THE CAMBRIDGE HISTORY OF CHINA

Volume 9
Part Two: The Ch'ing Dynasty to 1800

edited by
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Map 1. The Ch’ing empire: physical features
The Ch’ing Empire

- Grand canal
- Great wall
- Pass
- Trade route

Map 1. (cont.)
CONTENTS

List of figures and tables  page x
List of maps  xi
Preface to Volume 9, Part Two  xiii
Ch’ing dynasty rulers to 1850  xv

Introduction: The Ch’ing dynasty, the Ch’ing empire, and the Great Ch’ing integrated domain  1
by Willard J. Peterson

1 Governing provinces  16
by R. Kent Guy
   The Shun-chih reign: taking over from the Ming government  19
   The K’ang-hsi reign: empowering civilian governors  27
   The Yung-cheng reign: controlling governors from the center  47
   The Ch’ien-lung reign: subordinating governors and extracting wealth  58

2 Taiwan prefecture in the eighteenth century  77
by John Robert Shepherd
   Ch’ing taxation and administration of aborigines  82
   Restrictions on immigration  84
   The Chu I-kuei rebellion of 1721  86
   Colonization policy debates in the post-rebellion period  88
   The Ta-chia-hsi and Wu Fu-sheng revolts of 1731–2  91
The role of the plains aborigines 94
The growth of Han settler society 99
The Lin Shuang-wen rebellion and its aftermath 105

3 The Extension of Ch’ing rule over Mongolia, Sinkiang, and Tibet, 1636–1800 111
by Nicola Di Cosmo

The Ch’ing expansion in Inner Asia 117
The Li-fan yüan’s structure and functions 135

4 Tributary relations between the Chosŏn and Ch’ing courts to 1800 146
by Lim Jongtae

The uneasy tributary situation in late Ming 146
Manchu leaders force changes in the tributary relation 149
Chosŏn as the model tributary state of the Ch’ing? 153
Tributary relations in practice 156
Korea’s divided loyalty 164
Korean tribute embassies as the medium for cultural transfers 173
Trade between Korea and the Ch’ing 177
Cultural transfers to Korea and their impact in the eighteenth century 186

5 The emergence of the state of Vietnam 197
by John K. Whitmore and Brian Zottoli

Governments under competing families 202
Effects of contacts with the Ch’ing regime on state development in Vietnam 210
Socioeconomic forces and political crises 219
The rise of the new state of Vietnam 226

6 Cultural transfers between Tokugawa Japan and Ch’ing China to 1800 234
by Benjamin A. Elman

Tokugawa assessments of the effects of the Manchu conquest 236
Chinese learning and Tokugawa society 240
Appropriation of Ming–Ch’ing law and the “Sacred edict” 249
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Contents</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Medical practice and medical philology in eighteenth-century Japan</td>
<td>251</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japanese editions of books in Chinese and their way back to the Ch'ing empire</td>
<td>254</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7 Ch'ing relations with maritime Europeans</td>
<td>264</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>by John E. Wills, Jr. and John L. Cranmer-Byng†</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Early Ch'ing, 1644–90</td>
<td>265</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peaceful expansion, 1690–1740</td>
<td>276</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Patterns of trade through the eighteenth century</td>
<td>286</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The turn to restrictions, 1740–1780</td>
<td>299</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New directions, 1780–1800</td>
<td>311</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Some conclusions</td>
<td>325</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8 Catholic missionaries, 1644–1800</td>
<td>329</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>by John W. Witek†</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Schall encounters Yang Kuang-hsien</td>
<td>333</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Canton conference</td>
<td>336</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The K'ang-hsi emperor and Verbiest</td>
<td>338</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>French Jesuits at the Ch'ing court</td>
<td>342</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maigrot's directive</td>
<td>344</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Papal legations to the Ch'ing court</td>
<td>347</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Western medicine and map-making</td>
<td>353</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The second papal legation and its aftermath</td>
<td>356</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Yung-cheng emperor and Christianity</td>
<td>360</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The missions and the Ch'ien-lung emperor</td>
<td>363</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conclusion</td>
<td>368</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9 Calendrical learning and medicine, 1600–1800</td>
<td>372</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>by Chu Pingyi</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Calendrical learning</td>
<td>373</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medicine</td>
<td>398</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10 Taoists, 1644–1850</td>
<td>412</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>by Vincent Goossaert</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political control of Taoism under the Ch'ing</td>
<td>416</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cheng-i clergy and Chang Heavenly Master</td>
<td>429</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Ch'üan-chen clergy</td>
<td>436</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
11 Arguments over learning based on intuitive knowing in early Ch'ing
by Willard J. Peterson

Liu Tsung-chou's legacy
Huang Tsung-hsi to 1678
The first generation probes Sung learning
The second and third generations of men focusing on moral self-cultivation
An epistemological mire

12 Advancement of learning in early Ch'ing: Three cases
by Willard J. Peterson

Fang I-chih looks to things
Ku Yen-wu exhibits a new model for learning
Wang Fu-chih thinks for himself about the past

13 Dominating learning from above during the K'ang-hsi period
by Willard J. Peterson

Government initiatives in sponsoring learning
High officials' individual initiatives
Individuals' contributions to learning in the new climate

14 Political pressures on the cultural sphere in the Ch'ing period
by Wang Fan-sen

Literary inquisitions and intimidations
Self-censorship in the production, publication, and consumption of texts
Effects of political pressures and self-censorship

15 Changing roles of local elites from the 1720s to the 1830s
by Seunghyun Han

Imposition of controls over local elites' contributions in the eighteenth century
Changing incidence of state recognition of contributions by local elites
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CONTENTS</th>
<th>ix</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Policies on enshrining local worthies</td>
<td>683</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State control of publication of local gazetteers</td>
<td>691</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conclusion</td>
<td>700</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Bibliography*  
702

*Glossary–Index*  
780
FIGURES AND TABLES

FIGURES

15.1 Number of contributions recorded in the Shih-lu for the Chia-ch'ing and Tao-kuang reigns  page 673
15.2 Cases of memorial arches for selected years between 1736 and 1850  674
15.3 Cases of honorific rank and title (i-hsii) for selected years  675

TABLES

1.1 Locations of Ming grand co-ordinators (hsii-fu) and Ch'ing provincial governors (hsii-fu)  25
1.2 Percentages of governors promoted from lieutenant governor  38
1.3 Fines paid by eight officials who had served as provincial governors to the Secret Accounts Bureau of the Imperial Household Department in 1787 and 1795  75
2.1 Growth of population and land area registered for taxation, 1684–1905  101
7.1 Estimated prices at Canton (in silver taels) and percentage change  298
15.1 Provincial distribution of recorded instances of contributions during the Chia-ch'ing and Tao-kuang reigns  676
15.2 The number of county and prefectural gazetteers in Chiang-nan and north China produced between 1644 and 1850, by reign  696
MAPS

1 The Ch'ing empire: physical features  
2 Eighteen provincial administrative units  
3 Main places of Taiwan prefecture  
4 Manchuria and eastern Mongolia  
5 Leagues and banners in Inner Mongolia  
6 Outer Mongolia under the K'ang-hsi emperor  
7 Central Asia in the mid-eighteenth century  
8 The Ch'ing empire and its neighbors in 1759  
9 Before Vietnam

page ii  
22  
81  
113  
121  
129  
133  
144  
203
PREFACE

The editor of this volume, like the editors of the previous volumes in The Cambridge History of China series, has accrued many debts of gratitude. The foremost debt is to the authors of the chapters gathered here. Their scholarly contributions are the heart and body of the volume. All of them have shown forbearance, and some have had to be more than patient. Two of the chapters and their authors were included in the early plan for Volume 9 proposed many years ago by the late Frederick Wakeman Jr., and two more were prepared but for thematic reasons could not be included in what was published as Part One in 2002. At the opposite extreme, one of the chapters, the last to be commissioned, was not completed until January 2014.

The chapter authors and I are indebted to the late Denis C. Twitchett, my mentor and former colleague, who envisioned and remained the main force behind the entire project that is The Cambridge History of China. The readers, the users, of this volume, without fully realizing it, are indebted to Michael A. Reeve, whose critical acumen contributed to clearer articulation of the ideas presented, whose care for bibliographical detail led to more accuracy in the bibliographical citations across a body of literature in more than a dozen languages from the past three centuries, and whose skills in data management facilitated the progress of this long and complicated project. I am also indebted to Jenny Chao-hui Liu for editorial help on some of the chapters, and to my colleague Susan Naquin, who selflessly contributed her knowledge of Ch'ing history and her skills as an editor to the preparation of several chapters. The editor alone is responsible for the errors, inconsistencies, and infelicities that remain.

The East Asian Studies Program at Princeton University, directed during the relevant years by Martin C. Collcutt and Benjamin A. Elman, generously supported The Cambridge History of China project in numerous direct and indirect ways. In addition, Benjamin Elman generously made funds available from the Mellon research grant he was awarded to help expedite the editing of
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Willard J. Peterson
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CH'ING DYNASTY RULERS TO 1850

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Personal name</th>
<th>Lived</th>
<th>Chinese name of reign period</th>
<th>Reign period (calendar years)</th>
<th>Chinese posthumous names</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Nurhaci</td>
<td>1559–1626</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>T'ai-tsu, Kao</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(unknown, referred to as Hung Taiji)</td>
<td>1592–1643</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>1627–43</td>
<td>T'ai-tsung, Wen</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fu-lin</td>
<td>1638–61</td>
<td>Shun-chih</td>
<td>1644–61</td>
<td>Shih-tsu, Chang</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hsüan-yeh</td>
<td>1654–1722</td>
<td>K'ang-hsi</td>
<td>1662–1722</td>
<td>Sheng-tsu, Jen</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yin-chen</td>
<td>1678–1735</td>
<td>Yung-cheng</td>
<td>1723–35</td>
<td>Shih-tsung, Hsien</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hung-li</td>
<td>1711–99</td>
<td>Ch'en-lung</td>
<td>1736–95</td>
<td>Kao-tsung, Ch'un</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yung-yen</td>
<td>1760–1820</td>
<td>Chia-ch'ing</td>
<td>1796–1820</td>
<td>Jen-tsung, Jui</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mien-ning, Min-ning</td>
<td>1782–1850</td>
<td>Tao-kuang</td>
<td>1821–50</td>
<td>Hsüan-tsung, Ch'eng</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
INTRODUCTION: THE CH'ING DYNASTY, THE CH'ING EMPIRE, AND THE GREAT CH'ING INTEGRATED DOMAIN

Willard J. Peterson

The ninth volume of The Cambridge history of China series has the title The Ch'ing dynasty to 1800. As in all other volumes of The Cambridge history of China, the term “dynasty” is used in four main senses. It is used most often in a temporal sense as a way of indicating a period of time, from the inaugural declaration to the end of a succession of rulers who, after the founder, mostly inherited their position as ruler. Such a line of rulers is by definition a dynasty. In many instances in The Cambridge history of China series, references to a family dynasty include not just rulers, but also their relatives by birth and marriage. “The dynasty” is also used in an extended sense to refer to the government apparatus that the dynastic family employs to try to maintain itself in power and attract or compel obedience. In this third sense, “the dynasty” can refer to the court, the state, and the government institutions, including the military, without specifying which is meant. “The dynasty” in this institutional sense can be imputed with agency as the subject of active verbs: “the dynasty did this or that,” or “the dynasty conquered here or there.” Because a dynasty – that is, the line of one family of rulers and its government – could, and did, fail, to be replaced by one or more other dynasties, each dynasty assigned itself a name.¹ The names of the dynasties in The Cambridge history of China series were not the name of a family, as in the histories of some other places, but a name associated with the family’s place of origin, or, from the thirteenth century on, a name indicative of some chosen symbolic value by which it meant to be known.

Each dynasty had a spatial or geographical dimension; that is, the area or territories the dynasty ruled, or claimed to rule. In The Cambridge history of China volumes, the name of the dynasty is also used to indicate that territorial extent. This fourth sense of the term “dynasty” appears as a name on a map, where it functions as the name of a country. The subtitle of each volume through Volume 11, except Volume 6, has the name of the dynasty or dynasties

¹ In contrast, the continuing line of emperors in Japan to the present day do not have a dynastic name.
being considered. (The subtitle of Volume 6 is *Alien regimes and border states, 907–1368*, which might imply that they were not dynasties, but in the chapters the Liao, Chin and Yüan regimes are referred to as dynasties.) As a convention, then, the dynastic name is used as shorthand for a period of time, a ruling family, a government, and the territorial extent under the rule of that government.

The territorial extent of the major dynasties considered in the first eleven volumes of *The Cambridge history of China* is generally referred to as an empire, modified by the name of the dynasty that ostensibly ruled it. In other words, “empire” is used to refer to the territory under the control of a dynastic ruler, who is routinely labeled an emperor. The cluster of terms — “empire,” “emperor,” and “imperial government” — are conventional and pervasive in the first eleven volumes of *The Cambridge history of China*.

What is conveyed by the term “empire” in these volumes? The word in English and French is derived from a Roman word for “commanding” (*imperare*), which gave rise to words for the one who had supreme command (*imperator*), and then for the territory controlled by him and his designates; that is, an empire (*imperium*). In other historical contexts, the word “empire” has usually been reserved for command over more than a few important territorial units, and is generally taken to be greater in extent than what is ruled by a king. There is a built-in presumption of military conquest or subordination of more territories under the control of one ruler. If there is a counterpart word in earlier Chinese texts for “empire,” it is usually taken to be *t'ien-hsia*, literally “all under Heaven,” where Heaven (*T'ien*) was understood to be a superior ancestral deity who is “up there” in the sky (*t'ien*). The term “all under Heaven” was used a thousand years before the Roman *imperium* to convey the idea of an extensive territory of subordinated units in principle under the formal control of one man. “All under Heaven” was used from the beginning of the Chou dynasty (1045–256 BCE) as a way of indicating what was under the nominal command of the Chou king, who was ritually referred to as the earthly counterpart and even descendant of Heaven (*t'ien tzu*). In other words, the early rhetorical claim was that the king should command all the people in all the areas that acknowledge Heaven (*t'ien*) as a deity; it was not a universal claim to rule all peoples everywhere. This claim remained as rhetoric, not description, as Chou dynasty kings never achieved that degree of direct control. In 221 BCE the king of Ch'in, who inherited a kingdom (*kuo*), completed the conquest of the six major rival kingdoms in what we now call north and central China. Still a king, he asked for and acquired a new, superior title, *huang-ti*, to mark

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his bringing together all under Heaven (ping t'ien-hsia). The new title, by convention, and in analogy to Rome a couple of centuries later, is rendered into English as “august emperor,” and is usually just “emperor” in The Cambridge history of China volumes. (To avoid the reference to Rome, some authors prefer to translate the title as “august thearch,” although that term does not have comparable implications in English.) An emperor/huang-ti, by his own or his ancestors’ military conquests, commanded an “empire.” This is where The Cambridge history of China series of volumes begins, with the founding of an effective empire in 221 BCE by the newly named first Ch’in emperor. (There had been dynasties of kings before, but 221 marks the beginning of dynasties of emperors.) The volumes published so far, up to Volume 10, are primarily concerned with a succession of imperial dynasties headed by emperors, with Volume 7 ending with the last claimants who would be rulers of the Ming empire in the seventeenth century.

Although “empire” is used as a conventional term in Volumes 1 through 9 published in The Cambridge history of China series, it is not a well-defined concept. In historical literature more generally, “empire” is a problematic, contested term. History books are filled with empires: not only Roman, but Greek, Persian, Byzantine, Holy Roman, Ottoman, Spanish, Portuguese, French, Russian, British, Japanese, and many more that themselves embraced the word “empire” or something like it as self-descriptive or have been ascribed that status by others, usually historians. Even among this small selection, the empires do not have much in common other than commanding more than a few significant territories and peoples beyond where they started or were based. There is no consensus on the taxonomy of “empire,” or on the criteria under which the label is to be applied or withheld. In recent times, the term “empire” generally has been used in a pejorative sense, an accusation against ambitious, multi-territorial exertions of power in conflict with the ideal of the nation-state. In these uses applied to more recent times, “empire” is generally

5 The secondary literature is enormous on the comparative study of empires. A place to begin is the brief consideration of what they call “universal empire through time and across cultures” in Peter Fibiger Bang and Dariusz Kolodziejczyk, “‘Elephant of India’: Universal empire through time and across cultures,” in Universal empire: A comparative approach to imperial culture and representation in Eurasian history, ed. Peter Fibiger Bang and Dariusz Kolodziejczyk (Cambridge, 2012), pp. 8–14 and 27–8. In addition to “universal empire” (understood in the singular, perhaps as an ideal type), another term that is invoked is “tributary empire.” See Peter Fibiger Bang and C.A. Bayly, Tributary empires in global history (New York, 2011). The discussions in both volumes selectively reference the Han, T’ang, Yuan, Ming, and Ch’ing empires, all of which partially fit the various criteria used to describe “empire.”
a negative term, usually with implications of being bad, of being exploitative of others, a mode of governance used in the past that need be renounced. Although some commentators have tried to point to more positive characteristics of some empires as systems of multinational control, when the area the Ch'ing leaders controlled is treated as still another iteration of “empire” the negative implications of the term do not go away.

Part One of Volume 9, which has the subtitle *The Ch'ing empire to 1800*, includes assessments of the four individuals who reigned as the Ch'ing emperor /huang-ti/ khan from 1644 to 1795. “Empire” is routinely used to characterize the territories that came under the Ch'ing government’s control. Whether we think of empire with the negative implications that the term has acquired in historiography from the twentieth century on, or as a conventional translation of the long-standing, positive Chinese term *t'ien-hsia*, all under Heaven, there are three problematic aspects to be noticed when we consider the historical developments antecedent to the Ch'ing dynasty’s “empire.”

The first problematic aspect is that there was no settled boundary, not even the Pacific shore, for the territorial limits of the succession of empires treated in *The Cambridge history of China* volumes. They cannot be regarded together as constituting a single empire under a succession of different dynastic names, even though by convention they are all referred to as “China” in the titles of the volumes. The boundaries of the areas controlled under the Han dynasties of the two Liu families (see Volume 1), under the T'ang dynasty of the Li family (see Volume 3), under the Sung of the Chao family (see Volume 5), and under the Ming dynasty of the Chu family (see Volume 7) had significant differences in every direction. The capitals of these five dynastic families were in different places. The origins and backgrounds of the five families were radically different. On the other hand, each of these five empires ruled populations of roughly fifty million persons or more. (By late Ming the population of the empire was in the range of two hundred million.) They each adopted the rhetorical claims entailed by using the title *huang-ti* (emperor) and *t'ien-hsia* (all under Heaven, or empire). They each contributed to the evolving technology of governance using imperial institutions. Together these five (some would say four) dynastic families, the two Liu, the Li, the Chao, and the Chu, from 200 BCE to 1650 or so provided the titular rulers for 1,200 of the 1,850 years. If more restrictive criteria for assessing the degree

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6 In a 1717 edict the K'ang-hsi emperor declared that in the 1,960 years since the first year of the founding Ch'ìn emperor (counting from when he first became king of Ch'ìn), there had been 211 people who had been named emperor (*huang-ti*) and had recognized reign periods for tracking historical events. See Jonathan D. Spence, *Emperor of China: Self-portrait of K'ang-hsi* (New York, 1974), p. 145.
of actual, effective imperial command over major parts of the empire exercised by the reigning emperors and their surrogates are applied, then the percentage of years of the collective rule of these five dynasties would be reduced from two-thirds to less than half the total years from 200 BCE to 1650. In either case, there has not been one continuous empire as a geographical or political entity.

The second problematic aspect of the use of the term “empire” in the volumes of The Cambridge history of China prior to the establishment of the Ch’ing dynasty is represented in the discussion of the founding of the Yüan dynasty. Khubilai (1215–94), a grandson of the great conqueror known as Chinggis (d. 1227), maneuvered to become the fifth great khan, or khaghan, in 1260, and he only proclaimed the Great Yüan dynasty to begin in 1272, with himself as huang-ti (emperor). Khubilai and his successors as khaghan commanded more inner Asian territory than any previous dynasty considered in The Cambridge history of China volumes. Their command of the former Chin and Sung territories was as august emperors (huang-ti), with titles, reign names, rituals, and calendars much like the emperors of previous long-lasting dynasties. This dual, blended, or blurred practice combining khan and emperor was not unprecedented, and later it was attractive to some Ming emperors and their advisers, who had designs on recovering control of territories to the north and west. So the second problematic aspect of deploying the label “empire” to characterize or describe the Yüan dynasty’s territory is that to do so is to treat Yüan as one more iteration of a succession of empires without asking whether it was something categorically different from what had gone before. We might ask whether the label “empire” has become too elastic, and therefore vague, when it is applied to dynasties from the thirteenth century on in the volumes of The Cambridge history of China.

When “empire” is used as the conventional translation for t’ien-hsia (all under Heaven), it obscures the later development of an added meaning for that Chinese word and some of its associated words. In part because of the succession of dynasties that included takeovers by outsiders, by the seventeenth century some historically minded writers sought to use t’ien-hsia not in a territorial sense, as in “empire,” but instead to refer to something more enduring. They argued that t’ien-hsia did not change just because there was a change of dynastic family and the extent of the territory it ruled. In their arguments t’ien-hsia was a term that conveyed something like civilization, or civilized values and

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practices. Left unsaid was that it was “our” civilization, the civilization of the writers making the claim. This interpretation added an ambiguity to what the term *t’ien-hsia* meant. In the mid-eighteenth century, early in his reign, the emperor is recorded as declaring, “I am master of all under Heaven” (*chen wei t’ien-hsia chu*). The context does not limit his meaning of *t’ien-hsia* to the territory he ruled, as in empire, or to a large, diverse set of subjugated peoples, whom he controlled as emperor and khan, or to a non-dynastic tradition of civilization and civilized values. The reader now cannot determine whether the emperor or his audience had such distinctions in mind, but “empire” seems to be an inadequate word to cover his grandiose claim.

As a descriptive term derived from Roman history for an extensive, conquered territory that is also used as a standard term for rendering *t’ien-hsia* (all under Heaven), “empire” is so pervasive in *The Cambridge history of China* volumes, including this one, that it cannot be abandoned. But considering an alternative might enhance understanding of what “empire” means in the specific context of Volume 9. Under the Great Yüan, the Great Ming, and the Great Ch’ing regimes, as they called themselves, the governments ordered massive compilations that assembled geographical information about all the areas under their purview. All three compilations went under the rubric of gazetteer (*chih*), as the genre is usually translated when it refers to materials about territorial units such as a county, a prefecture, a province, or a region. Instead of using “all under Heaven” as the term to indicate the inclusive territory covered in the three massive compilations, the successive sets of editors in their titles used the term “integrated domain” (*i-t’ung*). In his preface to the *Ta Ch’ing i-t’ung chih* (*Gazetteer of the Great Ch’ing integrated domain*), dated the first month of 1744, the Ch’ien-lung emperor explained that his grandfather had ordered a compilation to celebrate the great integrated domain (*ta i-t’ung*), but the work was not finished when he died. His father renewed the commitment. Now, ten years later, the emperor wrote, more than 350 draft chapters had been prepared, covering eighteen provinces (*sheng*) with more than 1,600 prefectures, sub-prefectures, and counties; fifty-seven outer territories (*wai fan*) and attached states (*shu kuo*); and beyond them the thirty-one places that had sent representatives bringing tribute. This was an integrated domain that


9 See chapter 14 below, note 33.

10 Preface dated the first month of 1744 by the Ch’ien-lung emperor, in *Ta Ch’ing i-t’ung chih: San-pai wu-shih-liu ch¨uan*, 1744 preface date, printed 1764. East Asian Library, Princeton University, Princeton. The date of the submission of the printed version is at the end of the book in a note by the compilers.
was layered out from the imperial center. Notice was taken of effectively independent places with which it had contacts, including the Chosŏn dynasty’s Korea and Japan of the Tokugawa shoguns to the east, an unstable Annan to the south, and countries such as Holland in the far west on the Western Ocean.\footnote{Information about Chosŏn Korea is in chapter 353, information about Annan in chapter 354, information about Japan in chapter 356, information about Western Ocean countries that had direct relations with the Ch'ing court in chapter 355. These countries are discussed in chapters in this volume, in this order.}

The term *i-t'ung* as “integrated domain” had a long history. According to an account produced a century later (with supposed quotations from participants’ speech), at the moment of the transformation of the king of Ch'in in 221 BCE into the first emperor (*huang-ti*), his chief adviser, Li Šsu, argued successfully against any allocation of territory to subordinates on an irrevocable, inheritable basis. In the course of his argument, Li Šsu used the conventional inclusive term, *t'ien-hsia* (all under Heaven), which had been commonly used during the no-longer-existing Chou dynasty. He meant the term more in the sense of the people now under the ruler’s command, not as the territory. As a premise of his argument he used “within the seas” (*hai nei*) in the sense of everywhere that counted, with a geopolitical connotation. He also used what was probably a newer term, *i-t'ung* (“integrated domain”): “Now everywhere within the seas has submitted to His Highness’s holy integrated domain.”\footnote{Ssu-ma, *Shih chi* 6, p. 239.} The important distinction, made explicit by Li Šsu, was that previously all under Heaven had been divided up into autonomous, inheritable political units controlled by successions of dynastic lords and tribal leaders nominally under a Chou king. He urged that the new “integrated domain” should be administered by appointed officials on a revocable, salaried basis, not by a hereditary elite. Acknowledging that the newly entitled *huang-ti* (august emperor) had brought together all under Heaven (*ping t'ien-hsia*), Li Šsu proposed a further distinction. “Everywhere within the seas there are now administrative units [that are not inheritable or militarily autonomous] and the rules come from the integrated domain [and are not determined locally]; this has never been the case since high antiquity.”\footnote{Ssu-ma, *Shih chi* 6, p. 236.} This early articulation of an unprecedented ideal of an integrated domain under a Ch'in ruler whose dynastic successors could continue indefinitely was not realized. The first emperor died in 210, and Li Šsu was dead in 208 BCE.

Was the ideal of an integrated domain without delegation or toleration of inherited control over militarily autonomous regions ever approximated? A partial answer, limited to Volume 9, is that as the three Ch'ing rulers...
by the mid-eighteenth century doubled their territory far beyond the initial conquests of the seventeenth century, what they conquered was not left as nominally or loosely controlled autonomous regions. They weakened existing claims of inherited territorial privilege by subordinated leaders, and they blocked new claims by Manchus, Mongols, and others in their domain. On the other hand, from the beginning the Ch'ing rulers did not impose a uniform administrative system. The eighteen provinces, sometimes called the inner areas (nei ti) and formed out of what mostly had been directly controlled Ming territory, were each administered by Ch'ing governors appointed by the emperor under a changing set of criteria (see chapter 1 below). Pairs of provinces and their governors were usually overseen by a proximate governor-general. Provincial government also was supervised routinely from the capital on a divided functional basis by the six ministries inherited from the Ming system, and through the second half of the eighteenth century on a strategic basis by the Grand Council (Ch'iu-ch'ii ch'iran), a mid-Ch'ing innovation. Following Ming practice, the Ch'ing government continued to divide each province into a hierarchy of prefectures (fu), sub-prefectures (chou) and counties (hsien).

The island of Taiwan is an example of a territory with a significant non-Han population that had not been under Ming control but was incorporated into the Ch'ing provincial hierarchy after its conquest in 1683 (see chapter 2). Although there were special circumstances, especially related to large-scale immigration, Taiwan illustrates the complexity of integrating new territory into the prefecture–county hierarchy that had been reconfirmed as areas formerly controlled by the Ming government were taken over by Ch'ing forces in the seventeenth century.

The Manchu emperors successively subordinated more non-Ming territories in Mongolia, Tibet, and Sinkiang, but without bringing them into the province–prefecture–county hierarchy. Some were placed first under the newly developed banner system, and all came under the mainly civil administration of a board that ultimately was known as the Li-fan yuan (sometimes called the “board for governing outer territories”), charged with overseeing outer territories (uai fan) (see chapter 3). The question of a unified administrative system could always be raised, if only rhetorically. In an interview in 1715 the K'ang-hsi emperor asked an official who had lived for a year in Mongol territory if Mongols could be governed by the ways of Han people (Han jen chih tao), meaning a provincial system. The answer, of course, was that it was not possible. Although they were administered separately, and differently, from

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14 See chapters 3–5 of The Cambridge history of China, Volume 9, Part 1, and chapters 2 and 3 of this volume.

the inner areas, the outer territories were functionally also incorporated into an integrated domain by the middle of the eighteenth century. In this respect, the Ch’ing system was moving close to satisfying Li Ssu’s main criterion of not allowing territorial, militarized lords to remain in place or to develop.

The three eighteenth-century Ch’ing rulers did allow hereditary elites. There was a privileged dynastic family, known as the Aisin Gioro clan, which included the pool of sons from which emperors were selected, but from which direct powers and also peripheral members were stripped away.\textsuperscript{16} Of more military and political consequence was the conquest elite.\textsuperscript{17} (Elite is used here in a simple, vague sense of a relatively small, discernible group that wields disproportionate power over other elements of society, and has protected status and access to wealth.) Conquest elites were descendants of bannermen, especially leaders, who served successfully during the years of the conquests of eastern Mongols and the Ming empire. These descendants inherited notable ranks in the Manchu, Mongol, and Han-ch‘un banners, and their elite status gave them advantaged possibilities of appointment to leadership roles in the Ch’ing government.\textsuperscript{18}

A separate, larger elite, the core of which was men recruited on the basis of a civil service examination system largely taken over from the Ming dynasty, staffed the bulk of the regular official posts in the civil bureaucracy in the capital and in the provincial administrative hierarchies down to the county level.\textsuperscript{19} Their status was not normally inheritable, although sons of important men had a comparative advantage, and the Ch’ing system began to allow the purchase of eligibility for appointment to office. This elite consisted of serving and retired officials, and it was augmented by holders of higher examination degrees who had not been appointed to office. Officials and higher-degree holders were themselves a superior subset of the larger pool of men known as literati (\textit{shih}) since the eleventh century. Literati in Ch’ing times can be identified by their ability to compose examination-level prose essays and poetry. They constituted more loosely defined, overlapping groups variously called the examination elite, the educated elite, the learned elite,
the scholar elite,\textsuperscript{20} and sometimes the intellectual elite. The autonomy of this elite group, involved in a culture of books that stretched back at least to the eleventh century, was gradually co-opted and constrained in the eighteenth century (see chapter 14).

Another term, “local elites,” refers to more diffuse groups that could include officials at home, literati, men of some wealth, and others active in local affairs (see chapter 15). Although the term “merchant elite” is not used in Volume 9, through the eighteenth century there was a noticeable increase in men who owned significant wealth derived principally from regional and overseas trade in salt, tea, and other processed commodities, separate from rents from real estate.

These several differently constituted but not wholly distinct elites – even the members of the imperial family and the conquest elite that had inherited status—all were effectively managed or intimidated by the three administrative emperors through the eighteenth century. The emperors pursued policies and practices that created the conditions under which the different elites, especially the successful leaders in each group, perceived an interest in working with the emperor in a modulated political competition for advantage over other elite groups. Under the simple criterion of an integrated domain that did not condone autonomous control of territory by individuals who had inheritable power, the emperors in the eighteenth century administered an integrated domain. In this volume it is called the Ch'ing dynasty and the Ch'ing empire, but it represented a new order that was categorically different from the “old” empires.\textsuperscript{21}

Given that all under Heaven (\textit{t'ien-hsia}) has sometimes been taken to imply a claim about “universal empire,” did Ch'ing emperors in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries recognize or accept limits on the extent of their control? The Ch'ing government tolerated different practices in handling its relations with neighboring areas that it did not take to be constituent parts of the directly administered areas under the six ministries or the \textit{Li-fan yüan}.

The government in Korea under the Chosŏn dynasty of kings maintained its independent administration, although it was coerced into accepting the status of tributary state to the Ch'ing government from 1637 on (see chapter 4). The Ch'ing government dominated but did not directly control the Chosŏn monarchy, and generally did not take notice of the Korean elites’ continuing ideological resistance to any implications of Manchu superiority. By having


autonomous, inherited control of their own economic and military resources, the Korean kings were not subordinated as part of an integrated domain under Li Ssu’s criterion. Neither were, in the south, the kings of Annan, who, like the kings of Korea, had a formal tributary relation to the Ming emperors that was transferred to the Ch’ing emperors in the seventeenth century. Through the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries the kings of Annan themselves were controlled by territorial lords who were at war with even more southern rivals. The Ch’ing government tolerated a disunited area with endemic warfare on the southern edge of their domain, and quickly withdrew from an attempted military intervention at the end of the eighteenth century. Ch’ing emperors never commanded what came to be known after 1802 as Vietnam (see chapter 5). The rulers of Korea and Vietnam maintained the formality of being in a tributary relation with the Ch’ing court, and at times used it to their advantage, even as they maintained their autonomy.

To the north of their territories, Ch’ing emperors negotiated and maintained an accommodation with the eastward-expanding Russian empire.22 Farther to the east, although some previous regimes in Japan had accepted a tributary relation to the rulers on the mainland, the Tokugawa regime from its founding at the beginning of the seventeenth century, in the aftermath of the failed Japanese invasion of the Korean peninsula, never entered into a tributary relation with the Ch’ing court, even while establishing commercial and cultural contacts with the Ch’ing empire via intermediaries (see chapter 6). In these cases – Korea under the Chosón kings, Annan nominally under the Le dynasty of kings, Russia under the Romanov tsars, and Japan under the Tokugawa shogunate – there were different degrees of tributary relations – from frequent to none – and also of non-tributary involvement through the eighteenth century. However, each of these countries had its own autonomous, hereditary rulers with their own significant military forces. They were not parts of an integrated domain in the sense put forward by Li Ssu, but they were accorded sections of the Gazetteer of the Great Ch’ing integrated domain as places that at some point in the past had paid tribute to an emperor.

The Gazetteer also named and loosely described certain European countries, even though these countries were not in any sense subordinated parts of a Ch’ing-controlled polity. In the early Ch’ing period representatives of European countries arrived in Macao and tried to present themselves to the authorities in Canton as their earlier counterparts had in Ming times as coming

from a tributary state. They were participating, along with others representing lesser political entities, in the formalities of being bearers of tribute in order to be allowed to trade at southern coastal cities. Some of these Europeans made it to the Ch'ing court in Peking, but from the 1680s on few Europeans were involved in embassies or as tribute bearers. They were trading on the southern, coastal edge of the Ch'ing empire, along with many others from other parts of a maritime system that extended from Nagasaki to Malacca and beyond (see chapters 5 and 7). The different, evolving practical arrangements that the Ch'ing government implemented in its relations with neighboring political entities and toward both state-sponsored representatives and other visitors who were primarily interested in trade together seem to show that limits were tacitly recognized for what was administered as an integrated domain.

In quite different circumstances, dozens of members of the Society of Jesus also passed through Macao. They traveled and lived in many parts of Ch'ing territory, even in Peking. Some of the Jesuits were spread out as missionaries in the provinces. A few were employed by the Ch'ing state on special projects, including serving as tutors to the emperor. The various countries in Europe from which the Jesuits came were clearly not part of an integrated domain, nor was the Society in Rome to which they belonged. All of them adapted to the constraints that were variably imposed by Ch'ing government officials at different levels, even as they disseminated Western knowledge through their teaching and their books published in Chinese. Some of the new knowledge was selected and incorporated, at the highest levels, in part because of the K'ang-hsi emperor's personal interest, into imperially endorsed publications in fields of knowledge such as calendar systems, astronomy, and mathematics. At the same time, from the beginning of the Ch'ing period, literati who were not affiliated with the government also read and wrote, and published, on the new knowledge (see chapters 8 and 9).

The potentially destabilizing new knowledge from Western countries in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries was accepted at the government level and among literati interested in the new ideas, although in the early eighteenth century the ideas began to be characterized as neither new nor fundamentally Western. Their acceptance raises the question whether the ideal of an integrated domain extended to cultural and intellectual production and circulation. The question also comes because Li Ssu, who articulated the concept of an integrated domain for territories under his ruler in 221 BCE,

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is held responsible for proposing at that time to burn potentially disruptive written material as a means to make it easier to maintain the new order under his new emperor. The Ch'ing government, from its inception in 1636, on occasion attempted to impose strict sanctions specifically against some printed books and manuscripts, and more generally against expressions of opinions that were intended to be, or might be construed as, critical of the contemporary conduct of government, but did it go to the extremes that are imputed to Li Ssu? A complicated answer must be considered in sectors and in stages of the Ch'ing period to the year 1800.

Textual materials produced and transmitted by medical practitioners and scholars investigating the rich heritage of medical knowledge were largely left unregulated by the Ch'ing government, as were most other types of technical knowledge. They were not political. Even knowledge related to the calendar, which always had implications for the legitimacy of its sponsoring government, was much less controlled than it had been in Ming times (see chapter 9). Another rich and deeply rooted written tradition had to do with Taoist writings. Like elite medical practitioners, Taoist clergy who participated in professional service activities at the Ch'ing court were generally left unregulated. Even farther outside the imperial purview were local clergy and lay adherents who performed ritual services and taught in the provinces throughout the realm. They went as unnoticed as the broad range of medical providers who operated on all levels of society (see chapter 10). On the other hand, in the eighteenth century, Jesuits from Europe were strictly limited in their missionary activities, and the few who remained after 1720 mostly served Ch'ing imperial interests.

In the first few decades of the Ch'ing period – that is, the 1640s to 1670s – literati who were not participating in government service in general were left to pursue their intellectual interests, although there were sanctions against expressions of views, whether in writing or in public speech, that could be construed as critical of the Ch'ing government and of the Manchus, or as sympathetic to the deposed Ming dynasty. A broad spectrum of interest continued after 1644 in refining and even reformulating the primary concerns left over from Ming times, especially interpretations of the grounds of moral understanding and the motives and means of moral cultivation and moral action. These were largely discussed in terms that were incompatible with

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24 Ssu-ma, Shih chi 6, pp. 254–5. Li Ssu’s proposal, which the Ch’in emperor supposedly endorsed, was made in direct response to a suggestion that the old ways be restored by granting inheritable privileges to relatives of the emperor and to his most accomplished officials; that is, to back away from the concept of an integrated domain because it did not create inheritable political units with substantive military and fiscal powers.
the established teachings that the new Ch'ing government had taken over from Ming times in determining who would succeed in the civil examination system. These aspects of what is still characterized as Ming thought were not overthrown along with the Ming government, and Ch'ing authorities took little notice of this discourse (see chapter 11). They endorsed the authority of the mainstream Sung dynasty interpretations of classical learning for the purposes of the examination system that continued without interruption.

The Ch'ing institutions of territorial control stabilized, and as it transpired they contributed to almost a century without war (from 1680 to 1770) within the provinces and in the more central areas administered under the *Li-fan yulan*. During that time, three successive Ch'ing emperors took an increased interest in, and exerted greater control over, intellectual production. On the positive side, they patronized groups of scholars at the capital who produced a series of major publications, some of them massive, that were intended to establish unified, dominating interpretations of important aspects of the cultural heritage. There was a darker side, which included intellectual suppression and self-censorship (see chapter 14). As arbiters of the new political order, these emperors presumed they could have control over cultural values. They were proactive in asserting that control. The Ch'ien-lung emperor was interested in writings that merited patronage, preservation, and transmission, but also in eliminating, almost as Li Ssu had proposed, writings that might be disruptive of social order. At least in some of the imperial rhetoric, all the social practices for all in his realm came under the authority of the emperor.25 The government in Peking and its extension into the provincial hierarchy controlled who among the local elite in the counties could be rewarded publicly, what could be written in local gazetteers and other official publications, and much more. The Ch'ien-lung emperor extended the positive and negative effects of imperial control over intellectual production and preservation, and he wanted to do so over social norms. After he retired in 1795, the imperial center's direct influence began to retract. Writers, readers, and collectors of books experienced a reduction of central government involvement in their scholarly pursuits. Local elites began to recover some autonomy in local cultural and political affairs (see chapter 15).

Was there an integrated domain by 1750 in the sense, going back to Li Ssu, of a territorial administrative system that did not have constituent parts that were inheritable and militarily autonomous? The answer seems to be yes. Was there an integrated domain that extended central control over significant, but not all, portions of the cultural and intellectual spheres, especially those that might serve as sources of dissent? In spite of the censorship and disruptions,

25 See chapter 14 below, pp. 616–17.
the answer seems to be not yet clear, even in the 1770s when imperial pressures were at their most extreme.

The new order that the three eighteenth-century emperors were instrumental in building, whether or not it is regarded as an integrated domain, did not last long. As Volume 10 of The Cambridge history of China shows, this new order (described in the Introduction to Volume 10 as the old order) was less effective through the nineteenth century, although few would have predicted that outcome in the year 1800, when the coverage in this volume mainly ends.

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Under the Ch'ing dynasty, provincial governors (hstin-fu) played vital roles in each of the six traditional divisions of administration: personnel, finance, justice, war, ritual, and public works. Provincial governors supervised lower-level officials in the prefectures and counties, appointing some and dismissing and recommending others as need and opportunity arose. Assisted by lieutenant governors (pu-cheng shih), who in Ming times had effectively been provincial finance commissioners, Ch'ing governors were responsible for expenditures made from provincial treasuries, which held roughly one-quarter of the revenues collected by the dynasty. Governors oversaw and often personally attended provincial examinations, an important step in the civil service examination ladder, supervised by the Ministry of Rites. They provided logistical support for military garrisons located in their provinces, and themselves commanded garrison forces. They supervised and were responsible for financial accounting on local engineering projects, and reviewed all criminal and civil sentences meted out by local officials before such cases were sent to the capital for approval. Not only were they important functionaries; provincial governors also had the privilege of writing palace memorials, documents on which modern studies of the Ch'ing government and its capacities at the local level rest.

Strong, stable provincial government in the Ch'ing period was a relatively new phenomenon, as previous dynasties had not found it easy to delegate authority over province-sized units. Territorial leaders who were powerful enough to be effective in administration, like the regional commissioners (mu) of the later Han, or the military commissioners (chieh-tu shih) of the T'ang, posed challenges to the central government, particularly when they

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were located on the borders. Conversely, those units that were controlled by the center, like T'ang prefectures (fu), were too small and numerous to extract sufficient resources to maintain order when faced with larger military threats. The Yüan dynasty (1271–1368) contributed most to the institutional development of provinces in the late imperial period. Forced by the extent of their conquests to delegate territorial control, the Mongol leaders set borders for province-like units, and adopted the practice of transferring qualified officials from one to another of the areas they had conquered. Lacking in some cases even the language of those they governed, Yüan governors remained dependent on the central government’s control of military and economic resources. If the Mongol-appointed territorial administrators were to survive in their regional postings, they had to learn to deploy Yüan power effectively. The weakness of this system was that within each large territorial unit authority was delegated separately to multiple officials, one each to oversee civilian and military matters, as well as to an ombudsman-like provincial censor to assess the officials’ performance. Co-ordinating the activities of these separate administrators was a constant problem, and made consistent, stable regional administration difficult.

Nine years after declaring himself emperor, the founding ruler of the Ming dynasty, Chu Yüan-chang (r. 1368–98), instituted a major reform in civil administrative practice. He converted branch secretariats (hsing-chung-shu-sheng) that had been developed by the Yüan government into the seats of commissioners for the promulgation and dissemination of government policies (ch’eng-hsüan pu-cheng shih), in effect offices of provincial civilian administration. In 1426 the Ming government began the practice of using grand co-ordinators (hüin-fu) to manage both military and civilian affairs in particular regions of the empire. Over the course of the Ming period, thirty-one posts for grand co-ordinators were created. During the 1420s and 1430s most of them were

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sent to areas south and west of the new capital in Peking: Chekiang, Shan-
tung, Shansi, Honan, Kiangsi, and Hu-kuang.\footnote{In the Ming, some grand co-ordinators were identified by the names of the region they governed, often comparable to a modern province, and some were identified by the city at which they were posted. This practice persisted in the early Ch'ing, but by the mid-Ch'ing most governors were identified by the name of their province.} Between 1435 and 1475, grand co-ordinators were appointed along the empire’s frontiers and around the capital area at Shun-t’ien, Shensi, Kansu, Liaotung, Pao-ting, Hsuan-fu, Ta-t'ung, Ninghsia, Yen-sui, and Szechwan.\footnote{In a number of these cases, hsüén-fu were posted at the sites where Ming princes had been earlier enfeoffed, with some expectation that they could lead the defense there. Unofficial sources indicated that a second hsüén-fu was also established in Szechwan at Sung-p’an. There was also a hsüén-fu established in T’ung-chou, but the function of this official, minding the transport of grain to the capital, was quite different from that of the other officials who held the title.} In the sixteenth century, most new grand co-ordinator positions were located farther to the south, the scenes of violence between the state’s representatives and local bandit groups in Kwangtung, Kwangsi, Kweichow, Yunnan, Yün-yang, Nan-kan, Fukien, and P’ien-yüan in Hu-kuang. In the seventeenth century, as threats to Ming territories appeared on the northern frontier, grand co-ordinators were established at strategic locations to protect the two capitals: at Tientsin, Ch'eng-tien, Mi-yün, An-ch'ing, Teng-lai, and Huai-yang.\footnote{Hsüén-fu were established briefly at Shanhaikuan, Ch'ang-p'ing, and Ch'eng-te.} By 1644, more than half the grand co-ordinators were located within one day’s horse ride of Peking. In the late sixteenth century, when the grand co-ordinators had proved inadequate to the task of defending the dynasty, the position of supreme commander (tsüng-fu) was created on top of the grand co-ordinators. This was the situation when the Ch'ing leaders took over.

Change in the provincial order after 1644 was not the product of a grand design for governing that Manchu rulers brought with them to Peking, although elements of their system reflected their military experience. Rather, the new order was developed in response to shorter-term economic and political pressures, and represented a kind of institutional bricolage, a hybrid transformation of existing institutions to suit new purposes. Ch'ing rulers, through their regularized appointments of governors (hsüén-fu) and other strategic institutional innovations, gradually created a powerful post that could serve as a vehicle for both administrative reform and the maintenance of peace and stability. The office of provincial governor developed in four stages, corresponding roughly to the reigns of the first four Ch'ing emperors.

During the Shun-chih reign (1644–61), the Ch'ing leaders established a geographical framework for civilian administration. They rejected as too costly the multiple, redundant military postings of the late Ming. They delineated administrative boundaries that in many cases survive today. In the later
seventeenth century, during the K'ang-hsi reign (1662–1722), the multiple territorial delegates of central authority under the Ming and Yüan systems were eliminated, creating a new, streamlined, and largely civilian provincial governorship. The Yung-cheng emperor (r. 1723–35) used his powers of special appointment to place in office men who would not have qualified under previous procedures. He also used a new secret palace memorial system to establish personal ties with those who represented him in the provinces. The reign of his son and successor, the Ch'ien-lung emperor (r. 1736–96), saw a further centralization of provincial administration, with governors serving as the functional subordinates of the Grand Council (Chün-chi-ch'ü), a new and powerful administrative institution. Governors’ appointments and tenures were subordinated to the interests and emphases of the men who served successively as chief grand councilors.

**THE SHUN-CHIH REIGN: TAKING OVER FROM THE MING GOVERNMENT**

Changes in the institution of governor (hsüin-fu) began soon after the Ch'ing occupation of Peking in 1644. The new rulers set out to fashion a territorial administration for the Ming areas that they were acquiring. In the spring of that year, the questions to be addressed were fairly basic ones: where should provincial governors be positioned, and who should occupy the posts? The answers that evolved through the first reign after the fall of the Ming dynasty foreshadowed the subsequent development of Ch'ing territorial government in the conquered Ming areas.

The locations of provincial governors

Ch'ing rulers, like those of previous dynasties, balanced historical precedents against political and fiscal needs as they decided where to post territorial personnel. The Manchus’ centrally controlled armies achieved domination over northern Ming areas in 1644–5, and Han-chüen bannermen were installed as governors-general (tsung-tu) of the newly conquered territories. These Han-chüen bannermen had performed well during the first phase of the conquest,

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8 In discussions of Ming history, tsung-tu is usually translated as “supreme commander”; for Ch'ing history, tsung-tu is translated as “governor-general.” On the establishment of governors-general, see Ta Ch'ing bai-tien shih-li (1899; Peking, 1901), ch. 23, pp. 1–3; Chao-Erh-hsün et al., Ch'ing shih (Yang-ming-shan, 1961), ch. 117, pp. 1385–8; and Ch'ien Shih-fu, comp., Ch'ing-tai chih-kuan nien-piao (Peking, 1980), Volume 2, pp. 1342–74 (see the especially useful chart on pp. 1510–11). On the institution of Manchu, Mongol, and Han-chüen banners and bannermen, see chapters 1 and 6 in The Cambridge history of China, Volume 9, Part 1.
and the Prince Regent, Dorgon (1612–50), who began to rule for the new, six-year-old Shun-chih emperor, had high expectations for them as civil administrators. He placed them at the top of the developing hierarchy of regional officials, a half-step below garrison commanders in rank. Their role was not the command of troops, but overseeing the projection of Ch‘ing power over the cities and the countryside. In 1645, five governors-general were appointed for Shansi, Shensi, the Huai-yang area, the southeast coast, and Hu-kuang; two more governors-general were assigned to manage grain transport and river conservancy across provincial boundaries. Subsequently governors-general were established for Chiang-nan in 1646; Liang-Kuang in 1647; the capital area (Chihli), Shantung, and Honan in 1649; and Yunnan–Kweichow in 1653.

Initially the goal seems to have been to fill Ming posts of grand co-ordinators (hsün-fu) with competent, trusted men. In 1644, the new rulers appointed eight men to serve as governors in places on the North China Plain where the Ming had posted grand co-ordinators. By the end of 1645, Ch‘ing appointees had replaced Ming men in twelve other locations in north and northwest China and the Yangtze valley. In the late 1640s there were Ch‘ing governors (hsün-fu) in twenty more posts: Shun-t‘ien, Tientsin, Hsüan-fu, Anhwei, Shantung, Pao-t‘ing, Teng-chou, Shansi, Honan, Shensi, Yen-sui, Kansu, Fukien, Chekiang, Kiangsi, Yün-yang, Nan-kan, Hu-kuang, P‘ien-yüan and Ninghsia.9 In addition, the Ch‘ing leaders created two new positions. A governor was appointed at Nanking to replace the administrators of the Ming southern capital, and another was assigned to manage transport and commerce along the Yangtze River.

As Ch‘ing armies moved into the south and west, six new governors were appointed, in Foochow (1647), Szechwan (1648), Kwangtung (1649), Kwangsi (1649), and later Kweichow (1658), and Yunnan (1659).10 Ch‘ing armies were still in active pursuit of Ming loyalist forces, so that reappointing existing Ming personnel to many of these southern postings was not feasible. Most often in the south, the leaders of conquering armies, such as Wu San-kuei (1612–78), worked together with local people who could be persuaded to collaborate with them. These regimes were unstable, and it took at least a generation for civilian territorial government to be secured in the southern tier of provinces.11 By 1659 governors appointed by Ch‘ing officials in Peking served in twenty-six of the thirty locations where Ming grand co-ordinators had been stationed. The only Ming posts to which the Ch‘ing did not make

9 Ch‘ien, Ch‘ing-tai chih-kuan nien-piao, pp. 1517–18.
10 Ch‘ien, Ch‘ing-tai chih-kuan nien-piao, pp. 1519–25.
11 See Lynn A. Struve, The southern Ming, 1644–1662 (New Haven, 1984), for descriptions of the conflicts in the early days of the Ch‘ing in the south.
appointments were Liaotung, Ch'eng-t'ien, Mi-yün, and Ta-t'ung, positions that had been created to secure Ming defenses against Mongols and Manchus.

Having replaced the staff of the Ming provincial offices, the Ch'ing government began to adapt the system to its own needs. The most important development of the 1650s was a reduction in the total number of positions for financial reasons. As they expanded their area of control, Ch'ing rulers found their new empire enormously expensive to administer. In its later years, the Ming government had significant fiscal problems, and the new dynasty was initially unable to increase tax revenues or even to secure accurate tax rolls. In 1649, the Ministry of Revenue memorialized the throne to propose a number of steps to deal with what must have been a serious shortfall:

In our dynasty’s establishment of government, the most important thing has been sympathy for the people. Since the conquest, we have abolished illegal taxes in order to succor the people. Now, however, armies are on the march, and border areas have not yet been settled. Yearly income does not balance yearly expenditures. This office therefore proposes that licentiates (chien-sheng) and lower-ranking officials be allowed to purchase office, that Taoist and Buddhist ordination certificates be sold, that criminals be allowed to pay fines rather than suffer corporal punishment, and that the governorships of Tientsin, Feng-yang, and Anhwei be abolished.\(^\text{12}\)

In 1649, positions for hsüen-fu were eliminated at Pao-ting near the capital, and in the lower Yangtze at Feng-yang and Anhwei. The government determined that order had been restored in the area, and Manchu and Han troops originally stationed there were transferred farther south.\(^\text{13}\) Beginning in 1652, hsüen-fu posts of primarily military significance were eliminated along the northern borders at Hsüan-fu, Yen-sui, and Ninghsia. In the south the posts at Nan-kan in southern Kiangsi and Yün-yang in eastern Szechwan, which had been created to monitor the movement of people through critical passes into central China, were eliminated as it became apparent that Manchu garrison commanders in the north and governors-general in the south could control the situation. In 1666, there were eighteen positions remaining for hsüen-fu, now governors. There were eighteen provinces.

Typical of the pattern of creation and dissolution of a governor’s position was the posting at Teng-chou, a port on the north side of the Shantung peninsula that is today known as P'eng-lai. Teng-chou was not a traditional center of regional administration, but before the harbor silted up in the eighteenth

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\(^{12}\) Ta Ch'ing Shih-tsu Chang huang-ti shih-lu, ch. 44, p. 10b, quoted in Fu Tsung-mao, Ch'ing-tai tu-fu chih-tu (Taipei, 1963), p. 12.

\(^{13}\) The position of governor at Feng-yang was restored in 1657, when troops were returned from the south, but was abolished permanently in 1665.
Map 2. Eighteen provincial administrative areas
In 1621 the Ming government had posted a grand co-ordinator in the city because it seemed to be an ideal launching place for naval attacks against the Manchu threat in the north. The position had been allowed to lapse in 1629, in part because of the difficulty of co-ordinating with Tientsin and Liaotung. It was re-created in 1630 when Yellow Sea pirates led by K’ung Yu-te laid siege to the city, but was vacated with the Ch’ing conquest in the spring of 1644. Later that summer, Chang Jo-ch’i, a native of Teng-chou who was then serving as administrator of Peking, memorialized the new Ch’ing emperor urging that a governor be established in that coastal city. Chang nominated two individuals, one an official in the Ministry of Revenue and the other a censor of a circuit in Honan province, praising them both as administrators and assuring the court that either could do the job. He concluded the memorial by writing that he knew these men well, since one was his kinsman and the other his official colleague. A month after Chang’s memorial, Dorgon appointed a governor to Teng-chou, although neither of those that Chang had recommended.

Chang’s plea for a governorship at Teng-chou rested on an argument for the protection of mercantile interests in the port, and it is likely that early Ch’ing appointees there were meant to be specialists in commercial affairs. Of the three who later held the Teng-chou post, two went on to supervise river and grain transport along the Yellow River and the Grand Canal. As these inland transport routes were secured, the court was confronted with a report from the Ministry of Revenue that its holdings of grain and cash were not sufficient to cover expenditures. The Shun-chih emperor asked the ministry officials to recommend cost-saving measures, and abolition of the Teng-chou and Hsüan-fu governorships was on a long list of proposed expedients. Eventually, the governorship at Teng-chou was replaced with the office of a naval intendant, who commanded a brigade of waterborne defense forces.

As the number of governors’ positions was being reduced to eighteen by 1666, the number of cities where administration commissioners (ch’eng hsüan

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17 The memorial by Chang Jo-ch’i is in “Shun-chih ch’u nien lung-lo yü k’ung-chih Han-tsu kuan-shen shih-liao,” in Ch’in-tai tang-an shih-liao ts’ung-pien 13 (1990), p. 28. For Chang Jo-ch’i’s biography, see Ch’ing shih hsien-chuan (1928; Taipei, 1962) 79, pp. 50–2.
18 Ta Ch’ing Shih-tsu Chang huang-ti shih-lu, ch. 6, p. 8a.
19 Ch’ien, Ch’ing-tai chih-kuan nien-piao, Volume 2, pp. 1517–19.
pu-cheng shih) were posted increased from fourteen in 1659 to eighteen in 1667. Everywhere a governor was posted, there was now also an administration commissioner, and this arrangement changed the character of both positions. In Ming times, administration commissioners were responsible for geographically bounded areas equivalent to provinces, but grand co-ordinators, on the other hand, had been direct imperial appointees whose mandate was more functional than geographic. Under the Ch'ing, governors became the senior officials within administration commissioners’ jurisdictions, with responsibility for a specific geographical area, a process that one scholar has termed the “territorialization” of provincial administration. Because the governor (hsüin-fu) had emerged as the senior provincial official in the Ch'ing period, it is the practice to refer to the administration commissioners as their lieutenant governors.

The cycle played out in Teng-chou of Ch'ing appointees being sent to and then withdrawn from military outposts eventually produced a map of provinces different from the late Ming situation. In Table 1.1, the locations of Ming grand co-ordinators and Ch'ing provincial governors are compared. In the final arrangement, the Ch'ing government had about half, thirteen out of twenty-five, of the Ming postings of grand co-ordinators.

Ch'ing provinces were similar to the territories of provincial administrative commissioners that the first Ming emperor began in order to reorganize Yüan territory. The locations for governors were for the most part river valley cities of trade and commerce where civilian populations paid taxes and did business. These were centers that the Ch'ing had to control if they were to govern successfully. The posts that they eliminated were the ones that the Ming had created for military emergencies, including outposts along the northern border (Hsüan-fu, Ninghsia, Yen-sui, Ta-t'ung) that covered the Ming retreat from direct involvement in the affairs of the steppe, as well as internal control posts in the south (Nan-kan, Yün-yang and P'ien-yüan). The disappearance of these positions pointed to one of the fundamental characteristics of early Ch'ing rule: the Manchu leadership preferred to retain direct control of the preponderance of military force through their own organizational resources, especially the banner armies, than to add this power to the portfolio of civilian administrators. Posted in centers of civilian control and still retaining some of the functions of military occupiers, provincial governors in the Shun-chih reign were not fully tied to either the civilian or the military hierarchies.

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21 Hsü Ch'un-feng, “Ch'ing-tai tu-fu chih-tu ti chüeh-li,” Li-shih tang-an No. 1 (2006), p. 64. Hsü sees the “territorialization” process as having been completed in 1748, when governors lost their concurrent titles as censors and it was decreed that the governor was senior to the lieutenant governor.
Table 1.1. *Locations of Ming grand co-ordinators* (hsün-fu) and *Ch‘ing provincial governors* (hsün-fu)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Province</th>
<th>Ming only</th>
<th>Ming and Ch‘ing</th>
<th>Ch‘ing only</th>
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<td>Shantung (Chi-nan)</td>
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<td>Ming and Ch‘ing</td>
<td>Shantung (1644)</td>
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<td>Teng-lai*</td>
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<td>Shansi (T’ai-yüan)</td>
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<td>Honan (Kaifeng)</td>
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<td>Chekiang (Hangchow)</td>
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<td>Kiangsi (Nan-ch’ang)</td>
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<td>Shensi (Sian)</td>
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<td>Kansu (Kan-chou)</td>
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<td>Ta-t’ung*</td>
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<td>Fukien (Foochow)</td>
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<td>Hu-kuang (Wu-ch’ang)</td>
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* Existed briefly during the Ch‘ing; abolished by 1675.


**Appointing governors**

Late in 1645 the Ch‘ing leaders were still mostly using former Ming personnel to continue the existing system. Although the first governors they appointed
were Han-chün bannermen sent to protect the capital by taking control at Tientsin, Pao-ting, Tsinan, Kaifeng, and T'ai-yüan, the Ch'ing leaders relied on civilian collaborators to fill other governors’ posts. Of the twenty-two governors serving in early 1645, fifteen were former Ming officials. Four were promoted from the lower ranks, and eleven were former senior officials who had declared themselves loyal to the Ch'ing and been reassigned or promoted to new responsibilities. Of the eleven, three had served as grand co-ordinators, five had served in senior posts in the capital, and three others had held local office during the Ming. \(^{22}\) In turning to these surrendered officials, the regent Dorgon was influenced by a memorial submitted in 1644 by Sung Ch'üan (1598–1652), a former Ming official who was appointed to govern the Shunt'ien region around the capital. He urged Dorgon to solicit recommendations from Han Chinese literati. \(^{23}\) Dorgon needed to deploy a full roster of officials and show his Han subjects that the new rulers had effective control. Aware of the weaknesses and factionalism that had prevailed among Ming bureaucrats, he was willing to overlook the past records of potential appointees when necessary, and thus was rather indiscriminate in his selections. \(^{24}\)

One difficulty with Dorgon’s strategy, pointed out by both contemporaries and historians, was that it meant the new dynasty had few men of proven competence prepared to take office. Many senior Ming officials had fled the capital upon the arrival of the rebel troops of Li Tzu-ch'eng in the spring of 1644, and they were not willing to return to serve the new dynasty. Many of those who were willing either were inexperienced or had undergone some sort of administrative punishment in the Ming period. One of the newly appointed governors, Huang T'u-an, had held appointment in the Ming Ministry of Personnel. He had initially declined Ch'ing offers of appointment ostensibly out of concern for his mother’s health. When ordered to take office in 1645, he found the task of pacifying the remnants of Li Tzu-ch'eng’s retreating forces too challenging, and he asked to resign. The Ch'ing court decided that he had been derelict in his duty, and ordered that his name be removed from the list of potential officials. Nevertheless, Huang was appointed governor of Ninghsia on the recommendation of Fan Wen-ch'eng (1597–1666), a Han-chün bannerman who had been a Ch'ing grand secretary since 1636. Once again, Huang was dismissed from office and demoted five ranks. \(^{25}\)  

\(^{22}\) Ch’ien, Ch’ing-tai chib-kuan nien-piao, Volume 2, pp. 1516–17.  
\(^{23}\) Huang Ch’ing tsou-i (c.1800; Shanghai, 2002), ch. 1, pp. 2a–2b. The memorial is also frequently cited in Sung’s biographies.  
\(^{24}\) Chou Yi-an-lien and Chao Shih-yü, Huang-fu she-cheng uang To-erh-kun chüan chuan (Ch’ang-ch’un, 1986), p. 207.  
\(^{25}\) Ch’ing shib lieh-chuan 79, pp. 10–10a.
Tou-kuang had been indicted twice as the Ming grand co-ordinator at Fengyang for his failure to defeat the rebel Chang Hsien-chung (1605–47). Kao was appointed the Ch’ing governor at P’ien-yüan in Hu-kuang, but was dismissed after three years for taking bribes and for failing to enforce the requirement that Han subjects adopt the Manchu hairstyle, the queue.  

Even the most experienced and capable Ming officials found themselves in a nearly impossible position in the early Ch’ing, caught between restive and recalcitrant local populations and the new government’s demand to restore order. By the early 1650s, the fifteen governors who had been former Ming officials were no longer part of regional administration. Some left through routine personnel changes, and some were removed during the factional maneuvers attendant on the death of Dorgon in December 1650. Two were promoted to central government positions in Peking, five were demoted, one was relieved of his responsibilities, three were dismissed as officials, three left office through death or illness, and one retired when his position was abolished. For the most part, surrendered Ming officials were replaced with Han-ch’üan bannermen, and by 1659 bannermen occupied sixteen of the posts of governor.

Although replacing surrendered Ming officials was partly a product of circumstance, the turn to Han-ch’üan bannermen was in part motivated, at least in the southern regions, by the continuing need for a Ch’ing military presence. Conquest operations continued in the south for nearly a generation after the Ch’ing dynasty had been established in Peking. Even in the northern provinces, such as Shantung, Honan, Shansi, and Shensi, Han-ch’üan bannermen proved to be useful intermediaries between local communities and Manchu overlords. The Shun-chih regime produced a frame for territorial rule, but in the insecure world of the mid-seventeenth century, it was a frame reinforced by arms and administered by military men.

**The K’ang-hsi Reign: Empowering Civilian Governors**

During the K’ang-hsi reign, the regime of military occupation shifted to being a structure of civilian administration. The transition was crucial for any conquering order, but it was especially complex in the second half of the seventeenth century. The unity and even the survival of Ch’ing rule were not assured at the beginning of the K’ang-hsi reign. Garrison forces maintained control in the northwest, and the northern provinces were quiet for the most

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26 *Ch’ing shih lieh-chuan* 79, p. 11–11a.

27 Documents on the impeachments of these governors were first published in the *Chang-ku t’ung-pien* in 1928. They are reprinted in “Shun-chih ch’in-cheng hou Han kuan pei k’o an,” in *Ch’ing tai tang-an shih-liao ts’ung-pien*, 13 (1990), pp. 111–260.
part. But resentments continued along the lower Yangtze. The southeast coast was held by a regime that made many concessions to local demands. The southwest had been turned over to Wu San-kuei, the Ming general who had sided with the Ch'ing in the spring of 1644. Szechwan and Hukuang were only lightly controlled by Ch'ing forces and administrators. A conquering army maintaining a sort of martial law was both expensive and unpopular. Civilian territorial government had to be established with adequate and reliable flows of revenue to the capital, or the dynasty would be short-lived. As military conquest and occupation proceeded in some quarters of the empire, civilian routines were established elsewhere. With each of the crises that the Ch'ing regime overcame, new men came into the central government, with new visions of the relationship between the center and the provinces.

On the whole, the K'ang-hsi years were marked by significant institutional changes in territorial administration. During the Oboi regency (1661–9), governors by stages became responsible for the civilian functions of government, and local officials were made responsible to them. Between 1669 and 1683, the first years in which the young K'ang-hsi emperor personally exercised power, the emphasis was on achieving administrative consistency in all provinces of the empire, especially after the suppression of the rebellions led by Wu San-kuei and his allies in the 1670s. Following the fighting, a period of peace and growing prosperity, roughly from 1685 to 1700, saw an increase in the prominence of governors and the resources they could command. The court moved by word and deed to ensure the loyalty of these governors to the emperor and the central government, and not to the interests of private groupings, families, or factions. During the last years of the reign, from the year 1700 to 1722, tensions implicit in the provincial order became more manifest as the emperor withdrew from direct involvement in managing the provinces and their governors.

The political history of the K'ang-hsi years has been presented in terms of imperial edicts, changing factional allegiances, and the emperor's personal preferences. Less attention has been given to the effects of these changes on provincial governance. Central initiatives in the provinces have been refracted through the lenses of elite preferences and resistance, local conditions and needs. By considering the major developments at the capital and their effects, where discernible, in the provinces, a richer political history is achieved. Inevitably this history is somewhat anecdotal, as it is not possible to consider the impact of a single change on every province, or consider all the important changes in a single province. But some sense of dialog is essential, for it was through the discourse of edict and effect, central articulation and local reformulation, that provincial administration developed during the K'ang-hsi period.
Regents and reaction

The institutional changes of the early K'ang-hsi years were in large part the work of four regents, senior Manchu counselors led by Oboi (d. 1669), who exercised power on behalf of the young emperor between 1661 and 1669. Themselves veterans of the military campaigns of the 1640s and 1650s, Oboi and his colleagues brought to governing the habits of military administration. During their regency, the "values of military efficiency and military men's paramount roles were declared in the provinces as well as in the capital."28

The regents expressed their intent to control the provinces by appointing sixteen new governors in a single year, more than in any other year of the K'ang-hsi reign.29 In that same year, the regents created eight new positions of governor-general (tsung-tu) to oversee the governors. There were probably two purposes to this churning and culling of territorial officials. The moves allowed the regents to put their prot´eg´es in office, thereby securing subordinates with whom they were comfortable. The best-documented case is that of Chu Ch'ang-tso, a prot´eg´e of the regent Suksaha. Chu was appointed to Chekiang, where he systematically asserted central control in a province where his predecessor had made many concessions to local elites' preferences and customs. Chu was transferred to Chihli, where he assisted Suksaha's efforts to acquire better lands for his banner, for which he was dismissed from office and executed.30 The changes also served to bring Ch'ing military forces under more consistent and direct control. In addition, the regents abolished the units of troops under the governors' direct control, and left the governors-general as the senior provincial military officials.31

Having placed their men in the provinces, the regents were anxious to defend their appointees' authority, and they were suspicious of the duplications of responsibility and overlapping authority that had been inherited from the Ming. Under the late Ming territorial system, responsibilities had been divided among what were called the three commissions or offices (san ssu):

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29 See Ch'ien, Ch'ing-tai chih-kuan nien-piao, Volume 2, p. 1531. Three of the regents' appointees had served previously in the provinces; thirteen were serving in the capital at the time of their appointments. For the most part, these governors served only during the regency. Ten had left office by 1670, three more were gone by 1673, and only two of the regent-appointed governors remained in office through 1680.

30 R. Kent Guy, Qing governors and their provinces: The evolution of territorial administration in China, 1644–1796 (Seattle, 2010), pp. 263–4; and Chao Erh-hsün, Ch'ing shih, ch. 250, p. 38c6. See also Oxnam, Ruling from horseback, p. 98.

31 Ta Ch'ing hui-tien shih-li (1899; rpt. Peking, 1991). Chapters 546–55 have a historical summary, by province, of the disposition of Ch'ing forces. Governors' regiments are included under each province.
the provincial administration commission, the regional military commission, and the provincial surveillance commission. Provincial decisions and record keeping were also reviewed on regular tours by regional inspectors (hsüan-an) appointed by the censorate. “The three provincial offices were sufficiently independent of each other that no one man or agency was able to gain control over a province, but they worked cooperatively, sending their senior officials to assemblies for discussions of major policies and problems.”

This arrangement did not suit the Oboi regents. The first of these territorial officials to be pared away were the regional inspectors. Because their duty was to “observe all government officials, check files, audit accounts, interrogate officials, and criticize inappropriate policies” during their tours of provinces, these officials were a thorn in the side of governors. Governor Liu Wu-yüan at Nan-kan in southern Kiangsi spent much of his time in the south battling the forces of the Prince of Kuei, a Ming pretender, or Li Ch'eng-tung, the turncoat Kwangtung governor. Liu had little use for regional inspectors. In 1651, he memorialized to complain of the impact of these men on his ability to manage the area. “A regional inspector,” he wrote, highlighting what he saw as the appropriate hierarchy of offices, “is only a junior member of the censorate. He should be subordinate to a governor and governor-general, who hold higher-rank concurrent appointments in the censorate.”

Nine of the twenty-one indictments that resulted in the dismissal of territorial officials during the Shun-chih reign were launched by regional inspectors, and two of these indictments were of governors. Governor T'u Kuo-pao of Soochow committed suicide rather than face the investigation of the charges against him. The regents at the beginning of the K'ang-hsi reign lost little time in addressing this problem. After a brief experiment with trying to regulate regional inspectors, they summarily abolished these posts in the spring of 1661.

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33 Hucker, *A dictionary of official titles in imperial China*, p. 253. For a discussion of these officials during the Ming, see Thomas G. Nimick, *Local administration in Ming China: The changing roles of magistrates, prefects, and provincial officials* (Minneapolis, 2008), pp. 79–90.
34 Liu Wu-yüan’s memorial is in Huang Ch’ing tou-i, ch. 3, pp. 10b–15b; quotation is from p. 13.
35 Adam Y. C. Lui, *Corruption in China during the early Ch'ing period, 1644–1660* (Hong Kong, 1979), p. 43 and Appendix 1.
36 Ta Ch'ing Shih-tsu Chang huang-ti shih-lu, ch. 6, p. 1, and ch. 62, p. 9; Frederic Wakeman Jr., *The great enterprise: The Manchu reconstruction of imperial order in seventeenth-century China* (Berkeley, 1985), Volume 1, p. 646. T'u’s suicide proved a grimly ironic end to his term, which had begun with his wife’s suicide. Confronted with the prospect that Soochow would be occupied by pirates, she hanged herself from the Soochow bell tower. On the wife’s suicide, see Chao-lien, *Hsiao-t'ing tsa-lu* (1880; Peking, 1980), ch. 10.
37 Ta Ch'ing Sheng-tsu Jen huang-ti shih-lu (Peking, 2008), ch. 2, p. 24. At the end of the Shun-chih reign, the court had issued instructions to new regional inspectors. The regents almost immediately
The next post to be challenged was that of the junior of the two administration commissioners (pu-cheng shih) assigned to manage local affairs in each province. The senior of these was known as the left administration commissioner, and the junior as the right administration commissioner. The new Ch’ing rulers were skeptical of the need for two. An edict observed tartly, “The administration commissioner of the left is a very busy office. But what does the commissioner of the right do? If this is not a superfluous post, then he must have some function. The officials of the six ministries are unwilling to provide details.” The need for the second post was reduced when the central authorities abolished the requirement that a commissioner accompany all local officials to an imperial audience once every three years, a task that could take him away from his duties for several months or even a year at a time. The censor Wei I-chieh had memorialized in 1658 in support of the principle of collegial administration: “How can one person’s judgment compare with that of two men? How can one person’s energy compare with that of two men?” The regents were unconvinced by this argument, and in 1667 they ordered that there would be only one administration commissioner in each province, except in the several provinces whose geography seemed to require two administrative centers.

Although these institutional changes were carried out in order to render the governor clearly the senior official in his province, they also had the effect of simplifying the hierarchy of territorial officials. Already in the Shun-chih period a hierarchy was emerging among the offices that had been theoretically equal under the Ming. In early Ch’ing, the governor (hsün-fu) emerged as the senior provincial official, superior to the administration commissioner (pu-cheng shih), who was above the surveillance commissioner (an-ch’a shih). This hierarchy was apparent in appointment practices. In 1655, it was ordered that

fashioned a set of rules from these instructions, reissuing them in the imperative mood, with the threat of impeachment for those who violated a rule attached to the end of each rule. Compare Shih-tsu shih-lu, ch. 55, pp. 9–10a, and Sheng-tsu shih–lu, ch. 1, pp. 12a–13. The regulations were issued on February, 18, 1661, and were in force for a little over three months before the post was abolished. Several cases of corruption among the regional inspectors were reported in the first year of the regency; see note 17 of Oxnam, Ruling from horseback, p. 90.

38 Ta Ming hui-tien (1588; Taipei, 1963), ch. 2, pp. 1–1a.
39 Ch’ing ch’ao wen-hsien t’ung-kao (Hang-chou, 1988), ch. 77, p. 5571. Concerns about superfluous posts were common in the early Ch’ing.
40 For the rules governing these visits in the Ming, see Ta Ming hui-tien, ch. 13, pp. 1–9. The Ch’ing suspended these triennial trips to the capital at the end of the Shun-chih period and relied instead on written evaluations. The exact form of these evaluations was a subject of debate during the regency. For a brief summary of this somewhat inconclusive debate, see Guy, Qing governors and their provinces, p. 91.
42 Ta Ch’ing Sheng-tsu Jen huang-ti shih-lu, ch. 13, pp. 5a–6.
surveillance commissioners could be promoted to administration commissioner, and that circuit intendants (tao-t'ai) could be promoted to surveillance commissioner. In view of this emerging structure, Ch'ing historians writing in English have taken to referring to the administration commissioner (pu-cheng shih) as “lieutenant governor.” When the post of regional inspector was abolished, his tasks were divided among other territorial officials. The court assigned to the administration commissioners the duty of auditing civil and military accounts, to the prefects and circuit intendants the evaluation of county magistrates, and to the surveillance commissioners the review of judicial decisions and the inspection of prisons. Because of this assignment, Ch'ing historians commonly refer to the provincial surveillance commissioner as “provincial judge.” Each governor thus became responsible for a hierarchy of civilian officials who administered government affairs within his jurisdiction, and he carried out this responsibility without supervision or interference from within the province.

A final innovation in the structure of provincial administration occurred in 1668, the last year of the regency, when for the first time Manchus were appointed to posts of governor in Shansi and Shensi provinces. The decisions appeared to be part of a strategic plan, for within two weeks Manchu lieutenant governors and provincial judges were also appointed for these provinces. Two years later, Manchus filled the top three posts in Kansu. The Ta Ch'ing hui-tien (Collected statutes of the Ch'ing) takes the 1668 appointments as the beginning of a policy of appointing Manchus to these three northwestern provinces. As there does not appear to be an edict announcing such a policy, the reasons for this change can only be a matter of speculation. Most likely the shifts were prompted by military considerations: there was a large Manchu garrison in Shensi, which it was the governor’s role to supply, and Kansu and Shansi were the starting places for military campaigns in Central Asia. With brief exceptions, Kansu was governed by a Manchu until 1728, Shansi until 1737, and Shensi until 1792. In 1680 a Manchu was appointed governor outside the northwest, in Szechwan. Gradually the range of provinces where Manchus served as governor increased, until by the middle of the eighteenth century they had been governors in all the provinces and comprised as much as 40 percent of the governors’ corps.

