen.

In this article, Liu stated that "Today in the world, the power of the strong prevails, and Asia has been the place where the white powers display their force. India suffers from the British rule, Annam from the French, Korea from the Japanese, and the Philippines from the Americans. With regard to the situation in Asia, whereas the weak nations fall into a wretched state, the Japanese government has alone become the common enemy of Asia. Now the white powers are afraid that their Asian colonies would either rise in revolt or be occupied by Japan. They thus want to control their Asian possessions by utilizing
Japanese military force. For instance, Britain tries to control thoroughly the fate of India, by concluding the Anglo-Japanese Alliance and allying with Japan; France wants to control Annam by signing the Franco-Japanese Agreement. At the same time, France and Russia, in league with Japan through the Franco-Japanese and Russo-Japanese Agreements, plan to divide China...Thus, the white powers attempt to maintain their possessions in Asia by gaining Japanese support, while Japan plans, by allying herself with the white powers, to expand her trade with India and Cochinchina and to consolidate her position in Korea and Southern Manchuria. In addition, recently Japan, in opposition to the United States, desires to occupy the Philippines.... In short, Japan is not merely the Korean enemy, but the common enemy of India, Annam, China, and the Philippines as well.... Therefore, to maintain peace in Asia, we should not only throw off the power of the whites, but also the Japanese oppression of Asia by brute force, since imperialism is the most harmful kind of vermin in the present world. On the basis of the present situation in Asia and judging the future of the Asian weak nations, I believe that they can certainly throw the strong force away only if they unite together. And on the very day when the weak nations defeat the strong force, the home governments of the strong nations will be also overthrown and the world peace will be established."77

Chang Ping-lin, another important participant of the Ashū Washinkai, published an article in mid-1907 in which he criticized Okuma Shigenobu who told the Indians in Tokyo not to revolt against the British rulers.9 In another essay published in early 1908, he further cited a comment made by his Indian friend who was also a Washinkai member: "Since the Russo-Japanese War, the Japanese have increased their arrogance.... Before Japan became powerful, Asia still maintained peace, in spite of small conflicts. But now the situation is entirely different.... Who draws white power to Asia and despises the peoples of the same race?"80

The Japanese socialists also wrote in their organ in mid-1907: "How strange! The Japanese leaders waged the
greatest war on record under the pretext of preserving Chinese territorial integrity and the Open-door principle. Nevertheless, today they are negotiating with the other powers to divide Chinese resources. The powers' pledge to maintain peace means nothing but their desire to ally with each other and share the weak nations' market, isn't it?"81 Thus, the Chinese and Indian activists as well as the Japanese socialists by mid-1907 had a clear idea that, after the Russo-Japanese War, Japan became a member of colonialist club and thus the "common enemy" of the Asian peoples. They paid attention to the fact that Japan signed a series of treaties with the white powers in 1907.

The Yunnanese nationalists with whom Phan was in close contact also expressed a similar opinion. They contended that after the Russo-Japanese War, the strong powers signed agreements with each other and, abandoning an old policy of individually managing East Asia, adopted a new policy of managing it jointly.82 They also stated: "When the Franco-English Agreement was concluded, the condition for dividing Yunnan was prepared. Now that the Franco-Japanese Agreement is signed, the attempt to divide Yunnan will soon be carried out."83

It should be noted that, by mid-1907, as Phan entered into intimate contacts with those who were increasingly critical of the Japanese policy towards Asia and the white colonial powers, it is reasonable to conclude that Phan shared the same sentiment. For him, in particular, the Japanese conclusion of an agreement with the French had a serious implication, since this fact demonstrated clearly Japan was a friend of France and not an enemy. As a matter of fact, Phan often mentioned in his memoirs that the Japanese government suppressed the Vietnamese movement in Japan because it had signed the Franco-Japanese Agreement.84 In this way, Phan realized that he could not rely on Japan any longer, and instead placed his hope on the cooperation between peoples of the "same sickness" by mid-1907, i.e., well before the Japanese government began to suppress the Vietnamese students in Japan. He joined the League of East Asia or the Ashū Washinkai and had intimate contacts...
with the Asian émigrés as well as the Yunnanese nationalists, because he was disappointed with Japan for signing a treaty with the French in June 1907.

By 1907, the term "same sickness" had become a key word in the arguments among the Chinese for the need of solidarity among the oppressed Asian peoples. Many essays in the Min-pao, the organ of the Chinese revolutionaries in Tokyo, referred to this notion. One of them wrote that all of the "brother nations in Asia", except Japan, were suffering from the foreign rule and therefore the peoples of the "same sickness" had a "mutual sympathy". "We know that the Indians and Annamese [in Tokyo] have a sincere mind," the same essay continued, "[t]herefore we can place our hopes and mutual friendship [ho-ch'in in Chinese; washin in Japanese] among the Asian peoples so that we can acquire a great success in the future."13

We have already discussed in the previous section that Phan and his friends from Yunnan also used the term "same sickness". The Chinese revolutionaries who were active members of the Asū Washinkai had another set of key words when they argued about the international circumstances in East Asia; those were the opposing terms "universal principles" (kung-li in Chinese; công lý in Vietnamese; and kōri in Japanese) and "brute force" (ch'iang-ch'uan; cương quyền; kyōken). "Universal principles" stood for the righteousness of the oppressed peoples, and "brute force" for the suppression by imperialists.14

Liu Shih-p'ei wrote in mid-1907: "Governments of the civilized nations, declaring outwardly to respect morality and inwardly to observe universal principles..., exercise brute force and despise weak nations."15 The same author also wrote in late 1907: "Today in the world the brute force prevails, and Asia has been the place where the white powers display their brute force..."; "Ōkuma, a Japanese count, told the Indians to obey and collaborate with the British. It is the extreme case in which the colonialists display their brute force and neglect universal principles."16

Another author wrote in mid-1908 that India was conquered by the British and Annam by the French, just as China was occupied by the Manchurians; thus, "universal principles die out, while brute force is rampant."19

Not only the Chinese members of the Washinkai, but the Yunnanese nationalists also used the same terms: "Since the blood-and-iron and imperialist policy started, there has been only brute force and no universal principles exist in the world."19 Phan also used these contrasting terms in his memoirs19 as well as in his letter sent to Foreign Minister Komura in 1909.20

It is logical to argue that a few years after Phan came to Japan to seek Japanese assistance, he finally abandoned his reliance on Japan and turned to the building of cooperation among the nationalists of suffering Asia. In seeking Japanese assistance, he stressed the common cultural background, ethnicity, and geographical proximity between Vietnam and Japan, expressed in the phrase the "same culture, same race, and same continent." His shift in emphasis to the same "sickness" demonstrates a shift in his identification of the fate of his nation from that of a powerful and wealthy Japan which exercised "brute force" to that of oppressed and suffering Asia, for which "universal principles" stood.

The Asū Washinkai which Phan joined was an organization of those Asian nations. Its constitution, written by Chang Ping-lin, declared: "The object of the organization should be to oppose imperialism and recover independence of the Asian nations which have lost sovereignty," and "its membership should be open to all the Asians — except those who advocate expansionism, no matter which principle they hold, ranging from nationalists, republicans, socialists to anarchists."21

Thus Phan shared various opinions with revolutionaries from other countries, as well as Japanese socialists who were members of the Asū Washinkai. This does not necessarily mean, however, that he agreed with them in every respect.

At this juncture, it is worth mentioning that the Japanese and Chinese participants in the Washinkai were deeply influenced by anarchist ideas. Left-wing Japanese socialists,
especially Kōtoku Shūsui and Ōsugi Sakae, were fascinated by anarchism during the years of 1906-1907. While they adopted a radical policy for their own movement, they also tried to inspire Asian revolutionaries in Japan with anarchist ideas. In an article discussing the task of revolutionaries in Japan from the Philippines, Annam, and Korea as well as from China and India, Kōtoku wrote: "So long as their movements are confined to the search for a single country's independence and a single nation's solidarity, their influence cannot be very significant. On the contrary, if revolutionary parties of Asian nations establish a great league, making no distinction of nationality and ethnicity under the banner of internationalism and socialism, then Asia in the twentieth century will be a revolutionary paradise." He also argued in another essay that the "socialist movement is an international movement without distinction of ethnicity and nationality.... Just as European socialists are working together almost in a body, socialists in Asian countries should cooperate with each other." By mid-1907 a number of Chinese revolutionaries in Japan, most notably Chang Ping-lin, Chang Chi, and Liu Shih-p'ei, were deeply influenced by anarchist ideas through their intimate contacts with Kōtoku and other Japanese socialists. They expressed their opinions in the Min-pao (the organ of the Chinese revolutionaries in Tokyo) and in the T'ien I (Liu and his wife's magazine), in which they criticized the nationalist idea of "ethic [or racist] revolution", i.e., a revolution of the Hans against the Manchurian rulers, and praised anarchism.

Why were they fascinated by anarchist ideas? The main reason was that they found in them a solution to the impasse of the social Darwinist explanation of the existing world order. In other words, they refused to accept that struggles between nations, with the stronger devouring the weaker, were inevitable.

The original advocates of social Darwinism in Europe applied their theory to explain the origins of inequality existing in a single society or nation. Chinese intellectuals in the late nineteenth century, however, understood this theory as a persuasive explanation for the origins of the difference among nations, i.e., between the stronger and wealthier and the weaker and poorer. Chinese as well as Vietnamese nationalists at the turn of this century were overwhelmingly captured by this Chinese version of social Darwinist arguments. By 1907, however, a number of Chinese nationalists in Japan encountered a new idea through their contacts with Japanese socialists who had an anarchist tendency. They consequently came to notice the evil result of the endless competition among nations for survival and find in anarchist ideas a hint to overcome the social Darwinist view of the world and to stop the cruel and relentless survival game.

In the above-mentioned article "On the Present Situation in Asia", Liu Shih-p'ei held that (1) the weak nations in Asia should simultaneously achieve independence, and that (2) they should not establish governments after succeeding in revolution. As for the second point, he explained: "Today the weak nations in Asia severely suffer from the oppression of their government or the aggression by foreign governments. Furthermore, if states exist side by side, there will inevitably occur international conflicts which cause warfare and no eternal peace will be established." In conclusion, he advocated the anarchist idea of a post-revolutionary world order: "After recovering independence, the weak nations should apply an anarchist policy to realize the principle of the people's great harmony (tai-l'ung; đai đồng; daidō) and Kropotkin's or Bakunin's idea of the world federation." The more deeply they were captured by the social Darwinist view of the present world order, the more strongly they wanted to get rid of its nightmare. In search for a solution, they derived the idea of "mutual help" from Kropotkin's arguments as related to them by Kōtoku and other Japanese. Kropotkin had argued that "mutual help" among individuals of a species plays a decisive role for its own survival vis-à-vis the harshness caused by cruel nature. He thus criticized the one-sided view of social Darwinists who merely discussed the issue of competition among members of a species. This
argument was so fascinating to Liu Shih-p'ei and other Chinese that the term "mutual help" (hsiang-hu fu-chu; túng hò phù тр; sōgo fujo) became one of their key words. As Chang Ping-lin wrote in the Constitution of the Ashū Washinkai: "The obligation of the members is to obtain independence and freedom of their nations through their mutual help," and "If one of the Asian nations undergoes revolution, the members [of the Washinkai] from other nations should practice mutual help directly or indirectly within the limits of their ability." 102

Another important argument of the Chinese anarchists was their skepticism against the evolutionary theory of civilization. Since they rejected the path that Japan and the Western powers had followed to become strong and wealthy — the result of which was the colonization of weaker nations by the latter — they finally reached a conclusion that the process of civilization is not always good. Liu Shih-p'ei maintained that as long as governments exist, the development of civilization is accompanied by the increase of suppression and inequality, because it implies, for instance, the production of improved firearms by oppressors and the availability of more rapid means to transport their soldiers to conquer foreign nations. 103

It is obvious for us now that the ideas of the Chinese anarchists were too simple, and because of the great gap between their ideas and the reality, they finally fell into an impasse: Chang Ping-lin later abandoned anarchism, and Liu Shih-p'ei turned to be a betrayer of the Chinese revolution. 104 Yet, it is worth mentioning that they were not only Phan's contemporaries, but also in close contact with him. 105 Our next question is to what extent did Phan share their ideas.

The answer to this question is that, although Phan shared the notion that Asian nations of the "same sickness" should support each other, he did not agree with the anarchist arguments. So far as his essays written during his stay in Japan and his memoirs are concerned, the present writer has not found any hint suggesting that anarchist influences upon his thought. 106 Instead, Phan was in every inch a man of strong nationalist sentiments and clung to the idea of building an independent and strong nation-state of the Vietnamese people. 107 Therefore, our conclusion is that Phan was always a nationalist who accepted a social Darwinist idea of struggle between the stronger and the weaker nations, and the evolutionary theory of civilization. Since he realized that he could not rely on Japan any longer, he instead placed his hopes on the cooperation among the weak nations in Asia, which faced the "common enemy or enemies". His ultimate goal, however, was still to restore Vietnam's independence, and to make his own nation stronger and wealthier, i.e., what Japan and the Western powers were. In this sense, as we have seen in the previous section, he shared the common opinion with the Yunnanese nationalists who were also social Darwinists.

CONCLUSION

In Section I, we have examined three aspects of Phan's views of Japan: Japan as a nation of the "same culture" to rely upon, as a strong and wealthy nation which had succeeded in the competition among nations, and as a "civilized" country whose example the Vietnamese should follow. In Section II and III, through an investigation of Phan's contacts with the Yunnanese nationalists as well as Chinese and Japanese anarchists, we have come to the conclusion that, around 1907, Phan realized that he could, and should, no longer rely upon Japan and instead placed his hope on the building of cooperation among oppressed Asian nations. This means that he made a shift of emphasis from the "same culture" to the "same sickness".

The idea of the "same culture" was one of cultural determinism. Phan, as a Vietnamese intellectual who had been educated in classical Chinese identified himself a priori as a member of the East Asian sinicized scholarship. He was warmly accepted by Chinese and Japanese scholar-politicians. His ideas were especially in consonance with the pan-Asianist aspirations of the Japanese. 108 That is one of the main reasons why he could acquire sympathy and help from Inukai, Kawashibara, and other
Japanese. On the other hand, Phan's shift to the "same sickness" implies that he identified his nation as a member of the oppressed peoples. He gradually realized that cultural determinism did not work well on the stage of international power politics and that Japan was not a friend but a "common enemy" of the oppressed Asians. He came to adopt this notion by the latter half of 1907, partly because he was shocked by Japan's signing of a treaty with the French, and partly through his contacts with the Yunnanese nationalists, as well as the Chinese and Japanese revolutionaries, who were highly critical of Japan.

Phan was, however, close to the Yunnanese nationalists and distant from the Chinese and Japanese anarchists in his ideas concerning the nation-state system and the evolutionary theory of civilization. He did not come to terms with anarchist ideas, since he was a man of strong nationalist sentiments. His notion of the need for "mutual help" among the oppressed nations, therefore, was still closely associated with his confidence in social Darwinism, and his image of Japan remained ambivalent.

ABBREVIATIONS

NB  Phan Bội Châu, Phan Bội Châu Niên Biểu or Tự Phán

NCLS  Nghiên Cứu Lịch Sử

NTT  Phan Bội Châu, Nguyễn Trung Thực

YNKCKMTL  Yunnan Kwitchou Ko-ming Tzu-liao

YNTCHC  Yunnan Tsa-chih Hsüan-chi

NOTES


3 Terahiro Akio, "Etsunen shoki minzoku o meguru Nihon to Chūgoku" (Japan and China in Vietnam’s early nationalist movement). Ōsaka Gakugei Daigaku Kyō — Jimbun Kagaku, no. 15 (1966). Terahiro’s study was the earliest attempt in Japan to make a comparison between Chinese documents and Phan’s memoirs.


5 Georges Boudarel, “Phan Bội Châu et la société vietnamienne


8 Shiraishi Masaya: "Tai-Nichiki no Phan Bội Châu (Betonamu) to Uman katsudōka no kōyū" (Interactions between Phan Bội Châu and the activists from Yunnan during the former’s stay in Japan) in *Tōyū Bunka Kenkyūjo Kyō* (Bulletin of the Institute of Oriental Culture), no. 85 (1981); "Tōyū undōki no Phan Bội Châu — To-Nichika karō Nichi-Futsu kakumeika to no kōyū made" (Phan Bội Châu during the period of the Đông-du Movement — From his arrival in Japan to his contacts with Japanese and Chinese revolutionaries) in Nagazumi Akira, ed. *Tōnan Ajia ryūgakusei to minzokushugi undō* (Overseas Southeast Asian students and the nationalist movement) (Tokyo: Gannandō, 1981); "Meiji makki no zai-Nichiki Betonamujin no Ajia shominzoku renkei no kōkomin — Tōa Dōmei Kai' naishita wa 'Ashū Washin Kai’ o megutte" (Attempts by Vietnamese in Japan to cooperate with other Asians in late Meiji — On the organization called Đông-Â Đông-Minh Hội or Ashū Washin Kai) in *Tōnan Ajia Kenkyū*, XX-3 (1982); and "Phan Bội Châu (Betonamu) to Miyazaki Tōten, Son Bun to no Nihon ni okeru sesshoku" (Phan Bội Châu’s contacts with Miyazaki Tōten and Sun Yat-sen in Japan) in Osaka University of Foreign Studies, ed., *Tai, Betonamu to Nihon* (Thailand, Vietnam, and Japan) (Osaka, 1984).


10 Shiraishi Masaya: "Tōyū undō (Betonamu) o meguru Nichi-Futsu ryōdōkyoku no taiō (I)" (Attitudes of Japanese and French authorities toward the Đông-du Movement, Part 1) in *Ōsaka Gaikokugo Daigaku Gakuhō* (Bulletin of Osaka
University of Foreign Studies), no. 73 (1987); "Iwayuru 'Jiruberu Shieu jiken,' o megutte — Tōyū undō no sono shūhen" (On the 'Gilbert Châu Affair' and the Đông-du Movement) in Tōyū Bunka Kenkyū Kyō, no. 104 (1987); "Phan Bội Châu no kokugai taikyo o megutte — Zai-Nichi Betonamujin Tōyū undō no shūhen 1" (On the deportation of Phan Bội Châu from Japan — The final stage of the Đông-du Movement, Part I) in Tōyōshi Kenkyū (Historical Studies on Asia), vol. 46, no. 2; and "Cuồng-Dề no kokugai taikyo o megutte — Zai-Nichi Betonamujin Tōyū undō no shūhen 2" (On the deportation of Cuồng-Dề from Japan — The final stage of the Đông-du Movement, Part II) in Nampō Bunka (Bulletin of Southeast Asian Studies, Tenri University), no. 14 (1987).

11 Shiraishi: "Phan Bội Châu and Japan", "Kai-me-teki chishijinshō no keisei...", "Tai-Nichiki no Phan Bội Châu...", "Tōyū undōki no Phan Bội Châu...", "Meiji makki no zai-Nichi Betonamujin...", and "Phan Bội Châu (Betonamu) to Miyazaki Tōten...".

12 NTT, pp. 12-14; NB, pp. 25ff. As for Phan's first memoirs, I have consulted the Vietnamese version published by Nxb Tấn Việt (1950), and the Japanese version in Nagaoka and Kawamoto, eds. Betonamu bōkokushi hoka, but in this essay I only refer to the pages of the former. As for his second memoirs, I have consulted mainly the original text in literary Chinese — a photocopy of which Professor Hoàng Xuân Hãn kindly gave me; but the text does not have pagination. Therefore, in this essay reference will be made to the pages in the text published by Nxb Văn Sỹ Địa (1957) and if necessary, those in the version published by Nxb Anh Minh (1956) as well.