In most accounts of the K'ang-hsi reign, Oboi and his fellow regents have been treated as anachronistic remnants of the conquest generation or as obstacles that the young emperor had to overcome before he could rule personally. Yet the regents made substantial contributions to the Ch'ing development of a
The regents’ streamlining of the provincial hierarchy and appointing trusted men as governors were undertaken to make the Ch'ing occupation more efficient. In the early days, Ch'ing armies had been crucial in restoring order. As an invading regime became an established government, the political and financial costs of using an army to govern territory became more apparent, and nowhere more so than in the wealthy, highly literate communities of the lower Yangtze area. The K'ang-hsi reign began inauspiciously there. The root of the trouble was the reaction of the regents to the widespread tax delinquency and fraud in one of the empire’s richest regions. To address this problem, they decreed that local officials would be fined or degraded according to the percentage of uncollected taxes in their jurisdictions. Shortly after the death of the Shun-chih emperor in early 1661, an edict was issued that reiterated earlier regulations, and added the stipulation that any official whose own family’s taxes were unpaid would not be eligible for promotion. It was not so much the terms of the edict, which moderately increased pressure on county magistrates, but the way it was read by officials in Chiang-ning (Nanking in Ming times), the capital of Chiang-nan, that caused the problem. The edict did not mention the south at all, but referred only to tax problems in Chihli, but that could be taken to refer to the southern metropolitan area around the former Ming southern capital. Inspired by the severity that the Oboi regents seemed to exhibit toward the habits and failings of Han officials, especially in Chiang-nan, Governor Chu Kuo-chih, a Han-chün bannerman, moved to collect these outstanding taxes. In late March of 1661 he began to see resistance in the form of a demonstration by Soochow local elites against the burden of the back taxes they were being made to pay. As the regents
understood, this conflict between the government and the taxpaying elites of Chiang-nan could not be allowed to continue if the new dynasty was to endure. A new basis for interactions between the landowning elites and the central government had to be developed.\textsuperscript{49}

A process was set in motion in 1661 that eventually led to a new arrangement under which the elites of Soochow and the lower Yangtze area would have their own direct access to the central government. This process probably began when Chu Kuo-chih left his post abruptly in the autumn of that year. The circumstances under which Chu decamped were not made clear, although he faced local hostility for his vigorous prosecution of the collection of tax arrears. Chu’s biography in the \textit{Ch’ing shih} (\textit{History of the Ch’ing}) recounts his charges against Chiang-nan taxpayers, and then observes with delicious understatement, “for this he earned a reputation for cruelty.”\textsuperscript{50} The only formal acknowledgment of these events by the central government was an edict issued in March of 1662 in which Governor Chu Kuo-chih was condemned for using the pretext of a mourning obligation to leave his post. The Ministry of Personnel recommended that in punishment he be demoted five grades, the usual penalty for such action, but the regents commented that since Chu had abandoned such important duties, he should be cashiered as an official.\textsuperscript{51}

The edict condemning Chu seems to have appeared considerably after he had fled his post, for in December of 1661 the regents had appointed a Han-chün bannerman, Han Shih-ch’i, to replace him. Han had moved from a posting in the Imperial Household Department to the position of governor of Shun-t’ien, the area immediately around Peking, in the early summer of 1661. He was to serve as governor at Chiang-ning until 1669.\textsuperscript{52}

A further series of changes also began in Chiang-nan in 1661. Under the Ming and early Ch’ing system, the two administrative commissioners both served in Chiang-ning, but beginning in 1661 there was a territorial division between the two.\textsuperscript{53} One was given responsibility for the counties up

\textsuperscript{49} Wakeman, \textit{The great enterprise}, Volume 2, pp. 1067–71. As Wakeman described the matter, the solution was achieved when “a new system of tax registers was established, land was properly recorded therein, and liability was attached to the individual household without relying on the old tax headman system.” \textit{Ibid.}, p. 1070.

\textsuperscript{50} Chao Erh-hsien, \textit{Ch’ing shih}, ch. 487, p. 5289. Chu’s biography is placed in a \textit{ch’uan} that the \textit{Ch’ing shih} devoted to failed and cruel officials. See also Meng Sen, “Tsou-hsiao an,” in Meng Sen, \textit{Ming Ch’ing shih lun chu chi-k’an} (Taipei, 1965), p. 434.

\textsuperscript{51} \textit{Ta Ch’ing Sheng-tsu Jen huang-ti shih-lu}, ch. 6, p. 5a. After his service at Chiang-ning, Chu served as governor of Yunnan, during which capacity he was killed by the forces of Wu San-kuei. Meng Sen suggests that it was a Chiang-nan literatus, serving as adviser to Wu, who recommended the killing.

\textsuperscript{52} \textit{Ta Ch’ing Sheng-tsu Jen huang-ti shih-lu}, ch. 5, p. 5. See also \textit{Man-chou ming ch’en chuan} (Peking, Tao-kuang edition), ch. 19, pp. 533–4.

\textsuperscript{53} Fu Lin-hsiang argued that the territorial division had its origin in a functional division. The administration commissioner of the right was made responsible for collecting arrears, and the commissioner
the river, and the other was made responsible for the counties of the lower delta, where more tax arrears cases had occurred, and he would be located in Soochow. Later provincial gazetteers date the founding of Kiangsu province from this reorganization of the administrative commissioners’ duties. The change seems to have occurred when a new administrative commissioner of the right for Chiang-nan arrived in the lower Yangtze area in early January of 1662, one month after the new governor, Han Shih-ch'i.

Several other pieces of circumstantial evidence also suggest that the Ch'ing government was moving toward a new administrative presence in the Yangtze delta in the early 1660s. After taking up his post in Chiang-nan in late 1661, Governor Han Shih-ch'i ordered the city walls of Soochow strengthened and expanded, with structures incorporated for guardhouses and granaries. This was the first reconstruction of the city walls since the late 1360s, and the last major rebuilding in the later imperial period. Two years later, in the summer of 1663, the central government further increased its presence in the lower Yangtze delta by appointing two provincial judges for Chiang-nan. Both judges had the same title, but the Ch'ung-hsiu An-hui t'ung chih (Revised comprehensive gazetteer of Anhwei) and other sources distinguish between them as the judge for Anhwei and the judge for Kiangsu. Effectively, the former Ming southern metropolitan area had been split into the two Ch'ing provinces of Kiangsu and Anhwei.

**Administrative consistency for the provinces**

When the K'ang-hsi emperor dismissed the last of the regents in the summer of 1669, he sought to move beyond the military style of governance that they had advocated. He did not anticipate that he would soon have to confront a

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54 *Chiang-nan t'ung-chih*, ch. 22, as cited in Chiang T'ao, “Ch'ing-tai Chiang-nan sheng fen-chih wen-t’i: Li-tsu yü Ch'ing shih-lu ti k’ao-ch’a,” *Ch'ing shih yen-chiu* No. 2 (2009), p. 19; also see *Ch'ung hsiu An-hui t'ung-chih* (c. 1880), ch. 17, pp. 3–3b. Chao Erh-hsun, *Ch'ing shih*, ch. 117, p. 1389.
55 *Ta Ch'ing Sheng-tsu Jen huang-ti shih-lu*, ch. 5, p. 12b. The new commissioner, Sun Tai, was a somewhat mysterious figure. Prior to his assignment to Chiang-nan, he had held a post in the Grand Secretariat. He seems to have held no other high office in the Ch'ing and there is no extant biography of him.
57 The appointments are noted in *Ch'ing Sheng-tsu Jen huang-ti shih-lu*, ch. 12, p. 11b, and ch. 13, p. 2. See also *Ch'ung hsiu An-hui t'ung-chih*, ch. 7, pp. 3a–b; see also Ch’ien, *Ch'ing-tai chih-kuan nien-piao*, Volume 3, p. 1991. The Anhwei provincial judge served in Chiang-ning until 1760, and was the only provincial judge who served in a city separate from a provincial governor. See Fu Lin-hsiang, “Ch'ing tai Chiang-su chien sheng wen-t'i hsin t’an,” p. 26.
major rebellion. The emperor shuffled officials and positions throughout the government structure in the early 1670s. At the center, the Three Inner Courts (Nei san yiüan) that had served as advisory bodies to early Manchu rulers were reorganized into the Grand Secretariat, and a new group of Han officials and Manchus were appointed to serve as grand secretaries.\(^{58}\) In the provinces, the young emperor seemed to take a new attitude toward governors, no longer regarding them as an extension of his dynasty’s military power but as agents of civil administration. In 1671 a censor for the Shantung circuit memorialized asking the emperor to remind governors of their military duties so that banditry could be held in check and the people’s security assured. K’ang-hsi responded that governors need not be responsible for all the particulars of military activity. “Has not our dynasty,” he asked, “established governors-general and provincial military intendants for this purpose?” Governors should share command with the appropriate local officials.\(^{59}\) The emperor felt that the government could maintain the preponderance of force at the local level through its military hierarchy; it no longer had to rely on its governors in the disposition of troops.

The emphasis on civilian affairs in territorial administration was also reflected in a new procedure for appointing governors that gave their subordinate officials systematic access to promotion. In the Ming, most middle- and senior-level positions had been filled through personal recommendations, a process known as “collective recommendation” (bui-ya).\(^{60}\) The procedure for appointing a grand co-ordinator (hsün-fu) seems to have been that he was recommended collectively by the Ministry of War if the post was one of military significance. If the grand co-ordinator’s main role was to be tax collection, the Ministry of Revenue recommended him. This system had the advantage of assuring that an appointee would be well known to his superiors in the capital and to the court. Before the 1670s, Ch’ing rulers followed the Ming practice of allowing senior officials at the capital to memorialize to recommend candidates for office. During the first years of the dynasty, however, the disadvantages of the procedure became apparent, to judge from the changes perceived to be necessary. In 1653 it was decreed that any person could be recommended as governor or governor-general, regardless of rank, provided that the man’s accomplishments were carefully specified. Presumably these

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\(^{58}\) On the reorganization of the Grand Secretariat, see Meng Chao-hsin, K’ang-hsi p’ing-chuan (Nanking, 1998), pp. 60–1. According to the Ta Ch’ing hui-tien, the practice of making ranked lists was applied to the appointment of officials in the Grand Secretariat in 1671, but there is no edict establishing this fact in the K’ang-hsi shih-lu. In these years, there was also a spate of proposals on reorganizing evaluation and promotion procedures in the lower territorial service. See Fang Yu-chin, “K’ang-hsi ch’u-nien yu-kuan kuan-yüan ch’uan-hsüan chih yü-shih tsou-chang,” Li-shih tang-an No. 2 (1992), pp. 3–19.

\(^{59}\) Ta Ch’ing hui-tien shih-li, ch. 23, p. 7; Ch’ing Sheng-tui fen hsüang-ti shih-lu, ch. 35, p. 22.

\(^{60}\) Ta Ming hui-tien (1588; Taipei, 1963), pp. 110–15. Hsün-fu are treated on p. 110.
governing provinces 37
detailed documents, or the reasoning behind them, would have had to be
prepared in advance by men intimate with the inner workings of the system,
for in 1654 the court ordered that recommendations for a governor’s position
should be submitted on the day after the position was declared vacant.61 In
1661, a censor in the Ministry of Rites memorialized that “since I have been
at court, recommendations have frequently received a rescript requesting that
the recommenders memorialize again.” His solution to this problem was to ask
that those entitled to make recommendations provide as many as six names at
a time, so that the emperor could choose among multiple candidates without
having to wait for a series of recommendations.62 In 1663, the Oboi regents
decreed that if a recommended candidate proved to be inappropriate, both the
candidate and the recommender would be punished.

In 1671, the K’ang-hsi emperor approved a proposal, drafted by Ai Yüan-
cheng of the Ministry of Personnel, that a ranked list be established for candi-
dates for governorships.63 As Ai’s memorial made clear, the idea of these lists
and the graded entitlements to promotion that they entailed had originated
in the Manchu banner hierarchy, was applied first to the military, and now
was to be extended to provincial administration. This method was referred to
as preparing a ranked list (k’ai-lieh) of those eligible for promotion.64 On the
occasion of an opening, the emperor would have a complete list of all those
eligible for advancement to the particular office. Candidates could be assured
that their names would reach the court and be presented systematically.

Promotions of lieutenant governors to governorships was not new in 1671,
but following an edict of that year they increased significantly. Between 1651
and 1660, 18 percent of new governors had moved up from lieutenant gover-
nor. During the regency only 10 percent were promoted from positions in the
provinces. The K’ang-hsi emperor’s order had an immediate impact, setting
a precedent that subsequent emperors followed. This innovation meant that a
significant proportion of governors after 1671 had had experience as territo-
rial administrators in subordinate positions before they became governors.65

61 Ta Ch’ing hui-tien (1734 edition) ch. 6, pp. 10a–11.
62 Huang Ch’ing tsou-i, ch. 13, pp. 16b–17b. In view of the date of the memorial, it is possible that Hsü
Huang, the censor, was protesting the actions of the Oboi regents in appointing governors of their own
choosing from the center. Hsü subsequently served in posts in the provincial bureaucracy, but never
reached the rank of governor.
63 Ta Ch’ing hui-tien (1734 edition), ch. 8, p. 1.
64 The Ta Ch’ing hui-tien shih-li devoted four chapters to k’ai-lieh regulations (ch. 48–52, pp. 608–56), two
for Manchu and two for Han Chinese officials. Generally, the chapters move from the rules governing
promotions of more senior officials to rules governing more junior promotions. The relatively brief
discussion of making ranked lists for governors occurs at the beginning of ch. 51, p. 654.
65 The late seventeenth-century change in the attitudes and capacities of those who were appointed
governors during the Ch’ing dynasty has been of interest to historians. Authors of previous scholar-
ship, including Lawrence D. Kessler, “Ethnic composition of provincial leadership during the Ch’ing
Table 1.2. Percentages of governors promoted from lieutenant governor

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>K’ang-hsi reign, by decade</th>
<th>Later reigns</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1661–70 10%</td>
<td>Yung-cheng (1723–35) 34%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1671–80 39%</td>
<td>Ch’ien-lung (1736–95) 28%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1681–90 40%</td>
<td>Chia-ch’ing (1796–1820) 38%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1691–1700 40%</td>
<td>T’o-kuang (1821–50) 39%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1701–10 31%</td>
<td>Hsien-feng (1851–61) 48%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1711–20 44%</td>
<td>T’ung-chih (1862–74) 47%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Kuang-hsü (to 1900) 45%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Ch’ien, Ch’ing-tai chih-kuan nien-piao, Volume 2, pp. 1530–75 passim; and Guy, Qing governors and their provinces, p. 368.

Perhaps just as significant, new governors had had experience in provinces other than the one to which they were promoted. A rule of the K’ang-hsi period stipulated that an official could not be elevated to the rank of governor in a province in which he had served as lieutenant governor. These men thus carried their experience from one province to another, and the Ch’ing personnel system envisioned governors as masters of a body of experience not specific to one area. The rule also tended to separate new governors from the networks they had acquired as lieutenant governors in another province.

The turn after the regency toward an emphasis on the civilian side in provincial government was abruptly reversed in 1673, when in what was surely the most important decision of his early tenure, the K’ang-hsi emperor decided to accept a confrontation with Wu San-kuei, the former Ming general who had been given a large hereditary fiefdom with autonomous powers in the southwest as his reward for services in suppressing the Ming resistance. The war that ensued, lasting from 1673 to 1681, had both short- and long-term effects on the provincial order. In the short run, the fighting disrupted such administration as the Ch’ing had been able to build in the south and
southwest, and it produced a remilitarization both of specific provincial offices and of governorships in general. In the longer run, the fuller integration of these regions into the Ch‘ing empire, combined with the rising prosperity of the late seventeenth century, resulted in a strong, uniform, and effective provincial regime.

None of the eventual benefits of the war against Wu San-kuei and his allies were apparent when it broke out. The campaigns initially went badly for the Ch‘ing government, a fact reflected in its impact on the corps of governors. In 1673, the governor of Kweichow, where Wu San-kuei was based, surrendered to him, and the governor of Yunnan was killed.66 In 1674, the governor of P‘ien-yüan (later renamed Hunan) abandoned his post, the governor of Szechwan surrendered, and the governor of Kwangsi was imprisoned and executed by an ally of Wu.67 In 1676, the official appointed to replace the imprisoned leader of Kwangsi joined Wu’s forces, and the governor of Kwangtung joined the rebellion.68

The K‘ang-hsi emperor slowly re-established control of the provinces in rebellion. The tide began to turn even before Wu San-kuei’s death in 1678, but it was not until 1681 that a full quota of Ch‘ing-appointed governors served in the southern provincial capitals. Victory was accomplished only by re-emphasizing the role of the military, particularly south of the Yangtze. In 1675, the post of governor-general in Kiangsi that had been eliminated in 1665 was re-established, and in 1676 an official of governor rank was appointed to serve at Yün-yang, on the major route from the Szechwan basin into the middle Yangtze region. Each of these posts was abolished again after 1679, although over protests from some local officials.69 Never reversed, however, was the decision taken in 1674 to restore the governors’ brigades that had been abolished in 1665. New garrisons of banner soldiers were established in Fukien, Kwangtung, and Han-chung (in Hupei), and with a few exceptions the

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66 Ch‘ien, Ch‘ing-tai chih-kuan nien-piao, Volume 2, p. 1542. Historical legend has it that the Yunnan governor, the same Chu Kuo-chih who had fled his post in Chiang-nan after the tax protests there, was killed on the advice of a Chiang-nan literatus loyal to Wu; see note 51 above. There is no record of the fate of the imprisoned Kweichow governor.

67 See Ch‘ien, Ch‘ing-tai chih-kuan nien-piao, Volume 2, p. 1543. On the execution of the Kwangsi governor, see Wakeman, The great enterprise, Volume 2, pp. 1118–19. Successors were appointed to replace the governors of P‘ien-yüan, Szechwan, and Kwangsi, but their role was to co-ordinate the war against Wu. After the rebellion was defeated they returned to their provincial capitals.

68 Although Ch‘ing military appointees in various parts of the empire sided with Wu San-kuei, Kwangtung governor Ch‘en Hung-ming was the only governor who joined Wu. At the end of the rebellion the K‘ang-hsi emperor condemned Ch‘en, but pardoned him from execution. For a collective biography of the governors who were killed, imprisoned, or surrendered during the Three Feudatories rebellion, see Ch‘ing shih lik-chuan 80, pp. 14–15. Also see Spence, “The K‘ang-hsi reign,” pp. 136–46, including the map of the provinces joining in the rebellion.

post-rebellion governors of the southern provinces were Han-chün bannermen until the middle years of the eighteenth century.

As disruptive as the Three Feudatories rebellion instigated by Wu San-kuei was in the short run, the restoration of central control south of the Yangtze was a critical step in the dynasty’s establishment of regular provincial administration. In the southwest, regimes that had hereditary privileges had prevailed into the early Ch'ing period. The Ming-period governors of Yunnan had all been from the Mu family, descendants of an adopted son of the first Ming emperor, and many of the local officials there were of the sort known as hereditary local chieftains (t'u-ssu). In appointing Wu San-kuei to control the southwest, early Ch'ing leaders were continuing this pattern. The longer Wu San-kuei was in power, the greater the subsidy he demanded to preserve order. By the K'ang-hsi years his share of the budget was nearly equivalent to the military expenditures for the remainder of the empire. Moreover, Wu insisted on the right to make his own appointments, and the civil and military officials he selected were referred to as those “selected in the west” (hsi-hsiian). Asserting Ch'ing control in this region proved crucial to the dynasty’s success. A provincial order could hardly be stable when some regional commanders had greater financial and appointive authority than others. As the list of provinces where governors went over or fell to the rebels in the mid-1670s suggests, Ch'ing power in the southern tier of provinces was not secure as long as the power of someone like Wu San-kuei was intact. The process of eliminating hereditary powers in the southwest began in the 1670s, and in effect had precipitated the rebellion.

Post-rebellion provincial administration

Both the K'ang-hsi emperor and his governors emerged stronger after the rebellion. For the central government, the defeat of the three feudatories in the far south saw the end not only of wartime expenses, but also of the subsidies to Wu San-kuei. Once the fighting in the southern and central provinces ended, farmers and merchants returned to their normal activities, and the economy began to recover for the first time since the Ming collapse in the 1640s. With the 1683 defeat of the regime of Cheng Ch'eng-kung in Taiwan, trade was restored along the southeast coast and the economy revived. The economic disruptions that have been called the “K'ang-hsi depression” eased, assisted by the warming weather of the last years of the seventeenth century.70

As military expenses declined, it became possible for the central government to invest in infrastructure projects such as repair of the Grand Canal. This essential waterway connected the rice-producing areas of the central provinces with Peking, and had to be maintained if the capital was to be fed. The canal also served as a main highway for private commercial traffic. The canal drew on water from multiple rivers, and it had silted up during the late Ming and early Ch’ing when maintenance was deferred. Dredging it required more resources than a single province could provide and had to be a central-government task. During the term of Chin Fu as governor-general for river affairs from 1677 to 1688, the government embarked on a major renovation of the canal. This project provoked disputes between those emphasizing the necessity of keeping supplies flowing and others prioritizing the well-being of the communities living along the canal, but when the work was completed, it assured the supply of the capital and the livelihood of the provinces in the northeast.

The lower Yangtze region was not the only place in which the government was urged to make investments after the rebellions were over. In the autumn of 1681, Ts’ai Yü-jung (1633–99) memorialized in his new capacity as governor-general of Yunnan and Kweichow to offer an elaborate plan for the restoration of order in the southwest. Some of his ideas were directed at immediate problems, while others looked further ahead, but all suggested how much had to be done before the region could be fully incorporated into the provincial system. Ts’ai warned the court not to expect much revenue from these two provinces, declaring that until lands were reclaimed and the damages of eight years of warfare repaired, taxes would need to be forgiven. He made a series of proposals for investing in roads, diverting rivers to build canals, opening mines, and resettling population.

In many respects, Ts’ai Yü-jung and Chin Fu were similar. Both were Han-ch’un bannermen of grand vision, entrusted with projects central to the establishment of the Ch’ing state, and both came to be distrusted by the court they served. Chin’s canal project was undertaken in modified form because of the political, economic, and social importance of the work involved. Ts’ai’s plans reminded the emperor too much of Wu San-kuei’s dominance in the southwest, and he was dismissed. Both visions, however, were testimony to the growing prosperity of the post-rebellion era and the opportunities for state building.

71 See Guy, Qing governors and their provinces, pp. 244–8, for a discussion of river politics.
72 These memorials are reproduced in Yün-nan t’ung-chih (1736; rpt. Taipei, 1983), Part 29, ch. 4, pp. 11a–56b; individual memorials are anthologized in Ho Ch’ang-ling, comp., Huang-ch’ao ching-shih wen-pien (1826; Taipei, 1972), chs. 12, 26, 86.
Governors were now powerful figures overseeing substantial revenues. The emperor took some pains to remind his territorial officials that their obligations to the central government were more important than what they owed their protégés and superiors. In an edict issued in response to an earthquake in 1679, the emperor observed with some hyperbole that the households of provincial officials and their servants were growing more prosperous every day, while ordinary people were selling their children in the marketplace for gruel. He attributed this situation to the payments extorted by senior officials from their subordinates, and asserted that although he had been willing to tolerate such behavior during the war, he could not abide it now that there was peace. Despite the emperor’s admonitions, the power of governors steadily grew, and their arrivals and departures in provincial capitals were major events. In 1691 a censor urged the emperor to limit the size of the retinues that governors could bring with them to office to one hundred people, not including family members; lieutenant governors were to be allowed only fifty people.

The office of governor was becoming such a lucrative post that Mingju (1635–1708), one of the few K'ang-hsi counselors who had supported the emperor’s decision to risk war in 1673 and who emerged after the rebellion as the most powerful figure at court, began in effect selling the posts of governor. In 1688 the censor Kuo Hsiu (1638–1715) charged that Mingju and his collaborator, Yü Kuo-chu, were collecting substantial sums from those who sought to be appointed to senior provincial office. This pattern of collusion and corruption would become familiar to subsequent bureaucrats. Governors presided over streams of revenue in provincial capitals that eluded those in Peking who had appointed them. To secure access to these revenues, Mingju demanded money from new appointees. In turn governors, whose activities were not audited, could require payments from their subordinates, and so on down the line. Two of Mingju’s collaborators in 1687 were Chin Fu and Ts'ai Yu-jung, the men who presided over two of the largest engineering projects attempted by the Ch'ing government: the reconstruction of the Grand Canal in the lower Yangtze region and the building of a series of east–west canals linking the south-flowing rivers in the southwest. Portions of the money allocated for both these projects found their way into Ts'ai’s and Chin’s purses.

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73 Ta Ch'ing Sheng-tsu Jen huang-ti shib-lu, ch. 82, pp. 19–19b.
74 The censor’s memorial is in Huang Ch’ing tsou-i, ch. 24, pp. 2–3.
75 Kuo Hsiu’s accusation is available in several places. The full text is reprinted in Chao-lien, Hsiao-t’ing tsa-lu 3, pp. 63–5. It was also inserted in full into Mingju’s biography in Ch‘ing shih lieh-chuan 8, pp. 13b–14a.
76 This potential for corruption existed throughout the dynasty. The same pattern was visible in the cases of Nien Keng-yao and Ho-shen (see below).
and they no doubt judged the sums they had paid to Mingju to have been wise investments.\textsuperscript{77}

The K'ang-hsi emperor’s reaction to Kuo Hsiu’s accusations focused not so much on Mingju, who lost his positions but was not severely punished, as on the obligation that all officials owed to the dynasty. Kuo Hsiu’s charges provided the emperor an opportunity to address all officials on the political imperatives for a prosperous and secure state. They must recognize that their obligations to the dynasty they served, the values it represented, and the people they governed, all were more important than their relationships with mentors or families. He declared,

\begin{quote}
We have established offices and divided them according to ranks and roles in order to take care of the many tasks of government. Officials must abandon their own desires and act with complete honesty, with the great officials attending to the law, and small officials acting with humility, with each attending to his role and devoting himself wholeheartedly to his duty.\textsuperscript{78}
\end{quote}

Loyalty to the state marked the careers of the three governors whom the emperor, those around him, and subsequent historians regarded as the model territorial officials of the K'ang-hsi reign: Yü Ch'eng-lung (1617–84), governor of Chihli from 1680 to 1681 and then governor-general of Kiangsi and Chiang-nan from 1682 to 1684; P'eng P'eng (1637–1704), governor of Kwangsi from 1699 to 1701 and of Kwangtung from 1701 to 1704; and Shih Shih-lun (1658?–1722), lieutenant governor of Hunan, from 1701 to 1704 and of Anhwei in 1704. Each of these officials made a commitment to the Ch'ing early in their careers. Yü Ch'eng-lung had tearfully left his family in Shansi and headed off to what must have seemed the end of the earth, rural Kwangsi, to be a county magistrate. Then he served in difficult posts during the Three Feudatories rebellion. P'eng P'eng feigned illness for two years rather than serve in the army of Keng Ching-chung (d. 1682), an ally of Wu San-kuei, and then distinguished himself as a vigorous and honest investigator of corruption after the rebellion. Shih Shih-lun’s father, Shih Lang (1621–90), had led the naval forces that conquered Taiwan in 1683. Each was also identified as a skilled and incorruptible administrator by the K'ang-hsi emperor, and the imperial praise was echoed in popular acclaim. And each became the subject of a Ch'ing-era novel that offered a highly fictionalized account of their incorruptible lives and the judgments that they rendered. Highly popular, by the nineteenth century these works were available in multiple

\textsuperscript{77} The association of Ts'ai Yü-jung and Chin Fu with Mingju was asserted in the indictment. See also Lawrence D. Kessler, \textit{K’ang-hsi and the consolidation of Ch’ing rule, 1661–1684} (Chicago, 1976), p. 129.

\textsuperscript{78} \textit{Ta Ch’ing Sheng-tsu Jen huang-ti shih-lu}, ch. 133, p. 17a.
editions, despite having been written in what Lu Hsün described as “atrocious Chinese.”

The last two decades of the K'ang-hsi reign

The effectiveness of the K'ang-hsi provincial administration that was reached during the tenures of Yü, P'eng, Shih, and others like them was short-lived. After the year 1700 the emperor grew more concerned with factional disputes related to the selection of his successor, and the energy he devoted to the appointment and support of competent officials in the provinces waned. Perhaps as important were the increased powers that were accruing to governors around the empire. Their role had grown significantly, but not entirely in a way that was planned. Governors’ authority had been consolidated during the regency, and then linked more with civil affairs in subsequent years. Their military authority increased during the Wu San-kuei rebellion, and overall their positions were enhanced by the prosperity that followed its suppression. Increasingly powerful figures, governors were perceived as infringing on the authority of those officials in posts that had been of equal rank in the Ming but were now functionally subordinate.

The succession crisis developed during the last twenty years of the K'ang-hsi reign. Confronted with evidence of his favorite son’s unfitness for the role of emperor and the competing claims of his other sons, the emperor disowned his heir-apparent in 1708, reinstated him, and then deposed him again, finally, in 1711, but without settling on a successor heir. As this process unfolded, groups of officials in the capital and other interested parties formed around other princes who were potential heirs as they jockeyed for the emperor’s favor. This factional maneuvering was not primarily centered in the provinces, but, surrounded by political tumult, the emperor began to measure each governor not by his moral probity, but by the calm in his jurisdiction. He did not want officials who “created problems” (sheng shih). In 1715 the emperor wrote, “Although Chihli governor Chao Hung-hsieh and Shansi governor Sukeji are not entirely above the temptations of wealth, they have kept their provinces quiet, and their areas uneventful. I still regard this sort of man as excellent.”

Both of these officials served long terms, Chao Hung-hsieh in Chihli from 1705 to 1722, and Sukeji in Shansi from 1709 to 1722. Where honesty had once been the touchstone of provincial service for the emperor, in his later years a territorial official’s primary virtue was in maintaining stability.

Looking for security, the emperor did not separate loyalty to the state from loyalty to his person, so he selected as governors men he knew personally. Two prominent appointments of this sort were his *Book of change* tutor, Hsiü Ch'ao (1647–1715), who was governor of Honan from 1700 to 1704, and his calligraphy tutor, Ch'en Yüan-lung, who was governor of Kwangsi from 1711 to 1718. In the case of Ch'en’s appointment, it is not clear whether the posting to the far southern border of the empire was a promotion or a demotion. Ch'en’s service at court had been a roller coaster ride of dismissals and reinstatements. When the emperor dispatched him to Kwangsi he said,

Ch'en Yüan-lung has long served in the Hanlin Academy, but he has never really managed affairs. Since his appointment as a member of the Ministry of Personnel, some of those he has recommended have not been upright. Let us send Ch'en to a frontier posting and see how he does.  

It is telling that even though the emperor did not know how well Ch'en would do in Kwangsi, he preferred an appointee he knew personally for the position.

Some of the friction in administering the provinces of the empire derived from subordinate officials perceiving their powers being infringed and then looking to the central government for relief, while governors looked to the emperor himself for their defense. However, the K'ang-hsi emperor was not a legislator, and his grants of authority to provincial officials were inconsistent and confusing. Too often, the limits of a governor's power had not been defined; nor had the responsibilities and limits of those above and below him. This situation led to a series of mutual indictments and accusations of malfeasance.

In the summer of 1699, the lieutenant governor of Shansi, Chishiwu, indicted the governor, Wolun, for extorting money from the prefects of the province. Shortly thereafter, Wolun indicted Chishiwu for not managing provincial treasuries adequately and for sponsoring extortion among his subordinates. The mutual indictments pointed to anomalies in the late K'ang-hsi order. Lieutenant governors were responsible for collecting taxes and for accounting for those revenues that remained in the province after the central tax quota had been paid, but governors made the decisions about how much provincial revenue should be used to defray military expenses and relieve subsistence crises. Moreover, because of the way offices had been developed in the early Ch'ing, lieutenant governors had the same rank as governors, although
functionally they were subordinates. The situation was complicated by the fact that with the elimination of regional inspectors during the early Oboi regency, there was no outside review, and governors’ offices audited themselves. The court’s initial response to the accusations was to dismiss both Chishiwu and Wolun, and put new officials in their place.\textsuperscript{83} A similar case, centering on different provincial prerogatives, occurred in Szechwan a few years later. The governor, Y"u Yang-chih, and the provincial military intendant, Y"ueh Sheng-lung, came into conflict over how aggressive the strategy along the Tibet border should be.\textsuperscript{84} Y"ueh Sheng-lung favored an attempt to conquer the trading town of Dartsedo, whereas Y"u, who may have been receiving money from the merchants there, opposed any attempt to take the city. Each official accused the other of malfeasance. At stake was not only the question of Tibet policy, but also that of who should control military affairs, a pressing one in a border province like Szechwan.

The most spectacular case of mutual indictments occurred in the lower Yangtze province of Kiangsu in 1712. There governor Chang Po-hsing (1652–1725) accused governor-general Gali (d. 1714) of favoritism in the provincial examinations. In return, Gali accused Chang of a range of misdeeds, including failure to pursue pirates along the coast and to police his jurisdiction adequately, inability to assure the timely delivery of tribute grain to the capital, protecting the suspected traitor Fang Pao (1668–1749), and perhaps most galling to the chin-shib degree-holding Chang Po-hsing, reading and engaging in scholarship when he should have been attending to the affairs of government. Several sets of investigators failed to get to the bottom of these incendiary charges, which brought examination candidates and military personnel to the streets in protest. Finally the emperor sided with Chang Po-hsing, despite the fact that Gali’s mother had been the emperor’s wet nurse. Gali returned to the capital, and Chang was reappointed governor of Kiangsu.\textsuperscript{85}

These cases were widely known, in part because officials were transferred frequently and news traveled with them and their retinues. Wolun, accused in Shansi, was replaced by Gali, who was to be accused in Kiangsu. Chishiwu, who was vindicated in Shansi, replaced Y"u Yang-chih in Szechwan. Inevitably, the mutual indictments raised tensions among provincial personnel. In 1691, a censor memorialized to urge the emperor to act promptly in such cases, since

\textsuperscript{83} Ultimately Chishiwu was vindicated and promoted, and Wolun returned to a position in the banner hierarchy.

\textsuperscript{84} Ta Ch'ing Sheng-tsu Jen huang-ti shih-lu, ch. 194, pp. 2–2a, 6a–7. See also Dai Yingcong, The Sichuan frontier and Tibet: Imperial strategy in the early Qing (Seattle, 2009), pp. 57–62.

\textsuperscript{85} See memorial in Chang Po-hsing, Cheng-i t'ang wen-chi (Shanghai, 1936) 2, pp. 17–27. See also Guy, Qing governors and their provinces, pp. 248–57.
if they were allowed to fester, such disputes could affect officials throughout the system and government efficacy would decline. The K'ang-hsi emperor responded in each of these cases, but often tardily and tersely, seemingly disinclined to address the structural conflicts that underlay the accusations. He managed personalities rather than structures, trusted more in people than in laws, and was forgiving of the foibles of those he trusted. Both his son and grandson would describe his administrative style as “lenient” (k’uan) rather than “strict” (ch'ai).

Each of these cases of mutual accusation owed much to the particular circumstances and personalities involved. Shansi’s rather insular Manchu politics, Szechwan’s needs as a border province with Tibet, and the remarkable confrontation of military and civilian eminence that was enacted in the lower Yangtze region certainly shaped the protests that occurred there. However, collectively the accusers seemed to be probing and challenging the limits of provincial offices and authority.

**THE YUNG-CHENG REIGN: CONTROLLING GOVERNORS FROM THE CENTER**

Yin-chen, the prince who became the Yung-cheng emperor in 1735, was particularly aware of these weaknesses in the practice of administering provinces. An outsider prince who had not been expected to become emperor, Yin-chen had a temperament that was at once skeptical and experimental, restless and brilliant. He had observed capital officials long enough to know their talents and their failings. Just fifty days after ascending the throne, the Yung-cheng emperor issued a series of edicts outlining his expectations for provincial officials and his understanding of their failures. In these early edicts and throughout his reign he condemned Han officials for pursuing their private ends under the cover of Confucian universalism, for colluding with each other to deny the central government access to all the revenues raised in the name of the state, for resisting realistic assessments of administrative and political performance, and for ignoring the tasks of maintaining order and sustaining the military. The new emperor was hardly opposed to Confucian precepts, but he was opposed to the political practices of many literati. His critique raised the fascinating question of the relationship of precept to practice. Could administrative rationality be built on the foundation of the eighteenth-century bureaucrat’s classical training? One way to do so would have been to build a structure of

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86 The censor’s memorial is in Huang Ch’ing tsou-i, ch. 23, pp. 8–9.
regulations to constrain provincial officials’ capacity to advance interests other than the state’s. While the Yung-cheng emperor did this to some extent, his more immediate response was to use his powers of appointment to build a corps of provincial officials loyal to his own person and goals.

New men

In the course of his first six years on the throne the Yung-cheng emperor appointed eighty men as governors of provinces, creating the most tumultuous period in Ch’ing provincial administration before the middle of the nineteenth century. The new emperor’s earliest intervention in the corps of governors was to dismiss about half the provincial governors of the K’ang-hsi era in his first few months on the throne. He said he perceived them to be corrupt, or ineffective, or both. He may also not have trusted their loyalty to him as his father’s successor. Some of the replacements were the product of factional maneuvering. In the first full year of the reign, 1723, at least six governors were appointed on the recommendation of Nien Keng-yao (d. 1726), a Han-ch’un bannerman and chin-shib who, as a general in the northwest, had led Ch’ing troops to victory in Tibet in the last years of the K’ang-hsi reign. Over the next two years, as the new emperor became aware of Nien’s ambitions and the extent of his corruption, their relations began to sour. Beginning in the spring of 1725, the six governors were dismissed abruptly, causing a flurry of concern at court that the emperor sought to allay. This cycle played itself out clearly in Chihli. There, Chao Hung-hsieh, who had been praised by the K’ang-hsi emperor for not creating trouble, died in office in 1722, leaving tax arrears of some 450,000 taels of silver. In recognition of his long service in Chihli, the K’ang-hsi emperor had allowed his son, Chao Chih-huan, to succeed him and clear up the arrears. When Nien pointed out that the son was as corrupt as the father, the Yung-cheng emperor dismissed Chao Chih-huan. At this point, according to subsequent investigations, Chao offered Nien Keng-yao a bribe of 150,000 taels to be reinstated. Nien declined to take the offer, and instead recommended his protégé Li Wei-ch’un for the Chihli post. Li served nearly two years, and then was dismissed shortly after his patron was relieved of his command in Szechwan. Ironically, Li Wei-ch’un tried to save himself by indicting Nien, but the emperor saw through the ruse, charging him with being “outwardly compliant but inwardly rebellious.”

89 The emperor’s conciliatory words are quoted in Feng, Yung-cheng chuan, p. 457.
90 Ta Ch’ing Shib-tsung Hsien huang-ti shib-lu, ch. 34, pp. 10a–11a; Feng, Yung-cheng chuan, p. 105.
91 See biography of Li Wei-ch’un in Ch’ing shih lih-chuan 13, p. 2a.
The emperor’s parade of appointments continued after the early days of his reign. Even after Nien committed suicide in early 1726, new governors were appointed and dismissed at a rate unequaled during other times in the Ch’ing period. What were the characteristics of the new appointees, referred to as the emperor’s “new men”? Personal loyalty to the emperor was a common characteristic, fostered by his seeking and maintaining personal relations with those he appointed. His three favorite governors, T’ien Wen-ching (1662–1732), O-erh-t’ai (Ortai, 1680–1745), and Li Wei (1687–1738), were all men rescued from the obscurity of lower-middle- to middle-level bureaucratic careers. When the emperor observed them acting effectively, he raised them rapidly to high office. They owed their eminence entirely to him, and they served with intelligence and ability for the remainder of their lives.

The Yung-cheng emperor’s surviving comments on personnel dossiers and his remarks to individual officials show that he sought more than loyalty. He devoted a tremendous amount of time to evaluating the men who were to serve him. More than 11,000 imperial comments on audiences he held with those recommended for appointment and promotion are extant today. In his working reviews of officials, the emperor seemed above all concerned with talent (ts’ai). The search for talent was nothing new in administrative history or imperial rhetoric, but what was remarkable under this emperor was the emphasis on talent to the exclusion of other characteristics. Traditionally, officials were judged by three qualities: honesty (cb’ing), vigilance (shen), and diligence (cb’in). These desiderata were so established that they were inscribed on tablets in government offices throughout the empire. The Yung-cheng emperor decided that, at least for governors, these three virtues were insufficient: “The office of governor is difficult and has many responsibilities, and honesty, vigilance, and diligence are hardly enough to succeed. In employing officials we cannot demand perfection; nonetheless a governor must have a full measure of talent. Only then will he be able to avoid error.”

The difference between talent and the more traditional criteria lay in part

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92 This term “new men” was originally coined by Kent C. Smith in his dissertation “Ch’ing policy and the development of southwest China: Aspects of Ortai’s governor-generalship, 1726–1731,” Yale University, 1970, to describe O-erh-t’ai. William Rowe used the term more generally to describe prominent officials in the early Yung-cheng reign; see William T. Rowe, Saving the world: Chen Hongmo and elite consciousness in eighteenth-century China (Stanford, 2001), p. 53.

93 These comments by the Yung-cheng emperor are published in Ch’ in Kuo-ching et al., eds., Chung-kuo ti i li-shih tang-an-kuan ts’ang Ch’ing tai kuan-y¨uan l¨u-li tang-an ch’¨uan-pien (Shanghai, 1997). They are discussed at some length in Wang Chih-ming, Yung-cheng ch’ao kuan-liao chih-tu yen-chiu (Shanghai, 2007).

94 These characteristics were first identified in the Three Kingdoms period, and remained a staple of personnel administration throughout the imperial era.

in the way they were measured. Honesty, vigilance, and diligence were good Confucian virtues, outward manifestations of inner disposition and cultivation. Talent, on the other hand, was measured by accomplishments in office. The emperor was proposing a new paradigm for evaluating officials.

This change was critical for an emperor whose commitment to reform in some respects exceeded his own capacity to achieve results. Tellingly, most of the proposals for such reforms originated with provincial bureaucrats. For instance, although the emperor from his earliest days understood that there was a problem of financing local government, the idea of collecting the silver wastage fee for the public coffers and using it to provide salaries for previously unpaid sub-officials came from T'ien Wen-ching and other northern governors. Similarly, the policy of reorganizing the southwest by abolishing recognition of hereditary local headmen was forged by the emperor's favorite, O-erh-t'ai, while he was serving as governor-general of Yunnan and Kweichow, with the emperor approving in general terms. The reality was that before taking the throne, the Yung-cheng emperor had had little administrative experience. He was aware of abuses by officials and sub-officials, but he hardly had the experience to impose the means to ameliorate them. The new solutions for which his reign is famous came about through the initiatives of provincial officials whom the emperor trusted.

To be certain that governors accomplished the missions for which they were appointed, the Yung-cheng emperor expanded the secret palace memorial system that had been initiated by his father. This private communications system allowed documents to be conveyed directly and confidentially between the emperor and selected officials, a secure and regular channel of communication between them. These documents did not, given the speed of communications and the distances in the Ch'ing empire, allow the emperor to participate in key decision-making in the provinces, but he could much more readily avail himself of officials' advice. Secret palace memorials also allowed the emperor to ask one official in confidence about the performance of his colleagues, and then check the responses by consulting others or more open records. This possibility constituted a new check on provincial officials' activities. Initially, all the palace memorials and the imperial rescripts on them were strictly secret. The emperor himself regarded this work as his central contribution to the management of the Ch'ing state, and toward the end of his reign he ordered that a compilation of his secret comments to officials be published.

97 The origins of this system are well described in Silas H. L. Wu, Communication and imperial control in China: Evolution of the palace memorial system, 1693–1735 (Cambridge, MA, 1970).
as his legacy. The resulting *Yung-cheng chu-p'i yü-chih* (*Imperial rescripts in red from the Yung-cheng reign*) was issued in 1738. Although somewhat edited to reflect the ideological sensitivities of both the new emperor and his officials, it remains a primary source for understanding the evolution of policy in the Yung-cheng reign.\(^{98}\)

**Governor T’ien Wen-ching and the emperor**

The appointment of T’ien Wen-ching illustrates the energy and urgency that the Yung-cheng emperor brought to his new appointments, and the ways in which he used the new palace memorial system to achieve his ends. Like many Yung-cheng favorites, T’ien was a Han-ch’un bannerman, not a product of the examination system. After twenty-five years of experience in the lower strata of provincial administration, he was plucked from administrative obscurity by the vigilant emperor.

T’ien’s first appointment had been as assistant magistrate in Ch’ang-lo, Fukien, a coastal county downstream from Foochow city, where the Min River joins the sea. After eleven years there, T’ien was promoted, presumably by routine means, to be the magistrate of Hsiang-ning county in Shansi, a small place in the mountains east of the Yellow River, where he served for fourteen years. T’ien Wen-ching’s next posting was as magistrate of the larger independent department of I-chou in Chihli, which straddled the Great Wall along the Shansi border about 220 li southwest of Peking. After only a year there, T’ien was given a series of appointments in the capital. From 1705 to 1708, he served as assistant department director in the Ministry of Punishments; from 1708 to 1711, he was a department director in the Ministry of Personnel; in 1711, he was transferred to the Censorate; and in 1715, he was assigned the task of reviewing salt quotas for the Ch’ang-lu salt district, which included much of north China and provided significant revenue for the Imperial Household Department. While many sources describe T’ien Wen-ching as a fairly rough-and-ready provincial administrator, honest to a fault but lacking in the polish of his Confucian subordinates, his series of mid-level capital appointments suggests that he was not inept in the capital’s bureaucratic world.\(^{99}\)

By the early 1720s, T’ien Wen-ching was the sort of obscure but experienced junior official whom the Yung-cheng emperor wanted to meet, but the

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\(^{98}\) On the publication of the memorials, see Yang Ch’i-ch’iao, *Yung-cheng ti chi ch’i mi-che chih-tu yen-chiu* (Hong Kong, 1983), pp. 188–98. The resulting collection was first printed in 1738, and has been reprinted as O-erh-t’ai, *Yung-cheng chu-p’i yü-chih*.

actual circumstances of T’ien’s encounter with the emperor, as the emperor related them, owed more to accident than to imperial design. The emperor’s association with T’ien began when T’ien was directed, in his capacity as a reader in the Grand Secretariat, to represent the emperor at sacrifices carried out at Hua-shan, one of the five sacred mountains, located in Hua-yin county in central Shensi, just southwest of the elbow of the Yellow River. T’ien’s route probably carried him through I-chou, then down the Fen River valley in central Shansi, perhaps past Hsiang-ning county where he had spent the majority of his time as a county official. As he passed through these areas, T’ien encountered the first famine of the Yung-cheng reign. It was due to a drought that had probably begun in the summer of 1721 and was concentrated around the great bend in the Yellow River in Shensi province. By 1722 much of the north was affected, including Shansi. During an earlier trip to the capital when he was still in favor, Nien Keng-yao had reported this famine to the emperor, but Shansi officials had not made any mention of it, and so had not triggered any of the famine-relief procedures that the Ch’ing had developed. T’ien Wen-ching, asked to observe conditions along the way, reported that famine was everywhere in full evidence. The emperor replaced the governor of Shansi and appointed T’ien lieutenant governor, the first Han official to hold that position since the Oboi regency. Using the expertise he had accumulated during his years of provincial service, T’ien oversaw famine relief, and also worked to correct the tax deficits that had accumulated during the long term of Sukeji as governor.\footnote{Ta Ch’ing Shih-tung Hsien huang-ti shih-lu, ch. 51, pp. 8–15. This account was provided by the emperor as he defended T’ien from an indictment made in 1726. It has been questioned by Ch’en Chieh-hsien, “Lun sheng Ch’ing ming-ch’en T’ien Wen-ching chih te-ch’ung chi ch’i yüan-yin,” Ku-kung wen-hsien 4 (1973), pp. 29–30. Ch’en is inclined to trust rumors of the Yung-cheng era that T’ien had served in the household of Prince Yin-chen before he was elevated to the throne. Feng Erh-k’ang, in Yung-cheng chuan, p. 475, sees no cause to doubt the Yung-cheng account.}

Success in Shansi led to the transfer of T’ien Wen-ching to the post of lieutenant governor of Honan. There he confronted a new challenge, the distribution of relief and the reconstruction of the dikes along the Yellow River that had collapsed following torrential rains in the spring of 1723 that ended the northern drought. A new imperial appointee, Chi Tseng-yüan, was sent to inspect the situation, and he recommended shoring up the river banks through much of Honan province.\footnote{On Chi Tseng-yüan, see Hummel, Eminent Chinese of the Ch’ing period, pp. 119–20. His memorials on river conservation are printed in Chi Tseng-yüan, Fang-bo tsan-i (Yung-cheng reign; Shanghai, 2002).} The maintenance of these dike works was a perpetual obligation of the Honan governor, one of the few tasks of an individual governor that was formally recognized in the Ch’ing administrative code. In this regard, the situation in Honan was quite different from that of
Shantung, where the Ch’ing central state normally underwrote the cost of repairs to the Grand Canal. In Honan each governor had to cobble together a package of central allocations, local resources, and provincial funds to support river work. Often the labor and expense of maintaining the river had to be balanced against the need to provide relief for those whose homes and crops were destroyed by flooding. When T’ien Wen-ching arrived in Kaifeng as lieutenant governor, he found his superior, governor Shih Wen-cho, daunted by the task before him. Peasants would not sell the provincial government the straw needed to repair the dikes at reasonable prices, and laborers could not be hired within budget to accomplish the work. In a secret memorial, T’ien calmly reassured the monarch that straw could readily be acquired at harvest time on the northern plain, and that workers, if properly paid and supervised, would undertake the task of shoring up embankments. The issue was money. T’ien then proposed that landowners along the banks of the river, who would be the main beneficiaries of dike works, be assessed according to the size of their holdings in order to pay the workers and supervise the labor.

The activism and confidence of T’ien Wen-ching’s memorial distinguished it from Shih Wen-cho’s. In contrast to the governor’s worries about whether carts and men could be hired and straw found, T’ien assured the emperor in a matter-of-fact tone that the work could be accomplished, and that it would produce embankments secure for a generation. Shih Wen-cho addressed the emperor as one might a distant and rather ill-equipped accountant. The numbers were provided, but there was nothing to be done except reach the governor’s conclusion that a further imposition on the local population was necessary. T’ien Wen-ching did not offer the emperor a choice. There was no request for imperial authorization in his memorial, and subsequent events suggested that he had initiated his plan before the emperor read or responded to it. But he did provide a fairly clear outline of the situation, and his proposal was comprehensive enough to assure an emperor separated from the scene of disaster by distance and layers of officialdom that the goals of the project could be reached.

As it turned out, resistance by local landowners frustrated T’ien’s plan. Confronted with the lieutenant governor’s requests for money, members of the local elite responded by boycotting the provincial examination. By

105 On this boycott, see Benjamin A. Elman, *A cultural history of civil examinations in late imperial China* (Berkeley, 2000), pp. 230–1.
this means, they hoped to attract the attention of examination officials, who could convey their opposition directly to the Yung-cheng court, bypassing the governor’s yamen. They found a sympathetic ear in the examiner Chang T'ing-lu, and also in his brother Chang T'ing-yü (1672–1755), a confidant of the K'ang-hsi emperor, high-ranking official of the Yung-cheng emperor, and dean of scholarly officials in the capital. Although leaders of the boycott were arrested, T'ien retreated from his plan to have landholders pay for or supervise the work on the riverbanks. The necessary work along the banks of the Yellow River was accomplished instead by a detachment of “river troops” (ho-ping) lent to the Honan provincial administration by the director-general of the Southern River Conservancy. But the fact that T'ien Wen-ching could not implement his ideas did not undermine the emperor's confidence in him. In the autumn of 1725 T'ien was promoted to be governor of Honan, and subordinate officials of his choosing were transferred to the province to replace those who had sided with the local elite in the examination boycott.

Because of the governor’s honesty and initiative, the Yung-cheng emperor championed T'ien Wen-ching on this occasion and at several points later in his long governorship, when his activism got him in trouble. T'ien’s honesty was in part conditioned by his history within the Ch'ing bureaucracy. Having advanced to senior provincial offices through the emperor’s intervention, he had no bureaucratic mentors to please and every reason to report information and advice that the emperor wanted. By the same token, he had little incentive to tell the emperor merely what pleased him to hear, since Kaifeng was close enough to the capital that any obvious falsifications would make their way there. Just as important, T'ien Wen-ching had arrived in Honan ready to take charge, and he had offered a clear solution to an enduring problem for the province. The solution may have represented the perspective of a lower stratum of administrators than was usually heard at court. T'ien himself was only a few years away from being a magistrate, and a source published several years after the events suggested that his proposal had originated with the magistrate of one of the riverbank counties affected by the flood. In endorsing T'ien, the emperor may have been endorsing not one official, but a whole cohort of junior officials who in the eighteenth century were making their way up the provincial government hierarchy that the Ch'ing leaders had created in the seventeenth century.

Control of local officials

The first half of the Yung-cheng reign was marked by rapid changes of personnel; its second half was marked by institution building. For governors,
the most important of the latter trend was the development of a system that allowed them to promote the most competent of their subordinates to the most difficult posts in their provinces. Central evaluation of officials was ideologically important in the imperial system, but it could not readily deal with the problem that some areas required specialized knowledge of particular social and political conditions, and others needed higher levels of skill and experience.

This problem was hardly new. Administrators in the capital throughout the Ming and early Ch'ing periods had been concerned about assigning officials with particular expertise to posts requiring it. The Yung-cheng emperor formalized these procedures, decreeing a system that would prevail until the end of the dynasty. In broad terms, this mid-Ch'ing solution was to acknowledge that provincial-level officials, closer to local postings and their particular problems, were better qualified to judge fitness for local offices than was the Ministry of Personnel in Peking. Because they had been accorded special rights of appointment at several points in the late seventeenth and the eighteenth centuries, a patchwork of personnel regimes had been created among the provinces, sometimes with marked differences.\(^{107}\)

Under the Ch'ing, as with previous dynasties, a small number of local postings deemed strategically important were designated “directly attached” (chih-li) or independent departments or sub-prefectures.\(^{108}\) Officials in charge of these areas reported directly to the governor of the province in which they were located, rather than to the prefect and circuit intendant, who normally served as intermediaries. The governors of the provinces in which such jurisdictions were located were allowed to select the magistrates of independent departments and sub-prefectures from among the most competent officials serving elsewhere in the province. This grant of appointive authority was intended to guarantee not only that the local officials in these districts would be experienced and accomplished, but also that they would have the confidence of the provincial governor.\(^{109}\)

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\(^{107}\) For a discussion of local appointments in the Ming, see Nimick, *Local administration in Ming China*, particularly pp. 84–90.


\(^{109}\) *Ta Ch'ing hui-tien shih-li*, ch. 61, pp. 1–4. In 1899, there were fifty-three independent departments and twenty independent sub-prefectures. On their establishment and development, see *Ta Ch'ing hui-tien shih-li*, ch. 38, pp. 1–10. The rule that governors would select the officials of these units was labeled yuan-ting, part of the original regulations of the dynasty. This designation would seem to confirm Skinner's hypothesis that these jurisdictions were meant from the beginning to be special, as opposed to the notion in H. S. Brunnert, V. V. Hagelstrom, et al., *Present day political organization of China* (Shanghai, 1912), that they were areas in transition to more normal patterns of administration. See G. William Skinner, “Cities and the hierarchy of local systems,” in *The city in late imperial China*, ed. G. William Skinner (Stanford, 1977), p. 321.
After the rebellions set off by Wu San-kuei were defeated, the K'ang-hsi court faced the problem of getting qualified officials to accept postings perceived as dangerous and unhealthy in the far south. In 1684, the emperor decreed that those who served in distant southern postings, officially termed “malarial and miasmic” (yen chang), would automatically be eligible for promotion after they had served successfully for three or five years, depending on the difficulty of the position.¹¹⁰ In 1695, when the K'ang-hsi court set out to establish local administration on Taiwan, these two kinds of administrative special status were combined. Officials appointed to the island were to be selected by the governor of Fukien from among the most competent magistrates serving in the mainland jurisdictions of his province, and then deemed to be eligible for further promotion after three years of successful service.¹¹¹

During the Yung-cheng reign, the number of counties that were set aside for such special treatment increased significantly, and came to include not only places in border provinces, but those well within the frontiers. In 1724, the emperor decreed that the governors of Kwangtung and Kwangsi should select magistrates for “malarial and miasmic” districts from among the most competent in their provinces, and made their possibilities for promotion comparable to those in Taiwan.¹¹² In the same year, he extended those terms of service to counties along the seacoasts of Shantung, Kiangsu, Chekiang, and Kwangtung.¹¹³ A further order provided that the magistrates posted along the rivers of Honan, Shantung, and Kiangsu be selected by governors from among those working elsewhere in the province and be eligible for promotion after three years of successful service. For riverbank posts, such “success” was defined as having no breaks in the dikes during one’s term of office and not having spent excessive funds on dike maintenance.¹¹⁴ In this instance, it would seem, magistrates were being given an incentive not only to serve along the rivers, but also to avoid the graft that was often associated with dike maintenance projects. In 1727 the Yung-cheng emperor set aside five border districts in Shensi and Kansu for appointment by the governors of those provinces.¹¹⁵ Later that year the magistrates of forty districts and departments of Hunan, Kweichow, and Yunnan, designated Miao frontier areas (Miao chiang), were offered similar terms for appointment and promotion.¹¹⁶

Early Ch'ing regulations for borderlands and internal frontiers addressed one side of the problem of differences in postings, but there remained the

¹¹⁰ Ta Ch'ing hui-tien shih-li, ch. 67, p. 5.
¹¹¹ Ta Ch'ing hui-tien shih-li, ch. 65, p. 17.
¹¹² Ta Ch'ing hui-tien shih-li, ch. 67, pp. 5–6.
¹¹³ Ta Ch'ing hui-tien shih-li, ch. 65, pp. 2–7.
¹¹⁴ Ta Ch'ing hui-tien shih-li, ch. 63, pp. 15–16. This edict was issued shortly after the resolution of the dispute between T'ien Wen-ching and the riverbank landowners in Honan.
¹¹⁵ Ta Ch'ing hui-tien shih-li, ch. 66, p. 1.
¹¹⁶ Ta Ch'ing hui-tien shih-li, ch. 67, p. 11.
fact that some places not on frontiers required special experience and skill. The Ch'ing government had a system for identifying and distinguishing difficult postings. Each post was characterized according to the presence or absence of four attributes, each of which was indicated by a single character. A position could be troublesome (fan), meaning that there was a great deal of official business; a thoroughfare (ch'ung), meaning that it was a center of communications or commercial importance; difficult (nan), meaning that the magistrate had to cope with an “unruly, crime-prone population”; or wearisome (pi), meaning that taxes were difficult to collect. Combinations of these attributes meant altogether fifteen possible designations, and in general the more labels a post had, the more difficult it was considered to be.  

In 1731 governors were given control over the appointment of officials who served in posts with multiple attributes. Pursuant to an order to deliberate and respond on the matter, the Ministry of Personnel, whose powers were being curtailed, observed that postings could be easy or difficult, just as talents could be limited or abundant. Only when talents were matched to locations would there be benefit to the people. The ministry proposed that governors be allowed to recommend the most competent officials in their provinces for appointment to posts designated with three or four attributes. The emperor approved the proposal, and it became established practice.

By the end of the Yung-cheng reign, Ch'ing governors had acquired control over the appointment of a substantial number of magistracies in a wide variety of venues. The terminology used to designate these positions pointed to their political significance. Posts were labeled “very important posts” (tsui yao ch'ueh) if they had four designated attributes, or “important posts” (yao ch'ueh) if they had three attributes or had already been placed under the governor's control, based on their location. Appointments under the control of governors were also known in official records as posts for which selection was made outside the capital (chien hsüan tsai wai chih ch'ueh). According to the 1899 edition of the Ta Ch'ing hui-tien shih-li (Precedents and regulations of the collected statutes of the Ch'ing), there were 301 such magistracies in counties, departments, and

118 Ta Ch'ing hui-tien shih-li, ch. 61, p. 18; Ta Ch'ing Shih-tung Hsien huang-ti shih-lu, ch. 113, pp. 11–12. This innovation appears to have been the result of the proposal of one provincial governor. See Kuo Ch'eng-k'ang, Shih-pa shih-chi ti Chung-kuo cheng-chih (Taipei, 2001), pp. 285–7.
119 G. William Skinner argued that there was a “secret strategic component” to post designations that raised certain posts to “important” even though they had only two designators. While I have not examined all the possible cases, in most of the cases that I have observed, the posts that counted as “important” even though they had only two designators were those posts that had been set aside in the late K'ang-hsi and the Yung-cheng edicts. In these situations, there was certainly an additional component to these post rankings, but its origin was not particularly secret.
sub-prefectures in the eighteen provinces. Because of the common terminology used to describe them, it is impossible to tell how many posts were set aside for strategic reasons, and how many because of economic importance. During the early eighteenth century, a total of 181 counties and departments were so designated on the basis of their strategic location in the far south, along the seacoasts and riverbanks, and in Miao frontier regions. Some of these posts lost their special status in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, and it seems likely that, with commercial development, more districts of economic importance were added to the list. By then perhaps half of the posts under governors’ control were positions of economic or commercial importance.

In view of the great effort the Yung-cheng emperor put into selecting the officials who would serve him as governors, the fact that he so readily turned over to them the authority to select their junior officials might seem paradoxical. From the point of view of provincial administration, however, there was no inconsistency. Lower-ranked officials who were more responsive to their governor’s priorities made it possible for him to carry out central-government directives more effectively. Changing the locus of selection of many local officials from the Ministry of Personnel to the governor’s yamen also enhanced the power of those men whom the emperor held primarily responsible for the tasks of governing their province.

THE CH’IEN-LUNG REIGN: SUBORDINATING GOVERNORS AND EXTRACTING WEALTH

The Yung-cheng emperor left his son who became the Ch’ien-lung emperor a complicated and contested legacy. By dint of energy and dedication the Yung-cheng emperor by the end of his life had produced an efficient bureaucratic order that was almost professional in its character. He had achieved this success by exercising a degree of personal involvement that many of the Han official elite found distasteful. The main problem that his successor faced in the early days of his rule was how to signal a retreat from the most unpopular of his father’s policies of provincial government without either losing the capacity to monitor and influence local affairs that the Yung-cheng provincial order

120 Ta Ch’ing bai-tien shih-li, ch. 8, pp. 10a–13a. Postings under governors’ control were also identified in a manual of official posting, entitled Ch’iib-chib ch’ian-lan (Peking, 1904; rpt. Taipei, 1967). The purpose of this manual seems to have been to prepare officials for the postings they were dispatched to take up. The volume not only recorded the fact that a post had been judged “important” or “very important,” but also noted the designations assigned to a post and whether it belonged to one of the categories placed under a governor’s control by imperial edict.
afforded, or appearing to repudiate his father, an option that required careful maneuvering when filial piety was a cardinal virtue.

During the early Ch‘ien-lung years, governors continued to exercise the wide powers they had acquired during the previous reigns, and the more active among them not only refined and further defined these powers, they also produced a body of writings about administration. Few of the provincial activists enjoyed the close relations with the emperor that their predecessors had in the previous reign. As those who had served under Yung-cheng passed from the scene, by mid-century there was a shift in the way power was exercised. The locus of initiative in provincial affairs shifted from an emperor–governor alliance to an alliance between the emperor and officials in the central government who viewed governors as their subordinates. The mid-eighteenth-century governor’s role came to be defined as one of filling the forms generated by the increasingly powerful members of the Grand Council. The most frequent path to an appointment as governor became lateral transfer, and a governor’s political fortunes could be measured in his successive transfers to wealthier and more politically visible postings. As governors jockeyed for more advantageous positions, bribes and presents became a common feature of the appointment process and of the conduct of government generally.

Reaction to the Yung-cheng order

The Yung-cheng emperor has been admired by twentieth-century Western and Japanese scholars for his modernization of Ch‘ing administration, but he was not so well regarded in eighteenth-century China. His attempt to rule through strong provincial governors and to bypass many central-government officials and institutions, his emphasis on concrete accomplishments as opposed to more generalized notions of virtue, and what many perceived as an increasingly militarized provincial order were particularly unpopular among the Han official elites who participated in Ch‘ing rule.121

121 Fang Pao, “Ch‘ing chiao-ch’u chi-hsi hsing-ch‘i jen-ts’ai cha-tzu,” in Fang Pao, Fang Pao chi (Shanghai, 1983), Volume 2, pp. 557–63; Ts‘ao I-shih, “Ch‘ing fen-pieh hsien-neng shu,” in Ho Ch‘ang-ling, Huang-ch‘ao ch‘ing-shih wen-pien 19, pp. 24–5. For complaints that too many Manchus had been appointed provincial governor, see the entry on Hang Shih-ch‘un in Hummel, Eminent Chinese of the Ch‘ing period, p. 277; and CSL-CL 184:46a–50a. For Ch‘u‘an Ts‘u-wang’s complaint, see his “Chiang-yin Yang Wen-ting kung hsing-shu,” in Ch‘u‘an Ts‘u-wang, Chieh-ch‘i-t‘ing chi wai pien (Shanghai, 2002), ch. 11. On the complexity of the debate over the Yung-cheng emperor’s nourishment of virtue reforms in the early Ch‘ien-lung period, see Madeleine Zelin, The magistrate’s task: Rationalizing fiscal reform in eighteenth-century Ch‘ing China (Berkeley, 1984), pp. 266–78. Many of these critical perspectives emerged when the new emperor invited comment on Ch‘ing government in the early years of the reign, a process known as “opening the avenue of opinion.”
To address these resentments, a few obvious changes were made in the first years of the Ch'ien-lung emperor's reign. Many of those who had previously been dismissed were restored to their positions and ranks. Seven governors were appointed in 1736; they replaced four who had been relieved of office and recalled to the capital and three who were formally indicted and dismissed. In the southwest and northwest, these new appointments were related to a change in military strategy. There were also changes in economic policy. The emperor rescinded imperial authorization of a system of land deed registration that T'ien Wen-ch'ing had established in Honan, and he retreated from the Yung-cheng policy of reducing taxes on “reclaimed land”; that is, land put back into cultivation after warfare or disaster. Many of these early changes were justified by reference to a passage in the Book of documents that spoke of the need for successive monarchs to alternate leniency (k'uan) and strictness (chai) in their style of rule. Applied to the early Ch'ing period, it was understood that the K'ang-hsi emperor had been lenient and the Yung-cheng emperor severe, and that the Ch'ien-lung emperor's role was to modulate his father's severity.

One of the dismissals of a governor proved to be more contentious than the court expected. Wang Shih-chün (1683–1756), refusing to go quietly, lectured the emperor on the dangers of abandoning the Yung-cheng legacy. Wang rose and fell within the bureaucracy on the strength of his association with the bureaucratic and administrative style espoused by the Yung-cheng emperor. He earned his chin-shih degree in 1721, almost the last year of the K'ang-hsi reign, and his performance on the palace examinations and in the imperial interview earned him a place in the Hanlin Academy. The new Yung-cheng emperor decided to cut the size of the Hanlin Academy in half, and Wang was sent by special imperial order to assist Governor T'ien Wen-ch'ing while awaiting appointment as a magistrate. According to the Ch'ing shih (Ch'ing history) account, T'ien was initially inhospitable to the neophyte dispatched to him for training almost straight from Peking's examination halls, but Wang proved his competence, even successfully disputing the governor on a technical matter of taxation. In that dispute Wang received support from the lieutenant governor, Yang Wen-ch'ien, whose protégé he subsequently became. When Yang was transferred to Kwangtung, he asked that Wang accompany him, and Wang was appointed circuit intendant there. In 1732, Wang replaced T'ien Wen-ch'ing, who had died in office, both as governor of Honan and as

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122 Ta Ch'ing Kao-tsung Ch'ün huang-ti shih-lu (Peking, 1986), ch. 8, pp. 3–14.
123 Ta Ch'ing Kao-tsung Ch'ün huang-ti shih-lu, ch. 4, pp. 7–28.
125 On Wang Shih-chün, see Chao Erh-hsün, Ch'ing shih, ch. 295, pp. 4079–80.
governor-general for the lower Yellow River and Grand Canal (Ho-tung ho-tao tsung-tu).\textsuperscript{126}

Several factors rendered Wang Shih-chün a vulnerable figure after the Yung-cheng emperor died in the late summer of 1735. As governor-general, he was the successor of T’ien Wen-ching, who had already made numerous enemies among the senior officials and the local elites of Honan during his governorship. Wang made clear his admiration for T’ien, and in 1733 or 1734 nominated him for posthumous selection for the Honan temple of eminent statesmen. Unfortunately, nature had not smiled on the last years of T’ien’s administration, and he was indicted for failing to report a severe flood in 1730.\textsuperscript{127} It was easy for many in the province and in the capital to blame the hardship that Honan people suffered in the early 1730s on T’ien’s and Wang’s misgovernment. When in the late fall of 1735 the minister of finance indicted Wang for overreporting the amount of reclaimed land in the province, the new emperor relieved Wang of his duties. He charged that Wang had failed to exert himself adequately to nourish and restore the people after T’ien’s cruel administration. Fu-de, an associate of O-erh-t'ai, replaced Wang.\textsuperscript{128}

For the first time in his fourteen years in government Wang was recalled to Peking. He had reason, perhaps, to be bitter, but what made him most uneasy during his eight-month stay in the capital were the changes he saw being made in the Yung-cheng emperor’s institutions. When he received an appointment as governor of Szechwan, he could no longer restrain himself, and set forth his views in a lengthy and in places impassioned memorial.\textsuperscript{129} Four matters troubled Wang. Most important was the way the Yung-cheng legacy of administrative reform was regarded at the Ch’ien-lung court. Wang acknowledged that there had been excesses, supervisors had mistaken strictness for clarity, public accounting had become dominated by trifles, and punishments had

\textsuperscript{126} Ch’ing shih lieh-chuan 18, pp. 12–16; Chao Erh-hsün, Ch’ing shih, ch. 295, p. 4078; Hummel, Eminent Chinese of the Ch’ing period, p. 720.

\textsuperscript{127} The charge was revived in 1731; see Ta Ch’ing Kao-tüng Ch’ün huang-ti shih-lu, ch. 7, p. 30–30a. The charge was particularly potent as T’ien had made his name in the Yung-cheng years by pointing out an unreported flood.

\textsuperscript{128} Ta Ch’ing Kao-tüng Ch’ün huang-ti shih-lu, ch. 17, pp. 14–15. The indictment is quoted at some length in Ch’ing shih lieh-chuan 18, pp. 13a–14a, and Chao Erh-hsün, Ch’ing shih, ch. 295, p. 4079. It included the lurid detail that poor people in Honan were being forced to sell their daughters in order to meet the heavy tax burden caused by taking reclaimed lands off the tax rolls. The author was said to be a protégé of O-erh-t’ai. On O-erh-t’ai’s power at the early Ch’ien-lung court, see below. It was rumored that there was no love lost between the Yung-cheng emperor’s two favorites, T’ien Wen-ching and O-erh-t’ai.

\textsuperscript{129} The account here is based on an original copy of Wang Shih-chün’s memorial held in the First Historical Archives, Peking. However, most accounts of the case, for instance, Tai, Ch’ien-lung ti chi ch’ü shih-tai, pp. 111–12, are based on the Ch’ien-lung emperor’s response to Wang; see Ta Ch’ing Kao-tüng Ch’ün huang-ti shih-lu, ch. 23, pp. 16a–21a.
not matched crimes. In Wang’s view, these were faults of a bureaucratic order, not the results of Yung-cheng’s policies. After the emperor’s death, however, the whole court appeared intent on undoing his work. Among newly minted *chin-shih* degree holders and aspiring bureaucrats, any proposal that effectively would overturn Yung-cheng’s policies was regarded as good. Wang urged the young emperor to be on his guard.

Wang’s second and third concerns were with the emerging patterns of relations between provincial and central administrators. The root of the problem was that ministers (*shang-shu*) often served concurrently as grand secretaries (*ta-hsueh-shih*) and grand councilors (*chün-chi ta-ch’ên*). In their latter capacity as advisers, they were in a position to pass judgment on proposals that they had made in their other capacity as ministers. Of what use was it to write a secret palace memorial about personnel or financial matters when the ministers of personnel or finance would read it because they were also grand councilors? Related to this, the third problem Wang saw was favoritism in the treatment of provincial governors’ recommendations. Some proposals were approved automatically, he alleged, even if the weight of precedent was against them, while other governors found themselves frustrated even when their arguments were sound and their procedures traditional.

Wang’s fourth complaint suggested that instead of concerning themselves with matters of policy, courtiers were devoting their time to building factions. The occasions for this personnel manipulation were several seemingly innocuous edicts issued early in the reign in which the emperor invited serving officials to recommend men of talent and promised to restore to office those who had been dismissed wrongfully or for minor cause. As a result of these edicts, Wang noted, the courtyards of senior officials had become like marketplaces where graft and gossip were the stock-in-trade.

Few would have spoken to the new emperor in language as intemperate as Wang Shih-ch’un used. The case, moreover, marked a tear in the fabric of a transition that was meant to be seamless. In a sense the problem lay in a contradiction in the Yung-cheng emperor’s legacy. On the one hand, he had empowered provincial personnel to actively pursue his vision of the state, while on the other he had created a high-level advisory council in the capital that oversaw a wide range of civilian and military matters in the provinces. These two models coexisted somewhat uncomfortably through the middle decades of the eighteenth century. The differences between them were seldom sharply highlighted. Some eighteenth-century governors chose to be provincial activists in all matters, others only in some matters, while still others merely filled in the paperwork for an increasingly powerful Grand Council. Given the emperor’s sensitivity to factions among his senior bureaucrats, there was little group solidarity among governors of the different types.
Although many had reservations about the Yung-cheng emperor’s style of rule, few doubted the efficacy of the provincial order he had built. Much of this order was left intact in the early Ch'ien-lung years. The Grand Council remained the center of the Ch'ing administration, though it grew more powerful and independent with the new staff and record-keeping apparatus it acquired. Palace memorials remained the principle mode of communication between regions and the center, and increasingly became the medium through which the Grand Council as a government-within-a-government secured the information it needed to administer the empire.\footnote{Beatrice S. Bartlett, *Monarchs and ministers: The Grand Council in Mid-Ch'ing China, 1723–1820* (Berkeley, 1991), pp. 137–68. For one official’s concern about how decisions were being made under the new system, see “Lun chiu ch'ing hui i shih i cha-tzu,” in Fang Pao, *Fang Pao chi*, Volume 2, pp. 574–6.} The “nourishing-incorruptibility” (yang-lien) system, a method for providing government salaries for the subordinates of the magistrate and one of Yung-cheng’s main reforms, after some debate, was left intact. Provincial officials who had had their formative experiences under the Yung-cheng emperor remained in place throughout much of the empire. They dominated the first two decades of the Ch'ien-lung reign, and were responsible for many of its signal achievements. Examples of activist governors include Ch'en Hung-mou (1696–1771), Yang Hsi-fu (1701–68), and Fang Kuan-ch'eng (1698–1768).

Ch'en Hung-mou experienced his baptism of fire in the lower Yangtze shortly after receiving his chin-shih degree in 1724. Difficulties in administering examinations and collecting taxes were endemic to this region, where the intensive education of elites made examinations among the most competitive in the empire, and where collected tax revenues seldom matched what was due to the central government. Shortly before Ch'en's appointment to the lower Yangtze, the Yung-cheng emperor became aware that candidates there were hiring substitutes to take their annual requalification examinations. He charged Ch'en with eliminating this fraud. Ch'en found that the practice was so widespread that it would be practically impossible to arrest all those who engaged in it. He recommended an amnesty, followed by rigorous enforcement of the rules. The emperor, initially flabbergasted at the prospect of an imperial order being questioned, characteristically listened to the advice from his official in the province and approved Ch'en's suggestion. The problem of tax arrears was equally difficult. Aggressive prosecution in 1661 had led to public demonstrations. Although the court then had effected a compromise that produced peace in Kiangsu, unpaid taxes continued to plague almost
every governor of the province. During Ch'en's time in the southeast, governor Yin-chi-shan undertook a survey of taxes due in Kiangsu that produced a fairly full accounting of the arrears and led to the dismissal of many officials who had colluded in or condoned underpayment. Ch'en Hung-mou, however, emerged from the accounting with his reputation intact, and he was able to count Yin-chi-shan as one of his mentors in the bureaucratic world.  

Ch'en Hung-mou's other signal provincial contribution was in Shensi, where he served four times between 1740 and 1760. His initial appointment to the province was unusual. During the Oboi regency in the 1660s, the practice was established of appointing only Manchus to Shensi, and Ch'en was among its first Han governors. In the seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries, Shensi served as a rear base for the Ch'ing armies in the northwest, and many of the Manchu appointees had been responsible for military provisioning. Ch'en devoted himself to more civilian tasks, and was particularly known for his concern with irrigation and the encouragement of agriculture in Shensi, which was a theme in the writings of all the Han officials who governed Shensi. Ts'ui Chi, the first Han governor, was a chin-shih from Shansi. He had submitted an extensive series of memorials on hydraulic projects, but was dismissed when the emperor found that little action had been taken on any of them. Ch'en Hung-mou completed some of Ts'ui's projects and established the tradition of concern with these issues. The editors of the nineteenth-century Huang-ch'ao ching-shih wen-pien (Writings on ordering the world in our dynasty) devoted nearly one chüan to proposals regarding Shensi's waterways. During the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries a new agrarian economy based on crops from the New World that could be grown on marginal lands evolved in Shensi.  

In addition to these regional accomplishments, Ch'en Hung-mou made a substantial contribution to empire-wide territorial administration. By one account,

Fairly shortly after Ch'ien-lung's succession, he came to use the multi-talented Ch'en as a provincial troubleshooter. Ch'en's transfers came quite suddenly as he was needed to deal with food supply emergencies, or revive collapsing hydraulic structures, or handle urgent minority relations problems, or manage logistics for impending military campaigns, or clear up litigation gluts, or simply rescue a province mired in maladministration.

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131 Rowe, Saving the world, p. 51. 132 See above, p. 32. 133 On Ts'ui Chi, see Li Huan, comp., Kuo-ch'ao ch'i-hsien lei-cheng ch'u pien (1884–90; Taipei, 1966) 73, pp. 37–9a; and Ta Ch'ing Kao-tsung Ch'un huang-ti shih-lu, ch. 64, pp. 8–9. 134 Rowe, Saving the world, pp. 224–6; Ho, Huang-ch'ao ching-shih wen-pien 214, pp. 2875–98. 135 See Roy Bin Wong, China transformed: Historical change and the limits of European experience (Ithaca, NY, 1997), p. 19. 136 Rowe, Saving the world, p. 54.
In his capacity as imperial troubleshooter, Ch'en received more appointments to be a provincial governor than any other official during the dynasty. Ch'en's second lasting contribution to the life of the empire was his writings. Partly because of the geographical range of his experience, and because he wrote so clearly about the imperatives of stability, his written works were printed and reprinted from the early nineteenth century on for later generations who lived in an era of insecurity. They form a telling introduction to the methods and mentality of one of the most successful eighteenth-century officials.\(^{137}\)

Yang Hsi-fu was another revered activist official of the mid-eighteenth century.\(^{138}\) Although he served initially in the Hanlin Academy during the Yung-cheng reign, perhaps the most striking fact about his official life was that it was spent almost entirely in the south. Only six of his forty-one years in government service were in the capital, and he held no position in a northern province. Yang's first appointment was as circuit intendant in the Kuang-Chao-Lo circuit in central Kwangtung. The main feature of this area, a wealthy one in the core of the Ling-nan region, was a large, privately built dike system known as the Mulberry Enclosure that irrigated the most productive farmland in the region. Three years before Yang's appointment, these dikes had been the subject of a furious conflict between those who wanted to re-enforce them with stone and others who thought this would be too expensive.\(^{139}\) All was quiet during Yang Hsi-fu's term, but the experience may have been his first introduction to the politics of dike building and river control.

From Kwangtung Yang moved on to deal with a different set of problems as lieutenant governor of Kwangsi, the post to which he was promoted in 1736. There, as throughout the southwest in the first quarter of the eighteenth century, the dominant issue was the relations between the Ch'ing government, Han settlers, and indigenous Miao peoples. During the Yung-cheng reign, the solution that the court and local officials had envisioned was military conquest. When Yang arrived in Kwangsi in the first year of the Ch'ien-lung reign, the new emperor stressed instead a policy of peaceful accommodation. Yang's background as a trained civil servant suited him to the new communitarian directions of imperial policy, and when he wrote about establishing mutual responsibility (pao-chia) units and mechanisms for interregional cooperation among provincial officials, he received praise and support from Peking.

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\(^{137}\) Rowe, *Saving the world*, pp. 549–52, has a useful annotated list of Ch'en's writings.


\(^{139}\) This conflict is described in the biography of A-k'o-tun in Chao Erh-hsün, *Cb'ing shih*, ch. 304, pp. 4133–4.
The combination of experience in the wealthy core of Kwangtung and then in the borderlands of Kwangsi might have qualified Yang Hsi-fu superbly for service in Hunan, but one detail perhaps stood in the way. Yang was from Kiangsi, the neighboring province to the east of Hunan. Specifically, he was from Ch'ing-chiang, a county situated along the major route between Nanch'ang and Ch'ang-sha, the two provincial capitals. Service in Hunan could have been regarded as a violation of the rules of avoidance that prevented an official from serving within two hundred li of his native district. However, the Ch'ing leadership had decided early on that rules of avoidance did not apply to special appointments made by the emperor. The fact that Yang was appointed to Hunan strongly suggested that his appointment was decided upon at the highest levels.

Yang Hsi-fu was best known during his Hunan years for an essay in which he reflected on the relation of increases in population to rises in grain prices, and on the importance of maintaining the hydraulic infrastructure if a growing population was to be fed. Yang acted on this insight, and devoted much of his time as governor to repairing and expanding dikes and irrigation works. The court went out of its way on several occasions to make sure that Yang remained in Hunan. All Ch'ing officials were required to observe a period of ritual mourning when a parent died, about twenty-seven months for a father's death and a shorter period for a mother. When officials observed mourning, they formally vacated their offices, and on completion of the prescribed term they were expected to report to Peking. There they presented their credentials to the Ministry of Personnel, and waited for the next available vacancy at an appropriate rank. Yang Hsi-fu was unique among eighteenth-century governors in having to go into mourning twice while he was governor of Hunan, once in 1748 for his father and again in 1751 for his mother. After both periods of mourning Yang was sent back to Hunan, probably as the result of imperial intervention in the routine process.

After his service in Hunan, Yang was promoted to a position in the capital, and then to be governor-general for grain transport, a post he held for twelve years, longer than any other official in the eighteenth century. His epitaph recorded that the emperor recommended that Yang's book, Ts'ao-yun ch'uan-shu (Complete account of grain transport), be provided to all subsequent grain

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141 Regulations on mourning are found in ch. 138 and 139 of Ta Ch'ing hui-tien shih-li.
transport officials.\textsuperscript{142} The collection of his writings produced after Yang’s death by bureaucratic subordinates, the \textit{Ssu-chih t'ang wen-chi} (\textit{Collected writings from the Hall of four types of knowing}), presents a picture of nearly selfless dedication to administration.\textsuperscript{143}

Fang Kuan-ch'eng had a particularly rocky ride on his way to high provincial office. He came from one of the most famous lineages of the empire, the Fang families of T'ung-ch'eng, Anhwei. During his childhood, Fongs and Changs from that county, who intermarried, were among the ranks of senior officials. Chang T'ing-yü (1672–1755) of T'ung-ch'eng served as a grand councilor during the Yung-cheng and early Ch'ien-lung reigns. He had been a tutor to the prince who became the Ch'ien-lung emperor. Another example from T'ung-ch'eng is Fang Pao (1668–1749), who was commissioned by the Ch'ien-lung emperor to write a manual for writers of examination essays.\textsuperscript{144} Such eminence also had its costs. Back in 1713 a censor accused Hanlin academician Tai Ming-shih (1653–1713), also from T'ung-ch'eng, of publishing a collection with seditious content entitled \textit{Nan-shan-chi} (\textit{Nan-shan collection}). In it Tai mentioned a book on the princes of the southern Ming by Fang Kuan-ch'eng’s grandfather, who had also written a preface for Tai’s collection. The K'ang-hsi emperor, confronted with evidence both of sedition and of collusion among senior literati officials, reacted violently. He proscribed the volume, sentenced Tai Ming-shih to be executed, and condemned Fang’s family to exile.\textsuperscript{145}

As a teenaged boy Fang Kuan-ch'eng was spared from exile, but he spent most of his adolescence shuttling back and forth between a family property near Nanking and Heilungkiang, far in the northeast, where his banished parents and grandparents were living in exile. Because of the cloud over his family, Fang did not take the civil examinations in which members of his lineage for so many generations had enjoyed success. Instead he offered his services as an amanuensis to Fu-p'eng (d. 1748), a general and Manchu prince. In 1732 Fu-p'eng was appointed commander-in-chief of the Ch'ing forces.

\begin{footnotes}
\footnoteteext{142}{Chao Erh-hsün, \textit{Ch'ing shih}, ch. 309, p. 4176. Yang’s book by this title does not appear to be extant; however, another work, entitled \textit{Ti'ao-yüen te-li tsaan} (\textit{Regulations on grain transport}), attributed to him, has recently been reprinted.}
\footnoteteext{143}{Yang Hsi-fu, \textit{Ssu-chih t'ang wen-chi} (1805; Peking, 2000).}
\end{footnotes}
dispatched against the Dzungars far in the west. Fang accompanied him, having been given a nominal title of secretary in the Grand Secretariat. When the Dzungars sued for peace and Fu-p'eng returned to Peking, Fang was given a regular appointment on the staff of the Grand Secretariat. He then was transferred to the staff of the Grand Council, which was the foundation for his rise. Fang moved on to the Ministry of War and the Ministry of Personnel. In 1742 he was appointed circuit intendant in Chihli, and he was rapidly promoted to the posts of provincial judge and then lieutenant governor. During the next four years, he served as acting governor of Shantung and governor of Chekiang, before being appointed, in 1748, governor-general of Chihli, a post that he held until his death in 1768.\footnote{Hummel, \textit{Eminent Chinese of the Ch'ing period}, pp. 135–5; and Chao Erh-hsün, \textit{Ch'ing shih}, ch. 325, pp. 4275–6.}

Fang made a major contribution as governor-general to eighteenth-century statecraft in his management of drought-relief and water-control operations. His published account of this work, \textit{Chen-chi} (\textit{Record of relief efforts}, 1754, preface 1760), is described as “unquestionably one of the longest and most detailed accounts of a specific famine relief operation” in the late imperial period. The book “deals with all the possible forms of government intervention in such cases.”\footnote{Pierre-Étienne Will, \textit{Bureaucracy and famine in eighteenth-century China}, trans. Elborg Forster (Stanford, 1990), p. 16.} Fang was also responsible for the compilation of a collection of documents on water control. These works reflected Fang’s acquisition of specialized competencies. Like his contemporaries Ch'en Hung-mou and Yang Hsi-fu, these were abilities acquired on the job, in the course of carrying out the responsibilities with which the Yung-cheng emperor and central officials in the early Ch'ien-lung reign charged their provincial officials. Reprinted by students and admirers in the nineteenth century, the writings of these three eighteenth-century governors came to define the high point of Ch'ing provincial administration.

\textit{Appointments from the center}

As activist governors like Ch'en, Yang, and Fang passed from the scene around 1770, institutions in the central government assumed more of the initiative in provincial affairs. Domination by a few powerful figures might have been expected early in the Ch'ien-lung reign, when the twenty-five-year-old monarch was aided by senior officials who had served his father. O-erh-t'ai, who had accumulated influence during his provincial service in the Yung-cheng years, exerted his new standing in the Grand Council by controlling
the appointment of provincial governors.\textsuperscript{148} His dominance in provincial affairs continued through the first decade of Ch’ien-lung rule, and his sons and nephews served as governors until 1768. After O-erh-t’ai’s death in 1745, the influence he had exercised over provincial affairs shifted to others in the Grand Council. The power of a few figures at court over provincial governors was secured when the Grand Council acquired the prerogative of ascertaining, on the occasion of a vacancy in the provinces, whether the emperor wished to make a special appointment or to choose a person from the ranked lists prepared by the Ministry of Personnel. This task was almost certainly added to the Grand Council’s responsibilities at some point in the eighteenth century; the first reference to it appears in the collected statutes of the Chia-ch’ing period, published in 1812.\textsuperscript{149}

Another mark of the Grand Council’s importance in the selection of governors was the number of men who had first served as its clerks (chên-chi chang-ch’ing) and later were appointed as governors. Grand Council clerks were assistants, not mere calligraphers, although good calligraphy was probably a factor in their selection. They were young or early middle-aged officials chosen for their intelligence and capacity to handle “high-level discretionary tasks.”\textsuperscript{150} The practice of appointing former Grand Council clerks to governorships seems to have begun during the term of the second chief grand councilor in the Ch’ien-lung reign, Fu-heng (d. 1770). In 1727 Fu-heng’s older sister had married the young prince who would become the Ch’ien-lung emperor. He became especially devoted to her, designating her his empress when he ascended the throne, and she bore two of his seventeen sons and two of his ten daughters before she died in the spring of 1748.\textsuperscript{151} Already the brother of the emperor’s wife, Fu-heng became a member of the Grand Council in 1745 and chief grand councilor in 1746, a trusted post he held until his death in 1779.

At least thirty individuals who had served as Grand Council clerks were appointed governors during the Ch’ien-lung reign, about 15 percent of the total of 200 governors over the sixty years. Twenty of the thirty former clerks

\textsuperscript{148} For a preliminary list of governors likely appointed under O-erh-t’ai’s patronage, see Guy, Qing governors and their provinces, p. 130; see also Kuo Ch’eng-k’ang and Ch’eng Ch’ung-te, eds., Ch’ien-lung huang-ti ch’ien chuan (Peking, 1994), pp. 104–5.

\textsuperscript{149} Ta Ch’ing hui-tien (1822 edition; Taipei, 1992), ch. 3, p. 3.

\textsuperscript{150} Bartlett, Monarchs and ministers, p. 201.

were Manchus, and the other ten were Han.\textsuperscript{152} The first clerk so appointed was O-jung-an (\textit{chin-shih} 1733), the oldest son of O-erh-t'ai. He was appointed governor of Honan in 1748, three years after his father's death. O-erh-t'ai had objected to O-jung-an's being made a Grand Council clerk, but the Yung-cheng emperor had overruled his objections. Seven years later, O-jung-an's younger brother O-pao, also a former clerk, was appointed governor of Kwangsi. Another father-and-son pair, Ming-shan and Hai-niing (d. 1790), also moved through the Grand Council to high appointments in the provinces. Ming-shan began as a Grand Council clerk in 1754, and was appointed governor of Kiangsi in 1762. While he was governor, his son Hai-niing became a clerk, and eventually governor of Shansi in 1788.\textsuperscript{153} During 1768–9, four other former clerks were appointed governor.\textsuperscript{154}

As central government authorities asserted more control over provincial affairs, they found employment of Manchus as governors and governors-general to be particularly convenient. In 1738, Manchus occupied 13 percent of the offices of governor. By 1750, the high point of Manchu presence in these offices, they were 71 percent of the governors. They occupied at least 50 percent of the posts of provincial governor until the early 1770s.\textsuperscript{155} Manchus were not confined to any particular region. They governed in all provinces, although there was some tendency for Manchus who received their first appointment either in the north or along the southeast coast to remain in those regions. Those who were appointed to other provinces moved around just as their Han colleagues did. All this seems to have been a product of the emperor's decisions. Manchus were somewhat more likely than Han officials to be appointed to a governor's office through special imperial action,\textsuperscript{156} although even many of those Manchus who received their governorships through

\textsuperscript{152} To obtain these numbers, I compared the list of clerks in Liang Chang-chü, comp., \textit{Ssu yüan chi lüeh} (1875; Taipei, 1967), with the list of provincial governors in Ch'ien Shih-fu, \textit{Ch'ing-tai chih-kuan nien-piao}.

\textsuperscript{153} As these figures suggest, there was often a considerable gap in time between the beginning of an official's service on the Grand Council and an appointment as governor. Liang Chang-chü only provides the date of first service at the council, but not the conclusion of service. Biographical materials often, but not always, mention council service, but they are far more accurate on the concurrent appointments that council clerks held in the outer court bureaucracy than on inner court service. My impression is that many of the former clerks appointed governor had served at some post in the capital between these two appointments.

\textsuperscript{154} As Bartlett, \textit{Monarchs and ministers}, notes in Appendix 4, the dates Liang Chang-chü provides for the service of the clerks are not always accurate, and in 1768–9 there was a high turnover of governors.

\textsuperscript{155} These percentages were calculated by Narakino Shimesu, \textit{Shindai jûyô shokkan no kenkyû: Man–Kan hojô no zenbô} (Tokyo, 1975), pp. 250–1; cited in Wakeman, \textit{The great enterprise}, Volume 2, pp. 1022–3.

\textsuperscript{156} Appointment by special imperial action here refers to any case in which the emperor selected a candidate other than one proposed by the Ministry of Personnel. Such an appointment was referred to as a “special appointment” (t'e-chien).
promotion had served as lieutenant governor, provincial judge, or circuit intendant.

No single document announced a policy of appointing more Manchus to office, but several factors were at work. One was the steady increase in the Manchu population after the conquest, and since Manchus could only be legitimately employed by the state, positions had to be found for them. The number of Manchu banner officers had increased during and after the Three Feudatories rebellion in the 1670s. Until the early eighteenth century, crude birth and death rates were quite high among males in the imperial lineage, but from the 1690s the death rate fell considerably, with the result that the cohort of elite Manchus who were contemporaries of the Ch'ien-lung emperor was especially large.\textsuperscript{157} An active generation of Manchu officials who traced their ancestry to the conquest elite came of age in the 1740s and 1750s, and they expected opportunities to serve their state.

Such numbers alone do not tell the story. Despite his reputation as a patron of Han literati, the Ch'ien-lung emperor was more comfortable with Manchu officials, at least in the early years of his reign. He came close to stating this outright in 1738, when he was confronted with an indictment of the long-serving governor of Shansi, Shih-lin, a member of the Chüeh-lo branch of the imperial lineage.\textsuperscript{158} After thirteen years in office, during which he was reputed to have lined his own pockets, Shih-lin left the province's hydraulic works in disrepair and the provincial treasuries empty when he departed to mourn his mother. In response to the charges against him, the emperor stressed the efforts that Shih-lin's grandfather and father had made to eliminate corruption, and he punished Shih-lin's subordinates instead. The emperor complained, however, of the difficulty of determining guilt when ties of friendship and mentorship ran throughout the bureaucracy. Whom could the ruler trust? Then he provided a relatively straightforward answer: “I can guarantee that the six Manchu ministers (shang-shu) have no interest other than mine. But among the Han ministers, there are only one or two whom I can trust.”\textsuperscript{159} Since all of the offices of those Han ministers had turned over several times since his accession to the throne, it seems likely that the emperor was not indicting specific men so much as he was making a general statement about his perceptions of Han and Manchu dedication to the dynasty’s well-being. The emperor's affirmation of Manchu trustworthiness


\textsuperscript{158} Li Huan, \textit{Kuo-ch'ao ch'i-hsien lei-cheng ch'u pien} 71, pp. 14a–b.

\textsuperscript{159} \textit{Ta Ch'ing Kao-tsung Ch'un huang-ti shih-lu} 138.13b.
in an edict occasioned by charges of corrupt Manchu officials was in part a response to what must have been recurring questions about the fitness of Manchus to hold provincial offices, but there is no reason to doubt that it also was part of the emperor’s motives in appointing Manchu governors and governors-general to provincial capitals. The two trends in Ch'ien-lung provincial administration—centralization of power and appointment of more Manchus to provincial offices—reached a culmination in the last years of the reign, when Grand Councilor Ho-shen dominated the central government.

Effects of the Ho-shen years

Studies of Ho-shen (1750–99) have focused on his relationship with the elderly emperor and its disastrous consequences for Ch'ing provincial and central administration in the 1780s and 1790s. They generally do not set the career of this notorious court favorite in context by considering his position and accomplishments in relation to those of his predecessors. While the precise sources of Ho-shen’s influence over the emperor may never be known, it did not differ much from that enjoyed by previous chief grand councilors. Like O-erh-t'ai, Ho-shen was rescued from a lowly position in the ranks of the Peking Manchu banner establishment when the emperor noticed him in 1775. Like Fu-heng, Ho-shen became related by marriage to the emperor. In 1780 Ho-shen’s son married the emperor’s youngest and favorite daughter. Like Liu T'ung-hsün (1700–73), chief grand councilor in the early 1770s, Ho-shen advanced his influence in the capital by investigating charges brought in the provinces. In Ho-shen’s case the accusation was that Li Shih-yao (d. 1788), the governor-general of Yunnan and Kweichow, had accepted gifts from his subordinates, and had sold them pearls at highly inflated prices. These charges resembled the accusation that governor Heng-wen had forced


162 On Li Shih-yao, see Hummel, Eminent Chinese of the Ch'ing period, pp. 481–2; and Ch'ien-lung ch'ao ch'eng-fan t'an-tzu t'ung-an hui'an-pien (Peking, 1994), Volume 1, pp. 5–6, 697–1188. Ta Ch'ing Kao-tung Ch'un hsüan-ti shih-ku, chs. 1100–2, passim, contain both the charges against Li Shih-yao and an interesting record of Ho-shen’s journey from Peking to the southwest. See also R. Kent Guy, “Qing imperial justice? The case of Li Shiyao,” in Law and empire: Ideas, practices, actors, ed. Jeroen Duindam et al. (Leiden, 2013), pp. 197–222.
his subordinate to buy gold at inflated prices, a matter that Liu T'ung-hsün had investigated for the Grand Council in 1757.\(^{163}\)

Ho-shen differed most conspicuously from his predecessors in the degree to which he profited from office. Like earlier chief grand councilors, he appointed relatives to provincial posts. Chi-ch'ing, who governed in Shantung from 1791 to 1793 and Chekiang from 1793 to 1796, was Ho-shen's cousin. The unusual number of appointments made in 1780, 1785, and 1790 probably reflected the actions of Ho-shen. He was notorious for appointing Manchu associates to provincial offices and then extorting from them silver, gold, precious stones, and works of art. At his death, he had amassed one of the largest personal fortunes of his day, and the permanent enmity of most of the Han officials. His years as chief grand councilor produced some of the most spectacular corruption prosecutions of the eighteenth century. In 1782, Kuo-t'ai, the son of a famous Manchu general of mid-century, was charged with embezzling during his five-year governorship in Shantung from 1777 to 1782.\(^{164}\) Four years later, Fu-sung was cashiered from the governorship of Shansi when he was found to have allowed tax arrears to accumulate and to have manipulated salt tax revenues during his previous posting as governor of Chekiang.\(^{165}\)

The size of Ho-shen's fortune and the number of corruption cases of his day were not a function entirely of one man's greed but also of the vastly greater resources open to administrators in the last years of the eighteenth century. The case of Li Shih-yao, which Ho-shen prosecuted, may have resembled in statutory terms that of Heng-wen, which Liu T'ung-hsün prosecuted, but the state seized 900,000 taels worth of property from Li Shih-yao, compared to only 40,000 from Heng-wen.\(^{166}\) This degree of wealth was particularly available in the coastal provinces that benefited from overseas trade and the advantages of a strong economy, especially the Ling-nan region in the south and the lower Yangtze region.\(^{167}\) In view of the economic disparities among provinces, it is notable that many of those officials most closely linked to Ho-shen governed coastal provinces, and they remitted some of their revenues to the grand councilor.

On the whole, Ho-shen influenced policy and personnel selections at a level that has not been accessible to historians. He covered his bureaucratic tracks, and left few documentary records. However, a rather unusual series of fines imposed as bureaucratic discipline have been taken as emblematic of

\(^{163}\) Ch'ien-lung ch'ao ch'eng-pan t'an-wu tang-an, Volume 1, pp. 1–99.

\(^{164}\) Ch'ien-lung ch'ao ch'eng-pan t'an-wu tang-an, Volume 3, pp. 2395–491.

\(^{165}\) Ch'ien-lung ch'ao ch'eng-pan t'an-wu tang-an, Volume 1, pp. 3277–387. According to contemporaries, Fu-sung was an enemy of Ho-shen, unlike Kuo-t'ai, who seems to have been protected by the grand councilor.

\(^{166}\) Kuo, Shih-pa shih-chi ti Chung-kuo cheng-chih, pp. 373–5.

\(^{167}\) Marks, Tigers, rice, silk, and silt.
his activities. Punishment of malfeasance in Ming times had been expressed in terms of the number of strokes a guilty official was to be beaten. In the eighteenth century, the practice was to convert corporal punishments into various levels of reprimands and demotions. The Yung-cheng emperor complained that too much administrative talent was lost through demotions, and he established a system of salary fines that allowed an official to pay restitution without having to leave office. This order was meant to apply to junior officials, but by the Ch'ien-lung reign governors were paying salary fines as well. Thus the notion of making payments in lieu of corporal punishment or demotion was not new in the late eighteenth century. What was new about those payments to the Imperial Household Department was the amounts involved, which were greater than any previous salary fines by a factor of ten or a hundred. In practice, such payments were made not only to avoid punishments in cases where governors had been found guilty, but also to avoid disciplinary proceedings altogether. The Imperial Household Department fine system should be viewed not as an extension of the system of administrative discipline, but as a nexus created to give a few powerful individuals in the court access to some of the wealth that provincial governors could accumulate in prosperous times.

Ho-shen did not invent these fines, which were known as “money payments in righteous recognition of guilt” (i-\(tsui-yin\)), but he did systematize the process.\(^{168}\) By the 1780s, a bureaucratic apparatus had been developed by which the Imperial Household Department kept track of the amounts of money owed by officials and the rates of their repayments, and a special bureau made what appear to have been half-yearly reports to the emperor on the state of the accounts. In 1935 and 1936, archivists in the Palace Museum published four such reports, dated January 1787 (with twenty-seven cases), October 1787 (with twenty-five cases), March 1795 (with twenty-one cases), and October 1795 (with twenty-two cases).\(^{169}\) The number of officials listed as making salary “contributions” was small, but their collective payments to the Imperial Household Department coffers were significant. The fines levied ranged from 5,000 taels of silver to more than 200,000, but most were between 30,000 and 80,000 taels. The total amount of the fines recorded in the first 1787 report is 1,761,586 taels of silver, more than the value of the annual quota of land tax revenues of all but the seven wealthiest provinces.

\(^{168}\) Payments to exonerate guilt may have begun as early as 1763. One of the most useful treatments of corruption in the late eighteenth century is Kuo Ch'eng-k'ang, “Shih-pa shih-chi hou-ch'i Chung-kuo t'an-wu wen-t'i yen-chiu,” Ch'ing shih yen-chiu No. 1 (1995), pp. 13–26.

\(^{169}\) The four reports are in Ku-kung po-wu-yuan, comp., Wen-hsien ts'ung-pien No. 25 (1935) and No. 26 (1936).
Table 1.3. Fines paid by eight officials who had served as provincial governors to the Secret Accounts Bureau of the Imperial Household Department in 1787 and 1795

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Governor</th>
<th>Province</th>
<th>Years there</th>
<th>Amount</th>
<th>Accounting year</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Li Chih-ying</td>
<td>Kwangtung</td>
<td>1776–80</td>
<td>256,000</td>
<td>1787</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fu-sung</td>
<td>Chekiang</td>
<td>1782–6</td>
<td>200,000</td>
<td>1787</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wu Yüan</td>
<td>Hupei</td>
<td>1785–6</td>
<td>40,000</td>
<td>1787</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yang Kuei</td>
<td>Fukien</td>
<td>1781–2</td>
<td>50,000</td>
<td>1787</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shang-an</td>
<td>Kwangtung</td>
<td>1783–4</td>
<td>40,000</td>
<td>1787</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ming-hsing</td>
<td>Shantung</td>
<td>1782–7</td>
<td>30,000</td>
<td>1787</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ch'i-feng-o</td>
<td>Kiangsu</td>
<td>1792–5</td>
<td>30,000</td>
<td>1795</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kuo Shih-hsün</td>
<td>Kwangtung</td>
<td>1791–4</td>
<td>20,000</td>
<td>1795</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Of the total, 14 percent, or 250,000 taels, was earmarked for the support of public-works projects and was paid directly to the treasuries of the governors of Shantung, Honan, and Chekiang provinces. The remainder was to go into the Imperial Household Department treasury in Peking, not to a Ministry of Revenue account.

Provincial governors were culprits in six cases in each of the 1787 reports, and five cases each in the two 1795 reports. They accounted for about one-quarter of the officials charged. Since officials’ names appeared more than once in the reports, as they first incurred, partially paid up, and then completely paid off the amounts owed, there was considerable duplication on the lists. Eight entries in the 1787 and 1795 reports recorded fines incurred while the officials were serving as governors. The amounts of their fines, and the postings in which they were incurred, are listed in Table 1.3. Most of these governors served in wealthier coastal provinces, where both opportunities for corruption and the resources to pay fines were greatest. Three of the eight governors listed served in Kwangtung. While it is plausible to view these fines as a kind of institutionalized extortion by which central court officials extracted from provincial appointees money for themselves and the imperial purse, it is also possible to see them as a mechanism by which high-level court officials extracted additional revenue for the state from the provinces able to provide it, which leaves aside the question whether those fined were not guilty. The opportunities for transfers of money from individuals to the state in the late Ch’ien-lung reign owed much to the remarkable economic environment of those decades. Late eighteenth-century Ch’ing society was marked by extremes of wealth and poverty, and the court was often troubled by the question of how to respond to these differences.\(^{170}\) In the later years

of the century, richer provinces, such as Kiangsu, Chekiang, and Shantung, continued to serve as major sources of revenue for the state. The wealth of Kwangtung was mightily enhanced by the inflow of silver to pay for tea that was exported in the 1780s and 1790s. The governors of these provinces were often able to pay off their fines within a year. In contrast, the family of a governor who died with an outstanding fine was unable to make it up, and eventually the Imperial Household Department cancelled the debt.

The different financial circumstances of eighteenth-century governors highlighted the differences in the economic conditions of the provinces they governed, and also pointed to one of the remarkable ironies at the end of the century. By the 1780s the Ch'ien-lung emperor had created one of the most centralized regimes of provincial governance in Chinese history. The system was geographically based in what were the appropriate sites for provincial civilian administration, as had been established in the Shun-chih reign. It was built with the hierarchical structures established during the K'ang-hsi reign, and the new communications and control procedures created in the Yung-cheng reign. During the Ch'ien-lung reign, the power of the governors of the earlier era was checked, and their behavior made subject to regulations issued by an even more powerful Grand Council. To make these controls more personal, many governors were selected from the ranks of those who had served as Grand Council clerks. This centralized control was achieved when regional diversity was emerging as a new reality for the Ch'ing empire. Just when the Ch'ien-lung government needed to be more sensitive to regional differences, it was not prepared to allow governors independence or to fashion more flexible arrangements in provincial administration. The Ch'ing dynasty had entered the eighteenth century with an administration structured to meet challenges faced in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, but its solutions made it vulnerable to the new pressures confronting its empire in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.
CHAPTER 2

TAIWAN PREFECTURE IN THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY

John Robert Shepherd

When Ch'ing forces defeated the Cheng navy and occupied the Pescadores Islands in July 1683, the leaders of the Ming loyalist Cheng regime in Taiwan realized further resistance was futile and sued for peace. Shih Lang, the victorious Ch'ing admiral who earlier had been allied with Cheng, moved quickly in 1683 to consolidate his control over Taiwan.¹ The peaceful surrender of the Cheng regime meant that there was no organized resistance to the Ch'ing takeover. The new government nevertheless had to expend considerable effort rounding up unruly remnant soldiers and Cheng deserters.

Shih Lang’s immediate task was to restore civil order. Shortly after his landing on Taiwan in the fall of 1683, he met with representatives of the Han inhabitants and the aborigine tribes to assure them that Taiwan’s submitting to Ch'ing authority meant that all Taiwan’s people would be considered loyal subjects whom the government would protect and pacify. Shih acted to maintain the discipline of his troops in order to minimize friction between the occupying forces and the local population. Shih forbade government troops from occupying peoples’ homes. He ordered that commerce and agriculture should go on at the people’s convenience, with no interference in local markets. Military rations were imported from the mainland to avoid overburdening local supplies, and commandeering supplies at cheap prices was forbidden. In addition, a tax holiday was declared to celebrate Taiwan’s peaceful surrender to the Ch'ing forces. All of these measures were designed to ensure a smooth transition to a new order.²

² More detailed treatment of these events, along with references to sources, can be found in chapters 5 and 6 of John R. Shepherd, Statecraft and political economy on the Taiwan frontier, 1660–1800 (Stanford, 1993). Several sources give accounts of the policy debate over the future of Taiwan: Shih Lang, Ching-hai chi shih (1685; Taipei, 1958); Chuang Chin-te, "Ch'ing ch'u yen-chin yen-hai jen-min t'ou-tu lai T'ai shih-mo (shang),” T'ai-wan wen-hsien 15 No. 3 (1964), pp. 1–20; and his “Ch'ing ch'u yen-chin yen-hai jen-min t'ou-tu lai T'ai shih-mo (hsia),” T'ai-wan wen-hsien 15 No. 4 (1964), pp. 40–62; Ch'ing Sheng-tu shih-lu

Officials in Peking had intended, once the rebel Cheng regime was defeated, to abandon Taiwan and evacuate the Han population back to the mainland. Accordingly, military men of the Cheng regime were either sent back to their home communities or incorporated into Ch’ing armies. In all, 40,000 were repatriated. Many soldiers and refugees in Taiwan had been driven from the mainland during the years of the Ch’ing conquest. They had had a difficult life under the hard-pressed Cheng regime, and willingly returned to their mainland homes. The Han civilian population, nearly all of them immigrants from southern Fukien, were also under pressure to leave. The Ch’ing coastal regulations of 1683 decreed that anyone sojourning in Taiwan who had neither wife nor livelihood must return home to Fukien. Those with wives and property and desiring to remain were required to register with local officials. Shih Lang estimated that by the ninth month of 1684 nearly half the Han population had already left the island. Tax quotas to be collected in cash and grain had to be substantially reduced, although the per capita burden still remained high. If Shih Lang’s estimate was correct, Taiwan’s Han population must have fallen below 80,000 at this time, since its maximum under Cheng control is estimated at only 120,000. The remainder of the population of Taiwan in the areas under Ch’ing control consisted of an estimated 50,000 plains aborigines, descendants of several Austronesian ethno-linguistic groups. This implies a total population in Ch’ing-controlled areas of around only 130,000 in 1684.

Shih Lang vigorously opposed the Ch’ing plan to abandon Taiwan, which he had fought for many years to gain. In late 1683 several high officials met at Foochow to debate Ch’ing policy for Taiwan. Shih Lang argued that Taiwan was too important strategically and economically for it not to be incorporated into the empire, and that governing the new territory need not burden the imperial treasury. Shih pointed out the dangers to mainland coastal security were Taiwan to fall into the hands of a hostile power. Moreover, if Taiwan were under Ch’ing control, the garrisons along the southeast coast, and the attendant expenditures, could be reduced. Some of these troops could be used to garrison Taiwan, thereby reducing any additional expense of administering the new territory. Shih Lang named sulfur (a strategic ingredient for making gunpowder) and deer hides among the valuable products that made Taiwan

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3 Shih, Ching-hai chi shih, pp. 53–4.
5 Shih, Ching-hai chi shih, pp. 67, 69.
worth keeping, or at least worth keeping out of others’ hands. Shih also pointed out that the complete evacuation of Taiwan’s Han population would take years and would only serve to create large numbers of vagrants on the mainland. Cheng remnants hiding among aborigines in the mountains could never be entirely cleared out, and to abandon Taiwan to them would turn it into a pirates’ lair. Shih Lang’s arguments in favor of incorporating the island into the empire prevailed, and in the fourth month of 1684 the part of Taiwan controlled by officials delegated by the Ch’ing government was declared to be a prefecture of Fukien province.6

Land and marine forces were assigned to garrison Taiwan and the Pescadores. At the same time, the prohibition on maritime trade that had been instituted to inhibit the Cheng forces was lifted, which gave Fukien’s fishermen and merchants access to the seas and to Taiwan, and allowed Fukien’s residents to return to their coastal villages.7 In adopting these policies the government hoped to foster an economic recovery along the southeast coast that would stabilize its social order and also generate taxes and customs revenues from overseas trade, which would ease the court’s own fiscal problems. As maritime commerce gravitated back to Amoy after 1684, Taiwan lost the entrepôt functions it had had under the Dutch and the Cheng regimes when maritime trade with Japan and elsewhere had been outlawed by Ming and Ch’ing governments.

The Ch’ing government imposed a partial quarantine on emigration to Taiwan. It was determined to prevent the island’s again becoming a staging ground for resistance against Ch’ing rule. Rather than foster colonization by farmers from the mainland, the government sought to limit the further spread of settlements in Taiwan. The court was concerned that Han immigration to Taiwan would create a potentially rebellious population in areas beyond its effective control. It also saw that expanding Han settlement would be an intrusion on aborigine villages and would upset the ethnic status quo on the island. Quarantine policies had the effect of sheltering the indigenous tribes. Disturbances and aborigine revolts in Taiwan were nearly always attributed to the misdeeds of intrusive Han immigrants, but the government’s priority was to maintain control at the lowest cost, not to defend aborigine societies against the frontiersmen. The status quo was seen as the key to the maintenance of order and effective control over this strategically important area on the periphery of the empire.

The Ch’ing government attempted to consolidate its control indirectly over the island by regulating immigration and preventing the migration of

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6 Shepherd, Statecraft and political economy on the Taiwan frontier, pp. 38–40, 106.
families in order to keep immigrants, mostly single males, dependent on access to the mainland. It also restricted exports of rice to ensure that local food shortages would not be a source of disturbances. Direct control over the island was to be exercised by a military garrison and a civil administration concentrated in the southwest around the prefectural capital of T'ai-wan-fu (hereafter referred to as Tainan, and the location of the modern city by that name). Neither the military nor the civil bureaucracy was extended into the sparsely populated northern third of the western plain. While this was all the government presence that the tax revenues of the underpopulated island and financially strapped Fukien could support, the sizes of the civil and military bureaucracies in Taiwan relative to its population were much greater than that of the average Ch'ing prefecture.

The Ch'ing government replaced the Cheng soldiers in Taiwan with garrison forces totaling 10,000 land and marine troops. These were headed by a brigade general, whose immediate superior was the Fukien naval commander-in-chief in Amoy. Rather than being stationed locally on a permanent basis, as was usual for Green Standard troops, these soldiers were rotated every three years from the armies in Fukien. To help ensure their loyalty, the soldiers were required to leave their families behind on the mainland. The prohibition against recruitment of soldiers from within Taiwan reflected distrust of the local population. The relatively large size of the military garrisons meant that the ratio of soldiers to local population was several times greater in Taiwan than in the average prefectural jurisdiction. The garrisons were established at strategic points around Tainan, with a few scattered military outposts as far north as Chang-hua, but none north of the Ta-chia River. The concentration of the military presence in the Tainan area reflected the concentration of Han population in the island’s southwest core and that region’s strategic significance.

The highest-ranked civil official in Taiwan was the Taiwan–Amoy military circuit intendant. The intendant had the power to move troops and oversee communications between the ports of Tainan and Amoy. He was assisted by coastal defense sub-prefects stationed in each port. All cross-strait shipping was restricted by regulation to the ports of Amoy and Tainan. The duties of the intendant and the coastal defense sub-prefects included enforcing these restrictions and ensuring that these strategic points remained secure.

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8 Ch'ing Sheng-tsu shih-lu hsüan-chi, pp. 130–4.
9 See Shepherd, Statescraft and political economy on the Taiwan frontier, pp. 107–8, 127, 137–42, 179–82, appendix D, 426–39. The initial structure of the Ch'ing military and civil bureaucracies in Taiwan shows a higher-than-average density of civil and military officials deployed on the island as well as setting the stage for later developments.
intendant’s responsibilities were focused on the strategic and external affairs of Taiwan, whereas those of the prefect and magistrates were focused on internal security and tax revenue collection.

The prefect of Taiwan was subordinate to the intendant, the governor of Fukien, and the governor-general of Chekiang and Fukien. The prefect supervised the county magistrates for Chu-lo county, covering the northern plain; Taiwan county, which included the heavily settled areas around Tainan and the
Pescadores Islands offshore; and Feng-shan county, covering the plains south of Tainan. Each magistrate was assisted by a sub-magistrate. An additional sub-magistrate was stationed in the Pescadores, and an assistant county magistrate was assigned to Taiwan county in Tainan. Only previously experienced officials, rather than recent examination graduates, were to be appointed to serve as magistrates in Taiwan. The posting of experienced officials with relatively small areas to administer, the addition of sub-magistrates and an assistant magistrate, and the added oversight by the intendant and coastal defense sub-prefects, all indicate great concern to ensure control over the island prefecture.

Overall, the sizeable civil and military presence deployed in Taiwan was not justified by the size of Taiwan’s population, its economic significance, or its fiscal importance, but by the challenge this maritime frontier presented for control by the government. The relative density of civil and military officers indicates Taiwan’s strategic significance. The heavy civil and military presence created higher government expenses per capita in Taiwan, while Taiwan’s lower-than-average county populations produced low revenues. This made Taiwan dependent on subsidies from higher levels of government. To relieve this fiscal imbalance the state needed to minimize frontier expenses and increase revenues. Expenditures could be reduced by adopting low-cost methods of indirect control and quarantine, and by limiting further bureaucratic expansion. Revenues, on the other hand, might be increased by population growth, reclamation of farmland, and expanding the area registered for taxation, but a growing frontier population might in turn cause additional control problems that forced the state to incur additional expenses. This fiscal and control dilemma reappeared in many of the policy debates concerning the government of Taiwan in the eighteenth century.

**Ch’ing Taxation and Administration of Aborigines**

The repatriation of so much of the Han population from Taiwan at the beginning of Ch’ing rule in the 1680s, and the imposition of quarantine policies that restricted new immigration, left aborigine society and trade relatively undisturbed by the accession of the new regime. Villages in the mountains had been beyond the reach of the Dutch and the Cheng regime, and remained beyond the reach of Ch’ing military and administrative power, although mountain aborigines traded with and occasionally raided lowland settlements. The pressure from the Han population on aborigine hunting territories diminished. The Dutch and the Cheng regime had suppressed inter-village warfare and headhunting among the plains aborigines, and imposed overarching systems of administration and taxation on the villages. The Ch’ing representatives had no desire to disturb the status quo by creating a new administrative and tax
apparatus. They simply adopted the Cheng system of administering the plains aborigine villages and continued the Cheng practice of imposing both a head tax and corvée demands on the aborigine tribes.

Tax farming of aborigine villages and monopoly merchant control of the deerskin trade continued to structure the interaction of Ch'ing government officials, Han immigrants, and aborigines well into the early eighteenth century. The officials referred to tribes that had submitted to Ch'ing authority and paid taxes as “ripened” or “civilized” aborigines (shu-fan). These peoples inhabited the western coastal plains, in contrast to “raw” or “uncivilized” aborigines (sheng-fan), who inhabited the mountains and lived outside Ch'ing control. The plains tribes were grouped into thirty-eight taxpaying units, thirty-four in Chu-lo county to the north, and four in Feng-shan county to the south, plus eight tribes in Feng-shan who paid taxes in grain. The tax farmer paid the tribal tax on behalf of an aborigine settlement. In return he extracted goods from the tribe and acquired a trade monopoly on both buying aborigine produce from, and selling trade goods to, that settlement. Selling private merchants the right to farm taxes was advantageous for the local government because it guaranteed the payment of the tax quota at the same time as it eliminated the expense of administering a tax collection system in the villages. On the other hand, the monopoly merchant system concentrated great power in the hands of the tax farmer and his subordinates, who mediated between the state and the weakly organized and less sophisticated aborigines. Such power was often abused, as it had been in Dutch and Cheng times. Yü Yung-ho, who traveled north from Tainan on a trip to obtain sulfur in Tan-shui in 1697, commented as follows:

The Chungs extracted heavy labor service and taxes from the barbarians [i.e. aborigines], and our dynasty continues this practice ... In each administrative district a wealthy person is made responsible for the village revenues. These men are called “village tax farmers” [literally, “village merchants,” she-shang]. The village tax farmer in turn appoints interpreters and foremen who are sent to live in the villages and who record and check up on every jot and tittle [grown or brought in by hunting] of all the barbarians ... They make a profit from the sale of both of these things after paying their taxes. But these interpreters and foremen take advantage of the simple-mindedness of the barbarians and never tire of fleecing them, looking on whatever they have as no different from their own property. In connection with the activities of daily life, great and small, all of the barbarians – men, women, and children – have to serve in their homes without a day of respite. Moreover,
they take the barbarian women as their wives and concubines. Whatever is demanded of them they must comply; if they make a mistake they must take a flogging. And yet the barbarians do not hate them greatly.  

Officials in Taiwan were concerned about corrupt practices in the administration of the aborigine tribes because of the disturbances they might cause, and because they interfered with the government’s ability to farm the taxes.

In addition to the tribal revenue tax exacted in kind or in silver, the Ch‘ing administration required the natives to provide corvée labor service. Like tax farming, corvée reduced the state’s administrative expenses, was subject to similar abuses, and was the source of frequent trouble. Aborigines were required to render many different kinds of service, including bearing officials in sedan chairs, delivering official documents, and supplying oxcarts to transport lumber for shipbuilding. Aborigines also served as porters for the troops rotated from Fukien every three years. Labor duties were assigned by the tribal merchants and interpreters, who rarely observed any distinction between the levy of government corvée and the extraction of personal services. The extortions and abuses of the tax farmers and interpreters often reached unbearable levels. In a few instances the oppression exercised by bullies met with violent resistance. Two plains aborigine revolts in 1699, both in northern Taiwan, led to calls for reform of the tax-farming system.  

The large-scale aborigine revolt of 1731–2, discussed below, demonstrates that the early reform attempts made little headway, especially in the area of corvée exactions, where government officials and their underlings were the prime source of abuse.

RESTRICTIONS ON IMMIGRATION

Considerations of maritime security persuaded the Ch‘ing court in 1684 to keep Taiwan. Instead of adopting a policy of actively opening the Taiwan frontier, the court imposed a partial quarantine on the island. The court’s primary motive remained its fear that pirates, Cheng remnants, and rebels might make Taiwan into an antigovernment base. This led to numerous restrictions on mainland communications and the immigration of settlers. Discouraging permanent settlement by outlawing the migration of families meant that


13 Detailed treatment of the subject of this section and references can be found in chapter 6 of Shepherd, *Statecraft and political economy on the Taiwan frontier.*
only single males could legally make the crossing to Taiwan. Banning family
migration gave rise to a population of migrant laborers and sojourners crossing
for the spring planting and returning to their mainland homes after the fall
harvest. This served Ch'ing policy by creating a population of male laborers
tied to their families on the mainland. Filial obligations to parents and the
duty to maintain ancestral sacrifices reinforced this dependence. Punishing
wayward behavior on the hard-to-control Taiwan frontier by holding families
on the mainland responsible helped to guarantee that the migrants remained
law-abiding. These attempts to quarantine Taiwan and to prevent permanent
settlement resemble the policies the Ch'ing applied to some other frontiers
of new settlement. The Ch'ing government sought to limit the migration of
settlers into areas occupied by non-Han peoples where Han were sure to upset
the ethnic status quo. Thus in Manchuria and Inner Mongolia, as in Taiwan,
the Ch'ing tolerated the seasonal migration of male farm laborers, but prohib-
ited the migration of families and women in order to prevent the disruption
that would come with permanent settlement.14 Frontier quarantine policies,
however, were difficult to enforce, and in the Taiwan case were opposed by
many officials in the prefecture who saw them as the cause of much of the
unsettled state of Taiwanese society.

By the end of the K'ang-hsi reign (1662–1722) the pressure of a growing
population in Fukien was undermining the restrictions on immigration in
Taiwan. Sparsely populated Taiwan was off the southeast coast, which had
recovered from the devastation of the coastal evacuation policy and was well
on its way to becoming one of the most densely populated, rice-deficit regions
of the Ch'ing. Migrants to Taiwan came from southeast coastal prefectures
that had the highest ratios of population per unit of arable land. Chang-
chou and Ch'üan-chou in Fukien were the home of Hokkien immigrants in
Taiwan, and Hui-chou and Ch'ao-chou in Kwangtung were the home of Hakka
immigrants.15 The heavy demand for rice on the southeast coast meant that
those who farmed in Taiwan received high prices for their exported grain.
The realities of demography and economics subverted attempts to enforce
the restrictions on immigration. Furthermore, Ch'ing coastal authorities had
difficulty patrolling the Fukien and Taiwan coasts, where numerous landing
points made it easy for immigrants to escape official detection and squeeze.

14 Owen Lattimore, *The Mongols of Manchuria: Their tribal divisions, geographical distribution, historical
relations with Manchus and Chinese, and present political problems* (New York, 1934), p. 80; Henry Serruys,
“A study of Chinese penetration into Čaqar territory in the eighteenth century,” *Monumenta Serica 35*
p. 184.

By 1718 Taiwan’s population more than exceeded its high point during the Cheng period, and areas of concentrated Han settlement had spread north and south beyond the old Tainan core area.

The prohibition of the immigration of wives and families led not to a docile and submissive population, but to the growth of a volatile, bachelor-dominated society in Taiwan that was prone to brawling and rebellion. The predominance of bachelor sojourners was common on Ch'ing frontiers and in overseas migration and was not unique to Taiwan, or solely the result of government policy.¹⁶ Male sojourners went to the frontier to serve family goals, not to permanently relocate. Their initial intent was to return home, where parents would arrange for a bachelor son’s marriage. Once they were married, the proper place for their wives and children was at home, under the authority of the extended family, not on the frontier. Only following division of the parental family and its property could these men consider removing their wives and children to the frontier. The government’s barring these sojourners, even when they were established as property owners, from bringing over wives and relatives to join them slowed the growth of a rooted and more stable population of families in Taiwan. Attempts to tighten enforcement of limits on immigration after 1717 may have helped fuel the antigovernment resentment that erupted in the Chu I-kuei rebellion.¹⁷

THE CHU I-KUEI REBELLION OF 1721

The Chu I-kuei rebellion of 1721 demonstrated the volatility of frontier society and the fragility of Ch'ing rule in Taiwan. It forced the government to re-evaluate its policies toward its island prefecture.¹⁸ In 1721 Feng-shan county was under the administration of magistrate Wang Chen, whose harsh methods of tax collection alienated the local residents. His son’s indiscriminate


¹⁸ This summary account of the Chu I-kuei rebellion is drawn primarily from Lan Ting-yüan, Ping Tai chi lüeh (1732; Taipei, 1958), pp. 1–8 ff; and secondarily from Huang Shu-ching, T'ai Hai shih ch'u lu (1736; Taipei, 1957), pp. 85 ff.; Wang Ying-tseng, Ch'ung hsien Feng-shan hsien chih (1764; Taipei, 1962) 272 ff.; and Ch'ing Sheng-tsu shih-lu hsüan-chi (Taipei, 1963), p. 174. David Ownby provides a detailed account of the ideological and organizational traditions behind the rebellion; see David Ownby, Brotherhoods and secret societies in early and mid-Qing China: The formation of a tradition (Stanford, 1996), pp. 95–102. The Chu I-kuei rebellion figures heavily in Ming restoration and Heaven and Earth Society fictions; see Ralph C. Crozier, Koxinga and Chinese nationalism: History, myth, and the hero (Cambridge, MA, 1977), pp. 66–7. For additional background and references, see chapter 6 of Shepherd, Statecraft and political economy on the Taiwanese frontier.
use of extortion in an attempt to round up bandits had antagonized the law-abiding population, which was already distressed by a recent earthquake and an unusually cold winter.

Chu I-kuei, thirty-three years old in 1721, and a native of Chang-chou prefecture in Fukien, had arrived in Taiwan in 1713. Chu had taken up raising ducks in the Feng-shan area south of Tainan. In the third month of 1721 Chu and several confederates met in Feng-shan to plan an uprising. Chu appears to have emerged as leader of this newly formed rebel band in part because he bore the same surname as the deposed Ming ruling house. Chu’s rebel comrades judged this would be of use in attracting followers under the banner of Ming loyalism. On the night of the nineteenth day of the fourth month, Chu and a group of fifty to eighty armed men attacked a military outpost at Kang-shan, south of Tainan, and seized its weapons. Two days later the band conducted a successful raid on another outpost. Upon hearing news of these exploits, the outlaw leader Tu Chün-ying openly allied his own bandit group with Chu’s rebel band.

On the twenty-first the county government mobilized its troops and called up plains aborigine porters and auxiliaries. Although the outbreak was small in scale and containable, several government missteps in the following days allowed the revolt to spread and the violence to escalate. Chief among the errors was an attempt to incite plains aborigine auxiliaries against the rebels by offering bounties for rebels’ heads. When plains aborigines torched houses and killed innocent civilians to collect bounties, panic spread among the local population. It was then easy for the rebels to spread fear of retaliation from government troops and to win support in Han villages. Over the next few days the rebels defeated government forces in several skirmishes, and forced them to withdraw from Feng-shan and retreat to Tainan. Tu Chün-ying’s forces then launched attacks on the Feng-shan county seat. News of these defeats caused panic among the officials in Tainan, who began putting their families aboard ships to flee the island. On the thirtieth of the fourth month the rebel forces approached Tainan but were initially defeated by government troops. On the first day of the fifth month, rebels “by the ten thousands” massed outside Tainan and the forces of Chu I-kuei and Tu Chün-ying launched a united attack. The Ch'ing brigade general was assassinated, and ferocious battles resulted in heavy casualties for both sides. Despite their superior weapons, the government troops appear to have been badly outnumbered. Sensing defeat, the Ch'ing military and civil officials commandeered all available shipping and fled to the Pescadores and Fukien.19

19 Lan, P'ing T'ai chi lüeh, p. 5; Ch'ing Sheng-tsu shih-lu hsüan-chi (Taipei, 1963), p. 174.
The rebels occupied Tainan, the prefectural capital. Tu Chün-yíng set up his headquarters in the brigade general’s yamen, and Chu I-kuei set up his in the intendant’s yamen. Within a few days the Chu-lo county seat to the north also fell into the rebels’ hands, leaving only the northern tip of the island under the control of Ch’ing officials. Chu I-kuei was declared king, and official ranks and titles were bestowed on the various rebel leaders. Within less than two weeks Ch’ing rule in Taiwan had collapsed. A bungled government response had allowed a small outbreak to escalate into a major rebellion. However, rivalry between Chu I-kuei and Tu Chün-yíng began to undermine rebel unity. In the ensuing weeks communal tensions increased as additional clashes led to conflicts between Hakka and Hokkien settlers. In Feng-shan the Hakka villages organized a self-defense corps. A large battle between the Hokkien rebels and the Hakka self-defense corps was in progress in southern Feng-shan when the Ch’ing reconquest began in the middle of the sixth month.

By the beginning of the sixth month the Ch’ing government had assembled an armada of 600 ships, 6,000 sailors, and 12,000 soldiers in Amoy and the Pescadores. The first wave landed outside Tainan in the middle of the month and quickly gained control of the port of An-p’ing. The Ch’ing forces made heavy use of cannon to defeat rebel counterattacks, and within a week the prefectural capital was once again in Ch’ing hands. Chu I-kuei’s resistance collapsed, and within a few weeks he was betrayed and taken prisoner. Tu Chün-yíng, who had fled to the mountains, surrendered in the ninth month.

The large Ch’ing armies dispersed rebel forces and rounded up the remnants. They were assisted in Feng-shan by the Hakka self-defense corps, now styled “loyalists,” and by plains aborigines, who served as guides to Ch’ing troops clearing out bandits from mountain hideaways.

Ch’ing rule in Taiwan was restored in 1721 almost as quickly as it had been lost, but only after a sizeable loss in lives and expenditure of revenues. The sudden collapse of government demonstrated that the official administration had failed to establish ties to Taiwan’s frontier society that could be counted on to shore up government control and impede the spread of outbreaks.

**Colonization Policy Debates in the Post-Rebellion Period**

To critics like Lan Ting-yüan (1680–1733), restrictive immigration policies exacerbated the problem of creating a stable social order in Taiwan in which local residents would have vested interests in preserving government control.

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After the Chu I-kuei rebellion, Lan Ting-yüan became an outspoken critic of quarantine policies toward Taiwan. Lan had gone from Fukien to Taiwan in 1721 in the company of the imperial forces that suppressed the Chu I-kuei rebellion and which were under his cousin’s command. The rebellion’s rapid spread among Taiwan’s immigrant Han population, led by someone with the Ming imperial surname, reawakened fears among Ch’ing officials that Taiwan might become a rebel base that could threaten the southeast coast. In the wake of the rebellion and on into the Yung-cheng reign (1723–35) many of the old policies concerning Taiwan were reconsidered and new ones proposed. Lan Ting-yüan, an advocate of an aggressive colonization policy, was one of the most prolific participants in these debates.  

In 1683 the Ch’ing court had been impressed more by the burdens than by the benefits of the incorporation of Taiwan into the empire as a new prefecture. The court, concerned that Taiwan might again become a rebel base, had imposed a partial quarantine on the island. Policies strictly regulating migration and trade between the island and the mainland were adopted to prevent disruptions of the status quo on Taiwan. The spread of Han settlement and the extension of the government’s presence were simply not envisaged. However, by the end of the K'ang-hsi reign, the economic recovery of the southeast coast, the growth of its population, and the expansion of commerce and foreign trade were subverting the policy of quarantining Taiwan. Unauthorized migrants from the crowded southeast coast were flocking to Taiwan to take advantage of its undeveloped land and the high prices that Taiwan’s sugar and rice fetched in mainland markets. The growth of an unstable settler society upset the status quo on the Taiwan frontier. The Chu I-kuei rebellion demonstrated how serious the threat to government control could be.

The Ch’ing government’s first response to these developments was to tighten enforcement of the quarantine policies and the restrictions on immigration. Attempts were made to quarantine aborigine territories by drawing a “raw aborigine” boundary and to restrict the spread of Han settlement in Taiwan to areas under effective government control. Several officials, the most outspoken of whom was Lan Ting-yüan, argued for a reversal of the quarantine policies and the adoption of a pro-colonization course as the best way to ensure control over Taiwan. These officials argued that government control was best maintained

22 Lan, Pǐng T’ai chi lüeh. For fuller treatment of the subjects dealt with in this section see chapters 5 through 7 of Shepherd, Statecraft and political economy on the Taiwan frontier.

23 Ng Chin-Keong, Trade and society: The Amoy network on the China coast, 1683–1735 (Singapore, 1983), gives a detailed account of the recovery of south Fukien’s economy and coastal trade after 1683; Jane K. Leonard, Wei Yüan and China’s rediscovery of the maritime world (Cambridge, MA, 1984); Leonard Blussé, Strange company: Chinese settlers, mestizo women and the Dutch in VOC Batavia (Dordrecht, 1986); and Viraphol, Tribute and profit, trace the recovery of Fukien’s trade with Southeast Asia.
directly by enhancing the civil and military presence so it could crush both Han and aborigine disturbances, and by filling open frontier spaces with agricultural settlers. To help finance the increased governmental presence, land-tax revenues could be collected from areas newly reclaimed by immigrant families, who were to be seen as the allies, not the enemies, of government control. To observers like Lan Ting-yüan, the restrictions keeping out wives and families had perpetuated a population of rootless vagrants without family ties. Lan argued that migrants wishing to farm in Taiwan should be allowed to take families with them, and those already in Taiwan should be allowed to return home to bring their families over. Those without families should be barred from crossing, and vagrants should be sent back. Once all settlers had families, then the sources of rebellion would be eradicated, according to Lan Ting-yüan.²⁴

The government moved more cautiously than Lan urged, but largely in the directions he and his fellow pro-colonization advocates supported. In the first year of his reign, 1723, the Yung-cheng emperor approved a plan to divide Chu-lo county by adding Chang-hua county and Tán-shuí sub-prefecture.²⁵ This increased the presence of civil administration on Taiwan prefecture’s northern frontier. However, no expansion of the already large and expensive military presence was ordered at this time. Through the Yung-cheng era the quarantine policies were abandoned piece by piece and pro-colonization ones put in their place. Beginning in 1725 Taiwan’s increasing rice surpluses were designated for export to Fukien garrisons and for famine relief sales on the rice deficit southeast coast. Aborigine tribes were encouraged to rent their lands to Han farmers so that “both might benefit and the treasury be filled.” Cadastral surveys in 1728 enrolled large amounts of new land on the tax registers, especially in the newly established Chang-hua county, which was badly in need of a tax base.²⁶ In 1731 land-tax rates were lowered to encourage voluntary registration of land. The new policy, unlike that of the K’ang-hsi years, looked to the continued expansion of reclaimed land and growing land-tax rolls, rather than high tax rates, to fulfill the tax quotas. Also in 1731 the court added several sub-magistrates and assistant magistrates to its civil administration.²⁷ But at the end of the year excessive imposition of corvée demands on civilized aborigines, who had been ordered to build yamens for the government in the north, provoked the large-scale Ta-chia-hsi tribal revolt.

THE TA-CHIA-HSI AND WU FU-SHENG REVOLTS OF 1731–2

The most serious plains aborigine revolt to challenge Ch'ing authority in Taiwan began in the twelfth month of 1731. Taiwan's local gazetteers simply state that a revolt broke out at this time in the plains aborigine village of Ta-chia-hsi under the leadership of one Lin Wu-li. Ta-chia-hsi was a plains aborigine settlement located on the coastal plain of present-day Taichung county, north of the Ta-chia River. Palace memorials make clear that excessive impositions of corvée drafts and ill-treatment of the aborigines by officials, yamen underlings, and soldiers were basic causes of the revolt. 28

Early in 1731, as part of the pro-colonization policy of extending direct government control on the frontier, it was decided to give full fiscal and administrative authority to Tan-shui sub-prefecture, which had been created in 1723, and to create several new positions of submagistrate. To build the yamen offices needed to house the new officials, the Tan-shui sub-prefect, Chang Hung-chang, ordered the local tribes to supply labor for the construction. The increased official presence increased extortion, and the tribes were soon complaining that yamen runners were sleeping with aborigine women and that government soldiers were commandeering aborigine food supplies. Aborigine complaints went unheeded. Sub-prefect Chang, needing pillars for the new buildings, ordered aborigine laborers from Ta-chia-hsi to supply large logs from forests in the nearby mountains and aborigine women to drive out the carts bearing the lumber. When the women refused, the interpreters beat them with rattan strips. Unable to bear this treatment, men from Ta-chia-hsi and the neighboring village of Ta-chia-tung surrounded sub-prefect Chang in his office, killed some of his subordinates, and set the yamen on fire. Chang escaped by fleeing south to the county seat of Chang-hua. He left unprotected many settlers in the vicinity, some of whom were killed and their homes burned by the aborigines. 29

In the next weeks the men from Ta-chia-hsi were joined in revolt by two more neighboring villages. Ch'ing troops engaged the aborigines on several occasions but were unable to defeat them. The government reinforced its northern garrisons, enlisted the aid of loyal aborigines, and pressed the attack. By the third month of 1732, many of the rebel tribes, who had retreated

28 This account of these events is drawn primarily from memorials collected in Kuo-li ku-kung po-wu-yüan, comp., Kang chung tang Yung-cheng ch'ao tsou che (Taipei, 1977-80); and Yü Wen-i, Hsiü hsü T'ai-wan fu chih (Taipei, 1962), pp. 662–3. For more detailed treatment of the subject of this section, see chapter 5 of Shepherd, Statecraft and political economy on the Taiwan frontier.

into the mountains, were reported to be surrendering. The government responded to its early defeats at the hands of the aborigines by moving north troops usually stationed in the south. Taking advantage of the government’s difficulty, a group of Han rebels, including some remnants of the Chu I-kuei rebellion, raised their own flag of rebellion in Feng-shan county in the south. Led by Wu Fu-sheng, they attacked several government outposts, but within ten days, by the early part of the fourth month of 1732, the commander, Wang Chün, had crushed these Han rebels. Things next took a turn for the worse in the north. Crimes by arrogant officials alienated previously loyal aborigines and moved them to join the rebellion. In the fifth month of 1732 nearly 2,000 aborigines surrounded Chang-hua city, devastated the area around it, and slaughtered the soldiers stationed at two nearby military posts. Chang-hua city only escaped being taken due to the timely arrival of troop reinforcements and several hundred loyal Hakka from the south who had earlier proven their effectiveness in the victory over Chu I-kuei in 1721.

In the sixth month of 1732 governor-general Hao Yü-lin (d. 1745), a Han-chün bannerman, dispatched several thousand soldiers from Fukien’s garrisons to Taiwan. News that mainland reinforcements were arriving frightened some rebel aborigines into submitting, while others prepared for an onslaught by building defensive stockades. Commander Wang Chün took charge of the campaign, and he gradually pushed the rebels from the plain. By the eighth month of 1732, he had the remnants surrounded in the mountains. The dual threat posed to Ch’ing authority by the revolts by aborigines and by Han settlers in 1732 left a strong impression on governor-general Hao Yü-lin. In 1733 he ordered a reorganization of the military in Taiwan, and boosted its overall strength by several thousands. Of this number, 1,280 soldiers, the largest of the troop increases, were stationed on the north route, more than doubling its original strength. This shifted the balance of military power on the northern frontier. Attempting an extension of the civil administration without a concurrent strengthening of the military had been one of the fundamental errors of the government’s control strategy in 1731.

The double rebellion, rather than forcing the Ch’ing government to retreat from its new colonization and expansionist strategy, was taken as proof of the failure of the old policies. To pay for the military reinforcements, continued expansion of reclamation would be necessary to generate additional land-tax

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31 Yü, Hsü hsiu T’ai-wn fu chih, p. 662; Ch’ing Shih-tung shih-la hsiian-chi, p. 40.
33 Ch’ing Shih-tung shih-la hsiian-chi, pp. 43–4; Liu, Ch’ung hiu Fu-chien T’ai-wn fu chih, p. 320.
revenues. To critics like Lan Ting-yüan, these revolts were additional proof that the old immigration and quarantine policies were a failure. Han vagrants in the south and the near absence of Han taxpayers in the north weakened the government's ability to maintain control.\textsuperscript{34} In 1732 the Kwangtung governor, Omida (d. 1761), who had hired Lan to be his secretary, petitioned to allow families to cross to Taiwan, and the emperor's councilors, including O-erh-t'ai, famed for aggressive colonization policies in southwest China, endorsed Omida's arguments. Omida proposed that those with property and a livelihood in Taiwan could apply to the local authorities to allow their families to move to Taiwan. This proposal was accepted by the emperor in 1732. By the end of the Yung-cheng reign in 1735 nearly all the quarantine policies had been abandoned.\textsuperscript{35}

Over the next decade families could legally join settlers in Taiwan, and in 1743 the population of Taiwan was reported to have increased by several tens of thousands since the lifting of the ban. Early in the Ch'ien-lung reign the costs of the pro-colonization policies were beginning to loom large as the need grew to contain a burgeoning, unruly Han population and recurring aborigine disturbances. These problems arose in spite of an expanded civil and military presence and tax base. Many of the pro-colonization policies had already been tried and failed, which deflated the arguments counseling continuation of the pro-colonization course. When policy reversals were proposed, the new court was receptive. Governor-general Hao Yü-lin ordered a halt to the further reclamation of aborigine land in 1738, and in 1739 he sought an end, after a one-year grace period, to the legal immigration of families. In 1741 government quotas for rice exports were reduced, and in 1744 land-tax rates were raised.\textsuperscript{36} But the revived quarantine policies had now to operate in an environment transformed since the Yung-cheng years by a large influx of mainland farmers and the expansion of frontier settlement activity. The government was not any more successful than it had been in the late K'ang-hsi years at stopping illegal immigration and reclamation. In 1746 another survey of aborigine lands was ordered, the 1738 ban on their reclamation was reasserted, and new punishments were imposed to deal with violations.\textsuperscript{37} The revived quarantine policies had to be repeatedly adapted and compromised to deal with the reality of continued illegal immigration and the spread of Han settlements throughout the remainder of the Ch'ien-lung reign.

\textsuperscript{34} Lan, \textit{P'ing T'ai chi liuh}, pp. 61–4.
\textsuperscript{35} Shepherd, \textit{Statecraft and political economy on the Taiwan frontier}, pp. 138, 150.
\textsuperscript{36} Shepherd, \textit{Statecraft and political economy on the Taiwan frontier}, pp. 139, 151, 166, 236.
\textsuperscript{37} Shepherd, \textit{Statecraft and political economy on the Taiwan frontier}, pp. 270–4.
THE ROLE OF THE PLAINS ABORIGINES

Following the Ta-chia-hsi revolt of 1731–2, the government took steps to strengthen the cultural and educational foundations of Ch'ing authority among the civilized aborigines. In 1734 the Taiwan intendant proposed that instructors be appointed to the tribes in every county to educate aborigine youth, and that county directors of study conduct periodic examinations in these schools. A total of forty-seven aborigine schools were founded, the great majority located in villages that were also major aborigine taxpaying units. In 1737 the tribal tax was converted into a head tax figured at the same rate as for Han settlers, which had been lowered the year before to 0.2 tael per head. This reform reduced the official tribal tax obligation by more than 80 percent. The Ch'ien-lung emperor's stated purpose in adopting this reform was to remove inequalities in taxation among the tribes and to tax them at a rate equal to that levied on his Han subjects. He thereby sought to demonstrate that he considered the aborigines, like the Han, his loyal subjects. The substantial reduction of aborigine taxes in 1737 was in one sense a solution to the state's inability to create a tax collection system that was not subject to official corruption and interpreter abuse. It also reflects shifts in the fiscal structure of government in Taiwan, as the reclamation of new farms added land to the tax registers and revenues to the treasury, and reduced the fiscal significance of taxes on aborigines. The large reduction in 1737 also marked the end of a phase in the history of the plains aborigines of Taiwan's west coast that had continued over three regimes. From the imposition of Dutch rule, through the Cheng era, down to the early decades of Ch'ing administration, the deerskin trade, and the extraction of revenue from that trade, whether by hunting licenses, trading monopolies, or head taxes, structured the relations between plains aborigine hunters and farmers and Han traders and government officials. The system lasted until the growth of the Han population and the increase in their agricultural production in the eighteenth century, combined with overhunting, eroded the plains aborigines' economy and transformed the fiscal basis of Ch'ing rule.

The plains aborigine villages were not forced by Han agricultural colonization to migrate into the central mountains. The ability of the plains aborigines to remain on the plains and adapt to the transformation of the frontier depended on the Ch'ing government's willingness to recognize and

38 Liu, Ch'ung hsiiu Fu-chien T'ai-wan fu chih, pp. 333–4; Shepherd, Statecraft and political economy on the Taiwan frontier, p. 132.
39 Yü, Hsi hsiu T'ai-wan fu chih, pp. 186, 245; Shepherd, Statecraft and political economy on the Taiwan frontier, p. 132.
enforce plains aborigines’ claims to land. The government took measures to
guarantee the plains aborigines’ livelihoods because they were both taxpaying
subjects and recruits for loyal militia. Earlier the government had viewed
expanding Han settlement as a threat to the ethnic status quo on the frontier
and pursued quarantine policies to limit the disruptive effects of agricultural
settlement. Later, as the government found it impossible to impede the flow
of immigrants to the Taiwan frontier, it adopted increasingly accommodative
policies that sought to reconcile the competing interests of Han settlers and
plains aborigines over land ownership and use.40

Land policies fluctuated in conjunction with pro- and anti-colonization
policies. In general, pro-colonization advocates supported policies giving set-
tlers expanded access to tribal territories and reducing the extent of aborigine
claims, while advocates of quarantine were in favor of limiting Han settle-
ment to restricted areas and recognizing a greater range of aborigine claims
over frontier land. The Ch’ing state used its authority to allocate rights and
duties with respect to land in order to manage the relations between Han
settlers and the plains aborigines while at the same time pursuing its own
revenue and security goals. In Taiwan, government authorities recognized two
broad categories of frontier land: tribal land and government-owned waste-
land. Under Ch’ing law all land not under cultivation could be considered
subject to government ownership. But just as the government recognized the
ownership claims of Han settlers when they paid land taxes, so did the gov-
ernment recognize tribal land ownership when the aborigines paid their taxes.
Accordingly, the Ch’ing state came to recognize tribal ownership over large
amounts of uncultivated land that served as aborigine hunting grounds and
pasture. To reclaim government wasteland, settlers and land developers could
petition the government for patents according to an established procedure. To
reclaim tribal land, settlers had to come to terms with the aborigine claimants.
Because the Ch’ing recognized tribal ownership of hunting grounds, a large
amount of the land that Han immigrants and land developers desired to open
was subject to prior ownership claims. Some settlers simply squatted on land,
defying both tribe and government to remove them (though sometimes their
expropriations were aided by colluding officials). The government condemned
such abuses of aborigine land rights because of concerns they would lead to
Han–aborigine conflicts and more disorder. In 1704 the Taiwan intendant

40 For more detailed treatment of the subjects of this section, see chapters 5, 9, and 10 of Shepherd, Statescraft
and political economy on the Taiwan frontier. K’o Chih-ming (Ka Chih-ming), Fan t’ou-chia: Ch’ing-tai
Tai-wan tu ch’iin cheng-chih yii shu-fan ti-ch’iian (Taipei, 2001), provides new data and interpretations of
these policies and their results. Ch’en Ch’iu-k’u’n, Ch’ing-tai Tai-wan t’ou-chu ti-ch’iian: Kuan liao, Han
tien yii An-li she-fen ti t’u-ti pien-ch’ien, 1700–1895, 3rd ed. (Taipei, 2009), provides a case study of the
An-li tribe of central Taiwan.
decreed that settlers seeking to contract privately for land with aborigine tribes must also request official permission. Approval of such contracts would only be granted after an investigation was made by county officials to ensure that aborigine claims were respected.41

One method of acquiring aborigine land received explicit official sanction because it had the advantage of guaranteeing state revenues. It required the person reclaiming uncultivated land to assume the head tax burden of a tribe in return for recognition of rights to the land. This method derived directly from the monopoly merchant system of farming aborigine taxes. As the deer herds were depleted and as land-hungry immigrants pushed the agricultural frontier forward, with one or the other coming first in different localities, tribal livelihoods based on deer hunting were disrupted, but their tax obligations remained the same. By assuming responsibility for the tax obligations of the aborigines, Han settlers could acquire land rights in tribal territories.42 Measures to ensure order and to protect aborigine land rights took a new direction in response to the Chu I-kuei rebellion in 1721. In the wake of the rebellion, governor-general Man-pao of the imperial clan ordered the construction of an island-wide set of boundary trenches (“earth-oxen”) to be built in a north–south direction, paralleling the eastern mountain foothills. This cordon was intended to keep Han settlers and escaping outlaws out of the mountains, and to keep “raw” aborigines from coming out of the mountains to raid and take heads. Land reclamation east of this boundary was forbidden. In effect this was a revival of the quarantine policies that sought to limit expansion of Han settlement on the frontier.43

Lan Ting-yüan strongly opposed Man-pao’s application of the quarantine approach to the frontier in Taiwan. Lan denounced the new boundary policy that kept settlers behind a government-patrolled boundary. He argued that it would further disrupt an already unsettled society, that an artificial boundary could not prevent trouble from arising in the quarantined areas, and that instead unreclaimed land should be opened and tax revenue thereby increased.44 Lan also had pro-colonization views on tribal land rights. Lan proposed to give the aborigines a year to reclaim land, after which they would lose all rights to any land left unopened, which would then be available for Han settlement. Lan knew that giving deer hunters one year to open farmland and adopt agriculture would not preserve aborigine livelihoods. His analysis of the

41 Inō Kanori, Taiwan bansei shi (Taihoku, 1904), p. 76; Shepherd, Statecraft and political economy on the Taiwan frontier, p. 244.
42 Shepherd, Statecraft and political economy on the Taiwan frontier, pp. 248–52.
43 The Ch’ing often resorted to population removal and wall-building as control strategies; walls to segregate Chinese farmers from tribal populations were built in many parts of the empire, including the southwest and Manchuria. See Shepherd, Statecraft and political economy on the Taiwan frontier, p. 190.
state of Taiwan’s society required encouraging Han settlement, reclamation, and the expansion of taxable acreage. He gave little thought either to the cost to the aborigines or to the dangers of aborigine revolt. But even Lan approved the common practice whereby settlers paid taxes on behalf of aborigines in return for rights to reclaim land. Lan’s proposal to eliminate aborigine title to land that had been theirs was not adopted by the government. In the next years many officials expressed the fear that civilized aborigines, pressed too hard and too fast by encroaching Han settlement, would revolt and join the “raw” aborigines in the mountains. Official policy on aborigine land claims, therefore, moved more cautiously than Lan advocated.