14 NTT, p. 28.

15 NB, p. 44. As for China, NTT, p. 30 further mentions the fact that the Chinese did not help the Vietnamese leaders of the 1885-1886 uprising who went to China to seek aid.

16 NTT, p. 30. The Japanese version, quite different, reads: "Japan seemed to have a will to promote development of all Asia." It should be noted that this Japanese translation was first published in 1929.

17 NB, p. 44.

18 See the Vietnamese translation in "Hai văn kiến ngoài giao..." in NCLS, p. 90. See also Marr, Vietnamese Anticolonialism, pp. 113-114. Prior to his arrival in Japan, Phan had already used the term Đông-văn in his letter to the governor of Kwangtung ("Hai văn kiến ngoài giao", loc. cit.).

19 NTT, pp. 11-12. See also Siraishi, "Kai-me-teki chishijinshō...", pp. 561-564.

20 NTT and NB, passim. See also Marr, Vietnamese Anticolonialism, chap. 5.
21 NB, pp. 55-57.

22 NB, pp. 54-55, 57-58; NTT, pp. 39-40. See also Liang's foreword for Phan's *Việt Nam vong quốc sù* (Chinese text in *Chung-Fa chan-cheng* [The Franco-Chinese War, 1884-1885], published by Jenmin Ch'upanshe, Shanghai, 1961). The Vietnamese translation published by Tao Đàn (1969), based on the 1926 version of another Chinese text, omits most of this foreword. Incidentally, this foreword was originally published in Liang's periodical *Hsin-min T'ung-pao*, III-19 (1905).

The *Việt Nam vong quốc sù* (Yüeh-nan wu-kwo shih in Chinese) was widely read by contemporary Chinese activists, including Sun Yat-sen and Sun Chiao-jen; a part of it was reprinted in the Chinese periodical *Yunnan*, no. 6 (1907).

23 Chinese text of *Ai Việt Điều Điển* in YNTCHC, p. 716.


25 NB, pp. 32, 52.

26 See Onogawa Hidemi, *Shimmatsu seiji shisō kenkyū* (Study on the Political Thoughts in the late-Ch'ing Era) (Tokyo: Misuzu Shobō, 1975), pp. 120-121; Liang's *Wu-hsü Cheng-p'ien Chi*, vol. 1, pt. 1, chap. 1; and Shiraishi, "Tôyū undōki no Phan Bội Châu...", p. 248.

27 "Phan Bội Châu no Nihokan", loc. cit.


30 The Chinese text of *Hải Ngoại Huyệt Thuệt Sá Biên* in YNTCHC, p. 704.

31 The cases of other Vietnamese intellectuals whose ideas also reflected social Darwinism are cited in Shiraishi, "Phan Bội Châu and Japan", pp. 430-432; and "Kaimei-teki chishijinsō...", p. 571.

32 For further details, see Shiraishi, "Phan Bội Châu and Japan", pp. 432-434; "Tai-Nichiki no Phan Bội Châu", pp. 70-74; and "Tôyū undōki no Phan Bội Châu", pp. 249-256.

33 See note 30.

34 The Chinese text in YNTCHC, p. 712.

35 He did not want merely to obtain weaponry, but he further expected to obtain Japanese direct military aid. "If we go to Japan and persuade [the Japanese] by reminding them of their interests, then they must willingly help us. If they do not send soldiers, they will at least purchase weapons and lend money to us." (NB, p. 44.) In addition, recollecting his conversation with Liang when he met the latter in Yokohama, Phan recorded that Liang then said: "I am afraid that your plan is not good. Once Japanese troops entered your country, you cannot find any good reason to persuade them to withdraw. You thus have this plan in the hope to save your country, but in reality it will hasten the ruin of your country." (Ibid., p. 55.) Quotations from the NB in this essay are my direct translation from the original text in Chinese; therefore they are sometimes different from the Vietnamese versions.

36 NTT, pp. 40ff.; NB, pp. 54ff. See also Shiraishi, "Tôyū undōki no Phan Bội Châu", pp. 235-239.
37 In NB, Phan wrote: "Private schools [in Tokyo] had no appropriate regulations [to admit Vietnamese students] and no military training courses. They do suit our purpose." (p. 93). As a matter of fact, he was very eager to enrol his disciples at the Shimbu School, an official military preparatory school founded by the Japanese General Staff Office for the Chinese. Later Phan asked the Tokyo Dōbun School to establish a special class for the Vietnamese who preferred military training. Trần Trọng Khắc (alias Nguyễn Thúc Cạnh or Trần Huỳnh Công) recalls in his memoirs that Phan persuaded him to come to Japan to "receive military education" (qua Nhất lưu học lực quan). See Năm Mười Bốn Năm Hai Ngoại (Forty Four Years Abroad), published by the author (?), Saigon, 1971, p. 14.

38 Shiraishi, "Tōyū undōki no Phan Bội Châu", pp. 240, 256-262.

39 Phan provided various episodes in NB. Just after his arrival in Japan, he took a train from Kobe to Yokohama. On the train, Japanese passengers were willing to take care of him without asking reward for their service. When he got off the train in Yokohama, he found he had forgotten his luggage on the train. Being at a loss, he was asked by a policeman. The latter found the luggage and brought it to him a few days later. One day he went to Tokyo to meet a Yunnanese student, his rikisha driver looked for the student's apartment for half a day. When Phan tried to give a tip, the driver refused to accept, telling in writing (bút đâm): "You foreigners have come to Japan as attracted by Japanese civilization. I welcome you but not your money." The driver thus received just the normal fare regulated by the Ministry of Home Affairs. At the end of every episode, Phan expressed his appreciation of the "intellectual level of the population in a strong country" and the "quality of the people in a big country", and lamented "The situation of our country is different as earth and heaven", or "Comparing with our level of our people's knowledge, I am so ashamed that I would rather die." (pp. 53-54).

40 See the Chinese text of Việt Nam Quốc Sở Khảo (n.d.), a photocopy of which Mr. Anh Minh has kindly given to me, chap. 4, [pt.] 2.

41 Other Vietnamese intellectuals also expressed similar ideas. An anonymous author's Văn Minh Tấn Học Sách and Phan Chu Trinh's Letter to Governor-General Beaum reveal the idea that the civilization evolves from barbarian through half-civilized to civilized.

42 The Vietnamese translation of Tân Việt Nam in NCLS, no. 78.

43 See the Vietnamese translation in VTPBC, pp. 45-50.

44 See also Boudarel, "Phan Bội Châu et la société vietnamienne", [pt.] 2.


46 Fore a more detailed discussion, see ibid., pp. 60-61.

47 The periodical also published some of Phan's essays. See Marr, Vietnamese Anticolonialism, pp. 131-133; and Shiraishi, "Tai-Nichiki no Phan Bội Châu", pp. 48-52.

48 Wu Chi, "Yunnan's Position in China", Yunnan, no. 5 (YNHTCH, p. 313).

49 Ch'ung Shih, "Responsibilities of the Yunnanese" in Yunnan, no. 3 (YNHTCH, p. 297). See other essays reprinted in YNHTCH, pp. 460ff. The Yunnanese were also concerned about French military build-up in Vietnam. See Shiraishi, "Tai-Nichiki no Phan Bội Châu", p. 64 and notes 78-80.

50 Chi Ch'ui-sheng, "Yunnan's Failure in Diplomacy and Its
Remedy" in *Yunnan*, nos. 4-12 (YNTCHC, p. 618).

51 The Chinese text reprinted in YNKCCKMTL., p. 3. As for other Yunnanese sources about this point, see Shiraishi, "Tai-Nichiki no Phan Bội Châu", pp. 64-65 and notes 83-86.

52 A periodical’s reporter, in his "A Paragraph on the Miserable State of Annam", wrote: "We the Yunnanese are suffering from the same sickness as the Annamese" (*Yunnan*, no. 5 (YNTCHC, p. 714). The caption for a frontispiece of beheaded Annamese in the *Yunnan*, no. 12 (which is not reprinted in YNTCHC) also reads: "Shocked by this picture, we cannot help but feel mutual sympathy toward the people with the same sickness."

53 The Chinese text (see note 23) in the *Yunnan*, no. 6 (YNTCHC, no. 716).

54 Ch’ao Tuan, "Caution against the Waning of Ardour to Retrieve the [French] Concession of the Yunnan-Vietnam Railway" in the *Yunnan*, no. 15 (YNTCHC, pp. 569ff.)

55 Phan Bội Châu, "Grief over Vietnam and Condolence for Yunnan" in the *Yunnan* (see notes 23 and 53) (YNTCHC, pp. 715-716).

56 See Wu Chi’s article cited above (note 48).

57 Phan Bội Châu, "Grief over Vietnam and Condolence for Yunnan", pp. 718-719. As for the contacts between the Vietnamese and Yunnanese nationalists, see also Terahiro, "Etsunan shoki minzoku undo", pp. 140-141.


59 A pamphlet written by Chang Ch’eng-ch’ing and reprinted in YNTCHC, p. 355.

60 Li Fu, "Report on the New Year’s Day Meeting to Commemorate Our Periodical’s Anniversary", *Yunnan*, no. 13 (YNTCHC, p. 8); Emphasis added.

61 Hsieh Shao, "Our Nation’s Program to Preserve Our Land", *Yunnan*, nos. 5-6 (YNTCHC, p. 77).

62 See note 53.

63 Phan’s account in his memoirs about his meeting with Sun Yat-sen also suggests that there existed mutual interests and distrust between the two nationalists. See my detailed discussion in "Tai-Nichiki no Phan Bội Châu", pp. 88-89; and "Phan Bội Châu (Betonamu) to Miyazaki Tōten, Son Bun", pp. 63-69, 75-79.

64 Various citations from the *Yunnan* are in Shiraishi, "Tai-Nichiki no Phan Bội Châu", pp. 70-74 and notes 108-120. As we have seen in the previous section, Phan also adopted a similar attitude towards the Chams and the Khmers as well as the Ryūkyū people.

65 See note 31.

66 Ch’ung Shih, "Correlations between the Nation’s Ability and the Country’s Development", *Yunnan*, no. 19 (YNTCHC, p. 169).

67 Ibid., p. 168. It should be noted here that these two ambivalent images were expressed simultaneously by a same author. Another example is cited in Shiraishi, "Tai-Nichiki no Phan Bội Châu", pp. 82-83.

68 NB, pp. 100-120 (The Anh Minh version, pp. 105-124); NTT, p. 66.

69 Lê Văn Hảo, et al. *Kí Niệm 100 Năm Sinh Phan Bội Châu*

70 NB, p. 117 (Anh Minh version: pp. 120-121).

71 Shiraiishi, "Meiji makki no zai-Nichi Betonamujin", pp. 346-348. Shiraiishi’s analysis on Miyazaki Tōten, another member, is in "Phan Bội Châu (Betonamu) to Miyazaki Tōten, Son Bun".

72 Using Japanese and French documents as well as Vietnamese sources, Shiraiishi tries to provide a comprehensive study of this issue in "Tōyō undō (Betonamu) o meguru Nichi-Futsu ryōtōkyoku no taiō (I)", "Iwayuru 'jiruberu Shieu jiken' o megutte", "Phan Bội Châu no kokugai taikyo o megutte", and "Cuồng Đế no kokugai taikyo o megutte".


74 Chang Huang-ch’i, "History of Revolutionary Activities of Tao Ch’eng-ch’ang, Leader of the Kuang Fu Association", in Chung-kuo Shih-hsüeh Hui ed., Hsin-hai ko-meng (The 1911 Revolution) (Shanghai: Jenmin Ch’upanshe, 1957), p. 524. In his "Meiji makki no zai-Nichi Betonamujin", Shiraiishi also cites other sources indicating the resemblance of appellation between the Washinkai and Phan’s League (pp. 345-346).

75 For further details, see Shiraiishi, ibid., pp. 349-356.

76 Ibid., p. 357-358.

77 The Chinese text in T’ien I, no. 11/12 (the Daian Collection).


81 An editorial note in the Ōsaka Heimin Shimbun, no. 1 (June 1, 1907).


84 NB, pp. 101, 124; NTT, p. 59.

85 Po Cheng, "Aspiration for Mutual Friendship among the Asians", Min-pao, no. 23 (Aug. 10, 1980). Although the article was published in mid-1908, its title (Ashū washin no kibō in Japanese pronunciation) corresponded to the appellation of the Ashū Washinkai. This fact suggests that the author was (or had
been) closely involved in the Washinkai. Chang Ping-lin also used the term "same sickness" to indicate the necessity for cooperation with India, Burma, and Vietnam in his famous article "On Five Nothings" in the Min-pao (no. 16, Sept. 25, 1907).

86 According to Takenaka Hiroaki's survey, the Chinese anarchists first used these terms, and in the later period, Sun Yat-sen and other nationalists applied them in their writings. "Shimmatsu minkoku shoşi ni okeru kōri ishiki to nashonarizumu" (Chinese Ideas on Universal Principles and Nationalism in Late Ch'ing and Early Republican Periods), in Rekishigaku Kenkyū, no. 415.

87 "Government is the Source of All Evils", T'ien I, no. 3 (July 10, 1907).

88 "On the Present Situation in Asia", T'ien I, no. 11/12 (see note 74), pp. 345, 348.

89 Po Ch'eng's article, see note 85.

90 Hsia Shao, "The Future of Yunnan", Yunnan, no. 2 (YNTCHC, p. 289).

91 "We should realize that, in the world of brute force (cường quyền), there can be very few associations with justice (chinh nghĩa) and universal principles (công lý)." (NB, p. 120; the Anh Minh version, p. 124). Phan also cited Miyazaki Tōten, who said: "There are not few people who respect humanity (ninhan dao) and hate brute force (cường quyền). Only those people will help you." (Ibid., p. 117).

92 The letter is kept in the Japanese Diplomatic Archives, A6.7.0.1-1-1-1.

93 Cited in Takeuchi Zensaku, "Meiji makki ni okeru Chū-Nichi

kakumei undō no kōryū" (Contacts between Chinese and Japanese Revolutionaries in the Late Meiji Era), Chūgoku Kenkyū (Chinese Studies), no. 5, p. 77.

94 For the list of reference books, see Shiraishi, "Meiji makki no zai-Nichi Betonamujin", note 23.


100 In mid-1907 the Chang Chi group organized the Study Class of Socialism. At its first meeting, Kōtoku was invited to speak about Kropotkin's idea of mutual help (Nagai Sammi, "Shakaishugi Kōshūkai to Seibunsha" (The Study Class of Socialism and the Cheng Wen Society), in Tōyō Gakuhō, 51-3

105 Among those who discuss Liang and Liu’s ideas of solidarity among oppressed peoples are Kondō Kuniyasu ("Shō Hei-rin ni okeru kakumei shisō no keisei" [Formation of Chang Ping-lin's Revolutionary Thought] in Tōyō Bunka Kenkyūjo Kiyō, 28, 1962); Maruyama Matsuyuki ("Museifushugi to dentō shisō" [Anarchism and Traditional Thought], in Risō [Ideal], January 1972); Kawada Teiichi (op. cit.); and Mori Tokihiko ("Minzokushugi to museifushugi — Kokugaku no to, Ryū Shi-bai" [Nationalism and Anarchism — The Case of Liu Shih-p'ei, A Chinese Classic Scholar], in Onogawa Hitoshi and Shimada Kenji, eds. Shingai Kakumei no kenkyū [Studies on the 1911 Revolution], Tokyo: Chikuma Shobō, 1978).

106 See also Boudarel, "L’extrême-gauche asiatique et le mouvement vietnamien".

107 Phan’s nationalist ideas about nation-state was well revealed in his Việt Nam Quốc Sứ Khảo, loc. cit.


109 For an excellent case study of the activities and political tendency of the Yunnanese nationalists, see Yumoto Kunio, "Shingai Kakumei no kōzō-teki kenjō — 1911-nen no Chūgoku nansei chihō ni okeru seiyi hendō no shakai-teki imi, Kommei no jirei" (A Structural Study of the 1911 Revolution — The Social Implications of the Political Changes in the China's

PHAN BỘI CHÂU AND FUKUZAWA YUKICHI: PERCEPTIONS OF NATIONAL INDEPENDENCE

Vinh Sinh

Alas! What is my history? It is simply the history of a complete failure.

Phan Bội Châu, Preface to Phan Bội Châu niên biểu (Chronological Autobiography of Phan Bội Châu)

How happy I am; I have no words to express it! Only because I have lived long, I have known this wonderful joy.

Fukuzawa Yukichi, Fukuō jiden (The Autobiography of Fukuzawa Yukichi)

Phan Bội Châu (1867-1940) was the most prominent figure in the Vietnamese independence movement in the first quarter of the twentieth century. He was widely respected and given the highest place in the pantheon of modern Vietnamese heroes by his fellow countrymen, regardless of their political orientations. Phan’s voluminous passionate writings in various literary forms, his indefatigable anti-colonial efforts — although ending only in failure — and his spirit of indomitability have become an object of admiration for generations of Vietnamese.

A founder of the Duy-Tân Hội (Modernization Movement) in 1904, in the next year Phan went to Japan with a
colleague, Tăng Bát Hồ, to ask for military aid. This original plan, however, was changed into a movement, later called the Đông-du (Go East) Movement, lasting from 1905 to 1909, which brought Vietnamese youth to Japan to study, in the hope that the knowledge and experience that they acquired in Japan would eventually contribute to a Vietnamese version of modernization and (perhaps more important to the Movement) to the eviction of the French colonial rulers from Vietnam. The reason for the change in Phan’s original plan was that while in Japan, through the counsels of Liang Ch’i-ch’ao (1873-1929), a Chinese reformer who was then living in exile in Japan, and a number of Japanese personalities, he began to recognize the necessity of providing Vietnamese youth with a modern education.

In his attempt to create a new Vietnam in the image of Meiji Japan, Phan seems to have been inspired by the role that the prominent educator, philosophe, and publicist of the previous generation, Fukuzawa Yukichi (1835-1901), had played in bringing about Japan’s remarkable transformation. Phan held Fukuzawa in such high respect that in his writings the latter, referred to as Dư-Cạt (i.e., Yukichi), was cited along with Lê-Thoa (Rousseau). In addition, the Keio Gijuku, the famed university founded by Fukuzawa, was actually the model after which the Đông-kinh Nghia-thục (Đông-kinh Free School; 1907-08) was established by Phan’s group in Hanoi — Đông-kinh referring to both the old name of Hanoi and Tokyo, Nghia-thục being derived from Gijuku.

Given (1) that Phan and Fukuzawa both fought ardently for their country’s national independence and subsequently left a strong imprint upon their country’s modern history, (2) that Phan held Fukuzawa in high regard in his effort to create a Vietnamese version of Japan’s modernization, and (3) that Vietnam and Japan were both subject to the Western challenge in the mid-nineteenth century, but responded to it so differently, and ever since have followed amazingly disparate paths, it should be of great interest to look into the two men’s respective careers and spell out the differences in their
Fukuzawa Yukichi's calligraphy:
"The basis of independence is self-help and self-determination."

The front gate of Keio Gijuku University, founded by Fukuzawa Yukichi, in its early years
A letter in English written by Fukuzawa Yukichi
perceptions of national independence. It is hoped that such a comparison will contribute to furthering our understanding of Vietnam and Japan’s modern experiences.

**BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCHES**

As background for subsequent discussions, a brief summary of the highlights of Phan and Fukuzawa’s careers should be helpful.