In 1724 the Yung-cheng emperor approved entering the following regulation into the Ch’ing statutes: “Order the local officials to investigate all aborigine deer fields left as waste that are reclaimable. Each tribe may rent these fields to settlers for cultivation. Enter them on the tax registers.” This new regulation gave the first official approval to private rental agreements between tribes and settlers. It reduced the need to use the rubric of “assuming the aborigine revenue tax” to justify these arrangements, and opened the way for a variety of arrangements in which reclaiming Han tenants paid aborigine tribes a ground rent for access to their land. The government intended to tax the tribal lands whose lease to settlers it was now approving. By taxing newly reclaimed tribal lands, the government could raise the revenues needed to pay for its expanded administration after Chang-hua county and Tan-shui sub-prefecture were created in 1723, and for its military grain exports under quotas set the same year. The discussions that led to the 1724 decree aimed to arrive at allocations of rights and duties with respect to land that balanced the government’s goals of regulating Han competition for land, preserving aborigine livelihoods, increasing revenues from land taxes for the prefecture, and maintaining peace on the frontier. The pro-colonization and pro-reclamation policies had their costs in the increasing frequency of conflicts involving settlers and aborigines, and repeated violation of aborigine boundaries. Many tribes failed when they tried to organize reclamation and subleasing of their own lands. They ultimately transferred their rights to Han developers while retaining only diminished rights to rental incomes. Under these conditions land disputes and enforcement of the boundary policy demanded constant attention from officials.

Concern about the uncontrolled expansion of Han settlement mounted in the early Ch’ien-lung years. Officials reported that many rootless trouble-makers were taking advantage of the relaxation of restrictions on migration

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45 Lan, *Tung cheng chi*, p. 54; Shepherd, *Statecraft and political economy on the Taiwan frontier*, p. 256.
John Robert Shepherd

and posing a threat to local order, and that unlicensed reclamation of aborigine land was causing friction between Han and aborigines in Taiwan. In 1738 Governor-General Hao Yü-lin called for clarification of the boundaries between areas cultivated by aborigines and Han. Hao ordered a land survey and required that land contracts between Han and aborigines be presented for official inspection before the land could be registered with the local government. Land opened without such contractual agreements was to be returned to aborigine ownership, and future encroachment on aborigine land was forbidden.48

For the next twenty-five years the growing settler population exerted continuous pressure on aborigine lands and on Ch’ing policies designed to protect aborigine land rights. Clarifications of the boundaries between Han and aborigine land had to be made repeatedly. Squatters were ordered to be evicted, but those who had privately contracted with the tribes were often allowed to stay as long as they paid rents to the aborigines. Because it was militarily unable to evict large numbers of frontiersmen and financially unable to resettle them, the Ch’ing state was forced to acquiesce in most Han reclamation efforts even when they were illegal. The government merely drew new boundary lines that it declared to be permanent and tried to enforce the payment of rents to aborigines. These lines were extensions of or additions to Man-pao’s original “earth-oxen” trenches. Many officials agreed with Lan Ting-yüan in doubting the wisdom of trying to restrict reclamation, both because they were anxious for new productive land to help fulfill tax quotas, and because they were undeterred by the threat of strife between settlers and aborigines.

In 1760 the local government pushed back the aborigine boundary once again in northern Taiwan. It also required that a portion of the rents collected on newly incorporated land be allocated to pay rations to aborigine militia to guard strategic places along the boundary. In 1767 an order was promulgated allowing aborigines to recruit tenants to reclaim tribal lands and to collect rents from them, following the model of Han land developers and large holders of rented land. In 1768 aborigine lands rented to Han farmers were made tax-exempt for the aborigines.49 With these policies Ch’ing authorities finally recognized the futility of trying to stop Han reclamation, and also recognized that the tribes needed the rental income more than they needed land that was depleted of deer herds and which they themselves were unable to reclaim or farm profitably.

After the 1760s the urgency of disputes over plains aborigine land markedly declined. Other problems came to the fore: “raw” aborigine headhunting raids

48 Shepherd, *Statecraft and political economy on the Taiwan frontier*, p. 268.
49 Shepherd, *Statecraft and political economy on the Taiwan frontier*, pp. 289–93.
and, most threatening to Ch'ing authority, communal strife among immigrant groups. Because they had a role to play in the solution of both these problems, plains aborigines were able to maintain their position. Civilized aborigines living in the mountain foothills were familiar with the mountain trails and with the “raw” aborigine tribes that lived in the interior. Their knowledge of the mountain areas made them invaluable when the government wanted to punish a tribe for a headhunting raid, or to apprehend a Han bandit or rebel taking refuge in the mountains. Hunting also gave plains aborigine males the skills as archers and marksmen that made them effective when employed as a fighting force. As a non-Han ethnic group, plains aborigine militia could be counted on to remain loyal to Ch'ing officials during the frequent outbreaks of Han communal strife. After the Lin Shuang-wen rebellion of 1786–7, their martial role was institutionalized with the founding of aborigine military colonies (fan-t'un) along the mountain foothills.

The utility of the plains aborigines as a military force loyal to the state, fear of their potential for revolt, their status as taxpayers, ambivalence toward the immigration of settlers who disrupted the status quo but contributed to land tax revenues, and a Confucian concern to benefit the livelihoods of subject peoples were all factors motivating the Ch'ing state to arbitrate conflicts between immigrant farmers and civilized aborigines. The goal of the Ch'ing state was to keep the competition between settlers and aborigines from disrupting its control of a strategic periphery of the empire and imposing additional costs that Taiwan’s inadequate revenues did not defray. Aborigine taxpaying established, in the government’s eyes, their claim to rights over land. The government’s attempts to restrain the immigrants led it to adapt split ownership rights appropriate to Taiwan’s frontier conditions. Han settlers seeking to reclaim tribal lands were required to respect the tribes’ prior claims by paying rents to aborigines. Income from ground rents was critical to the survival of the plains tribes. But the challenge posed by the spread of Han settlements was only partially economic. Cultural contacts and intermarriage brought more dislocation and change to plains aborigine lives.50

**The Growth of Han Settler Society**

During the eighteenth century Taiwan’s population increased rapidly, especially in the period from 1732 to 1740 when mainland families were first allowed to emigrate legally to Taiwan. In 1740 Governor-General Hao Yü-lin, upset by increasing disorder and conflict on the frontier, convinced the

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50 For fuller treatment of the transformations in plains aborigine societies, see chapter 11 of Shepherd, *Statetraft and political economy on the Taiwan frontier*. 
emperor to put an end to the legal migration of families to Taiwan. The major pro-colonization policies of the late Yung-cheng years were reversed and the earlier policy of control through quarantine was revived. The end of legal migration did not, however, stop illegal migration, which continued at a steady pace, much to the consternation of officials assigned to bring it to an end. The Han population had grown significantly in the years of open migration and included a large number of females, making possible a rapid growth of population that compounded continued immigration. Whatever the policy, the Ch’ing court had to rely on local officials, who were often satisfied to subvert official policy by accepting bribes or extorting. The policy had to be enforced against people determined to escape poverty in the heavily populated prefectures on the southeast coast. Migrants who had immediate interests in earning livelihoods and raising families took little notice of official proclamations and preferred to evade official control. These people are referred to in official decrees as “secret crossers.” The Ch’ing state could not halt their movement.51

Few statistics are available to document the actual rates of migration to Taiwan. It is also difficult to gauge the impact of fluctuating official policies or the push and pull of changing social conditions on the southeast coast and in Taiwan itself on the numbers of migrants crossing to Taiwan in any period of time. There are a number of impressionistic observations recorded by officials who were struck by rapid population growth. Local gazetteers reflect this increase in their listings of village settlements and market towns, which show large increases in numbers in the frontier regions of Chang-hua and Tan-shui. The number of villages recorded in Chang-hua increased from one in 1717 to 110 in 1740 and to 132 in 1768. The number of villages recorded in the territory of Tan-shui sub-prefecture went from zero in 1717 to thirty-five by 1740 and 132 by 1768. The village lists also give a crude measure of the impact of the spread of immigrant settlements on aborigine villages. In 1717 only eight of the seventy-six northern plains aborigine villages were also sites of Han settlements. By 1740 the number was thirty, and by 1768 forty-five sites accommodated both aborigines and Han.52

The increasing amounts of land entered by 1762 on the tax registers, and recorded in local gazetteers, reflect the spread of Han reclamation efforts and government tax collectors. Registered areas grew fastest in the frontier areas beyond the old core area around Tainan. The gains in Chang-hua to the north were especially impressive. The actual cultivated acreage is known to

51 Chuang, “Ch’ing ch’u yen-chin yen-hai jen-min t’ou-tu lai T’ai shih-mo (shang),” pp. 9–11; Shepherd, Statcraft and political economy on the Taiwan frontier, pp. 150–1.
52 Liu, Ch’ung hsien Fu-chien T’ai-wan fu chih, pp. 78–85; Yü, Hsü hsien T’ai-wan fu chih, pp. 72–90; Shepherd, Statcraft and political economy on the Taiwan frontier, pp. 171–4.
be much greater than the acreage reported for taxation; the 1762 reported area is estimated to reflect less than half the actual reclaimed area.\footnote{For greater detail on the expanding registered area, see Shepherd, Statecraft and political economy on the Taiwan frontier, pp. 157, 159, 169, 231. Note that gazetteers report only the area registered for taxation; it is mistaken to infer that Ch'ing land statistics report “cultivated area” rather than “fiscal acreage,” as Ho Ping-ti pointed out long ago in Studies on the population of China, pp. 101–35. Ch'ing land data have to be assessed in terms of the local fiscal apparatus, and should never be taken as reporting actual cultivated acreage.}

The outlook for Taiwan’s rice production was so good that after 1725 the Ch'ing government decided to make regular shipments to mainland Fukien of portions of Taiwan’s tax rice (100,000 shih of unhusked rice), and it officially purchased rice to provision troops and their dependents and for

\footnote{Huang Fu-san, T'ai-wan shui-t'ien hua yin-tung hsien-ch'ü: Shih Shih-pang chia-tsu shih (Nan-t'ou, 2006); and Yin Chang-i (Yin Chang-Yi), T'ai-wan k'ai-fa shih yen-chiu (Taipei, 1989), provide detailed studies of important early investors in irrigation and land development.}
relief.\textsuperscript{55} Previously, Taiwan tax rice only had been used to supply troops stationed in Taiwan and the Pescadores. Surpluses were collected in government granaries because officials feared any rice shortages would destabilize Ch'ing control of the island's population. Production had increased substantially since the days when Shih Lang first arrived and imported his troops' provisions. The newly authorized government exports helped relieve pressure on rice-short southern Fukien, where the Ch'ing garrisoned a large military force. The amounts sent were increased several times in the next years. In its efforts to ensure that rice harvests would be adequate for these needs, the government itself acquired an interest in policies that encouraged the reclamation of new farmlands, for example by approving the renting of aborigine lands and lowering land taxes on newly opened agricultural land. Between 1723 and 1756 rice prices rose generally, and prices in Ch'üan-chou, Taiwan's major market on the mainland, remained above those in Taiwan.\textsuperscript{56} Rising prices and the higher prices in Ch'üan-chou made rice farming and exporting profitable for growers and shippers in Taiwan. Taiwan's rice and sugar exports constituted a large proportion of the cargoes carried in the Amoy coastal trade and played a critical role in the development of the regional economy of the southeast coast in the early eighteenth century.\textsuperscript{57} The emergence of a commercial rice and sugar export economy on Taiwan despite the government's attempts to restrict the cross-strait trade, prohibit family immigration, and limit the reclamation of aborigine lands testifies to the powerful economic stimuli at work in the densely populated but productive southeast coast. No group in the arena of the formation of policy for the southeast coast had the interest or the power to sustain enforcement of the quarantine policies against these economic pressures and opportunities.

As the rate of expansion of settlements intensified, Taiwan's frontier society did not become more peaceful, which is what Lan Ting-yüan had predicted. Rather, instances of large-scale strife became more frequent. Government police actions against gangsters sparked conflicts that escalated into communal strife when one group gave refuge to its outlaw compatriots and another group took the side of the government to do in their rivals. These affrays, sometimes provoked and sometimes merely exploited by opportunistic elements in the population, and unchecked by a government that was ineffective in peacekeeping, divided Han society in Taiwan into actively hostile groups

\textsuperscript{55} Ch'ing Shih-tung shih-lu hsüan-chi, pp. 15, 28, 32. Shepherd, Statecraft and political economy on the Taiwan frontier, p. 164.

\textsuperscript{56} Ng, Trade and society, appendix A; Wang Yeh-chien, "Food supply in eighteenth-century Fukien," Late Imperial China 7 No. 2 (1986), p. 100.

\textsuperscript{57} Ng, Trade and society, p. 217.
united primarily by a common place of origin. To understand the patterns of Han frontier community organization, we need to consider the special characteristics of the migration and settlement process, and how certain of these characteristics contributed to the emergence of a society divided into hostile groups. The migration that began as a sojourning strategy evolved over time into a permanent relocation of families to Taiwan. When male family members, usually traveling in groups of friends and kin, left home in search of economic opportunity, they retained important rights in, and obligations to, their families at home. Wives of married migrants remained behind to serve the husbands’ parents and care for children. Thus most of the early waves of migrants were unmarried young men. This preponderance of unattached males, fond of gambling and brawling, helped destabilize frontier society.58

A key characteristic of the migration to Taiwan was the tendency for local social ties to reinforce, rather than dissipate, native-place ties. In Taiwan, migrants tended to associate with other migrants from home. Chain migration reinforced this pattern. Among their fellows, migrants formed voluntary associations such as brotherhoods and worship groups that rendered mutual aid and provided fellowship and common security. Some of these brotherhoods were involved in crime and racketeering, and some formed gangs of toughs, attractive to many bachelor sojourners, who readily participated in communal violence.59 Communities coalesced around temples dedicated to patron gods identified with their home communities. Larger groups tended to identify with home counties and prefectures, such as Chang-chou and Ch'üan-chou among the Hokkien, and with a province and language group, as among the Hakka. Settlers were suspicious of neighbors who were immigrants from other


59 Ownby, Brotherhoods and secret societies in early and mid-Qing China, gives an extended treatment of the traditions of brotherhoods and secret societies in southeast coast society that often played key roles in communal strife and rebellions on Taiwan.
locales, and misunderstandings were frequent between groups speaking different dialects and worshipping different patron deities. Social relations could be cordial across the lines dividing groups by place of origin and language, but such ties tended to be more casual and context-specific. The migrants to Taiwan also brought with them traditions of violence and self-defense. The communities of the southeast coast were famous for their feuding clans and lineages, and the turbulent history of the dynastic interregnum on the coast in the mid-seventeenth century reinforced local traditions of violence. Migrants arriving in Taiwan knew how to defend themselves if conditions required, and how to employ violence to obtain advantage. These characteristics of migration to Taiwan led to the emergence of a society that was easily broken into hostile groups. Taiwan entered a phase of severe community strife in the late eighteenth century, a phase that lasted from 1782 to 1862. Whether or not population pressure and intensifying competition for land and other resources were causes, they contributed to the magnitude of the conflicts. The key to the intensification of inter-community strife in this period is the overall decline in the effectiveness of government control and the militarization of the social structure that occurred throughout the Ch'ing realm later in this period. When each party to a dispute sought revenge for acts of violence perpetrated against its members, alliances quickly formed and conflicts escalated. Aggravating the situation were brotherhood gangs that readily joined the fighting and sought to capitalize on the feuding.

When both the government and local leadership proved incapable of containing such outbreaks, they turned into epidemics. The importance of common place of origin to legal and extralegal social organizations and the mutual suspicion between competing immigrant groups is indicated by the frequency with which feuds broke out during the eighteenth century. At the same time, government officials found it to their advantage to exploit divisions among the settlers. Loyal militia recruited from the Hakka villages of Feng-shan were crucial to victories over Chu I-kuei, a native of Fukien's Chang-chou, in 1721, and over the dual revolts of Wu Fu-sheng, also a Chang-chou native, and the Ta-chia-hsi aborigines in 1731–2. Hakka loyalists

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60 See Lamley, "Subethnic rivalry in the Ch'ing period," pp. 303–4; and Hsü, "Frontier social organization and social disorder in Ch'ing Taiwan," p. 94; this periodization corresponds to Johanna Meskill's "strongman era"; see her A Chinese pioneer family, pp. 87–9, 258–62.
62 Ownby, Brotherhoods and secret societies in early and mid-Qing China, p. 171.
63 James S. Coleman's classic Community conflict (New York, 1957) lays out the social dynamics of how specific disputes escalate into general hostility, and social networks polarize communities, including the key roles played by emergent new leaders in the polarization process.
also played an important role in the defeat of the Lin Shuang-wen rebellion that broke out in 1786. The government played on divisions between immigrants from Ch’üan-chou and those from Chang-chou when recruiting militia in Hokkien communities. Plains aborigine auxiliaries were also reliable allies of the government in putting down Han communal disturbances. Officials had to manage and contain, as well as exploit to the government’s advantage, communal divisions if social order was to be maintained. The appearance of official impartiality was important to winning the trust of competing groups. But the government’s success in doing so was declining by the end of the eighteenth century. Corrupt administration, abuses by local soldiers, and an uncontained outbreak of communal strife in 1782 indicate a low ebb in the effectiveness of Taiwan’s administration. These serious disturbances set the stage for the disastrous Lin Shuang-wen rebellion in 1786.

**The Lin Shuang-wen Rebellion and Its Aftermath**

Fighting broke out between Chang-chou and Ch’üan-chou settlers in Changhua county in the eighth month of 1782. The fighting spread southward to Chu-lo county, and was serious enough to require the dispatch of troops from the mainland. The situation was reported to be under control by the end of the eleventh month, although several important leaders were still at large, and more incidents of feuding erupted the next year. The disorder arose from a dispute between Chang-chou and Ch’üan-chou gamblers over losses and debts. The scale of the fighting escalated when large numbers of people gathered for a festival and opera performance. Investigations conducted in the aftermath of the disturbances revealed activity by a sworn brotherhood called the Small Knives Society, and included participation by the Lins of Ta-li-i, a Chang-chou stronghold. Over twenty Lins were among those executed or exiled for their part in the disorders.64

In putting down the fighting, the government was sensitive to the strong antagonism between settlers from different localities. The Ch’ing commander was a Chang-chou native, and the court in Peking feared that any suspicions by settlers from Ch’üan-chou of bias on his part would make the job of pacification even more difficult. The commander was ordered to pursue troublemakers in Chang-chou villages first, and only after demonstrating his impartiality was he to punish Ch’üan-chou lawbreakers.65 Dissatisfaction with local officials’ tardy response to the feuding brought another round of impeachments, this

64 Shepherd, *Statecraft and political economy on the Taiwan frontier*, pp. 319–20; Ownby, *Brotherhoods and secret societies in early and mid-Qing China*, pp. 167–70.
time of the Taiwan prefect, the Taiwan brigade general, and six lesser officials. The corrupting influence of Ho-shen (1750–99) in Peking was being felt throughout the empire in these years, and by 1786 two successive Fukien–Chekiang governors-general had been impeached on charges of embezzlement and extortion. The numerous impeachments affecting Taiwan’s civil and military administration point to malfeasance, corruption, and extortion, but rather than remedy the situation, the impeachments may have only aggravated it.66

At this juncture, an inheritance dispute between two sons of a wealthy Chu-lo resident led each son to find allies in competing brotherhoods.67 Concern about this threat to local order prompted investigations and arrests of some of the participants in the intercalary seventh month of 1786. The eldest son then mobilized his brotherhood, styled the Increase Younger Brothers Society (T’ien ti hui), and they attacked the officers who were detaining one of their compatriots at an inn. In response, the local garrison was mobilized to join the battle. Investigations followed, and over the next weeks, dozens of society members were arrested, and eighteen were beheaded. By this time many members of the society had fled to Ta-li-i to take refuge with Lin Shuang-wen. The Chang-hua magistrate soon learned of their presence, and threats were made, including arrests of innocent villagers, to have the fugitives turned over to the authorities. These tactics pushed Lin Shuang-wen and his Heaven and Earth Society (T’ien-ti hui) allies into open rebellion in the eleventh month of 1786. When the Taiwan commander failed to act, the revolt spread. Members of the Heaven and Earth Society persuaded large numbers of the villagers to join by warning them that government troops in search of rebels would not spare the innocent. Fighting spread rapidly as society chapters in the north and south joined in the revolt. The rebels were nearly all Chang-chou men, which was apparent to officials and to other settler groups. The officials dispatched Ch’üan-chou and Hakka degree holders to recruit fighters from among their own groups. Before long, many of the Han settlers in Taiwan were divided into hostile groups feuding on a scale much larger than in 1782.

Lin Shuang-wen’s revolt began with a successful attack on government troops at Ta-t’un (present-day Taichung) and the capture of the county capital of Chang-hua.68 After they failed to win the key port city of Lu-kang, a Ch’üan-chou stronghold, Lin’s forces moved south. They took Tou-liu-men

66 Shepherd, Statecraft and political economy on the Taiwan frontier, pp. 320–2.
67 Ownby, Brotherhoods and secret societies in early and mid-Qing China, pp. 72 ff gives a detailed account of these events. Dian H. Murray, The origins of the Tiandihui: The Chinese triads in legend and history (Stanford, 1994), and Ownby give background on the Heaven and Earth Society connections.
68 The following synopsis of events is drawn from Lai Fu-shun, Ch’ien-lung chung-yao chan-cheng chih chün-hsü yen-chiu (Taipei, 1984), pp. 39–41; Chuang Chi-fa, Ch’ing Kao-tung shih chü’üan wu-kung yen-chiu (Taipei, 1982), pp. 185–267; and the Ch’üin-t’ing p’ing-t’ing T’ai-wan chi-liüeh (Taipei, 1961).
and the county seat, Chu-lo, by the end of the first week of the twelfth month. Concurrent uprisings led by Heaven and Earth Society members in Tan-shui sub-prefecture were initially successful, but were then thwarted by loyalist Hakka and Ch‘uan-chou forces who kept the port of Tan-shui in government hands. More successful was the uprising in the south led by society member Chuang Ta-t‘ien, who captured the county capital of Feng-shan by the end of the second week of the twelfth month. Lin’s forces fended off attacks by the army of brigade general Ch‘ai Ta-chi (d. 1788) based in the prefectural capital at Tainan, and on the twenty-fourth Lin linked up with Chuang Ta-t‘ien. Lin and Chuang launched a joint attack on Tainan, but met resistance from government troops bolstered by loyal militia. On hearing that the attack on Tan-shui had failed, that Chang-hua was retaken, and that commander Huang Shih-chien would soon arrive from Fukien at the head of a force of Green Standard troops, the rebels abandoned their assault on Tainan. Lin withdrew to the north, and Chuang went south.

With the key ports of Lu-kang and Tan-shui and the prefectural capital still in the hands of government forces aided by significant numbers of loyal militia, it was clear that Ch‘ing rule would not collapse as it had during the Chu I-kuei rebellion in 1721. But neither did rebel forces disperse in a matter of weeks. The rebellion dragged on for another year. It eventually required the dispatch of nearly 50,000 troops from the mainland, and the expenditure of 8 million taels of silver before it was suppressed. 69 Huang Shih-chien, with his reinforcements, arrived in Tainan in the first week of the first month in 1787. Troops sent against Chuang Ta-t‘ien in the south and Lin in the north made slow progress. The cities of Feng-shan and Chu-lo were not retaken until late in the second month, and Feng-shan fell back into rebel hands again the next month. Dissatisfied with the pace of the suppression, the Ch‘ien-lung emperor ordered the governor-general, Ch‘ang Ch‘ing (d. 1793), to take charge of the campaign. Ch‘ang Ch‘ing arrived in Tainan on the ninth day of the third month. A plan to attack rebel strongholds simultaneously from Lu-kang and Chu-lo was formulated but never successfully prosecuted. Lin’s forces in the north and Chuang’s forces in the south engaged the Ch‘ing troops in numerous skirmishes and remained strong and mobile. Government forces repulsed a joint attack on Tainan on the twenty-fifth day of the fourth month, and a separate attack on Lu-kang on the fifth day of the sixth month. On the twentieth of the sixth month, Lin Shuang-wen attacked Chu-lo, trapping brigade general Ch‘ai Ta-chi and the residents inside the walls for the next five months. During this period of stalemate, Lin consolidated his strongholds along a line stretching from Chu-lo north through Tou-liu-men to Ta-li-i, an

69 Shepherd, *Statecraft and political economy on the Taiwan frontier*, p. 324.
area of almost entirely Chang-chou settlements. Ch'ing forces, weakened by the summer heat and debilitated by tropical diseases, were stymied.\textsuperscript{70}

Ch'ang Ch'ing's failure to prosecute the war frustrated the Ch'ien-lung emperor. On the second day of the eighth month, he gave an imperial commission to the Manchu governor-general of Shensi and Kansu, Fu-k'ang-an (d. 1796), to take charge of the campaign in Taiwan. Fu-k'ang-an assembled a force of veteran troops from Hupei, Hunan, and Kweichow, and aborigine military colonists from Szechwan, all of whom were experienced in mountain fighting. As it had for several other of the Ch'ien-lung emperor's so-called Ten Great Campaigns, the state organized an impressive logistical effort, mobilizing men, supplies, and transportation for the expedition, with a minimum of disruption for the local population.\textsuperscript{71} After a delayed crossing, Fu-k'ang-an landed in Lu-kang on the second day of the eleventh month. Led into battle by seasoned banner troops,\textsuperscript{72} this army lifted the siege of Chu-lo on the eighth, and retook Tou-liu-men on the twenty-first. A fierce battle at Ta-li-i followed on the twenty-fourth. Aided by the use of cannon, the Ch'ing army destroyed most of Lin's forces. The Lin remnants fled to Chi-chi-p'u, far upstream on the Cho-shui River, and to neighboring territory of “raw” aborigines. The Ch'ing army pursued the rebels and defeated them at Chi-chi-p'u. Lin Shuang-wen then fled with the remainder of his forces into the mountains, where the dispersed men fell easy prey to aborigine headhunters and pursuing troops. Lin surrendered early in 1788. Fu-k'ang-an's army then turned south to mop up Chuang Ta-t'ien's forces. Chuang surrendered a month later, after being pursued to the Heng-ch'un area at the southern tip of the island. Lin and Chuang were transported to Peking to be executed. Throughout the campaign, Ch'ing troops were aided by loyal militias recruited from the Ch'üan-chou, Hakka, and plains aborigine communities. Officials had to take many precautions to prevent group animosities from subverting the discipline of both the forces from Taiwan and the troops brought from mainland Fukien.\textsuperscript{73} Vendettas against surrendering Chang-chou villages had to be prevented or quickly suppressed.

The threat to local order posed by the continuing tensions among settler groups was of great concern to the Ch'ing court as it considered proposals


\textsuperscript{72} Lococo, “The military campaign to suppress the Lin Shangwen rebellion,” pp. 328, 390.

\textsuperscript{73} See \textit{Ch'\textasciitilde in-ting p'ing-\textasciitilde ting T'ai-wan chi-li\textasciitilde h\textasciitilde b}, pp. 523–33, 542, 733; Shepherd, \textit{Statecraft and political economy on the Taiwan frontier}, pp. 328–9.
for reconstruction of the Taiwan prefectural administration. Although some radical proposals were made that advocated resettlement of communal groups to prevent their intermingling, nothing so drastic was ever implemented. Pacification and the restoration of settled life were deemed the immediate goals. Staffing Taiwan’s garrisons with soldiers rotated from Fukien was maintained, as their loyalty was considered to be more reliable. Fu-k'ang-an implemented plans to establish a locally recruited military force that could be trusted to remain loyal. Inspired by the model of the Szechwan aborigine military colonists that were part of his expeditionary force, Fu-k'ang-an ordered that plains aborigine military colonies be created at strategic sites on undeveloped land in the foothills. The foothills colonies were placed between the “raw” aborigine territories in the mountains and the Han-dominated plains. This system assigned the civilized aborigines the role of being border guards of mountain passes that had been envisioned earlier in government decrees of 1746 and 1760. In subsequent years the aborigine colonists were called up for military service primarily to help pacify incidents of Han communal strife and banditry. Only in the final decades of the nineteenth century were they mobilized for campaigns against the “raw” aborigines in the mountains.

Fu-k'ang-an’s plans for reconstruction called for strengthening the official civil and military presence on the island. Changes on the civil side were relatively minor, with some adjustments in the jurisdiction and staffing of the counties, and with the introduction of measures to ensure closer supervision and review of appointments by higher levels of the provincial government in Foochow. Greater changes were ordered on the military side, with the addition of 1,200 new troops to Taiwan’s garrisons. When he arrived, Fu-k'ang-an had found Taiwan’s garrisons in a sorry state. Many soldiers had taken side jobs to boost their income. Others were involved with criminal elements in gambling and prostitution. These activities were prohibited. Fu-k'ang-an ordered additional patrols and training for the troops, and regular inspections by superiors. He criticized the commanders for lax leadership that warranted their impeachment, but there is little evidence that impeachments resulted in better administration in Taiwan. Despite Fu-k'ang-an’s efforts, incidents of communal strife, banditry, and even attempts to revive Heaven and Earth Society brotherhoods reoccurred in the final decade of the eighteenth century. More charges of official corruption were brought. Taiwanese society seemed

74 Ch’in-ting p’ing-ting T’ai-wan chi-lüeh, pp. 638–9, 805, 733; Shepherd, Statecraft and political economy on the Taiwan frontier, pp. 331–3.
75 Shepherd, Statecraft and political economy on the Taiwan frontier, pp. 352 ff, 357; on the 1746 and 1760 precedents, see pp. 273–4, 382–3.
polarized between rival settler groups ready to leap into battle at the smallest provocation. The turbulence over the next half-century of Taiwan’s history reveals the inadequacy of the measures adopted to create order in Taiwan in the wake of the Lin Shuang-wen rebellion. The Ch’ien-lung emperor’s desire that the post-rebellion reconstruction of Taiwan be so thorough that “by one great effort eternal ease could be gained” was frustrated by settlers, aborigines, and officials alike.\textsuperscript{77}

The Ch’ing administration of Taiwan prefecture illustrates the repertoire of policies used by the state to govern localities, not just directly, but by affecting their social, economic, and cultural development. Restrictions on family migration, rice exports, and land reclamation, development and settlement, as well as adjustments in land tax rates, other revenues, examination quotas, and the deployment of military and civil bureaucracies, were used to manage the growth of frontier society on the island of Taiwan.\textsuperscript{78} The Ch’ing state used allocation of land rights and responsibilities, education, ritual performances, recruitment of militia, and manipulation of ethnic and communal antagonisms to achieve its revenue and security goals.

\textsuperscript{77} Ch’in-ting p’ing-ting T’ai-wan chi-lueh, pp. 658–9; Shepherd, Statecraft and political economy on the Taiwan frontier, p. 357.

\textsuperscript{78} For a fuller comparative treatment of Ch’ing frontier policies, see chapter 12 of Shepherd, Statecraft and political economy on the Taiwan frontier.
CHAPTER 3

THE EXTENSION OF CH'ING RULE OVER MONGOLIA, SINKIANG, AND TIBET, 1636–1800

Nicola Di Cosmo

The proclamation of the new Ch'ing dynasty in 1636 signaled the beginning of a new phase in the history of Inner Asia. The dynasty established by the Aisin Gioro clan in the next few years conquered the Ming empire, and over the next century transformed the political and territorial configuration of the eastern part of Inner Asia, and in particular Mongolia, Sinkiang, and Tibet. The year 1636 also marked the end of the later Chin dynasty, founded by Nurhaci in 1616 and continued for a decade by his son, Hung Taiji (r. 1627–43). They strengthened the Manchu position against the Ming while preparing to intervene in the political and social fabric of the Inner Asian borderlands that would be brought under Ch'ing rule.

Early achievements included the unification of Jurchen tribes and aristocratic kingdoms, military defeat of Ming armies, conquest of the Liaotung peninsula, and successful expeditions against Korea. It was arguably the success of the Manchus’ multifaceted policy with regard to the south Mongol polities that contributed the most to stabilizing the Inner Asian front and allowing the Manchus to reorganize the Mongols as a component of the newly established Ch'ing dynasty. Manchu rule was established over the Mongols in the context of the inter-Mongol wars fought to defeat the Chakhar leader Ligdan Khan (1592–1634), a Chinggiskhanid noble with imperial aspirations of his own. The early Ch'ing leaders began what was arguably going to be one of their most important political legacies: the creation of an empire that extended into Inner Asia and that, notwithstanding some similarities with the Han and T'ang dynasties, was not modeled after Han Chinese precedents.

By the 1760s, the Inner Asian regions controlled from Peking included the northeastern territories later known as Manchuria, Inner and Outer Mongolia, Kokonor (modern Tsinghai), Tibet, and also Dzungharia, the Tianshan region, and the Tarim Basin in the northwest. The Ch'ing view of and policy toward Inner Asia and the systems of government in these frontier regions were shaped from the beginning by the special circumstances of the Ch'ing dynasty as a
regime originating on a frontier, and by the significance of what might be called the Mongol factor in the state-building process. These circumstances resulted in a new configuration of imperial expansion and government of the Inner Asian and especially Mongolian dependencies. This chapter traces the main lines of the changes taking place in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries in Mongolia, whose position was central to the system of imperial “tutelage” set in place by the Ch’ing government to rule the “outer territories” (Ch. wai-fan, Man. tulergi golo).

At the end of the sixteenth century, the Jurchens who inhabited Manchuria were politically divided into three main groupings: the Hai-hsi Jurchens were located in the valley of the Sunggari River; the Chien-chou Jurchens were to the south of the Hai-hsi, in the basin of the Liao and Yalu rivers, closer to the Liaotung border with Ming territory; and the yeh-jen (savage) Jurchens were to the north of the Hai-hsi, in the forest zone of the Amur River. Both Hai-hsi and Chien-chou Jurchens carried on tribute relations with the Ming dynasty, with annual visits to court in which they typically offered horses. Breeding horses was, together with hunting, gathering, and agriculture, an important part of Jurchen economy, which has traditionally been regarded as mixed or – less properly – as semi-nomadic. Environment and tradition dictated the forms of subsistence that prevailed in one or another area.

After the fall of the Yüan dynasty in 1368, the Ming began to intervene militarily in Manchuria to curb residual Mongol resistance and sever Mongol–Jurchen political ties. The Ming offensive, which relied also on diplomacy, resulted in the establishment during the reign of the Yung-lo emperor (r. 1403–24) of a series of garrisons or guards (wei) and posts (so). In practice, these corresponded to pre-existing Jurchen political groupings, organized on tribal and territorial bases.¹ Their leaders were turned into Ming commanders (chib-hui shih) of various ranks. Along with Chinese titles and certain privileges, they acquired obligations toward the Ming emperor. The first important garrison, the Chien-chou wei, was created in 1403. This area was to become recognized much later as the ancestral home of the Ch’ing royal family, the Aisin Gioro clan. The Wu-che and Nu-erh-kan garrisons were established in 1404, and the one at Mao-lien in 1406. Over the following 200 years the Ming government established a total of 368 guards, in addition to twenty

Map 4. Manchuria and eastern Mongolia
While the Ming court did not exercise any direct control over these subdivisions, prominent Jurchen chiefs could be promoted to high positions within the Ming military administrative system of the region. The Chien-chou Jurchens obtained control of two additional guards in 1405 and 1438. One of the ancestors of Nurhaci, Mongke Temür (r. 1405–33), was the first commander of the Chien-chou guard of the left in 1405. He rose to the title of a regional military commissioner (tu chih-bui shih).

One of the key advantages of high rank was that the chiefs received trade permits from the Ming government. In total the Ming issued 1,500 permits for the Jurchen people, 1,000 from among the Hai-hsi and 500 from the Chien-chou Jurchens. These permits allowed Jurchen aristocrats in positions of leadership to carry on commercial activities in trading towns along the border. The permits were also required to participate in the annual presentation of tribute to the court in Peking. The missions to bear tribute to the Ming emperor were lucrative ventures, as the members of the delegations were able to trade and sometimes plunder along the way. The gifts they received in exchange from the emperor, moreover, surpassed the value of the tribute that they presented. Competition among Jurchen tribes developed over access to border markets, also called horse markets (ma shih), and over the permits that allowed presentation of tribute. Nurhaci himself, in the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries, fought continually to appropriate for himself the licenses and trading rights held by other Jurchen chiefs.

Historians concur in finding that Jurchen society of southern Manchuria underwent a massive economic development in the period from the Yung-lo (1403–24) to the Wan-li reign (1573–1620). Both internal and external factors are responsible for this development. Among the internal ones was a large increase in agricultural production, which was especially significant in southern Manchuria. Demographic growth and the chronic need for iron agricultural implements, such as plows and hoes, and farming animals, such as oxen, are noticeable already from the second half of the sixteenth century. Autochthonous production of iron tools increased only from the year 1600 onwards with the development of mining and the establishment of local workshops in Manchurian territories. Jurchen, Han Chinese, and Korean artisans (some migrants, some war prisoners) were employed as blacksmiths, but local production still remained insufficient to fully replace imports.

The development of agriculture had an important side effect: hunting and foraging, which were formerly subsistence activities, could be harnessed

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2 The best study in English on the establishment of wei and so garrisons in Manchuria remains that by Henry Serruys, Sino–Jürčed relations during the Yung-Lo period, 1403–1424 (Wiesbaden, 1955).

3 Lucien Gibert, Dictionnaire historique et géographique de la Mandchourie (Hong Kong, 1934), p. 626.
commercially to provide expensive products sought by Chinese merchants. Among the most precious Jurchen exports were pearls, ginseng, and furs from fox, sable, marten, leopard, lynx, Siberian squirrel, and other animals. They also traded horses, honey, and forest products, such as wild mushrooms and nuts. Economic data from the late sixteenth century shows a significant difference in value between Manchurian imports and exports, with substantial quantities of silver likely flowing into Manchuria to make up the difference.4 One of the effects of the prosperity of southern Manchuria, irrespective of the pendulum swings of the political relations with the Ming government, is the migratory movement and relocation of northern peoples to more southern places, closer to the Liaotung frontier.

The most common causes of friction between Jurchen and Ming leaders were the breaches or abuses of trading rights, which often led to disruption of peace and to violent raids carried out by Jurchens against Ming cities. Intense bouts of military confrontation occurred in the mid-fifteenth and the mid-sixteenth centuries. In the first case the support given by the Jurchens to the Oirat ruler Esen Khan (r. 1438–54) led to economic sanctions and to the further fortification of the northeastern frontier. In the 1570s military clashes along the Sino-Jurchen border resulted from the Ming policy, already started with regulations issued in 1536, of curbing the size of tribute missions and subjecting border trade to more rigorous controls and taxation.5 However, this is a period in which tensions developed especially among the various Jurchen tribes and aristocratic groups, fueled by rampant military and economic competition.

Jurchen society at the time comprised three main classes of people: aristocrats, commoners, and slaves. The aristocracy was primarily engaged in the exercise of political power and military activities. Its members were called beile and beise, and belonged to families traditionally powerful, often with connections to the Ming court. To this class belonged also the companions-in-arms (gucu) of high-ranking political figures. Access to aristocratic rank could come from association, usually from a young age, with a successful leader. Slaves (aha, booi aba, booi niyalma) were initially mostly household slaves, and typically consisted of people captured in battle or in the course of pillaging raids in Ming and Korean borderlands. During the sixteenth century the spectrum of their activities expanded, together with their number and social functions, as they began to be employed in agriculture and handicraft production. The expanding Jurchen economy required manpower that came from south of the

border, often as war prisoners. The Jurchen commoners were called *juˇsen*, a Manchu term that designated both the Jurchen people as a whole and non-aristocratic members of society. They tilled the land, hunted, bred animals, and followed their clan leaders in war. Their social position gradually became less free and more rigidly subordinated to the aristocracy, which implied an increase in compulsory taxation, corvées, and military service. In Nurhaci’s time they made up the bulk of the Eight Banner system, a military and administrative institution that produced an even steeper verticalization of social relations.\(^6\)

The rise of Nurhaci, from the 1580s to the early years of the seventeenth century, took place at a time that is described in the Manchu annals as a period of turmoil and great political instability. This was also, however, a period of overall economic development, of demographic expansion, and of intense militarization of Jurchen society. Politically and economically the aristocracy vastly increased its position and power. The accumulation of riches in the hands of a few political leaders is nowhere exemplified better than in Nurhaci’s own strategy, as he made effective use of his growing political influence with the Ming government to carry out by war and diplomacy a monopolistic concentration of the tribute and commercial privileges granted to the Manchu leaders.\(^7\) The centralization of power was due in part to Nurhaci’s gaining monopolistic control over economic resources, militarization of commoners, and astute diplomacy.

Nurhaci’s strategy was not limited to intra-Jurchen politics and border relations with the Ming and with Korea. After the establishment in 1616 of the independent regime known as the later Chin dynasty (Man. amaga aisin gurun), it became increasingly evident that the survival of Nurhaci’s polity depended on his ability to accompany his military expansion into Ming territory (Liaotung) with more efficient ways of organizing the newly conquered populations and territories. Nurhaci had to defend these gains against a growing number of actual or potential enemies. It also appeared in 1619 that Nurhaci’s ambition to establish an independent regime was going to be challenged, as Ligdan Khan of the Chakhar Mongols rose to rival political prominence. If the defections of Han advisers who joined Nurhaci following the conquest of Liaotung are held responsible for “teaching” Manchus how to rule Ming territories, it is in the context of their developing relationship

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\(^6\) For a list of economic and military obligations to which the *juˇsen* were subject, see Wang Chung-han, “Man-tsu tsai Nu-erh-ha-ch’i’i hsh ti she-hui ching-chi hsing-t’ai,” in *Wang Chung-han Ch’ing shih lun chi* (Peking, 2004), pp. 73–4.

with the Mongols that the Aisin Gioro rulers, Nurhaci and later his son Hung Taiji, expanded the range of tools at their disposal to control nomadic peoples and incorporate territories. The seed was thus planted for a frontier strategy that differed deeply from that of any previous dynasty.

THE CH'ING EXPANSION IN INNER ASIA

A useful concept in examining the developing involvement of the Ch'ing dynasty in Inner Asia is to consider it as an “imperializing” project that developed on the frontier among the Mongols and the Manchus. From one perspective, in reference to the relations between Manchus and Mongols, the “Ch'ing looks almost like a project to restore an empire along Mongol lines by gathering clans and eliminating rivals.” Several attempts had been made by Mongol leaders during the Ming dynasty to create larger powers by unifying various Mongol groups, whether or not they attempted to re-create Chinggis Khan’s empire. Among them, the political projects of Esen Khan, Dayan Khan (r. 1480–1517), Altan Khan (1508–82) and Ligdan Khan were especially bold and far-reaching. As the Manchus began to organize, and even long after their conquest of the Ming empire had been completed, Mongol attempts to expand their political and military power constituted a threat to the realization of the Manchus’ own political ambitions. In this regard, while the Mongol imperial tradition in theory regarded only a descendant of Chinggis Khan as a legitimate authority to launch an imperializing campaign and to adopt an imperial rhetoric, the western Mongols, or Dzungars, proved equally capable of expressing imperial aspirations even though, with the exception of the Khoshut, they could not claim a Chinggisid ancestry (see below). The Chinggiskhanid legacy did not lose its political importance, and continued to play a role at some rhetorical level, but the most influential Dzungar khans relied primarily on legitimization obtained through the support of the Dge-lugs-pa sect and the Dalai Lama. The Manchus countered such projects by a series of political, diplomatic, and military interventions, and by gradually extending their rule into the borderlands and making them part of their Ch'ing empire. At the same time, these regions remained ethnically and culturally distinct, and administratively separate from the rest of the Ch'ing

domain, nearly to the end of the dynasty. How this was achieved is one of the fundamental questions in the history of early modern Inner Asia.

Ch'ing expansion into Mongolian territories cannot be conceived as some kind of manifest destiny. Rather, it progressed as a response to a series of challenges spanning a century and a half. Schematically, we can identify four phases that should not be seen as disconnected, but as part of a continuous and evolving frontier strategy. The first phase includes the relations between the early Manchu rulers, Nurhaci and Hung Taiji, and Mongol leaders before and after the foundation of the later Chin regime (1616–35) that led to the organization of southern Mongols into companies (Mon. *sumu*, Man. *niru*) within the banners. This phase also includes the development from 1637 of what was later known as the *Li-fan yüan* (Board for governing outer territories) as the main branch of government in charge of administration of conquered areas of Inner Asia. The wars initiated by the K'ang-hsi emperor against the Dzunghar leader Galdan in the 1690s constitute the second phase of this process, as they led to the submission of the Khalkha khans to the Ch'ing at the Dolon Nor Convention, and to the subdivision of Mongolia into administrative units overseen by the *Li-fan yüan*. The third phase is one of continued conflict with the Dzunghars, which brought the Ch'ing military to occupy some towns in eastern Turkestan and especially to establish political rule in Tibet through the system of imperial residents (Man. *amban*). The fourth and last phase can be identified in the Ch'ing conquest of what later became Sinkiang (lit. “new frontier”), as a result of which new territories and diverse populations, including Muslim oasis settlers and Kazakh and Kirghiz nomads, came under Ch'ing rule.

When Nurhaci began to assert himself as regional strongman and leader of the Chien-chou Jurchens, the political relationships between him and the southern Mongols worsened. In 1593 a group of Mongol aristocrats, later to become staunch allies and even close relatives of Nurhaci himself, joined Jurchen tribes in an anti-Nurhaci coalition. The military successes of the Chien-chou Jurchens – the Manchu polity headed by Nurhaci – led to territorial and economic expansion. In 1606–7 Nurhaci reached a diplomatic agreement with the Khalkha Mongols, who “bestowed” upon him the honorific title of Kündülen Khan, meaning Most Respected Ruler, a title higher than that he enjoyed even among his own people.¹⁰

From 1620 the Jurchens were drawn more deeply into Mongol politics as a consequence of the rise of the Chakhar leader Ligdan Khan, who unleashed a series of bloody raids meant to terrorize other Mongol groups into

¹⁰ *Ta Ch'ing T'ai-tsu K'ao huang-ti shih-lu* (1937; Peking, 1986), Volume 1, p. 47.
The Manchu leadership was drawn deeper into Mongol politics both to curtail Ligdan’s ambition to re-create a unified Mongol empire and to stop the flow of refugees from Mongolia into Manchu-controlled territories. Nurhaci and his son Hung Taiji proved able to attract Mongol aristocrats to their side by offering them protection and by actively fighting Ligdan. By this time the Manchu diplomatic exchanges with various Mongol leaders had the essential aspect of “tutelage” that characterized the Ch’ing attitude towards Mongols and was later extended to other dependencies on the frontiers. The act of granting protection was sanctioned ritually by swearing oaths, and involved a series of obligations by both parties, among which the integration of Mongol troops into the Manchu army was paramount. The Mongols who joined the Manchus and moved into Manchu territory were then organized into companies. In this way they began to be incorporated within the Eight Banner system created earlier by Nurhaci. With a larger population of southern Mongols accepting Manchu sovereignty, the number of Mongols who joined the banners grew steadily through the 1620s and early 1630s. As more and more Mongol aristocratic families and subjects were brought into the fabric of the new Manchu state, they also became active in military affairs. The culmination of this first phase can be dated to 1635, when Hung Taiji extracted the Mongol companies from the Manchu banners to which they had been assigned and reconstituted them into a separate and autonomous formation known as the Mongol Eight Banners (Meng-ku pa ch’i). While each Mongol banner was still subordinated to the Manchu banner of the same color, they had a separate ethnic character.

The Eight Banner Mongols were formed from the oldest and closest allies of the Manchus, and as such their leaders enjoyed the privileges of the Ch’ing conquest elite. Over the next two centuries they continued to intermarry with the Manchu aristocracy. Some of them were promoted to high-ranking positions in the military as well as civilian hierarchies, yet those in the Eight Mongol Banners constituted only about a fifth of the total Mongol population under Ch’ing rule. The Ch’ing government gradually organized the remainder of the southern Mongol nations into new territorial units that were also called banners, but had no connections with the Eight Banners as a

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12 “Tutelage” is meant here as implying loss of full sovereignty but not excluding retention of autonomy and not involving colonial dependence. See Nicola Di Cosmo, “From alliance to tutelage: A historical analysis of Manchu–Mongol relations before the Qing conquest,” Frontiers of History in China 7 No. 2 (2012), pp. 189–90.
political and administrative system. It was rather a system that rationalized political boundaries imposed on southern Mongol groupings along lines of pre-existing as well as newly emerged geopolitical configurations resulting from the upheaval caused by the Chakhar wars and subsequent population shifts.

The reorganization of southern Mongolia after its pacification proceeded through the early period of the Ch'ing dynasty. In 1635 southern Mongolia was organized into forty-nine banners, whose names are still visible on current maps of Inner Mongolia. To facilitate communication between the banners and the court, and to allow for consultation among banners on a series of issues, such as serious criminal offences, the ruling officials of the banners formed unions of banners organized on a territorial basis, and met on a regular basis. These groups of banners were referred to as “leagues,” and were altogether six in number. Each of the banners was named after the main division, or “nation,” of Mongols that constituted them. One such nation could include more than one banner, with multiple banners of a single group differentiated by a positional indicator (right, center, or left). These were organized as follows:

1. the Jerim League of ten banners, belonging to the four nations of the Khorchin (6), Jalayit (Jalayid) (1), Dörbet (Dörbed) (1), and Ghorlos (2);
2. the Juu Uda League of eleven banners, comprising the Mongol nations of the Aokhan (1), Naiman (1), Ongniut (2), Barin (2), Jarut (2), Khalkha of the Left Wing (1), Aru Khorchin (1), and Kesigten (1);
3. the Josutu League of five banners of the Karachin (3) and Tümet (Tümed) (2) nations, both of them staunch allies of the Manchus;
4. the Silinghol League of ten banners, comprising the Üjümchín (2), Abagha (2), Abaghanar (2), Khaucht (2) and Sünit (Sünid) (2) nations;
5. the Ulanjab League of six banners of the Dörben Keüked (1), Khalkha of the Right Wing (1), Urat (Urad) (3) and Maominggan (1);
6. the Yeke Juu League of the seven Ordos banners.

Often called tribes, Mongol political and territorial groups are, however, not based on common ancestry, but on ties that are territorial and political, and sanctioned by common traditions. They are closer, in actual historical meaning, to Native American nations than to generic tribes, while collectively as a people they recognized themselves as Mongols. The word “nation” in that sense may therefore be better than “tribe” to refer to sociopolitical units such as Chakhar, Khalkha, Khorchin, and others.

Map 5. Leagues and banners in Inner Mongolia
In addition to these leagues and banners in southern Mongolia, there were Chakhar banners. These were units of a mixed nature that straddled the military–administrative organization of the Eight Banners and the territorial structure of the jasagh-ruled sumu (that is, a local area controlled by a local hereditary ruler; see below). They were first created in 1634 after the defeat and death of Ligdan Khan. The following year Ligdan Khan’s son Erke Khongkhor Eje (1622–41) submitted to the Manchu leaders with the remainder of the Chakhars people. At this point the Chakhars regained considerable independence. Hung Taiji raised Eje to the highest rank of nobility and settled the Chakhars in nomadic pastureland in today’s southeastern Inner Mongolia. The actual status of these Chakhars has been in question until recently, when newly discovered Mongolian documents showed that they were organized not as part of the Eight Banner system but as a jasagh banner, thus enjoying the privilege of territorial autonomy and relative political independence. In 1669 the arrest of the Chakhar leader Abunai precipitated a situation of tension that led to the revolt by his son Burni, coinciding with the Three Feudatories rebellion in southwest China (1673–81). The rebellion by Burni was quashed by the K’ang-hsi emperor’s forces in 1675, and ended with the death of Burni in battle and the execution of Abunai along with many other members of his family and officials of the Chakhars forces. The K’ang-hsi emperor then dissolved the Chakhars people as an autonomous jasagh banner and reorganized them into Eight Banner units directly under the supervision of the same-color Ch’ing banners. Some of them were given land and organized into “pastures” as a service agency for the court charged with providing pastoral products to the capital. All twelve Chakhar units were under the supervision of the Manchu resident amban at Kalgan (Chang-chia-k’ou).15

The critical element in the political remaking of the southern Mongol nations lies in the figure of the jasagh, a Mongol term, derived from the word “to rule,” that indicates the local ruling authority, the “puissant” lord. It was instituted as a Ch’ing administrative position in 1635, with the formation of the Inner Mongol banners. Each banner was headed by a jasagh who acted as the highest local political and judicial authority. The jasagh all were appointed from among local aristocrats. Virtually all were Chinggisids, a position that was hereditary, although it needed to be confirmed by the Ch’ing emperor, who might rescind or alter the line of succession. While the jasagh had to abide by the laws and regulations of the Li-fan yian, the position retained ample powers. Among its prerogatives were the supervision of the census, the collection of

taxes, the adjudication of lesser crimes, and military assistance as needed. The *jasagb* was also responsible for regulating trade and providing support to Ch'ing officials and other government representatives traveling through that banner's territory, a task that was made less onerous during the K'ang-hsi period by the creation of a system of postal stations under the direct control of the *Li-fan yüan*. The *jasagb* communicated with the *Li-fan yüan* on any number of issues related to civil, administrative, legal, military, and political matters. The system of indirect rule devised by the Ch'ing authorities was based on the co-optation of local elites combined with local imperial presence with supervisory powers. The system was later adopted in other parts of Mongolia, and served as one of the chief means for the extension of Ch'ing rule in Tibet and Sinkiang. It is difficult to gauge the degree to which the common people accepted the authority of the *jasagb*. A 1651 regulation of the *Meng-ku liü-shu* (*Mongol statutes*) forbidding people from turning directly to the local Ch'ing government officers, thus bypassing the authority of the *jasagb*, indicates that the central government and its chief agency supervising Mongolia, the *Li-fan yüan*, at least initially needed to prop up the authority of the *jasagb*.\(^{16}\) (This statute disappears in later editions of the code.)

The other crucial achievement of this phase, which will be discussed in greater detail below, is the formation of the *Li-fan yüan*, the administrative linchpin of Ch'ing policy for the rule of Mongolia and other Inner Asian dependencies, and the political transmission link between the Manchu court and local Mongol, Turkestanian, Tibetan, and other elites. The name *Li-fan yüan* has received several English translations in addition to the conventional, but now less favored, Court of Colonial Affairs.\(^{17}\) The name has been rendered as Department of Tributary Territories,\(^{18}\) and also, based on the Manchu or Mongol names for it, as Ministry Ruling the Outer Provinces (Man. *tulergi golo be dasara jurgan*)\(^{19}\) and as Court of Administration of the Autonomous Mongolian States (Mon. *ghadaghadu Monggol töri-yi jasakhu yabudal-un yamun*).\(^{20}\) The Mongol translation, in particular, indicates that in 1638 the terms *fan* in the Chinese version and *tulergi golo* in the Manchu version referred specifically to Mongolia. *Fan* is a term that was applied in ancient Chinese texts to

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17 This translation has been deemed unsatisfactory by some Chinese scholars in view of the anachronistic use of the term “colonial.” See for example Wang Chung-han, “Shih lun Li-fan yüan yü Meng-ku,” *Ch'ing shih yen-chiu chi* 3 (1984), p. 167.


19 Ning Chia, “The Lifanyuan and the Inner Asian rituals in the early Qing (1644–1795),” *Late Imperial China* 14 No. 1 (1993), p. 61.

liminal regions, beyond the control of a central authority, but possibly within its sphere of action, as in the sentence in the classical text the Chou li (Chou rituals), “What is outside the nine divisions [that is, the Hua-Hsia states] are called fan [outer or foreign] countries” (Chiu chou chib wai wei chib fan kuo). Taking that as the central allusion of fan in the name of the agency, the Li-fan yīan, a translation such as “Board for Governing Outer Territories” is probably the most fitting, but for clarity’s sake the term Li-fan yīan will be used in this chapter instead of a translated term.

The second phase of expansion came as the K'ang-hsi emperor sought to assert his rule over the Khalkha Mongols of Outer Mongolia, a fateful development resulting from the long-brewing rivalry between Khalkhas and Dzungars that finally erupted into open conflict in 1686. The Ch'ing court’s approach to the western (Oirat) and eastern (Khalkha) Mongols had evolved into a tributary relationship in the early years of the dynasty, when the dust of conquest had yet to settle and the Manchus were busy pacifying the southern provinces still loyal to the Southern Ming court. In 1655 eight Khalkha chiefs were appointed tributary jasagb, and presented as tribute the “nine whites,” eight white horses and a white camel, to the Ch'ing emperor, thus establishing trade and tribute relations and accepting the Ch'ing government as the sovereign power. The Ch'ing, on the other hand, used the tribute system to try to maintain peaceful control over a frontier rife with dangers.

In the meantime, the Oirats, a confederation that included several separate nations, had undergone a process of expansion under Batur Hongtayiji (r. 1635–53), whose project to “imperialize” the western Mongols by establishing a Dzungar khanate had been essential to the strengthening of the Dzungars in relation to the eastern Mongols. Batur Hongtayiji never assumed the title of khan, and therefore it is not possible to speak of a Dzungar khanate until Galdan received the title Boshoghtu Khan in 1678. All along, however, his political intention and strategic trajectory were doubtless to create an imperial entity that could unify all Mongols. Meanwhile, notions of political legitimacy moved away from a strictly Chinggisid inheritance, which allowed only Chinggisids to aspire to carry the title of khan or to undertake the political project to form a Mongol khanate. This principle held true up to Ligdan Khan, but it lost force in the following decades. Among seventeenth-century Mongols direct descent from the Chinggisid agnatic line was an important,


but not unique, path to imperial rulership. Absence of a royal genealogy was most effectively compensated, as in the case of Galdan, by investiture from the Tibetan Buddhist chief hierarch, the Dalai Lama. It is possible that the erosion of the principle of Chinggisid legitimacy, and its at least partial replacement by religious investiture, facilitated the transfer of a notion of imperium as conceived in the Mongol and Tibetan political languages to the Manchu leader.

This development has been partly attributed to the acceptance by southern Mongols that the political authority deriving from the Mongol imperial legacy of Chinggis Khan had been appropriated by the Manchus. In the Precious Summary (Man. Erdeni-yin Tobčii) compiled in 1662 by the Ordos nobleman Sagang Sechen, there are passages that suggest a Manchu succession to the Mongol imperial legacy. For instance, by stating that Hung Taiji (Mon. Sechen Khan; Man. Sure Han) “took the state” of the Mongol khans, and by establishing a connection between Chinggis Khan and Nurhaci, it posited the Manchu founder as the political descendant of the Mongol.\(^24\) In eighteenth-century texts, such as Rashipungusug’s Crystal rosary of 1774, it is stated explicitly that the Ch’ing emperors enjoyed the blessing of the Holy Chinggis Khan.\(^25\)

Hung Taiji’s support for Tibetan Buddhism, culminating in the construction of the Mahākāla Temple complex in Mukden (Shen-yang) in 1636, together with the ceremonies that accompanied the victory against Ligdan and the public ceremony that announced recovery of the “seal” of the Yüan dynasty in 1635, is an unmistakable sign that the Manchus’ political propaganda aimed to establish an image and reputation for themselves as the successors of the Mongol imperial khans without recourse to the legitimation principle based on Chinggisid ancestry.\(^26\)

Independent Mongol leaders, however, followed their own political ambitions by various means. In 1640 the Khalkha Mongols under the Jasaghtu Khan and the Oirats under Batur Hongtayiji met at a great assembly that gathered also the Volga Kalmyks (Qalmaqs) and the Kokonor Mongols, but excluded the eastern Mongols who had submitted to the Ch’ing. On this occasion Oirats and Khalkha signed a peace treaty and issued a legal code. The code was meant to buttress Mongol unity, punish those who violated the peace,

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\(^{24}\) Johan Elverskog, Our Great Qing: The Mongols, Buddhism and the state in late imperial China (Honolulu, 2006), pp. 44, 81.

\(^{25}\) Elverskog, Our Great Qing, p. 80.

establish ways to resolve disputes between tribes, and increase the power of the aristocracy. Moreover, Tibetan Buddhism was formally proclaimed to be the official religion of the Mongols. In the 1640s Batur also managed to establish and formalize trade relations with Russia, and a treaty signed in 1647 allowed commercial exchanges between Oirats and Russians to expand. The prosperity and peace created by Batur was short-lived. His death in 1653 was followed by a series of succession struggles that eventually led, in 1670, to the assassination of Batur’s son and successor Sengge. It was only later, with the rise of Galdan, that the western Mongols again found a unifying leader.

On the eastern front the 1660s were a time of increasing tensions. The Khalkha were divided into four khanates: two on the right flank or wing (western side) and two on the left flank (eastern side), each named after the titles of their khans, and all of them of Chinggisid descent. The two right-flank ones were named after the Jasaghtu Khan and the Altan Khan, the left-flank ones were the Tüsiiyetü Khan and the Sechen (also known as Setsen or Chechen) Khan. A civil war broke out in 1662 among the right-flank Khalkha Mongols when one of their two rulers, the Jasaghtu Khan, was killed by the other ruler, Lobzang Tayiji (r. 1652–67), who was honored as the Altan Khan. The Altan Khan’s territory was located in north-western Mongolia, and his subjects were mainly Oirats who had been subjugated by Khalkha princes in the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries. One of the two left-flank Khalkha rulers, the Tüsiiyetü Khan Chakhundorji (r. 1655–99), intervened in defense of the Jasaghtu Khan’s rights, defeating Lobzang Tayiji, who was subsequently captured by the Oirat ruler Sengge. This war caused widespread destruction and the displacement of many of the Jasaghtu Khan’s Mongols, who ended up as subjects of the Tüsiiyetü Khan, either because they were seized by his troops or because they moved to his territory to escape the war and seek protection. The new Jasaghtu Khan, after being installed in 1670 with the support of the Tüsiiyetü Khan, requested that the former subjects of his domain be returned by the Tüsiiyetü Khan. Because of lack of progress on the return of these people the dispute dragged on, leading to a worsening of the relations between the two wings of the Khalkha Mongols.

The Oirat camp was at the same time troubled by internal wars as Galdan (1644–97) rose to avenge the death of his brother, Sengge, who was ruler of the Dzunghars until he was assassinated in 1670 by a half-brother. Galdan had previously been sent to Tibet to become a disciple of the Panchen Lama and of the Dalai Lama. He then broke his vows, defeated his enemies,

27 Perdue, China marches west, p. 107.
and subsequently overthrew the Ochirtu Khan, the highest Oirat authority, thereby unifying all Oirats under Dzungar leadership. In 1678 the Dalai Lama bestowed upon Galdan the title of Boshoghtu Khan (the “legitimate” or “mandate-holding” khan), and by doing so made Galdan his champion in the Mongol political world. Galdan soon began a political expansion into Eastern Turkestan and launched raids against the Kazakhs, while keeping good relations with Russia.

In 1686 Galdan entered the broader theater of Mongol politics as he tried to mediate between the Jasaghtu and the Tüsiyêtü Khan at a conference held at Küriyen Belçiger.29 At this meeting Galdan took offence at a supposed affront suffered by the representative of the Dalai Lama, who was given a post of honor equal, not superior, to that of the Jebtsundamba Khutukhtu, the highest Buddhist authority among the Khalkhas, a position held by the brother of the Tüsiyêtü Khan. The meeting ended with a general oath of peace and the promise to return all displaced people to their respective domains. Soon after, however, Galdan accused the Jebtsundamba of having challenged the authority of the Dalai Lama. He then prepared to attack the Tüsiyêtü Khan by moving closer to the Jasaghtu Khan’s territory and holding talks with the right-flank Khalkhas. The K'ang-hsi emperor tried to resolve this dispute diplomatically, but matters turned critical when the Tüsiyêtü Khan, possibly fearing a coalition against him, launched an attack in 1687 against the Jasaghtu Khan, in the course of which Galdan’s brother, who was assisting the Jasaghtu Khan, was killed. Galdan retaliated with an all-out war. He invaded the territory of the eastern Khalkha with 30,000 troops and inflicted heavy losses on the Tüsiyêtü Khan. Galdan’s march through Khalkha territory was marked by much violence, and by the wholesale destruction of temples and religious establishments. This war caused tremendous upheaval among the Khalkha population, and as the khan and the Khutukhtu fled to seek protection in the territory of the Sechen Khan (the second ruler of the left-wing Khalkhas), the common people could only save themselves by running away and moving closer to the Ch'ing border. The masses of refugees made the Ch'ing authorities look at Galdan’s advance with increasing apprehension, and persuaded the K'ang-hsi emperor to send troops to the border to keep the situation under control.

Both the conduct of Galdan in war, who showed no mercy for religious places, and his rage at the treatment of the Dalai Lama’s representative, show that Galdan’s attack, while allegedly meant to avenge his brother’s death, had as its main objective the destruction of the power of the Khutukhtu, which he

feared might grow independent of that of the Dalai Lama. It was not possible for him to tolerate the existence of two foci of spiritual leadership, especially in consideration of the inextricable ties that the heads of the Tibetan Buddhist clergy had with Mongol leaders, and the critical role they played in Mongol politics. Galdan therefore did not budge on his request that the Khutukhtu be surrendered to him and sent to the Dalai Lama to make amends.

In 1690 Galdan’s position as leader of the Oirats was challenged by Sengge’s son Tsewang Rabdan (r. 1697–1727). After some fighting the latter gained the upper hand and proclaimed himself ruler of Dzungaria. Galdan survived the civil war, and continued to lead the troops still loyal to him against the Khutukhtu, the Tüsiyetü Khan, and the Sechen Khan. In the course of this campaign, wishing to negotiate with the Ch'ing government, Galdan went into Inner Mongolia, which was under Ch'ing rule. At this point the K'ang-hsi emperor, outraged by Galdan’s continual disruption of the peace, launched a military campaign that he led in person. The expedition was by no means a triumphal march for the Ch'ing troops, who suffered many casualties and had severe supply problems. A decisive battle was fought at Ulan Budung on 3 September 1690. This was celebrated as a major Ch'ing victory even though, while the Ch'ing forces inflicted heavy losses on Galdan’s, they were unable to crush him. Galdan was allowed to withdraw and present an oath of submission in which he promised to refrain from further military activity. At this time Galdan also found that the Russians were not willing to help him as the Tsar had signed, the year before (1689), the Treaty of Nerchinsk with the K'ang-hsi emperor, which strictly regulated relations between the Ch'ing and Russia, and precluded any intervention in each other’s internal affairs.

The most important outcome of these events from the point of view of Ch'ing rule of Mongolia was the decision by the Khalkha rulers to submit to the Ch'ing emperor, a historical determination made at the Dolon Nor Convention (1691). The K'ang-hsi emperor organized the gathering with great pomp and an impressive display of power and grandeur. He secured the submission of the Khalkha khans, the Jebtsundamba Khutukhtu, and 550 noblemen. This crucial event led to the complete restructuring of the political and administrative order of northern Mongolia, modeled after the


31 Perdue, China marches west, pp. 155–8.

reorganization of Inner Mongolia. The Khutukhtu was established as the nominal head of all Khalkhas, and the Khalkha population was divided into thirty-four banners (khoshuu) that were grouped in three ayimaghs (tribes or clans), named after the Tüsiiyetü, Jasaghtu, and Sechen khans. A fourth was added in 1725, named after the Sayin Noyan Khan. Each khoshuu was in effect an aristocratic appanage. After 1691 the terms khoshuu and ayimagh were given clear meaning, and their evolution responded to the logic of the Ch'ing administration. The number of khoshuu increased through the eighteenth century from thirty-four in 1691 to fifty-three in 1725 and eighty-six in 1765. After 1778 the ayimaghs were designated as Inner Mongol leagues (meng). The khoshuu were headed by jasaghs, who met every three years to discuss major political or legal issues. Most of the Ch'ing civil and military posts in Mongolia were created after 1725, when the Khalkha nobility was directly subordinated to imperial residents, the highest of whom was the military governor of Uliasutai.33 The whole of northern Mongolia was thereafter ruled through the same

mechanism of tutelage that applied to Inner Mongolia, with resident *amban*, military commanders, and especially the representatives and personnel of the *Li-fan yüan* that actively supervised the Mongol aristocracy while allowing ample latitude in local government.

The concluding episode of this phase was the second expedition of the K'ang-hsi emperor against Galdan. Galdan’s attempts to gain support in western Mongolia and Sinkiang, and his intention to reach Tibet, possibly to establish his own rule there with the support of the Dalai Lama or the regent (who had ruled Tibet by keeping secret the demise of the Dalai Lama until 1693), persuaded K'ang-hsi that it was necessary to eliminate Galdan once and for all. The emperor led the second campaign in person. Ch'ing expeditionary troops under the command of Manchu general Fiyanggū engaged Galdan on the battlefield of Jao Modo, on the Kerulen River close to today’s Ulan Bator. Galdan and his Dzungar troops were severely defeated on 3 July 1696. Galdan fled, and the K'ang-hsi emperor pursued him for nearly a year. Galdan died in the spring of 1697 in western Mongolia from causes unknown.

The third phase of the consolidation of Ch’ing control of the frontiers and development of the system of frontier administration began in the late seventeenth century and lasted until the Ch’ing conquest of Sinkiang and complete destruction of the Dzungar khanate. In the process, Ch’ing armies acquired control over Kokonor (Tsinghai) and Tibet. Setting up civil and military resident officers led to critical changes in the role, structure, and size of the *Li-fan yüan*.

With the death of Galdan, the new ruler of the Dzungars, Tsewang Rabdan, tried to keep good relations with the Ch’ing and the Russian emperors while fighting against the Kazakh “hordes” (Kaz. *jüz*), as their three main divisions were called, namely the senior, middle, and junior horde. The Kazakhs suffered for several years from punishing raids by the Dzungars. Dzungar relations with the K’ang-hsi emperor, however, were souring already in the early years of the eighteenth century over territorial disputes, as well as over the Dzungars’ reluctance to be reduced to the dependent status of the other Mongols, as the K’ang-hsi emperor had explicitly proposed. Moreover, developments in Tibet drew increasing attention from both sides because of the inherent political sensitivity of the religious issues stemming from the power games that the regent in Lhasa had engaged in for decades, and because of the weak, ineffective role played by the Sixth Dalai Lama, who was also accused of behaving in a manner unbefitting his religious vows. Perhaps more worrying from the viewpoint of the Ch’ing government, he was a political puppet of the traditionally pro-Dzungar regent. Therefore the Ch’ing supported a takeover by the Lhazang Khan (r. 1703–17), a Khoshut descendant of Güüshi Khan (r. 1636–56), and traditionally both the main Mongol power in Kokonor and Tibet as well as a staunch ally of the Manchus. The removal of the Sixth
Dalai Lama and installation of a new Sixth Dalai Lama by Lhazang Khan caused great displeasure among the Tibetans, and offered the Dzungars, who had seen themselves since Galdan’s time as the secular defenders of the Dalai Lama’s dignity, the opportunity to intervene militarily.

In 1715, as Ch’ing forces fought the Dzungars in western Mongolia over territorial disputes and Dzungar incursions into Khalkha territory, and as the K’ang-hsi emperor prepared for a new campaign against such a crafty rival, Tsewang Rabdan launched a devastating campaign against the Khoshut Mongols in Tibet. The Dzungars overcame Khoshut resistance, occupied Lhasa, and in the process killed Lhazang Khan. This turn of events forced the K’ang-hsi emperor into a direct military intervention in Tibet. The Dzungars soundly defeated the first Ch’ing expeditionary army in 1718, but subsequent military operations were successful, and in 1724, at the beginning of the Yung-cheng reign, Tibet was freed of the Dzungars’ control.

Tibet was now under the control of the Ch’ing. A series of institutional changes that had been initiated under K’ang-hsi were strengthened under the Yung-cheng emperor, especially in 1727. The spirit of the system was to allow the government of Tibet to remain in the hands of the Dalai Lama and the Council of Ministers (Tib. bka-shags), which included secular and religious members. Tibet was to remain under a regime of supervision and arbitration operated by two Ch’ing officials, one senior and one junior, and by designated offices within the Li-fan yüan. The Ch’ing officials had at their disposal a standing military force of 2,000 men. The duties of the Li-fan yüan representatives in Tibet were similar to those they carried out in the Mongolian banners: to supervise the collection of taxes; to arrange for the appointment, promotion, demotion, and stipends of local officials and noblemen; and to make appropriate arrangements for supervising and regulating the journeys of the Tibetan nobility and Buddhist hierarchs to Peking to visit the court of the emperor. This system allowed a greater degree of autonomy than the jasagb system of Inner and Outer Mongolia, but in 1750, following an anti-Ch’ing revolt in Tibet, the powers of the Ch’ing officials were strengthened, and they began to take a more interventionist role in the government of Tibet. They became directly involved in the nomination of civil and religious officials and their confirmation by the government. In practice, all major economic, legal, and governmental actions of the Dalai Lama and Panchen Lama, as well as of the local ministers (Tib. bka’-blon), were to be carried out jointly with the Ch’ing residents.34

The fourth and final phase of the Ch'ing establishing primacy over Inner Asian territories includes the last act of the Dzungar conflict and the conquest of Sinkiang. Going back to the late K'ang-hsi emperor's troubled relations with Tsewang Rabdan at the time of the expedition to expel the Dzungars from Tibet, Ch'ing forces had also attacked and captured the Turkestani cities of Barkul, Hami, and Turfan, the latter being especially critical as it allowed the Ch'ing to open anti-Dzungar negotiations with the Kazakhs. At the end of the K'ang-hsi reign Ch'ing troops were poised to launch yet another campaign against the Dzungars, but this required time and considerable resources due to the remoteness from Peking of the Dzungar homeland, near the Altai Mountains in today's northern Sinkiang.

The death of the K'ang-hsi emperor in 1722 temporarily removed the threat of an imminent Ch'ing assault on the Dzungars. In 1727 Tsewang Rabdan died, and was succeeded by his son Galdantsering (r. 1727–45). In the 1720s relations between the Yung-cheng emperor and the Dzungars, while remaining hostile, were less heated. In the 1730s, however, Galdantsering, who had spent his first years in power reorganizing the Dzungar state, resumed attacks on the Khalkha Mongols, who had been for so long the target of Dzungar expansionism. The Ch'ing military intervened in order to protect their eastern Mongol subjects, and especially to preserve their hegemony in the region. After they repeatedly defeated the Dzungars, a peace treaty was signed in 1739 that settled the border between the two states, by which the Dzungars suffered extensive territorial losses, including Tuva. Official trade, however, was resumed, and the Dzungars were allowed triennially to send tributary and commercial delegations to Peking. This treaty held until the 1750s.

In 1745 a succession struggle broke out at the death of Galdantsering that eventually saw a Dzungar nobleman, Dawachi (r. 1753–5), succeed to the throne in 1753 with the assistance of the Khoyd chief Amursana. Within a few months the newly unified Oirat state was again troubled by massive defections to the Ch'ing and internal dissent. Amursana himself revolted against Dawachi, siding with the Ch'ing. The Ch'ien-lung emperor (r. 1736–95) took advantage of Dzungar weakness to settle the situation once and for all, and a force of 25,000 Manchu and Mongol troops moved into Dzungaria practically unopposed. Having gained an easy victory, the Ch'ien-lung emperor planned to reconfigure the Oirats politically. He divided them into four units according to their original tribal affiliation, namely the Dörbet, Khoshut, Khoyd, and Choroo (as the Dzungars were renamed). These units were to be headed by Mongol-style khans with equal standing,

35 Bergholz, The partition of the steppe, p. 313.
and to replicate the organization that obtained in Outer Mongolia. Amursana, however, aspired to something grander than being confirmed chief of the Khoyd. He proclaimed himself the *hongtayiji* (the supreme Oirat title of old, formerly held by Batur Hongtayiji) of all Oirats in 1756. Amursana's bid for independence and revolt against the Ch'ing was followed by the so-called Chingünjav Rebellion (1756–7), an attempt by some Khalkha princes to rise against Ch'ing control. However, support for each rebellion melted quickly as the Khalkha khans and princes fell in line with the dictates of the Ch'ing authorities, and initial supporters defected. Chingünjav himself was captured and executed in 1757. Amursana fled to Russia, having been hounded down by the Ch'ing forces sent to pacify Dzungaria, and he died there of smallpox in the same year.

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The campaign led to the final incorporation of Dzungaria and Eastern Turkestan into the Ch’ing empire, which caused the destruction of the Dzungar khanate— that is, the Oirat tribal confederation headed by the Dzungar khans—and the disappearance of the Oirats as a protagonist of steppe politics, almost completely wiped out in the course of an extremely bloody campaign. The conquests in the northwest by Ch’ing forces followed to a certain degree principles already in place in the Mongolian dependencies, while at the same time being more complex and articulated across different ecological, economic, and ethnic regions. Sinkiang (the New Frontier) was divided into three regions under the general authority of the Ili military general, based at Ning-yüan in the northern region of Dzungaria, the Ili Valley, with deputy military commanders in major centers in the east and the south. The Ch’ing armies brought to Sinkiang included a number of Mongol and Manchu troops relocated from the east, such as Chakhar, Solon, Daghur, Sibe, regular bannermen, Green Standard (Han) soldiers from the nearby provinces of Ninghsia and Shensi, and local western Mongols. These military units were largely expected to be self-sustaining through the system of military farms.38

Civilian administration included different territorial divisions. In eastern Sinkiang, which included Urumchi, Turfan, and Hami, a relatively few areas were turned into prefectures and counties under the supervision of the Kansu provincial government. The Mongols in the region and even some Muslim towns were organized along the model of the jasagb-led banners. The overall regional authority rested with the commander (tu-t’ung) based in Urumchi. In southern Sinkiang, which included the oasis cities of the Tarim Basin known as Kashgharia or Altyshahr, several resident officials (ts’an-tsan ta-ch’en) with subordinate offices, and a military commander, represented Ch’ing authority, while the actual supervision of local civil administration was entrusted to local Muslim officials, known as beg. The entire Ch’ing administration of Sinkiang was placed under the jurisdiction of the Li-fan yüan, in some collaboration with the six ministries. The beg system in force in southern Sinkiang was in effect a fusion of the pre-existing Turco-Muslim administrative structure within the framework provided by the Li-fan yüan. These officials were appointed by imperial decree through a complex system of nomination and confirmation that was managed by the Li-fan yüan. They wore Ch’ing official robes and imperial insignia while retaining their Turkic and Muslim titles. The Li-fan yüan remained critical to Ch’ing rule in Sinkiang in many aspects of government, including carrying out land surveys and censuses for fiscal purposes, keeping

accurate accounts, selecting candidates to fill appointed political positions, and managing international relations with bordering states and independent nomadic groups, in particular Russia, Khoqand, and Kirghiz and Kazakh tribesmen. Matters of international trade, tribute relations, and all diplomatic correspondence were dealt with through Li-fan yüan representatives. The Ch’ing system of rule in Inner Asia granted considerable autonomy to local elites, especially in judicial matters, where Muslim law was applied by local judges (qādi).39

**THE LI-FAN YÜAN’S STRUCTURE AND FUNCTIONS**

The keystone of the administration of territories from Mongolia to Tibet was the Li-fan yüan. This critical office was established in the late 1630s in the context of the incorporation of Mongol leaders into the conquest elite as part of the social fabric and the military and administrative infrastructures of the new Manchu state. Early relations between Manchus and Mongols were based on the Inner Asian system of tribal alliances. These were sealed in two ways, by sworn oaths and by diplomatic marriages. While there are differences between the two, both entailed a series of mutual obligations. The policy of intermarriage between Manchu and Mongol aristocratic families over several decades created bonds that allowed the most trusted among the Mongol allies of the Manchu imperial house to integrate within the elite military and higher political echelons of the Ch’ing state. With the expansion of the Mongol population and territory brought under Ch’ing rule, and with the replacement of a relationship of diplomatic equality by one of political subordination, a new type of territorial control over the Mongol aristocracy and management of local governments was needed. The Li-fan yüan was the branch of the Ch’ing government intended to provide structural coherence to the administration of non-Han lands and organic connectivity between the court and the local elites co-opted within the system of rule of these regions.40

Created in 1636 as the Bureau of Mongol Affairs (Meng-ku ya-men), in 1638 the name of this office was changed to Li-fan yüan. In the early years after the conquest of Peking it began to define its role and prerogatives in governing the Mongols south of the Gobi Desert. Over time the Li-fan yüan was restructured, and several new positions were created. The most important posts were the

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minister (Ch. shang-shu, Man. alicha amban) of the highest rank, and two vice ministers (Ch. shib-lang, Man. ashan-i amban), of whom the left-side one was senior to the right-side one. In addition, there were altogether eight assistant directors (aisilakū hafan) in charge of the four departments, or bureaus, that comprised it. Finally, a supervisor (mujilen bahabukū) was appointed.41 The higher officers were all Manchus or Mongols, with Han employees in lower clerical positions, typically as scribes and secretaries.

From its inception through the initial phase of its existence in the Shun-chih reign (1644–61), the Li-fan yüan was headed by a minister and two vice ministers. Its administrative structure was formalized in 1661 into four main bureaus: the Bureau for Rewards for Meritorious Service (Lu-hsiün ssu), the Bureau for Reception of Guests (Pin-k’o ssu), the Bureau for Cherishing Those Who Come from Distant Places (Jou-yüan ssu), and the Bureau of Punishments (Li-hsing ssu).42 Through the K’ang-hsi and especially the Ch’ien-lung reigns, the Li-fan yüan underwent several reforms. After 1764 the number of bureaus was expanded to six, as new responsibilities were added in consequence of the conquests in the northwest (Sinkiang).43

The Bureau for Rewards for Meritorious Service was charged with the important task of handling special prizes and rewards, rank assignments, promotions, and appointments to local political and military posts. It was also in charge of supervising postal stations, frontier posts, and commercial traffic. It had, moreover, police functions, from the pursuit of fugitives to the investigation of criminal cases, such as mishandling and theft of government animals and other property allocated to the postal stations. During the K’ang-hsi period all the ranking aristocrats of the outer territories (wai-fan) began to be accurately registered, together with their family affiliation. This bureau also compiled short biographies, with details of their meritorious service, promotions, and other relevant personal information. In this way, it was possible to keep updated records and résumés of aristocrats who traveled periodically to the capital to visit the court, and appeared in audience before the emperor (ch’ao-chin), or who were proposed for appointments, promotions, and rewards.

The Bureau for Reception of Guests handled all the preparations and matters relative to the court audiences, the royal hunts, and the presentations of tribute by the Mongol jasaghs and later by other dignitaries from the outer territories

extension of ch'ing rule 137

(wai-fan), including Tibetans and Turkestanis. Every year it fixed the dates and itineraries of each delegation traveling to the capital according to a rotating schedule, and established the names and numbers of the participants, their rank order, and the sequence according to which they would be received. There were specific rules also for the tribute that each Mongol banner was allowed to present, and for the banquets prepared for the visiting delegations. Their tribute was verified and received by the personnel of the Li-fan yüan before being handed over to the Ministry of Rites. These regulations changed over time, but always remained an important tool in regulating the political balance between the Ch'ing court and the regional centers of power represented by Mongol aristocrats and, later on, by Muslim begs and Tibetan lamas in their respective territories.

The Bureau for Cherishing Those Who Come from Distant Places was in charge of monitoring the presence of Tibetan Buddhist lamas among the Mongols. Every aspect of their activity was subject to supervision, from their number in each Mongol banner down to their specific movements in and out of Mongolian territories, from their management of religious property down to the color of the robes and the rank insignia they were allowed to wear when they visited the court, and finally even down to the books kept in each monastery. If lamas were given overnight accommodation by Mongols while traveling, that had to be reported to the Li-fan yüan, and duly recorded, under penalty of legal sanctions. These regulations were the same across all the territories under the jurisdiction of the Li-fan yüan, and applied to all Mongols. The close attention paid to Lamaist activities throughout Mongol lands speaks of the great importance attached to the supervision of the relations between Mongol aristocracies and Tibetan hierarchies, and of the political control exerted by the Ch'ing emperors through the Li-fan yüan upon their relationships.

A central function of the Li-fan yüan in the Inner Asian territories was the exercise of legal powers, the spectrum of which covered military, criminal, and civil law. The personnel of the Bureau of Punishments of the Li-fan yüan intervened in the affairs of all Mongol banners as investigators, consultants to the local jasagh, supervisors of legal proceedings, and participants in the judicial process, usually in collaboration with the local authorities. Up until the nineteenth century, several codes and regulations were issued by the Ch'ing government for the administration of law in the territories, and they were periodically revised or updated. The Bureau of Punishments was in charge of keeping Mongols and other nationalities informed of any new regulations or modifications of the legal codes and statutes, and of transmitting copies

On the audience rituals (ch'ao-chin), see Chia, “The Lifanyuan and the Inner Asian rituals in the early Qing (1644–1795),” pp. 64–6.
of the code to the banners. In practice, the *Li-fan yüan* was involved in every legal case, a report of which was to be made and recorded. The roles of legal supervision and judicial powers were entrusted to the *Li-fan yüan* early on, and there are records of legal proceedings among Mongols handled by the *Li-fan yüan* dating from the Ch'ung-te period (1636–43), as in the example of three bannermen sent to investigate a criminal case among the Khorchin in 1638.\(^{45}\) Manchu envoys from the *Li-fan yüan* could investigate and indict Mongol *jasaghs*, and recommend their removal from office.\(^{46}\) They intervened directly in the administration of justice within the Mongol territories.

It is important to underscore the relevance of the legal codes and statutes issued by the Ch'ing dynasty for Mongolia and the other Inner Asian dependencies. Their development can be traced back to before the conquest of the Ming in 1644. The military regulations issued to Mongol troops during the military operations in Ming territory in the late 1620s and 1630s are the earliest instances of legal regimentation that the Manchus imposed on their Mongol allies and subjects.\(^{47}\) Legal and administrative procedures, in addition to requirements of tribute, visits to court, and regulations regarding appointments to political position (either by inheritance or by merit) formed the basis of the regime of tutelage that the Manchus gradually devised for their rule of Mongol tribes and later extended to other frontier regions, with differences dictated by local circumstances.

The literature on the legal aspects of Ch'ing rule in Mongol areas has stressed the statements by Manchu emperors of their intention that laws for the Inner Asian regions had to suit existing customary laws and local conditions.\(^{48}\) At the same time, this declaration of principle was countermanded by the Ch'ing promulgation of written codes to imbricate the administration of justice in a bureaucratic net that clearly delineated the powers of the central government over the local ones. If the *Li-fan yüan* was the bureaucratic structure through which the legal authority of the Ch'ing was preserved and reinforced, the legal codes (e.g., *Meng-ku lü-shu*, *Meng-ku lü-li*, *Li-fan yüan tse-li*), repeatedly revised, were a critical tool in the exercise of imperial power. It has been argued that over time the whole legal system of Mongolia was transformed by the introduction of Ch'ing laws, and contributed to the gradual assimilation of Mongolia into the Ch'ing imperial system.\(^{49}\)


In 1644, after Ch'ing armies had moved through the Shanhaikuan, the \textit{Li-fan yüan} began to collate the legal edicts issued to Mongols during Hung Taiji's period into a single code, called \textit{Meng-ku lü-shu} (Mongol statutes). This was the earliest version of what we know as the \textit{Meng-ku lü-li} (Mongol statutes and regulations) and the predecessor, therefore, of the \textit{Li-fan yüan tse-li} (Regulations of the Li-fan yüan) issued in 1811.\textsuperscript{50} Periodic editions of the \textit{Meng-ku lü-li} in the K'ang-hsi and Ch'ien-lung reigns reflect changes in the administration of Mongolia, which required new edicts and modifications to existing laws.

Mongol traditions regarding trials and punishments were not based on a judicial apparatus separate from the ruling aristocracy, but, under the new regime imposed by the Ch'ing government, the noblemen's legal powers were limited by the establishment of a multitiered process. Decisions on controversial or especially serious crimes were to be referred to higher administrative levels and subject to supervision and review by \textit{Li-fan yüan} officials. Minor offenses and civil disputes were handled by the local \textit{jasagh}; more difficult cases were reported to the league head, who, in consultation with other \textit{jasaghs}, issued a verdict. Then their sentence was transmitted to the regional Ch'ing administrative or military officers (\textit{amban}, \textit{tu-t'ung}, and so on) for review, and only then was the case reported to the \textit{Li-fan yüan}. In areas in which there were no ruling \textit{jasaghs} the competent authorities were by default the Ch'ing officials and bannermen stationed in that area. If a case involved a Mongol and a Han person, then it was to be handled jointly by the local Mongol and Ch'ing authorities. The laws prescribed harsh penalties for serious crimes such as theft, plunder, and murder. Members of the aristocracy, however, normally received only a monetary fine or a demotion. Cases in which a particularly harsh sentence was contemplated, such as exile but excluding the death penalty, had to be reported directly to the Bureau of Punishments in the \textit{Li-fan yüan}, which had the power to adjudicate and impose the penalty. In cases that involved the death penalty the verdict by the same bureau required consultation with the three judicial organs of the Ch'ing central administration, namely the Ministry of Justice, the Censorate, and the Court of Judicial Review (\textit{Ta-li ssu}), and in some special cases the final decision was only made by the emperor at the autumn assizes. Therefore the Ch'ing legal system and the role played by the Bureau of Punishments of the \textit{Li-fan yüan}, with its broad range of competence, overrode in the most important cases the authority of local native rulers.

One key principle of the borderlands' legal systems was that the applicable laws had to conform to the code of the place where the crime was committed. Therefore a Mongol committing a crime in Mongol lands was to be judged

\textsuperscript{50} Dalizhabu, "\textit{Meng-ku lü-li} chi ch'i yü \textit{Li-fan yüan tse-li} ti kuan-hsi," \textit{Ch'ing shih yen-chiu} No. 4 (2003), pp. 1–10.
according to the Mongol statutes, but if a Mongol committed the crime in one of the inner provinces (nei-ti), then the Ch’ing code would apply. A precedent for this principle can be found in the pre-Ch’ing period, when regulations issued as early as 1631 stipulated that a Manchu who committed a crime in Mongol territory (Khorchin or Abagha) had to be judged according to Mongol laws; conversely, a Mongol in Manchu territory was subject to Manchu laws. Only in those cases for which there were neither clear regulations in the Li-fan yüan statute books nor customary laws to rely upon could one resort to the “metropolitan” Ch’ing code.

Special legislation applied to the Khalkha tribes of Outer Mongolia after their submission to Ch’ing authority. A legal code, known as Khalkha jirum, was issued in 1709 and remained in effect, albeit with some overlap with the Meng-ku lü-li, until 1790. This has led some to the impression that the Khalkha princes enjoyed a greater degree of independence. Recently found Mongol documents, however, show that these statutes applied essentially only to the appanages subject to Tüsiyétu Khan and to the Jebsundamda Khutukhtu. In fact, from 1694 to 1709 the statutes of the Meng-ku lü-li were transmitted to Outer Mongolia and used through the various ayimaghs.

The Khalkha jirum issued in 1709 contained eighteen sections on administrative and legal matters, including management of temples and postal stations, military matters, marriage and inheritance laws, commercial regulations, hunting rights, handling of fugitives, and penalties for criminals. The relationship between the Khalkha aristocracy of Outer Mongolia and the Ch’ing court continued to be regulated by the Li-fan yüan according to the rules of the Meng-ku lü-li, and Ch’ing military posts were established in northern Mongolia. Communications between ayimaghs were likewise subject to government supervision, and the legal proceedings within each territory were monitored by the Li-fan yüan. If the Khalkha jirum can be interpreted as a sign of greater autonomy conceded to a portion of Khalkha aristocracy, its existence does not imply that the Ch’ing political presence in the region was necessarily weaker.

Another area in which the Li-fan yüan had an important role was the management of marriage relations between the Ch’ing imperial household and the Mongol aristocracy. Already in Nurhaci’s time alliances with Mongol tribes were initiated or sealed by marriage agreements. The strategic goal to

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expand the Manchu political role among the Mongol aristocracy by seeking
marriage alliances was pursued even more extensively by Hung Taiji, who was
himself related by marriage to the Khorchin. After the establishment of the
Li-fan yüan, its officials handled the marriages between Mongol and Manchu
noble families. When a potential Mongol efu (imperial son-in-law) was sought
for marriage to a Manchu princess, the Li-fan yüan sent letters asking for the
names of suitable candidates to the jasaghs of the Khorchin and the other
thirteen Inner Mongol banners with which the Aisin Gioro imperial family
entertained marriage relations. When these were received, their birth dates
and backgrounds were checked for up to three generations. Then the Li-fan
yüan selected a few candidates and submitted the short list to the Imperial
Household Department for additional screening. The final decision had to be
approved by the emperor.

The Li-fan yüan was also in charge of relief to the local people in case
of natural disasters. The Ch'ing government imposed light taxes and few
corvées upon the Mongols, but in areas hit by natural disasters it required
that the jasaghs, wealthy families, and monasteries provide aid to the local
population. In case this was not sufficient the entire league had to contribute
resources to help the affected population. The names of the families receiving
aid were to be registered and reported to the Li-fan yüan. In particularly
dire circumstances the league chief and jasaghs asked the Li-fan yüan to send
inspectors to assess the gravity of the emergency and provide assistance as
needed. While statistics are incomplete, it has been calculated that the Li-
fan yüan took direct responsibility for relief operations forty times during
the K'ang-hsi reign, and eighteen and fourteen times respectively for the
Yung-cheng and Ch'ien-lung periods.\(^5\)

The Li-fan yüan was also directly involved in organizing the collective
gatherings of the six Inner Mongol leagues, held typically every three years, and
making sure that protocol rules were observed. These were solemn occasions
meant to affirm political allegiance, in the course of which the most serious
criminal cases were also reviewed. After 1751 the presence of Ch'ing central
government officials at these meetings was discontinued, but the jasaghs had
to report to the Li-fan yüan whenever special issues arose, in which case the
Ch'ing government would dispatch its representatives.

The Li-fan yüan personnel also took charge of the logistics networks estab-
lished by the Ch'ing in Mongolia. A network of postal stations and military
routes reminiscent of the Mongol imperial post system (yam) in the Yüan
period allowed government agents, military personnel, and anyone else with
official license to use these facilities. Prior to 1692 horses and victuals needed

5 Chao Yün-t'ien, “Ch'ing ch'ao chih-li Meng Tsang ti-ch'i ti chi ko wen-t'i,” Chung-kuo she-hui k'o-hsüeh
by government officials traveling to and within the border regions, both civil and military, were in effect requisitioned or borrowed from local Mongols, which caused considerable hardship to the population. The K'ang-hsi emperor changed the system by assigning to the *Li-fan yüan* the responsibility to establish government-operated postal stations along several routes. Altogether fifty-one stations were set up in Inner Mongolia to connect the various banners, and over 120 in northern Mongolia on routes to the most remote regions, including Altai, Uliasutai, Kobdo, and Khiakhta. Military posts (Man. *karun*) were also established at various locations between those outer territories (*wai-fan*) and the inner domains, as well as along the frontiers of the Ch'ing empire, to check the credentials and identities of travelers. Typically a postal station had to take care of twenty horses, in addition to camels, sheep, and food. For every two adjacent stations the personnel included one Mongol officer with ten soldiers, two corporals, and one secretary. They all were under the *Li-fan yüan*. Among their tasks were the reception and distribution of dispatches from the court and imperial edicts through the areas under their jurisdiction. The relay station network was also used to send military supplies, salaries, and agricultural tools, and to provide logistic support wherever needed, such as to escort criminals or couriers. Only people with permits issued by the *Li-fan yüan* were allowed to use these facilities, and horses, lodging, and food were allocated to them according to specific regulations. Moreover, these stations functioned in peacetime as periodic marketplaces for those living in the area.

In conclusion, with its Manchu and Mongol officials, the *Li-fan yüan* was intended to be, even before the conquest of Ming territory, the physical expression of the Ch'ing imperial government among the Mongols and the other Inner Asian dependencies. They were charged with sensitive tasks related to keeping peace and order after the pacification of politically unstable frontier regions.

The most salient aspect of the remaking of Inner Asia by the Ch'ing government is to be recognized in the forms of political tutelage that the empire established over indigenous communities. Political tutelage chiefly took two forms. The first consisted of establishing norms that defined the relationship between the local aristocratic elites and the center of the empire, namely the emperor, the imperial clan, and the court. The second consisted of the creation of a bureaucracy that allowed the central government to regulate through administrative and legal means the social and political life in the outer territories. The former policy grew out of the incorporation of Mongol aristocrats into the Ch'ing ruling structures through alliances, marriages, co-optations, voluntary submissions, military conquests, and other means according to particular context. These circumstances determined the political
conditions under which the allegiance and participation of Mongols in the Ch'ing imperial project were maintained. The latter policy, for which the *Li-fan yüan* was the lynchpin, is embodied in the development of the outer regions’ government structures. The political, ritual, judicial, logistic, and administrative tasks entrusted to *Li-fan yüan* bureaucracy, and the normative codification of statutes and laws that underpinned its activities, testify to the comprehensive and yet not burdensome, relatively fluid control the Ch'ing government retained over Mongolia. These regulations provided a key element of the supporting structure for the extension of Ch'ing rule into Inner Asia.

One of the critical questions confronting the Ch'ing leadership, even before the conquest of the Ming dynasty, was how to attract the many internally divided and politically unstable Mongol groups. Peaceful co-optations and legal control of the local elites, joined with selective military intervention, continued to inform the frontier strategy after the conquest. During the Ch'ing period to 1800, the dynasty honed but also expanded the tools developed in the 1630s to produce an expert and efficient bureaucratic apparatus able to consolidate the gains made on the battlefield. The Ch'ing conquest and control of Mongolia, Tibet, and Sinkiang occurred over periods in which these regions and their societies were undergoing intense transformations. The emergence of strong ties between the Mongol aristocracies and the Tibetan Buddhist religious elites, the erosion of the political values inherent in the notion of Chinggisid legitimacy, and an international scene profoundly modified by the rise of the Dzungars and the Russian expansion, were some of the critical intervening changes that contributed to the extension of Ch'ing rule in Inner Asia.
Map 8. The Ch’ing empire and its neighbors in 1759
Map 8. (cont.)
CHAPTER 4

TRIBUTARY RELATIONS BETWEEN THE CHOSŎN AND CH'ING COURTS TO 1800

Lim Jongtae

On February 24, 1637, after being besieged for forty-six days at the Namhan san fortress on the southeastern outskirts of Seoul, King Injo (1595–1649, r. 1623–49) and his court gave up their hopeless resistance against the Manchu troops led by the recently elevated emperor of the Great Ch'ing, Hung Taiji. In the ritual of surrender held that day on the southern bank of the Han River, the Chosŏn king performed “nine kowtows” to the Ch'ing ruler, an expression of his complete submission to the new regime. The Chosŏn dynasty (1392–1910) had to sever its ties as a tributary state to the Ming dynasty in order to serve the newly named Manchus, Jurchens whom Koreans had for centuries looked down upon as barbarian, “wild people” (K. yain, Ch. yeh-jen). This event marked the beginning of tributary relations between the two courts that lasted for two and a half centuries. Chosŏn played the role of faithful tributary until 1895, when Japan’s victory in the Sino-Japanese War put Korea into a new international order dominated by Western and Japanese imperial powers, not the Ch'ing empire.

The Ch'ing and Chosŏn dynasties managed their relations in accordance with the protocols of the tribute system that conditioned the broader interactions between the two states, particularly economic and cultural exchanges. The tribute system did not constitute a set of fixed rules. Rather, it was a framework in which negotiations over conflicts and even occasional violations allowed various parties to pursue their own political, economic, and cultural goals. In a period when restrictions limited the travel of people and things across the boundary between the two states, the tributary relation of the two courts provided government officials, intellectuals, merchants, and ordinary people with the only legitimate opportunities to be involved in the exchange of goods and ideas.

THE UNEASY TRIBUTARY SITUATION IN LATE MING

The tributary relation between the Ch'ing and Chosŏn, forcibly established in 1637, reversed the hierarchical order that Chosŏn had maintained over the
preceding two centuries with the Ming dynasty and with Jurchen leaders. At
the beginning of the seventeenth century, under the leadership of Nurhaci,
Chien-chou Jurchens, as they were called by the Ming and Chosŏn govern-
ments, unified the various Jurchen tribes, built a military organization that
put Chosŏn under its control, and, after 1644, became the rulers of what had
been the Ming empire. Many important features of the subsequent relation-
ship between Ch’ing and Chosŏn were consequences of this change in the
previous relations between the three states.

From the late fourteenth century, the newly founded Ming and Chosŏn
dynasties, after a decade of mutual suspicion, developed an enduring rela-
tionship based upon tributary protocols. Building their state and society on
Confucian principles and institutions, the Chosŏn court established a strong
connection with the Ming.¹ Chosŏn persuaded the less enthusiastic Ming gov-
ernment that it would send regular tributary embassies three times a year: on
New Year’s Day (K. chŏngjo, Ch. cheng-ch’ŏn), on the birthday of the emperor
(K. sŏngjŏl, Ch. sheng-chieh), and the birthday of the heir apparent (K. ch’ŏnch’ŭ,
Ch. ch’ien-ch’iu). Ming rulers reciprocated by sending embassies to Chosŏn 118
times. The frequency and continuity of exchanging embassies was exceptional
among the Ming dynasty’s tributary relations with about eighty other foreign
entities.²

In the sixteenth century, Chosŏn leaders began to view their relationship
with the Ming from a moral perspective. The hierarchical relation of the Ming
and Korea was presented as a desirable one between the “Middle Kingdom”
(K. Chungguk, Ch. Chung-kuo) and its tributary. This change partly reflected
the general transformation of Korean society spurred by the spread of Con-
fucian teachings in both academic circles and court politics. The new literati
elites, who were increasingly dominant in court politics from early in the
sixteenth century, considered the exceptionally favorable relationship that
Chosŏn had established with the Ming as a sign of their successful entry
into the realm of Confucian civilization through participating in the noble
culture of the Ming. They even described the relations of the two coun-
tries as one between parent and filial son, a more intimate relation than that

¹ Early Ming rulers, particularly the Chien-wen and Yung-lo emperors, had their own reasons to stabilize
the relation with the Chosŏn state. See Donald N. Clark, “Sino-Korean tributary relations under the
Ming,” in The Cambridge history of China, Volume 8: The Ming dynasty, 1368–1644, part 2, ed. Denis C.
² A comprehensive list of the embassies exchanged sent to the Ming from Chosŏn is given in Pak
exceptional nature of Sino-Korean relations during the Ming period is discussed in Kye Sŏng-bŏm,
“Chosŏn sidae tong Asia chilsŏ-wa han-chung kwangye: chaengjŏm pyŏl punsŏk-kwa ihae,” in Han-
Chung-II hakkye-ŭi han-chung kwangyesa yŏn’gu-ŭe chaengjŏm, ed. Tongbuga yŏksa chaedan (Seoul, 2009),
pp. 144–6.
between a ruler and his subject, as was the normal rhetoric in the tribute system.³

The idealization of the Ming by Korean ruling elites was enhanced in the early decades of the seventeenth century after the war against Japan from 1592 to 1598. When Japanese troops sent by Toyotomi Hideyoshi (1536–98) occupied most of the Korean peninsula and threatened even the Ming dynasty’s security, the Wan-li emperor’s government dispatched troops to fight the Japanese invaders. The allied forces of the Ming and Korea drove the Japanese invaders from the peninsula by 1598. Although there were different opinions among Koreans about how essential a role Ming troops had played, the court and elite literati generally understood that Ming military aid was an expression of the Ming emperor’s benevolence toward his endangered tributary state. King Sonjo (r. 1567–1608), who had suffered a crisis in his legitimacy because of his mostly failed response to the Japanese invasion, had an urgent need to emphasize the Ming role; his negotiation for Ming assistance was the king’s only achievement worthy of attention. The king and his court praised the Ming emperor’s aid as a “special favor that enabled us to rebuild the country” (K. chaejo chi ḩun), an expression that acquired wider currency in Korean literati society for the rest of the Chosön period.⁴

The relationship between Chosön and Ming changed in 1637. Going back to the fifteenth century, Jurchens had been a major source of instability for relations between the Ming and Chosön. The collapse of the Yuan dynasty (1271–1368) in the fourteenth century had created a political vacuum in the border area. Both the new Ming and Chosön regimes had difficulties in imposing administrative control over it. Although the Chosön dynasty had expressed its willingness to acknowledge the Ming as its suzerain state, Chosön kings did not want to abandon their leverage over the Jurchens. To consolidate their rule over the northern border area along the Yalu and the Tumen rivers, Chosön kings strove to control the Jurchens, especially the Chien-chou Jurchens, the range of whose activities included this frontier. Some of the ruling elite of Chosön entertained the old ambition of extending Korea’s northern frontier into the Liao-tung region. To try to control the Jurchens, the Chosön court, on its own, made efforts to invite Jurchens into a peaceful tributary relation by granting official titles to Jurchen chiefs along with privileges for trading in Seoul or at border markets. The Chosön government’s tributary relations with the Jurchens violated the norm of the Ming tribute


system that a tributary ruler was not entitled to manage his own diplomatic relations with other countries.

The Ming government had its own reasons for concern about Chosŏn’s connection with the Jurchens, particularly at the turn of the fifteenth century, when relations between Ming and Chosŏn were not yet stabilized. In the first half of the fifteenth century, the Ming government appointed Jurchen chiefs to be commanders of the newly established Chien-chou Guard (Chien-chou wei) and the Chien-chou Left Guard (Chien-chou tso wei) to include them as Ming tributaries. Chosŏn made efforts to persuade them not to put themselves under the Ming. Although Chosŏn’s attempts failed, the Koreans annoyed the Ming government to the extent that during the T’ien-shun reign (1457–64) it warned Chosŏn King Sejo (1417–68, r. 1455–68) not to establish formal relations with the Jurchens or award them official titles and material benefits. Upon the Ming government’s demand, Chosŏn ended its formal relations with the Chien-chou Jurchens. The Jurchens, whenever dissatisfied with their relations with the Ming or Chosŏn states, were ready to plunder the border area. The two governments often had to rely on military measures. In 1467, for example, Ming and Chosŏn undertook a large-scale joint military campaign against the Chien-chou Jurchens. Through the sixteenth century, the Chien-chou Jurchens and the Chosŏn court were both sending tribute to Peking. This was the status quo at the turn of the seventeenth century.

MANCHU LEADERS FORCE CHANGES IN THE TRIBUTARY RELATION

Another consequence of Hideyoshi’s invasion in 1592 was that it gave Nurhaci, then the new leader of the Chien-chou Jurchens, an opportunity to expand and consolidate his new Jurchen state. At the start of the invasion, Nurhaci suggested to the Chosŏn court that he could send troops to fight the Japanese. He also asked the Chosŏn court to grant to him an official position, which would restore the long-abandoned tributary relation between the Chien-chou Jurchens and Korea, but the Chosŏn court did not accept Nurhaci’s offer, worrying that it would make diplomatic trouble with the Ming, as it had in the mid-fifteenth century. While Ming and Chosŏn leaders concentrated their attention and resources on the war against the Japanese, Nurhaci expanded

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6 On the relations between the Ming, Chosŏn, and the Jurchens, see Clark, “Sino-Korean tributary relations under the Ming”; Kim Han-gyu, Han-Chung kwanch’yesa (Seoul, 1999), Volume 2, pp. 590–608; Pak Won-ho, Myŏng ch’o Chosŏn kwanch’yesa yŏnggu (Seoul, 2002).
7 Kim, Han-Chung kwanch’yesa, Volume 2, pp. 622–3.
his political and military hegemony over the other Jurchen tribes, and by the mid-1610s he had gained supremacy over them. At first Korea’s relations with Nurhaci were not especially hostile, but as the Ming abandoned its appeasement policy and began to resist the growing power of the Chien-chou Jurchens, Chosŏn was in a precarious position between the two forces.

Korea’s position between the Ming and the Jurchens worsened particularly after Nurhaci in 1616 announced that he was the khan of a new dynasty called by the old name, Chin (called Later Chin by historians). Two years later, Nurhaci declared war on the Ming by proclaiming seven causes for his grievance against the Ming government. Nurhaci’s new state renounced its status as a tributary of the Ming emperor. For both the Ming government and Nurhaci, the Chosŏn state was a potential ally, or at least to remain neutral in the impending war. The Ming urged King Kwanghae (1575–1641, r. 1608–23) to dispatch troops in their war against Nurhaci, reminding him of the favor given two decades earlier when Korea was under Japanese threat. Knowing very well Korea’s position as the Ming dynasty’s loyal tributary, Nurhaci emphasized to the Chosŏn court that he had no special grudge against Korea. He even informed the Chosŏn court in advance of his plan to attack Ming troops stationed at Fu-shun in 1618.

The Korean court’s policy was a practical one, reminiscent of its dual approach toward the Ming and the Jurchens in the early fifteenth century. King Kwanghae did not want to be involved in another war only two decades after the Japanese invasion, and therefore he attempted to keep his distance from the two antagonistic forces. While preparing for future military conflicts with the Later Chin, the king also refused to commit the fate of his dynasty to the Ming cause. After the fall of Fu-shun, the Ming government asked the Chosŏn court to take part in the impending large-scale campaign against the Jurchens. Although the king made every effort to avoid this request, eventually he had to dispatch 10,000 to support the Ming military operation attacking the Later Chin capital at Hetu Ala. King Kwanghae secretly ordered the Korean commander Kang Hong-nip (1560–1627) not to fight the Jurchens wholeheartedly. In the historic battle at Sarhu in 1619, Kang surrendered to Nurhaci after finding that a Ming defeat was inevitable. Later Nurhaci sent a series of messages to the Chosŏn court to express his understanding of Korea’s unwilling participation in the war. He further requested an alliance against the Ming, which the Korean court did not accept because of its formal tributary relationship with the Ming and the strong anti-Jurchen sentiment among the Chosŏn literati officials.

9 Kang Man-gil et al., comps., Ch’ungse sabwe-ui palchŏn 2 (Seoul, 1994), Volume 8, pp. 212–16.
The policy of the Korean court underwent a dramatic change after the collapse of King Kwanghae’s rule in 1623. The literati officials who plotted a coup against King Kwanghae justified the usurpation as an act of “restoring righteousness” (K. panjŏng). They listed a number of immoral actions of the king, including the injustice of his abandoning loyalty to the Ming dynasty. King Kwanghae’s policy of remaining neutral between Ming and Later Chin was not popular among the literati officials, who mostly supported a pro-Ming stance. The new government of King Injo from 1623 inclined more to a pro-Ming policy as part of his effort to acquire approval from the Ming court for his apparent usurpation. Another destabilizing factor was the presence of the Ming forces led by Mao Wen-lung (1576–1629), who, after defeat in Liao-tung by the Later Chin forces established himself at Kado (or P’i-tao as it was renamed by Mao), an island off the northwestern coast of the Korean peninsula. Mao’s presence made Pyŏng’an province a virtual military base of the Ming. Together with the troops of Yüan Ch’ung-huan (1584–1630) in Liao-hsi, Mao’s force was a major military threat to the Later Chin. Mao’s presence and frequent military clashes with the Jurchens caused tensions between Korea and the Later Chin regime. King Injo’s court had difficulty controlling Mao, particularly because Mao had played a role in persuading the Ming court, which had suspicions about King Injo’s legitimacy, to give a patent of investiture to the new Korean king.10

The Later Chin’s first invasion of Korea in 1627 was intended ostensibly to eliminate Mao’s forces at Kado. Hung Taiji, who succeeded to the throne after Nurhaci’s death, dispatched to Korea troops led by his cousin Amin. The elimination of Mao, let alone the complete subjugation of Korea, was beyond their capacity, considering the threat from the west by Yüan Ch’ung-huan, who the previous year had inflicted a devastating defeat on Nurhaci. The invasion therefore was concluded by a treaty between the Chin and Chosŏn in which the two dynasties established a brotherly relationship. In spite of strong opposition from anti-Jurchen officials, the Chosŏn court had to accept being in the lower position of treating Chin as an elder brother. To confirm the treaty, the delegates of the two courts drank horse blood together, a ritual of Inner Asian origin. This marked the beginning of Korea’s incorporation into a new order outside the Ming tributary system.11 Another outcome of Hung Taiji’s invasion was that the Chin regime imposed on Korea an obligation to make significant annual payments (K. sep’ye, Ch. sui-pi). It also forced Korea to open border markets for Jurchens to trade with Koreans.12 During these years, Korea was a source of critically needed supplies for the Jurchens,

10 Han Myŏng-gi, Chŏngmyo · Pyŏngja boran-kuwa tong Asia (Seoul, 2009), pp. 46–53.
11 Han, Chŏngmyo · Pyŏngja boran-kuwa tong Asia, pp. 53–6. On the ritual at the peace treaty, see pp. 90–2.
12 Han, Chŏngmyo · Pyŏngja boran-kuwa tong Asia, pp. 76–81.
who were suffering a severe famine and were cut off from trading with the Ming.

After concluding the formal treaty with the Chin in 1627, Korea had to manage its relations with two countries at war, each of which demanded Korea take their side and sever its ties with the other. This ambiguous situation did not last long. In 1630 Yüan Ch'ung-huan, who had executed Mao Wen-lung in Kado the previous year, was himself put to death by the Ming court. The power balance between the Ming and the Chin began to tip. The time had come for the Chosôn court to make a decision on which side it would stand, and the Korean answer was with the Ming.

In 1635 Hung Taiji successfully incorporated the Chakhar (Chahar, Chah-erh) of Inner Mongolia under his control. The next year Hung Taiji proclaimed the new Great Ch'ing regime. His elevation to the new title of emperor included the formality of accepting petitions for his enthronement from Manchu nobles, Mongol princes, and surrendered Han officials. What was missing in the list was a delegation from the Chosôn king, which Hung Taiji thought should have been sent in accordance with the brotherly relationship between the Chin and Chosôn. Earlier that year Hung Taiji had sent to Korea an embassy consisting of both Manchus and Mongols to request that the Chosôn king take part. Hung Taiji seemed to think that Korea’s participation would be necessary for the dignity of his new state.13 Hung Taiji’s invitation to submit to his new dynasty was not acceptable to the Chosôn court. Although Korea had for several years maintained formal relations with the Chin, this relationship did not preclude Korea’s tributary relationship with the Ming emperor. Korea’s participation in the Manchu imperial order, however, would require that it sever its ties with the Ming. Although a few officials at the Chosôn court, notably Ch’oe Myŏng-gil (1586–1647), suggested a prudent approach to this issue, the majority of the literati officials took an uncompromising stance on the invitation. Moral indignation toward the “barbarian” Jurchens and firm resolution to be loyal to the Ming dynasty prevailed among the court officials and the literati elite. Feeling threatened, the Ch'ing envoys secretly escaped from Seoul. That winter Hung Taiji organized a large-scale military expedition to Korea.

In spite of the high moral stance taken at the Chosôn court, Korea resisted the Ch'ing invasion only for forty days or so. Having failed to notice the invasion in its early stages, King Injo and his court hurriedly took shelter in the Namhan san fortress, where soldiers and provisions had not been prepared to withstand a long siege. The period of the siege involved negotiations rather than battles between Hung Taiji and King Injo. Hung Taiji required the king to come out of the fortress and to surrender in front of him. Injo suggested

13 Han, Chŏngmyo · Pyŏngja boran-kwa tong Asia, pp. 140–53.
they make a peace treaty after the withdrawal of the Ch'ing troops. Opinions at the Korean court were divided. Although hardliners against the Ch'ing at first dominated, the voices of a realist approach gradually prevailed, for there would be no help from outside to rescue the isolated court. News about the fall of Kanghwa, an island where the princes and other members of the royal family had taken refuge, reached the fortress. King Injo finally accepted the Ch'ing demand to surrender, and to hand over several anti-Ch'ing hardliners to the Ch'ing forces. In the ritual of surrender, Hung Taiji first made his own kowtow to Heaven, and then received the Korean king's kowtow, a ritual that would establish a clear hierarchy between the new emperor and his tributary king. To Hung Taiji, the submission of the Korean king marked an important stage in building the Great Ch'ing domain, a step that had been postponed for a year by Korea's initial refusal to participate.14

Hung Taiji's successful campaign against Korea in early 1637 ended the ambiguity that had for several years characterized the relations between the Chosôn, Ming, and Ch'ing courts. Korea had become a tributary of the new Ch'ing dynasty. Hung Taiji's edict promulgated on the occasion of Korea's surrender specified that Chosôn sever its ties with the Ming and instead serve the Ch'ing as its suzerain state in the same manner as it had done the Ming. Included in the list of duties imposed upon Korea was to dispatch troops for the Ch'ing war against the Ming. Several months later, Ch'ing and Korean troops captured the Ming military base at Kado island. Thus began the formal co-operation in the tributary relationship between the Ch'ing and Chosôn dynasties.

CHOSÔN AS THE MODEL TRIBUTARY STATE OF THE CH'ING?

For most of the Ch'ing period, the Ch'ing and Chosôn courts followed closely the formalities of the tributary relation. Mainly for this reason, the historian Chun Hae-jong claims that Korea was China's “model tributary.” He argues, “during the Ch'ing era official Sino-Korean relations ... provided an example of the relation expected or desired between China and other peripheral states.” Contributed to a volume devoted to foreign relations in the Ch'ing period, Chun's article provided the model case upon which John K. Fairbank elaborated in general terms the idea of a premodern, non-Western hierarchy of countries that he termed the “Chinese world order.”15

14 Han, Chôngmyo · Pyôngja boran-kuwa tong Asia, pp. 163–5.
In this scheme, the Ch’ing state and its peripheral states were supposed to have been engaged in relations regulated by the so-called tribute system. This was an international extension of a putative ideal social order established between a monarch and his feudal lords in the ancient Chou dynasty (1045–256 BCE). It presupposed the superiority of the ruler who was the Son of Heaven in both a moral and a political sense. The Son of Heaven, mandated by Heaven to rule all under heaven, granted to his tributary rulers the patents of investiture, allowing them to rule their own territories without imperial intervention. This political hierarchy between the emperor and the tributary rulers was maintained in principle not by violent measures but by a highly articulated set of rituals that were to be performed, usually at the imperial court, at ritually important moments. In these rituals, a series of gift exchanges were to be carried out. In return for the tribute offered by tributary rulers, generally their local products (fang-wu), the emperor would bestow his own gifts on the tributary rulers and their delegates. One of the emperor’s gifts that symbolized his superior position was the calendar prepared by his Bureau of Astronomy (Ch’in-t’ien chien in the Ming and Ch’ing periods), the reception of which signified the tributary ruler’s submission to the emperor’s prerogative to regulate his people’s lives according to the cyclic movements of celestial bodies.  

Multiple lines of criticism have been raised against Fairbank’s concept of the “Chinese world order.” It has a Sino-centric bias, the critics argue, for it privileges the views of Chinese ruling elites, found mostly in their documents written in classical Chinese; it is simply an ideal, and therefore fails to account for the realities of China’s relations with different neighboring countries in different periods. In the years since Fairbank advanced the concept, the image of the Ch’ing dynasty as one more “Chinese” dynasty has also undergone a dramatic transformation. The Ch’ing has come to be viewed more as a unique empire that successfully preserved its own Manchu identity than as another Chinese dynasty of barbarian origin.  

In spite of the significant changes in scholarly views of the Ch’ing dynasty and its foreign relations, few scholars have modified the previous image of

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Chošon Korea as its model tributary. The relations of the two countries obviously fit well with the protocol of the existing tribute system. Novel features of Ch'ing foreign relations have been found mostly in its dealings with the countries at its northwestern frontier, such as Russia, rather than with its southeastern neighbors, such as Annan. In establishing limited diplomatic relations with Russia, the Ch'ing government relied on various measures that deviated from the norms of the tribute system. In the border negotiations with Russia, Ch'ing officials managed the procedures as if they were between two states of equal sovereignty. The Ch'ing government was flexible in managing its foreign relations.18

The multiple strategies the Ch'ing government deployed toward its different neighbors within and outside the tribute system force the question whether Chošon Korea was a “model” tributary. Ch'ing emperors used the rhetoric of being the Son of Heaven, which put them at the top of the hierarchy of countries, to the people of the defeated Ming dynasty and to some of the former tributaries of the Ming, but not in all their relations. Ryukyu and Annan, countries that had sent tribute to the Ming, have been shown to have been model tributaries only in a fictive sense.19 It might therefore be asked whether Ch'ing–Chošon relations, both in the formalities and in the concrete instances of mutually favorable engagement, constituted the only valid example of the model of the tributary relationship. If so, that would mean that the relations practiced by the Ch'ing and Chošon courts were highly exceptional in the entire range of Ch'ing foreign relations. The tributary relations that the Ming dynasty had maintained with Korea through the early seventeenth century, then, would be regarded as similarly exceptional because the Ch'ing established and then maintained its formal relation with Chošon in almost the same manner as the Ming had done.20 But was the relation of the Ch'ing and Chošon courts simply a continuation of the Ming–Chošon relation?21

The main features of the Ch'ing–Chošon tributary relations were shaped under the specific circumstances of 1637, when the Ch'ing leaders acted on

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18 The division of the Ch'ing imperial world order into the northwestern and the southeastern parts was first suggested in Mancall, “The Ch'ing tribute system.” On Ch'ing flexibility in its foreign relations, particularly toward its northwestern frontier, see Susan Naquin and Evelyn S. Rawski, *Chinese society in the eighteenth century* (New Haven, 1987), pp. 27–51.


21 Chun Hae-jong argues that the Ch'ing–Chošon tributary relation was an “elaboration” of that of the Ming and Chošon. See Chun, “Sino-Korean tributary relations in the Ch'ing period,” p. 90.
their decisions about how to manage their future relations with Korea. Hung Taiji’s military expedition to Chosŏn that year was intended to complete the process of constructing the new Ch’ing imperial state that would first consist of the territories of the Jurchens, the Chakhar Mongols, and the Chosŏn king. To this end, the Ch’ing had to force the Chosŏn court, which had maintained its loyalty to the Ming, to submit to the Ch’ing as its new suzerain state.

Korea’s transfer of its tributary status in 1637 from the Ming to the new Ch’ing imperial order lent several distinctive and mutually conflicting features to future relations between the Ch’ing and Chosŏn dynasties. The Ch’ing adopted Ming precedents in managing its relations with Chosŏn, but this does not mean that the Ch’ing–Chosŏn relationship was simply a continuation of the Ming–Chosŏn relationship. Reflecting Korea’s new status as one of the Ch’ing government’s two major subordinated allies, along with the Chakhar Mongols, in its ongoing war against the Ming empire, the Ch’ing positioned Korea as part of the new Manchu-led order. That order conceptually was separated from the greater region consisting of the Ming empire and its tributaries, such as Ryukyu and Annan. Although accepting Ch’ing suzerainty in 1637 and transferring formal tributary obligations to the Ch’ing, the court and the ruling elites of Korea covertly maintained their previous loyalty to the Ming. Koreans considered the Ming dynasty to have been the legitimate successor of the culture of the Middle Kingdom in a world threatened after 1637 by barbarian Manchus. These features, which were in contradiction to one another, show how problematic, let alone exceptional, the tributary relationship was between the Ch’ing and Chosŏn courts.

TRIBUTARY RELATIONS IN PRACTICE

For the Ch’ing leaders, engaged in war against the Ming empire and thus having few resources with which to try to impose direct rule over Korea, an easy choice was to adopt the tributary protocols for managing relations with one of the most faithful Ming tributaries. In establishing this apparent continuity between the Ming and the Ch’ing in their relationship with Korea during the chaotic middle decades of the seventeenth century, former Ming officials who had surrendered to the Ch’ing seem to have played an important role. Having extensive knowledge of Ming institutions, including tributary rituals, they advised the Manchu rulers about how to establish a hierarchical relation with the Chosŏn court.22

22 Han, Chŏngmyo · Pyŏngja koran-ku ka tong Asia, pp. 447–501, makes valuable suggestions concerning the roles played by the Han officials who had surrendered to the Ch’ing in the foundation of Ch’ing policy toward Chosŏn.
The two courts thereafter maintained their relationship by frequent exchanges of embassies. During the 258 years from 1637 through 1894, Chosŏn sent embassies to the Ch'ing court a total 507 times (an average of two a year), while the Ch'ing from 1636 through 1880 dispatched imperial emissaries 169 times (an average of fewer than one a year). The higher frequency of Korean embassies mainly reflected the unequal distribution of obligations between the two courts. Korea was “serving the greater,” and Korea’s service was to be recognized by the Ch'ing emperor’s corresponding duty of “caring for the smaller.”

In principle, Korea had to send four tributary embassies to the Ch'ing each year: for celebrating the three major junctures of ritual importance (K. samjŏl, Ch. san-chieh): New Year’s Day, the emperor's birthday, and the winter solstice (K. tongji, Ch. tung-chib), and for the presentation of annual tribute (K. yŏngong, Ch. nien-kung). Embassies of the first three types were a continuation, albeit with minor modifications, of the practices of the Ming period. On these occasions, there were ritual exchanges of documents and gifts. The fourth embassy, presenting annual tribute, was new in the Ch'ing period. It was first implemented under the rubric of annual payments (K. sep'ye, Ch. sui-pi), as a direct aftermath of the Chin campaign into Chosŏn in 1627. This duty was imposed upon Chosŏn as a kind of war indemnity and to satisfy the Ch'ing leaders’ material needs for their war against the Ming. In addition to these four types of embassy, Korea sent another type of regular embassy on a smaller scale, called the “calendar mission” (yŏkhaeng, Ch. li-hsing), whose assignment was to receive the imperial calendar for the next year issued by the imperial Bureau of Astronomy in the tenth month every year. This was another example of asymmetrical duties, because the power of bestowing the calendar was held by the Ch'ing emperor, as it had been held previously by the Ming emperor.

In addition to these five types of regular mission sent by Korea, there were other bilateral exchanges of emissaries between the two courts. There were exchanges on special occasions of political and ritual importance, with different titles and formalities according to the hierarchical distinctions between the two

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23 The number of the Korean embassies does not include 190 small-scale missions, such as those for presenting memorials and receiving imperial calendars, that consisted of one or two official interpreters. Chun, “Sino-Korean tributary relations in the Ch'ing period,” pp. 99, 101. The list of embassies exchanged between Ch'ing and Chosŏn is available in Sŏngmunwon, comp., Tongmun hwigok (1788, 1882; Seoul, 1978), Volume 2, pp. 1700–71.

24 Sep’ye was a term applied to the relation of two countries with brotherly relations, while segong or yŏngong was a term for tributary relations between two countries.

25 Chosŏn sent a separate calendar mission to the Ch'ing from 1660. Previously, the winter solstice mission and the mission for presenting falcons received the calendar. Yu Sung-ju and Yi Ch'olsŏng, Chosŏn bugi Ch'unggak-kwa'ui myŏk sa (Seoul, 2002), p. 27.
courts. For example, there were embassies for “thanking,” “congratulating,” “courtesy visits,” “offering condolences,” and “presenting obituary notices.”

There were also embassies with mainly political or diplomatic purposes, in which the two governments carried out negotiations on current issues. In this category were the emissaries for “offering explanations,” “conveying imperial orders,” and “conducting joint investigations of criminals.” The distinctions between the two categories were not always clear, as seen when the Ch’ing gave imperial patents for the enthronement of a new Chosŏn king. Although there was apparently no case in which the Ch’ing exercised its privilege as the suzerain state to block the will of the Chosŏn court, the possibility of Ch’ing interference in a domestic matter was always open, and thus moments of succession in the Chosŏn kingship raised political tensions on the Korean side.

Although this general scheme of tributary relations was set up largely in the decade after 1637 and then maintained into the late nineteenth century, the specific manner of its implementation and the significance that the two courts attached to it underwent considerable change, particularly in connection with the gradual consolidation of the Ch’ing imperial regime in the second half of the seventeenth century.

In the initial phase during the years before the Ch’ing occupied Peking in 1644, the tributary protocol was only an outer cover for the harsh realities of political surveillance and economic exploitation that the Ch’ing imposed upon Korea. Still suspicious of Korean loyalties, the Ch’ing regime employed various measures, including a series of overbearing interventions in the internal politics of the Chosŏn court. In the 1630s King Injo was under continuous threat from the Ch’ing illusion that he could be replaced by his heir apparent, Prince Sohyŏn (1612–45), then being held as a hostage in Shen-yang. The Ch’ing also required that the Chosŏn court be filled with officials with a pro-Ch’ing stance, and at times imposed harsh punishments upon certain Korean officials for their anti-Ch’ing attitudes or for their plotting a secret alliance with the Ming. The Ch’ing also imposed economic burdens to support its war against the Ming. In the 1630s and 1640s, when both Manchu and Chosŏn

26 See the table in Chun, “Sino-Korean tributary relations in the Ch’ing period,” p. 99.

27 A classification of the missions exchanged between the two courts, based upon the list of embassies recorded in the Tongmun hwigo, an official compendium of foreign relations compiled by the Chosŏn government, is given in Chun, “Sino-Korean tributary relations in the Ch’ing period,” pp. 92–4. For a case study about King Yongjo’s enthronement in the early eighteenth century, see Kim Mun-sik, “Yŏngjo-ui kugwang chaekpong-e nat’ananŭn han-chung kwangye,” Han’guk sirhak yŏng’gu 23 (2012), pp. 159–87.

28 Han, Ch’ongmyo · Pyŏngja boraen-kuwa tong Asia, pp. 172–84.
areas were suffering a series of severe famines, Korea’s annual payments to the Ch’ing were not so much a tributary ritual of gift exchanges as a means for the Ch’ing to acquire material resources needed to maintain its people and to support the war against the Ming. In addition, Korea had to dispatch soldiers to support Ch’ing military operations. In a sense, the Ch’ing at this moment lacked the resources to behave like a suzerain state in accord with tributary protocols.29

The highly oppressive nature of Ch’ing relations with Chosŏn in the mid-seventeenth century explains the high frequency of embassies exchanged between the two courts. The Ch’ing strictly imposed on Korea the rules of exchanging embassies, and many political issues between the two countries required additional exchanges of emissaries for special purposes. During the Ch’ung-te reign (1637–43), the frequency of Korean embassies to the Ch’ing court was 4.5 times a year, the highest in the entire Ch’ing period. Although the frequency decreased to 3.3 times a year during the Shun-chih reign (1644–61), this was still higher than the average over the whole Ch’ing period of about two a year. Similarly, imperial embassies were sent to Chosŏn about twice a year in the Ch’ung-te and Shun-chih periods, while the average over the entire Ch’ing period was fewer than one a year.30

The Ch’ing leaders gradually softened their harsh attitude toward Korea. By the early 1680s, having suppressed resistance by the remnants of the Ming and the rebellion of the Three Feudatories, the Ch’ing dynasty was completing the process of consolidating its rule over Ming territory. Ch’ing territorial ambitions turned toward the northwestern frontiers, the region of Mongols, Tibetans, and Russians, among others. Ch’ing success in the west lessened both the military and the economic importance of Korea. Chosŏn, isolated at an eastern corner of the empire without any ally, was no longer a potential military threat to the Ch’ing. Having taken over the huge population and economic resources of the Ming, the Ch’ing government had less need for maintaining an economic reliance on Korea.31 By the late seventeenth century, the suspicion and antagonism between Ch’ing and Chosŏn had relaxed, and the relations of the two countries were more stable. Not having many issues to negotiate, the two courts managed their relations with each other

31 For example, as soon as the Ch’ing occupied Peking, they greatly reduced the amount of rice, an item of yearly tribute, to be paid by Korea. See Kim, “17-segi Chungguk-kwa Chosŏn-ūi kigun-kwa kukche-chŏk kongmul yur’ong,” pp. 338–46.
mainly through ritualistic exchanges of embassies, gifts, and documents on such formal occasions as celebrating New Year’s Day and investing Korean kings.

The stabilization of the Ch’ing–Chosŏn relationship was accompanied by a gradual reduction by the Ch’ing court of the heavy political and economic burdens that had been imposed on Korea. The Ch’ing simplified the regulations concerning the exchange of embassies, and as a result their frequency decreased. After the Ch’ing rulers took over in Peking, they let the four annual embassies be combined into one New Year’s mission, which was then formally titled the “embassy for the three junctures of ritual importance and the yearly tribute” (K. samjŏl yŏng’gong haeng, Ch. san-chieh nien-kung hsing). In 1660, special embassies for presenting falcons (K. chin’ŭng haeng, Ch. chin ying hsing), which had been sent annually since 1644, were abolished. For the first thirty years of the K’ang-hsi period (1662–92) the number of Korean embassies dropped to around two a year, and in the second half of the reign (1693–1722) it fell somewhat more. This lowered frequency continued well into the late nineteenth century. The number of Ch’ing embassies sent to Korea also diminished. In the first half of the K’ang-hsi period, the frequency averaged 1.25 times a year, about half the frequency of the Shun-chih period. It went down to one every other year in the second half of the K’ang-hsi period, and by the second half of the Ch’ien-lung period (1766–95) it was about one every ten years. The Ch’ien-lung emperor let his edicts and commands be delivered to Chosŏn by returning Korean embassies, without sending his own imperial missions, as had been done previously.32

Step by step, Ch’ing authorities decreased Korea’s tribute-paying duties, in both the number of items and the amounts. This trend is most visible in the annual tribute (yŏng’gong), the most onerous duty imposed on Korea. In 1639, when Chosŏn first paid tribute to the Ch’ing, it consisted of a total of twenty-eight items, including a hundred liang (a liang was about 37.5 grams, roughly an ounce) of gold, a thousand liang of silver, a thousand pao (bundles) of tea, ten thousand pao of rice, and local products of various other kinds. The number of items decreased after that, to the extent that by the Yung-cheng period in the eighteenth century, nearly half, including gold and silver, were no longer required. For the remaining items, the amounts were reduced considerably. For example, the amount of rice to be paid by Korea was decreased to a hundred pao in 1647 and to forty by 1728. This trend was similarly observed in the local products presented to the emperor and his family by Korean embassies for the “three rituals” and other special occasions. The Ch’ing government in the late K’ang-hsi period even exempted the duty to pay local tribute in most

cases of embassies for special occasions. The alleviation of Korea’s tributary payments was a part of the general amelioration of the Ch’ing government’s attitude towards its neighbor. From the late seventeenth century, the Ch’ing court abandoned its former suspicion and began to take a more favorable stance toward Korea, to the extent that its behavior appeared almost like that of a “great” country taking care of its smaller tributary.

The two courts from the early seventeenth century had a tacit understanding that their border was along the Yalu River and the Tumen River, but no formal attempt had been made to stipulate it. The border demarcation came to be a diplomatic issue between the two courts as the Ch’ing dynasty’s interest in Jurchen territories, particularly in the region bordering on Korea, intensified from the late 1670s. The Ch’ing authorities wanted to consolidate their control over this border area and to protect it from Korean trespassers who crossed the Yalu and the Tumen rivers to collect ginseng, wood, and other profitable resources. In 1685, when several Manchu soldiers were killed in a skirmish with a group of armed Korean ginseng collectors, the Ch’ing sent an imperial embassy to bring the Chosŏn court to account for the troubles.

In addition to protecting political and economic interests, the K’ang-hsi emperor from the 1680s showed a heightened interest in the Manchu homeland, particularly the region around Long White Mountain (Ch’ang-p’ai shan, or Paektu san, as it was called by the Koreans), alleged to be the sacred place of origin of the Ch’ing imperial clan. To survey around Long White Mountain, Ch’ing officials asked the Chosŏn court to let them investigate the area on the Korean side, which made the Korean court suspicious about a possible military incursion. The emperor commissioned a series of geographical surveys of the region, with the results first presented in 1684 in the Sheng-ching t’ung-chih (Comprehensive gazetteer of Sheng-ching). Another aim of the Ch’ing surveys was to identify the unknown origins of the Yalu and Tumen rivers, both of which were thought to start somewhere on the Long White Mountain. Again the Ch’ing government asked for co-operation. These embarrassing requests

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33 The items and amounts of tribute Korea paid are summarized in the tables in Chang T’e’un-wu, Kŏndae Han-Chung muyŏk sa (Ch’ing Han t’ung-jan mao-i, 1637–1894) trans. Kim T’aek-chung et al. (1978; Seoul, 2001), pp. 29–36. See also Chun, “Sino-Korean tributary relations in the Ch’ing period,” pp. 102–6. Even this reduced duty of tribute still put strains on the weak financial capacity of the Chosŏn court, as shown by Chun Hae-jong’s estimates of the prices of the tribute to be paid and other expenses incurred by the exchanges of embassies in the early nineteenth century. According to Chun’s estimates, Korea paid tribute to the Ch’ing worth approximately 107,000 liang of copper (80,000 for the yearly tribute and 27,000 for local products), while the Ch’ing’s return gift to the Korean king and his envoys Chun estimated as worth only 29,000 liang of copper. In this, Chun wanted to emphasize the unfair nature of the gift exchanges between the two courts even in the early nineteenth century, when the relations between the two courts were apparently favorable.
provoked apocalyptic worries among the Koreans, who thought that the Ch'ing leaders were interested in establishing a military route through Korean territory to their ancestral homeland, Ningguta. This route supposedly could be used if the Ch'ing were driven out of Peking. Such ideas had been popular among Koreans in the last decades of the seventeenth century, and on into the eighteenth, during the rebellion of the Three Feudatories and then the K'ang-hsi emperor's expeditions against the Dzungar Mongols. The Chosˇon court had made every effort to evade responding to the Ch'ing requests to survey Long White Mountain from the Korean side, but finally in 1712 the Ch'ing government achieved its goal. Mu-k'e-teng, guided by Korean officials, climbed the mountain and identified what he thought were the origins of the Yalu and the Tumen rivers. At the watershed of the two rivers he erected a stone stele on which he specified his geographical findings. Mu-k'e-teng's expedition to Long White Mountain in 1711 and 1712 was made in the course of the grand cartographic project to be completed as the Huang y¨uc h '¨uan lan t'u (Comprehensive maps of the imperial realm). Identification of the origins of the two rivers helped settle where the border was between the two countries, and the suspicions of the Korean court that there was a Ch'ing military plot behind the geographical survey were abated.

At around the same time there were numerous instances in which the K'ang-hsi emperor showed special favor to Korea, actions that left a deep impression on the Koreans and contributed to a decrease in their animosity toward the Ch'ing and the Manchus. One of the most important episodes in this regard occurred in 1697–8, when the K'ang-hsi emperor, upon receiving a petition from the Chosˇon court, issued special permission for trading with Korea, which had been suffering for years from what was later remembered by the Koreans as the great famine of 1695–6. The emperor also granted to Korea some 10,000 shib of rice in addition to allowing several tens of thousands of shib of rice to be traded at a border market at the mouth of the Yalu River. (One shib had a volume of about three bushels, or a hundred liters.) The K'ang-hsi emperor portrayed this unusual instance of aid as an expression of his benevolence toward the people of a tributary country who were in misery.

In 1706 the K'ang-hsi emperor again expressed in general terms his favorable evaluation of Korea. After exhibiting to his officials his knowledge about the geography of Korea, he continued,

Few of these places in Chosŏn could escape the sweep of our troops during the campaign of our Emperor T'ai-tsong [i.e. Hung Taiji, in 1637]. Our dynasty, having a high regard for this already devastated country, rebuilt it and let its people live as safely as before. For this reason, at the site where our ancestral emperor had stationed his troops, the people of the country erected a stone stele on which they carved an inscription [commemorating] his virtue in rehabilitating their lives. Since then, generation after generation, they have expressed their deep admiration [for the virtue of Hung Taiji]. In addition, they have still another point worthy of recognition: during the last years of the Ming, they never betrayed their loyalty. Chosŏn can be called a country that puts a high regard on ritual and righteousness (li-i).\textsuperscript{37}

In this praise of his grandfather’s virtue, the K'ang-hsi emperor showed he thought the Ch'ing had turned the object of Chosŏn’s loyalty from the Ming to the Ch'ing. He made a conscious effort to establish the parallels between the Ming and his dynasty. As the Ming had protected Chosŏn by dispatching troops to fight Japanese invaders, the Ch'ing granted a similar favor by allowing the Koreans to preserve their state after ending their resistance to the Ch'ing regime. As a result, the relationship between the two countries was to be managed by the principles of hierarchical moral obligations between the great and the small and the protocols of an ideal tribute system. The emperor in his remarks seemed to promote an image of his empire as a “Middle Kingdom” showing beneficence.

The K'ang-hsi emperor’s portrayal of Chosŏn as a model tributary to the Ch'ing court was later incorporated into official publications by the Ch'ing government during the Ch'ien-lung and the Chia-ch'ing reign periods. Ch'ing compilations that include material on the protocols and historical precedents of Ch'ing relations, such as the Huang Ch'ing chih-kung t'u (Arrays showing the tributary functions to our imperial Ch'ing) and the Ta Ch'ing hui-tien (Collected statutes of the Great Ch'ing), and even the Ta Ch'ing i-t'ung chib (Gazetteer of the Great Ch'ing integrated domain), put Chosŏn at the front of the list of tributary countries. Korea was usually followed by Ryukyu, Annan, and other Southeast Asian countries. This sequence reflected the relative position of each country in the Ch'ing imperial order.\textsuperscript{38}

Alongside its depictions of Korea that used the language of the tribute system, the Ch'ing government’s actions suggest another view that was applied

\textsuperscript{37} Ta Ch'ing Sheng-tsu Jen huang-ti shih-lu (1937; Peking, 2008), p. 5219.
\textsuperscript{38} Tung Kao et al., comps., Huang Ch'ing chih-kung t'u (Ho-fei, 2002), Volume 27, pp. 351 ff; “Ch'u-k'o ch'ing-li ssu,” in K’un-kang et al., comps., Ta Ch'ing hui-tien (Kuang-hsū printing) (1899; Taipei, 1968) n’è 5, ch. 39, pp. 445 ff.
to its relations with Korea. In appointing personnel to the embassies to be sent to Chosŏn, the Ch’ing court applied criteria that were different from those for its embassies to Ryukyu and Annan, which were, like Korea, controlled by the Ministry of Rites (Li-pu). The embassies sent to Ryukyu and Annan were composed of officials with a rank of five or below, and consisted of both bannermen and Han officials. The embassies to Korea were, with few exceptions, chosen from officials of rank three or higher, and consisted only of bannermen. The Ch’ing rules for appointing embassies to Ryukyu and Annan were largely a continuation of Ming practices. The rules for Korea were new. The Ch’ing court seemed to view Korea as a place to which Han officials were not allowed to have access. In this respect, Korea’s position in the Ch’ing imperial order seemed to be more similar to areas on the northwestern frontier that were supervised by the Li-fan yüan.39

In sum, Korea had an ambiguous position in Ch’ing foreign relations that reflected the perception of Korea by the Ch’ing leaders from an earlier stage. On the one hand, Korea was considered a model tributary under the control of the Ministry of Rites, and was recognized as such in Ch’ing official documents. In 1637 the Ch’ing army forced Korea to sever its former tributary ties to the Ming and to accept incorporation into the new Ch’ing imperial order. Korea was put into a Manchu space that was to be conceptually different both from former Ming territory and from other Ch’ing tributaries. An important consequence of this perception was that the Koreans, connected largely to the Manchu part of the Ch’ing government, had few chances to have contact with Han literati officials until the mid-eighteenth century.

KOREA’S DIVIDED LOYALTY

The Chosŏn court and politically powerful elites viewed their relationship with the Ch’ing as a continuation from the Ming period. They had to accept the reality of the Ch’ing dynasty as the new recipient of their tribute. Yet Korean perceptions of the Ch’ing after the traumatic events of 1637–44 developed their own complexity that remained mostly unnoticed by the Ch’ing side.

The Chosŏn court and ruling elite maintained a divided loyalty for the entire Ch’ing period. In the conduct of politics, they behaved like a loyal tributary state. In their minds and in sociocultural domains hidden from the vigilant eyes of Ch’ing authorities, however, they maintained their loyalty to the fallen

39 On the comparison between the different rules the Ch’ing adopted in selecting imperial envoys to Korea, Ryukyu, and Vietnam, see Koo Bumjin, “Chŏng-ui Chosŏn sahaeng insŏn-kwa ‘Tae Ch’ong cheguk ch’eje’,” Inmun nonch’ong 59 (2008), pp. 1–50; Koo, “Dai Shin teikoku no Chosen insiki to Chosen no isu,” pp. 91–113.
Ming dynasty and denounced the Ch'ing as “barbarian” usurpers. Despite Chosôn's tributary status, Ming loyalism and anti-Ch'ing ideology became almost an established orthodoxy, the cogency of which no one could openly dispute. It shaped the basic contours of court politics and the intellectual lives of literati elites through the late nineteenth century.40

As an object of Korean loyalty, the “Ming dynasty” was a complex idea. Koreans viewed it as representing a government of the recent past that had shown enormous grace to Korea when the fate of that kingdom was in danger during the Japanese invasion of the 1590s. This “Ming dynasty” was a “parent” whose filial Korean son was unable to repay its debt of gratitude even when, under threat from the Manchus, the Ming had badly needed help. The Koreans’ painful sense of their unpaid debt to the Ming shaped their memory of the recent past. They preserved only the good memories of the Ming while forgetting the problems and suspicions that had characterized their relations in the early decades of the seventeenth century. The “Ming dynasty” came to be regarded as almost an ideal representing the line of Middle Kingdom dynasties that traced back to the venerated Chou dynasty of ancient times. For some, the idea of the “Ming dynasty” came to stand for the Confucian civilization that had been ruined by the invasion of “barbarian” Manchus.

Whether as a dynasty of the recent past to which a filial obligation was owed, or as a pure representation of Confucian civilization, or as something in between, ideas about the “Ming dynasty” could be accommodated in divergent politico-cultural agendas in Korea. During the next two centuries, Koreans conceptualized in different ways the relationship between the ideal “Ming dynasty,” the actual Ch'ing dynasty, and their Chosôn state.

A straightforward example of Koreans’ anti-Ch'ing stance is the scheme for the so-called “Northern Campaign” (K. pukpŏl, Ch. pei-fa). This remained a recurrent slogan during the late Chosôn period, but it was advanced most enthusiastically at the court of King Hyojong (1619–59, r. 1649–59) in the early 1650s. This ambitious yet unrealistic plan aimed to take revenge on the Ch'ing in order to wipe away the earlier disgrace of the Korean king’s

40 Ming loyalism in the late Chosôn period is still an issue of diverging, even conflicting, interpretations in contemporary Korean scholarship. One of the first attempts to highlight the positive aspects of what previous historians had denounced as “toadyism toward China” was Chong Ok-cha, Chosôn hugi Chosôn chunghwa sasang yŏng’gu (Seoul, 1998). For recent debates among Korean historians, also ideologically charged, see the disagreement in these two articles: Kye Sŏng-bŏm, “Chosŏn hugi Chosŏn chunghwa chuui-ŭi kŭ haesŏk munje,” Han’guk sa yŏng’gu 159 (2012), pp. 265–94; and Wu Kyŏng-sŏp, “Chosŏn chunghwa chuui-ŭi taehan hakkŏsŏ-čhŏk kŏmt’o,” Han’guk sa yŏng’gu 159 (2012), pp. 237–63. For a critical review of this issue, see Kim Young-min, “Chosŏn chunghwa chuui-ŭi chae kŏmt’o: iron-čhŏk chŏpkŭn,” Han’guk sa yŏng’gu 162 (2013), pp. 211–52.
surrender. The immediate aim was to help the Han Chinese, particularly the still struggling Southern Ming forces, to restore the Ming dynasty.

This plan was a result of King Hyojong’s personal hostility against the Ch'ing, shaped during the hard years between 1637 and 1644 when he had been detained at Shen-yang as a hostage. The scheme might also be understood in terms of court politics. King Hyojong had ascended the throne after his elder brother’s suspicious death, and he needed to enhance his legitimacy. He had eliminated the powerful courtiers of his father’s reign, notably Kim Cha-jŏn (1588–1651), from the period when Manchu rulers had interfered in Chosŏn court politics. By advocating a cause that had an irresistible politico-ideological appeal, a campaign against the new power to the north, the king was able to recruit a group of military officials and literati ideologues with a strong anti-Ch'ing stance. For several years after 1652 King Hyojong’s court actively implemented measures to increase armaments, reform the tax system, construct fortresses at strategic places, and recruit and train soldiers. Encouraged partly by news of the anti-Ch'ing activities of the Southern Ming forces in southern China, King Hyojong pursued the idea of invading Ch'ing territories.41

The only substantial result of the plan for the Northern Campaign was that armaments built up to fight the Ch'ing were put to use to aid the Ch'ing. Responding to requests to dispatch Korean troops to help block a Russian advance in the Amur River region, the Chosŏn court sent hundreds of soldiers north in 1654 and again in 1658. In these military operations, dubbed grandiosely the “Military Campaign to Nasŏn” (Nasŏn chŏngbol), Korean troops reportedly achieved a remarkable feat of arms in battles against Russians near the Hou-t'ung River in 1654 and the Amur River in 1658.42

From the mid-1650s there was opposition to King Hyojong’s idea of the Northern Campaign on the grounds of both feasibility and desirability. Few dared to deny the ideological legitimacy of the cause, at least as a goal, yet the critics argued that the court could not afford the huge financial burden of the ambitious build-up of armaments.43 To the majority of literati officials, particularly those of a strong Confucian bent, the Northern Campaign scheme was not only unrealistic, it was also undesirable. It put too much emphasis on military measures when, the Confucian critics advised, the moral rearmament

of the country had to be put first; the king should take the initiative for inner moral cultivation (K. *naesu*, Ch. *nei-hsin*).

This moralist position was promoted by Song Si-yŏl (1607–89), the leader of a prominent Confucian politico-academic sect called the Westerners (K. *sŏn*). He had been invited to court by the king to support the Northern Campaign plan. Although agreeing with the king’s cause, Song Si-yŏl nevertheless regarded the discussion of the military campaign only as a means to achieve a higher moral aim. In his famous memorial presented to King Hyojong in 1649, Song endorsed the plan on condition that it would serve the noble cause of rehabilitating human morality based on heavenly principle (Ch. *t’ien-li*) that had been ruined by the “barbarian” Ch’ing regime. In other words, the Northern Campaign should not be undertaken merely for personal or dynastic revenge. In Song’s moral scheme, the “Ming dynasty” was an ideal to be restored as a manifestation of Confucian principles, a representative of the noble line of rulers of the Middle Kingdom. Chosŏn would be entitled to pursue the Northern Campaign cause, Song claimed, only if the king, his court, and his kingdom as a whole stood on firm moral ground. Song and his adherents wanted to establish Ch’eng–Chu learning as the state orthodoxy. Chu Hsi had emphasized the superiority of the Middle Kingdom over the barbarians in the wake of the Sung dynasty’s (960–1279) loss of the north to the Jurchens in 1127. This enhanced his appeal as the model figure for Koreans to emulate in their movement against the Manchus.44

The enthusiasm for the Northern Campaign did not last for long. Its major proponent, King Hyojong, died in 1659, and the collapse of the last Southern Ming claimants in 1662 deflated the Koreans’ hope for any restoration of the Ming order. Contrary to the Koreans’ wishes, Ch’ing power did not wane. The rebellion of the Three Feudatories in the 1670s was perhaps the last opportunity for the Koreans to put the Northern Campaign plan into action. The Chosŏn court did not act, however, in spite of a few literati’s enthusiastic yet largely ignored promotion of the scheme.45

As both enthusiasm for and the practical possibility of military action waned in the last decades of the seventeenth century, Koreans’ Ming loyalism underwent a substantial change. The emphasis shifted more to commemorating the legacy of the Ming dynasty rather than plotting military action against the Ch’ing. Korean literati now viewed their own state as the true bearer of Confucian civilization. Once the heritage of the Middle Kingdom had died out in China with the collapse of the Ming cause, the noble culture

stemming from the ancient Chou kings was preserved only in their Eastern State (K. Tongguk). One important sign of Korea’s being the inheritor of Middle Kingdom civilization was their Ming-style clothes and hats (K. ˇuigwan), which were quite unlike the Manchu dress that had been imposed upon Han Chinese.  

A more drastic move to consolidate this new identity was the efforts by a group of literati to commemorate the Ming dynasty and its emperors. In 1669 a Korean envoy to Peking happened to acquire a piece of allegedly authentic calligraphy by the Ch’ung-chen emperor, the last Ming ruler in Peking. Song Si-yŏl had the passage the emperor had written, “Do not move unless it is in accordance with the rites” (Analects 12.1), carved on a cliff near his study in the style of the emperor’s calligraphy. He preserved the original piece in a shrine he called the “Temple of the Bright Culture [of the Middle Kingdom].” Notably, Song portrayed the Ch’ung-chen emperor not so much as the monarch of a dynasty but as a noble suicide who died heroically defending Confucian ritual practices. More significantly, by commemorating the Ming emperor’s death, Song implicitly attempted to elevate his own standing, and more broadly that of the Korean literati community, as legitimate successors to the Ming legacy. The 1673 preface he wrote for a treatise on Chinese geography compiled by one of his disciples shows how Song utilized loyalty to the “Ming dynasty” for the purpose of consolidating the cultural identity of Korean literati elites.

Alas! The August [Ming] dynasty, despite its vast territory, could not avoid the tragedy of the third month of the kapsin year [1644, when the last Ming emperor died] ... Now, the country where the sage kings Shun and Yū took tours of inspection, and where Confucius and Master Chu delivered their teachings, has failed to preserve the traces of the past, being instead full of the smell of rotten fish and meat. How we wish we could draw water from the Milky Way and wash it off all at once! Only our Eastern State, being located in the corner of the world, is able to be a state of [preserving Confucian] “hats and belts” (K. kwandae). Thus it was said that “the rituals of the Chou dynasty were preserved in the state of Lu” [i.e. another eastern state].