From the time that France began her intervention in Vietnam in 1858, resistance movements sprang up throughout the country. The most significant was the one led by Phan Đình Phùng, a member of the scholar-gentry and once the chief censor of the Nguyễn court in Huế; in response to the Cần-Võng (support the King) edict issued by the deposed King Hầm-Nghi in 1885 calling for an all-out resistance, he organized a guerrilla army in Nghệ-An, Hà-Tĩnh, and Quảng-Bình which kept the colonial forces at bay until 1896, when Phan died of dysentery.

Frustrated by the failure of previous anti-colonial attempts, the scholar-gentry began to look for new alternatives. Phan Bội Châu was typical of this group of literati. From 1900 to 1904, a number of works by Chinese reformists were available, presumably with limited circulation, in Vietnam; particularly those by Liang Chi-ch’ao, such as Wu-hsu cheng-pien (The Reform Movement of 1898), Chung-kuo hun (The Chinese Spirit), Jih-pen san-shih nien wei-hsin shih (History of Japan’s Thirty Years of Modernization), and issues of the periodical Hsin-min ts’uang-pao (New Citizen Journal), a fortnightly that Liang began to publish in Tokyo from 1902. Through these tan-thu (literally, new books), Phan Bội Châu became aware of the 1898 Hundred-Day Reform attempt in China and Japan’s remarkable success in modernization. Inspired by the Japanese example, he wished to create a Vietnamese version of modernization, thus belonging to the first group of Vietnamese who seriously felt the necessity of modernization in their quest for national independence.

As already mentioned, Phan was a founder of the Duy-Tân Hồi (1904) and the main figure behind the Đồng-du Movement which brought at its peak some 200 Vietnamese youth to Japan to study from 1905 to 1909. The significance of this movement is multiple and perhaps unattainable. On a practical level, it resulted in a series of anti-colonial and modernizing attempts, most notably the creation of the Đồng-kinh Nghĩa-thúc, which aimed at providing an independent education, and a peasant movement demanding a lowering of taxes in central Vietnam. On an intellectual and spiritual level, although Phan’s attempt to create a strong and independent Vietnam in the image of Meiji Japan was both conceptually highly subjective and short-lived, it revivified hopes among his people following the setback of the Cần-Võng movement, and spurred on generations of Vietnamese thereafter to work for the national cause. From 1925 Phan lived in Huế under the surveillance of the colonial authorities, and although he could not achieve much of what he had set out to do by the time he died in 1940, he was nonetheless, like Sun Yat-sen in modern China, an indisputable national figure in modern Vietnam, and it looks as if his vision of a Vietnamese modernization without Westernization, his perception of national independence, and his world-outlook continue capture the imagination of many Vietnamese to the present day.

Fukuzawa, for his part, was generally considered to be the most influential figure outside of the government circle in modern Japan. A prominent writer and educator, he played a key role in the introduction of Western culture and civilization into Japan with the ultimate goal of making Japan independent and strong. He was the initiator of the art of public speaking in Japan and founder of the Keiō Gijuku (1868) that later grew into the Keiō Gijuku University, a famed private university, after which the Đồng-kinh Nghĩa-thúc was patterned. Fukuzawa also founded in 1882 the newspaper Jiji Shimpō (Daily News), which then became for years one of the most influential newspapers in Japan. Fukuzawa’s writings were voluminous (his
complete works consist of 22 large volumes, all characterized by
a lucid style. His principal works include *Gakumon no susume*
(An Encouragement of Learning; 1872-76) and *Bummeiron no
gairyaku* (An Outline of a Theory of Civilization; 1875), in
which he set out to articulate the meaning of 'civilization' and
argue that the adoption of Western civilization was the key to
independence. These works have become classics and continue to
attract impassioned studies and arouse enthusiastic debates
among contemporary Japanese.

EDUCATION AND ASPIRATIONS

Phan Bội Châu was born in 1867 into the family of a
poor scholar in Nam Đàn prefecture, Nghệ An — near by the
Hương mountain and the Lam river, a land well-known as the
birthplace of a host of resistance leaders against foreign
intervention throughout Vietnamese history.

Until 5 years old, as his father was busy with teaching
away from home, Phan was educated and brought up mainly by
his mother, who familiarized Phan with passages from the
Confucian classics and gave him the first orientation on
Confucian virtues. At 5, Phan attended his father’s classes,
where he memorized all the *Three-Character Classic*
(*Tam Tự Kinh*, in Chinese, *San Tsu Ching*) in three days, and
began to study the *Analects* (*Lưu Ngụ*; *Lun Yű*). He recalled
that by 6 years old, he managed to create his little own
"Analects" to ridicule his classmates, for which he was scorned
by his father.¹

Phan’s concern for the fate of his country was shown
even from his early days. As Phan grew up, the fortune of
Vietnam’s independence deteriorated day by day. He seemed to
be eager to take part in every turn of events. In 1874, when
Phan was still 7, as the scholar-gentry around his hometown
rose against the Huế imperial court’s concessions to France,
Phan gathered his classmates in playing at Bình Tây (pacify, or
expel, the French). In 1883, at 16, in response to the risings
against the French occupation of Tonkin, Phan drafted an
appeal, entitled "Bình Tậy Thu Bặc" (expel the French and
retrieve the North), calling for a general uprising. He posted the
appeal along main roads, but to his disappointment, there was
no response. Again, in 1885, when the scholar-gentry in
Nghệ-An and Hà-Tĩnh, though with only primitive weapons,
rose up to the call of King Hâm-Nghi’s Căn-Vương edict, with
a close friend Phan assembled about 100 fellow youth who were
also preparing for examinations to form the "Si-Tụ Căn-Vương
Đội*" (Loyalist Candidates’ Army). But while Phan’s group was
still in the process of raising funds and preparing weapons, the
plan was smashed by a French sudden attack. Phan later recalled
that he reflected from these early failures that people would not
pay attention to those whose academic fame has not yet been
accomplished through success in the civil service examination
(*khoa-cu*), and that in order to achieve a great undertaking,
plans should be made carefully and bold actions would serve
nothing.

In the following fifteen years Phan thus concentrated on
preparing for the mandarin examinations, while studying works
by Chinese and Vietnamese military strategists such as Sun-tzu
(*Tôn Tù*),² Chu-ko Liang (Gia Cát Lượng),³ and Trần Hưng
Đạo for later participation in the national cause. His assuming a
low profile during this period of time was also because he had to
shoulder the financial burden of his family as his father was
gravely ill, and he was concerned that his covert political activity
might endanger his father. It should be noted that by this time
Phan had established himself as the first among the four most
talented young men in his prefecture.⁴

After failing six times, at 33 Phan finally graduated first
(*giải-nguyễn*) in the Nghệ An regional examinations (*thượng-thi*).
Phan now thus acquired the academic status which he had
considered necessary for people to take him seriously, and with
the death of his father in the same year he was now released
from family obligations to fully devote himself to the struggle
for Vietnam’s national independence.
Fukuzawa Yukichi was born in 1835 into the family of impoverished low-ranking samurai class of the Nakatsu domain (presently part of the Oita Prefecture in Kyushu). This family background is important in that the low-ranking samurai, though being part of the supposedly privileged samurai class in the Confucian four-class system, suffered most from all sorts of irrational treatment in the feudal system. In fact, many of those who played a leading role in bringing down the Tokugawa Shogunate government and later became leaders of the new Meiji government (e.g. Itô Hirobumi, Yamagata Aritomo, and Saigô Takamori), and most of the scholars in the Meirokusha (Meiji-Six Society), the intellectual society created by Fukuzawa and his colleagues in 1873 for the dissemination of Western ideas, were from this class background.

Like Phan Bội Châu, Fukuzawa had a solid training on Chinese classics (kangaku) in his youth. Fukuzawa, however, only displayed his interest in learning when he was already fourteen or fifteen. But he was a quick and analytical learner. "I could discuss a book with the older student who had taught me the reading of it earlier in the morning," Fukuzawa recounted, "and I was always upsetting his argument." He went through basic texts such as the Analects, Mencius, Meng-ch'iu, Shih-shu, Tso-chuan, Chan-k'ao Ts'e, to historical works such as Shih-chi, Ch'ien-hou Han-shu, Chin-shu, Wu-tai-shih, Yüan-Ming Shih-lueh, and others. Among these works, Tso-chuan was Fukuzawa's favourite. "While most of the students gave it up after reading three or four volumes out of fifteen," Fukuzawa wrote, "I read all — eleven times over — and memorized the most interesting passages." However, unlike Phan's case in which Confucian studies continued to be the most important frame of reference for his intellectual activity throughout his entire life, Fukuzawa's thorough training in the Chinese classics later served him well in his unrelenting criticism of the old studies. This divergence was perhaps due to the two major important differences, which were interconnected, in the practice of the Confucian doctrine in Vietnam and Japan.

In the first place, unlike Vietnam (and Korea), Japan imported Confucianism from China without institutionalizing its Examination System. Secondly, whereas neo-Confucianism (which was expounded by Chu Hsi and his followers in twelfth-century China) gained absolute orthodoxy in the Vietnamese examination scholarship, there existed a variety of interpretations of the Confucian doctrine in Tokugawa Japan (1600-1868). In addition, the rangaku (Dutch Studies) and kokugaku (National Studies) that emerged from the mid-eighteenth century also posed serious challenges to the Chinese value system.

To most of the Vietnamese intellectuals at the turn of the century, success in the khoa-cu² was the key to access to the traditional bureaucracy. As mentioned above, Phan in his later account said that he had considered this success simply as a measure to enhance his voice in the public in his future anti-colonial activity. Even so, at the same time one might suggest that, ironically through the years that Phan spent in preparing for the examinations, his intellectual outlook had been perhaps irrevocably moulded. This he later discovered to his disappointment. As he put it: "It is not Chinese studies (Han-hoc) but the khoa-cu² and the empty learning (hi-vân) to blame, "² or:

Alas! The broom in our house was worn out, yet still we thought it precious; that which we come to like over time becomes a habit. And so I too was tied to fashion, to such a degree that I wasted so many days and months following a destiny of examination preparation for almost half a man's lifetime. That indeed must be judged a very large stain upon my life.³

The Vietnamese khoa-cu² system — modelled after the Chinese, with its restriction of subject matters to the Chinese classics (kinh-sach) and its strict requirement of following set formats,
symbolized in the famous "eight-legged essay" (bát-cổ vấn; pa-ku wen in Chinese) — deprived the learners of knowledge about modern world affairs and was by no means conducive to intellectual creativity.\footnote{10} It produced in the process a retrospective outlook among the literati. It is perhaps from this antiquarian and nostalgic intellectual tradition that Phan expressed from time to time his aspirations to become a Trường-Lương (Chang Liang in Chinese)\footnote{11} of modern times, or likened his going to Japan to look for help to that act of Thần Bào Tự (Shen Pao-hsu in Chinese), a man in the sixth century B.C. from the Ch'ü state, who pleaded with tears for aid at the court of the Ch'in state until his efforts were successful.

It is worth noting that most of Phan’s colleagues in the Đông-du Movement were either degree-holders, like Phan, or those who had at least spent a good part of their youthful time for khoa-cả preparations. For instance, Phan Chu Trinh (1872-1926), the man next to Phan Bội Châu in stature in Vietnam’s political and intellectual scene in the first quarter of the twentieth century, graduated third in the regional examination in 1906 and second (phó-bàng) in the metropolitan examination (hội-thi) the following year; Huynh Thúc Kháng (1876-1947), Phan Bội Châu’s long-time close colleague and editor of the Tiếng Dan (Voice of the People), passed with the highest score in the regional examination in 1900 and the metropolitan examination in 1904, and came fourth in the palace examination (định-thi); Nguyễn Thành (1863-1911), a co-founder of the Duy-Tân Hội with Phan Bội Châu, was about to take the 1885 regional examination when the fighting in Huế broke out, decided to join the resistance and never resumed his khoa-cả preparations.

The above background explains why it was difficult for Phan and his colleagues in the Đông-du movement to come to grasp the modern intellectual and political realities of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. In contrast, the existence of a tradition of intellectual diversity even during the Tokugawa years should have contributed to the receptivity and responsiveness to Western ideas among the Meiji intellectuals as seen in Fukuzawa. On the basis of the knowledge that Fukuzawa derived from Western positivism and liberalism, he was acutely aware of the deficiencies of the old studies and strove to show them to his people. The following passage from Fukuzawa’s Gakumon no susume reveals, incidentally, the inadequacy and impracticality of the nature of the kind of learning that was later to be pursued by Phan Bội Châu and his Vietnamese colleagues for a good number of years:

Learning does not essentially consist in such impractical pursuits as study of obscure Chinese characters, reading ancient texts which are difficult to make out, or enjoying and writing poetry. These kinds of interests may be useful diversions, but they should not be esteemed as highly as the Confucian and Japanese Learning scholars have esteemed them since ancient times. Among the Chinese Learning scholars, those who have been skilled in practical matters have been few indeed. Rare also have been the chōnin [merchants] who, if he was well versed in poetry, was also successful in business. Consequently we observe that thoughtful chōnin and peasants, when they see their own children concentrating on books, fear as good parents that they will eventually bring the family fortune to ruin. This is not without reason. And it proves that such forms of learning are ultimately without practical value and will not serve daily needs.

Such impractical studies should thus be relegated to a secondary position. The object of one’s primary efforts should be practical learning.\footnote{12}
In 1854, when Fukuzawa was 19, to escape from the "narrow stiffness" of the feudal domain Fukuzawa left Nakatsu for Nagasaki to study Dutch and gunnery, then later proceeded to Osaka to attend the Tekiteki-juku, a famed school for Dutch studies (rangaku). In 1858 Fukuzawa was summoned to Edo (now Tokyo) by his domainal authorities to establish a school of Dutch studies, and this school was the beginning of what later developed into the celebrated Keio Gijuku University. In a visit to the new foreign trading quarters in Yokohama, Fukuzawa found to his dismay that his knowledge of Dutch, after some five years of study, was useless as the language spoken by the merchants was not Dutch but English, which he was then determined to study. Other members of the Meikokusha also shared this training pattern: all of them uniformly began with Chinese studies, switched to Dutch studies, then ended up with other Western studies (yōgaku) such as English, French, and German.

A momentous turning point in Fukuzawa's career took place in 1860 when he was invited to join the first Japanese delegate sent by the Shogunate government aboard the Kanrin Maru to the United States with the mission of exchanging ratifications for a Japan-U.S. commercial treaty. Including this trip, Fukuzawa visited the U.S. and Europe three times altogether. The experiences and information that Fukuzawa acquired through these journeys formed the basis for his well-known book Sēyō jijō (Conditions in the West, 3 volumes; 1866-70), in which Fukuzawa sought to introduce systematically fundamental knowledge about politics, culture, and social systems of Western nations. Through this book, which sold out about 250,000 copies in one year, Fukuzawa came to be recognized as an authority on the West. However, it was only after the Restoration in 1868 when the new Meiji government had taken bold steps in adopting Western culture that Fukuzawa realized that his mission was to bring in "more of Western civilization and revolutionize our people's ideas from the roots," so that "perhaps it would not be impossible to form a great nation in this far Orient, which would stand counter to Great Britain of the West, and take an active part in the progress of the world." 13

In contrast to Fukuzawa's proficieny in Western languages and familiarity with Western societies through his first-hand experiences, the only written language in which Phan Bội Châu was well-versed was literary Chinese. 14 Phan later regretfully looked back at this non-proficiency in modern Western languages and time and again frankly acknowledged the subsequent drawback that he had to suffer. As he recalled the impressions about his first arrival in China:

Although I went principally on this trip as a representative from a particular revolutionary group, I was also the representative of a whole country and people.

If I were a very talented and intelligent man, if I had been able to study foreign languages, literature, politics and international relations ... then, even though I might bear the shame of having lost the country, I would not shy away from the fact that I was as capable as any man on earth .... As for talent, I have none. Outside of three expressions in Chinese, I have not studied properly. Although my head is full of words, it might as well be empty. 15

and when he arrived in Japan:

At that time a great difficulty emerged. I was not conversant in Japanese, yet my Chinese was unintelligible. I had to speak with my brush and converse with my hands. How troublesome it was! What's a shame to be diplomat like that! 16
Due to this stumbling block, Phan’s knowledge about Japan and the West was mainly derived from his reading of Chinese works by Chinese reformers such as Liang Ch’i-ch’ao, who in turn derived their information about the West from the Japanese literature. Owing to this indirect channel of information gathering, among other reasons, Phan’s understanding of Japan as well as the West never went beyond a superficial level. 

PERCEPTIONS OF NATIONAL INDEPENDENCE

Before looking into Phan and Fukuzawa’s perceptions of national independence, a question one might ask is that, whereas in Phan Bội Châu’s case the plea for national independence was obvious — as the French intervention of Vietnam could be seen completed by 1885, was there any need for Fukuzawa to speak for Japan’s national independence after the Meiji government had created a nation-state in 1868? The reason for that is the nature of the treaties that the Tokugawa Shogunate government concluded with the U.S. and other Western powers in 1858, following the opening of Japan. Mainly because these treaties gave the extra-territorial rights to foreign nationals, ceded Japan’s tariff autonomy, and allowed the presence in Japan of large numbers of Westerners, the Japanese considered these treaties humiliating and unequal. The precarious international situation in Asia, in India, China and Indochina in particular, also contributed to an acute sense of urgency among observant Japanese, as expressed in the following furious lines by Fukuzawa: “Wherever the Europeans touch, the land withers up, as it were; the plants and the trees stop growing. Sometimes even whole populations have been wiped out. As soon as one learn such things and realizes that Japan is also a country in the East, then though we have not yet been seriously harmed by foreign relations we might well fear the worst is to come.”

As the foundation of the Meiji state was consolidated only after the promulgation of the Meiji constitution in 1889 and in fact Japan only achieved complete abolition of extra-territoriality in 1899 and full control of her own tariffs in 1911, it is no surprise that in the two decades following the Meiji Restoration of 1868 there was a proliferation of literature by articulate intellectuals like Fukuzawa, in an attempt to identify the nature of problems facing Japan and propose for Japan’s course of action if she were to survive as an independent nation in the modern world.

Fukuzawa’s views on Japan’s independence, as on most other matters, were highly orderly and crystal clear. He saw that personal independence and self-respect (dokuritsu jison) were the foundation of national independence. Although at the first glance this view may appear to place somewhat a disproportionate emphasis on individualism, however, it was essentially not separate from Fukuzawa’s central concern for Japan’s national independence, strength, and prosperity. He thus wrote: "Persons without the spirit of personal independence will not have deep concern for their country," or: "the independence of a nation springs from the independent spirit of the people. Our nation cannot hold its own if the old servile spirit is so manifest among the people." As might be inferred, Fukuzawa derived these ideas from the ethical values of Victorian England, exemplified in Samuel Smiles’ Self-help (1859).

In his comparison of Occidental and Oriental civilizations, Fukuzawa recognized that each has certain strong points and weak points; however, so far as "wealth, armament, and the greatest happiness of the greatest number" were concerned, he would "put the Orient below the Occident." In the education of the East, so often saturated with Confucian teaching," wrote Fukuzawa, "I find two things lacking; that is to say, a lack of studies in number and reason (sūri) in material culture and a lack of the idea of independence in spiritual culture."

Prior to Perry’s visits to Japan, the Japanese had been alarmed by news of the humiliating Treaty of Nanking (1842), the first unequal treaty that China had to sign with Western
powers following her defeat in the Opium War. During the late Tokugawa turbulent years, Fukuzawa was against the joi (anti-foreign) advocates and in support of an opening policy. It would be a mistake, however, to simply assume that Fukuzawa was an undiscriminating admirer of the West. His views were rather based upon scrupulous and pragmatic considerations. For Fukuzawa, the opening policy was simply an expedient (höben) to preserve Japan’s independence and to make Japan wealthy and strong.

China was frequently quoted by Fukuzawa as a 'negative example' for her ineptitude in dealing effectively with the fierce expansion of Western powers. In order to spare Japan from the same fate, Fukuzawa argued that the Japanese should realize that Japan was also a target in the advance of Western powers; and through his analysis of world history and current trends, he came to the conclusion that Japan’s most vital problem in her struggle for national independence was in foreign relations (gaiokoku kōsai), an area “that we should be willing to sacrifice everything, even our lives.”

With respect to the wide difference in terms of national power between Japan and Western countries, Fukuzawa had his eyes fixed, more than anything else, upon the enormous economic power of the Western nations. "They are certainly to be feared for their business prowess," said Fukuzawa. Fukuzawa’s keen interest in the economic question dated back to the late Tokugawa years when he wrote about the necessity and the advantage of opening Japan and establishing trade with Western countries. His economic view was characterized by a strong desire to maintain Japan’s independence and to transform her from a late-developer into a member of the world powers. He was among the first Japanese who became aware of this problem and strove to draw public attention to it. In 1874, after Japan’s victory in her "expedition" against Formosa, Fukuzawa wrote "Seitai wagi no enzetsu" (An Address on the Peace Negotiations after the Formosa Expedition). In this address, Fukuzawa held that though the result of the peace negotiations looked favourable to Japan — she was awarded 500,000 taels as indemnities by China — ironically, the winner of the war in terms of economics was neither Japan nor China. The reason was that both countries had to import special war procurements from Western merchants. Japan, for example, had to buy everything from war-ships and guns to uniforms and caps, and the colossal expense of these supplies was greater than the indemnities that Japan collected from China. Accordingly, Fukuzawa maintained that unless Japan were going to war with other countries with her own "home-made" weapons, she should take the financial consequences of the war into account apart from the military victory. He thus came to the conclusion that in Japan’s struggle for national independence vis-a-vis Western powers, the "formidable enemy" (keiteki) was not a "military enemy" (heiba no teki) but rather a "commercial enemy" (shōbai no teki), not an enemy in terms of force (buryoku no teki) but rather an enemy of wisdom (chiryoku no teki). He envisaged that the outcome of this war of wisdom (chizen) would depend entirely upon the progress of learning of the Japanese.

To achieve this goal, Fukuzawa saw that the only way was to assimilate Western modern civilization: "The way in which to preserve this independence cannot be sought anywhere except in civilization. The only reason for making the people in our country today advance toward civilization is to preserve our country’s independence." In other words, for Fukuzawa, civilization was not an end but rather an expedient to achieve Japan’s independence, the ultimate goal. As he put it: “Our country’s independence is the goal, and our people’s civilization is the way to that goal.” Fukuzawa believed that before Japan could advance her own civilization, it was necessary for her first to adopt Western civilization.

It is worth noting that Fukuzawa’s interpretation of history and civilization was influenced by Guizot’s General History of Civilization in Europe (1829-32) and Buckle’s History of Civilization in England (1856-61). The common view in these works was that the progression of history is unilinear and has three stages: from savagery to barbarism to civilization. Only
European countries and the United States had advanced to the stage of civilization, Asian countries were either barbarous or semi-civilized, and Africa and Australia were savage. While Fukuzawa accepted the hierarchical framework of this interpretation, he was, nonetheless, conscious and critical of the problems and biases in this view.

The undifferentiated treatment of Asia as a whole seems to have concerned Fukuzawa most; for if that were the case, what would be the future of Japan’s civilization, or even more importantly, Japan’s independence? Thus, if Fukuzawa was optimistic about the prospect of Japan’s civilization and Japan’s independence, which he actually was, he had to demonstrate that Japan was different from other parts of Asia. It is then no coincidence that in Rummereon no gaizyaku Fukuzawa sought to probe into the differences in the nature of the civilizations of Japan and China. According to Fukuzawa, unlike China where people believed “the one in whom the most sacrosanct and the most powerful positions were united,” in Japan, with the rise of the military government from the Kamakura period (1185-1333), “the most sacrosanct [the emperor] was not necessarily the most powerful, and the most powerful [the Shōgun] was not necessarily the most sacrosanct,” thus “people could hold in their heads, as it were, the simultaneous existence and functioning of the two ideas.” “Once they did so,” wrote Fukuzawa, “they could not help adding a third, the principle of reason ... And since no single concept predominated, there naturally followed a spirit of freedom.”

In Japan’s emulation of the Western civilization, Fukuzawa saw that the most important factor was to change the “spirit of the people” (Jimmin no kifu), rather the adoption of external forms of civilization as seen in tangible things such as food, clothing, shelter, and so on. Who were then the propagators of civilization?

According to Fukuzawa, in order to preserve the independence of any country and resist outside pressure, it is necessary to rely upon the middle class, which is the backbone of society, regardless of whether the political system is monarchist or democratic. In Fukuzawa’s view, the shizoku, or the ex-samurai — the class he came from, formed the core of the middle class. During the early Meiji years, Fukuzawa assigned the shizoku the role of being leading scholars who would initiate Japan’s civilized progress. As he asserted: “At present, the only Japanese in the middle class who can advocate national independence and modern civilization are the scholars.” From 1880’s on, Fukuzawa entrusted the shizoku with the task of transforming Japan into a commercial and industrial nation. His emphasis on a commercial role for the shizoku was based upon his judgement that commerce was still considered at the time as a “mean occupation” (sengyo) because it was carried out by the merchants and other people outside of the shizoku class, who were still regarded as “lowly” as during the Tokugawa period. He thus argued that if commerce was handled by the shizoku, then the position of commerce and industry would quickly improve.

Fukuzawa’s call for an expansion of the role of the shizoku was in conformity with the opinions of leading figures in the Meiji government at the time. Viewed in this light, it was no coincidence that a number of successful businessmen and entrepreneurs during the Meiji years were from the shizoku background.

While one may appreciate or object to Fukuzawa’s forthright pragmatism, as symbolically reflected in his ready acceptance of the existing order and trends in a Western-dominated world, there is perhaps no argument as to the receptivity and thoroughness in his interpretation of the vital issues concerning Japan’s position in the modern world, and the cohesion and consistency in his argument. In contrast, due to a number of reasons that have been mentioned, Phan was neither able to arrive at a cohesive understanding of the outside world nor did he develop a comprehensive plan of action or an all-embracing “blue-print for implementation” in order to achieve Vietnam’s independence. His writings, nonetheless, left profound impact upon his Vietnamese audience because they were appealing to their national pride — in spite of the setback.
of the Căn-Vunctuation movement — in having a long history of persistent and undomitable resistance against foreign intervention, and at the same time to their acute sense of urgency as this pride is being seriously challenged by the danger of vong-quốc (loss of country, or national ruin). In other words, Phan’s writings matched perfectly with the feelings and psychological needs of his audience. The contrast between Fukuzawa’s emphasis on reason and Phan’s feelings is also manifest in the fact that whereas all of Fukuzawa’s writings were written in lucid prose style, a fairly large number of Phan’s writings were passionate poetry, which appealed primarily to the patriotic sentiments and national pride of his audience but offered little concrete direction. Nonetheless, in looking into Phan’s works in their entirety, particularly those written during the “prime years” of his life and also of the Đông-du movement, one can draw out the following characteristics in his ideas about Vietnam’s independence.

1. Lack of unity and low level of people’s rights and people’s intellectual level as the causes for the loss of Vietnam’s independence: Unlike Fukuzawa who was most concerned with the advancement of personal independence and held it to be the basis for national independence, Phan saw the question of unity, which he called hòp-quàn (literally ‘group unity’), the most urgent. While the two ideas in essence are not necessarily contradictory, one should note that because Phan considered personal independence as egotistic and selfish — thus detrimental to the people’s unity, he failed to recognize the dynamic relation between personal independence and national independence as did Fukuzawa. It was in this vein that Phan wrote:

Perhaps there are those who misunderstand the independence (độc-lập) of the Europeans and consider that to look after oneself is independent. Alas! What a confusion! The meaning of independence in Europe is, one country does not depend on another country and both countries do not interfere in each other. Such is called independence. This independence is the result of hòp-quàn. People of the same country, with their heart and mind united as one body, stand against another country so that the latter cannot meddle in their country: that is independence, an independence resulted from hòp-quàn. When every one has his individual mind and forms his own party to sway and kill each other, this is a sign of disunity and destruction. How is it possible then to have independence? Alas! This is an ignorance of knowing to gain profit for oneself without being able to unite (hòp-quàn).

It is no coincidence that the terms hòp-quàn (in Chinese, ho-ch’ün) and vong-quốc (in Chinese, wang-kuo), appear quite frequently in Phan’s writings. Phan had apparently derived these notions from contemporary Chinese reformist writings, particularly those by Liang Ch’i-ch’ao, his mentor. Quàn (literally ‘group’, ch’ün in Chinese) was in fact an important concept in Liang’s socio-political philosophy, which reflects Liang’s concern for the creation of China’s cohesive social and political integration. As neither Phan nor Liang bothered to elaborate on the relationship between ch’ün and wang-kuo explicitly, it may be helpful to use the explanation offered by Li Ta-chao (1888-1927), a pioneer of Marxism in China who was, like Phan, under the influence of Liang’s writings. Writing in 1914 during his stay in Japan, Li compared China’s wang-kuo to that of India, Korea, and Vietnam. He pointed out that while people were afraid of the misfortune of wang-kuo, they were not aware that a much more awful misfortune is wang-ch’ün (literally ‘group ruin’, in Vietnamese vong-quàn), which China was exactly facing. Li defined ch’ün as “a group of people sharing the same thoughts,” and distinguished ch’ün from the state (kuo-chia, in Vietnamese quốc-gia) in that even if the state is ruined ch’ün is not ruined, but as soon as ch’ün is ruined, the
state will be ruined. Thus, for Li, chün would mean either society or people, and this appears to be what Phan also intended to imply by quán in his writings. 35

In his inquiry into the causes for the loss (vong-quốc) of Vietnam, apart from the lack of hồ-quan, Phan also cited the decline of dân-quyền (people’s rights) and the low level of dân-trí (people’s intellectual level).

Phan maintained that the dawn of people’s rights in Vietnam could be traced back to the early stage of Vietnam as an independent state, illustrated in the system of filing public grievances to the kings during the Lý dynasty (1010-1225), and King Trần-Nhân-Tông’s summons, in face of the Mongol invasion, of the elders from various parts of the country to a convention at Điền-Hông (1285), which resulted in a unanimous determination to fight the invaders. To Phan, the Điền-Hông convention resembled a modern national assembly. 36 Phan’s notion of people’s rights is reminiscent of that of Liang Chi-ch’ao, who "in one instance . . . treated the idea of people’s rights (min-ch’üan), almost solely as a kind of mechanism which could generate collective dynamism in China, in another context, discussing the idea of a national assembly, . . . emphasized that this could serve to facilitate communication between ruler and ruled and thus promote national solidarity." 37

According to Phan, people’s rights in Vietnam were later suppressed by tyrants of subsequent dynasties. Viewing that popular rights were respected in Japan, England, Germany, France, and the United States because the people’s intellectual level in these countries was high — and thus they were capable of demanding for their rights, Phan concluded that his utmost desire was to see the advance of the intellectual level of his people. 38

2. Preference for violent action (bao-dông): 39 In the first place, it is important for us to remember that the original purpose of Phan’s visit to Japan was to ask to military aid. After his arrival in Japan, however, Phan began to recognize the necessity of educating Vietnamese youth in the anti-colonial struggle, his visit thus unexpectedly became the starting point of the movement to send Vietnamese youth to study in Japan, i.e., what later came to be known as the Đông-du movement. As mentioned before, Liang Chi-ch’ao was among the group of people who played a vital role in this shift. Phan later recollected that when he related his plan of asking Japan for military help, Liang dismissed the idea on the ground that "once the Japanese troops were invited to enter the country, it would be impossible to find a means to drive them out." 40 Liang’s advice to Phan was that "your country should not be concerned about not seeing the coming of the day of independence but rather should be concerned about having no citizens ready for independence. "The real strength of your country," Liang added, "is the intelligence of your people, their spirit, and men of talents." 41

Phan’s conviction to education, however, must not be over-emphasized as even during his years in Japan — when he appeared to be most optimistic about the prospect of education, he was never fully committed to education. Phan himself wrote that he was most attracted to Mazzini’s motto “education and violent action must proceed simultaneously.” 42 Thus it is not difficult to understand why in 1912, in creating Việt-nam Quang-phuc Hội, Phan advocated "extreme violent action" (bao-dông kích-liệt) and saw it as the only way to seek for "a life in ten thousand deaths". 43 This approach differs significantly from that of Fukuzawa, who, as we have seen, firmly believed that to educate his people the modern and scientific spirit of thinking was the only way to maintain Japan’s independence.

The question then is, why Phan was attracted to violent action? In NTT, Phan gave three reasons. First, he considered himself as by nature a militant extremist (cấp-kịch). 44 Second, he said that it was because of the pressure of "the militant extremist faction in the Nghệ-Tĩnh area ... [who] wrote to me mostly to urge me on in the affair of obtaining weapons," thus "I could not turn my face away in indifference to the request from those in the militant faction." 45 Third, the Japanese authority’s decision to expel him and his group from Japan left him with no alternative except turning to violent action. In
relation to this, Phan recounted that "although I already knew that violence and suicide were acts committed by those of narrow learning, with no ability to plan for the future, ... [but] if I were to give up violence at that time there would have nothing more worth doing." 46

While one can appreciate the above accounts which appear to bespeak the vicissitude of the circumstances surrounding him at the time, that Phan was not fully committed to the cause of education can also be explained, perhaps, by the fact that Phan never appear to be neither certain about the nature of the education that he would like the Vietnamese youth to be taught, nor did he ever develop a practicable educational programme. For example, in Tân Việt-nam (The New Vietnam; 1907), being carried away by his enthusiasm to build a new Vietnam in the image of Japan ("the Japan of the present day is the Vietnam of tomorrow"), Phan became too optimistic and thus underestimated the difficulties in adopting foreign technology: "to master the professions in England, Japan, Germany, and the U.S. it requires at least two years: we should not consider this difficult. To master the military, industry, agriculture, and commerce, it requires at least five years: we should not consider this long! To learn the professions from various countries, we should first study for one or two years their spoken and written languages to acquire familiarity and fluency: those who have a willing mind should not consider this hard. The main idea is to climb up to the stage of civilization." 47

3. Challenging the existing world trends: Not unrelated to Phan's espousal of violent action was his world outlook. In contrast to Fukuzawa and most of other Meiji intellectuals, who were although aware and critical of the aggressiveness of the Western powers, chose to change things within the existing world order, Phan irresistibly wanted to challenge it. Phan's unyielding leaning was well reflected in his desire to reverse the existing situation, which was expressed in idioms such as va trời lập biên (to patch up the heaven and to fill in the ocean), or xoay trời chuyển đất (to turn around the heaven and to move the earth).

At times Phan was reflective of the impasse resulting from this uncompromising rigidity. As he put it: "In view of the considerable strength of the French on the one hand and the pettiness of my own capabilities on the other, I relied on the people. Yet the people were still at a low level of political awareness ... I was not cautious but relied on my inflexible temper. I had hoped to patch up the sky and to fill in the ocean — who dares say that I wasn’t crazy! And so I marched on enthusiastically, throwing caution to the winds. Could there have been anyone on this earth more stupid than myself?" 48 Unlike Fukuzawa who placed hope in the of the middle class who would bring wealth and power to Japan, Phan laid his faith in a small group of heroes and their heroic acts. A natural corollary of this view was that when Phan found that it was impossible for him to change the entire existing situation, he wished that his heroes and himself might have been born in a more favourable place or at a more favourable time. For instance, in Chân tướng quân (The True General; 1917) Phan stated that had Hoàng Hoa Thám been born in the U.S. or in Japan, his achievements would not be inferior to those of Washington and Tōgō Heihachirō, 49 the architect of the Japanese naval victory over the Russians at Tsushima strait in 1905. Similarly, in Truyện Pham Hồng Thái (A Biography of Pham Hồng Thái; 1924) Phan regretted that Pham had not been born in Europe, America, or Japan. 50 Or in his autobiographical Nguc trung thi (Prison diary; 1914), in recalling the difficulties in securing weapons around the time the Duy-Tân Hồi was created, Phan said he had wished: "Had I lived during the time of the Đinh, the Lý, the Lê, or the Trịnh, it would have been sufficient merely to raise my arm and cry out a single word and right away the waves would have risen up and the thunder would have echoed and our task would have been achieved in but a short moment." "But these days," he added, "things are altogether different." 51

4. Pan-Asianist orientation: Pan-Asianism is a concept that emerged in the late nineteenth century, asserting that the co-operation among the East Asian peoples, believed to share common culture and common race (đồng-văn đồng-chủng, in
Japanese *dōbun dōshu*) was necessary to counter growing Western expansion. "Asian", in practice, was understood as non-Western or anti-Western. There were exponents of pan-Asianism not only in every country in East Asia but also in other parts of Asia, such as India and the Philippines. Even within an East Asian country, take Japan for example, there were various variants of pan-Asianism, i.e., from romantic, idealistic, or liberal, to radical, militant, or expansionist. In addition, as time and circumstances changed, an exponent of pan-Asianism might shift his brand from one to another.

Phan was an ardent adherent of pan-Asianism throughout his life. He consistently perceived that Vietnam’s independence could not be achieved without the help and co-operation of other Asian countries. His pan-Asianist ideas could be divided into two periods.

Before his deportation from Japan in 1909, his first experience with 'real politics', Phan viewed the Western colonial inroads into Asia as the domination of the white race over the yellow race, and entrusted Japan with the role as the leader of an Asian alliance, "the eldest brother among the yellow race" (*người anh cả da vàng*). Although Phan was exhilarated at Japan’s resounding victory over Russia, his expectation in this "powerful neighbour" (*cuồng-lân*) was not an entirely naive one: apart from his genuine admiration for Japan, there were calculated considerations on Phan’s part to make use of Japan, by boosting her leading role in Asia to solicit aids for his anti-French cause. As Phan put it: "At that time Japan, a yellow-skinned people like ourselves, had just defeated Russia and becoming a strong power. Perhaps they wanted to be lord and master of all Asia. In any case they would help us if only to weaken the strength of Europe — this would be to their advantage. If we were to go to Japan and tell them our moving story, surely they would assist us. Whether they lent us weapons or helped us to buy them, it wouldn’t be difficult."

The following lines are typical of Phan’s views of Japan during this period:

The first to wave the flag of independence, Japan is naturally a country of the same culture, As East Asia is entering the era of modernization, Who could vie with the Japanese Emperor, an enlightened monarch... The example that Japan has set for us in East Asia, We should follow, lest to fall into error.  

What about Phan’s attitude toward Japan after 1909? In PBCNB, Phan recalled that he was introduced to Miyazaki Tōten (who was referred to as Cung-Ky Thao-Thiên) by Sun around October 1908, when the Đông-du movement reached an impasse as the Vietnamese youth had been ordered to leave Japan. Miyazaki’s counsel for Phan when the two met was as follows:

Vietnam, by her own force, certainly will not be able to fight against France, thus it is appropriate to ask for help from a neighbouring country. But how can Japan help you? Japanese politicians have an abundance of ambitions but are poor in chivalrous spirit. You should advise your young people to study English, Russian, and German, make acquaintances with many peoples in the world, and denounce the French crime to alarm them. The world is not lacking of those who prize humanism and despise the right of the strong [cuồng-quyền], and it is only these people who can help you."