In this passage, Song likened the cultural identity of Korea to the state of Lu, the country of Confucius, the eastern transmitter of the noble legacy of the Chou dynasty.

Song Si-yŏl was creating an extended lineage for the Middle Kingdom that elevated Korea’s position as the legitimate cultural successor of the Ming dynasty. Although he was the leader of a political faction in a period of fierce


infighting at court, Song represented a common strategy taken by the Korean literati elite in this period. They reformulated the idea of the “Ming dynasty” that they celebrated. Witnessing the successful consolidation of Ch'ing rule, they turned from taking revenge to preserving the civilization of the Middle Kingdom. In this sense, Korea’s new Ming loyalism presupposed, or even required, the absence of the Ming dynasty.

The Korean reconceptualization of the Ming from being a dynasty to be restored to one to be memorialized reached its peak in 1704, the sixtieth anniversary of the fall of the Ming in Peking. As an endorsement of what Song Si-yŏl and his disciples had done, King Sukchong took the initiative of building in the rear garden of the royal palace an “Altar for the Great Repayment” (K. Taebotan) for the Ming emperors’ grace. It was dedicated to the Wan-li emperor, the alleged savior of Korea after the Japanese invasion.

The first and last Ming emperors were added to the ritual agenda in the mid-eighteenth century. A memorial ritual for emperors of a fallen Chinese dynasty by a tributary ruler was unprecedented. Yet this innovation enabled Korean kings to express their claim to be the rightful successors to the Ming order. It also signaled that the court and ruling elites now fully accepted the irreversible reality of the absence of the Ming dynasty.48

This self-image found an elegant literary expression in the account by Kim Ch'ang-ŏp (1658–1721) of his travels to Peking with an embassy in 1712. There had been Korean missions to the Ch'ing court since 1637, but previous literati envoys had mostly considered their tributary duties to the Ch'ing emperor to be a cause for embarrassment. Their travel accounts written in classical Chinese were dominated by repugnance and hostility toward the barbarian Manchus. Although sharing much of this anti-Ch'ing sentiment, Kim's piece contained a novel element: appropriation of the legacies of the Middle Kingdom that he encountered. He presented his journey as a cultural pilgrimage on which a Korean Confucian scholar searched for vestiges of civilization in a Manchu-ruled state. Passing historic sites related to the Ming–Ch'ing dynastic change, Kim recorded painful memories of tragic battles and heroic deeds. The world he saw had completely changed, and its people, whether Han or Manchu, wore barbarian clothes and the Manchu queue. Kim was able to find some enduring things that had successfully resisted cultural degeneration: mountains and rivers, cultural relics from antiquity, and, most

significantly, his own Confucian-style clothes and hat (ǎigwan). In Kim’s narrative, the close association between his attire and the traditional culture of the Middle Kingdom was in stark contrast with the current degenerate attitudes of the Han people, who had lost even the memories of their ancestors’ proper apparel. In this sense, Kim described his journey as a process by which he and his literati audience were appropriating the traditional culture of the Middle Kingdom. By wearing Confucian clothes and hats they were the only legitimate heirs of civilization after the end of the Ming dynasty.49

Significantly, the consolidation of the Korean self-image as the successor to the Middle Kingdom was taking place concurrently with an amelioration of Ch'ing–Chosŏn relations. By making the “Ming dynasty” into an ideal, the Chosŏn court and literati elites gradually freed themselves from the traumatic memories of the past and engaged more comfortably in diplomatic relations with the Ch'ing. Kim Ch'ang-ŏp’s trip was with an embassy sent to express thanks to the K'ang-hsi emperor for settling a border issue that year.

One important diplomatic issue in the late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries illustrates the changing attitude of the Chosŏn court toward the Ch'ing government. The Koreans wanted to “rectify false records” (K. pyŏnmu) about the royal house, particularly about King Injo’s accession to the throne in 1623, that were contained in a few Chinese historical works compiled in late Ming. One of the most problematic works, printed in 1628, was Liang ch'ao ts'ung-hsin lu (Trustworthy records of two reigns) by Shen Kuo-yuăn, which recorded events in the T'ai-ch'ang and T'ien-ch'i reigns (1620–7). Shen had portrayed King Injo’s accession as an illegitimate usurpation. He included excerpts from memorials from Ming officials presented at the time reporting that Injo was planning high treason against his current king, Kwanghae; was making alliances with Japanese and Jurchen forces; and then, in the course of the coup, was behaving cruelly toward the king.50 Contradicting the official Chosŏn account of the change of ruler as an act of “restoring righteousness” by ending Kwanghae’s immoral governance, these Ming records were regarded as having a grave potential for undermining the legitimacy of the Chosŏn ruling house. This was a touchy subject. King Injo was the progenitor of the subsequent royal lineage, and more importantly, his takeover was later judged

50 For a list of the Chinese books at issue and their accounts of King Injo’s coup, see Yi Sŏng-gyu, “Myŏng-Ch'ŏng sa só-ŭi Chosŏn 'kokp'il'-kwa Chosŏn-ŭi 'pyŏnmu’,” in Yi Kongbŏm kyosu chŏngnyŏn kinyŏm tongyangwa nonch'ong, ed. Osong Yi Kongbŏm kyosu chŏngnyŏn kinyŏm tongyang sa nonch'ong kanhaeng wiwonhoe (Seoul, 1993), pp. 508–28.
by the court and literati elites to have been the foundational event for the highly moralistic later Chosŏn regime.

Korean concerns about what was in Chinese historical records was a sign of their commitment to the moral legitimacy of their own dynasty. It also showed their obsession with the protocol of the tribute system, which they regarded as basic to the legitimacy of the Chosŏn kingship. During the Ming period the Chosŏn court had made an almost two-century-long effort to “rectify false records” in the Ta Ming hui-tien (Statutes of the Ming dynasty). There the founder of the Chosŏn dynasty, Yi Sŏng-gye (1335–1408, r. 1392–8), had been misidentified as the son of an immoral official who, together with Yi, had murdered the last four kings of the Koryŏ dynasty (918–1392) and usurped the throne. After persistently sending embassies to Peking to resolve this issue, in 1588 the Korean court finally received from the Ming government a copy of the new edition of the Ta Ming hui-tien into which the Korean court’s explanation of this matter had been inserted. Upon hearing this news, King Sŏnjo reportedly rejoiced. He proclaimed that our Eastern State “has been transformed from a country of beasts to one of ritual and righteousness (lǐ-i).”

There were obvious differences between the case of the “false records” about King Injo and the earlier case. The Chosŏn court now was appealing to the “barbarian” Ch'ing emperor, and the records in question had been privately compiled. The problem had been known in Korea as early as the 1630s, but what made the issue a vital one in the 1670s was the news that the Ch'ing emperor was about to order the compilation of an official history of the Ming. If incorrect or slanderous information was incorporated into that important work, several Korean officials argued, it would damage the dignity of the Chosŏn state. Accordingly, in 1676 King Sukchong (r. 1674–1720) sent a special mission to Peking to ask the Ministry of Rites to correct the records about King Injo’s accession. The envoys mentioned the example of the Ming revision of the Ta Ming hui-tien. They requested that the emperor ensure that the circumstances of King Injo’s enthronement were rightly recorded in the chapter on Chosŏn in the history of the Ming, and that after its completion a copy be bestowed on the Chosŏn court.

Although few Korean officials could openly oppose the cause of rectifying history, some of them, including an ardent Northern Campaign ideologue, Yun Hye (1617–80), expressed their doubts about whether it was appropriate to raise this issue with the Ch'ing government. They suggested a number of

51 Yi, “Myŏng-Ch'ŏng sasŏ-ŭi Chosŏn 'kokp'il'-kwa Chosŏn-ŭi 'pyŏnmu',” pp. 504–7. The quotation is from p. 507.
52 Han, Chŏngmyo · Pyŏngja boraen-kwa tong Asia, pp. 508–27.
practical reasons against appealing to the Ch'ing on this matter. The books in question, they argued, were private compilations, undeserving of much attention. Moreover, the false information had been recorded by late Ming literati with whom the Ch'ing had no connections. Behind this argument was their thought that on this important matter concerning the legitimacy of their ruling house, the barbarian Ch'ing emperor could never be a proper counterpart with whom to negotiate.\footnote{Han, Ch'ôngmyo \cdot Pyôngja boran-kuwa tong Asia, pp. 526–7.}

The divided opinion at the Chosŏn court on the history issue exemplifies the oscillation between political realities and anti-Ch'ing ideology. The Ch'ing government’s hostile response to the Korean king’s appeal shows that in the 1670s the Ch'ing still viewed Korea with suspicion, which reflected the instability of the dynasty during the rebellion of the Three Feudatories. Not only dismissing the Korean envoys’ appeal as a political impropriety, the Ministry of Rites declared that the act of acquiring Chinese historical works had violated the imperial ban on the “private smuggling of history books” by foreigners. This was especially serious in a time of war because history books, maps, and geographical treatises contained strategic information about the empire. The Ch'ing government required the Choson king to punish those who had bought the Ming books. In 1667, dissatisfied with the report from the king on this matter, the Ch'ing imposed a fine amounting to \textit{5,000 liang} of silver.\footnote{There were several other scandals concerning the smuggling of Chinese history books in the second half of the seventeenth century. See Yi, “Myŏng-Ch'ŏng sasŏ-ŭi Chosŏn 'kokp'il'-kwa Chosŏn-ŭi 'pyŏnmu',' pp. 528–34, 546–8.}

The Chosŏn court’s effort to correct the historical record achieved success in the 1730s. King Yŏngjo revived the appeal in 1726, perhaps after finding that the new \textit{Ming shih kao} (Draft Ming history) of 1723 portrayed the circumstances of King Injo’s enthronement in a very negative light.\footnote{Yi, “Myŏng-Ch'ŏng sasŏ-ŭi Chosŏn 'kokp'il'-kwa Chosŏn-ŭi 'pyŏnmu',' pp. 548–53.} This time the Chosŏn court prepared the petition carefully in order to avoid the possible accusation of “smuggling.” The Chosŏn court also emphasized that the Shun-chih emperor had valued King Injo’s loyalty. The request was accepted in 1730, and the Yung-cheng emperor ordered that the revised draft of this section of the Ming history be sent to Korea. In 1739, the Chosŏn court received a copy of the revised “Account of Chosŏn” in the printed \textit{Ming shih} (Ming history).\footnote{Yi, “Myŏng-Ch'ŏng sasŏ-ŭi Chosŏn 'kokp'il'-kwa Chosŏn-ŭi 'pyŏnmu',' pp. 548–53; Han, Ch'ôngmyo \cdot Pyôngja boran-kuwa tong Asia, pp. 528–33.}

In this successful phase of the appeal in the early Yung-cheng years, there does not appear to have been much discord at the Chosŏn court or in the negotiations between Korea and the Ch'ing authorities, as previously had
been the case. By the early decades of the eighteenth century, the Ch'ing government had come to appreciate Korea's loyalty, and at the same time the Chosŏn court had become more accepting of its status as a tributary of the flourishing Ch'ing empire. The Chosŏn court's efforts to re-enforce its legitimacy by rectifying official Ch'ing accounts of its history contradicted its other strategy of establishing itself as the sole heir of Middle Kingdom values by maintaining a secret loyalty to the "Ming dynasty." As "barbarian Manchus," the Ch'ing still remained a cultural other against which Korean elites defined their cultural selves, as they would for the remainder of the Chosŏn dynasty. From the early eighteenth century, however, as memory of the traumatic dynastic change faded and the Ch'ing state entered a stable and prosperous era, it made a series of generous gestures toward the Chosŏn court. At least some Korean elites began to view the Ch'ing in more favorable terms. A few even valued the cultural accomplishments under the Ch'ing dynasty as a sign that it might be an inheritor and transmitter of civilization.

This process of Korean redefinition of Manchu otherness was stimulated by the ongoing material and cultural exchanges that were taking place between the two countries. A significant byproduct of their tributary relationship was the cultural effects that became visible in Korean society from the early eighteenth century on.

**KOREAN TRIBUTE EMBASSIES AS THE MEDIUM FOR CULTURAL TRANSFERS**

The embassies exchanged between the Chosŏn and Ch'ing courts were the main medium through which men, ideas, and artifacts moved between the two countries in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries as both countries strictly regulated commerce and travel. In terms of cultural transfers, there were several factors that account for why Korean embassies returning from Peking had more significant effects than the embassies sent by the Ch'ing emperors. Korean embassies were larger and went more frequently. Ch'ing embassies to Seoul consisted of bannermen, not Han literati officials, which was perhaps another reason why they were objects of Korean contempt and hostility; they did not have a prominent role in cultural exchanges. In addition, the obvious politico-cultural asymmetry between the two countries made Koreans much more acquisitive. Their interest in access to Chinese culture led

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58 There were more personnel in Korean embassies than in Ch'ing ones, in part because the Korean embassies carried out more diverse activities.
them to seek books and other cultural items. The rise of the Ch'ing dynasty in the seventeenth century did not fundamentally change the centuries’ old movement of Chinese goods and knowledge into the Korean peninsula.\textsuperscript{59} In addition to the ritual gift exchanges between the two courts that were a source of cultural goods, the personnel of the missions had opportunities to purchase silk, medicine, books, and paintings. The tributary mission was therefore the major route through which Ch'ing high culture, including literati scholarship, arts, and science, was introduced to Chosŏn society.

Because of their multiple goals, the Korean missions consisted of men from different social strata, each assigned different duties. To take the example of an ordinary mission for the three junctures and annual tribute, the embassy consisted of thirty-five official envoys (chŏnggwan) and several hundred workers. The envoys were divided into two types: ten literati who were yangban, or hereditary elites, and twenty-five lower-ranked officials who were classed as chung’im, with more technical expertise. Three main envoys (the senior envoy, the associate envoy, and the secretary) were appointed from among high literati officials and took formal charge of the whole mission, while the seven other literati, often members of the families of the main envoys, had no official duty except to be military attendants (kun’gwan) for the principals.

The second, larger group consisted of functionaries with practical specialties from various government offices. They were interpreters (yŏkkwan), medical doctors (ŭitwon), painters (bwawon), transcribers (sajagwan), and astronomers (ilgwan). Collectively known as chung’in, they ordinarily served the court with their respective skills and specialties, and, together with the sons of concubines of yangban elites and the petty officials of local government offices, constituted a distinctive social stratum between the yangban elite and the common people.\textsuperscript{60} Lastly, the mission included hundreds of people from the lower classes, including slaves and horsemen, who supported the mission with manual labor.\textsuperscript{61}

\textsuperscript{59} The different degree of interest also explains the marked difference in the number of travel accounts produced by each side. Korean envoys wrote many travel accounts; Ch'ing envoys left only a few. See Koo Bumjin, “19segi chŏnban Ch'ŏng’ın-ŭi Chosŏn sahaeng: Baijun (1844 nyŏn)-kwa Huashan (1845 nyŏn)-ŭi kyŏng’u,” Sarim 22 (2004), pp. 119–46; Hong Sŏng-gu, “18segi Chungguk-ŭi Chosŏn insik – Akedun-ŭi Chosŏn ch’uls-a-wa Tongyu jip · Pongsa to-rŭl t’onghae pon Cho Ch’ŏng kwangye, kūrigŏ ku sidaejŏk r’ukching,” in 15–19segi Chungguk in-ŭi Chosŏn insik, ed. Pak Won-ho (Seoul, 2005), pp. 79–129. One of the most comprehensive collections of accounts of Korean travel to China contains about 440 specimens, of which about 300 were produced during the Ch’ing period. See Im Ki-jung, comp., Yŏnhaengnok chŏnjip (Seoul, 2001).

\textsuperscript{60} There is considerable research on the chung’in officials and their composition, social status, and culture. See, for example, Han Yŏng’wu, “Chosŏn sidae Chung’ın-ŭi sinbun gyegeophŏk sŏnggyŏk,” Han’guk munwha 9 (1988), pp. 179–209.

\textsuperscript{61} On the composition of the embassies, see Yu and Yi, Chosŏn hugi Chungguk-kwaŭi muryŏk sa, pp. 43–51.
This seemingly neat distribution of power and responsibility was often disregarded in practice. The yangban envoy held the highest position among the mission personnel and played an essential role as the king’s representative in the tributary rituals and diplomatic negotiations, but he was not always dominant in the business of the mission. Because their opportunities for travel were limited, the literati envoys knew little about the practical matters of an embassy to Peking. Moreover, much of the mission business, commercial trade in particular, was not considered a proper concern for the noble yangban. For these reasons, most of the embassy’s affairs were put in the hands of the lower-ranked members. The literati thus found themselves in a vulnerable position, dependent on the services and know-how of people whose moral integrity they did not fully trust.

The actual managers of the missions were chung’in interpreters. They were trained as specialists in foreign languages in the Royal Translation Bureau (Sayŏgwon), which had four departments to teach Chinese, Manchu, Mongolian, and Japanese. On the missions to Peking the interpreters specializing in Chinese and Manchu were dominant. Interpreters usually had years of experience on tributary missions, through which they acquired business expertise and established personal connections with Ch’ing officials and later also with some Han people. The formal rituals, information gathering, commercial trade, and other major activities of the mission were carried out under the supervision of the interpreters. Reflecting their diverse duties, interpreters made up about twenty of the thirty-five envoys in a regular annual mission.62

Partly as a reward for their services, interpreters were entitled to engage in their own private trading, from which they derived considerable benefit. The chung’in interpreters, as specialists in the business of tributary missions, were the main agents in every aspect of the Korean side of Ch’ing–Chosŏn relations in carrying out the interests of the Chosŏn court and literati elites. The diverse roles of the interpreters can be illustrated by the colorful career of Kim Chi-nam (1654–?). His accomplishments ranged from diplomacy to technology. He and his son, Kim Kyŏng-mun, who also served as an interpreter, played important roles in the border negotiations with the Ch’ing envoy, Mu-k’e-teng, in 1712. Kim Chi-nam was also known for his successful acquisition of a more advanced Ch’ing method of producing saltpeter, an essential ingredient in gunpowder. Interpreters were not limited to their officially assigned duties. With their connections and broader knowledge of things in Peking, they

brought back sought-after Chinese objects at the request of yangban elites or for their own personal pleasure.  

Although less significant than interpreters in terms of both numbers and their assigned duties, other types of chung’in officials fulfilled other specialized roles. Medical doctors cared for the envoys’ health, and also purchased Chinese medicines for the Chosŏn court. Transcribers were responsible for transporting and protecting diplomatic documents to be presented to the Ch’ing court. Painters purchased special pigments and depicted various objects of ritual or artistic importance. Astronomers were sent on the embassies to Peking to learn the new Shib-bsien li (Following the decree of Heaven calendar), the official Ch’ing calendrical system that was promulgated in 1644; the Chosŏn court had adopted it in 1653 without fully understanding the methods used in the calculations. Like the interpreters, these other chung’in officials were often required to carry out tasks other than their regular duties. The medical skills of the doctors were valued by some Manchu nobles, and the doctors used this access to gather intelligence about Ch’ing government affairs. Similarly, transcribers and painters were sometimes required to make copies of secret, strategic, or rare documents and maps.

Compared with the active roles of the interpreters, the envoys who were yangban literati took a secondary role in material and cultural transfers, particularly in the second half of the seventeenth century. Although buying and selling were not considered proper activities for the literati class, there were in principle no constraints that prevented them from buying books, paintings, antiques, and other cultural items in Peking. In the Ming period, for instance, yangban literati had been active agents in importing books and establishing personal relations with Ming literati. Their opportunities for cultural involvement were restricted after the 1620s by political uncertainties and ideological antagonisms.

Because of strict Ch’ing regulations on the movements of Korean envoys in Peking, the literati members of the missions had little freedom there, and had to leave most business in the hands of the more experienced and better-connected interpreters. For example, Pak Se-dang (1629–1702) wrote an account of his trip to Peking in the winter of 1668–9. It shows that he rarely had a chance to leave the official Korean residence, except for several

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63 Kyŏnggi munhwa chaedan, Yŏnhaeng-ŭi saboesa (Suwŏn, 1999), pp. 305–9.
formal rituals at the Ch’ing court. Considering the strong anti-Ch’ing sentiments prevailing in Korean literati society, the high-ranked envoys could not openly enjoy their journey to the capital of the “barbarian” Manchus. The same Korean embassy in which Pak Se-dang served as secretary was later criticized by Chosŏn court officials on the grounds that some of the members had attended a theatrical performance and the Lantern Festival during their stay in Peking. To some Korean literati, Ch’ing culture could not be openly embraced. Yangban literati, however, did not continue to remain in the background of the cultural exchanges between the two countries. As antagonisms toward the Ch’ing eased in the early eighteenth century, they gradually returned to the forefront of cultural transactions. Before examining the new cultural trends shaped by this reinvigorated literati interest in Ch’ing culture, we look at trade and other material transactions that were aspects of Ch’ing–Chosŏn relations.

TRADE BETWEEN KOREA AND THE CH’ING

As a tributary state, Korea lost in the “gift exchange” with the Ch’ing court. The Korean annual tribute (yŏngōng) that began in 1637 included gold, silver, paper, animal skins, tea, pepper, knives, silk, mats, ramie fiber, fine silk, cotton goods, hemp products, and rice. Although the Ch’ing gradually reduced these payments, they remained a financial burden to the Chosŏn court, and were still valued at roughly 80,000 liang of copper a year in the early nineteenth century. In addition to the annual tribute, Korea had also to send local products such as fine ramie, lightweight silk, mats, and paper for members of the Ch’ing imperial family. The local products intended solely for the emperor on one three-junctures mission in the early nineteenth century were estimated to be worth about 26,000 liang of copper. These local products were reciprocated with imperial gifts, but what was given to the Korean king, such as satin, marten fur, and saddle horses, was valued at only 7,000 liang of copper. The discrepancy in this unequal exchange was partly compensated for by

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68 He was therefore highly dependent upon the Korean and Manchu interpreters in acquiring information about what was going on at the Ch’ing court – for example, the famous contest in astronomy between F. Verbiest and Yang Kuang-hsien. Pak Se-dang, Kugyŏk Sŏgye yŏllokk, trans. Kim Chong-su (Seoul, 2010), pp. 87–8, 100–1. See also the chapter by Chu Pingyi in this volume.
70 Chun, “Sino-Korean tributary relations in the Ch’ing period,” pp. 102–6. Chun argued that if one considers various other expenditures, such as the cost of hosting the embassies in Ch’ing territory, even the Ch’ing could not profit from its tributary relations with Korea. From this, Chun suggested that the tributary relations of the two countries were maintained mostly for political reasons, in spite of the financial burdens to both courts (pp. 109–11).
profits that mission members could earn from the commercial trade that was permitted in the course of the embassy.\textsuperscript{71}

Chinese dynasties had granted opportunities for trade to neighboring countries as one of the perquisites of tributary status.\textsuperscript{72} Both the Ming and Chosŏn dynasties had allowed the Jurchens to do business at their border and in their capital, but after the Jurchens formed the Ch'ing state, and especially after their occupation of Peking in 1644, they began to apply the formalities of tributary trade to their commercial transactions with Chosŏn. Border markets were created at the Jurchens’ request in the late 1620s and regularized after 1644 at three places: on an island in the Chunggang (Chung-chiang), a branch of the lower Yalu River, and at Hoeryŏng and Kyŏngwon, two northern towns on the Tumen River. This border trade satisfied Ch'ing needs by supplying necessities to Manchu bannermen, but even though private business flourished at Chunggang, the Korean court and the responsible local offices considered this trade a burden to be avoided or abolished.\textsuperscript{73}

The Koreans viewed more positively the trade allowed to their embassy personnel, opportunities for which were gradually increased after 1644. Following Ming precedents, in 1653 the Ch'ing government allowed Korean envoys to sell ginseng and other goods in Peking, signaling a full-scale resumption of tributary trade after two decades of instability. A corresponding occasion for trade was initially given to the bannermen accompanying Ch'ing embassies to Seoul. In 1658, however, the Ch'ing court abolished this privilege in response to Korean complaints about the bannermen's overbearing manner toward Korean merchants. Thereafter, embassy-connected commercial trade was allowed only to Korean missions to the Ch'ing.\textsuperscript{74} This trade was, however, far more extensive than that at border markets, which remained on a small scale through the late nineteenth century.

\textit{Trade in conjunction with embassies}

From the Koreans' point of view, trade during their embassies to Peking served two practical purposes: to help defray the costs incurred by having

\textsuperscript{71} Also to be included in Korea’s expenditures were many “gifts-cum-bribes” given to Ch'ing officials whose goodwill was necessary. Chun, “Sino-Korean tributary relations in the Ch'ing period,” pp. 109–111. The two major government offices responsible for the expenses of diplomatic relations with the Ch'ing were Pyŏng' an province and the Ministry of Revenue in Seoul. See Kwŏn Nae-hyon, Chosŏn bugi P'yŏng' an do chaej'ung yŏng'gu (Seoul, 2004); Pak So-ŭn, Chosŏn bugi hojo chaej'ung ch'ongch'aek sa (Seoul, 2008).

\textsuperscript{72} For a general discussion of the tributary trade, see Mancall, “The Ch'ing tribute system,” pp. 75–85.

\textsuperscript{73} Chang, Kŏn'gdae Han-Ch'ong mayŏk sa, pp. 217–79.

\textsuperscript{74} Concerning the earlier phase of the Ch'ing–Chosŏn tributary trade, see Chang, Kŏn'gdae Han-Ch'ong mayŏk sa, pp. 81–7.
diplomatic relations with the Ch'ing government, and to provide both the Chosŏn court and embassy officials with opportunities to purchase Chinese goods for consumption and resale. The privilege of conducting trade was granted particularly to the substantial number of official interpreters as a reward for their services. The Royal Translation Bureau had seventy-six paid positions, while the supply of interpreters generated through the civil service examinations had increased the pool of interpreters to as many as six hundred. Granting interpreters the privilege to trade allowed them to make up for the shortfalls in their pay. In return, the interpreters were required to bear a considerable part of the embassy expenses, especially the gifts to Ch'ing officials known as “silver for official use” (kongyŏng ḏin).

In principle, Korean mission personnel were allowed to carry out commercial business according to a system of assigned quotas. The quota that had been fixed in late Ming for an individual envoy to sell was eighty chin (one chin was approximately 1.3 pounds) of ginseng, usually packed into eight bundles. The quota itself came to be called the “eight bundles” (p'alp'o). In the early and mid-seventeenth century, ginseng was the main good that Koreans carried to trade in Peking. After the Chosŏn court banned the export of ginseng in the early 1680s because of chronic shortages in the domestic market, the term “eight bundles” came to mean the quota for goods other than ginseng to be taken for trade by an individual envoy. The quota was reckoned in silver. In this system, one chin of ginseng was equal to twenty-five taels of silver, and therefore “eight bundles” stood for 2,000 taels or goods of equivalent value. Korean envoys with official rank higher than 3a were allowed to take 3,000 taels’ worth of goods, which was also called “eight bundles,” suggesting that the term had come to stand for the officially allowed tributary trade as a whole.

The “eight-bundle” trade was a lucrative business. In the second half of the seventeenth century, it also permitted Korean interpreters-cum-traders to earn enormous profits by being intermediaries between China and Japan. The Ch'ing and Tokugawa governments had no formal relationship at this time, and virtually the only legitimate means for trade between the two countries was the intermediate trade between Peking and Waegwan, a district near the port of Pusan where Japanese merchants were allowed to reside. Korean interpreters sold what they had bought in Peking, silk in particular, for payment in Japanese silver. According to a record from 1670, the sale prices at Waegwan were about 2.7 times the cost of the goods in

75 Yu and Yi, Chosŏn hugi Chungguk-kwaŭi muyŏk sa, pp. 36–43.
76 Yu and Yi, Chosŏn hugi Chungguk-kwaŭi muyŏk sa, pp. 59–61.
77 On the “eight-bundle” system, see Yu and Yi, Chosŏn hugi Chungguk-kwaŭi muyŏk sa, pp. 51–7.
Peking. Consequently, many interpreters’ families in this period reportedly used their trips to the Ch'ing capital to make fortunes in this middleman role.\(^7^8\)

Participation in the “eight-bundle” trade was also allowed to several local government offices, particularly those in northwestern Korea. This measure was taken by the court to give indirect financial support to those who had to bear the expenses of both the Chosŏn and the Ch'ing embassies that passed through their jurisdictions. By the early eighteenth century, five local offices, including those of Üiju and Kaesŏng prefectures and that of Pyŏng'an province, were allowed to engage in their own “eight-bundle” trading. Unlike the interpreters who traded in Peking, the representatives of these local offices did their business mainly in Shen-yang (Sheng-ching), where the passing Korean embassies unloaded part of their annual tribute to be used in the rituals at the Ch'ing imperial tombs.

In addition, various offices in the central government in Seoul were permitted to do business in Peking. This “extra-bundle” (pyŏlp’o) trade was intended mainly for the purchase of Chinese goods for official use at the court, such as clothing, medicine, silk, and hats for the king and other royal family members. Official interpreters were the business agents commissioned by these offices to acquire Chinese goods with Korean government silver.\(^7^9\)

Compared with the Korean side of the trade, relatively little is known about the Ch'ing counterparts. Only limited groups of people had access to the Korean embassies. In Peking the Ch'ing interpreters for Korean language (Ch'ao-hsien t'ung-shih) and those officials in charge of the Koreans at the College of Interpreters (Hui-t'ung kuan) played an important role in the trade. The Ch'ing interpreters were without exception bannermen officials, and mostly descendants of Koreans who had been captured and enrolled in the banners in the early seventeenth century. A few interpreters' families, and private merchants who had connections with them, came to be prominent in the commercial business with the embassies. Another important group was the attendant officials (hsŭ-pan), whose duties were to supervise the residence for the Korean embassies while they were in Peking. Besides their official duties, they also served as brokers between Korean envoys and Ch'ing merchants, particularly in the purchase of cultural items such as books, paintings, and calligraphy.\(^8^0\)

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\(^7^8\) Yu and Yi, *Chosŏn hugi Chungguk-kwaˇui muyˇok sa*, pp. 67–70.

\(^7^9\) Yu and Yi, *Chosŏn hugi Chungguk-kwaˇui muyˇok sa*, pp. 58–9.

Commercial trade with the Ch'ing was officially monopolized by the Korean mission interpreters, but it was not impossible for private merchants, particularly those from Seoul, Kaesŏng, and Ŭiju, to infiltrate the embassies and carry on their own private business. With the collaboration of the interpreters, who would share part of the profits, merchants disguised themselves as attendants, personal slaves, horsemen, and porters. Private merchants also joined the embassies as business agents for those local government offices that had “eight-bundle” trading privileges. Serving as an agent was an excellent opportunity for doing private business, but limited quotas meant that only a small number of merchants had this chance.

Merchants had other illegal ways to take advantage of tribute missions. They found opportunities for private business at the border city of Cha-men (or Pien-men), the gateway from Korea to Ch’ing territory at the mouth of the Yalu River. The private trade at Cha-men was carried out by violating the official regulations on the transportation of Korean tribute and other goods between Cha-men and Ŭiju, the Korean town on the opposite side of the Yalu River. When Korean tribute to the Ch’ing was taken over to Cha-men, Ŭiju prefecture sent along “additional horses” to be used in emergencies. When the embassies returned to Korea, the prefecture sent “welcoming horses” to Cha-men to carry back the goods brought by the embassies. With the connivance of the interpreters and the local officials of Ŭiju prefecture, private merchants used these horses, which were supposed to be without cargo in at least one direction, for their private trade. The number of the horses often exceeded what the regulations allowed. According to a report to the court by the Korean envoy in 1686, the “additional horses” that had crossed the Yalu River accompanying that embassy numbered as many as a thousand, although the regulations allowed only about ten. The growth of Korean business at the border would not have been possible without co-operation from the Ch’ing side. In this regard, the porters who handled the Korean tribute and other goods overland between Cha-men and Shen-yang organized themselves into a powerful cartel, and, under the protection of Ch’ing local officials, came to dominate business with the Koreans in this border area. By the early decades of the eighteenth century, the combination of illegal, private, and official trading was uneasily contained within the formal tributary system.

82 For the Cha-men trade, see Yu and Yi, Chosŏn hugi Chungguk-kwa’ui muyŏk sa, pp. 100–7.
The growth of business turned Cha-men and nearby areas into flourishing centers of trade by the late seventeenth century, but not for long. The Korean interpreters’ commercial business began to collapse, and court documents from the 1720s and 1730s reported cases in which interpreters could not repay the silver they had borrowed from government offices. One possible cause of this crisis was the decline of the Waegwan trade with Japanese merchants after direct commercial relations between Ch’ing and Tokugawa were established through the ports of Ningpo and Nagasaki in the late seventeenth century. More significantly, the flow of silver from Japan, which had sustained Korea’s commercial and diplomatic business with the Ch’ing, decreased sharply from this period.  

Narrowed commercial opportunities increased competition. In the 1720s the Korean court supported the interpreters and attacked private business at Cha-men. In 1723, delegates from the Chosŏn court, consisting mostly of interpreters, successfully persuaded the Ch’ing government to abolish the porters’ cartel, and a few years later the Koreans also banned its embassies from trading at Cha-men or Shen-yang. Fierce responses from various interest groups against these measures illustrate how deeply entrenched private business at the border had become by the early eighteenth century. Resistance to the Korean court’s measures was voiced by local government offices in Shen-yang and Óiju, both of which had profited from the trade by the private merchants who were under their protection. Partly as a result, the court reopened the Cha-men trade in 1754, but this time only for the merchants of Óiju prefecture. Korean court policy in the second half of the eighteenth century oscillated between two competing pressure groups: the interpreters and the private merchants. For example, the court in 1758 awarded the interpreters a monopoly on the importation of Chinese hats, a measure intended to generate profits and help cover embassy expenses. And yet this privilege was soon withdrawn and the court instead gave the business to private merchants while imposing import duties on them at the same time.  

Korean court policy on the supply of Chinese hats illustrates the financial difficulty of supporting the embassies during the second half of the eighteenth century, when there was a chronic and increasingly serious shortage of silver in Korea. Relying on the importation of foreign goods was at best only a provisional measure, for they were being paid for with silver. An alternative Korean export item was found in the last decade of the eighteenth century: red

84 Pak, Chosŏn hagi hojo chaesŏng ch'ŏngch'ae aek sa, pp. 100–6; Yu and Yi, Chosŏn hagi Ch'ingguk-kwaui muyŏk sa, pp. 107–10.
85 Yu and Yi, Chosŏn hagi Ch'ingguk-kwaui muyŏk sa, pp. 112–14.
86 Yu and Yi, Chosŏn hagi Ch'ingguk-kwaui muyŏk sa, pp. 120–52.
ginseng. Because of the widespread cultivation of ginseng that had begun in the early eighteenth century and the new technique for processing it (drying the ginseng after steaming it), red ginseng came to be the main item traded for Chinese goods. In 1797, the Korean court built a factory to process ginseng in Seoul, and began to monopolize its production and sale. The interpreters and other personnel of the Korean embassies were thereafter allowed to take a certain amount of red ginseng for their commercial business. The government monopoly was not perfect, however, and private merchants from Kaesŏng and Ŭiju, as they had done during the previous two centuries, found ways to infiltrate this lucrative business.\(^{87}\)

**Importing cultural goods**

The items that were sought during the Korean missions were not confined to goods to be used at court and in daily life. Importations that might be called “cultural,” including knowledge and techniques, were also acquired by the embassies to Peking. This movement was mostly in the direction of Korea, reflecting its position as a consumer of Chinese culture. Literati elites were the main recipients for things such as books and paintings, but the court and government officials also sought statecraft knowledge such as calendrical astronomy and firearm technology.

Koreans were enthusiastic purchasers of books from Peking. The Chosŏn court showed a great interest in acquiring Chinese-language books, only partly motivated by their strategic concerns with maps and geographical treatises. In the second half of the eighteenth century the royal library (Kyujanggak) sought to collect the Confucian classics and commentaries, official histories, encyclopedias, and other books on diverse topics to be used in court projects. Having already been the main collectors of Chinese books in the late Ming period, literati elites had resumed their role as major book buyers in the late seventeenth century. Yi Úi-hyon, who went to Peking on a 1720 mission, brought back a total 1,416 殿. Korean interpreters and Ch’ing officials attendant on the embassies (bośii-pan) served as brokers between Chinese booksellers and Korean consumers. Even without any specific requests, interpreters purchased books and paintings of scholarly and artistic value for resale in the domestic market.\(^{88}\) Koreans were also interested in items banned for export by the Ch’ing government, such as books on history and geography, including

\(^{87}\) Yu and Yi, *Chosŏn hugi Changgak-kwawi mayŏk sa*, pp. 164 ff.

useful maps of adjacent territory, ingredients for gunpowder, and manuals and instruments for calendrical astronomy. The court and government offices often encouraged their agents to use illegal means to bring those items back to Korea.

Saltpeter, an essential ingredient of gunpowder (along with sulfur and charcoal), is a good example of government-sponsored smuggling. The series of wars against the Japanese and then the Manchus, as well as King Hyojong’s Northern Campaign initiative in the 1650s, stimulated the Korean government’s need for gunpowder. It made continuous efforts to acquire a stable supply of the necessary components, particularly sulfur and saltpeter, for which domestic production had been chronically short for centuries. From the early seventeenth century, the importation of those materials from either Ming territory or Japan was blocked. For its own strategic reasons, the Ch’ing also strictly banned their export, particularly that of saltpeter, to Korea. The Korean court’s emphasis on domestic production of saltpeter and their search for sulfur mines provided an encouragement, at least indirectly, to Korean merchants and officials with opportunities for the lucrative yet dangerous business of smuggling saltpeter. These illegal attempts created serious diplomatic tensions between the Ch’ing and Chosŏn, particularly in the 1650s and 1660s, when the Manchus sent a series of embassies to Seoul specifically to investigate the problem.89

As a result, the Koreans tried to learn for themselves the more advanced Chinese and Japanese methods for producing saltpeter. An important achievement in the acquisition of this technology was made by an official interpreter, Kim Chi-nam, in the last decade of the seventeenth century. After secretly engaging in this project for several years with the encouragement of several high court officials, Kim was finally able in 1698 to compile a manual for making saltpeter, titled Sinjŏn chach’ŏ pong (Newly transmitted recipe for saltpeter). Kim Chi-nam’s success in improving gunpowder technology illustrates how much the Chosŏn court depended on the efforts of interpreters and other chung’in functionaries to collect strategic information and import useful objects and techniques from the Ch’ing.90

Circulating privileged knowledge about the official Ch’ing calendrical system, the Shih-hsien li, was also against imperial regulations. The Ch’ing government continued the Ming policy of banning the private practice of astronomy and astrology, a regulation that also applied to the rulers of tributary states. Unlike the knowledge for making saltpeter, Korea’s need for knowledge about

the Ch'ing calendar system arose mainly from its status as a tributary state. The Chosŏn dynasty had to accept the calendar issued by the Ming and then the Ch'ing Bureau of Astronomy. The ritual in which Korean embassies received the imperial calendar that set the first day of the new year and first day of each month (cheng-shuo) and all the other dates derived from them was an important confirmation of the Korean king’s submission to imperial power.91 The Korean court used the calendar granted by the Ch'ing emperor, but they were also motivated to acquire an understanding of the techniques of calendrical astronomy. Chosŏn kings promoted possession of knowledge of astronomy and calendar-making as an important source of legitimacy to rule their own kingdom. This had been one of the main motives behind the ambitious promotion of calendrical astronomy by King Sejong (1397–1450, r. 1418–50) in the early fifteenth century. Moreover, the long and complicated process of producing their own printed calendar, including its publication and distribution, meant that the Chosŏn Royal Bureau of Astronomy (Kwansanggam) did not want to wait for the calendar for the next year that normally was brought back to Seoul by envoys in the eleventh month. To have it earlier, the Royal Bureau of Astronomy wanted to be able to calculate the defining moments for setting the calendar independently and much earlier.92

The self-sufficiency of the Chosŏn bureau in astronomical calculation was limited, however, because the results had to be in exact accordance with the Ming and then the Ch'ing imperial calendar. Any differences could be taken as an act of lese majesty and would cause serious diplomatic problems. A series of embarrassing experiences caused by such discrepancies between their locally produced calendar and the new Ch'ing calendar provided the Chosŏn court with the incentive to invest in the project of learning the Shih-hsien li system. This project aimed to acquire an independent ability to apply to keep the Korean calendar compliant with the new Ch'ing calendar that had been reformed according to Western methods. In 1645, when the news of the Shun-chih emperor's promulgation of the new Ch'ing calendrical system reached Korea, the court sought a strategy for carrying out this project that would yield the knowledge that could function as a standard method for the rest of the Chosŏn period. The core of the strategy lay in forming a special team of astronomers and interpreters to be sent to Peking with the tributary missions specifically to learn the calculation methods from Ch'ing astronomers.

The first meaningful effort to learn the Ch'ing system was made in 1648, after serious discrepancies had been found in the Korea-produced calendar. In

the third month of that year, the Royal Bureau of Astronomy reported that the Korean calendar, calculated using the Ta-t'ung li system acquired from the Ming, differed from the Ch'ing calendar in the setting of fortnight periods and placement of the intercalary month. The court had no choice but to use the Ch'ing calendar, at least for dates in the documents to be sent to the Ch'ing government, but a durable solution had to be sought. An astronomer was dispatched to Peking twice that year, only to discover that it was not an easy task to learn the new method during short stays in Peking, especially given the restrictions on the activities of Korean envoys. In the first year of King Hyojong’s reign (1650–1), the Korean calendar, still calculated from the old methods, differed from the Ch'ing calendar. Accordingly, the court dispatched another astronomer, Kim Sang-bŏm (d. 1654/5), to Peking four times between 1651 and 1654. Kim eventually learned how to calculate the calendar according to the new method. The Chosŏn court was thereafter able to issue its own version that anticipated the Shib-hsien calendar from the year 1654. This pattern was to be repeated for more than a century, in the course of which the Royal Bureau of Astronomy bit by bit learned more about Ch’ing astronomy.93

CULTURAL TRANSFERS TO KOREA AND THEIR IMPACT IN THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY

The transactions in commercial goods and cultural importations between the Ch'ing and Chosŏn Korea continued from the beginning of their relations, even when there was mutual suspicion and antagonism. From the early eighteenth century, however, literati elites in Korea gradually took a more active role in cultural relations with the Ch'ing. As can be seen from travel accounts written by members of embassies to Peking in this period, the strict regulations the Ch'ing government had previously imposed upon the Korean envoys were lifted considerably, giving them more freedom to tour the city, meet people, and acquire books and other artifacts.94

The diversified experiences that the literati envoys came to enjoy during their missions are also reflected in the enhanced literary quality of their travel writings. From the early eighteenth century, Korean travelogues showed a remarkable sophistication in both literary elegance and the cultural agenda

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the authors presented to their literati audience. In the second half of the seventeenth century, travel writings were mostly dry records about itineraries and assigned duties, reflecting both the poverty of the authors’ travel experiences and their moral repugnance against the “barbarian Manchus.”

Important for upgrading literary standards and redirecting the rhetorical aim of the Korean travelogues to Peking was that by Kim Ch'ang-öp portraying his journey in 1712. Enjoying great popularity in late Chosön society, Kim’s travelogue incorporated the author’s rich experience and dealt in an elegant way with the soul-searching question about the cultural identity of the Korean literati in the world dominated by the Ch'ing regime. His work, by providing future travelogue writers with a literary model to be emulated, also opened the possibility for using accounts of the trip to Peking as an important vehicle to publicize the authors’ cultural agenda.

Although Kim Ch'ang-öp, an older generation literatus by the time of his travel, could not free himself from the traumatic memories of the preceding century, a few literati travelers of a younger generation came to formulate a novel cultural agenda in their travelogues. They introduced to their fellow literati various features of Ch'ing culture, particularly its material aspects, in much more favorable terms. A good example was Yi Ki-ji (1690–1722), a young literatus who accompanied the Korean mission in 1720 as an attendant of his father, the senior envoy Yi I-myông (1658–1722). Having the ambition to write a travelogue that would rival Kim’s, he showed a different cultural orientation in his. Rather than searching for the vestiges of the fallen Middle Kingdom, Yi Ki-ji instead provided detailed reports about various useful resources he witnessed, including techniques, knowledge, and other cultural attractions that, if imported, could enrich the cultural life of his own country. Among the attractions in Peking that Yi paid attention to were the European techniques and artifacts he found in the Roman Catholic churches in Peking. One of Yi’s assignments was to acquire astronomical manuals and instruments from the Jesuit priests who served as mathematicians at the Ch'ing court.

Another significant change that exerted an impact on the Korean intellectual scene in the eighteenth century was the gradual re-establishment of cultural contacts between Korean travelers and Han Chinese literati. The vibrant intellectual relations between Chinese and Korean literati in the late Ming period had stopped in the chaotic decades of the early seventeenth

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95 Pak Se-dang’s travelogue based upon his mission in 1668–9 was a case in point. Pak, Kugyok Sogyê yâllok.

96 For comprehensive research on the literary style and cultural agenda of eighteenth-century Peking travelogues, see Kim Hyôn-mi, Sippy'al segi yônhaengnok-ûi chôn'gae-wa t'aksõng (Seoul, 2007).

century. Although Koreans resumed their visits to Peking after Ch'ing occupation in 1644, their relationship with Han literati was not immediately restored. The delay might be explained partly by the fact that the Koreans’ contacts with the Ch'ing were confined mostly to its Manchu side. The residence of the Korean embassies in Peking, the Hui-t'ung kuan, was located in the Inner City, where only bannermen were allowed to reside. Without any freedom to move about the city even in the late seventeenth century, the literati members of the Korean embassies had few opportunities to make contacts with Han literati.

In the late 1760s Hong Tae-yong (1731–83) successfully presented his account of meetings with several Han literati in Peking as a fresh cultural issue for the first time since the late Ming period. After returning from his Peking mission in the winter of 1765–6, Hong circulated the record of the “brush talks” he had exchanged with three Chiang-nan literati who were staying in Peking to take civil service examinations. Containing detailed and lively discussions about a variety of topics concerning literati learning, Hong's records of their dialogue provoked a heated controversy among literati in Seoul. While some harshly criticized Hong's associating with “degenerate” Han Chinese who were willing to serve the “barbarian” Ch'ing dynasty, many of his colleagues enthusiastically welcomed Hong's deed as a rare example of true friendship forming between people from thousands of li apart.98

Significantly, Hong's exemplary deed of making friends with Han literati was soon to be emulated by his fellow Korean literati, notably his close friend Pak Chi-won (1737–1805) and the literati under Pak's intellectual influence. They followed in Hong's footsteps in their own travels to Peking, and subsequently relationships with Han literati were stabilized and further extended. By the end of the eighteenth century the Koreans' list of contacts included such focal figures in Ch'ing scholarship as Chi Yün (1724–1805) and Juan Yüan (1764–1849). The vigor of the intellectual interaction between Korean and Ch'ing literati also increased, as seen from vibrant exchanges of letters and poems between them. Koreans, who viewed their relationship with the Ch'ing scholars as a means to enhance their own academic prestige, tended to be more active in their attempt to gain recognition of their literary works in Ch'ing academic circles. Yet the Han literati's interest in Korean literati and their literary achievements was not negligible either. Literary works of a few Korean literati, including Yi Tök-mu (1741–93) and Pak Che-ga (1750–1805), were appreciated and published by Ch'ing scholars. They

welcomed Koreans’ work as rare examples of an extended intellectual community that participated in Chinese classical culture.  

Besides its importance in this restoration of contacts with Han literati, Hong Tae-yong’s travel experience, as presented in his famous travelogue, showed a deepened interest in various aspects of Ch’ing culture. As had been done by Yi Ki-ji half a century before, Hong also included a record of his visits to the Roman Catholic church in Peking and the brush talks he exchanged with the Jesuit priests as an important episode in his travel experience. Illustrating Hong’s own interests in European mathematics and astronomy, this episode reflected the ongoing investment by the Chosŏn court in the project of learning Ch’ing astronomy, for Hong’s visit to the Catholic church was occasioned by a chung’in astronomer’s official mission to learn from the Jesuit missionaries the methods of astronomical calculation.

Hong Tae-yong’s Peking experiences and his travelogue pioneered two mutually related cultural trends that prevailed in literati society in the Seoul area from the second half of the eighteenth century: interest in Western learning (K. sŏhak), including the sciences and Christianity that the Jesuits had brought to China, and pursuit of what was called Northern learning (K. pukhak), which referred to Ch’ing cultural developments.

Western learning and Northern learning

As seen in Hong Tae-yong’s visit to the Roman Catholic church in Peking, Koreans’ growing exposure to Western learning in the late Chosŏn period was due mainly to the interests of the court and literati officials in the European astronomy that had been adopted for the official calendar system of the Ch’ing dynasty. The pace of introduction of Western learning into Korea was conditioned not only by the intellectual merits of European astronomy per se, but more importantly by changes in Korean political and cultural attitudes toward the Ch’ing calendar system.

Although Koreans knew about Jesuit learning from the first decade of the seventeenth century, it did not attract serious interest. Without finding any practical importance in it, Korean literati were generally indifferent, if not hostile, to the new learning. The situation changed when the Ch’ing

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100 Hong’s visit to the Jesuits is described in Hong Tae-yong, Sanhaegwan chamgin mun-ŭl ban son-ŭro nilch’idada: Hong Tae-yong-ui Pukkyŏng yŏnaenggi “Ŭllyŏng yŏnaenggok”, trans. Kim Tae-jun and Pak Sŏng-sun (Seoul, 2001), pp. 182–91.
government promulgated the *Shih-hsien li* as its official calendar system. The official aura of Western astronomy as the basis of the imperial calendar made it an object of practical importance for the Korean court. The decision to learn Western astronomy therefore had to be made in spite of its generally negative reputation among literati officials, who denounced the calendar of “barbarian Manchus.” Their strong anti-Ch'ing sentiments limited Korean interest in Western learning narrowly to the field of calendrical astronomy, particularly the astronomical tables and calculation methods possessed by the Ch'ing Bureau of Astronomy. In this mundane mission, the literati officials themselves did not take the initiative, but assigned the task to *chung'in* astronomers and the interpreters. Few showed serious interest in the cosmological and philosophical, or religious, aspects of Western learning. Advancement of understanding of Western learning required a new political–cultural setting in which the Ch'ing and its cultural assets would be viewed by the Chosŏn court and literati elites in more favorable terms. In 1705 the Chosŏn court resumed the project to master Western astronomy. Compared to the effort in the mid-seventeenth century, however, the court this time set a more ambitious aim, the full-scale introduction and implementation of Ch'ing astronomy with its component Western learning. Court astronomers as specialists in astronomy and interpreters were assigned to make contacts with Ch'ing astronomers in Peking. The court astronomer Hŏ Won and the chief interpreter Yi Hu-gang jointly carried out this mission. They bought several important astronomy books and, more importantly, established a good relationship with a Chinese astronomer named Ho Ch'ün-hsi, who for several years thereafter kindly helped Hŏ Won to learn Western astronomy.

This favorable attitude toward the Ch'ing astronomical system might be viewed as a reflection of the generally improved image the Koreans had about the Ch'ing as part of the amelioration of Ch'ing–Chosŏn relations in the early eighteenth century. But the endorsement of the *Shih-hsien li* system by the Korean court and the literati officials took a rhetorical detour. In the aftermath of the court actions in 1704 for commemorating the sixtieth anniversary of the fall of the Ming, Korean court and literati officials reconstrued the astronomy

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of the Ch'ing government as one of the noble legacies of the Ming dynasty. The system behind the *Shih-hsien li* calendar, they argued, had obviously been developed in late Ming under the auspices of the Ch'ung-chen emperor. In 1708, for instance, King Sukchong commissioned the Royal Bureau of Astronomy to make copies of Matteo Ricci’s world map and Adam Schall von Bell’s star atlas, both of which had been brought to Korea in late Ming. In the preface devoted to the two charts, the director of the bureau, Ch’oe Sŏk-ch’ŏng (1646–1715), recorded the touching moment when he had read in the two Jesuit works such phrases as “the *mujin* year [1628] of the Ch’ung-chen era” and “the integrated domain of the Great Ming” (*Ta Ming i-t’ung*). The implication was obvious; the *Shih-hsien li* was a Ming legacy and thus could rightly be adopted by Chosŏn, which they regarded as the only bearer of the culture of the “Middle Kingdom” after the fall of the Ming. The redefinition of the *Shih-hsien li* calendar system as a Ming legacy was made not so much for negating the reality that it was the official calendar of the Ch’ing. The proponents of the *Shih-hsien li* calendar seemed to aim at imputing a sense of noble origin to this apparently “barbarian” object in order to be able to endorse it. These somewhat conflicting factors – improved relations between the Ch’ing and Chosŏn and the Chosŏn court’s endorsement of Western astronomy as a Ming legacy – shaped the subsequent involvement of Koreans with Western learning.

In the eighteenth century the Korean court dispatched court astronomers to Peking with missions to learn about the changed calculation methods whenever the Ch’ing emperor ordered calendrical reforms. Korean astronomers paid visits to Jesuit astronomers, notably Ignatius Kögler and August Hallerstein, to learn the methods in the compilation entitled *Li hsiang k’aо ch’eng* (*Thorough investigations of astronomical phenomena*) and its sequel. Compared to the previous century, when only *chung’in* functionaries carried out the project, some *yangban* literati joined the enterprise. In 1720, Yi Ki-ji approached José Soares and Kögler to acquire books on professional astronomy, perhaps the draft version of *Li hsiang k’aо ch’eng*. Hong Tae-yong in 1766 visited Hallerstein with an astronomer whose mission was to learn from the Jesuit how to calculate “the paths of the five planets.”

As literati figured prominently in the contacts with the Jesuits in Peking, the Koreans’ interests were broadened. In addition to calendrical astronomy,

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107 Hong, *Sanhaegwan chamgin mun-ŭl ban son-ŭro milch’idoda*, pp. 182–91; Lim, “Postponed reciprocity.”
literati travelers also found possible benefits in European natural philosophy, paintings, mechanical clocks, and glassware, and in a few rare cases even Christianity. Consequently, during the first half of the eighteenth century, a full range of Western learning was introduced to Korean intellectual circles, to the extent that Western learning came to be one of the prominent cultural trends of the literati in the second half of the century.\textsuperscript{108}

Setting aside the common interest in ideas and artifacts from the West, however, the specific fields of interest and literati’s evaluation of them varied according to the proclivities of individuals and the academic schools to which they belonged. Most of the Korean literati in this period treated Western objects at best as mere curios, if not as culturally subversive, but some literati were seriously attracted to aspects of Western learning. An extreme case was a group, formed in the early 1780s, of literati who became Christian converts. Without any missionary presence in Korea, these Confucian literati, mostly from the so-called “Southerner” faction that had been marginalized in the court politics of the eighteenth century, nurtured in themselves Christian spirituality through reading Jesuits’ texts on Christian teachings. These literati converts, who were soon to be the victims of a series of official persecutions, did not represent the majority attitude of literati toward Western learning. More typical were those who limited their interests to Western science and technology. European excellence in the fields of mathematics, astronomy, and instrumentation was widely recognized among the literati, including even those of an extreme anti-Christian bent.\textsuperscript{109}

The growing interest of Korean literati in Western science in the late eighteenth century produced a group of literati mathematicians. Consisting mostly of Seoul literati, notably Hong Tae-yong, Yi Kahwan (1742–1801), and Sŏ Ho-su (1736–99), they cultivated specialized interests in such diverse fields of mathematical learning as cosmology, astronomy, cartography, and instrument making. Although inspired by Jesuit geometrical texts compiled in late Ming – Matteo Ricci’s \textit{Chi-ho yüan-pen} (\textit{Elements of geometry}), for instance – they nevertheless pursued comparisons and even syntheses between Western and Chinese mathematical traditions. Significantly, they found the principles and exemplars to guide their syncretic effort in the works of Mei Wen-ting (1633–1721), the mathematician of the late seventeenth century, and in the Ch’ing official compendium of mathematical learning of the late K’ang-hsi period titled \textit{L"ul iy"uan y"uan} (\textit{Origins of pitchpipes and the calendar}). Korean mathematicians accepted the theory of the so-called “Chinese origins of Western learning” (\textit{hsi-hsüeh chung-yüan}), which had been articulated by Mei Wen-ting


\textsuperscript{109} Kang, \textit{Chuŏn-ŭi sŏbak sa}, pp. 147–83.
and promoted in the Ch'ing compendium of mathematics. The Korean interest in Western learning was highly mediated by the interpretations by Han Chinese scholars and the Ch'ing court.110

The interest in Western learning in the late Chosŏn period was not an early sign of Korea's conversion from adherence to a “medieval China” to adherence to a “modern West,” as was often asserted by Koreans in the twentieth century. On the contrary, to the Koreans Western learning was one of the cultural resources available in the Ch'ing metropolis, and the interest in Western learning was an outcome of the changed attitude of Korean literati about the Ch'ing and its culture. Korean literati mathematicians were also the leading advocates in the second half of the eighteenth century of another new cultural trend, called Northern learning (K. pukhak).

Taking its name from a passage in the Mencius (3A4) that can be read, “travel to the north to learn [the culture of] the middle kingdoms,” Northern learning represented a dramatically changed attitude toward the Ch'ing taken by a number of literati in Seoul and its vicinity late in the eighteenth century. Strongly advocated by Pak Chi-won and his circle, but at the same time shared widely among the literati from a few powerful clans that monopolized court politics in the late eighteenth century, Northern learning put the cultural aura of the Middle Kingdom over the Ch'ing, which earlier had been regarded as repugnant by Koreans.111 The unanticipated longevity and prosperity of the Ch'ing dynasty that the Koreans witnessed during their tributary travels to Peking, and the large-scale importation of high Ch'ing culture into Korea, led a number of literati in Seoul to feel a sense of contradiction between the political–cultural reality and their inherited orthodoxy of Ming loyalism and anti-Ch'ing attitudes. While overthrowing the prevailing orthodoxy was not a possibility, they attempted to adjust the previous ideas in order to accommodate the new political–cultural reality.

The rhetorical strategies deployed by proponents of Northern learning in legitimating Ch'ing culture were diverse. Some found merit in the supposedly rustic way of life of the Manchus, which they contrasted with the highly articulated yet decadent culture of the Han Chinese. Others viewed Ch'ing culture as a continuation of the Middle Kingdom culture; this attitude usually accompanied high evaluations of the Ch'ing emperors’ cultural accomplishment in promoting classical learning.112 The elevated status of Ch'ing culture as

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111 Yu Pong-hak, Yŏnam il'pa hakhak sasang yŏng'gu (Seoul, 1995), pp. 56–78.

perceived by the Northern learning scholars involved a re-evaluation of Korean culture. They began to point to signs of cultural backwardness. They ridiculed their fellow literati’s belief in Korea’s position as the sole inheritor of Middle Kingdom culture after the fall of the Ming dynasty. They criticized literati’s narrow focus on Ch’eng–Chu teachings. They saw backwardness in agriculture and crafts. Some even found traces of barbarian influence in Korean clothes and hats (ˇuigwan), once regarded as the prime sign of Korea’s being the true “Middle Kingdom.” In sum, they began to view the Ch’ing as a country of cultural excellence, against which Korea was, in their view, repositioned as a culturally backward country.

The proponents of the Northern learning drew on various aspects of Ch’ing culture. As Koreans’ contacts with Han literati became more frequent late in the eighteenth century, the major achievements of Ch’ing evidential scholarship were introduced to Korean literati society. By the early nineteenth century, Ch’ing scholarship, particularly its philological investigations into Confucian classics, became an important topic of scholarly discussion in and around Seoul, but the impact of the iconoclastic implications of Ch’ing philological works on Ch’eng–Chu interpretations remained marginal throughout the late Chosˇon period.

More visible in the literati society of the Seoul area at the turn of the nineteenth century was an enhanced interest in what might be called the world of things and techniques. Books and various other cultural artifacts imported from Ch’ing, combined with the growth of Seoul city, cultivated in the minds of elite literati a new cultural sensitivity that went beyond the traditional Neo-Confucian emphases on the pursuit of metaphysics and moral cultivation. This new cultural interest took various forms, ranging from compilations of works of encyclopedic coverage to highly specialized studies.

Out of their interests in things and techniques, a few proponents of Northern learning formulated proposals for statecraft reform. They emphasized to the court and literati society an urgent need for importing useful techniques and artifacts from Ch’ing society that would improve people’s lives and the strength of the country. In 1786, for example, Pak Che-ga, one of the most enthusiastic advocates of Northern learning, presented to the king a famous memorial in which he proposed a full-scale commercial trade with the Ch’ing domain as an effective way to import useful techniques and artifacts. While

113 Kim, Chosˇon hugi chisigir-ˇui taeoe insik, pp. 90–1.
115 A useful sketch of this new cultural trend in late eighteenth-century Korea is provided in Ch ˇong Min, Sipp’al negi Chosˇon chisigir-ˇui palgyˇon: Chosˇon hugi chisik p’aerˇodaim-ˇui pyˇonhwa-wa munhwa pyˇondong (Seoul, 2007).
listing many useful things he had witnessed in his own travels to the Ch'ing capital, Pak also paid attention to Jesuit learning still present in Peking.

Your minister has heard that the Westerners who made the calendar in the Ch'ing Bureau of Astronomy were all well versed in geometry and thoroughly understood the method of maximizing usefulness for enriching the people's livelihood. If our state could get them and with the resources of the Royal Bureau of Astronomy hired and accommodated them, the youth of our country could learn how to calculate the movements of the heavenly bodies and to use musical and astronomical instruments, learn the appropriate methods of agriculture and sericulture, learn about more effective medicine and herbs, learn how to cope with droughts and floods, and learn how to manufacture bricks for the construction of palaces, ramparts, and bridges ... If they could learn all of this, in a few years they would turn into men of ability for the proper administration of the state ...  

Pak's memorial illustrates two main aspects of the way that the Western learning and Northern learning movements in the late eighteenth century were perceived in Korea. In spite of its origin in Europe, Western learning was a part of the material culture available in Peking and associated with the Ch'ing Bureau of Astronomy. Second, the seemingly new cultural agenda was in fact not new at all. The cultural movement called Northern learning borrowed its concrete exemplars, its methodologies, and even its cultural sensitivity from what the chung'in officials had been doing in their Peking missions for more than a century. Pak Che-ga's proposal to hire Jesuits as teachers of technology was a modification of the previous practice of sending chung'in officials to Peking. Literati travelers, belated participants in the ongoing cultural transactions, might have cultivated much earlier this new sensibility by learning how and what the chung'in envoys were doing on the tributary embassies. A number of chung'in professionals, particularly official interpreters, with the wealth and cultural assets they had accumulated through their business with Ch'ing counterparts, played an active role in promoting the new cultural trends, Western learning and Northern learning in particular. It was mainly through their efforts that the Ch'ing cultural objects and ideas were imported into Chosŏn society. They also played the roles of brokers and messengers in networks of cultural communication between Korean and Han Chinese literati. A few astronomers and interpreters were even accepted by literati elites as colleagues in their pursuit of mathematical learning and Northern learning. Significantly, Pak Che-ga himself was the son of a concubine, another category of people who were usually classified as chung'in, along with lower-ranked government functionaries.

116 Wm. Theodore de Bary et al., eds., *Sources of East Asian tradition* (New York, 2008), Volume 2, p. 419, with some modifications.

By the late eighteenth century Korean elites in the Seoul area had incorporated into their culture elements from those who earlier had been denounced as cultural others: Ch'ing literati and chung'in officials. Although the yangban literati in general still tried to keep their cultural distance from Manchu “barbarians” and the chung'in “lesser men,” an increasing number of the elite came to view those cultural assets in more favorable terms, at least as objects to be appropriated by literati in their own cultural pursuits. These two aspects of the transformation of the Chosŏn literati’s perception of the Ch'ing and of the chung'in were interrelated, for the chung'in officials had played the role of being the main agents in Korea’s relationship with the Ch'ing in political, economic, and cultural matters. In a sense, the increasing cultural diversity and vigor of late eighteenth-century Korea, with its new focus on topics outside the Neo-Confucian tradition, might have been unthinkable without the concomitant reassessment of Ch'ing government and cultural achievements. Although still bewilderingly somewhere between being the barbarian usurper and the legitimate inheritor of the Middle Kingdom, the Ch'ing dynasty at its height of political power and cultural prosperity in the eighteenth century came to be viewed by Koreans as having the aura of the Middle Kingdom, even if they could not say as much.
CHAPTER 5

THE EMERGENCE OF THE STATE OF VIETNAM

John K. Whitmore and Brian Zottoli

The name “Vietnam” (Ch. Yüeh-nan) was determined at the Ch'ing court at the beginning of the nineteenth century. After Nguyen Anh and his troops, starting from Saigon in the south, achieved victory in 1802 over their last rivals in Dong-Kinh (Tonkin, centered on Hanoi) in the north, he sent a delegation to Peking to petition for imperial recognition as the ruler of the new state he had formed. He had his envoys request approval to call their state Nam Viet (Ch. Nan Yüeh). This name, Nan Yüeh, implied a connection back to the recognized kingdom established in the early Han dynasty by Trieu Da (Ch. Chao T'o, d. 137 BCE) that included important portions of what was Kwangtung province under Ch'ing rule. The use of the name “Yüeh” had a long history, going back to the Chou period, for designating a shifting set of regions and political entities along the eastern and southern coast of what is now called China. The Chia-ch'ing emperor and his advisers did not accept the name Nan Yüeh (Southern Yüeh), which might have implied it was part of some “Yüeh,” and instead settled on Yüeh Nan (Viet Nam/Vietnam), presumably to indicate a state south of “our Yüeh.” This name came to be extended retroactively to the strip of land stretching some two thousand kilometers along the eastern coast of Southeast Asia from the Gulf of Tonkin and inhabited by people predominately speaking Vietnamese language. In 1838 Nguyen Anh’s dynastic heirs would change the name to Dai Nam (Great South), disposing with Viet/Yüeh altogether. At the same time, Nguyen Anh’s envoys requested that he be allowed to use a new reign title, Gia-long. The envoys explained to the Ch'ing court that the title was a combination of Gia-Dinh, the region in the south from which Nguyen Anh launched his conquest of the north, and Thang-Long, the capital (now Hanoi) in Dong-Kinh. They disavowed the fact that Gia-long was appropriated from

the first character of the title of the present Chia-ch'ing reign and from the second character of the title of the previous Ch'ien-lung reign. This reign title was granted for use by the ruler that Ch'ing records treat as a king and Vietnamese records as an emperor.

During the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries the interaction between elements of what was to become known as Vietnam and the Ch'ing empire was not a simple one-to-one relationship of capital to capital. As Vietnamese regionalism developed, different segments of Vietnam had contacts with different parts of an expanding Chinese world, including migrants and merchants, and not just with the central Ch'ing government and its representatives. The contacts contributed to the emergence of new geographical and cultural regions that competed with each other during these two centuries, as well as to the spread of overseas Chinese petty capitalist communities into Southeast Asia.

A distinguishable Vietnamese culture began to coalesce in the middle of the Red River delta during the last millennium BCE and continued to develop under Chinese influence or domination. This area, extending from the Red River delta, became known in the fifteenth century as Dong-Kinh (the Eastern Capital, also written Tonkin, Ch. Tung-ching), and remained the center of the state into the nineteenth century. Through the first millennium the Red River delta area and farther south was at least nominally treated as part of a larger administrative unit of the successive empires to the north. Despite efforts to subordinate it, first by the Han and then the T'ang dynasty, the region separated from the northern empire and established its own strong royal tradition. A state known as Dai Viet emerged as a T'ang-influenced, Buddhist, Southeast Asian-style polity, with an economy based on wet rice agriculture. Having once been the T'ang empire's protectorate of Annan, this new polity controlled various lowland localities of the Red River delta and

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3 Keith W. Taylor, "Surface orientations in Vietnam: Beyond histories of nation and region," Journal of Asian Studies 57 No. 4 (1998), pp. 949–78. Taylor made a strong case for not uncritically accepting "representations of Vietnamese history and culture [that] have mostly affirmed unity and continuity" (p. 954), but he did not abandon the terms "Vietnamese" and "Vietnam" for describing the history before 1800.

down the coast to Mt. Hoanh as it fought off threats: Champa kings in the south, the Dali kingdom in the northwest, the nascent Nung state in the north, and the Sung dynasty in the northeast. The Ly lineage (1010–1225) of the central Red River delta and then the Tran clan (1225–1400) of Han Chinese descent built strong states on the southeast coast of the lower delta in the midst of an increasing Chinese (V. Ngo) population. They interacted and competed with rival kingdoms of Champa (in present-day central Vietnam) and Angkor (in Cambodia and present-day southern Vietnam). The Ly and Tran regimes centered in Thang-Long maintained their independence from the north by defeating invasions of imperial forces, particularly those of the Mongols in the 1280s.5

As Vietnamese society developed, stresses and strains occurred, and during the fourteenth century weaknesses riddled the realm. Tai attacks from the Truong Son Mountains to the west and Champa assaults coming from the southern coast almost destroyed Dai Viet. The Ming campaigns of 1407–27, joining with the local Ngo community, finished the Thang-Long regime. During this period, a new political power emerged in Dai Viet from the territory of Thanh-Nghe, just to the south of Dong-Kinh. First Ho Quy Ly (r. 1400–6) built a new polity after the catastrophes of Champa, and then Le Loi (r. 1428–33), after he led the resistance to the Ming invasion, became the king of Dai Viet and founded a new dynasty.6 This chaotic situation provided an opening for the rise of scholars who argued that classical Chinese thought held the solution for their country’s ills. As these scholars became more heavily involved in court politics, Buddhist political influences declined in the fifteenth century. The writings and interpretations based on the Chinese classics underlay Ho Quy Ly’s revival of Dai Viet power. Many scholars had joined and supported the Ming occupation, and after the Ming forces’ defeat, other scholars worked with the newly powerful Le Loi government. These scholars were predominantly men from Dong-Kinh and had a fragile alliance with the new ruling elite from Thanh-Nghe. The old Dong-Kinh aristocracy of the Ly and the Tran eras faded from the scene as the new warrior elite rose from the highlands of Thanh-Nghe.7 For the next 500 years, three of the four

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ruling families of Vietnam, the Le, the Trinh, and the Nguyen, came originally from this highland region. The fourth family, the Mac, was a Dong-Kinh clan linked to Confucian scholars and to the coast.

The new Le dynasty of Dai Viet through the fifteenth century adopted and adapted the Ming imperial model, though it followed the T’ang code for its laws. The fifth Le ruler, Le Thanh Tong (r. 1460–97), fourth grandson of Le Loi, brought Dong-Kinh scholars and Thanh-Nghe warriors into his government. He transformed Dai Viet into a bureaucratic state with a strongly Confucian character and established the Nam-giao (Ch. Nan-chiao), a sacrifice to Heaven, as the new central state ritual. To staff the new bureaucracy, the Le dynasty king, referred to as an emperor in the Vietnamese records, for the first time consistently utilized the triennial examination system of the Ming dynasty to recruit scholars for appointment in the civil service. This administrative system constituted the Hong-duc model, named after the second of Le Thanh Tong’s two reign periods. The transformed Le state crushed Champa to the south and attacked Tai states to the west. After its defeat and the expulsion of its troops in 1427, the Ming government exhibited little desire to become involved again, and generally left the Vietnamese alone for over a century, as the Ming now placed their southern neighbor outside the range of civilization. Vietnamese scholars increasingly participated in Dai Viet’s tribute embassies north to Peking and doubtless brought back a stronger sense of how the Ming bureaucratic system operated.8

Over the following century, this new model of government crashed not once but twice. Following the deaths of Le Thanh Tong and of his son and successor, Hien Tong (r. 1498–1504), the rivalry of the Nguyen and the Trinh, powerful families in Thanh-Nghe, as well as a Buddhist revolt, tore the Le realm apart. From the chaos, the Mac clan seized power and sought to restore the Hong-duc bureaucratic model. Their leader, Mac Dang Dung (r. 1528–41), emerged as a powerful military figure. This Dong-Kinh family, which perhaps originated in southern China, claimed to have had over 200 years of involvement with local scholars of classical texts and to have been mainstays of the Ming colonial regime a century earlier. Nevertheless, in the 1530s tensions developed with local scholars of classical texts and to have been mainstays of the Ming colonial regime a century earlier. Nevertheless, in the 1530s tensions developed with the Ming court because the Mac had driven the Le family from the throne. This

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dispute was resolved when the Mac negotiated with the Ming court to have the lesser title of Commissioner of Annan (An-nan tu-t'ung shih), rather than the customary title of king (wang). Concurrently, a Thanh-Nghe faction led by the Nguyen and another Trinh family rose in revolt from their southwestern mountain base to try to put the Le ruler back on the throne and to deny the rule of the Mac over Dai Viet. In the 1550s, a visiting Portuguese priest, Gaspar da Cruz, described the realm as prosperous and Ming-oriented, but a further three decades of war tore Dai Viet apart. In 1592 Thanh-Nghe forces finally drove the Mac from the capital, Thang-Long.

As the Manchus challenged the Ming dynasty’s hold on power through the first half of the seventeenth century, Dai Viet was divided under the control of three families in three separate territories. Dong-Kinh and Thanh-Nghe formed Le territory under the Trinh. The region around Cao-Bang, a section of the northern mountains under Ming protection on the border of Kwangsi, sheltered the remnants of the Mac clan, now essentially local hereditary officers (t’u-ssu) in the Ming system. On the southern border of Dai Viet in what is now central Vietnam, Nguyen forces controlled Thuan-Quang, former Champa territory that had become the twelfth and thirteenth Vietnamese provinces. The Nguyen forces were northern troops including the Nguyen clan with their following, as well as the Mac and their supporters with whom the Nguyen allied. This pattern of family control, originating in the fifteenth century, set the framework for the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries in Dai Viet. The Nguyen of Thanh-Nghe had been favorites of Le Thanh Tong’s mother, and of Thanh Tong himself, before rising to compete for power following Thanh Tong’s death. The Mac from Dong-Kinh were tied strongly to, and revived, Le Thanh Tong’s Hong-duc model of government and with it the appointment of literati to civil office. The Trinh, led by Kiem (r. 1539–69), also of Thanh-Nghe, according to the later Nguyen histories had emerged as protégés of the Nguyen, intermarried with them, and gradually took control of the restored Le regime during the second half of the sixteenth century.


11 William T. Rowe, China’s last empire: The great Qing (Cambridge, MA, 2009), pp. 14–24.

century. After their victory in 1592, the Trinh consolidated their control over the Le kings, Dong-Kinh, and their homeland in Thanh-Nghe. The Trinh and Nguyen clans contested for control of Dai Viet through the 1590s, until the Trinh won. The Nguyen, led by Hoang (c. 1558–1613), seeing power slip away from them, took advantage of existing Mac institutions to establish themselves on the southern border in Thuan-Quang beyond Mt. Hoanh, safe from Trinh demands. From 1600 on, the Nguyen built their new power base in Thuan-Quang.

The Trinh clan, led by Trinh Tung (c. 1570–1623) did not seize the royal throne of Dai Viet as earlier victors, the Ly, Tran, Ho, Le, and Mac families, had done. Having restored the Le family (1592–1788) to the throne of Dai Viet, the Trinh kept them there, married to Trinh daughters, and maintained control of the court and the land as lords (V. chua), not as kings. The Trinh did not make themselves kings for two reasons. First, for 200 years, the Ming government had discouraged what it saw as usurpations in its bordering states. Ming armies had crushed Ho Quy Ly’s usurping regime in 1407, and during tensions over disputed border territories they threatened to do the same to the Mac claimants around 1540, despite the latter’s adoption of Chinese norms. Reinforcing this potential of a northern threat, the Ming government under the Wan-li emperor (r. 1573–1620) demonstrated its military might in three great campaigns of the 1590s against the Mongols in the northwest, the Japanese in Korea, and the Miao (Hmong) in the southwest. If the Trinh claimed the throne outright, they might invite a similar response. A second reason for the reluctance of the Trinh to make themselves kings was that they had not unified Vietnamese territory, and the Mac to the north and the Nguyen to the south were ready to fight against a Trinh monarchy.