On the basis of the above Miyazaki’s advice and of the fact that Phan had joined the Đông-A Đông-Minh Hội (League
of East Asia; in Japanese Tōa Dōmei Kai), which was founded, according to PBCNB, in the fall of 1908, and was composed of Chinese revolutionaries, Japanese socialists, and Asian émigrés from India, Korea, and the Philippines, it has been assumed that since Phan had directed his eyes toward peoples of the "same sickness" in Asia, Phan became completely disenchanted with Japan.

Certainly Phan must have disappointed with Japan, which had by then become a full-fledged imperialist power and had collaborated with France, forcing him and others in the Dong-du movement to leave Japan. Yet he did not entirely lose his admiration for and expectations of Japan. The shift in his view of Japan was that Phan no longer considered her as the leader of Asia, but as "a friend," in his conceived Asian league against Western powers. He now placed more hope in China, which shared the "same sickness" (dông-bệnh) with Vietnam, and argued that an alliance of China and Japan would be indispensable for the independence movement in Asia.

That Phan continued to uphold pan-Asianist ideas after his forced departure from Japan in 1909 was evidenced in his call for such a Sino-Japanese alliance in Liên-A sô-ngôn, written in 1911 while he was in Thailand, arguing that a unified effort of China and Japan against Western powers would be beneficial, lacking it would be injurious, to the independence movement in Asia. The gist of the same argument was reiterated a decade later, in 1921, in his A-châu chi phuc-âm (The Gospel for Asia). Phan's brand of pan-Asianism in this period is reminiscent of that of Sun Yat-sen, who also called for an anti-Western Sino-Japanese alliance. It is not clear, however, whether or not, or to what extent Phan was conscious of Sun's pan-Asianist thinking.

In contrast to Phan's pan-Asianist ideas which were undermined by a cultural and racial consciousness, Fukuzawa's view of Asia, though undergoing a major situational shift as a result of the changing circumstances surrounding Japan, was consistently characterized by a forthright, undisguised sense of political realities and raison d'état.

In the early stage, from 1876 to 1883, Fukuzawa saw that the creation of an East Asian league — consisting of Japan, China, and Korea, was vital to Japan's survival in face of increasing Western expansion. Fukuzawa's premise here on the surface might look somewhat similar to Phan and other pan-Asianists' calls for a co-operation among the East Asian countries, but there is a crucial difference between the two arguments. While Phan and other pan-Asianists placed emphasis on the alleged common East Asian cultural heritage, Fukuzawa had rejected an East Asian co-operation from an ideological or ethical (i.e. Confucian) consideration. He simply took into account the geographical proximity of the East Asian countries.

Fukuzawa illustrated his support for an East Asian league by the saying "hosha aiyori kuchiburu horobite ha samushi", or "shinshi hosha" — literally, just as it is necessary for a carriage to have an axle, so it is necessary in the same way for teeth to have lips — meaning that neighbouring countries are mutually dependent on each other. Using fire prevention as example, Fukuzawa said that even if our house is made of stone, we can by no means feel secure as long as neighbouring houses are wooden. If we wish to protect our house from fire, we should at the same time consider how to protect neighbouring houses from fire, either offering help to them or persuading them to build stone houses like ours. Should the situation become urgent, we may go without reservation and build new stone houses with our own hands. This is neither because we love them, nor do we hate them, but simply because we want to protect our house from fire.

Fukuzawa's plea for an East Asian league, nonetheless, did not last long. From 1883 onward, due to the failure of his direct involvement in Korean affairs and the expanding military conflict between France and China over Vietnam in which Fukuzawa predicted an inevitable victory for the former, Fukuzawa began to argue for Japan's dissociation from Asian countries to join ranks with Western nations. The rationale behind Fukuzawa's argument was that he did not wish Japan to be treated by Western nations in the same way as other Asian
countries, which had become either Western colonies or semi-colonies. Consequently, Fukuzawa held that what should Japanese concern was that "Western countries may mistakenly see Japan as an ordinary country in the East." He seemed to have been preoccupied by the fact that in the news of the Sino-French war, which was reported in the West as "the incident of the East" (Toyo jiken), the two words "China" were used as a synonym for "the East", as if "the East" only means China. His concern about Western association of Japan with her Asian neighbours was particularly evident when it became clear that China could not face France. If China’s defeat were taken by Westerners as the defeat of the East as a whole, Fukuzawa wrote, then they might think they could discomfit Japan as easily as China. He thus wrote: "The defeat of China, a weak country which rashly went to war, is of course the natural consequence of her own doings. But China’s defeat may cause France to become haughty, and in the end there may arise in Western countries a belief that China can easily be handled. Since China is the representative of the East, to which Japan belongs geographically, we must expect that Westerners, in their ignorance, will draw in their minds a fanciful picture of Japan as a country which is also easy to manage. This is truly regrettable." 70

In December 1884, immediately after the failure of the coup of the Korean reformists in which Fukuzawa was closely connected, he asserted that the time had come for Japan to settle the matter of "honour and disgrace" with China. With a Japanese victory in this war, "not only will Japan’s national prestige shine in the East, but also Japan will be respected by distant Western powers; not only extra-territoriality be abolished, but as a civilized, rich, and powerful country in every respect, Japan will be looked up to by Western world powers as the leader of the East for ever." Fukuzawa’s argument along this line was culminated in his "Datsua-ron" (On departure from Asia), which he wrote in March 1885.

In this article, apart from calling for Japan to disengage herself from her Asian neighbours, Fukuzawa also pleaded, in plainest terms, that Japan should join ranks with Western powers in their encroachment of Japan’s neighbours: "It is not necessary for us to make special recognition in law for China and Korea just because they are neighbouring countries. We should deal with them exactly as the Westerners do. Those with bad companions cannot avoid bad reputation. We must resolve to repudiate the bad companions of East Asia." 71 The "bad companions" here were none other than "peoples of the same sickness" with whom Phan was seeking an alliance.

CONCLUSION

In summary, there were obvious contrasts between Phan and Fukuzawa’s perceptions of national independence.

Both men in their early days received thorough training in Chinese classics. Throughout his career, Phan worked almost entirely within the assumptions of East Asian cultural and political principles and precedents. Although at times Phan did show his fascinations for things Western, because of the lack of proficiency in Western languages and first-hand experiences in the West, and of his antiquity-orientated outlook, he was unable to grasp the roots of wealth and power of the West and modern world affairs. The modernization that Phan thus envisaged for Vietnam was modelled after Meiji Japan, the one that required minimum Westernization. Yet his understanding of the foundations on which Japan transformed herself into a modern power never went beyond a superficial level. Following his forced departure from Japan, he became disappointed with Japan as an imperialist power, but still believed that an anti-Western Sino-Japanese alliance was indispensable for the independence movement in Vietnam and other parts of Asia. Toward the end of his eventful life, he was still writing works expounding the significance of Confucianism to modern Vietnam. 72 Apart from being an ardent patriot, Phan was indeed an idealist pan-Asianist.
Fukuzawa, on the other hand, firmly rejected the Confucian tradition and saw that the adoption of Western civilization, in particular its spirit, was the only way for Japan to survive as an independent nation in the modern world. He wrote *Bummeiron no gairaku* in 1875 to demonstrate why Japan, and not other Asian countries, could successfully adopt Western civilization, before advancing her own. In retrospect, one may say that it is thus a question of time for him to move from a conceptualized differentiation of Japan from Asia in this work to a forthright calling for Japan’s departure from Asian countries in "Datsuen" a decade later. Unlike Phan who constantly saw Vietnam as an unseparated part of the East Asian world and thereby linked her fortune to that of other East Asian countries, Fukuzawa considered Asia and the West inter-connected, and at the centre stood Japan. If he spoke fervently in favour of Western modern civilization, it is because he had fixed his eyes upon the backwardness of Asiatic countries— in his view this was the cause for their loss of independence and wanted to save Japan from a similar fate. Likewise, if he relentlessly criticized Western powers, it is because he had seen their deliberate performance in other parts of Asia and did not want Japan to share the same experience. Although by no means an indiscriminate adulator of the West, Fukuzawa chose, out of pragmatic considerations, to accept and work within the prevalent world trends, transforming Japan in the image of Western nations, particularly England of the late nineteenth century. Fukuzawa was a fervent nationalist with the keenest sense of pragmatism.

As we have seen, quite differently from Fukuzawa, Phan wished to challenge the existing order of a Western-dominated world. This disposition, apart from reinforcing his adherence to pan-Asianist thinking, appeared to have played a part in his preference for violent action. Although Phan recognized the necessity of educating his people, and considered that a low level of intellectual level and people’s rights had contributed to the loss of Vietnam’s independence, he nonetheless held that educational reform needs violent action as a catalyst. 75

To obtain a clearer picture of the above sharp divergence in Phan and Fukuzawa’s perceptions of national independence, perhaps they should be seen in their respective historical perspective, for the image of national independence in any given country cannot be separated from its historical context. Although Vietnam and Japan were two countries of comparable size located on the periphery of China, there was a crucial difference in their international environment.76 Adjoining China to the south, Vietnam had, prior to the modern period, a long history highlighted with struggles for national independence, in which success could be secured solely by a phenomenal military upset over the great army from the Middle Kingdom, and was guaranteed by its complete withdrawal from Vietnam’s national boundaries. Phan’s preference for violent action and his notion that "sovereignty must be complete, externally and domestically"72 were well-rooted in this tradition. In this perception national independence, “[t]he main thing was driving out the French; all other problems depended on that and could be postponed.”76 This perhaps explains why, to many Vietnamese and regardless of their political orientations, Phan was their favourite hero, and Phan Chu Trinh, who envisaged a gradual approach to national independence through anti-feudal domestic reforms within the French colonial mechanism — an approach not very diverging from Fukuzawa’s — was thrust aside from the mainstream of Vietnamese history.

Japan, in contrast, lying off on the eastern end of East Asia and being separated from China and Korea by the China Sea and the Straits of Korea, managed to control the flow of Chinese influence in accord with her own needs. Her geographical isolation had contributed to the development of a strong collective sense of self-identity, an acute curiosity and remarkable sensitivity about foreign culture, along with a downright recognition and acceptance of the existing hierarchical order in the outside world.77 Fukuzawa’s remarkable receptivity about the trends and nature of the modern world, and the pragmatic course of action that he charted for Japan thereby were pertinent to these under-currents.
It has been suggested that if Japan's later military expansionism could be carried out under such rhetoric as the "Asian liberation" or "Asian solidarity", it could also be well justified as the dissemination of "civilization", as implied in Fukuzawa's "Datsua-ron". However, it must be added emphatically that Fukuzawa's ideas about what Japan should do in Asia in the late nineteenth century were derived from considerations that were intensely political and situational in nature and thus could not be properly appreciated unless specific historical circumstances surrounding Japan in his times were taken into account. In fact, liberal scholars such as Professor Maruyama Masao found his study of the rational and independent spirit embodied in Fukuzawa's works a great comfort during the high tide of wartime Japan's militarism and ultra-nationalism. After the collapse of imperial Japan in 1945, Japan has recovered from the ashes of devastation to become one of the most powerful economic and industrial powers in the world. It would be almost silly if any one of us now were to have doubts about the state of her national independence, an issue that once occupied the utmost attention of Fukuzawa and other observant people of Meiji Japan.

In the meantime, in Vietnam, national independence — the cause to which Phan had totally and passionately devoted his life — has remained, ever since his death in 1940, the main issue for which wars have been fought, and yet continued to be an issue after these wars ended. A military victory over a foreign power does not seem to provide Vietnam with a complete, and long-lasting independence as it did in the pre-modern days. As such, the tradition of perceiving military resistance as the only means to attain national independence, as seen in Phan and many after him, calls for question.

Phan himself, time and again humbly and earnestly made a request to those of younger generations to learn from his mistakes and failures. In spite of his total devotion to the national cause, he often wrote that he felt his task as that of a tinh-về bird, carrying one little rock after another in a futile attempt to fill the Eastern Sea.

With all due respect to Phan, perhaps one should say that although being a great inspirer and political activist, Phan was in the final analysis a traditionalist and not a revolutionist. This was understandable, given the times during which Phan was active. The main role that Phan played was to awake the Vietnamese soul, a task in which he stood second to none. In retrospect, there is one thing that seems to have gone unnoticed in the mainstream of Vietnam's independence movement ever since the days of the Đông-du movement but bears a special significance for self-reflection in the context of modern Vietnam's political culture. That is the priority that Fukuzawa gave to economic activities and cultural interactions with the outside world as the most effective safeguard for national independence.

NOTES

1 There are two versions of modern Vietnamese translation of Phan Bội Châu niên biểu (Chronological autobiography of Phan Bội Châu; hereafter PBCN): Từ phán (Self-judgement), published by Nxb Anh Minh, Hück, 1956; and Phan Bội Châu niên biểu, translated by Phạm Trọng Diệm and Tôn Quang Phiet and published by Nxb Văn Sử-Dia, Hanoi, 1957. In this study, I have used the Từ phán (hereafter TP) version. TP, p. 20.

2 (fl. early 4th century BC). A great Chinese military strategist, reputed author of Ping-fa (The Art of War), a classic on the subject of war and strategy.

3 A.D. 181-234. A darling hero of the Chinese people, serving Liu Pei of Shu as a counsellor in the latter's struggle against Ts'ao Ts'ao of Wei and Sun Ch'üan of Wu.

4 Nam-dân tú-hỏ. For further information on Phan's life in

5 During the peaceful Tokugawa period (1600-1868) the samurai actually became warrior-bureaucrats, and thus occupied the most respected status, as did the scholar-bureaucrats in Chinese and Vietnamese societies.


7 Ibid., p. 8.

8 TP, p. 21.

9 All quotations from *Ngực trung thục* (Prison diary; hereafter NTT) in this essay are taken from its English translation by Christopher Jenkins, Trần Khánh Tuyệt, and Huỳnh Sanh Thông in David G. Marr, ed. *Reflections from Captivity* (Ohio University Press, 1978). NTT, p. 11.


11 Died 187 B.C. A native of the Han state, he was determined to revenge the Ch'in which had destroyed his fatherland. He served Liu Pang as a trusty counsellor when the latter attacked the Ch'in. Chang Liang was named one of the Three Heroes following Liu Pang's success.


14 At the time Phan received his education, literary Chinese (*chữ Hán, or Hán-văn*) was still considered as the official Vietnamese written language (*chữ ta*, literally "our language", in contrast to *chữ Tây*, i.e. French language) before the *quốc-ngữ* was popularly used. This was the reason why Phan apparently had difficulties with this romanized system of writing. Nguyễn Thượng Huyên (who was with Phan in Hangchow in the early twenties) and Trần Huy Liên (who often met Phan for sometime when the later was living under house arrest in Huế) both attested to this. See Nguyễn Thượng Huyên, "Cu Phan Bội Châu o Hằng-Châu", *Bach-khoa*, no. 73 (Jan. 15, 1960), p. 37 and Trần Huy Liên, "Nhớ lại Ông già Bên-Ngu", *Nghiên cứu lịch sử* (hereafter NCLS). no. 47 (Dec. 1963), p. 43. Phan must have felt the difficulty even more acute after the abolition of the khoa-cử system in Trung-ký in 1915 and in Bác-ký in 1919, as thereafter the *quốc-ngữ* became the official form of written Vietnamese.

15 NTT, p. 25.

16 TP, p. 51.

17 With the exception of Yen Fu, "nearly all of the Chinese purveyors of Western culture were men whose only foreign language was Japanese"; thus "from 1895 to 1919 China was almost completely dependent on Japan for its knowledge of the West." Martin Bernal, "The Triumph of Anarchism over Marxism, 1906-07," in Mary C. Wright, ed. *China in Revolution: The First Phase, 1900-13* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1973), p. 97.

18 For example, in *Hải-ngoai huyê̄t-thụ* (Letter Inscribed in Blood from Overseas; 1906), Phan with gross inaccuracy wrote


20 GS, p. 16.

21 FJ, p. 337.


23 BG, pp. 191.

24 GS, p. 79.

25 Fukuzawa's early economic notions were derived from William and Robert Chambers's Political Economy and Francis Wayland's Elements of Political Economy, and the ideas of Adam Smith and John Stuart Mill.

26 First appeared in the Meiroku zasshi, vol. 21. Edited in Fukuzawa Yukichi zenshū (hereafter FZ), vol. 19, pp. 539-42. This address was also the first public speech ever to be given in Japan.

27 BG, p. 193.

28 Ibid.

29 BG, pp. 21-22. I am indebted to Professor Matsuzawa Hiroaki of Hokkaidō University for his valuable comments on Fukuzawa's views of Japan's national independence. For further details, see my article "Meiji Nihon to kokusai kankyō: Fukuzawa Yukichi no Ajia-kan" (Meiji Japan and Its International Environment: Fukuzawa Yukichi's Views of Asia. Kindai Nihon kenkyū (Studies on Modern Japan), vol. III (1986).

30 GS, p. 32.

31 To borrow David Marr's words in his Vietnamese Anti-colonialism, p. 200.

32 In PBCNB, Phan considered the three years from 1906 to 1908, during which Phan was mainly in Japan, as the prime (dác-y) years of his life (TP, p. 67.).


34 For a good analysis of Liang's influence on Phan, see Chuong Thâu, "Anh hướng cách mạng Trung quốc đối với sự biến chuyển của tư tưởng Phan-Bội-Châu" (The impact of the Chinese Revolution upon the changes of Phan-Bộ-Châu's ideas), NCLS, no. 43 (October, 1963).

35 In fact, Liang Ch'i-ch'ao also translated Herbert Spencer's Principles of Sociology into Chinese as "A Study of Group" (Ch'ün-hsiēh). See Alexander B. Woodside, op. cit., p. 54. Li Ta-chao's article, entitled "Feng-su" (Customs), appeared in Chia-yin tsa-ch'i (Tiger Magazine), no. 3.

36 Việt-nam quốc-sự khảo, loc. cit., p. 123.

37 See Hao Chang, Liang Ch'i-ch'ao and Intellectual Transition

38 Ibid., p. 140.

39 This term, also rendered as 'militant action' or 'militant activism', in practice means 'armed insurgency' or 'armed resistance'.

40 TP, p. 53.

41 Ibid.

42 Phan learned of Giuseppe Mazzini's (1805-72) career through his reading of *I-ta-li Chien-kuo San-chieh Chuán* (Biographies of the Three Heroes of the Building of Italy) in manuscript form which Liang was working on when he first met Phan (TP, p. 73). The actual words used by Mazzini were "education and insurrection".

43 TP, p. 150.

44 NTT, p. 69.

45 NTT, pp. 39-40.

46 NTT, p. 46.

47 TVPBC, p. 105.

48 Ibid., p. 104.


50 As mentioned above, Saigō was mistaken for Tōgō. TVPBC, p. 125.

51 TVPBC, p. 188.

52 NTT, p. 21.


54 Note that there was a proliferation of racial literature in both the West and Asia at the time. For an excellent study of racial ideas and beliefs in international relations, see Jacques Barzun, *Race: A Study of Superstition* (New York: Harper & Row Publisher, 1965).