GOVERNMENTS UNDER COMPETING FAMILIES

The rule of the Le, Trinh, Nguyen, and Mac families during the first half of the seventeenth century did not apply in any strict way the Ming model of government established in the fifteenth century by Le Thanh Tong and

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restored in the sixteenth century by the Mac. The remnants of the Mac clan, protected by the Ming, existed in their highland enclave on the northern border, separated from the support of scholar elites in the delta lowlands of Dong-Kinh. The diminished circumstances of Mac territory and resources were insufficient to maintain a bureaucratic structure. With the restoration in 1592, the Le family reigned as kings in Thang-Long but did not rule. They
were tightly intermarried with and controlled by the victorious Trinh lords. Historical texts no longer celebrated the accomplishments of the Le ancestor Thanh Tong and his bureaucratic accomplishments in Dong-Kinh. Rather, the roots of Thanh-Nghe greatness became central, and the need to unify the realm of Dai Viet under Thanh-Nghe control became a paramount goal.15

But there were two claimants for Thanh-Nghe dominance. By the year 1600, the Trinh clan had control of Dong-Kinh and Thanh-Nghe, despite their earlier need for Nguyen aid, resources, and cannon from the south to defeat the Mac and their partisans (again according to Nguyen sources). Outmaneuvered around the capital of Thang-Long in Dong-Kinh, the Nguyen leader Hoang returned to the base he had established on the Mac foundation in Thuan-Quang decades earlier. Turning his back on Dong-Kinh and founding a new realm in former Champa territory, Hoang and his descendants continued to reject Trinh suzerainty. The Trinh in turn saw their former Thanh-Nghe allies in the south as blocking Trinh efforts to achieve a fully unified realm. They declared the Nguyen to be rebels. In this divided situation, the Le remained on the throne as the one legitimate entity accepted by both sides.16

For 200 years, through the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, the struggle for power by the two sides reverberated across the Vietnamese landscape. The divided realm – that is, the main section of Dai Viet (Dong-Kinh and Thanh-Nghe) against the southern borderlands of Thuan-Quang beyond Mt. Hoanh – meant that the two Thanh-Nghe families, the Trinh and the Nguyen, had to remain militarized. Neither was immediately disposed to revive Le Thanh Tong’s Hong-duc bureaucratic model of government. The Nguyen were in a new land, expanding their power southward while defending themselves against the Trinh in the north. The aristocratic Trinh, attempting to unite Dai Viet, had no desire to bring back the Hong-duc bureaucratic model strongly tied to their Mac opponents and the scholar elites. The result in both cases was tightly knit aristocratic rule by families tied strongly to their shared Thanh-Nghe homeland.17 What mattered on both sides were personal ties, loyalty, and ability, mainly military. The belief system on each side was Mahayana Buddhism combined with the spirit world, an old world for the Trinh in Dong-Kinh and Thanh-Nghe and a new one for the Nguyen in the

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former Champa territory of Thuan-Quang. The oath of personal allegiance, previously put aside by the bureaucratic model, again became important. The Hong-duc model itself did not completely disappear as the Le throne retained its Ming trappings, and a scattering of scholars still served in the capitals. The scholars in Dong-Kinh continued to serve on embassies to the Ming court. The aristocratic families made the decisions in their respective regions, and these families had little need for scholars and their ideas about governing society.

In Thuan-Quang, the Nguyen lords were stepping into the old realm of Champa and the commercial world of the South China Sea that connected the southeast coast of China, Japan, and the Ryukyu Islands with the ports of Southeast Asia, Phnom Penh, Ayudhaya (near Bangkok), Batavia (Jakarta), and Manila. Moving their capital among varied locations across Hai Van Pass from their major port of Hoi-An (Faifo), the Nguyen began to construct a realm of their own, separate from, but in ways similar to, that of the Trinh in Dong-Kinh. Later Nguyen histories tell a tale that needs further examination using other sources, especially European ones. About the turn of the seventeenth century, Nguyen Hoang, acting in a manner similar to Vietnamese rulers going back to the eleventh century, brought together an overarching Buddhist structure and the evolving local spirit cults of the land, particularly Cham. To belong to a land, the people had to come to terms with the powers, natural and supernatural, in the landscape, and through this relationship authority and legitimacy flowed to their rulers. The Nguyen, acting on their Champa and Mac foundations, are believed to have set up a network of five temples, centered on the Thien Mu (Heavenly Mother) Temple, an amalgam of the Taoist Queen of Heaven and the female Cham deity Po Nagar. Gradually, local Cham cults were adopted by Chinese and Vietnamese residents. This was especially the case for the cult of Po Nagar, who became the Sino-Vietnamese Thien-Y-A-Na. By accepting and absorbing such local powers, the new regime built a claim of legitimacy for itself separate from the claim to legitimacy by the Trinh in Dong-Kinh.

Early in the seventeenth century, Nguyen forces north of the Hai Van Pass became active in the major port of Hoi-An and increased their involvement

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in the commerce of the southern coast. Over the following decades, Nguyen power and society pushed south against the surviving Cham territories. A Mac prince allied with the Nguyen took over Phu-Yen (Cap Varella), moving beyond Thuan-Quang and through the next region of Quy-Nhon. Nguyen forces continued to expand their control over the surviving realm of Champa, and Saigon, just north of the Mekong delta, became part of their realm by the end of the century. The Nguyen and their allies incorporated the Gia-Dinh region as the southernmost sector of their territory. Reflecting this new geopolitical reality, the southern realm came to be called the “inner realm” (Dang Trong), in contrast to Dong-Kinh in the north as the “outer realm” (Dang Ngoai) controlled by the Trinh. The newly arriving Europeans called the Dang Trong region Cochin China. This may have meant the Cochin near China, as distinguished from the Cochin in the south of India.

A group of families from the single district of Tong-Son in Thanh-Nghe, joined by history, blood, experience, and intermarriage, became a new aristocracy of the southern realm. These Nguyen leaders forged alliances by arranging strategic connections for their children: “married Nguyen daughters were intermediaries intended to bind allied families closer together, or to use their influence on behalf of their natal kin,” and similarly Nguyen sons were adopted into other families. This aristocracy was primarily a military one. The new realm retained its military form because the Nguyen were defending against, and hoped to conquer, the Trinh in the north, and also because of hostilities with the Cham and other campaigns such as support for an allied Cambodian monarch at war with Ayudhaya. The balance of power between the Trinh regime, on the one hand, and the Nguyen to the south and the Mac forces to the north of Dai Viet, on the other, prevented either the Trinh or the Nguyen from gaining a decisive advantage. As the Nguyen realm in the south grew, military garrisons (V. dinh) became the primary administrative form, dominating civil officials and controlling all elements of their jurisdictions on an ad hoc basis. These administrative units of the Dang Trong region eventually numbered twelve: six in the old area of Thuan-Quang; three in Quy-Nhon formed from former Cham lands; and three in Gia-Dinh, the former Khmer


20 Quotation from Cooke, “Regionalism and the nature of Nguyen rule in seventeenth-century Dang Trong,” p. 134; chapter 4 of Zottoli, “Reconceptualizing southern Vietnamese history from the 15th to the 18th centuries.”
territory in the Mekong delta. A thirteenth unit, the center at Ha-Tien in the far southwest, lay in an area once dominated by Portuguese traders. By the eighteenth century, it had come under the influence of Cantonese immigrants (said to have been part of the Ming diaspora) and subsequently joined the Nguyen realm.21 This realm was ruled through mainly martial regimes, and the extent of civil bureaucratic administration varied.

Standing behind the walls at Dong-Hoi on their northern border, a defensive line built across the narrow lowlands between the sea to the east and the mountains on the west, the Nguyen continued to develop their military capabilities. The officer corps was originally composed of men of Thanh-Nghe origin, descended from the border warriors whose ancestors had been fighting for the past two centuries as well as men of eastern Dong-Kinh origin. Other men from the immigrant northern Vietnamese population formed the reserves and were conscripted into the army. Linked to these forces were craftsmen and artisans who provided construction labor and supplies. Elephant troops and artillery units formed significant elements in the military, and naval forces were key to defending against Trinh intrusions down the coast.22

The economic engine that drove southern Vietnamese society and was a source of power in the new realm was involvement in international trade. From the time that Nguyen forces entered Thuan-Quang in the second half of the sixteenth century and joined surviving Mac forces there, they had participated in the burgeoning seaborne foreign commerce. The expanding Vietnamese presence along the eastern coast of the Southeast Asian mainland coincided with the major growth of regional trade occurring from the middle of the sixteenth century. Still, the Nguyen had to take an active role to benefit, and already by the 1590s the wealth and power they were gaining from it were obvious to observers in Dong-Kinh.23

The Nguyen and their great port of Hoi-An benefited from a confluence of events. Private trade by Chinese had been officially sanctioned by the Ming government in 1567. A flow of American silver was penetrating the region, as were Europeans, especially Portuguese in the early phase. In the late sixteenth century, civil war was gradually resolving the disunity of events. Private trade by Chinese had been officially sanctioned by the Ming government in 1567. A flow of American silver was penetrating the region, as were Europeans, especially Portuguese in the early phase. In the late sixteenth century, civil war was gradually resolving the disunity


of Japan, and ships and traders from western Japan were taking to the sea. Mining technology there was producing more silver that was introduced into the trade. In the early seventeenth century, Dutch and English ships joined in the trade. The main point in Hoi-An’s favor as a port in the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries was that the Ming government wanted nothing to do with Japanese ships after decades of East Asian piracy, raids, and unregulated trading activities along its east and southeast coast, and then the Japanese invasions of Korea in the 1590s. As a result, Japanese traders and, after Japan’s reunification in 1600, official Red-seal ships (J. shuinsen), authorized by the Tokugawa regime, came to Hoi-An for their trade in Chinese goods. The local Vietnamese regime encouraged and profited from this trade, providing the entrepôt where Japanese merchants could meet private Fukienese traders. This thriving commerce then drew other traders, including Southeast Asians and Europeans, to Hoi-An.\(^\text{24}\)

The resulting economic dynamism on Vietnam’s south central coast came to involve both internal and external trade. The southern expansion of Nguyen control played a role in this commerce. The newly developing local economies, encouraged at first by Japanese financing and then by Fukienese, produced goods such as indigenous silk, pepper, sugar, and forest goods. This financing likely took the form of credit advances to be paid off with locally produced materials. The situation was conducive to the petty capitalism that was practiced on China’s southeast coast, but without the restraints imposed by the Ming and Ch’ing governments. Fukienese merchants operating along the Vietnam coast were free to develop their enterprises as commodity producers in a more dynamic fashion than in their homeland. The thriving local economies drew more Vietnamese settlers, perhaps following kinship ties, from Dai Viet into the new realm. Much of the southern economy was linked to the flow of international commerce.\(^\text{25}\)


The Trinh, ruling in Dai Viet and controlling the Le throne, were in a situation quite comparable politically and culturally to their former compatriots, the Nguyen, yet quite different in social and economic terms. They, too, formed a tightly knit group whose origins were in Thanh-Nghe and whose primary experience in the prior century had been military combat. Although the throne, court, and core of the country, the Dong-Kinh region, were under Trinh control, they were unable to build on their victory in 1592 and go on to unify the country. Geography and local antagonisms worked against them. The Mac, protected by the Ming government, survived in Cao-Bang in the northern mountains. The Nguyen, expanding to the south, were enriched by the thriving international commerce and protected by military developments of the time, particularly the cannon. The Trinh, too, remained militarized, and the tensions with the Nguyen led to open conflict from the 1620s on.

Like the Nguyen, the Trinh held their regime together with personal ties, martial achievement, and loyalty. Power relations were bound by oaths of allegiance, the old Vietnamese and Southeast Asian practice in which the participants drank a sacral fluid (e.g. the blood of a sacrificial animal) and swore to the spirits their loyalty to the Le and the Trinh. All this existed within a broader Mahayana Buddhist context. One Le king, Le Than Tong (r. 1619–43, 1649–62), was seen as a reincarnation of his namesake, the Ly ruler Ly Than Tong (r. 1128–37), of 500 years earlier. The scholar elites, with their knowledge of Chinese texts and administrative skills, took part as requested. As in earlier centuries, their major function was to understand and negotiate with the Ming court, and a number of them went to Peking on official tribute embassies sent to the Ming by the Trinh-controlled Le court in Thang-Long.

The Trinh also became involved in international commerce. For the first time, the major trading center was not at the fringe of Dai Viet, but at Pho-Hien, as well as at Ke-Cho on the riverbank at the capital Thang-Long in the midst of Dong-Kinh’s population and upriver from the coast. Nevertheless, the central economic activity in the north was wet rice agriculture, and government finances were based on rice production. Public lands in the villages served as the fiscal basis of the realm. Although the Trinh region encountered some of the same economic forces as did its southern counterpart, fiscal development required a more internal focus. For the Trinh, the most important aspect of foreign trade was supplying their military, and particularly

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satisfying their need for artillery, as they continued their efforts to unify Dai Viet under the Le reign and their own rule.28

During the first half of the seventeenth century, while the Manchus were threatening and ultimately conquering the Ming dynasty, in Dai Viet the two families, the Trinh and the Nguyen, interrelated by blood, marriage, and geography, struggled for control. Despite their basic similarities, their different situations led them in different directions. The Trinh ruled a densely populated, labor-intensive region that relied on rice agriculture for its economic base. The Nguyen controlled a region in which agricultural resources, at least initially, were much sparser; its economic bases were international trade and the foreign investment that stimulated local production. The two ruling families made choices based on the socioeconomic focus of their realms, and each realm interacted with different parts of Ming and Ch'ing society based on these choices. Ultimately, these different contacts with China led to a larger, unified Vietnam and a new pattern of rule for the Vietnamese.

**EFFECTS OF CONTACTS WITH THE CH'ING REGIME ON STATE DEVELOPMENT IN VIETNAM**

The creation of the Ch'ing state led by Manchus in the middle of the seventeenth century had repercussions that the two Vietnamese realms were able to exploit. For Thuan-Quang, it meant a changed international situation, as various Chinese coastal populations, migrants and merchants involved in petty capitalism, had a greater presence in the life of coastal Vietnam and more generally in the Nan Yang (Southern Sea), the coasts of Southeast and South Asia. For Dong-Kinh, it meant the loss of Ming protection for the Mac in Cao-Bang, and dealing with a dynamic new imperial court and bureaucracy centered in Peking.

The Nguyen in their southern realm felt the impact of the events in China more directly and more quickly than did the Trinh in the north. Following the Manchu conquest of Peking in 1644, there was a forty-year struggle by the Ch'ing dynasty to gain control over the entirety of the former Ming realm. The main areas of Ming resistance moved along the southeast and southern coasts, and involved elements who participated in trade in the South China Sea. This resistance led to the Ch'ing policy of removing the population close to the coast and trying to suppress the movement of trading populations south

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into Nan Yang. It was not until the 1680s that the restrictions along the coast ended, after the Ch'ing conquest of Taiwan. By this time, the Nguyen port of Hoi-An and the entire Nguyen polity had become a major center in the developing network of Fukienese commercial contacts extending across coastal East Asia even to Japan in the east and southwest into Nan Yang. Flourishing Chinese communities developed in the major ports of Manila, Batavia, Ayudhaya, and Phnom Penh.

As the large Japanese commercial effort of the first third of the seventeenth century faded and the inflow of various Han Chinese groups from the southeast coast ports grew through the middle of the century, the port at Hoi-An hosted an increasing Han population. Seen through the eyes of contemporary European and Asian visitors, this port was dominated by the Fukienese community in the second half of the seventeenth century. Temples were built, and in them integrative social, cultural, and economic leadership roles emerged for this community. The latter gave its support to the Nguyen in their capital just to the north of Hoi-An, and they played major roles both in the economic surge and in the formation of the new Vietnamese realm.

Through the seventeenth century, Hoi-An and the central coast of Vietnam thrived. Chinese ships went from Southeast Asian ports, especially Hoi-An, to Japan. The cargo loaded in Hoi-An was mainly Chinese and local Vietnamese silk that was traded for Japanese copper and silver, and many other products as well. The port brought wealth to the Nguyen regime. The growing trade drew on and stimulated the socioeconomic development in their new southern region. Fukienese traders poured money and credit into local societies, and stimulated local production and delivery of the goods they sought. This stimulus involved both lowland agricultural produce and highland forest goods. Raising silkworms and producing silk cloth, together with the flow of the mountain products, enriched elements of local society and pushed lowland contacts ever deeper into the Central Highlands. Pepper from Thuan-Quang was one of these products. Sugar was produced in response to demand and investment from the Fukienese commodity traders, and exports more than


doubled from the 1640s to the 1660s. The economic development attracted more Vietnamese settlers from the main part of Dai Viet. Joint Chinese and Vietnamese commercial enterprises formed a key component in the southward expansion of Vietnamese society.

Besides the role of international commerce in southern Vietnamese social development, the influx of Chinese immigrants into Nguyen territory played a major part in the expansion of their new realm. Through the second half of the seventeenth century, as the wars with the Trinh ground to a stalemate, the Nguyen extended their control south down the coast, through the Quy-Nhon region and on into the broad Mekong delta of the far south, the Gia-Dinh region. Several thousand refugees from Canton came into contact with the Nguyen in 1679 when the former moved into the previously Cambodian dominated Mekong delta area. They eventually established settlements at Bien-Hoa and My-Tho, and thus Nguyen-allied communities came to exist just north of and inside the delta. Along with Chinese immigrants, Vietnamese were moving into the Gia-Dinh region, with its great potential for growing rice, far beyond what the central coast (Thuan-Quang, Quy-Nhon) was able to produce. By the end of the seventeenth century, the Nguyen had established their garrison (V. dinh) in Saigon and begun to bring the broad southern territory of Gia-Dinh formally into their realm. To a great extent, the influx of Chinese was a male migration from the southeast coast, and the single men tended to marry local women, many of whom were local traders. In addition, mestizo Portuguese merchants, long a prominent force in Cambodian politics, remained active. After 1683, with the reopening of the Ch'ing southeast coast, two distinct groups of Chinese formed in this expanding southern territory: those settled and married locally, a permanent part of southern society, and merchants and seagoing men who participated in trade, for however long a stay, and returned home to coastal China. The first group came to be referred to as Minh Huong (Ch. ming-hsiang). Their customs and dress, supposedly reflecting their Ming sympathies, were common within the South China Sea network, from which they had come. The merchant communities were called Thanh Nhan (‘Ch'ing people,’ Ch. ch'ing-jen), and they maintained strong native-place ties and observed Ch'ing customs and the required style of hair and dress.

32 Li, Nguyen Cochinchina, pp. 78–87.
33 Li, Nguyen Cochinchina, pp. 33–4.
Through the eighteenth century, Gia-Dinh existed as a broad multicultural zone with a number of different linguistic groups, including Khmer, Cantonese, Vietnamese, Cham, Malay, Thai, and Portuguese. The Mekong delta began to produce rice for export to the northern parts of the Nguyen realm. In addition, Gia-Dinh was connected to the broader Southeast Asian commercial world. Early in the eighteenth century, a third Chinese element entered this world, a Cantonese clan surnamed Mok (V. Mac, Ch. Mo). The Mok established Ha-Tien as their entrepôt on the far western edge of the Mekong delta. Known for both its thriving trade and its community of scholars, Ha-Tien flourished in the interstices of the politics of the region. Eventually caught between the expanding Thai and Vietnamese powers, the Mok chose to side with the Nguyen, and Ha-Tien became the thirteenth and last garrison (V. dinh) of the southern realm.35

Despite the strong socioeconomic links that existed between Vietnamese as they moved south and the varied overseas Chinese communities that were forming across Southeast Asia, the Nguyen initially chose to remain somewhat apart from the Chinese surge and its commercial world. While benefiting greatly from the trade and its resulting internal economic stimulus, they kept their capital to the north of Hoi-An, and through the middle of the seventeenth century concentrated on holding their defensive walls against the Trinh. By the final third of the century, the Nguyen military emphasis began to shift south to support their southern advance and the increasing competition with Cambodia and with the Thai. Nevertheless, the South China Sea trade network offered something more than financial benefits for the Nguyen regime. The network was intertwined with a religious movement. Mahayana Buddhist contacts flowing along the shipping routes offered the Nguyen a broader legitimacy than did their amalgam of Hindu, Buddhist, and spirit cult elements. Through the last decades of the seventeenth century, the Nguyen court drew upon the flow of Chinese religious figures around the South China Sea trade network to construct a formal ideology. Led by the Nguyen lords, the court sought a means to consolidate its control over the expanding southern realm. The Ch’an (V. Thien) school of Buddhism, spread and nurtured by peripatetic Chinese monks of both the Lin-chi and the Ts'ao-tung sects, provided a more hierarchical pattern of religious belief linked to the throne. Tied into the old pattern of localized Buddhist and spirit cults, especially at the center at the Thien Mu Temple, the newly introduced forms of Ch'an thought and practice

focused spiritual authority on the court and strengthened the Nguyen position in its ethnically mixed and ever larger realm. At the same time, trade with Macao and military support from the Portuguese (such as casting cannon and providing copper cash) encouraged participation in Christian networks. Rivalry on occasion appeared between Christian and Buddhist factions at the court.36

The Ch'an religious effort was particularly apparent in the mid-1690s when the Nguyen lord, Phuc Chu (r. 1691–1725), invited the monk Ta-shan from Canton to establish a more integrative and authoritative form of Buddhist belief at his court, now established in Phu-Xuan (the Hue area). Led by Nguyen Phuc Chu, who styled himself Minh Vuong (“Enlightened Prince,” Ch. ming wang) and had his palaces built to look like Buddhist temples, the Nguyen family and the members of the court accepted Ta-shan as their master, becoming part of his Ts'ao-tung school’s thirtieth generation. Standing aloof from what Ta-shan described as a vulgar Buddhism widely spread throughout local society, Nguyen Phuc Chu and his aristocracy claimed to possess a purity and legitimacy of their own Ch'an Buddhism that reinforced the legitimacy of their rule.37

While their efforts to contact the Ch'ing court were turned aside, the Nguyen rulers and aristocracy continued to gain strength materially and politically from the South China Sea network. This network had been changing since the 1680s, when Ch'ing forces crushed the remnants of Ming resistance in Taiwan and reopened the southern China coasts for trade. Chinese ports, especially Canton, were now able to be in direct contact with the ports of the Vietnamese coast, mainly Hoi-An. At the same time, the Japanese government under the Tokugawa shoguns was unwilling to meet the heavy international demand for its copper and silver and gradually withdrew from the trading network.38 Through the late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries, the process of expansion and enrichment continued in the southern portion of the Nguyen realm. Its well-established ruling circle, from its strengthened Buddhist position, presided over the flourishing external trade and internal growth of population and religious belief. The Nguyen drew wealth from

Chinese immigrants and traders who contributed to the dynamism of local society, especially in the move across Gia-Dinh. There was a sharp rise in the production of rice. Within the competitive zone of mainland Southeast Asian politics, the Vietnamese expansion was part of a new trading and political dynamic.\(^{39}\)

In the meantime, the Trinh regime in Dong-Kinh had to face an increasingly unpleasant situation. The growing prosperity and power of the Nguyen regime to the south made the prospect of unifying Dai Viet more difficult. From 1627 on, the Trinh lord Trang (r. 1623–57) had repeatedly sent soldiers south with little result against the entrenched Nguyen, who were protected by their walls and advanced artillery. During the 1650s, the Nguyen struck back at the Trinh and occupied sections of Thanh-Nghe. In response to this attack and their failure to block it, the Trinh looked to the Ch’ing government to gain support from a different segment of the Chinese world than had been involved with the Nguyen. The Trinh sent emissaries over the land route through southern China up to the capital, Peking. This was the route taken by Vietnamese scholars who had served as Le kings’ tribute emissaries to the Ming court before it fell in 1644. Various members of the Trinh family, especially Trinh Tac (r. 1657–82), began to raise scholars into positions of service and authority. An emphasis on civil administration was marked in 1653 by a great project erecting twenty-five stelae in the Ming style inscribed with the names of the successful candidates in the Le examinations over the previous 100 years. The revival of the scholar elites and the fifteenth-century Hong-duc model of government depended on two factors: Tac’s ability to gain power and the Nguyen threat. The major Nguyen push north during the late 1650s drove home to the Trinh the need for change. Tac’s defeat of his brothers provided the opportunity.\(^{40}\)

Through the 1660s, under Trinh Tac’s leadership, the scholars, some of whom had visited Peking on earlier embassies, set about re-establishing the Ming bureaucratic model that their predecessors had set up under Le Thanh Tong two centuries earlier. Their purpose was to strengthen Dai Viet and gain unification of the realm. Seeking efficiency and enhanced power through a civil bureaucratic administration, Tac achieved greater political, socioeconomic, and cultural integration throughout the lowlands and the Red River delta. Unlike in the south, these developments had agricultural production, not trade, as their foundation. Dong-Kinh’s prosperity grew from the rise in

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Trinh Tac started by working on his fiscal base. He imposed taxes based on the registration of the adult male population that also provided corvée labor for roads and dikes. He strengthened the legal structure. Through the mid-1660s, he staffed his bureaucracy with graduates of the triennial examinations, presumably a continuation of the previous two centuries of the Ming pattern as adopted by the court in Thang-Long. He proclaimed forty-seven moral admonitions to apply countrywide. This text emphasized the five Confucian virtues of respect for ruler, parent, older brother, and husband, along with harmony among friends. Teachers and widows had to be exemplars, and the villagers harmonious and productive. Even as the Trinh lords were shrinking the ritual role of their Lê sovereigns, Tac promoted the idea of the centrality of the ruler in the relation between Heaven, humans, and Earth. He once again instituted the practice of sacrifices to Heaven (V. Nam-giao, Ch. Nan-chian).

With the gradual penetration of literati values into Vietnamese society, gender roles became more differentiated. Women were supposed to be “inside” the home, not with men “outside.”\footnote{By 1667 the Trinh were prepared to move in force against their rivals. First, they attacked and destroyed the northern enclave of the Mac in Cao-Bang, formerly under Ming protection. Militarily, the Trinh were successful, though diplomatically they lost, because the Ch'ing rulers had continued the Ming support of the Mac and demanded their reinstatement. A decade later, Trinh diplomacy with the Ch'ing succeeded and the Mac took shelter in Kwangsi, where they continued to operate. The Trinh then prepared for their major strike south to destroy the Nguyen and thereby establish Thang-Long once again as the capital of all Dai Viet. Even with their improved civil and military organization, the northern armies could not penetrate the Nguyen defenses, and the campaign gradually ground to a halt. The year 1673 marked the end of almost half a century of overt warfare between Dong-Kinh and Thuan-Quang. In 1674 the Trinh called a halt to their military efforts at unification and worked instead to re-establish the Hong-duc model of governance. They

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shifted their attention to rule by law and to growth and prosperity within their own land.\textsuperscript{43}

Trinh Tac sought to develop Dai Viet as the scholars advocated. This involved both capital and provincial levels of bureaucratic administration and appointing scholar-officials down to the district level. The goal of these scholar-officials, supported by the Trinh lords, was to develop a political economy that benefitted the people and the state. While tax collection and labor control in the villages became more efficient, the benefits to local economies rose as agricultural productivity and infrastructure were enhanced by local officials’ efforts at diking, alleviating catastrophes, spreading technical information, and general administration. Despite accepting the Confucian belief that agriculture was the root and commerce the branches of a good society, these officials were pragmatically involved in advancing general economic well-being. With peace, the population grew, and with the rise in population and productivity came expansion of commercial activity. The marketplace was as much a positive point of interest to these Vietnamese officials as was the rice paddy. Since the Vietnamese had long used Chinese-style copper coins but did not have a sufficient supply of copper ore, the issue of a sound money supply was a crucial one in the rising economy. Dai Viet minted its own coins and also used coins minted in Nagasaki and Macao. Coinage was a major trade issue.\textsuperscript{44}

The final decades of the seventeenth century and the first years of the eighteenth saw a flourishing northern society, state, and government led by Trinh Can (r. 1682–1709), built on internal economic growth and aided by external commerce with the Ch'ing empire and the South China Sea trade network. With the resolution of the problem of the Mac on the northern border in Cao-Bang in 1677, diplomatic relations with the Ch'ing settled into a predictable pattern of a tribute mission sent every three years or a double mission every six years, proceeding by land to present gold and silver objects. The result of these missions was a steady, asymmetric relationship that guaranteed Dai Viet its autonomy. The scholar-officials on these missions from Thang-Long absorbed the flourishing elements of Ch'ing society during the long K'ang-hsi reign.\textsuperscript{45}


\textsuperscript{45} See the map in Kelley, Beyond the bronze pillars, p. xiv; Whitmore, “Vietnam and the monetary flow of eastern Asia,” pp. 587–8; Brantly Womack, China and Vietnam: The politics of asymmetry (New York,
The Confucianism of the community of scholars in Dai Viet appears to have been different from that of its East Asian neighbors. Vietnamese scholars into the eighteenth century were practical, political, and parochial in their aims, with little concern for philosophical debate. Strongly independent in their application of this classics-based thought, Vietnamese literati nevertheless seem to have accepted the standard Ming state-sponsored Ch'eng–Chu interpretations of the Chinese classical texts. While Confucianism was promoted by the scholar elites as the basis of proper behavior prescribed by the government of Dai Viet, all segments of society were gaining new exposure to other influences and ideologies. For the first time, foreign traders came into the midst of Dong-Kinh instead of being kept on the coastal periphery to the east. They were present in Ke-Cho on the outskirts of the capital Thang-Long, as well as in Pho-Hien in the lower Red River delta. Mahayana Buddhism had a major revival. Catholicism became a presence in Vietnamese society at a number of different social levels. In this dynamic spiritual mix, a gender competition arose between the Cult of the Holy Mothers and the Inner Religion (V. Dao Noi). The Trinh and their fellow aristocrats, male and female, while supporting the role of scholar values in the bureaucracy, became more involved in an expanding range of beliefs of the day.\textsuperscript{46}

At the beginning of the eighteenth century, two Vietnamese regimes existed, both ostensibly under Le authority and flourishing politically and economically, yet with different court ideologies, different social and economic profiles, and different ways of connecting with the Ch'ing empire. The Nguyen were tied into the trade of the South China Sea, focused on Ch'an Buddhism, and strongly involved with communities left over from the Ming resistance to the Ch'ing conquest, the Minh Huong. The Nguyen domain interacted primarily with Fukienese, Cantonese, and their petty capitalism from the southeast coast of China. In Dong-Kinh, the Trinh developed their agricultural base, imposed their centralized Chinese bureaucratic model, adopted scholar values, and had formal tributary ties with the Ch'ing dynasty.

in Peking. The strengths, weaknesses, and Chinese connections of each system set the political trajectories through the eighteenth century.

**SOCIOECONOMIC FORCES AND POLITICAL CRISSES**

Through the seventeenth century and into the eighteenth, a stronger integration of society was achieved in Vietnam as well as in Burma and Thailand. Populations grew, trade increased, and local cultural patterns merged into larger units. The state encouraged and benefited from this integration as it expanded its administrative and economic involvement and promoted ideologies. Improvements in communications and weaponry enforced the centralizing tendencies, and economic growth depended in part on the state being able to provide peace and stability. In contrast to the Burmese and Thai realms that each thrived within a single river system, the Irrawaddy and the Chao Phraya, Vietnamese integration was bifurcated rather than centripetal, occurring in Dong-Kinh, the core area in the Red River system, and also in the coastal territory stretching through the regions of Thuan-Quang and Quy-Nhon to Gia-Dinh in the Mekong delta and west to Ha-Tien. Given the Nguyen and Trinh families’ rivalry, access in the Thuan-Quang region to international commerce and foreign weaponry enabled the Nguyen to remain independent of the centralizing intent of Trinh control. Economic and political control of the Mekong delta brought increasing amounts of rice to the Nguyen storehouses in Thuan-Quang. The Trinh consolidated their political and administrative systems and developed as a major power in Dong-Kinh.

The two political systems each benefited from the integrating socioeconomic developments. For both the Trinh and the Nguyen, their thriving socioeconomic situations placed stress on their political systems, and eventually these strains overwhelmed the two family regimes. In both cases, the collapse and then the resolution involved local Chinese populations and ultimately the Ch'ing government.

In the north, the Trinh system under the lords Trinh Cuong (r. 1709–29) and Trinh Giang (r. 1729–40) was eroded by the bureaucratic effort to simplify and regularize the flow of taxes. In the 1660s, with the reinstitution of the Hong-duc bureaucratic system, officials established population and land registers in the villages.

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and tax quotas for each village. Officials accepted set amounts of resources coming from the countryside into the capital with no revenue fluctuations. As a result, revenues did not change with severe weather or with real social and economic growth. For several decades, overall growth enabled the system to carry on. After a few generations, however, population growth led to strains on the system. The government lost track of changes in the population and land inventories that formed the foundation of its revenues. From the first decade of the eighteenth century, as natural disasters hit, tax burdens accumulated on smallholders, and powerful families consolidated their private control of local resources, depriving the state of revenue. As the situation deteriorated, vagabonds and bandit gangs roamed the countryside, and uprooted individuals and families moved from villages to urban areas as well as down the coast into the prospering Nguyen territory.

Trinh officials, linking the fortunes of the court to the wealth produced in the countryside, sought to reverse their weakening fiscal condition. At first, they acted conventionally. They sought to strengthen government control of state lands – that is, agricultural land in villages that formed the court’s fiscal base – and keep them out of private hands. They began updating the village registers. By the 1720s, the government categorized and taxed private lands for the first time. In their efforts to enhance fiscal control, scholar-officials promoted the T’ang model of “equal fields” for more direct economic control of revenues by the state. The Trinh goal was a new tax system. Called by the Vietnamese to-dung-dieu after the tsu yung tiao system (taxes in grain, labor, and other goods) of the T’ang dynasty, the new tripartite fiscal system included taxes on grain-producing land, both state and private fields; on adult male individuals, not as a quota on the village as a whole; and cash payments in place of a variety of service obligations and handicraft productions. In this way, all agricultural land was meant to be subject to taxation by the government, commerce provided a share of revenues for the state, and the bureaucracy gained a better accounting of revenues and expenditures. For the first time, Dai Viet moved in the direction of having a government budget, seeking to stabilize the balance of revenues and expenditures.

The Trinh government’s efforts did not overcome the increasing problems within the realm. Private power, often with the aid of allies in public office, continued to withhold land and manpower from the new system, which subverted the aims of the central administration. Urbanization in Dai Viet continued, not to the same degree as in other parts of East Asia, but still

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beyond local rates in earlier centuries. Population growth and continued commercialization brought shortages in available cash. The government accepted private minting of cash (i.e. counterfeiting), used debased zinc currency, and made pleas not to reject bad coinage in commercial exchanges. The government tried to increase copper mining in the northern mountains on the Ch'ing border. This effort drew entrepreneurs and laborers from across the border to take part in the production, and gradually taxes and fees from these mining operations underwrote much of the Trinh government’s activities. Still, the often unruly operations at the copper mines destabilized the territory north of the capital at a time when the Ch'ing government was increasingly sensitive to its southern borders and sought to control them.52

Through the middle of the eighteenth century, under Trinh Doanh (r. 1740–67) these socioeconomic strains contributed to increasing instability across Dai Viet. Local leaders of all types rose in resistance. At court the royal Le family chafed under the control of their maternal kin, the Trinh. In 1737, three Le princes attempted a palace coup. The Trinh suppressed the effort, and only one prince, Le Duy Mat (d. 1769), survived by escaping into the Lao hills called by the Vietnamese Tran-Ninh (Plain of Jars), southwest of the capital. Le Duy Mat resisted for three decades as other rebellions rose and were crushed through the 1740s and 1750s. The Trinh finally destroyed the prince and his group in 1769.53

In the midst of the swirling political, economic, and ideological vortex, Vietnamese scholars sought to come to grips with social problems. As the numbers of adherents of Buddhism and Christianity grew among Vietnamese on all social levels, scholars worked to control their texts and continued to write Chinese-style poetry. Two key examples of these families were the Ngo Thi and Phan Huy clans, which intermarried. Their members entered the official ranks through the middle and later parts of the century. Ngo Thi Si (1726–80), scion of the first clan, took a conservative approach to the crisis. His proposal was to restore the bureaucratic model to its full glory, focus efforts on reactivating the village registers, and set right the proper relationship between court and village landholders, all within a classical moral context. At the same time, the most famous Vietnamese intellectual of the century (perhaps of all


time), Le Quy Don (1726–84), an apparent rival of the two clans, followed the pattern of contemporary statecraft study under the Ch'ing and argued for a less idealistic, less hierarchical approach. For him, local traditions had a strength that the literati needed to draw upon for their solutions. By mid-century, Vietnamese scholars had begun to absorb recent changes in Ch'ing thinking that emphasized evidential learning and practical statecraft. Le Quy Don was more of an East Asian thinker than were his literati colleagues, yet he shared his fellows’ nonmetaphysical, primordialist approach to Chinese classical thought that focused directly on the classics and did not rely on Neo-Confucian intermediaries for their interpretation.54

As the Trinh court under Lord Sam (r. 1767–82) struggled to maintain its political balance amidst the growing chaos of Dong-Kinh, the Nguyen in Thuan-Quang developed their power based on involvement in foreign trade and the southern expansion. From the 1680s, Hoi-An and its merchants fit comfortably into the expanding network of the Fukienese petty-capitalist communities north and south along the coast and the broad Portuguese connections. The Ch'ing government began to concentrate long-distance trade at Canton. Vietnamese merchants and their Fukienese compatriots joined the traffic of junks among the widely scattered major ports of East and Southeast Asia, including Macao, Nagasaki, Batavia, Manila, Ayudhaya, and Phnom Penh, which were linked as well to Canton, up the southeast coast, and on into the interior of the Ch'ing domain. Hoi-An’s fortunes, together with the Nguyen regime’s fiscal base, fluctuated with this trade.55 Over a century and a half, trade relations with the Ch'ing continued to develop, until the flood of opium and the arrival of British guns forced the Ch'ing government into a fundamental change of the conditions of trade from 1840 on.

Through the eighteenth century the Nguyen regime became more involved to the south with increased agricultural production in Gia-Dinh and the


Mekong delta, as well as with Cantonese producers and merchants in Saigon to the east and Ha-Tien to the west. This multicultural environment of Portuguese, Khmers, Chams, Cantonese, and Malays came more and more under the sway of the Nguyen regime. Starting with the establishment of a government office in Saigon by 1700, the Nguyen presence there grew over the following century until it became strong enough to serve as the base for Nguyen Anh (1762–1819) to assert control over all Vietnam at the beginning of the nineteenth century.  

The Gia-Dinh region served as the battleground for the major powers of the area, predominantly Thailand, with its capital first at Ayudhaya, then at Bangkok, and the Nguyen, with their capital at Phu-Xuan. The Cambodian regime based at Phnom Penh gradually lost control of the Mekong delta area and itself became a pawn between these two competing forces. The Cantonese entrepôt of Ha-Tien, controlled by the Mok, in the Malay coastal zone on the west, sided with the Nguyen against the Thai and they were drawn into the Nguyen realm. Controlling the two Cantonese-dominated ports of Saigon in the east and Ha-Tien in the west, the Nguyen cut the Khmer off from international oceanic trade. Thailand sought control here as well, by linking with Ch'ao-chou merchants, rather than the Cantonese of Ha-Tien on the Nguyen side. 

The expansion of the Nguyen realm made direct administrative control more difficult, even as steps were taken to have a government more like the Ch'ing model. Certain families, such as the Nguyen Dang and Nguyen Khoa, dedicated themselves to preparing for examinations and serving in the civil administration. But the Chinese-style reforms of Lord Nguyen Phuc Khoat (r. 1738–65) in 1744 were aimed more at ritually and symbolically advancing the dominion of Nguyen power over the expanding realm than at effectively bureaucratizing the administration. The court adopted the court dress as well as the traditional six ministries of the Chinese imperial system. The Nguyen seat of power at Phu-Xuan changed from the Buddhist orientation it had had since the 1680s to take on the trappings of a capital. The lord emphasized that he was a true king (V. vương, Ch. wang).  

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56 Li, Nguyễn Cochinchina, pp. 141–7; Dutton, The Tây Sơn uprising, pp. 29–30. Also see the essays in Nola Cooke and Li Tana, eds., Water frontier: Commerce and the Chinese in the Lower Mekong region, 1750–1880 (Singapore, 2004).  
57 See chapters 9 and 10 of Zottoli, “Reconceptualizing southern Vietnamese history from the 15th to the 18th centuries”; Li, Nguyễn Cochinchina, pp. 143–4; Woodside, “Central Vietnam’s trading world,” p. 158.  
This was a time of economic prosperity for the Nguyen regime. The Nguyen also benefited from the social, economic, and political troubles of Dai Viet to the north as the robust southern economy attracted Vietnamese down the coast to take part in the new vitality. By the 1740s Cantonese settlers and traders in the Mekong delta, joined by Vietnamese, were producing a surplus of rice and transporting enough to make it plentiful along the central coast. The rice was paid for in copper cash gained from the international trade. The large number of Chinese junks sailing in and out of Hoi-An brought both profits and supplies of copper cash.\(^5^9\)

The demand for cash in the flourishing economy was so great that it led the Nguyen to mint their own zinc and copper coins in an attempt to remedy shortfalls in the money supply. The debasement of the currency contributed to inflation. In response, the Nguyen in the 1750s raised the duties on cargoes of incoming ships in an effort to gather more revenues, which caused Hoi-An’s international trade to suffer. Simultaneously, the Nguyen were undertaking a grand royal building program while continuing to incur the costs of enforcing their military control over the Mekong delta and Gia-Dinh. These increasing government expenditures, as receipts from trade declined, weakened the regime. To make up their losses in the 1760s, the Nguyen made efforts to extract revenues from the western mountain areas of the Central Highlands.\(^6^0\)

Along with these fiscal problems, the Nguyen had a growing need for ships to transport rice north from the Mekong delta and to provide logistical support for the military effort to maintain their hold over Gia-Dinh against the Thai. A key territory in this effort was the Quy-Nhon region, halfway between Phu-Xuan to the north and Gia-Dinh to the south. The government at Phu-Xuan placed heavy tax burdens on the area and its highlands. In 1765, the regent, Truong Phuc Loan (d. 1776), seized power in the Nguyen capital, which exacerbated the problems in an already deteriorating situation. This turmoil led in 1771 to a revolt in the Quy-Nhon highlands led by the three Tay-son brothers. Their movement drew highlanders, Cham people, and Vietnamese, together with Chinese pirates, all with their own grievances and interests, to proceed to Thuan-Quang and destroy Truong Phuc Loan and his regime. This ostensibly restored the Nguyen to their rightful place, but the result was the near destruction of the Nguyen family itself. In 1775 the turmoil enabled the Trinh to breach the walls at Dong-Hoi and invade the Nguyen capital of

\(^{59}\) Li, Nguyen Cochinchina, pp. 71, 89, 94, 144–6, 158.

Phu-Xuan. Sent south by the Trinh as an official, the Dong-Kinh intellectual Le Quy Don left a remarkable description of the great wealth discovered by the Trinh forces at Phu-Xuan in the form of the many thousands of strings of imported cash produced abroad for the Nguyen regime.61

The Tay-son armies pressed south into Gia-Dinh against the Nguyen remnants. In the 1780s they twice drove the last Nguyen claimant, Nguyen Anh, into the arms of his family's chief rival for the Mekong delta, the Thai, with their capital now at Bangkok. In the process, the Tay-son forces destroyed the entrepôt of Saigon and killed thousands of Vietnamese and Chinese residents and traders. Then in the mid-1780s the Tay-son pressed north into Dong-Kinh and destroyed the Trinh regime. The Le kings, fearing the assault from the south, invoked their tributary connections with the Ch'ing emperor and requested his government's aid. In what the Ch'ing court later claimed as one of the Ten Great Campaigns of the Ch'ien-lung reign, Ch'ing troops moved south from Kwangsi to save the Le royal house of Dai Viet and take control in the capital, Thang-Long. After performing their rituals for the New Year (Tet) early, Tay-son forces on New Year's Day 1789 launched the first Tet offensive. In a stroke akin to George Washington crossing the Delaware on Christmas night some twelve years earlier, they attacked the Ch'ing troops who were in the midst of their own New Year's celebrations. Trapped against the Red River, the Ch'ing forces were badly defeated, and survivors retreated north with the Le royal heir. This episode led to the Ch'ien-lung emperor's recognition of limits on his projection of military power on the southern periphery of his empire.62

The Ch'ien-lung emperor chose to recognize the Tay-son leaders as the legitimate rulers of Vietnam and to accept tributary relations with them. The Tay-son presented themselves as the rulers of the ancient realm, the Hundred Yüeh (V. Bach Viet), which had held the territory in what were now the provinces of Kwangtung and Kwangsi. They were also sponsors of a growing Chinese pirate network that they used against the resurgent Nguyen resistance in Gia-Dinh. These potential sources of friction notwithstanding, the Tay-son regime was able, with some subterfuge, to maintain relations with the Ch'ing


imperial government for a decade. Given the magnitude of the Ch'ing defeat in 1789, followed in the 1790s by a series of military upheavals within the Ch'ing empire, the Tay-son regime was the beneficiary of the Ch'ing interest in continuing this relationship in as stable a manner as possible. In 1797, the Tay-son attacked a pirate base at the request of the Ch'ing government, but otherwise maintained their sponsorship of piracy. A Ch'ing effort to control the Vietnamese-supported pirates met with little success. Only Nguyen Anh's defeat of the Tay-son forces in 1802 brought an end to the flourishing pirate network based in Vietnamese waters.63

THE RISE OF THE NEW STATE OF VIETNAM

Nguyen Anh's victory in 1802, with its strong Minh Huong support, led to a Vietnamese regime different from any previous one. Nguyen Anh had spent most of his years in Gia-Dinh and Thailand with his combined Asian and European forces, and relations with Macao and Portuguese active in Gia-Dinh were crucial to his successful return. He began a series of far-reaching, Chinese-inspired political reforms after becoming the Gia-long emperor (r. 1802–19) in his newly established capital of Hue.64 The standard historical view has stressed continuity from the Le period and asserted that, facing the task of ruling Dong-Kinh, formerly dominated by the Trinh lords, nominal Le emperors (or kings), and northern literati now nostalgic for the Le, the new Nguyen leader adopted a system of government that invoked the fifteenth-century golden age of Le Thanh Tong's Hong-duc reign (1470–97). The Nguyen were believed to have also borrowed some elements from their immediate Ch'ing present as well as from China's and Vietnam's own pasts, much as the Le rulers in the fifteenth century had drawn on their own contemporary Ming model and their own past back to when Dong-Kinh had been in the orbit of the T'ang dynasty. Our contrary view is that the Nguyen adaptation of an imperial government system was not an attempt to replicate the earlier Dong-Kinh model, but a disjuncture with the past. It was a result of the response to the increased Nguyen contact with their contemporary Ch'ing mercantile world and the growing importance of the Minh Huong within Dang Trong, the Nguyen domain during the eighteenth century. The

Nguyen system, especially under the Minh-mang emperor (r. 1820–40), was mainly based on that of the Ch'ing. There was a reconsideration of earlier Chinese institutions, but little explicit reference to the prior model of the Le dynasty's Dai Viet.65

Minh Huong participation in the Nguyen power base was a major element in the new economic and political order. Most notably, their agricultural exports continued to fuel growth in Gia-Dinh. Overseas Chinese factions played significant roles in the formation of both the Chakri court in Thailand and the Nguyen court in Vietnam, though without the intermarriage with the royal family in Hue, as happened in Bangkok.66 Initially, the new Nguyen state, like Thailand, found it expedient to entrust much of its foreign commerce to Chinese merchants. Nguyen Anh’s early career had been linked closely with the fortunes of the Cantonese Mok clan in Ha-Tien, descendants of a Ming official from Kwangtung. The Mok were famous for their achievements in classical learning; their pragmatic dealings with powerful Southeast Asian neighbors; and their energetic, profitable participation in the southern trading systems.67 Members of the Mok family found positions in the Nguyen court retinue in Hue as a consequence of their sharing exile with Nguyen Anh among the Chinese community in Bangkok during the years of the Tay-son wars.

The newly established Nguyen government of Vietnam in Hue sought to include other groups in the new polity. The royal clan and its Minh Huong allies from Gia-Dinh formed the mainstream of southern society known as the “civilized people” (V. Han Nhan, Ch. Han-jen), a term that included Vietnamese families who traced their origin back to Dong-Kinh and Thanh-Nghe, and also the Minh Huong. Their descendants became known as the Kinh ethnic group (lit. “the people of the capital”) by the end of the nineteenth century. The Nguyen coalition originally included Tho Nhan (indigenous peoples) who did not follow the normative social patterns of the Nguyen. They remained in Khmer, Cham, or mountain villages, spoke their own languages, and were isolated from the new Vietnamese socioeconomic developments. The

65 This is well reflected in Woodside, Vietnam and the Chinese model, especially chapter 2, “Nguyen and Ch'ing central civil administration: Power structures and the communications processes,” pp. 60–111; Kelley, Beyond the bronze pillars, p. 79.
means to bring such localities closer to the state included military–agricultural settlements established by Nguyen Anh and later efforts by the Hue court to standardize customary social practices.\(^{68}\) This regulation of customs involved negotiation between the state and the localities. At the same time, French clients of the throne, eclipsing Nguyen Anh’s early Portuguese allies, took their places next to Minh Huong scholars from merchant families and Vietnamese military men of royal lineage to reimage and re-create a synthetic Vietnamese tradition in the new court of the Gia-long ruler.\(^{69}\)

As Minh Huong scholars gained local fame, the prestige of descendants of Vietnamese literati who had originally followed Nguyen Hoang in the early seventeenth century was enhanced by the China connection. Nguyen Anh’s policies in the last quarter of the eighteenth century were a far cry from those of his heavily Ch’an Buddhist ancestors. Anh both courted Christian allies and made use of the Confucian traditions of his grandfather and of Minh Huong scholars from Gia-Dinh. Of the latter, especially significant were the students of Vu Truong Toan, a teacher of the classics in Binh-Duong district on the outskirts of Saigon. Living in seclusion during the Tay-son revolt, Toan cultivated disciples, among them Trinh Hoai Duc, who became a core group of Minh Huong serving as officials during the formative years of the Nguyen dynasty in Hue at the beginning of the nineteenth century. In symbolic recognition of his earlier importance, Toan’s remains would be rescued by a senior Minh Huong official, Phan Thanh Gian, in the wake of the French occupation of Gia-Dinh in 1865. The Binh-Duong school formed by Toan’s students trained most of the southern graduates of the early nineteenth-century regional examinations, though Gia-Dinh would never match the success of the scholars in Dong-Kinh under the system of examinations of the Le era.\(^{70}\)

Minh Huong had rallied behind Nguyen Anh in the wars against the Tay-son, and he charged these Gia-Dinh scholar-officials to provision and finance the Nguyen forces for the push north. Beginning in the 1780s, Anh re-established a Nguyen kingdom in Gia-Dinh, using Chinese-style political and administrative forms. His court drew upon these scholars of the southern Sino-Vietnamese communities to institute the new regime. The scholars’ abilities

\(^{68}\) Choi, Southern Vietnam under the reign of Minh Mang, pp. 136–46.


were demonstrated by the completion of the Gia-Dinh citadel in 1789, the first in Vietnam to fuse the European and Chinese architectural styles that years later would characterize Hue. These institutions were established before the southern coalition could have reasonably expected to conquer the former Le lands in Dong-Kinh. Nguyen Anh was continuing the royal project begun forty years earlier when his grandfather, the Nguyen lord Phuc Khoat, had adopted Chinese forms and decreed his southern kingdom to be separate from Thang-Long and Dai Viet in Dong-Kinh.

As the ruler of Vietnam recognized by the Ch’ing government, Gia-long proceeded to construct his new regime and to represent it in Peking. Conscripts built a new royal citadel in Hue, on the Huong River downstream from the Thien Mu Temple. He and his Minh Huang allies modeled this region on the Ch’ing capital as well as on the old Champa riverine system. Continuing his grandfather’s reforms of 1744 and adopting the advice of his scholars, including the Minh Huong, Gia-long used Ch’ing forms to develop his monarchy. He performed sacrifices at the altars of Heaven and of Soil and Grain, and he built a new temple of literature close to the Thien Mu Temple, along with mausolea honoring the nine ancestral lords of his family line, beginning with Nguyen Hoang. Hue’s basic Peking-style layout, including its walls and defenses, were in place by the end of the Gia-long reign in 1819, though the citadel would be refined by Minh-mang and later emperors, even after Hue’s internal dynamic was altered by the French occupation.

Although Nguyen Anh’s victory brought an end to decades of civil war, Dong-Kinh scholars found it difficult to assimilate into the new southern social, political, and intellectual world dominated at the capital by Han Nhan. Where the Manchu rulers in Peking utilized Han literati to administer the provincial parts of their empire, the Nguyen clan in Hue used its own allies to replace the northern state and village governance based on Le traditions in Dai Viet. Nguyen ambivalence toward the heritage of the old capital, Thang-Long, its name soon to be changed to Hanoi, is illustrated by the case of the Dong-Kinh scholar Phan Huy Chu. A descendant of both the Phan Huy and Ngo Thi clans, he presented his compendium of Dai Viet literati lore to

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the sinophile Minh-mang emperor, son of the Gia-long emperor, who showed little interest in it.\textsuperscript{73}

The Le system in Dong-Kinh was left largely in place under the control of Viceroy Nguyen Van Thanh (1757–1817) for the first decade after the Nguyen conquest of Thang-Long. Land and tax registers dating from the Le era were revised. The examination system was reinstated, though initially only at the regional level. This brought Dong-Kinh scholars into the ranks of the growing civil administration. The boldest effort to reform the administration in Dong-Kinh came in 1812 with the promulgation of the Gia-long code, a near direct copy of the Ch'ing code that at least notionally replaced the earlier Le code. Where the Le code had allowed significant autonomy in terms of village customary law, the new Gia-long code did not.\textsuperscript{74} A decade after the conquest, the Nguyen court attempted to place northern and central Vietnam under a common taxation system by establishing cadastral registers in all regions except Gia-Dinh in the south, which was controlled by the viceroy there, Le Van Duyet (1763–1832). The regime in rice-poor Thuan-Quang imposed high levies on the Dong-Kinh state land that had previously provided the revenues to support the Trinh-controlled regime. This proved a heavy burden for Dong-Kinh when dikes in the Red River delta did not hold up in times of unusually severe drought and floods and rice production suffered. While many of the Dong-Kinh elite had initially been willing to recognize Hue’s rule as the best available option, their support waned as control of the bureaucracy remained firmly in the hands of southern supporters of the Nguyen. Exploiting widespread unrest, numerous local rebellions in the north harried the Nguyen garrison forces.\textsuperscript{75}

The attempt by the Nguyen regime to control Gia-Dinh from Hue was no less daunting, and in the end proved disastrous. By the 1820s, at court and in the southern region, a generational change was taking place. The old guard, men who had come up through the ranks under Nguyen Anh in the fight against the Tay-son, left their offices and were replaced by their sons, by


graduates of the examination system dominated by Dong-Kinh literati families, and by the next generation of Minh Huong from Gia-Dinh. Only one group from the Gia-long era, European mandarins, disappeared completely from the new government. The Minh-mang emperor, who took the throne on the death of his father Gia-long in 1819, pursued Ch’ing-style civil and bureaucratic reforms during the 1820s and early 1830s in order to impose common standards throughout the country. He combined this administrative activity with military campaigns against isolated revolts and for outward expansion, particularly into Cambodia. Tensions began to surface as his government in Hue sought to take over direct bureaucratic control of Gia-Dinh after the death of Le Van Duyet, the famed eunuch general and local viceroy. Rule from Hue imposed restrictions and financial burdens on the southerners, particularly on the Chinese communities, as the emperor attempted to reduce the strength of the native-place ties of the Minh Huong and to naturalize new immigrants from the southeast coast. In Nguyen records mentioning Minh Huong, the character for the Vietnamese word huong (“incense”/“loyalist,” Ch. hsiang, or Ming “loyalist” as in Ch. Ming hsiang) came to be replaced by its homonym that simply meant village (Ch. hsiang). In the first half of the nineteenth century, the commercial center shifted to Saigon and the Gia-Dinh region from Thuan-Quang, with the long decline of the latter’s port of Hoi-An.

With the Nguyen military stretched thin by local uprisings and their expansionist designs in the highlands, Laos, and Cambodia, forces opposed to the Nguyen saw the opportunity to seize power in Gia-Dinh and perhaps to overthrow the Nguyen dynasty. A call to arms was issued in Gia-Dinh in 1833 by Le Van Khoi, the adopted son of the late viceroy, Le Van Duyet. Nearly the entire populace of Gia-Dinh and south-central Vietnam responded to his call, including officials in Saigon and Ha-tien, various Chinese communities, Christians, forced migrants from Dong-Kinh, and remnants of the Champa kingdom. At the same time, a Le pretender, Le Duy Luong, revolted in a minority area of the north-central Vietnam highlands. He drew support from literati still loyal to the former Le dynasty. The former Mac region in Cao-Bang also rose once more, this time under the leadership of a Tai chieftain.

Massive Nguyen campaigns waged in the early 1830s in all parts of the country largely crushed these local leaders and renegade officials, leaving the Hue government in control. Half the private agricultural land in the Tay-son’s

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77 Choi, Southern Vietnam under the reign of Minh Mang, pp. 45–93; Dutton, Sources of Vietnamese tradition, pp. 306–7; Ancient town of Hoi An, p. 160.
homeland of the Quy-Nhon region, still a strategic position for Hue’s assertion of power in Gia-Dinh, was confiscated by Minh-mang. He sought to use the Le system of establishing a state land system to provision his troops, and there were calls to extend this land regime farther south. The bloody aftermath of the dispersed resistance to Hue’s authority helped destroy the loose alliance among Chinese communities, Dong-Kinh Vietnamese, Gia-Dinh Vietnamese, and minority groups, and it paved the way for harsh and relentless assimilation policies in areas where non-Vietnamese groups held local power.  

The full details of the imperial Confucianism under the Nguyen regime have yet to be analyzed. Whether it had a southern character distinct from Confucian beliefs of the Dong-Kinh literati needs to be examined. This southern approach to Confucian scholarship seems to have been more in line with contemporary Ch'ing learning than with the northern approach. The Nguyen rulers promoted the standard Ch'ing interpretation of the Five Classics and the Four Books based on the commentaries of such Sung and Yüan scholars as Chu Hsi, Ch'eng Hao, Ch'eng I, Ts'ai Ch'en, Hu An-kuo, and Ch'en Hao. The Nguyen government also endorsed the early Han dynasty theory of Tung Chung-shu (179–104 BCE) that an active Heaven could support the throne, perhaps to aid their efforts in consolidating their new and extensive realm.  

The Vietnamese people of this time also recognized the Three Teachings (V. Tam Giao, Ch. San-chiao), the coexistence of Buddhism, Taoism, and Confucianism. The royal family, especially the royal women, supported this cult and maintained Buddhist beliefs of their own.  

Among those who stood to lose from the Nguyen court’s civilizing and standardizing efforts were the Dong-Kinh literati. Their relationship with the Hue court remained ambivalent, even openly hostile, into the 1850s and later. Dong-Kinh culture retained many indigenous elements that did not fit into the new social order promoted by the Nguyen court. The Ch'ing-style Gia-long code, for example, rejected certain aspects of northern Vietnamese tradition, such as allowing non-patrilineal inheritance. The land registers compiled in 1805 in the north reveal a surprisingly high proportion of female landowners in Dong-Kinh (surprising if one assumes a pervasive Confucian culture there).  

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The Hue government’s promotion of Confucian elements cannot be understood as having been carried in a gradual spread from Dong-Kinh with the Vietnamese expansion into the southern frontier regions. On the contrary, it was the southern regions, with their heavy local Chinese influences and direct contact with the Ch’ing realm, that were the source for the growth of the greater Confucian orientation in Vietnam during the nineteenth century. The developing southern Vietnamese tradition of Chinese scholarship joined with the model of the contemporary Ch’ing state to form the backbone of this new regime. Both were transmitted by the south’s continued contact with the southeast coast of China, and in the process the Nguyen court appears to have neglected the four-centuries-old tradition of the Dong-Kinh literati. The centralizing policies of the Nguyen regime in the 1820s and 1830s, such as banning the Nom script used in Dong-Kinh, to be replaced by standard Chinese characters, and reducing the Dong-Kinh provinces to equal administrative footing with the Gia-Dinh provinces, were not generated in the north.\(^8^3\) Political and popular culture, in both the north and the south, began to converge as a result of the increased exchange with the Ch’ing world and the broad influence of the various Chinese communities within Vietnamese society.

\(^8^3\) Woodside, Vietnam and the Chinese model, pp. 54–5, 141–3.
CHAPTER 6

CULTURAL TRANSFERS BETWEEN TOKUGAWA JAPAN AND CH'ING CHINA TO 1800

Benjamin A. Elman

After the year 1600 the new Tokugawa leadership in Japan did not acknowledge the Ming government as the leading power in East Asia. Nevertheless the Tokugawa sought to discourage conflict with the Ming authorities and allowed the tally trade (J. かんこう, Ch. k'an-ho) to resume. Earlier the Ming court had issued tallies for trade to representatives of the Japanese Ashikaga regime (1338–1573) as a tributary state. Unhappy with the precedent that the Ashikaga had formally asked for and received recognition as a tributary to the Ming emperor, the Tokugawa shogunate avoided accepting tributary status under the Ming dynasty and then the Ch'ing, which impeded direct trade. In 1715 for the first time the Tokugawa government began to issue its own trade credentials, which were meant to imply Ch'ing subordination to Japan. From then on, to enter Nagasaki harbor, where the shogunate confined overseas trade after 1635, vessels from China formally had to accept Japanese terms in order to receive trading credentials (J. しん牌, C. hsin-p'ai) from Nagasaki authorities.¹

One of the chief Tokugawa ministers who played a pivotal role in drafting the 1715 regulations was Arai Hakuseki (1657–1725), a sinophile in the shogun’s inner circle who was proud of his ability to write Chinese poetry. He feared that the export of metals through the Nagasaki trade to China was causing shortages that hampered domestic trade and was increasing smuggling. He contended that about 75 percent of the gold and 25 percent of the silver expenditures in Japan were spent on foreign trade. The goal of the new regulations was to restrict the Nagasaki trade in metals, especially copper and silver, to no more than thirty Chinese ships visiting Nagasaki each year. Tokugawa had already tried to place a general ban on exporting silver in 1668, but this ban did not become fully effective until 1763. Arai was also concerned

about Ch'ing expansionist policies, and he feared that the K'ang-hsi emperor was maneuvering to weaken Japan.

Nagasaki’s registered population had dropped from 64,523 in 1696 to 42,553 in 1715, when the new trading regime started. In the eighteenth century, Nagasaki also was home to a Chinatown (Tokan), which during the peak of the trading season brought some 10,000 Chinese and overseas Chinese traders and seamen to the port. The Tokugawa government forced a decline in the annual number of Chinese ships arriving in Nagasaki over the eighteenth century from seventy to fewer than twenty. In comparison, Dutch ships arriving in Nagasaki during this period declined in annual number from five or six to one or two. Some southern Chinese merchants who did not receive new trading credentials from the Nagasaki officials complained to their home-port authorities. They charged that the Tokugawa era name on the new Japanese trading credentials was treasonous for a tributary state such as Japan. Local officials on the Fukien and Chekiang coast responded by confiscating Nagasaki trade credentials and then reported the matter to Peking. When the Tokugawa government was informed of the dispute by one of the ships that escaped and returned to Nagasaki with its Japanese credentials intact, the Japanese accused the Ch'ing government of ignoring foreign statutes. Cooler heads prevailed, and the dispute blew over. The Tokugawa did not want to antagonize the Ch'ing government any further, and the K'ang-hsi government needed Japanese copper for minting coins as well as silver in the domestic economy.

Pragmatism generally prevailed in eighteenth-century relations between the two countries. The Japanese tallies proved effective in managing the trade with Chinese merchants. As a result, Chinese ships with the proper trade credentials continued to visit Nagasaki throughout the remainder of the Tokugawa era. The Ch'ing state allowed trade with both Japan and Russia (after 1689 in Nerchinsk) to continue outside the tribute system. However, Japanese Buddhist missions to China, which recurred during the eighteenth century, followed earlier tributary protocols. One group of monks from the Enryakuji Temple on Mount Hiei in Kyoto, for instance, prepared diplomatic

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papers in the fall of 1732 that were filed with Ningpo officials upon their arrival in Chekiang in early winter 1733. The diplomatic papers prepared by the Tendai monks were presented in the name of the “country of Japan” (Nihon koku), and the Ch'ing realm was referred to as the “T'ang” (J. Kara). 5

TOKUGAWA ASSESSMENTS OF THE EFFECTS OF THE
MANCHU CONQUEST

The Manchu conquest of the Ming empire was of concern to the Japanese authorities. Kumazawa Banzan (1619–91) openly discussed the strategic problems posed by the threat of an imminent Ch'ing invasion of Japan. He was an eccentric samurai best known for his efforts to adapt the teachings of Wang Yang-ming (1472–1529) to Japan at a time when most Tokugawa scholars still tended more toward the Sung learning brought earlier by Ch'an (J. Zen) monks associated with the Kamakura (1185–1333) state and the five main Zen temples (J. Gozandera). The understanding of Chu Hsi’s teachings had been updated by Korean scholars uprooted to Japan during the invasion by Toyotomi Hideyoshi (1536–98). Banzan stressed Japan’s lack of preparedness in his 1686 Daigaku wakumon (Questions on the Great learning). No one took Banzan’s approach to classical learning too seriously at first, but the Tokugawa regime shared his fear that the Manchu conquest might spill across the Yellow Sea, just as, 400 years earlier, the Mongol conquest of Korea and attempts to invade Japan had threatened trade between Korea and Hakata. 6

In 1674, the Tokugawa government pointedly charged Hayashi Gahō, the rector of the newly endowed shogunal college for classical learning in Edo known as the Senseiden (Hall of Earlier Sages), with assessing the threat posed to Japan by the Manchu conquest. Gahō’s father, Hayashi Razan (1583–1657), was one of the leading Confucian scholars in early Tokugawa and had founded a private college in 1630. Under the Ashikaga regime, such policy assignments would have been given to Buddhist monks in the major Zen temples in Kamakura or Kyoto because the monks were able to read and document difficult classical Chinese sources. For much of the sixteenth century, Confucian learning, particularly Chu Hsi’s teachings, had been their prerogative. Buddhist spirituality and Chinese classical learning went hand in hand. The rulers of the Ashikaga government had relied on Buddhist

5 See Denkyō taishi nyū Tōchō, manuscript memorandum, 1773, Hieizan Kokuhōden, Kyoto.
clerics, as masters of classical Chinese in an era of warrior dominance on the battlefield and aristocratic pre-eminence in cultural affairs, for their official interactions with the Ming dynasty. During the widespread destruction of the Ōnin War from 1466 to 1477, however, Zen monks began to lose their influence, when major temples in Kyoto were burned to the ground and their monks dispersed.  

Hayashi Razan and Hayashi Gahō represented a new constellation in Tokugawa state and society: classical scholars (J. *jusha*, “Confucians”) who were commoners (J. *heimin*), not samurai. Like Razan, many of their families were originally from Buddhist ranks, but after the pummeling Buddhism took in the sixteenth-century wars, they had turned to the teachings associated with Confucius for their new calling. Their skill in reading and writing classical Chinese led the Tokugawa shogunate to rely on them rather than on Buddhist clerics to learn about the tumultuous events in China. Hayashi Gahō compiled an account of current events in China that he called *Ka i hentai* (*Reversal of civilized and barbarian*). In the preface, Hayashi described China’s transformation from “civilized” (J. *ka*) to “barbarian” (J. *i*) because of the Manchu conquest. The fall of the Ming dynasty suggested to Hayashi and others that East Asian cultural superiority had passed to Japan, despite its earlier failures to conquer Korea and Ming under Toyotomi Hideyoshi.

Arrested briefly because he had publicly rejected the Ch'eng–Chu orthodoxy, the troublesome samurai-scholar Yamaga Sokō (1622–85) also argued that the Manchu conquest proved Japan’s superiority over China. He contrasted Japan, whose military had always repelled foreign conquests, with China’s repeated subjugation by barbarians. The Manchus were simply the latest in a long line of outsiders ruling in China. Japanese beliefs in its unbroken imperial lineage and its divine origin also evidenced their country’s superiority. As Yamaga put it, “Our ruling dynasty (*honchō*) is descended from [the sun goddess] Amaterasu, and its lineage has remained intact from the time of the deities until today.”

Asami Keisai (1652–1711), who was Yamaga Sokō’s contemporary and a follower of Yamazaki Ansai’s (1618–82) Kimon school of thought that


combined Shintō and Confucianism, shared some of Sokō’s views on China. Asami prepared his account of China for lectures given in 1688 and 1689, which he conveyed in letters to his colleague Satō Naokata in 1700–1. In a short piece with the title Chūgoku ben (Disputations on the Central Realm), Asami denied China’s centrality. He argued that the new geography of the Earth as a sphere or globe described by Europeans revealed that China’s claims to be at the center of the world were spurious. He also noted that barbarian areas had been integral parts of the Chou order thousands of years earlier. Shun was a barbarian, for example, who had achieved sagehood and ruled over all under Heaven. Satō Naokata, also a follower of the Kimon school, took a more radical position than either Asami or Yamazaki Ansai. In his 1706 Chūgoku ronshū (Collected arguments about the Central Realm), Naokata held that both the Chinese classics and the Shintō classics could not be true. Neither the Chinese nor the Japanese imperial line was pure and unbroken, and neither the Japanese nor the Chinese emperor was divine. Thus, for Naokata, neither Japan nor China was the “Middle Kingdom.” Yamazaki Ansai sided with Asami in this debate.

The Kimon school’s Confucian–Shintō syncretism linked Chu Hsi learning to Japanese nativism. Neither Yamazaki Ansai nor his immediate followers clearly envisioned the concept of a sacred polity (J. kokutai), but when Ansai’s teachings were later combined with the Mito school’s focus on Japanese history and Japanese nativism in the nineteenth century, an unbroken genealogy upholding Japanese national essence emerged in Meiji times. It was not yet explicitly there in the eighteenth century, when “Chinese learning” was dominant in Japanese elite society.

For some writers, Japan was now the “Second China”; that is, Japan had succeeded the Ming empire as the center of civilization. The Tokugawa state dared not express, much less act on, such pretensions. The ill-fated Hideyoshi invasions of Korea in the 1590s still weighed heavily on the shogunate. Given the dangers the Manchus posed to Japan after their invasions of Korea in 1627 and 1637 and their takeover of Peking in 1644, a direct confrontation between the Tokugawa and the new Ch‘ing regime was possible. Ming loyalists who had fled to Japan, such as Chu Shun-shui (1600–82), had called on the Tokugawa to aid the Southern Ming resistance. The Manchu leadership showed little

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interest in Japan, however, as long as Korea posed no threat to their Manchu homelands. They also had their hands full dealing with the rebellion of the Three Feudatories in the 1670s and then with the Russians along the border of their northeastern homelands in the 1680s. Meanwhile, the Tokugawa government showed no interest in officially establishing formal tributary, diplomatic, or commercial relations with the Ch'ing dynasty.\textsuperscript{13}

The Tokugawa regime also refused to acknowledge that Chosŏn Korea was a kingdom within a Ch'ing tributary system. It wanted to establish Korea as its own tributary. This produced a miniature tributary system centered on Edo in which the Korean court sent what it thought were diplomatic missions to Edo; there was no return Japanese embassy to Seoul because the Tokugawa authorities regarded them as tributary missions. Altogether, Korea sent twelve official embassies to Edo, making it the only foreign country, in addition to the Ryukyus, to maintain state-to-state relations with Japan until the 19th century. The Ryukyu Islands officially sent fifteen tribute embassies to Japan between 1634 and 1806, although many Japanese considered the Ryukyu leader to be a dependent of Kagoshima in the outer domain known as Satsuma.\textsuperscript{14}

In the seventeenth century, the view of the Ming empire as civilized and Japan as barbaric shifted to the claim that became common in Japanese writings under Tokugawa leadership: Japan had surpassed the Ch'ing dynasty in cultural standing. But no one went beyond the limited cultural claims that Yamaga Sokō and later the arch-nativist Motoori Norinaga (1730–1801) would make. Norinaga spent his days making a living by practicing traditional Chinese medicine (then called \textit{kanpō}, “Han prescriptions”), which allowed him the leisure to attack Chinese learning in his evening lectures that promoted so-called Japanese nativist thinking.\textsuperscript{15} As Yamaga Sokō was stressing Chinese classical language and ritual as the civilizing criteria for Japan, the only criteria he could have Japan adopt in order to claim superiority would be Chinese classical models. If Tokugawa were to be the “Second China,” then its scholars would have to prove that they had mastered ancient classical learning and had become more Confucian than scholars under the Ch'ing dynasty. There was no alternative. Despite the inroads being made by Dutch learning,
through the eighteenth century there were as yet no well-articulated Western statecraft models that Japanese scholars would take seriously.\textsuperscript{16}

CHINESE LEARNING AND TOKUGAWA SOCIETY

By the late eighteenth century, Japanese scholars interested in studies involving \textit{kanbun} (Han writing) were adapting the philological research techniques practiced by Ch'ing literati because mastering classical Chinese had become an essential scholarly tool among newly interested Japanese elites. In some instances the transmission of these new techniques occurred by way of Korea, where scholars had more frequent contact with the Ch'ing capital through the tribute missions sent to Peking. More often it occurred when eighteenth-century Tokugawa scholars received copies via Nagasaki of the most recent books on classical studies published in the Ch'ing empire. The process was slow and cumulative.

The commercial and tributary exchanges that transmitted books with new knowledge between China, Japan, and Korea in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries promoted the gradual emergence of an East Asian community of textual scholars who specialized in empirical research and philological studies of Confucian and medical classics, and texts of other kinds as well. Among the important commodities in the two-way trade at Nagasaki after the \textbf{1680}s were recent Jesuit translations of Western scientific and medical books published in Chinese, which Japanese scholars and shogunal officials desired, and copies of rare classical texts long since lost in China but now made available in Japan, which Chinese traders with scholarly interests sought.\textsuperscript{17} Some of the merchants were civil examination failures who maintained a commercial interest in classics as well as in silver and copper.

Japan imported many Chinese translations of European books on science that contained the new Chinese terminology for Sino-Western mathematics, particularly after \textbf{1720}, when the shogunate relaxed its prohibition of all books related to Christianity. Many of the books had been translated in China after the Tokugawa authorities expelled the Jesuits in the \textbf{1630}s, and thus were unknown in Japan. Unlike the Chinese translations of European books, which were circulated in Japan, Tokugawa authorities kept secret their sponsored translations of Dutch learning from the second half of the seventeenth century on.