56 Used in Phan's "Bài ca kể cho phụ nữ" (Ballad to Appeal to Women; 1907), ed. in VTPBC, p. 119.

57 NTT, p. 24.

58 "Để tình quốc dân ca" (Ballad to Awake the People). Cited in Trần Văn Giàu, *op. cit.*, p. 98.


60 TP, p. 120. After citing Miyazaki's advice, Phan noted that "At the beginning I did not believe these [Miyazaki's] words, and it is only now that I realize that they are sound." He added that
the idea of "world solidarity" (liên-kết thế-giới) then emerged in him (without mentioning specifically when) and that he had wished to go to Europe and America but had neither fund nor language proficiency, thus he had to confine himself with the effort to first bring about a solidarity among the peoples "who lost their countries" (vong-quốc) in Asia (TP, pp. 120-21). In a later section of PBCNB, Phan wrote that in Fall 1913, Cuồng-Dề was arrested by British authority in Hong Kong following his successful three-week fund raising trip to southern Vietnam. Cuồng-Dề used portion of the collected fund as bail, then immediately left for Europe, without waiting for Phan to go together, an arrangement that had been made between the two previously. "For this reason," Phan added, "my plan of going to Europe became an impossibility, I had therefore to stay on in Canton and soon became a prisoner!" (TP, p. 170-71). If this account is accurate, then the timing of Phan's plan to go to Europe was before World War I, prior to his imprisonment in Canton. Whether or not Phan's pan-Asianist ideas and activities during this later period were indeed simply a part of his conscious plan for an ultimate "world solidarity", as implied in the above lines, merits further study. What concerns us, within the framework of this this study, is the fact that Phan continued to argue for the creation of an Asian alliance as a prerequisite for the achievement of Vietnam's independence.

Phan "was shocked by Japan's signing of a treaty with the French in June 1907 and abandoned his idea of 'relying on Japan'...." then joined "the revolutionaries from other Asian nations and the Japanese socialists in placing their hopes on cooperation between peoples of the 'same sickness'." (Tonan Ajia kenkyū (Southeast Asian Studies), vol. 20, no. 3, p. 335.) On this specific point, my interpretation is slightly different from Prof. Shiraishi's.

62 For example, in Việt nam quốc sử khảo, written in 1908, Phan still spoke of Japan with high respect.

63 As Phan wrote in the declaration of the Chân-Hoa Hướng-Á Hội (Society for the Rejuvenation of China and Regeneration of Asia), founded in 1912: "...Japan, [though?] an ally of Britain, which is a newly-emerged power and shares our common culture and common race, should be considered only as a friend." (TP, p. 156.)

64 According to the account of the background of this work in the PBCNB, which is more detailed than that in NTT, Liên-Á Sô-Ngôn was written while Phan was at his farm in Ban-thâm (Phichit). Upon completing the work, "I then entrusted the farm to Đặng-Ngô-Sinh and Đặng-Tú-Kinh, and went to Bangkok with Đặng-Tú-Mần to visit the China-Siam News (Hoa-Xием Tận-Bao) to see Mr. Tiêu-Phạt-Thanh, who himself was the director of the Chinese revolutionary organ in Siam. I showed him the manuscript of the Liên-Á Sô-Ngôn, for which he took a great liking. He thus printed 1,000 copies for free. The book was well received by the Japanese residents in Siam, who bought 300 copies. For the remaining 700 copies, I present a few to the overseas Chinese and took the rest with me to China." (TP, p. 144). The NTT account of the Liên-Á Sô-Ngôn (p. 50) gave the impression that it was written while Phan had arrived in Hong Kong. On this specific event, the PBCNB account appears to be more accurate than the NTT's.
65 TP, p. 195.


67 Jiji shōgen (My personal opinions on the current events), ed. in FZ, vol. 5, pp. 186-87. A more detailed discussion is available in my article "Meiji Nihon to sono kokusai kankyō — Fukuzawa Yukichi no Ajia-kan," pp. 124-33.

68 Fukuzawa's concern about the Sino-French conflict was indicated by the fact that from June 1883 until March 1885, Fukuzawa wrote as many as 30 articles on the subject in his daily Jiji Shimpō (hereafter JS). For further details, see Ibid., pp. 136-38.

69 "Nihon wa Shina no tame ni owarezaru o kishibeshi" (We should hope for Japan not to be shrouded by China), JS, May 5, 1884; FZ, vol. 9, pp. 414-15.

70 "Hoshashinshi no kogen tanomu ni tarazu" (The old saying hoshashinshi is unworthy of trust), JS, Sept. 4, 1884; FZ, vol. 10, p. 33.


72 For example, the two volumes of Không học dăng (The light of Confucianism)(Hue: Nxb Anh Minh, 1957).

73 "bao-dòng là mở-giói để cải-tương giáo-duc". TP, p. 150.


75 Cited in Trần Văn Giàu, op.cit., p. 142.


77 The last two points have been elaborated in my article "Japan and Vietnam: Some Preliminary Observations on Their Interactions," The Vietnam Forum, 8 (Summer-Fall 1986), pp. 151-172.
VIETNAMESE POLITICAL MOVEMENTS IN THAILAND:
LEGACY OF THE ĐONSE DU MOVEMENT

Furuta Motoo

In pre-modern times the Vietnamese developed an explicit national self-consciousness within the East Asian world order. This was their "Nam Quốc" (Southern Country) consciousness, suggesting that Vietnam shared the same civilization with China, but had its own well-defined territory, culture, dynasties, and history. Modern Vietnamese nationalism has inherited this "Nam Quốc" consciousness to a considerable extent; however, early in this century the Vietnamese discovered that they could not effectively oppose French colonialism as long as they relied only on their own traditions, and began looking for a new national identity more suited to survival in the modern world.

Part of the significance of the Đong-du Movement was that it marked a departure from the traditional Vietnamese view of the East Asian world order. Phan Bội Châu asked Japan to help his anti-French movement because he thought that Japan shared the same East Asian civilization (đông văn) as did Vietnam. However, during his stay in Japan, he widened his view through contacts with many Asian revolutionaries and began to think that it was necessary for the oppressed peoples (whom he called "fellows suffering from the same sickness") to unite together.

From this time, the Vietnamese began to seek their way to associate themselves with other peoples who had different cultures for the struggle against imperialism. One of the regions where this attempt was experimented was Indochina. Although the Đông-du Movement itself had little concern about other peoples in Indochina, it provided a precedent for Vietnamese revolutionaries to use Thailand as an important base which later served the Vietnamese communists to create solidarity among the Indochinese peoples. This paper is then a historical survey of Vietnamese political movements, examining how the Vietnamese communists inherited and developed the legacy of the Đong-du Movement.

On the topic of the Vietnamese in Thailand, we already have excellent studies by Peter A. Poole and E. Thadeus Flood.¹ My paper will focus on the period from the late 1910s to the late 1940s which these studies mentioned only briefly.

I. THE QUANG PHỨC HỘI AND THAILAND

It is well known that the French's conquest of Indochina was achieved through a confrontation with Siam. The Thais had thus sympathized, to a certain extent, with the Vietnamese in their anti-French activities. In this regard, Vietnamese nationalists could find a comparatively safe haven from the French police in Thailand. In addition, it was relatively easy to go from central Vietnam to Thailand. It took only about two weeks to walk from Nghệ-an province in central Vietnam to northeastern Thailand. This access to Thailand was an important factor in explaining why people from Nghệ-an played such an important role in the Vietnamese nationalist movement.

The Vietnamese anti-French movement had built up a connection with Thailand from its early stage in the late nineteenth century. The most typical case was the uprising headed by Phan Đình Phùng which offered uncompromising resistance in Nghệ-an and Hà-tĩnh provinces in central Vietnam from 1885 through 1896. This uprising had access to efficient weapons in Thailand. Cao Đạt, one of the leaders of this uprising, went to northeastern Thailand several times to buy weapons. Following Phan Đình Phùng's death, Cao Đạt and his comrades took refuge in Thailand and settled down in Sakhon
Nakhon.²

Phan Bội Châu paid his first visit to Bangkok in 1908, asking the Thai imperial court to allow his colleagues to farm in Thailand. Although on this occasion he met the Thais with an introduction from a Japanese politician, Ôkuma Shigenobu,³ he may have borne the story about the uprising of Phan Đình Phùng in mind.⁴

After being expelled from Japan, Phan Bội Châu went to Thailand once again with remnants of the Đông-du Movement and founded farms at Phichit with the purpose of earning money for both livelihood and weapons. These activities received support from Cao Đát’s followers. Phan Bội Châu himself, however, had little concern about the Vietnamese residents in Thailand, except for the remnants of the Cân-vọng Movement. His main concern was to gain an understanding of the Thai ruling elites in preparation for his future diplomatic activities.⁵

With regard to Cambodia and Laos, Phan Bội Châu was well aware of the strategic importance of Vietnam’s western mountainous region for his planned armed resistance against the French; however, he regarded the people living there as "man di" (barbarians). In addition, geographically he considered the territory of the existing French Indochina, including Cambodia and Laos, the same as the "lost Vietnam," which he wanted to recover. Nonetheless, he had little concern for the Cambodians and the Laotians.⁶ In short, people living in Indochina were not included in his category of "fellows suffering from the same sickness."

Upon receiving the news of the Chinese revolution of 1911, Phan Bội Châu went to Canton and launched the Việt Nam Quang Phúc Hội (Vietnam Restoration Society) in 1912. The Quang Phúc Hội established a branch in Thailand which was the first political organization among the Vietnamese in Thailand. The leaders of this branch consisted mainly of individuals from Nghệ-an province such as Trần Hữu Lục, Hoàng Trọng Mậu, Đặng Tư Kính, Hồ Văn Long, and Đặng Thúc Húa.

In 1914-15, there were heated disputes among them on the policy of the Quang Phúc Hội. One of these disputes was over their main task in Thailand. The great majority of the members insisted on using Thailand as a staging area to buy weapons and prepare for armed struggle in Indochina. A minority, including Đặng Thúc Húa, advocated much more attention to revolutionary training of young Vietnamese in Thailand.⁷

The armed struggle wing gathered remnants of the Cân-vọng movement and established contact with the German consulate in Bangkok to buy weapons. However, this attempt encountered difficulties after Siam decided in July 1917 to participate in World War I on the French side. The Thais then began to control Vietnamese anti-French activities in Thailand strictly. At this juncture, the Thai branch of the Quang Phúc Hội, being driven to a tight corner, tried to launch attacks on French positions along the Mekong river in 1917, but these attempts ultimately failed.⁸

It was under these difficult circumstances that Đặng Thúc Húa (1870-1931), a member of the scholar-gentry of Thanh-chứtông, Nghệ-an, began to engage in political indoctrination among the Vietnamese in Thailand. Being different from other leaders, he made much of "patriotism" among ordinary Vietnamese residents other than remnants of the Cân-vọng. Húa, who was nicknamed a "walking teacher," made the round of the main settlements of Vietnamese in Thailand and recruited young people into his program, which consisted of "the Vietnamese language, general refinement, and patriotism." Later he sent some promising students to China for further revolutionary training.

Húa also managed to establish a route for radical youth from central Vietnam to escape from the country and to go to China through Thailand. After he went to China to meet Phan Bội Châu and returned to Thailand in 1919, Húa associated with some members of the Quang Phúc Hội in the two provinces of Nghệ-an and Hà-tĩnh such as Ngô Quang and Lê Văn Huấn to help youths escape to Thailand.⁹
The young men who went from Nghệ-an and Hà-tĩnh to Thailand numbered as many as one hundred in the 1920s. They may have been more numerous than the students who went to the University of Indochina in Hanoi from these two provinces. Owing to the route to Thailand, counter elites in Nghệ-an and Hà-tĩnh could preserve an independent education for their children, and the nationalist movement among them was connected with the later communist movement.

Among the young people who escaped from Nghệ-an to Thailand earlier in 1919-20, there were persons who later played an important role in the early stage of the Vietnamese communist movement such as Hồ Tùng Mậu and Lê Hồng Sơn. They went to South China via Phichit and Bangkok. In Kwangchow they met Phan Bội Châu and became his close associates.11

In the early 1920s, there emerged many secret societies in Nghệ-an and Hà-tĩnh which were connected with Đảng Thúc Húa in Thailand and which managed to send young people abroad. For example, some local gentry such as Phan Thái An and Cao Xuân Khoạch in Anh-sơn prefecture of Nghệ-an organized an association called Tam Giáo Hội around 1923-24. Cao Xuân Tùng, Khoạch’s son, with four other people left for Thailand in August 1925 under the escort of Đảng Thái Thuyên, son of Đảng Thái Thần who was one of Phan Bội Châu’s closest associates. After an one-month trip, they arrived at a Vietnamese village near Nakhon Phanom called Bản Mai which had been developed by one of the participants of the Đồng-du movement, Vũ Trọng Đài. From here they went Húa’s farm in Phichit, and some of them were selected to be sent to South China.12

When Lê Hồng Sön and Hồ Tùng Mậu founded the Tầm Tâm Xà (Heart-to-heart Association), a Vietnamese radical anticolonial organization, most of its members came from Nghệ-an and Hà-tĩnh to South China via Thailand.13 In early 1924, Phan Bội Châu and Lê Hồng Sơn requested Hồ Tùng Mậu to go back to Nghệ-an. On his way to Nghệ-an, Mậu met a group, which consisted of those who had just escaped, such as Phạm Hồng Thái, Lê Hồng Phong, Trương Văn Linh, and Lưu Quốc Long. Upon their arrival in Kwangchow, they were welcomed by Lê Hồng Sơn and became members of the Tâm Tâm Xà.14 It is well-known that Sön and Thai attempted to assassinate Governor General Merlin and this incident, which resulted in Thai’s tragic death, further accelerated the trend of "xuất đường" (exodus abroad) among young people. After the incident, Sön and other members of the Tâm Tâm Xà entered the Whampa Military Academy; they then met Nguyễn Aì Quốc, who arrived in Kwangchow in late 1924.

In early 1925, Nguyễn Aì Quốc founded the Thanh Niên (Việt Nam Thanh Niên Cách Mệnh Động Chì Hội; Association of Vietnamese Revolutionary Youth) through the conversion of the Tâm Tâm Xà to communism. The most trustworthy members of the Tâm Tâm Xà were organized into a secret group called Cộng San Đoàn (Communist Corps), which formed the core of the Thanh Niên. At least five out of nine founding members of the Cộng Сан Đoàn were those from Nghệ-an en route Thailand; namely Lê Hồng Sơn, Hồ Tùng Mậu, Lê Hồng Phong, Trương Văn Linh, and Lưu Quốc Long.15

By the Vietnamese nationalists’ conscious efforts, the exodus route through Thailand played an important role in the development of the Vietnamese nationalist movement in the 1920s. Nguyễn Aì Quốc himself was well aware of its importance. In a report to the Comintern dated February 19, 1925, he thus mentioned Húa’s farm in Thailand and wrote: “We have had a fairly firm base in Siam. There are about 50 people who plow a rice field and are strictly solid. They have done many things. Now, we have to organize them politically, and help them economically to enlarge this base.”16

Until the latter part of 1920s, however, Thailand was thus nothing more than a route to South China. This route contributed to strengthen the Vietnamese revolutionary movement’s ties with that of China. The Vietnamese nationalists by then, nonetheless, had little concern about other peoples around them like the Thais, Cambodians, and Laotians.
II. THE THANH NIÊN AND THAILAND

It was the Communists who began to use Thailand not only as an escape route but also as a base for political activities. Given the process of its founding, it was natural that the Thanh Niên had its branch in Thailand. However, the means of establishing its branch were provided by its connection with China.

In 1926, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) dispatched an operational team into Thailand. Hồ Tùng Mậu, who had become a member of the CCP in March of that year, went with this team, and organized some Vietnamese nationalists in Thailand, including Đặng Thúc Hậu, into the Thanh Niên.17 Four branches were established during that year at Phichit, Nakhon Phanom, Udon, and Sakhon Nakhon.18

The headquarters of the Thanh Niên in Canton assigned the following tasks to its branches in Thailand: to organize and educate the Vietnamese in Thailand to be loyal to their fatherland, to organize the Vietnamese in Laos, and to maintain the route to Vietnam.19 According to these guidelines, the Thanh Niên in Thailand founded a fraternal society among the Vietnamese called the Hội Thân Ái Việt Kiều (Fraternity of Vietnamese Residents) in 1926. Unlike former Vietnamese nationalist organizations in Thailand, the Hội Thân Ái sought to organize a much wider segment of the Vietnamese community, including the Catholic Vietnamese, to develop their national consciousness.20 The Hội Thân Ái opened Vietnamese schools and published some newspapers in quoc-ngu Vietnamese such as the Đông Thanh (published from 1927, renamed as Thân Ái in 1929, edited by Đặng Thúc Hậu), the Tiếng Chuông (from 1927, edited by Hoàng Văn Hoan), and the Đại Chung (from 1928, edited by Đặng Tùng).21

The Thanh Niên also founded another organization to conduct the political training of young activists called the Hội Hợp Tác (Cooperation Society). At the beginning the Hội Hợp Tác consisted mainly of young revolutionaries from Vietnam. Later, through Nguyễn Ái Quốc’s suggestion, it opened door for activists from settlers’ families.22 Its membership reached about 450 to 500 at the peak.23

Nguyễn Ái Quốc was in Thailand from autumn 1928 through the end of 1929.24 With Udon as the focal point of his activities, he went around the bases of the Thanh Niên. He criticized the Vietnamese revolutionaries who were in Thailand but would not learn the Thai language, as most of the newly arriving members simply regarded Thailand as nothing more than a route to China. Nguyễn Ái Quốc stressed the necessity for them to realize that Thailand might become a long-standing base for the Vietnamese revolution of they could gain an understanding of the Thai people. He thus suggested that his comrades study Thai and to make the revolutionary structure take firm root among the Vietnamese settlers who had been in Thailand for a long time.25

The Thanh Niên played a very important role in raising funds and maintaining escape routes for political criminals from the interior. It was also greatly instrumental in the organization of the Thanh Niên’s local structure among the Vietnamese in Laos, which reportedly established contacts with some Laotians.26

In this Thanh Niên period, Vietnamese political activities in Thailand began to pay attention to the Thais and Laotians. However, the Thanh Niên itself was an organization for the Vietnamese. Although the Thanh Niên expanded its organizations throughout Indochina, its “Indochineseness” was nonetheless just an expansion of Vietnamese activities for their national revolution.27

As the representatives of branches in Thailand, Đặng Thái Thuyền, and Võ Tùng attended the First National Party Congress of the Thanh Niên held in 1-9 May, 1929 in Hong Kong. At the Congress, they did not agree with the Bác Kỷ representatives who demanded the creation of a communist party immediately to replace the Thanh Niên. With the members who afterward founded the Annam Communist Party, they created a group for advancing the establishment of a communist party, and upon returning to Thailand they began to organize
communist cells. At the time Nguyên Ai Quôc founded the Đảng Công Sản Việt Nam (Vietnamese Communist Party), members of the Vietnamese communists in Thailand were reported to number 41. This number is significant in comparison with the Party's 265 members in the interior.

III. AS A WING OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF SIAM

A. The establishment of the Communist Party of Siam: It was not the Vietnamese Communist Party but the Communist Party of Siam to which the Vietnamese communists in Thailand had to belong. These measures were taken by Nguyên Ai Quôc when he came back to Thailand in March 1930. As a representative of the Comintern, he was charged with the following mission at this time: to establish the Vietnamese Communist Party and put it under the direction of the Shanghai Bureau of the Comintern, to reorganize the Nanyang Communist Party into the Malayan Communist Party and to charge its Central Committee with a mission to lead the communist movement in Southeast Asia as the Singapore Section of the Comintern, and to combine the Chinese Communists in Thailand who had belonged to the Nanyang Communist Party with the Vietnamese Communists in Thailand to establish the Communist Party of Siam. These measures accorded with the decision of the Sixth Congress of the Comintern to establish an individual party in each colonial state.

According to the organizational principle of the Comintern at this time, each Communist Party should be a "regional Communist Party" which was organized within one existing state, regardless of its members' national or ethnic origins. A communist had to belong to the Party which operated in the country in which he lived, even if he were a foreigner in that country. For example, Korean communists living in Japan had to belong to the Japan Communist Party. In principle, a "regional party" did not assume any national character.

Nguyễn Ai Quôc seems to have had some contradictory views on this principle. On one hand, he thought a communist movement should have its own national character and a party should be a "national Communist Party." His naming of the "Vietnamese Communist Party" (VCP) reflected this idea typically. He was criticized by the Comintern as too nationalistic because of this name and thus the VCP changed its name to the Indochinese Communist Party in October 1930. On the other hand, he was an internationalist who thought there would be no inconsistency between belonging to a foreign Party and being a patriot to contribute to a struggle to free his own homeland. In this way, he himself once belonged to the French Communist Party, and recommended some members of the Thanh Niên for membership in the Chinese Communist Party.

The Vietnamese communists in Thailand belonged to the Communist Party of Siam (CPS) in accordance with the organizational principle of the Comintern. This principle created confusion and opposition among members of the communist-led mass organizations in Thailand because they were organized along the political line that stressed their members' national consciousness as Vietnamese. The Vietnamese militants were pleased at becoming regular members of the Party regardless of the Party's name. Nonetheless, they had difficulty in explaining to people in the Hội Thanh Ai why it was that they were placed under the direction of the Party of "Siam."

At the time Nguyễn Ai Quôc still made much of the Vietnamese revolution's connection with that of China. In a report to the Comintern dated 18 February 1930, he wrote:

The Singapore Section has insisted to us that the Annam C.P. will be under the direction of Singapore. But considering [the] geographical situation (Russia-China-Annam) as well as [the] political situation (Party more strong [sic], industries more developed in Tonkin than [in] Cochinchina), I propose that the A.N.C.P. shall [sic] be directed from
Shanghai via Hong Kong. 35

At the same time he also attempted to combine the Vietnamese revolution with that in Southeast Asia. In the same report, he thus wrote: "However, the A.N.C.P. must be in close touch with Singapore. For that reason, I ask the Chinese C.P. [for] a letter of introduction so that we may send an Annamese comrade to work with Singapore." For the same purpose, Nguyễn Ai Quóc placed the Vietnamese communists in Thailand who belonged to the CPS under the direction of the Singapore Section. 36 As he expected, the Vietnamese communist organs in Thailand played an important role in creating an Indochinese wide movement and thus contributed to the Vietnamese revolution's "Indochineseness."

An event which also contributed to its "Indochineseness" was the birth of the Indochinese Communist Party (ICP) in 1930. The ICP was the first Vietnamese political party to explicitly advocate unity with Cambodians, Laotians, and other peoples in Indochina in order to struggle against French colonialism. Although the Comintern played an important role in adopting the name of "Indochinese" Communist Party, it should not be overlooked that there were also some young Vietnamese communists who subjectively advocated the adoption of an Indochinese framework for revolution, because they thought it was too narrowly nationalistic to advocate Vietnamese revolution. They criticized the Thanh Niên for excluding Cambodians, Laotians, and other peoples from its membership.

They advocated the unity of all Indochinese people not because they found strong political movements among Cambodians and Laotians with which the Vietnamese could ally, but rather because they wanted to prove that they were "internationalists." Although the idea of Indochinese revolution was too idealistic, it did prompt the Vietnamese to wake up to the multi-ethnic situation which they faced in Indochina. 37

B. The Đồng Dương Viên Trò Bố: Despite the constraints of the Comintern-imposed organizational principle, Vietnamese communists in Thailand were actively concerned with the revolution in their fatherland. After the revolutionary upsurge in 1930-31, French reprisals almost destroyed the entire ICP apparatus in Vietnam. The Vietnamese communist organs in Thailand subsequently played important roles in restoring the ICP's structure throughout Indochina.

In December 1931, a group of local Party leaders from Hà-tĩnh including Bui Quang, a member of the Hà-tĩnh provincial executive committee who had been in Thailand in the 1920s, arrived at Sakhon Nakhon. This news was reported by the CPS to the Singapore Section (Central Committee of the Malayan Communist Party). The Singapore Section and the CPS directed the Vietnamese communists to help in the reorganization of the ICP. To undertake this task, the Đồng Dương Viên Trò Bố (The Commission for Aiding Indochina) was set up in early 1932 as an organ of the CPS. The responsibilities of this Commission were: to save funds for the restoration of the ICP, to organize training courses for remnants of the ICP, and to help remnants of the ICP make contact with the Comintern. 38

The Đồng Dương Viên Trò Bố founded a training center for the ICP members who escaped to Thailand at Nakhon Phanom and began to dispatch a number of operational teams to Central and South Vietnam after since 1932, and en route these groups also organized the ICP's cells among the Vietnamese in Laos and Cambodia. 39

Among its operations, those in Hà-tĩnh, Nghệ-an, and Laos were relatively successful. In the case of Hà-tĩnh, an operational team of the Commission succeeded in establishing contacts with the surviving ICP sections in the province at the end of 1932, and its continuous operations resulted in the restoration of a provisional executive committee for Hà-tĩnh in early 1934. 40

In the case of Nghệ-an, there was a rather complicated situation. In early 1928, one Thanh Niên member in Thailand, whose name was Hoàng Thế Thiện, was dispatched to Nghệ-an. He was arrested upon his arrival at Nghệ-an. Following his release from prison, having lost contact with the local Thanh Niên organ, he organized a separate group called "Vùng Hồng"
(Aurora), which operated along the Thanh Niên lines. During the Ngế Tinh Soviet period, this group insisted that priority should be given to organizational construction, and was very passive about organizing a mass movement. For this reason, it was denounced as traitorous by the local ICP members. This group, however, was able to maintain its organization even after the collapse of the Ngế Tinh Soviet in 1931, and began to attempt restoration of the local ICP structure with some surviving ICP members. Nonetheless, other surviving members of the ICP still strongly suspected this group, and they made individual attempts to reorganize the ICP.

It was the Vùng Hồng group that established contacts with the Commission in Thailand. According to the direction of the Commission, this group founded a provisional executive committee for Ngế-an. In 1934, the Commission dispatched Ngô Tuân into Ngế-an. Tuân established the ICP liaison provincial committee of Ngế-an and Hà-tinh, which later became the Bắc Trung Kỳ (northern part of Central Vietnam) Regional Committee, also under his direction.41

Along with these operations toward central Vietnam, operations toward Laos were also institutionalized from 1932-33, focusing on the Vietnamese settlements along the Mekong river such as Vientianne, Thakhet, Savannakhet, Pakse, and the mining towns of Boneng and Phontièu. For example, Nguyễn Như, a member of the Udon Provincial Committee of the CPS, was dispatched into Boneng-Phontièu in the middle of 1932. He organized Vietnamese workers there and set up a Party cell. Như served a term as secretary of that Party cell before returning to Nakhon Phanom.42 At that time, the Comintern itself managed to reorganize the ICP by sending a number of Vietnamese “professional revolutionaries” into Indochina. It placed communist activities in Indochina under two separate jurisdictions: those in northern Indochina (Bắc Kỳ, northern Trung Kỳ, and Laos) were governed by Bô Chi Huy Ó Ngoai (Overseas Directing Committee, created in 1932) led by Lê Hồng Phong; those in southern Indochina (Nam Kỳ, southern Trung Kỳ, and Cambodia) were assigned to a special committee headed by Trần Văn Giaù. It might have been the latter which first established contacts with the Commission in Thailand.43 Lê Hồng Phong, who had experience in Thailand in the 1920s, went to Bangkok on his way from Russia to Indochina in 1931; however, as he failed to establish contacts with the Party there, he went to South China where he founded the Overseas Directing Committee.44 This Committee first established contacts with the Commission in Thailand in June 1934 when a special conference for the restoration of the ICP was held in Macao.45 From the conference, Nguyễn Tài (alias Vê, that is, Lê Ngón, who came from Đô-liông, Ngế-an to Thailand since 1926), the secretary of the Northeastern Regional Committee of the CPS responsible for the Commission for Aiding Indochina, became a correspondent of the ICP’s Overseas Directing Committee.46

The resolution of that special conference referred to communist activities in Laos: on the one hand it attached much value to the development of the Party organs in Laos, yet on the other hand it charged that the Party organs in Laos were “chauvinistic” and had failed in its attempts to organize the Laotians.47

After that conference, the ICP’s Provisional Regional Committee for Laos was set up at Vientianne in September 1934.48 This Committee consisted of seven members, five Vietnamese and two Laotians.49 At this time, along with Nam Kỳ, Laos became the most advanced region for communist activities in Indochina. The Party organs in Laos during this period belonged nominally to the ICP, but they were really directed by the Committee for Aiding Indochina. For example, a conference of the Regional Committee for Laos in preparation for the First National Congress of the ICP took place at Udon under the leadership of Nguyễn Tài in January 1935.50

It was indeed an important development that a Vietnamese political organization attempted to enrol Laotians as its members. However, the Laotian members of the ICP in Laos were only a few, therefore it could hardly say that the ICP succeeded in recruiting the Laotians in the early 1930. The two Laotians who were elected as the ICP’s Regional Committee
members in 1934 did not make any great contribution to the Laotian communist movement afterward.

The ICP came into being by attempting to create a "New Indochina," which would be multi-ethnic in character. This attempt, nonetheless, was difficult to realize as long as the Vietnamese communists only relied on conditions set up by France. Because the colonial bureaucracy was filled mainly with Vietnamese, the opportunities for people of different cultures to meet together inside that bureaucracy were very limited. To overcome this lack of social contacts between the Vietnamese and other peoples, the Vietnamese had to develop special devices of their own, but by the 1930s they were unable to do so. In the case of Laos, once Party organs were established among the Vietnamese residents, it became increasingly difficult to organize Laotians in the context of a colonial plural society. Furthermore, in the 1930s, there had not been any strong national movement among the Laotians. In this situation, the Vietnamese communists had a hard time finding allies among the Laotians.51

The First National Party Congress of the ICP held in Macao in March 1935 marked the completion of the organizational reconstruction of the ICP. By this Congress, the Commission for Aiding Indochina had accomplished its mission and was dissolved. The Congress, attended by a representative of the Commission for Aiding Indochina (i.e. Trần Tô Châu) and representatives of the CPS including Party General Secretary Tăng (a Vietnamese),52 adopted a special message to the Central Committee of the CPS:

Indochina and Thailand are neighboring countries. Revolutionary movements of the two countries are closely related and influence each other. We must therefore strengthen the ties of solidarity between the Indochinese Communist Party and the Communist Party of Siam. In the period of of the ICP's reorganization, comrades of the CPS have done their best to help us. At the Congress

we confirm that the CPS has taken measures to meet the spirit of revolutionary internationalism and the principles of the Comintern.53

C. The Vietnamese communists and the revolution in Thailand: Since they belonged to the Communist Party of Siam, the Vietnamese communists were also required to contribute to the revolution in Thailand. The Comintern orthodoxy at that time criticized some alien communists who were only interested in the revolution in their homeland and would not contribute to the revolution in the country where they were living.

So far as the Vietnamese communists in Thailand were concerned, this question was also related to the Thai government's attitude toward Vietnamese nationalist activities in Thailand. However, the spread of communist influence among the Vietnamese caused the Thai authorities to be more cautious toward the Vietnamese. Sometimes they took rigorous measures against the Vietnamese communists at the request of the French consulate in Bangkok. For example, Đặng Thai Thuần and Vũ Tùng were arrested by the Thai police in Bangkok on their way to Hong Kong to meet Nguyễn Ai Quoc and were handed over to the French police in 1930. A number of Vietnamese were detained at Phichit in September of the same year.54 Nevertheless, the Thai took these measures only so as to deal with France. They often rejected the French requests. For example, in the period of French reprisals after the Nghệ Tĩnh Soviet movement many Vietnamese from Nghệ Tĩnh took refuge in Thailand. The French requested the Thais to hand over these "Vietnamese communists." The Thais detained them for a while, but did not hand them over to the French on the ground that they were "Vietnamese nationalists" and not "communists".55

Under the circumstances, the most dangerous enemy for the Vietnamese communists in Thailand was not the Thai authorities but the French police. In early 1930s, the Vietnamese communists organs in northeast Thailand had special armed teams to defend their organizations called "Đội Mao Hiếm"
(Adventure Teams), whose main task was to assassinate agents of the French police. But the Vietnamese communists brought their activities under self-imposed control so as to avoid conflicts with the Thai authorities as far as possible. This policy constricted the line of mobilizing the Thai masses against the Thai government.

The situation changed after the Constitutional Revolution of 1932. As a measure to strengthen Thai nationalism, the Thai government gradually began a strong anti-Chinese and anti-communist campaign. As a part of the campaign, Thai authorities sought to suppress all communist activities in Thailand including the Vietnamese activities.

In response, the Northeast Branch of the Communist Party of Siam, which consisted mainly of Vietnamese, began to emphasize the necessity of organizing the Thai masses. A local Party congress of Udon province, convoked by Hoàng Văn Hoan in 1934, resolved to strengthen Party’s activities among the Thai masses and to smuggle members who could speak Thai into villages and factories. Nonetheless, it was very difficult for party organs once established among Vietnamese residents to organize Thais. The CPS could do nothing more than organize a small number of Thais around its struggle against difficult living conditions and send a few promising Thais to Moscow for revolutionary training.

However, this Siamese Party’s new line resulted in conflicts with the Thai authorities. For example, when the Vietnamese communists organized a demonstration in opposition to oppressive taxation at Khon Kaen in October 1936, the demonstration was reportedly attended by about 20 Vietnamese and 200 Thais. The Thai authorities described this incident as a "Vietnamese communist plot against the Thai government," and arrested about 150 Vietnamese. By 1937, a large proportion of the Vietnamese communists in Thailand were either arrested or exiled. In prison there were heated debates among the Vietnamese communists on the issue of whether their main task was to contribute to the Thai revolution or to organize the Vietnamese residents in Thailand for the Vietnamese revolution.

As the ICP apparatus in Laos was also almost entirely destroyed by France in 1935, there were few communist-led activities among the Vietnamese residents in Laos and in Thailand in the period of the mass movement’s upsurge in Indochina from mid-1936 to mid-1939. During this period, more reformist line was predominant among the Vietnamese in Thailand. This line demanded the French government to take protective measures for the "subjects of its protectorate," i.e., the Vietnamese residing in Thailand, against the oppression of the Thai government.

IV. VIỆT MINH AND THE RESISTANCE IN CAMBODIA AND LAOS

From the Popular Front period (1936-39), the Comintern began to reemphasize the national question and this reorientation became clearer during World War II. The reorientation affected not only each Party’s revolutionary line but also its organizational principles. At the time when the Comintern was dissolved, each Communist Party was on its way to reorganize itself as a "national Communist Party."

The Party in Thailand was reorganized in December 1942 under the name of the "Thai Communist Party." Although this reorganization was reportedly initiated by the Chinese communists in Thailand, the new Party had a "Thai Branch" and a "Chinese Branch" within its structure, and the latter was separated from the Party when the Party went into a lawful struggle in 1946. Thus the Thai Communist Party began to take on much of its ethnic Thai character.

The ICP also made an overall appraisal of the national question from the sixth session of its Central Committee held in 1939, and in 1941 decided to settle the question of national liberation within the framework of each Indochinese country and to found the Việt Minh. Accordingly, a proposal to reorganize
the Party along national lines was put forth in this period, which resulted in the separation of the ICP into three individual national parties of Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos in 1951. In this situation, the controversy among the Vietnamese communists in Thailand in the late 1930s was settled in the direction of attaching more importance to their Vietnamese identities. The communists released from prison resumed their activities among the Vietnamese in Thailand about 1942-43. In 1943, they established the Tông Hội Việt Kiều (General Association of Vietnamese Residents) and there was a communist organ behind it called the Ủy Ban Văn Động Việt Kiều (Committee for mobilizing Vietnamese residents). Although this organ was ostensibly an organ of the Thai Communist Party, the Vietnamese communists were free to organize the Vietnamese residents to help the current Vietnamese revolution.

A group of local ICP's leaders escaped from Quang Bình at the end of 1943 reported the ICP's new line to establish the Việt Minh among the Vietnamese in Thailand. In 1944, the Vietnamese communists reorganized the General Association of Vietnamese Residents to the General Association of Vietnamese Residents for National Salvation, in support of Việt Minh policies. After the Japanese coup of March 9, 1945, it is well-known that in Vietnam the Việt Minh expanded its influence rapidly. In this period, the Việt Minh also strengthened its forces among the Vietnamese residents in Laos and Thailand. The ICP dispatched Nguyễn Chính Cầu into Laos and reestablished its Regional Committee for Laos in June 1945. At the same time, the Special Committee for Vietnamese Residents in Laos and Thailand was also established as a leading organ of the Việt Minh. From this time, the Vietnamese communists in Thailand came to be directed by the ICP in substance and the communist activities among the Vietnamese on both sides of the Mekong river developed as one body.

While it is true that the Việt Minh's popularity in Vietnam during the August Revolution and the following years had its source in Vietnamese patriotism, yet it should not be overlooked the fact that the Việt Minh also had serious concern about the need for Indochinese unity. The ICP charged the Việt Minh with a mission to help the Cambodians and Laotians establish their own, separate national united fronts. It was in Thailand where this ICP policy first materialized. At the end of World War II, the Vietnamese communists in Thailand could find their allies among the Cambodian and Laotian nationalists who had close ties with the Free Thai Movement. These Indochinese people came into contact with each other at such places as a base of the Free Thai in northeastern Thailand. Some bases of the Free Thai had special training camps for Vietnamese and Laotians. The Vietnamese established their first armed unit in Thailand called "Dộc Lập Quân" (Independence Army) in April 1945 with the weapons obtained from the Free Thai. The Laotians also had their small armed units which called themselves "Lao Pen Lao" (Laos for Laotians).

The ICP decided to launch a general uprising at its National Congress which met at Tấn Tráo on August 13. The Việt Minh representatives who bore this news arrived at Savannakhet on August 29. Even before their arrival, the Vietnamese communists in Thailand began to prepare the uprising in Laos, anticipating that "Vietnamese residents in Thailand and Laos in one united body will support the Lao Pen Lao Party and rise up with the Laotian people to wrest power from the Japanese and to prevent the French colonialists from returning."

The Vietnamese armed units in Thailand went across to the other side of the Mekong river and joined with the Việt Minh forces there, and helped the Lao Pen Lao come to power in the main Laotian cities. The most powerful armed forces supporting the Provisional Government of the Lao Issara (Free Laos) established on October 12, 1945 were those of the Vietnamese. Many of the Vietnamese residents sided with the Lao Issara and fought against returning French forces in the spring of 1946. However, the French occupied one town after another, and along with the Lao Issara thousands of Vietnamese refugees were forced to cross to the Thai side of the Mekong.
The combined total of Vietnamese refugees who came from Laos and Cambodia at the early stage of the resistance war was reportedly about 46,700.  

The Free Thai government at that time also sympathized with the Indochinese resistance movements and in 1946 gave official diplomatic recognition to the Việt Minh Mission in Bangkok headed by Trần Văn Giàu. Until the military coup in November 1947, the Việt Minh agents in Thailand were allowed to recruit guerrilla units from among the Indochinese refugees and to transport arms to those units. The Vietnamese units organized in Thailand—called Câu Long I, Câu Long II, Câu Long III, Quang Trung, and Trần Phú—had been the military core of the anti-French resistance in Cambodia and Laos in its early stage 1946–47. The ICP’s organ in Thailand, called the Thai Special Zone Committee, directed the resistance in northeastern Cambodia and western Laos until at least 1950.  

These units fought against the French forces in Cambodia and Laos along with the Khmer Issarak and the Lao Issara. It was not until this time that the Vietnamese communist were able to organize systematically Cambodians and Laotians, who had originally had little social contacts with the Vietnamese. 

In this manner, the attempt by the Vietnamese communists to create the "New Indochina" as an alliance among the three Indochinese nations began to be institutionalized. The bases in Thailand, the country which had close cultural and historical ties with Cambodia and Laos, thus played an important role in bringing the Vietnamese into interactions with the Cambodians and Laotians. 

CONCLUSION 

It is true that this active role of the bases in Thailand was short-lived. After the military coup in November 1947, anti-communism came to be the dominant theme of Thai foreign policy. The Thai government began to take a cold attitude toward the communist-led resistance in Indochina and to restrict the activities of the Vietnamese communists in Thailand. Although the Viet Minh Mission was not expelled from Bangkok until the Thai government recognized the French-sponsored Bao Dai government in 1950, it became almost impossible for the Mission to continue transporting arms to the guerrilla bands in Indochina immediately after that coup. As a result, Trần Văn Giàu removed his headquarters into the Thai-Cambodian border area. In response to this new situation in Thailand, since 1948 the Vietnamese communists began to take measures to reinforce the resistance in Cambodia and Laos from the Vietnamese side.  

Nonetheless, the initial role of the bases in Thailand in the attempt by the Vietnamese to unite the three Indochinese peoples should not be overlooked. The "New Indochina" after World War II represents an attempt to bring about political integration of the three Indochinese countries for the first time, despite social and cultural, as well as political disparities. While the "New Indochina" still has not matured enough to achieve a stable integration of the region, the Vietnamese conception of Indochinese integration has had a long-term impact on relations among the three countries. In the process of creating the "New Indochina," the Vietnamese have been establishing a new identity in relation to their immediate Southeast Asian neighbors which they never had in their pre-modern history. 

This is the legacy of the Đông-du Movement seen in the early stage of the Vietnamese communist movement. Naturally, the question that the Đông-du Movement addressed to the Vietnamese is much broader, involving their very nature of the existence of the Vietnamese nation in the modern world. That question, nonetheless, has never been answered sufficiently. It was the communists who made a relatively definite answer to the question in the modern history of Vietnam. Yet the communists themselves seem to have realized just how difficult it is to provide an adequate answer. Whether this answer is acceptable to their neighbors, including the Thai, is of course another problem.
NOTES


4 One might note that Gia-Long (r. 1802-20), the first emperor of the Nguyễn dynasty — of whom Prince Cường-Dệ, the nominal leader of the Đông-Du Movement, was a direct descendant — before coming to power had received aid from the Thai and for some time had used Siam as a military base. It is unclear whether or not Phan had related this connection to the Thai authority when he asked for help, or the Thai were sympathetic to the cause of Phan and his colleagues because of this historical precedent. In any event, unlike Cường-Dệ and Phan Bội Châu who were anti-French, Gia-Long received substantial French aid in his unification of Vietnam.

5 See Lê Trọng Khánh and Đặng Huy Văn, "Cuộc khởi nghĩa của Việt Nam Quang Phúc Hội ở miền Nam Trung Bộ năm 1916" (The uprising of the Vietnam Restoration Association in the southern part of central Vietnam in 1916), NCLS, no. 22 (Jan. 1961); Nguyễn Tài and Hoàng Trọng Thúc, "Đặng Thúc Hưa: Một tấm gương yêu nước bền bỉ bất khuất" (Đặng Thúc Hưa: An example of persevering and indomitable patriotism), NCLS, no. 76 (July 1965); and Phan Bội Châu, op.cit., p. 138.


7 Nguyễn Tài and Hoàng Trọng Thúc, op. cit.


9 Nguyễn Tài and Hoàng Trọng Thúc, op. cit.; Bùi Văn Nguyễn, "Thân Sơn Ngô Quang, một trong những bộ tướng xuất sắc của Phan Đình Phùng" (Thân Sơn Ngô Quang, one of the brilliant commanders under Phan Đình Phùng), NCLS, no. 143 (Mar.-April, 1972); and Lê Thúc, "Làng Trưng-lê trong phong trào chống Pháp" (The Trưng-lê village in the anti-French movement), NCLS, no. 152 (Sept.-Oct., 1973).


12 Cao Xuân Tùng, "Con đường xuất đường qua Thái" (Route of exodus abroad through Thailand), unpublished memoirs in the Archives of Commission for the Study of the History of the Party, Hanoi.


18 Lê Manh Trinh, op. cit., p. 23; Nguyễn Tài and Hoàng Trung Thực, loc. cit.; and Đông Tùng, loc. cit.

19 Lê Manh Trinh, op. cit., p. 23.


21 Nguyễn Tài and Hoàng Trung Thực, loc. cit.; Đông Tùng, "Việt Kiều tại Thái Lan" (The Vietnamese Residents in Thailand), Sứ Đạ, no. 16, 1969.

22 Lê Manh Trinh, op. cit., pp. 24-25, 33-34.


25 Lê Manh Trinh, op. cit., p. 33; Lê Manh Trinh, "Những ngày ở Quảng Châu và ở Xiêm" (The days in Kwangchow and in Thailand), in Bác Hồ (Uncle Hồ) (Hanoi: Nxb Văn Học, 1960), pp. 101-02. Flood also provided some details about Nguyễn Ai Quốc’s activities in Thailand: see Flood, loc. cit.

26 Lê Manh Trinh, 1961, op. cit., p. 28; Nguyễn Tài, "Nhớ lại những ngày dìa Bác Hồ từ Thái Lan sang xây dựng cơ sở cách mạng ở Lào" (Remembering the days when I led Uncle Hồ from Thailand to Laos to establish revolutionary base), Tạp chí Công san (Review of Communism), no. 12, 1986.

27 For further details, see my article in Japanese, "Some theoretical considerations on ethnicity in Indochina and Vietnam," Tôyō Bunka (Oriental Culture), Institute of Oriental Culture, University of Tokyo, no. 64, 1984.


29 Thế Tạp, "Gop phan tim hieu them ve dong chi Nguyen Ai Quoc voi viec thanh lap Dang ta" (Contribution to a further understanding of Comrade Nguyễn Ái Quóc as to the founding of our party), Tạp chí Công san, no. 5, 1982.

Minh, representative of the Third International, came (to Thailand) and set up the Siam Communist Party (Phak Khommunit Sayam) as a section of the Third International." Flood, loc. cit.


32 This principle was specified in the Comintern’s regulations adopted at the Sixth Congress in 1928.

33 For further details, see my article in Japanese "The Indochinese Communist Party’s search for a reorganization of the region," Ajia Kenkyû (Asian Studies), vol. 26, no. 4, 1980.

34 Nguyễn Như, loc. cit.; Lê Ngôn, loc. cit.

35 Unpublished photocopy in the Archives of the Commission for the Study of the History of the Party, Hanoi. The original was written in English.

36 Ibid.


38 Lê Ngôn, loc. cit.

39 Ibid. See also Ban nghiên cứu lịch sử Đảng tỉnh ủy Hà Tĩnh, Lịch sử Đảng bộ Tỉnh Hà Tĩnh (History of the Hà Tĩnh Provincial Party Branch) (Hà-Tĩnh: 1971), p. 50; Đảng Thông and Đông Tùng, "Độc tài liệu của Sở Mật thám Đông-duong về Đông-duong cộng sản đảng" (Reading the documents of the Sûreté in Indochina on the Indochinese Communist Party), Sứ Đa, no. 17-18, 1970.

40 Ban nghiên cứu lịch sử Đảng tỉnh ủy Hà Tĩnh, op. cit., pp. 50-51.


42 Nguyễn Như, loc. cit.

43 Huỳnh Kim Khánh, op. cit., p. 173.


45 Lê Ngôn, loc. cit.

46 Nguyễn Tài, loc. cit.


49 Interview with Nguyễn Hào Hùng; Lê Ngôn, loc. cit.
50 Lê Ngôn, loc. cit.

51 For further details see my article "Indoshina no togo: shokuminchi-tekki Indoshina toatarashii Indoshina" (Integration of Indochina: Colonial Indochina and New Indochina), Kokusai Selfi (International Relations), vol. 84, 1987.

52 Trung Chinh, op. cit., p. 114; Nguyễn Như, loc. cit.


57 Ichikawa, op. cit., p. 86; "Sự nguy ngập cuả Việt-kieú ở Xiêm" (The danger of the Vietnamese residents in Thailand), Tiếng Dân (Voice of the People; Huế) no. 986 (Nov. 17, 1936); Lê Manh Trinh, 1961, op. cit., pp. 45-47.

58 Nguyễn Như, loc. cit.; Lê Ngôn, loc. cit. The Northeastern Regional Committee of the CPS was reorganized in winter 1934, but all Committee members were still Vietnamese.

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61 Interview with Nguyễn Hào Hùng.

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73 Poole, op. cit., pp. 40-41.

74 Ibid., pp. 36-37; Interview with Trần Văn Giàu, July 9, 1982.

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76 The ICP’s Eighth Central Executive Session (Hội nghị cán bộ Trung ương) held in August 1948 decided on a new policy of bringing Vietnamese communists in Thailand into the Thai Communist Party. This policy may appear to be a response to the “Cold War” situation, but it also seems to have been inconsistent with the move toward “national Communist Parties” in both Indochina and Thailand. In practice, this policy was not implemented mechanically, as some Vietnamese moved into the Thai Communist Party, while others still belonged to the ICP. See “Tình hình và nhiệm vụ mới của Đảng (Báo cáo của đồng chí Lê Đức Thọ, Ủy viên thường vụ Trung ương, tại Hội nghị cán bộ lần thứ V, 8-16 Aug. 1948)” (The new situation and new tasks of the Party: Report by Lê Đức Thọ) in Trương Đặng Nguyên Ai Quốc, Văn kiện lịch sử Đảng (Historical documents of the Party; Hanoi), vol. VI.

77 For further details, see my article in Kokusai Seiji.

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THREE POEMS BY PHAN BỘI CHÂU

Translated by Huỳnh Sanh Thông

ĐÔNG DU KỲ CHỮ ĐÔNG CHÍ

I

Đính thiên lập địa hào nam phi,
Khằng hữu can khôn tự chuyển đi.
U bạch niệm trung tự hưu ngã,
Khơi thiên tài hâu cánh vô thủy?
Giang sơn tụ hi sinh như nhũ nhũ,
Hiền thành liễu tiện túng diện si,
Tiến trực trường phong dòng hài khu,
Còn ba kinh lang nhất tế phi.

II

Khả vỡ thiên địa, khả vỡ thân,
Thủ kiến mang mang quyết kiếp tran.
Khước sỉ sinh ử thiên tài hả,
Do nằng thân kiến ngũ châu xuân.
Quan hạ mộng lỷ kinh niên tuyệt,
Vụ trì kỳ quan trực nhất tận.
Ký ngữ thưởng thưởng dòng hài ngoại,
Nhu hải như như tuy cánh hà nhân?

(1905)
TO ALL COMRADES AS I GO EAST

[Full of determination and optimism, Phan wrote this poem on a boat from Haiphong to Mocay, on his first trip to Japan.]

I

A man stands tall between the sky and earth —
let not the cosmos turn at Heaven’s whim.
Within this century we fulfill a need —
in future times will no one carry on?
Our homeland lost, to live would be for naught.
The saints and sages dead, to pray wastes breath.
I’ll ride the wind and cross the Eastern Sea
as sharks and whales all splash and play wild waves.

II

No earth, no heaven? There would be no man.
A hero roams at large and sees man’s realm.
To posterity he will leave no shame —
he can admire five continents with joy.
His dreams of old are past and gone for years —
the world begets new wonders day by day.
These words are sent to those beyond the sea:
who are the ones, zeal-mad and passion-drunken?

(1905)

TÂI CHÚ BÂ LINH GIA CAM TẮC

Ý lầu nam vồng nhất bơi hơi,
Tâm tự nhủ van vật bất khai.
Sầu vù thấm cảnh nhân ám khắp,
Ta đường sở nguyệt nhân cỏ hối.
Khá vọ dại họa tiêu sầu Khử,
Thiện hữu cương phong tổng hận lại,
Cô ẩn tự liên hoàn tự tiểu,
Đồng báo như thư nghĩa hạ ai!

(1910)
A POEM INSPIRED WHILE AT CHU PO-LING'S HOUSE

[Composed by Phan following his expulsion from Japan and the collapse of the Đông-du Movement. Chu was an old Chinese lady who generously provided Phan with home and meals during his frustrating days in Canton.]

Upstairs, I daily brood as I gaze south.
My heart's a raveled skein of mists and clouds.
A night of rain — a man sits hushed and weeps.
Through dusk, a peeping moon — stray geese wing home.

There is no blaze to burn up all my griefs — towards me stormwind blows more rage and wrath.
Alone, I feel self-pity and self-scorn — how can my sorrows match my people's woes?

(1910)
nhĩ mình mình lưu ngán ngẻ tháng ngày?
Chăng język gì sao, hay làm mãi?
Lắm mái sao chẳng cái gì thành?
Tai ai hay thọ bài mình?
Tai mình hay cùng sự-tình tai ai?"
Bông nghệ hỏi thọ đại mà nói:
"Kẻ đầu đầu thưa tôi tại ông,
Miếng đói đọc ngọt gián nào,
Cao aiيلا gà mà ông nghệ liều?
Ông xem xét càng nhiều hồ-hùng,
việc trầm nấm tưởng như ngã mái.
Lồng ai ông tưởng như ai,
biet đầu rần rành nai đây đường.
Người lần đâu ông càng số bưng,
trước bây mà phanh giọng phát linh.
Người sao chúng trọc mình thanh,
quống sao chúng tùy mình tình là gì?
Ông chẳng thấy tôi nay danh-gia,
chàng gì hồn xe ngựa lâu dài.
Nơi cơn ăn áo là rồi,
ai còn nghi đến việc ngoài thân-gia.
Đầu lịch-sử ông chưa thấy kể,
húc hay vinh họ kể gì đâu.
Việc gì ông cứ bỏ bò,
trong thiên-tha kể rất ngai bằng.
Ông thiếu dat nặng trạng xuống hòi,
xem Như tôi tôi nơi phải chẳng?"
Nghe lời ông lại dẫn lòng
rằng xe trước đó còn họng xe sau,
Bồng hỏi bông, giấm như tình ròn,
con sau này với bạn tâm-trì.
Vừng treng yu an non táy,
Trời đông rung rung lại may với ta.

(1933)
MY SHADOW AND I

[In this poem Phan expressed his loneliness and disappointment as he lived under house arrest in Huế from 1925.]

It's night — I'm dangling here beneath the sky.
I've asked some questions — Heaven, though, keeps mum.
The moon, the stream — between, there's only I:
to my own shadow let me say some words.
Ah, what a quick-tongued chap my shadow is!
At once he opens his big mouth and speaks:
"Where can you find so true a friend as I?
Sit down, stand up, walk out — I follow you.
Yet, for some reason, you still look quite sad,
and so you make me feel unhappy too.
Is something rankling here, inside your breast?
Unburden what you think and and let me hear."
"I did want to, but in the dead of night,
I feared a lengthy speech might bore you stiff.
Wasn't it strange that Heaven's wife would choose
to drop down here a fellow like this man?
The earth rang with a whine — the race of gods and dragons overnight got one more son:
a pair of gleaming eyes, two sensitive ears,
a handsome body, rather tall and huge;
a nice, round head that holds a deep, deep brain;
a beard and brows such as become a man.
Were Europe and America short of space?
I was plunked down in this Vietnam's mid part.
Why wasn't I born deaf and dumb as well?
Why have I always taken burdens on,
trying to kick at heaven with bare feet,
striving to move the hills with naked hands?
Doesn't my tongue get jaded clattering so?
My heartstrings I keep spinning, but what for?
And is my body made of stone or steel

so bullets may be shot at it as butt?
Haven't they had enough of dust and storm,
my heart and soul, unyielding, firm as rocks?
What thoughts and whims keep churning day and night
within myself, bewildering my poor head?
What serves no purpose why keep doing still?
Why stick with it and win not one success?
Is it somebody's fault or is it mine?
If I am blameless, then who is to blame?"
My shadow's heard me out — he sighs and says:
"From first to last, my friend, it's all your fault.
The world's forked tongues spill venom sweet as mead —
why do you lend a ready ear to lies?
You don't think matters through and lightly treat a lifetime task as if it were a game.
You take all human hearts to be like yours,
quite unaware that highroads crawl with snakes.
The guileless you suspect — you give your trust to friends who spout the Buddha's holy word.
Thickheaded, you stay clean in this foul crowd.
Insane, you stay awake while others sleep.
But don't you see that glory in these times means horse and carriage, mansions, real estates.
Eat well, dress warm — that's all there is to life!
Who cares for what takes place outside his home?
About our history who will give a damn?
Of shame and honor they take no account.
Why cling on to what's none of your concern?
Yes, under heaven, you're the champion fool!
Invite Miss Moon down here — ask what she thinks and see if I've told you the truth or not."
I've heard those words — admonishing myself,
I vow I shan't repeat my old mistakes.
O shadow, tarry here and help me out —
stay by my side and be my bosom friend.
The moon’s just dipped behind those western
heights —
the east will shine again on you and me.

(1933)

PHAN BÔI CHÂU AND THE ĐÔNG-DU MOVEMENT:
A SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY

This bibliography is focused on the Đông-du Movement and Phan Bội Châu, its main leader. Apart from the materials available in the Library of Congress and other major centres for Asian studies in the United States, in the British Museum, and in the Bibliothèque Nationale, in the last fifteen years or so, helpful bibliographies have been published on the subject, most notably Georges Boujardel’s “Bibliographie des oeuvres relatives à Phan Bội Châu éditée en quốc ngữ à Hanoi depuis 1954,” and the bibliographies appended to in David Marr’s Vietnamese Anti-colonialism, 1885-1925, William Duiker’s The Rise of Vietnamese Nationalism, and Shiraishi Massaya’s “Meiji makki no zai-Nichi Betonamujin to Aja shominzoku renkei no kokoromi” (Attempts by Vietnamese in Japan to co-operate with other Asians in late Meiji). This bibliography is thus a modest attempt to combine selectively, supplement, and update the above. In order to provide a basis for further research on the subject, I have tried to include both retrospective and current materials in Western, Vietnamese, Chinese, and Japanese languages. Nonetheless, the following bibliography by no means can be claimed as exhaustive. Any comments or additions to this bibliography will be appreciated.

Insofar as primary and secondary source materials on Phan Bội Châu are concerned, the state of their collection and conservation is still far less than desirable: parts of the materials are scattered in libraries and archives located on different continents. As a first step, scholars would certainly benefit from the publication of a comprehensive collection of Phan’s works. Also, as Professor Nguyễn Khắc Kham has noted in his article in this volume, for the sake of verification, it is crucial that Phan’s original writings in literary Chinese should be published along with their quốc ngữ translations.

Vĩnh Chính

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