\textsuperscript{17} Ōba Osamu, \textit{Edo jidai ni okeru Chūgoku bunka juyō no kenkyū} (Kyoto, 1984). See also Eiko Ikegami, \textit{The taming of the samurai: Honorific individualism and the making of modern Japan} (Cambridge, MA, 1995).
While these international transfers were taking place, Tokugawa society between 1600 and 1800 was transformed from being dominated by a hereditary military elite (samurai) and an imperial aristocracy to being a commercialized society that increasingly empowered merchants (J. chōnin) and commoners. One of these social changes was the rise of a restricted group of men of letters (bunjin) who identified with the Confucian classical tradition. In Ming and Ch'ing society the literatus could be a scholar, painter, or doctor, a model emulated in Tokugawa. Buddhist scholarship and Japanese classical literature still had strong followings among monks and Kyoto aristocrats, but secular scholars followed a growing avenue for social circulation in the new Tokugawa age of political stability and bureaucratic rationalization based on Chinese classical learning and statecraft.\(^\text{18}\)

Early in the Tokugawa period, scholars did not identify themselves primarily as classical teachers or men of letters, but they began to recognize the uses of literacy in classical Chinese in the new age. Some had been Buddhist monks: Fujiwara Seika (1561–1619), Hayashi Razan, Yamazaki Ansai; others were former samurai, such as Nakai Tōju (1608–48), or masterless samurai, such as Kumazawa Banzan; some were practitioners of medicine or the military arts, or the sons of such men: Nagoya Gen’i (1628–96), Hayashi Razan, Yamaga Sokō, Asami Keisai, Ogyū Sorai (1666–1728); some were townsmen, such as Itō Jinsai (1627–1705). These men were still marginal figures in early Tokugawa society, but they were the nucleus of a new, slowly forming cultural elite.\(^\text{19}\)

Thousands of Japanese teachers, doctors, and students learned Chinese during the Tokugawa period.\(^\text{20}\) The trend began slowly in the seventeenth century, as it became clear that Buddhist clergy had lost their secular functions as advisers in foreign and civil affairs, and peaked in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. Many in the Tokugawa educational market were samurai, merchants, physicians, or commoners who were literate in Chinese writing. Many Japanese men began making a living as teachers in a private, merchant, or public school. For instance, Itō Jinsai, a commoner, and Yamazaki Ansai, who began as a Buddhist monk, competed for students by establishing


their Confucian schools directly across from each other on the banks of the Horikawa River in the center of Kyoto. In 1662 Jinsai established his academy, named Kogidō (“Way of Ancient Meanings”), with the help of his son Itō Tōgai (1670–1736). Over a period of forty-five years it attracted 3,000 students (as had Confucius, supposedly) to study the Chinese classics. The Taki family, on the other hand, established a private school of medicine called the Seijukan in 1765 in their home in Edo. After the Tokugawa shogunate in 1791 made it the government’s official medical school (igakkkan) for the new kanpō traditions of Chinese medicine, members of the Taki family occupied the top teaching posts until the middle of the nineteenth century. Their commentaries on the Chinese medical classics were among the most sound in East Asia in their time, and still circulate in China today.21

The kanbun teacher’s authority emerged from his mastery of the Japanese techniques for reading and writing the classical Chinese language, which he was able to introduce to students. They learned the texts by following a series of practical instructions. This process began by parsing kanbun into its constituent parts: types of written characters (J. moji), correct phrases and sentences (J. choku), and forms of composition (J. bunri). Like his Chinese counterparts, the Japanese grammarian became a preserver and transmitter of the classical language as the repository of articulate utterance in high culture by marking correct punctuation and readings via kundoku (marked guides to reading), incorporating voicing marks, and adding interlinear glosses for kanbun particles known as joji (“connectives,” e.g. postpositions, endings), jitsuji (“concrete” characters, e.g. names of things), and kyoji (“insubstantials”, e.g. adjectives and verbs).22

The top teachers transmitted traditional readings of the Five Classics. Lesser, more technical teachers taught the medical classics and the mathematical classics along with the highly developed techniques of wasan (Japanese mathematics).23 Unlike in China, mastery of classical texts was not tested for advancement into the civil service, but the leading classical teachers prospered by serving merit-sensitive commoners and merchants who lacked the


22 See Yoshikawa Kōjirō et al., eds., Kango bunten sōho (Tokyo, 1979). These grammatical divisions derived from Sung–Ming classical scholarship.

status of high birth. As some commoners rose in social standing because of their classical literacy, some landless samurai fell into poverty and disrepute because hereditary obligations and employment prohibitions gradually submerged them in debt. Many samurai, recognizing that success required literacy more than martial arts, turned to studying in order to become scholars or doctors.24

Like his Chinese counterpart, the classicist’s membership in the elite in Japan depended on his schooling in classical, medical, and literary texts. Motoori Norinaga, for example, studied medicine in Kyoto from 1753 to 1756 under Confucian teachers who were followers of the Sung–Chin–Yüan traditions of medicine. Norinaga also read works by those who sought to revive ancient Chinese medical practices lost since antiquity. As Japanese mastered the rules governing phonology, morphology, syntax, and diction, their kanbun expertise qualified them as members of a civilized society that could compete culturally with China.25

The ancient sages of culture and medicine now spoke directly to Japanese readers through the classics, and many listened. Words were the entry to a world of formalism and pedantry, rules and categories, and lexical discussions. The classicist’s command of a few classical texts saved him from the base occupations of the unlearned. Weighing individual words, phrases, and verses allowed him and his students the possibility to write their way to fame and fortune, or at least to teach and write for others. Because knowledge of classical Chinese became a prestigious form of writing and speech in the eighteenth century, it also appealed to the Tokugawa lords who wanted a literate bureaucracy to help administer their domains.26

The classicist’s instruction was embedded in a social system where wealth, distinction, and eloquence differentiated elites from those who were mainly poor, anonymous, and illiterate. Those without classical educations were now more noticeable; before, only Buddhist clergy had been the masters of Chinese language. Confucians now provided the language and values through which a changing social and political elite recognized its own aspiring members.


26 See Herman Ooms, Tokugawa village practice: Class, status, power, late (Berkeley, 1996).
The former governing elites of aristocratic courtiers and samurai now shared elite status with commoners with classical educations. Classical literacy (bun) signaled enhanced social status. Classical studies provided a modest level of upward social circulation, particularly via access to urban networks of patronage.\(^{27}\)

As in China since the Sung period, widespread classical literacy and print culture grew in tandem in Tokugawa Japan. The value of classical literacy amidst the pervasive illiteracy of early Tokugawa society made grammar the first step for upwardly mobile students who were drawn to literary culture (bunka). In turn, the social and cultural elite valued the classical teacher and hired him to train their young. By opening their own schools and preparing their own textbooks, classical teachers became the agents of cultural transmission and of the civilized process. Because grammar was the second stage after memorization in a classical education, students had to master many technical rules. Since the grammarian controlled access to the classical language, his profession was embedded in the shared life of the elite. Command of kanbun was a useful measure of classical success because it worked so well, unlike the “vulgar” vernacular language of the marketplace. Grammarians taught the forms of classical, medical, and literary analysis and conceptual categories inherited from the past in China and now reproduced in Japan. Some even taught vernacular Chinese for those seeking to read Ming and Ch’ing novels.\(^{28}\)

Unlike aristocrats and samurai who received stipends, teachers depended on fees and salaries. Physicians could earn livings and even amass wealth by applying their linguistic training in reading Chinese medical texts to a classically informed clinical practice. Although doctors had no hereditary place, beginning in the Tokugawa they were creating new roles for themselves. The stigma of the teaching profession was the need to earn a living in a world of haughty Kyoto and Edo elites. Teachers depended on class size and their students’ ability to pay. The professional teacher might draw additional income from his family property, as a landlord, or via his medical practice, among many other options. The renowned sinophile Motoori Norinaga, for instance, mastered kanbun well enough to practice Chinese medicine professionally. The best classicists, such as Ogyū Sorai, received government salaries as retainers attached to daimyo schools and private incomes as teachers in their own

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schools. Grammarians were not especially mobile. They were usually limited to Kyoto, Edo, and other regional centers where there were more students. Tokugawa aristocrats still controlled the classicists’ appointment or removal as officials, despite the newly found status of men with learning.29

In addition, scholars could augment their teaching by preparing textbooks for the growing Tokugawa publishing world. Publishers, especially in Edo, Osaka, and Kyoto, welcomed books that focused on teaching Chinese literary grammar for reading and writing kanbun, and they publicized them widely in their advertisements. There were many autodidacts who studied a modicum of Chinese this way and by visiting lending libraries (J. kashi bonya), some 600 in Edo alone by the year 1800.30 Minagawa Kien (1734–1807) in Kyoto and Yamamoto Hokuzan (1752–1812) in Edo were particularly prolific in this regard. Minagawa was a model man of letters (bunjin) in the ancient capital. He became a leader there in defining the role of Chinese learning and the scope of “sinology” (J. kangaku). Besides his learned tomes, he also published a 1798 handbook for learning to read and write kanbun entitled Shubun roku (Record of practicing classical literacy), and a number of textbooks in Kyoto on language particles and auxiliary connectives that bookstores sold throughout Japan. Minagawa also prepared the 1774 primer/lexicon entitled I an ruigo (Words classified for medical cases). Yamamoto Hokuzan published a reading and writing primer in Edo c. 1818 entitled Sakubun ritsu (Rules for writing).31

In the Tokugawa period, the urban or village grammarian depended on his public reputation because there was no civil service examination degree to confirm his expertise for decoding a classical Chinese text into kanbun. This was one reason why the Tokugawa classicist was so different from his Ch’ing counterpart. In learning to prepare polished writing, Japanese students were still exposed to the scriptures of earlier religious masters and Chinese classical texts by their secular teachers. The linguistic mixture of religious scriptures and classical texts begun by Buddho-Confucian teachers in the Kamakura and Muromachi periods was by Tokugawa times further enriched with the kanbun stock in trade of more secular Confucian grammarians, teachers, and classicists, who disdained Buddhism and Shintō as their chief competitors.

31 More work needs be done to reconstruct the grammar and linguistic registers of the Chinese language that these pioneering Japanese kanbun textbooks presented.
Teachers of *kanbun* had a considerable range in their social origins and their success. They were subordinate to patrons who sent them their sons as students. They enjoyed middling respectability among urbanized elites, particularly aristocrats in Kyoto and samurai officials in Edo and in the various Tokugawa domains. As teachers they had some chance for professional, social, and geographic mobility within their domains and within the shogunal government, but with no access to the highest positions held by the military and imperial court aristocrats. Some became primary consultants in their domains. From samurai, commoner, and medical backgrounds, they were among the respectable classes in the growing cities. (Edo grew to over one million inhabitants early in the Tokugawa period.) Despite their skills and accrued respect, teachers remained closer to the bottom than to the top of the social pyramid. Their status origins remained a handicap, compared to the cultural prestige that a small number of commoners achieved by succeeding in the civil examinations in Ming and Ch'ing times.³²

How to teach classical Chinese became a matter of dispute in the eighteenth century. Most *kanbun* teachers typically punctuated a Chinese text using *kun-doku* markings according to Japanese word order, in which Japanese verbs come at the end of a sentence. Ogyū Sorai objected to this method and preferred to teach his students to speak Chinese and read and write directly in classical Chinese, although when he moved to Edo and opened a school there in 1711, Sorai had called it the *Yakusha* (“Translation Society”). One of Sorai’s disciples, Dazai Shundai (1680–1747), also wrote critically of the schooling and the textbooks used for teaching Chinese as *kanbun* in Japan. He upheld Sorai’s opinion that students should learn to read and write Chinese in Chinese word order and not transpose the Chinese characters into Japanese word order and pronunciation. The prestigious Edo publisher Suharaya Shinbē released Dazai’s *Wadoku yōryō* (*Essentials of Japanese readings of Chinese*) in 1728. In vain, however, Dazai complained that when Japanese read Chinese in Japanese word order, they were no longer reading Chinese. He noted the history of how Chinese was taught in Japan, and concluded that in order to master classical Chinese, Japanese would have to understand the Chinese word order. Otherwise, they would never understand the correct meaning. He, like Sorai, advocated getting rid of the Japanese ways of reading Chinese.³³

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Not accepting Sorai's and Dazai's radical pedagogy for learning Chinese, most classical scholars in Japan had profitable careers as grammarians who taught literary style using the conveniently marked *kundoku* readings. Their more traditional textbooks established a basic grammar and sentence structure that enabled students in the eighteenth century to master Chinese classical syntax, even if they mentally transposed sentences into Japanese word order. What attracted the shogunate and daimyo leadership to such classical teachers, in addition to advancing their own careers, was that Chinese classical learning affirmed the virtues the leaders wanted to inculcate. The grammarians affirmed the linguistic and ethical status quo for employers who preferred it. Change, or novelty, for which Sorai and Dazai became famous even though they were not pedagogically successful, was an unintended by-product of learning to read and write. Classical learning became the guide to the right choices. Moral values and Sino-Japanese classical literacy, undergirded further by the legal code, upheld each other.

Chinese learning had the upper hand in Japanese literate society for much of the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, but tensions between sinophiles and sinophobes were clearly building in mid-Tokugawa. This dispute had its roots in Shintō, but only after Confucian classical learning from China had superseded Buddhism in Japan in the seventeenth century did the challenge from Shintō defenders begin to leave its mark on Japanese Confucians in the eighteenth century. As late as the 1820s sinophiles such as Ōta Kinjō (1765–1825) could still voice their admiration for Chinese learning and even for the Ch'ing regime that had conquered all of the former Ming empire by the 1680s.34

The admiration for Chinese learning in Japan before 1800 produced fears that Japanese native learning was imperiled. Motoori Norinaga, a student of the Chinese classics as a youth and a practitioner of traditional Chinese medicine as an adult, in 1771 at the age of forty-two voiced his intense opposition to Chinese civilization in his *Naobi no mitama* (*Rectifying spirit*), which introduced his life's work, the *Kojiki den* (*Commentary on the Record of ancient matters*). Like many other commoners and townsmen, Norinaga had turned from his family's business to Chinese medicine as a way to raise his status and support his scholarly interests. Subsequently he was disdainful of both aristocrats and sinicized Japanese for their pretensions.35 The intensity of Norinaga's attack on Confucian learning and the Chinese language makes


little sense unless it is seen as a reaction to the boom in Chinese studies in
Edo, Osaka, and Kyoto in the eighteenth century. A sinophobe, Norinaga
especially rebuked Japanese Confucians who denigrated Japan. The sinophile
Dazai Shundai had attacked the ancient custom in Japan of marriage between
half-brother and half-sister as violating the Confucian taboo on incest between
those of the same surname. From Dazai’s point of view, the Confucian classics
could be used to civilize the Japanese. Norinaga, on the other hand, painted
an image of Ogyū Sorai as an “eastern barbarian” (J. tōi) of his time because
he worshipped Chinese civilization over Japan’s. The recognition of Japan’s
special place as a sacred community had been subverted by China’s Way, which
according to Norinaga had deceived the people of Japan.\textsuperscript{36}

Classical teachers such as Ogyū Sorai and Dazai Shundai commanded large
student audiences as sinophiles who extolled the ancient Chinese language,
unlike nativists such as Motoori Norinaga, who as a sinophobe appealed
instead to ancient Japanese as the ideal spoken language. However, sinophiles
and sinophobes were not always enemies. Each side represented a hybrid
with contradictions. Norinaga was an accomplished reader and writer of the
Chinese language that he abhorred. For Sorai, the Tokugawa’s less bureaucratic,
decentralized system was more akin to the time of the ancient sage kings in
China, and thus it would be easier, he thought, for Japan rather than China
to return to the Ancient Way. Sorai saw himself in Japan as a true heir of the
Way, which he thought the Ch’ing had lost. He also studied ancient Chinese
music, which he thought China had carelessly lost and now survived only in
Japan.\textsuperscript{37}

Tokugawa Confucians Japanized the Way of the Chinese sages by detach-\textsuperscript{36}
ing Confucianism from China. This tactic allowed them to claim special status as
being civilized. Itō Jinsai adopted this approach to affirm the superiority of
Confucian values in Japan over current practice in Ch’ing. He believed that
Japan could maintain the values and ideals that China had betrayed, thus
impugning the Chinese as barbarians for straying from the classics. Jinsai also
stressed the continuity of Japanese rulership in contrast to China’s frequent
dynastic changes. This approach meant they were still judging Japan by
Chinese categories and standards. Both Itō Jinsai and Ogyū Sorai as teachers


and classical scholars had internalized their sinophilism – that is, “Japanized it” – and used it as criticism against China.\(^{38}\)

### APPROPRIATION OF MING–CH’ING LAW AND THE “SACRED EDICT”

The shogun Tokugawa Yoshimune (1684–1751; r. 1716–45) nurtured a new jurisprudence (\textit{ritsuryō no gaku}) based on eclectic borrowings from the Ming and Ch’ing legal codes, which were then adapted by the central authorities in Edo and the autonomous domains of the daimyo. One famous eighteenth-century legal case dealt with the conflict between the duties to be filial to one’s father and loyal to one’s husband when a wife reported that her father had murdered her husband. Arai Hakuseki, the Tokugawa chief minister until 1716, recommended exonerating the daughter. He cited several Chinese precedents that a wife’s loyalty to her husband was comparable to the duty of an official’s loyalty to his ruler and thus trumped filial obligation to the father in this case. Serving the shogun, Muro Kyūsō (1658–1734) also argued for the daughter’s exoneration.\(^{39}\) Hayashi Nobuatsu (1644–1732), the head of the now officially patronized Hayashi family academy, staunchly opposed their arguments. A devoted Sung learning moralist who championed the teachings of Chu Hsi, Nobuatsu argued for the primacy of filial obligation toward the father. He was overruled by the more powerful Hakuseki. Under the Ming and Ch’ing codes, the wife would have been found guiltless. For some, however, the case was an example of the excessive Confucianization and bureaucratization of the Tokugawa regime. The solution was distinctly Japanese, in that the authorities allowed the woman to enter a Buddhist convent. Despite this compromise, it was clear to contemporaries that criminal law in Japan was moving from harsh military discipline to a softened, civilian system of penalties. Sinophiles such as Arai Hakuseki were predominant, but sinophobia was apparent even among those accomplished in Chinese studies, like Confucian gadfly Ikai Keisho (1761–1845).\(^{40}\)

In 1723, Ogyū Sorai’s younger brother, Ogyū Hokkei (1669–1754), then serving as court physician for the shogun Yoshimune, completed a

\(^{38}\) Wakabayashi, \textit{Anti-foreignism and Western learning in early-modern Japan}, pp. 22–7.


comprehensive legal commentary. Using kunten (punctuation marks) readings for the Ming code (Ta Ming lü), he prepared a more accurate version than found in the 1720 translation, Dai Mei ritsurei yakugi (Translation of the Great Ming code), prepared by Takase Kiboku (1668–1749). Sorai also prepared a punctuated edition of the Ming penal code for Yoshimune.41 Yoshimune ordered the distribution of a Ming–Ch’ing composite text known as the Liu yīi yen-i (Amplifications of the Six admonitions, J. Rikuyu engi), based on the “Six Admonitions” that had been issued by Ming T’ai-tsu (r. 1368–98) and reissued by Ch’ing emperors to educate and civilize their subjects. A 1652 version of what is known as the Shun-chih emperor’s “Sacred edict” (Sheng yii) with a colloquial commentary was taken to the Ryukyu Islands and from there presented to the daimyo of Satsuma, from whom in turn it was passed on to Yoshimune in 1721. The Ryukyu kingdom ostensibly was a Ch’ing tributary, but it was also a dependency of the outer domain of Satsuma, and thus, along with Korea, served as one of the Tokugawa’s unofficial intermediaries to the Ch’ing. Ch’ing civil service licentiates (sheng-yüan) had to write out the “Sacred edict” from memory for local examinations. Intending to use the edict for indoctrination in Japan, Yoshimune ordered his Confucian adviser Ogyū Sorai to provide it with kunten markings so the colloquial Chinese commentary could be understood as kanbun by Japanese readers.42

The shogun also asked Muro Kyūsō to prepare a simple Japanese translation and commentary for the “Sacred edict,” which was then distributed to Buddhist temples as a model for calligraphy practice in an effort to communicate Confucian values to the populace. After the Japanese version became public, Satō Issai (1772–1859) noted that an expanded and illustrated edition of the Liu yīi yen-i compiled by Katsuda Tomosato was already widely used to improve public morals. Increasingly, rural schools and some chartered and private academies also used it as a morality textbook. Nakai Riken (1732–1817) used it as a text at the Kaitokudō merchant academy in Osaka, for example. Subsequently, another revised version of the “Sacred edict,” completed in 1724 under the auspices of the Yung-cheng emperor with the title Sheng yii kuang hsüin (Amplified instructions for the Sacred edict), arrived in Nagasaki in 1726 on a Chinese merchant vessel. Like its predecessor, it was reprinted sixty-three

41 Henderson, “Chinese influences on eighteenth-century Tokugawa codes,” p. 271, has confused some of the information. The Ch’ing code had been revised in 1723–7 and republished in 1727. This version remained definitive in the Ch’ing period after some changes were added in 1740.
years later in Japan in 1789 in its original format. The director of the Kaitokudō academy, Nakai Chikuzan (1730–1804), wrote a preface for the reprint, and he and his younger brother Riken used it as a teaching text at the academy. Although a scholar steeped in kanbun learning, Ikai Keisho thought such steps went too far. He opposed the new Nakai version because it implied that the K'ang-hsi emperor and his Manchu successors had superseded the Japanese emperor and his imperial line as the source for correct social values.43

MEDICAL PRACTICE AND MEDICAL PHILOLOGY IN EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY JAPAN

Classical teachers were motivated in part by their hope for respect in the increasingly fluid urban world, but their equivocal social standing prompted them to despise doctors and merchants, just below them, who strove to climb higher. Classicists such as Itō Jinsai criticized doctors as money-oriented nouveaux riches who misleadingly equated their “lesser” learning with the Confucian classics. Similarly, Ogyū Sorai remarked how physicians exploited the Chinese classics to try to rise in urban society. Many sons of doctors became classicists throughout the Tokugawa period; classicists for their part became masters of the medical classics.44

For commoners in eighteenth-century Tokugawa society, practicing traditional Chinese medicine, like Chinese classical studies, offered an avenue for modest upward mobility. The draft by Asada Sōhaku (1815–94) for his Köchō ishi (History of physicians in our era), later published as Kōkoku mei den (Biographies of famous physicians of our august country), was modeled on the Ming work of 1547 by Li Lien (1488–1566) entitled I shih (A history of physicians). Asada described how many of the leading physicians who favored the revival of “ancient medical prescriptions” (J. koibō) in the eighteenth century entered the profession from commoner or lower samurai ranks.45 Particulary instructive is the career of Yoshimasu Tōdō (1702–73), who became a proponent of kanpō (“Han prescriptions”) in Nagasaki and Kyoto. His ancestors had been military officials who lost their samurai status and became local physicians during the

chaos of the Sengoku era (1482–1558). Initially Tōdō had hoped to restore his family to samurai status by taking up a military life, but he realized that “a period of great peace was no longer the right time to succeed as a soldier.”

Medicine allowed for upward mobility, but a career as a physician required years of training in classical Chinese medical texts, and the support of appropriate patrons, to master the new therapies (that is, standard “formulas”) that had emerged during the Ming–Ch'ing revival of ancient Chinese medicine. Those Japanese physicians who later became interested in Western medicine, such as Sugita Genpaku (1738–1818), focused on first mastering classical Chinese and then Ming and Ch'ing medical books entering Nagasaki from China. These Chinese currents of medicine took the form of a clash between those who favored reviving ancient medicine, particularly the Shang-han lun (Treatise on cold damage disorders), and those who continued to practice more recent Sung–Chin–Yüan medical currents based on the Huang-ti nei-ching (Yellow Emperor’s inner canon), which itself comprised parts, including the Su-wen (Basic questions) and the Ling-shu (Divine pivot).

The Huang-ti nei-ching, probably compiled in the Han period, had two standard recensions from the T'ang, and was edited and printed during the Northern Sung. It focused on vital functions and dysfunctions and their cosmic correlates in the part called the Basic questions, while applying these understandings to acupuncture and moxibustion in the Divine pivot. This classic paid little attention to details of therapy; its focus was on hygiene and preventative medicine. Later a medical treatise by Chang Chung-ching (150?–219?) applied the Huang-ti nei-ching to drug therapies for clinical practice. Chang allegedly wrote his book between 196 and 220 CE in response to Later Han epidemics. He called it the Shang-han tsa-ping lun (Treatise on cold damage and miscellaneous disorders). Subsequently Chang’s book was divided and circulated as three books, two of which, the Shang-han lun (Treatise on cold damage disorders) and the Chin-k’uei yao-lüeh (Essentials of the golden casket), were widely used from the Northern Sung period on. Literati considered the Huang-ti nei-ching to be the font of medical theory, for which Chang’s Treatise on cold damage disorders provided a guide to clinical practice.

46 Asada Sōhaku, Kōchō ishi, manuscript, 1834, Fujikawa Bunko, Kyōto Daigaku, Kyoto. See also Yoshimasa Tōdō, Tōdō ikō, manuscript, 1785/1812, Fujikawa Bunko, Kyōto Daigaku, Kyoto, hsia, pp. 1a–2b.
47 Jannetta, The vaccinators, pp. 96, 103–5.
48 For historical background, see Yamada Seichin, Shōkan kō, manuscript, 1779, Fujikawa Bunko, Kyōto Daigaku, Kyoto.
Late Ming and Ch'ing scholar-physicians challenged medical learning as it had been transmitted since the Northern Sung period. Ch'ing scholar-physicians in particular sought to reverse the adulteration of ancient medical practice caused by Sung learning medical practitioners such as Liu Wan-su (1120–1200) and Chu Chen-heng (1280–1358), who allegedly relied too much on Ch'eng I and Chu Hsi's moral theory. The Ch'ing appeal to the ancient significance of the “authentic” medical classics added to the eighteenth-century denunciations of Sung learning in classical, political, and social matters. Moreover, Ming physicians such as Wang Chi (1463–1539) and Yü Ch'ang (1585–1664) referred to case histories (i-an), a new genre, instead of the medical classics, to advertise their therapeutic successes and explain them to students and amateurs.⁵⁰

In Tokugawa Japan, Ch'ing debates between advocates of ancient medical prescriptions (koihō) and the so-called latter-day medicine advocates (J. koseiha) over the relative standing of early medical texts paralleled the debates between classicists advocating Han learning and those who followed Chu Hsi learning. Some Japanese scholars began to focus on “ancient learning” (kogaku) to overcome the recent decline in prestige of the Ch'eng–Chu tradition. The rhetoric of the “return to the ancients” that Itō Jinsai and Ogyū Sorai pioneered early in the eighteenth century carried over by mid-century to the discussion of ancient and modern medical texts. Like Ch'ing period scholars of Han learning, Tokugawa scholar-physicians began by studying Han dynasty medical texts because they were allegedly more ancient. They rejected Sung dynasty medical sources, which Muromachi scholar-physicians had relied on, because of their questionable authority and greater separation from antiquity. Sorai declared that the Basic questions, which Sung medical sources cited, was a composite work compiled by Han dynasty medical experts and not the work of the Yellow Emperor himself.⁵¹

Philological approaches to the Huang-ti nei-ching also led scholars in the eighteenth century to investigate the original content of the Treatise on cold damage disorders and the role of heat-factor illnesses (je-ping). Making critical editions of the ancient medical texts also enabled Japanese scholar-physicians to re-examine their original import. New works appeared on the Huang-ti nei-ching, Chang Chung-ching's Shang-han lun, and Chang's Chin-k'uei yao-liueh. A proliferation of annotations emerged, with more works published in China


and Japan on the *Shang-han lun* than ever before. This era of Japanese medical philology (J. *kōshō gaku*), which focused on the Chinese medical classics, reached its height between 1780 and 1840.\textsuperscript{52}

Like evidential scholars of the Confucian classics, Ch'ing and Tokugawa scholar-physicians thought their rediscoveries were practicable. They wanted to improve contemporary medical therapies for high fevers by inducing purging through vomiting or sweating. In their view, Japanese scholars of ancient medicine had revealed the true meaning of the *Shang-han lun*, and thus surpassed scholars in China in understanding medicine. The Tokugawa scholar-physicians were reviving the best ancient medical prescriptions and practices. Japan, the “eastern place” (*tōbō*), focused on recovering knowledge from antiquity through the pioneering studies of Jinsai and Sorai, thus enabling the Japanese to surpass Sung–Chin–Yüan scholars in the “western land” (*seito*), which had lost its ancient heritage. This induced some Japanese to began to use the name *Shina*, derived from a medieval Sanskrit term (Ch. *Chih-na*), to refer to China and to further destabilize its “central” position in East Asia.\textsuperscript{53}

\textbf{JAPANESE EDITIONS OF BOOKS IN CHINESE AND THEIR WAY BACK TO THE CH'ING EMPIRE}

Kamakura Zen masters and Muromachi admirers of the Kiyohara family at the Kyoto court had been the first to prioritize Ch'eng–Chu learning, and they were followed in this by Hayashi Razan and others in Tokugawa scholarly circles in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. From the 1720s, Tokugawa classical scholars were increasingly sympathetic to the turn to “ancient learning” (*kogaku*) pioneered by Itō Jinsai, the eldest son of a Kyoto merchant. Jinsai attempted to recover what he considered the true message of the teachings of Confucius, particularly as they were presented in the master’s *Analects*. Jinsai’s distinguished son, Itō Tōgai, noted that “his father favored the *Analects* because it was the most precious treasure in the world.”\textsuperscript{54} Jinsai and his son both rejected the claims made by Chu Hsi and others in the Sung dynasty that the *Great learning* had been composed by Confucius as a separate work.


More than Itō Jinsai’s followers, who stressed comparing the content of the teachings in the classics with the *Analects*, Ogyū Sorai’s students emphasized the need to recover the ancient texts of the Confucian classics and their early commentaries, which depended on locating the most reliable, earliest manuscripts in Japan that could then be traced back to the earliest versions transmitted from China. This was why the manuscripts at the Ashikaga Academy (J. *Ashikaga gakkō*), when discovered, took on such importance in Japanese scholarly circles in the eighteenth century. The Ashikaga Academy was located in Shimotsuke province, northeast of Edo, in modern Tochigi prefecture. It had been a center of learning since the mid-Muromachi period, and was known as a repository of both early manuscript copies and early printed editions of Chinese texts.

*Sorai school textual studies and the Ashikaga Academy*

In the early eighteenth century, the Ashikaga Academy’s archives were known to hold Muromachi manuscript versions of Confucian classics, in addition to many fine Sung dynasty printed editions. The preface by Hattori Nankaku (1683–1749) for his colleague Nemoto Sonshi’s (1699–1764) 1750 collation of Huang K’an’s (488–545) *Lun-yü i-shu* (Subcommentary for the meanings of the *Analects*, J. *Rongo giso*) noted, “Ashikaga preserves many unusual books that today are no longer available abroad.” He went on to praise Nemoto’s diligence in traveling there with Yamanoi Konron (d. 1728) to recover and transmit such works to later generations, and to express the hope that the printed version of the *Lun-yü i-shu* would not just be widely distributed in the world within the seas [Japan], but also transmitted to the land beyond the seas [China], so that they would know that our country is bountiful and secure in its concern for civilization. In this way, Nemoto’s diligence will benefit both our land and China!

The Ashikaga holdings attracted the interest of students who studied with Ogyū Sorai in nearby Edo. It is doubtful that, as scholars opposed to Ch'eng–Chu learning and thus critical of Buddhism as well, the Sorai scholars would have been allowed to see manuscripts held in Kamakura or in Zen Buddhist temples in Kyoto. The Sorai followers made a virtue out of necessity and presented the Ashikaga Academy as their archive of choice. They proceeded

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56 Hattori, “Kō Kan Rongo giso shinkoku jo,” pp. 4a–b.
there many times for long stays to rediscover and work on texts that were stored there.\textsuperscript{57}

Sorai’s break with the meditative and moral self-cultivation aspects of Ch‘eng–Chu learning and his advocacy for what he termed *kobunji gaku* (“learning based on ancient texts”) – that is, interpreting the ancients in accord with the words and language of the time in which they were written – led him to take issue as well with the Ch‘eng–Chu commentarial tradition, which had held a pre-eminent position in Japan over the preceding century. His follower, Dazai Shundai, described how Confucius’ teachings had been so mixed with Buddhist ideas during the Sung that the two had become thoroughly confused, and ancient glosses for the *Analects* had been lost. Confronting this situation through his comparison of terms found in the *Analects* with the usage in other ancient texts and Han commentaries, Sorai had succeeded in correcting this state of affairs. According to Dazai,

Now in our country, where we have lived in peace for a hundred years, literati who practiced the arts of the Way arose everywhere. Master Sorai then appeared and surpassed them all ... Taking evidence from the Six Classics ... without distortion and using the ancient glosses to consider their meaning, he cleared away the clouds and mist so that the Way of Confucius could be seen as if on a bright sunny day.\textsuperscript{58}

Regarding the value of the so-called “ancient commentaries” (J. *kochū*), particularly those dating from the Han dynasties and the immediately following period, as opposed to the “new commentaries” (J. *shinchū*) compiled by Sung scholars, Sorai himself observed that in the Han period, subsequent to the burning of the books under the first Ch‘in emperor at the end of the third century BCE, various scholars had attempted to recover the ancient texts and explain their meaning, which resulted in diverse interpretations. Yet overall each school of interpretation could be traced back to Confucius’ disciples, and the efforts of Later Han scholars to gather and collate their commentaries had much merit. “One who, living a millennium later, wishes to pursue the Way of the sages, thus cannot set aside [the commentaries of] the Han scholars and adopt those of others.” Ogyū Sorai contended that not only had too many scholars from the Sung period on followed the new interpretations, but also too few had paid due attention to the old commentaries, and therefore good printed editions of the old texts with all the words intact were hard to find.\textsuperscript{59}

\textsuperscript{57} Hattori, “Kō Kan Rongo giso shinkoku jo,” p. 1a.


Like many other Edo Confucian scholars, Ogyū Sorai alluded to the tradition that the Ashikaga Academy had been founded by Ono no Takamura (802–52), an early Heian scholar, and suggested that therefore it retained copies of works brought to Japan by emissaries who had come from the continent during the T’ang period and by figures such as Kibi no Makibi (695–775), sent to China in the Nara and early Heian periods to study and acquire manuscripts. There is little reliable evidence for the school’s existence prior to its “revival” in the 1430s by Uesugi Norizane (1410–66), the powerful lord who served as the Muromachi official largely responsible for supervision of the eastern part of the country. Norizane and his successors presented the school with several Sung printed editions of old commentaries, and the school and the Buddhist priests who headed it continued to enjoy the patronage of the Go-Hōjō family, who subsequently extended their power over the region, and later the patronage of Toyotomi Hideyoshi and Tokugawa Ieyasu (1542–1616). Through such connections and those of its heads with major temples in Kyoto and elsewhere, the Ashikaga Academy acquired a notable collection of both imported texts and Japanese manuscript copies. By the early eighteenth century, it had declined as an educational center, but it still had much to offer those seeking old editions and manuscript copies of classical texts and commentaries.

Yamanoi Konron’s use of Ashikaga manuscripts

The son of a physician, as were many Japanese classical scholars during the eighteenth century, and a student of both Itō Tōgai and Ogyū Sorai, Yamanoi Konron was responsible for the first famous discoveries of early texts of classics. Yamanoi traveled to Ashikaga in 1720 and again in 1722 in the company of Nemoto Sonshi, also one of Sorai’s disciples, in search of early manuscripts at the academy. They located enough old manuscript materials that their joint efforts enabled Yamanoi to compile what he called the Shichikei Mōshi kōbin (Examined texts for seven classics including the Mencius). Later Sorai noted that Yamanoi had spent three years in Ashikaga painstakingly going through manuscripts there. Hattori Nankaku reported that during this time, Nemoto began to collate the manuscript copy of the Lun-yü i-shu, which Yamanoi also used, and the variants in the editions of the Analects he had found.

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60 Ogyū, Ogyū Sorai, p. 490. Regarding the tradition that the school was founded by Ono no Takamura, today largely rejected, see Yuki Rikuro, Kanaizawa bunbo to Ashikaga gakko (Tokyo, 1959), pp. 155–6; also Kawase Kazuma, Ashikaga Gakkō no kenkyū (1948; Tokyo, 1974), pp. 3–9.

After Yamanoi’s death in 1728, the shogun, Tokugawa Yoshimune, ordered Ogyū Sorai’s younger brother, Ogyū Hokkei, to enlarge and correct errors in the collection. Yoshimune sponsored its publication upon completion in 1732 under the title *Shichikei Mōbi kōbun hoi* (Additions to the Examined texts for the seven classics including the Mencius). The Nagasaki magistrate sent the entire compendium in thirty-two volumes containing some two hundred chüan to Ningpo, but it took until the 1760s to draw the interest of classical scholars in Chekiang. Scholars there realized that the *Shichikei Mōbi kōbun hoi* proved for the first time that versions of the Chinese classics lost in China, such as the subcommentary by Huang K’an, had apparently survived in Japan.\(^{62}\)

Yamanoi’s expanded lists of variants for the seven classics (*Book of change, Book of documents, Book of poetry, Tso’s commentary, Analects, and Classic on being filial, and also the Mencius*) became popular among scholars devoted to evidential learning in Ch’ing because it was based on allegedly reliable old Japanese manuscripts that had survived in the Ashikaga archives. Some of the Chekiang bookmen who were involved in the Ningpo–Nagasaki trade began to inquire about other such texts when their ships arrived in Japan. Later, the Hangchow salt merchant and bibliophile Wang Ch’i-shu (1728–99) submitted a copy of Yamanoi’s work to the Ch’ien-lung emperor’s Suu-k’u ch’üan-shu commission to add to the imperial library in Peking.\(^{63}\)

The editors in Peking enthusiastically accepted the book, and recopied it into the Ch’ien-lung library, but initially they did not realize that the author was Japanese. They also gave the wrong date of first publication, 1670, before Yamanoi was even born. This was corrected when the Yangchow scholar-official, Juan Yüan (1764–1849), who was completing his own huge project collating the best editions for the thirteen classics (*Shih-san ching chu-shu chiao-k’an chi*), met with Kim Ch’ong-hŭi (1786–1856) in 1810. Kim was then visiting Peking on a tribute mission from Korea that arrived in 1809. The first Korean to recognize the importance of Yamanoi’s edition, Kim sent Juan Yüan a copy of the original, manuscript version of Yamanoi’s *Shichikei Mōbi kōbun,* which he had copy[^64].

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\(^{62}\) Yamanoi Konron, *Shichikei Mōbi kōbun hoi* (Taipei, 1983–6), which includes a fan-li that lists on 6b what it calls the “Kô Kan Giso rongo” (or Huang K’an-i-shu Lun yû).


\(^{64}\) For the Su-k’u ch’üan shu editors’ comment on Yamanoi’s *Shichikei Mōbi kōbun,* see Wang Yün-wu et al., comps., *Hoi-yin su-k’u ch’üan-shu tsung-nu t’i-yao chi su-k’u wei shou shu-mu, chin-hùi shu-mu,* Volume 1 (Taipei, 1971), pp. 677–9. They discussed the problems in the transmission of the supposed Huang K’an commentary to the Lun yû at pp. 712–13. See also Fujitsuka Chikashi, *Nichi-Sen-Shin no bunka kôryû* (Tokyo, 1947), pp. 26–7; and Yoshikawa, *Jinsai, Sorai, Norinaga,* pp. 149–51.
The *Ssu-k’u ch’üan-shu* editors also were pleased to find that Yamanoi’s editions for the various classics contradicted the infamous claims made by Feng Fang (1493–1566) in the Ming period that his new edition of the *Great Learning* had been based on a reliable version from abroad. In an ironic twist, the Ch’ing scholars at the Ch’ien-lung court used an eighteenth-century Japanese edition of the classics to confirm that Feng Fang’s sixteenth-century edition was a forgery. Yamanoi’s collection showed Japanese scholars that they were now the equals of scholars at the Ch’ing capital when it came to collating and editing the classics.65

**Dazai Shundai and his ancient-script version of the Classic on being filial**

Following Yamanoi’s lead, another Sorai student, Dazai Shundai, traveled to Ashikaga in the 1720s and found an unknown version of the *Hsiao ching* (*Classic on being filial*, J. Kōkyō). He thought it was based on an ancient-script (Ch. *ku-wen*, J. *kobun*) version recorded in the Sui dynasty (581–618) that had been transmitted to Japan in the seventh century, according to Japanese records. That version of the *Classic on being filial* had been endorsed by the Heian court, but in 860 the endorsement was withdrawn because of the texts’s dubious transmission history. Instead, a T’ang edition prepared under imperial auspices in Ch’ang-an was recognized and remained in circulation. The ancient-script version that Dazai discovered allegedly dated back to a number of manuscripts written in ancient-style script supposedly discovered in the walls of Confucius’ house when it was being enlarged sometime between 154 and 128 BCE. In 1732, Dazai published the *Kobun kōkyō Kōshi den* (*K’ung’s commentary to the ancient-script version of the Classic on being filial*), which was his collation of the newly discovered text of the classic along with a commentary he attributed to K’ung An-kuo (156–c.100 BCE) of the Western Han dynasty. K’ung’s commentary had been lost in China by the mid-sixth century and mysteriously reappeared in the late sixth century under the Sui dynasty. This commentary was carried to Japan, but was lost in China during the Five Dynasties period (907–60).66

Dazai hoped that this lost classical commentary would be officially transported from Nagasaki to China as Yamanoi’s work had been. He made his request official in 1733, when he asked the daimyo of Numata, where Ashikaga

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65 See Wang et al., *Ho-yin s-su-k’u ch’üan-shu tuung-mu t’i-yao chi s-su-k’u wei shou shu-mu*, Volume 1, pp. 712–13, 677–9, on the Shichi Mōshi kōban boa.

was located, to see to it that the Nagasaki magistrate send a copy to Ningpo. It is not clear what copy of Dazai’s edition made it to China, but it was included in the first collection of the *Chih-pu-tsu chai ts'ung-shu* (*Collectanea from the Hall of knowing one’s deficiencies*), which began to be printed in 1776 by the bibliophile Pao T'ing-po (1728–1814). Later it was critiqued by the compilers who included it in the *Ssu-k'u ch'üan-shu*. In the eighteenth century, the K'ung An-kuo version was doubly questioned by Ch'ing scholars as a “forgery of a forgery” because the consensus among them was that K'ung An-kuo had never prepared any sort of classical commentary. This meant that even a first version of K'ung’s commentary, whatever that was, must be doubted. Unlike the more positive assessments accorded the newly discovered Huang K'an subcommentary for the *Analects* in the 1780s, most Ch’ing scholars simply dismissed Dazai’s version of the K’ung An-kuo commentary as a later forgery of an originally forged text.67

In 1778 a Ch’ing merchant brought printed copies of the 1776 *Chih-pu-tsu chai ts'ung-shu* collection to Nagasaki. It included prefaces by several Ch’ing scholars praising Dazai’s work, although they voiced suspicions that the supposed original Han dynasty version of the K’ung commentary was also a later forgery. In 1781, the Ch’ing prefaces by Lu Wen-chao (1717–96), Wu Ch’ien (1733–1813), and Cheng Ch'en, as well as Pao T’ing-po’s original colophon, were reprinted in Edo as a separate volume. Dazai’s alleged fame in China cemented his reputation in the Japanese academic world. The influential patron of literature and the arts Kimura Kenkado (1736–1802) prepared a preface honoring Dazai Shundai for the publication of his work in China. A Japanese reprint of the *Chih-pu-tsu chai ts'ung-shu* edition of Dazai’s *K’ung commentary to the ancient script version of the Classic on being filial* was also issued the following year, with a glowing preface by one of his disciples.

The publication of these two works in Japan confirmed Dazai Shundai’s reputation as a classicist and polymath in Tokugawa scholarly circles. Moreover, Yamanoi’s use of early manuscripts and Dazai’s return to texts originating in the Han dynasty ancient-script tradition vindicated the Sorai school’s attack on those who uncritically upheld the much later Sung dynasty teachings of Chu Hsi as the core of the classical curriculum.68 Shundai’s edition of the *Classic on being filial* helped to try to reverse the priority previously given to the Ch'eng–Chu editions of the Four Books and Five Classics that dated back


68 On Huang K’an’s subcommentary for the *Analects*, see Benjamin A. Elman, “One classic and two classical traditions: The recovery and transmission of a lost edition of the *Analects*,” *Monumenta Nipponica* 64 No. 1 (2009), pp. 53–82.
to the Sung dynasty. Shundai’s edition of the K’ung An-kuo commentary was reprinted frequently all over Japan, and soon became the most widely circulated version of the *Classic on being filial*. Its success in turn provoked numerous follow-up studies by Japanese scholars on the K’ung commentary, which were both favorable and unfavorable. In essence, Shundai’s focus on recovering the *Classic on being filial* of antiquity through its ancient-script version held in the Ashikaga Academy enabled him as a Japanese scholar to surpass the textual authority of the Sung scholars. A classic lost in China had been resuscitated in Japan.69

*The Cheng Hsüan modern-script version of the Classic on being filial*

As a result of the fame achieved by Dazai Shundai, other Japanese scholars sought out missing commentaries, such as the *Hsiao ching Cheng chu* (Cheng’s commentary for the *Classic on being filial*, J. Kōkyo Seichū), attributed to Cheng Hsüan (130–200). The Cheng Hsüan commentary also had been lost in China during the turmoil of the Five Dynasties period. In Sung it was reimported to China from Japan, and then lost again. In Japan, a seemingly reliable version was discovered within the *Ch’u-n-shu chib-yao* (Selections on the essentials of rulership, J. Gunsho chiyo), an important T’ang dynasty compilation lost in China for centuries. The ruler of Nagoya had the manuscripts surviving in Japan collated and printed during the 1780s. Classical scholars realized while collating the T’ang dynasty work that a version of the Cheng Hsüan commentary to the *Classic on being filial* survived within the collection. Okada Shinsen (1737–99) was not the first to publish an edition of the supposed Cheng Hsüan commentary in Japan, but his edition was the first one sent to China. He hoped it would also be honored with publication there. It was immediately reprinted in the *Chib-pu-tsui chai ts’ung-shu* series. When Okada’s version appeared in 1794, some Ch’ing scholars accepted his version of the Cheng commentary, while others condemned it as a forgery because it lacked passages that were cited in other surviving versions of the commentary. Without access until 1847 to a widely available reprint of the Japanese version of the *Ch’u-n-shu chib-yao*, from which the Cheng Hsüan commentary had been extracted, Ch’ing scholars could not corroborate that this collection was a reliable source. They then determined that Okada’s version was an abridgment of the Cheng commentary. When compared to Ch’ing classicists’ skeptical reception of the ancient-script version of the *Classic on being filial* that accompanied a commentary attributed to K’ung An-kuo, they were much more positive toward the so-called Cheng Hsüan “modern-script” (*chin-wen*) version, despite some reservations. The more

69 Hess, “The reimportation from Japan to China of the commentary to the *Classic of filial piety*,” pp. 6–7.
positive reaction was in part due to the elevated status Cheng Hsüan commanded among late eighteenth-century Ch'ing classicists, who regarded him as the key Later Han textual scholar because he had annotated most of the Confucian canon. Evidential scholars regarded him as the father of Han learning (Han hsüeh). They relied on his many glosses to unravel the ancient meanings of characters and terms in the Five Classics, and to replace the allegedly anachronistic “meanings and principles” (i-li) readings introduced by Sung scholars.\(^{70}\)

Despite its positive reception in China, Tokugawa scholars did not consider Okada Shinsen’s work the equal of Nemoto’s, Yamanoi’s, or Shundai’s. As Sorai scholars, they could count on their master’s iconoclasm and widespread influence on classical learning in Japan during the second half of the eighteenth century to enjoy positive responses to their new editions of lost Chinese works. By the turn of nineteenth century, however, a new group of more eclectic classical scholars was emerging in Japan. They tended to denigrate both Jinsai and Sorai and their students for being doctrinaire Confucians with limited philological knowledge, which marked a shift in scholarly standards.\(^{71}\)

In both China and Japan through the eighteenth century, scholars’ turning away from Sung and Ming interpretive approaches to classical texts led to an emphasis on textual criticism and philology, and spurred interest in pre-Sung commentarial traditions. A certain degree of mutual awareness and transfer of knowledge accompanied this shared interest, but until the late eighteenth century the Tokugawa and Ch'ing pursuits of critical textual studies followed relatively independent trajectories based on different sorts of sources, mainly printed editions in Ch'ing and manuscripts in Tokugawa. The commonalities between the two traditions increased in the early nineteenth century, when some Japanese scholars argued for adapting the Ch'ing emphasis on evidential learning as the way to approach classical texts.

The incorporation of a philological emphasis survived the prohibition of “heterodoxy” in the Kansei era (1789–1801). After 1790 the shogunate for the first time directly supported the tradition derived from Chu Hsi’s learning.\(^{72}\)

\(^{70}\) Elman, From philosophy to philology (2001), pp. 146, 162.


Although the Ch'eng–Chu persuasion continued in the following years, its proponents failed to block books containing the new classical learning that arrived through Nagasaki. The importation and spread of new studies on the classical texts from south China, the heartland of evidential research after the mid-eighteenth century, provided a philological methodology that was no one's monopoly in China or Japan. It could be used to attack orthodox learning, as Ogyū Sorai had in part done, or to reaffirm it with reservations, as the eclectics did. It was also employed by nativist scholars in Japan who sought to cleanse ancient Japanese chronicles and poetry masterpieces of their Sinitic encumbrances and thereby restore the true spirit of Japanese antiquity.  

CHAPTER 7

CH'ING RELATIONS WITH MARITIME EUROPEANS

John E. Wills, Jr. and John L. Cranmer-Byng†

The Ch'ing empire was involved in global changes effected by maritime trade. Tea from China was one of the transoceanic consumer goods that helped to stimulate the steady growth of intercontinental maritime connections and the emergence in northwestern Europe of prosperous and dynamic bourgeois societies. Chinese porcelain was less important in trade-value terms but more important for European consumption patterns and rôvès chinois.¹ The export of tea shaped several sectors of the south China economy, provided revenues for the Imperial Household Department, and drew an inflow of silver vital to the further monetization of the Ch'ing economy. By 1780–1800 other waves of world-historical change were reaching Fukien and Kwangtung: ships from the new United States, some of them bringing Pacific sea otter skins and Hawaiian sandalwood, and private traders from the emerging British Empire in India bringing opium. The Ch'ing rulers viewed these maritime connections with trepidation, recalling the earlier Ming loyalist resistance along the southeast coast and the doubts they had of the loyalty of overseas Chinese settled in Southeast Asian ports. The overseas Chinese returned the distrust. Little of their rich knowledge of European and Southeast Asian trading partners made its way into print or into the files of the Ch'ing bureaucracy. Ch'ing leaders’ wariness of the cultural contamination brought by Roman Catholic missionaries sometimes affected their attitudes toward European traders, especially the Portuguese of Macao. The result was a Ch'ing economy involved in an early modern world in a variety of ways, but with a ruling elite not well informed about the maritime connections. In the great trade at Canton, the traders and the Ch'ing representatives maintained a minimum of exchange of information. There were almost no foreigners traveling within the

empire. Europeans could and did trade without sending tribute embassies to Peking.  

EARLY CH'ING, 1644–90

The patterns of Ch'ing relations with maritime Europeans in the 1690s were different from what they had been under the Ming dynasty in the 1630s. The changes in the intervening decades cannot be understood without attention to the stages of Ch'ing conquest and dynastic consolidation, but some of the most striking changes, like Cheng Ch'eng-kung’s conquest of Taiwan, were peripheral to that process or, like the expulsion of the Portuguese from Japan, were completely unrelated to it. Macao survived the immense blow of its ships being excluded from Japan, strengthened its trading connections with the sandalwood islands of eastern Indonesia, and eventually emerged as an important center of the Indian Ocean–South China Sea “country trade” of the eighteenth century. However, Macao did not recover its earlier prosperity or its centrality in Sino-European relations.

The Dutch and Cheng Chih-lung in Taiwan, sometimes competing and sometimes co-operating, were not slow to take advantage of the opportunities for trade with Japan presented them by the expulsion of the Portuguese. They already had begun to expand their trade to Nagasaki as the Portuguese position there disintegrated in the late 1630s, and continued to do so in the early 1640s, although the volume of Sino-Japanese trade between 1644 and the reopening of Ch'ing maritime trade in 1684 is difficult to sort out.

During these decades the Ch'ing court and bureaucracy took the first steps toward establishing policies to manage commercial and political relations with Europeans. The lack of vigorous commercial interests in these decades gave the new dynasty some breathing space to experiment and change policies numerous times before it began to consolidate its own coherent approach in

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4 Wills, “Relations with maritime Europeans,” pp. 333–75.


the 1680s. As in many aspects of its rule, the Ch'ing government took Ming precedents as starting points. However, these did not offer much guidance for dealing with maritime Europeans. In the early and middle Ming, all relations with other polities were supposed to be managed in the framework of the tribute system. All foreign rulers visiting the Ming court or sending ambassadors to it had to accept ceremonial and documentary forms that portrayed them as tributaries paying homage to the Son of Heaven, the Ming emperor. Trade by foreigners in Chinese ports, border towns, or the capital was allowed only in conjunction with tribute embassies, and no Chinese were legally permitted to travel outside Ming territory except on rare official missions. The frequency of tribute embassies, the number of people in an embassy party, even the number of ships that brought them were carefully prescribed. This elaborate system presented a possible model for dealing with traders from maritime Europe, but it had never been successfully applied to relations with them. In 1517–24 a Portuguese embassy had been rejected. Local authorities allowed the Portuguese to settle at Macao in 1557, but it probably was not until after 1600 that the court realized that the inhabitants of Macao were the same people who had been banned from the empire in the 1520s. By that time, Macao was firmly entrenched in a new order of coastal administration that, not so much violating the tribute system as ignoring it, licensed a large-scale overseas trade in Chinese ships and taxed that trade and the trade of the Portuguese at Macao and Canton in order to supplement provincial revenues.7

This new order also made possible trade relations with other Europeans that left questions of diplomatic form in abeyance. In 1567, after much confusion and debate, the Ming permitted and established controls on maritime trade in Chinese vessels, especially from Hai-ch'eng near Chang-chou.8 The Spanish settled at Manila in 1571, and Chinese traders went to them there. Nothing came of Spanish efforts to acquire a coastal entrepôt like Macao. The Dutch irruption into East Asian waters in the 1620s was one of several catalysts of major political changes in coastal China. The Dutch first appeared on the coast as marauders, were never legally welcome to trade in Chinese ports, and eventually were mollified and kept at a distance by the large-scale trade carried in Chinese ships to Casteel Zeelandia on Taiwan.9

The Portuguese presence at Macao was confirmed by the Ch'ing court as early as 1647, and reconfirmed in 1650, after the Ch'ing lost and then retook

7 Wills, “Relations with maritime Europeans,” pp. 333–75.
Canton. It was hoped that the taxes on their trade would help to pay for Ch'ing armies. Despite flowery rhetoric about how the Portuguese had “scaled the mountains and navigated the seas before they had a chance to look upon the brilliance of the Celestial Empire,” they were not required to send a tribute embassy; there was no Ming precedent for their doing so. In the first years of Ch'ing rule, Macao profited greatly from the special relations of Jesuit missionaries with the capital elite. The personal relations of the Shun-chih emperor with Adam Schall von Bell are well known. Equally important for Macao was the interest in Roman Catholicism of high officials in Canton. T'ung Yang-chia, who submitted the first memorial in favor of Macao in 1647, was a member of a powerful Manchu–Chinese family that included converts and important patrons of the Jesuits. Shang K'o-hsi (d. 1676) and his son Shang Chih-hsin, who commanded Kwangtung, also were on good terms with the missionaries, and commercial ties with them and their client merchants were important for Macao in the 1650s.

Portuguese and Jesuit connections with the ruling elite were one source of the difficulties that the Dutch East India Company encountered when it tried to open relations with the Ch'ing in the 1650s. Ming precedents were another. In 1651–2 Martino Martini SJ, passing through Batavia on his way to Europe, remarked that the new Ch'ing government seemed more hospitable to foreigners than the Ming had been. The ruling council of the Company in the Netherlands already had been urging the Batavia authorities to consider an embassy to China, and trade profits on Taiwan seemed to be declining. In 1652, on instructions from Batavia, the Dutch on Taiwan sent an exploratory mission to Canton. Chinese officials recalled that the Dutch had never been welcome in Chinese ports, and the Macao authorities did all they could to oppose them, but the Ch'ing military commanders Shang K'o-hsi and Keng Chi-mao allowed them to carry on a trade in which they were major investors and told the Dutch they could pick out a site for a permanent factory. But before they left in March 1653 the Dutch were told they should send an embassy to Peking to request trading privileges. When the Dutch on Taiwan ignored this directive and sent another trading voyage to Canton

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11 See the chapter in this volume by John W. Witek.
13 Wills, Embassies and illusions, pp. 84–6.
14 On Dutch relations with the Ch'ing in the 1650s, see Wills, Embassies and illusions, pp. 40–4.
in the summer of 1653, they were sent away without being allowed to trade. The change in attitude at Canton from 1652 to 1653 probably resulted partly from the general recovery of the Ch'ing government from disarray after the death of the powerful regent Dorgon and partly from turning back toward Ming models of foreign relations after it was decided in the fall of 1652 that it would be inappropriate for the Son of Heaven to go out beyond the Great Wall to meet the Dalai Lama while he was on tour in Mongolia.

Batavia sent an embassy in 1655 under Pieter de Goyer and Jacob de Keyser. After many delays the ambassadors were received in audience on October 2, 1656. They performed all tributary ceremonies without hesitation, thus making “Holland” the first European power to be received into the tribute system. “Holland” (Ho-lan) referred to the Dutch East India Company and the “king of Holland” to its governor-general in Batavia; cognate terms were generally used throughout the Indian Ocean, and the Ch'ing authorities rarely betrayed any understanding of the difference between Java and the Netherlands. The Dutch, for their part, only occasionally understood that in Ch'ing eyes they were presenting tribute, and even then did not care. They reminded themselves that in reality Peking received such embassies from many powerful and independent states. Dutch requests for coastal trading privileges were supported by the commanders in Canton, to whom the Dutch had promised 35,000 taels of silver if such privileges were granted, and who also would profit from their own involvement in any trade permitted to the Dutch. The Dutch proposed that they send an embassy every five years and be allowed to trade every year, and recorded that some in Peking, especially Manchus, had been ready to approve this. But the final decision was for an embassy every eight years and trade only in conjunction with embassies. This curious throwback to mid-Ming restrictiveness owed something to the efforts of Schall, doing all he could to protect Macao from Dutch competition, but more to Ch'ing policies of economic warfare against Cheng Ch'eng-kung, adopted in August 1656. To ward off attacks from the sea, coastal defenses were improved, the Cheng network of merchant contacts on the mainland was uprooted, and all maritime trade in Chinese vessels was forbidden. As had happened several times under the Ming, restrictive policies toward Chinese-managed trade also led to new barriers to foreign trade in Chinese harbors. In addition, the Ch'ing authorities must have known that Cheng traded with

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the Dutch on Taiwan, and thus would have viewed Dutch trading privileges in their ports as a breach of their blockade.

Although in the eyes of the Ch'ing court the Dutch were not permitted on the China coast until 1664, they did manage to buy and sell small amounts of goods in the Canton delta in 1657 and 1658. In 1661–2 their situation was transformed by Cheng Ch'eng-kung’s conquest of Taiwan. Trading privileges in mainland ports were much more important to the Dutch now that they had lost their offshore entrepôt. In their eyes revenge against Cheng and his successors was morally and politically necessary. Already in 1661 Ch'ing local authorities had expressed interest in obtaining Dutch naval help against the Cheng regime and had promised rewards for it.\(^{16}\) If the rewards took the form of trading privileges, both Dutch goals would be achieved at once.

In 1662–5 the Dutch East India Company sent three substantial fleets to the Fukien coast under Balthasar Bort to co-operate with Ch'ing forces in attacking the Cheng regime.\(^{17}\) A Dutch fleet made a large, though perhaps not indispensable, contribution to the expulsion of Cheng forces from Amoy (Hsiamen) and Quemoy (Chin-men) in November 1663. But the Ch'ing officials found the Dutch to be difficult allies, rude, impatient, prone to unilateral action against the common enemy, and a dangerous presence because of the firepower of their ships. The Cheng forces fled their last mainland coastal strongholds early in 1664, and in 1665 the Ch'ing deferred interest in an attack on Cheng-controlled Taiwan. Thereafter, the Ch'ing government had little reason to conciliate the Dutch even if these dangerous allies had behaved themselves.

The Dutch found the loose alliance even less satisfactory. They never understood or accepted the inevitable delays of Ch'ing bureaucratic decision-making. Ch'ing negotiations for the surrender of Cheng commanders, sensible in a civil war, seemed to them cowardly and treacherous acts of dealing with the enemy. And the Dutch got the trading privileges they were seeking only in very limited and insecure forms. They were allowed to sell the cargoes brought on the three fleets as special favors to facilitate military co-operation. As a reward for their aid, in November 1663 they were granted permission to trade every other year. The privilege was enjoyed just once, in 1665, the very year in which the Dutch unwittingly made themselves less welcome. They did not send an embassy, although one had been due in 1664. They sent ships in three groups to two different ports, making administrative and reporting difficulties for the local officials. Worst of all, when two Dutch ships,


\(^{17}\) See chapters 2 and 3 in Wills, *Pepper, guns, and parleys*. 
cruising off Chekiang to prey on Cheng’s ships, anchored off the great Buddhist sanctuary island of Pu-t’o-shan, their crews plundered some temples there, and local authorities reported this to Peking. When the Dutch left Foochow at the end of the year, they were told that orders had been sent to all coastal officials that no more Dutch ships were allowed in Chinese harbors until an embassy was sent.18

An embassy was sent in 1666, under Pieter van Hoorn, and was received in Peking in June 1667.19 Its arrival led to a review of recent difficulties with the Dutch, and after the fall from power of Sunahai, one of the leading shapers of coastal policy in previous years, the Dutch biennial trading privilege was revoked. According to this decision, after the departure of the embassy there would be no legal Dutch trade in Chinese ports until 1674.20 In Peking, Van Hoorn could not obtain any discussion or explanation of this decision or any other substantive issue. He was even forbidden to open within the empire routine replies sent to the governor-general at Batavia. The ships that came to fetch him in 1667 had to take away their entire cargoes unsold. Two ships sent to Canton in 1668 sold only a small quantity of goods, and that illegally.21

In Chinese official sources, relations with the Dutch in this period are fitted into the style and categories inherited from the Ming tribute system, which expected that a new tributary ruler was to be enrolled and given a statutory interval and route for tribute embassies. He would then send military aid, if required, and he and his commanders would receive presents and edicts of praise. A biennial trading privilege was granted in addition to the usual trade in connection with embassies. The privilege might be revoked. A second embassy would come, and its tributary presents and the imperial gifts in return would be recorded in detail. Implicit in these sources is the premise that Ch’ing statesmen thought of other sovereigns as inferior to the emperor and of all formal embassies to Peking as tribute missions. There was no possibility that an embassy would be received at Peking without performing the tributary ceremonies. The rejection of the Russian embassy of F. I. Baykov in 1656 makes this clear.22 The Dutch in 1656 could not have obtained their initial permission to trade if they had not sent an embassy, but the limitation of trade to that in conjunction with embassies had not been in effect in late Ming, and its revival at this time was largely the result of the temporary imperatives of economic warfare against the Cheng regime in Taiwan. Similarly, the 1667 revocation of the Dutch biennial trading privilege was less a principled reversion to the early Ming system than a response to

18 Wills, Pepper, guns, and parleys, p. 133.
19 See chapter 2 in Wills, Embassies and illusions.
20 Wills, Embassies and illusions, pp. 76–7.
21 Wills, Pepper, guns, and parleys, pp. 139–44.
22 Mark Mancall, Russia and China: Their diplomatic relations to 1728 (Cambridge, MA, 1971), pp. 45–53.
particular changes in Ch'ing politics and particular offenses by the Dutch, of which their failure to send an embassy on schedule in 1664 was by no means the most important.

The Portuguese also sent an embassy to Peking in the 1660s, but an account of Sino-Portuguese relations centered on participation in the tribute system would be even more misleading than it is in the account of relations with the Dutch.23 The embassy was sent to save Macao, and the center of this effort is the impact on Macao of coastal evacuation and changing relations with officials in Canton.24 When the Kwangtung coast was ordered evacuated in 1662,25 all Chinese were forced to leave Macao, and the food supply of the remaining Portuguese and Eurasians was sharply curtailed. Shang K’o-hsi co-operated with the Jesuits in efforts to obtain from the court an exemption for Macao’s non-Chinese population from the coastal evacuation decrees and, if possible, permission for Macao to continue its maritime trade. They thought they had succeeded, but then the regents reversed the favorable recommendations of the ministries and ordered that all foreigners be sent away from Macao and all fortifications there be razed. This reversal may have come at about the same time as the regents’ rejection of proposed Dutch trading privileges early in 1664, and may also have been linked to reactions to the Dutch demonstrations of European naval power. Finally the Jesuits and their allies secured permission for non-Chinese to stay in Macao, but not for the continuation of maritime trade. The situation was further complicated by the arrest in 1665 of all missionaries in the capital and provinces, depriving Macao of its most influential and capable allies. Macao barely survived, its trade almost entirely cut off.

In February 1667 orders arrived that all the people in Macao were to be moved inland. This reversal of the previous toleration of Macao seems to have come at about the same time as the revocation of the Dutch biennial trading privilege, and some of the same political changes in Peking probably contributed to it. The Macao authorities promised 250,000 taels of silver to the governor-general of Kwangtung and Kwangsi if he would not cut off their food supplies and would write to Peking in their favor. This was sufficient to keep Macao viable until late August, when it was learned that the court had accepted the governor-general’s recommendation and exempted Macao from the coastal evacuation order. Macao’s future was further stabilized when Shang K’o-hsi, seeing an opportunity in the new emperor’s assumption of direct

ruling powers, reported to the court on the governor-general’s extortions. This led to the latter’s imprisonment and suicide, and the emperor’s viewing Macao as a victim of extortion by an official.

The four-year-long black comedy of the Portuguese embassy of Manoel de Saldanha illustrates the masterfulness of the K'ang-hsi emperor, Jesuit finesse, and the incompetence and factiousness of colonial outposts. The arrival of the embassy in 1667 probably contributed to Macao’s new lease on life. It stayed in Canton until January 1670, partly because of the ambassador’s reluctance to turn over to the authorities there the royal letter to the emperor or to show the presents being taken to him. The Canton officials probably tolerated this delay because the presence of the embassy legalized their trade with Macao and because the political situation in Peking made the prospects for a Jesuit-connected embassy very uncertain. These prospects improved markedly after the emperor’s coup against the regent, Oboi, in June 1669. When the Saldanha embassy finally reached Peking in June 1670, the emperor demonstrated his break with the policies of Oboi and his partiality to the Jesuits by ostentatious signs of favor to the embassy. These gestures probably helped to defend Macao against renewed proposals for its extinction, but could not protect it from official extortion or from the competition of foreign traders in the nearby islands in the 1670s. The embassy had obeyed, sometimes unwittingly or unwillingly, all the rules for a tribute embassy and had been recorded as such, but no fixed interval had been established for Portuguese embassies. The letter Saldanha brought in the name of the king of Portugal declared that he was sent to congratulate the new emperor upon his succession to the throne. In Canton the Jesuits had seized on this to secure the change of the characters on its banners from chin-kung, “presenting tribute,” to chin-bo, “presenting congratulation.” The Jesuits were convinced that they had won an epochal victory over the pretensions of the tribute system, but in fact chin-bo had been altogether acceptable within the system for centuries.26 The Portuguese and their Jesuit advisers made the same terminological distinction in the two eighteenth-century Portuguese embassies, thereby convincing themselves that their involvement in the tribute system in no way compromised the honor of the king of Portugal.

A second Portuguese embassy under Bento Pereira de Faria in 1678 brought the emperor a lion from Mozambique but was otherwise entirely organized in Macao.27 Ch'ing officials had been careful about documenting the authenticity of the Saldanha embassy, but do not seem to have raised any objections to the irregularities of this one. The emperor was fascinated by the lion and had some of his courtiers write poems about it. His personal attention again enhanced

27 See chapter 4 in Wills, *Embassies and illusions*. 
the prestige of the embassy. Pereira de Faria quite sensibly left substantive negotiations in the capable hands of the Jesuits, and soon inspectors were sent from Peking to visit Macao. Late in 1679 Macao’s land trade with Canton was fully legalized. According to Portuguese sources its maritime trade was legalized in the fall of 1680. It is clear that from then to 1684 the Ch’ing authorities treated Macao’s trade differently from that of its would-be Dutch, English, and Chinese competitors, but the Chinese sources do not confirm that its maritime trade was fully legalized.

In the years 1676–80 the Ch’ing court and officials in Fukien again showed interest in obtaining Dutch naval aid against the Cheng regime, then occupying parts of southern Fukien as well as Taiwan, and even sent low-ranking emissaries to Batavia in 1679–80. The Dutch, convinced that they had been used and then betrayed in the 1660s, were not much interested, and the negotiations made no progress. In the meantime the Dutch were allowed to trade every year in Foochow, although they had not sent an embassy since 1666–7. The tribute system was less and less the center of the Ch’ing government’s relations with Europeans.28

By 1690 the linkage between tribute and trade had disappeared for Europeans. From 1684 on, trade in Chinese ports was open to all foreigners, regardless of whether their rulers had ever been enrolled as tributaries, and maritime trade was taxed and controlled by special agents of the court. These were changes in political economy, not in the dynamics of trade. European demand for Chinese goods was weak. The market for tea was just beginning to grow, and cheaper Bengal raw silk was undercutting demand for the Chinese product. The major economic change during the 1680s–90s was the surge of Han Chinese shipping and emigration that followed Ch’ing legalization of Chinese maritime trade.29

Ch’ing decision-making was focused on the permission and taxation of Chinese trade and Chinese overseas voyages; the application of these basic decisions to foreign traders was an afterthought. The surrender of the Cheng regime in Taiwan to the Ch’ing forces in 1683 eliminated the economic warfare rationale for trade restrictions. In the summer of 1684, the emperor permitted maritime trading and fishing voyages from Chinese ports, and dispatched metropolitan officials to supervise the taxation of maritime trade for three years; on the basis of their receipts and recommendations, quotas then would be established for each province. At first it was thought that after three years

28 See chapter 4 in Wills, Pepper, guns, and parleys.
maritime customs collection might revert to the regular provincial officials, but maritime customs superintendents, known as the “hoppo” of the later Canton trade, remained in control of the Fukien customs until 1729 and the Canton customs until 1842. The emperor was aware that full legalization and effective central control of maritime trade were not in the interests of the high officials of the coastal provinces, who for years had profited from illegal trade dominated by their client merchants. The presence of the maritime customs superintendents in the port cities eventually undercut provincial officials’ domination of trade and allowed more merchants to participate. From 1685 on, the superintendents were allowed to levy tolls only on maritime trade, and in 1686 separate guilds were established in Kwangtung for internal and maritime trade; one firm might be involved in both, but it had to maintain a separate establishment for each. Thus the fundamentals of specialized official supervision and a specialized mercantile body for foreign trade, the foundations of the eighteenth-century Canton system, were established for the control and taxation of Chinese merchants, whether they traded with foreigners in Chinese ports or sent their own ships abroad, with no explicit reference to the foreigners who might be involved.³⁰

³⁰ ¹ P’eng Tse-i, “Ch’ing-tai Kuang-tung yang-hang chih-tu ti ch’i-yūan,” Li-shih yen-chiu No. 1 (1957), pp. 1–24. The term “hoppo,” used by foreigners for the superintendent of maritime customs, had its origin in the dispatch of ministers from the capital, most often the Ministry of Revenue (bu-pu), to fill this post. In one case, when the local superintendent was from the Ministry of Works (kung-pu) the Dutch called him “the Kampo.” Also see John K. Fairbank, Trade and diplomacy on the China coast: The opening of treaty ports, 1842–1854 (1953; Cambridge, MA, 1964), p. 49 and note 15, for reservations about the basis in Chinese for the Westerners’ term.
When the Dutch also sought to trade at Amoy in 1684, the Ministries of War and Rites recommended that they not be allowed to trade until they sent an embassy. The emperor decided that the harbors of the empire should be open to all, apparently without reference to tributary status, but that the Dutch would not be allowed to trade again until they sent an embassy. They did so in 1685, with Vincent Paats as ambassador. It accomplished nothing for the Dutch, and the Dutch were told that the emperor had complained of the expense and expressed his wish that they send no more embassies. There would not be another maritime European embassy for commercial purposes for a century. This break with the pattern of the tribute system can also be seen in other diplomatic relations, especially in the relations with Russia and Inner Asia that were more vital to Ch’ing interests than were maritime relations with European states. The tribute pattern remained in place for the states culturally tied to China – Korea, Ryukyu, and Annan – and for mainland Southeast Asia, including Siam, which maintained an important maritime trade within the tribute framework. The fundamentals of taxation and control of foreign trade in Chinese ports were quickly established, largely on precedents worked out in late Ming for the trade at Hai-ch’eng, Fukien. Ships paid a “measurement” fee, and their import goods were taxed according to elaborate tables of unit taxes on various kinds of goods. Agents of the imperial court were dispatched as superintendents of maritime customs for Chiang-nan, Fukien, and Kwangtung. Practices and policies were similar to those for inland toll barriers.

In the late 1680s, Macao sent an embassy to revive its old connection with Siam. The Portuguese entrepôt enjoyed a modest prosperity in the shadow of the immense Chinese maritime trade. After 1690 the Dutch did not send ships to China, but depended on the growing Chinese-carried trade to Batavia for supplies of Chinese goods. The English, with no port of their own regularly visited by Chinese shipping, expanded their investment both in the trade of their East India Company of Britain and in private trade from Madras in the late 1680s. Between 1690 and 1699, the effects of the conflict between the old and new companies and the many private trade voyages make it impossible to get from surviving sources more than a fragmentary picture

32 See chapter 5 in Wills, *Embassies and illusions*.
of English trade to China. Scattered references show that by 1700 Thomas Pitt and other Madras-based private traders were regularly sending ships to Canton and Amoy, where there were many competing traders, Chinese and foreign, and profits were erratic.35

PEACEFUL EXPANSION, 1690–1740

By 1690 economic conditions were recovering from the so-called “K’ang-hsi depression.” The expansion of trade and emigration in Chinese ships remained the most important phenomenon along the south China coast in terms of the amount of shipping, value of trade, and effects on imperial policy. The most dynamic expansions were in voyages and emigration to Java, to Taiwan, and probably to Siam. Between 1700 and 1715 twelve to fifteen Chinese ships per year went to Batavia, and after 1723 more than twenty. Throughout this period they were joined annually by several Portuguese ships from Macao. In the 1730s Chinese traders sold at Batavia more than 20,000 piculs of tea, as much as all Europeans bought in Chinese ports at that time. They also brought many Chinese to settle in Java as petty traders, workers in the sugar fields and sugar mills, tax agents along the Java coast, and so on.36 The growth of trade to Siam was stimulated by the growth of Chinese imports of Siamese rice as well as by emigration.37 Possibly the most important development to the economy of coastal China was the beginning of steady emigration to Taiwan, relieving population pressure on the coast and providing another source of grain for the coastal garrisons.38 Trade with Nagasaki and Manila was still important, but was declining by 1740. The annual trade with Japan was limited by the Japanese authorities to a value of 600,000 taels, roughly equal to the volume of Chinese and Macao trade at Batavia or to the volume of European trade

38 See the chapter in this volume by John R. Shepherd and chapters 5 to 8 in John R. Shepherd, Statecraft and political economy on the Taiwan frontier, 1600–1800 (Stanford, 1993).
in Chinese ports in the 1730s. Late in the 1730s the trade with Japan was declining as China became somewhat less dependent on Japanese copper, and Japan developed its own silk industry and stopped buying Chinese raw silk and silk goods. Chinese trade with Manila may have been about one million taels per year between 1696 and 1710, but this was only about half the volume of the early seventeenth century, and after 1710 the figures usually were lower still.\(^{39}\)

This coming and going of long-distance ships and a flourishing coastwise trade stimulated piracy. Moreover, Taiwan, a rapidly expanding frontier society, was sometimes violent, with outbreaks of rebellion in a regularly administered territory of the empire. Instability in Taiwan and piracy along the coast formed parts of the background for major changes in policy toward Chinese and European maritime trade. Although our knowledge of Chinese groups in Southeast Asia in this period is fragmentary, it is clear that there was much opposition to the Manchus among them. In Malacca they used a non-Ch'ing reign period for their calendar, and many in Batavia had not adopted the queue. Remnants of the Cheng regime fleeing from Taiwan had settled on the coasts of Vietnam and Cambodia.\(^{40}\)

At the end of 1716 the emperor, noting reports of concentrations of rebels in such places as Manila and Batavia, said that on one of his southern tours he had learned that many of the oceangoing ships built in China were sold in Southeast Asian ports and did not return. He also had less reliable information that rice was being exported from China, possibly to those areas. Trade that aided rebellious Chinese could not be tolerated. All Chinese trade to Southeast Asia (Nan-yang) was to be forbidden, while that to Japan and the Ryukyus (Tung-yang) might continue, and foreign ships might continue to come to trade in China. The emperor speculated that in a hundred or a thousand years the Europeans might cause trouble for the empire, but Chinese rebels were an immediate danger; the Han Chinese were never of one mind, always hard to govern, and their rulers must never cease to be aware of this danger.\(^{41}\)

This ban was fairly effectively enforced. From 1718 to 1722 no Chinese ships got through to Batavia, and trade to Manila was sharply reduced. Trade to Nan-yang was not formally reopened until 1727. In a separate decision


\(_{41}\) Fu, A documentary chronicle of Sino-Western relations, Volume 1, pp. 122–3.
in 1718, the government allowed Macao to continue its maritime trade, and Chinese maritime trade to Vietnam was exempted from the ban.\textsuperscript{42} In the absence of Chinese competition, Macao's maritime trade grew rapidly. The Macanese bought ships in other Asian ports, expanding their merchant fleet from about ten ships in the 1680s to twenty-five in 1724. These were smaller craft than those used by the East India Companies, and later in the century there rarely were more than twelve. The Canton authorities, justifiably confident that they could control Macao, nevertheless were made uneasy by this expansion and ordered that all Macao's ships be registered and that no further increase in their number be allowed.\textsuperscript{43} The organs of autonomous local power, the Macao Senate and Misericórdia, were largely in control of the little settlement until reform efforts in the 1780s, and the Misericórdia's provision of credit extended beyond Macao's own voyages into the Canton financial web.\textsuperscript{44}

Not everyone agreed with the emperor's emphasis on the dangers of Chinese rebellion rather than on those of European encroachment, or with his willingness to sacrifice Chinese overseas trade to the security of the dynasty. In the last years of the K'ang-hsi reign there was increasingly sharp criticism of Roman Catholic missionaries, and not all European traders were behaving themselves. In 1704 an English private trader captured a Chinese junk at Johore on the Malay Peninsula, and in 1715 the English country trader \textit{Anne} captured a Chinese ship off Amoy in a trade dispute. A point of view opposed to that of the emperor can be seen in fragmentary references to the views of Ch'en Mao, a Kwangtung general who had engaged in maritime trade as a young man and recently had been on a mission of investigation to Manila and Batavia. Ch'en was a product of a milieu where many lived by maritime trade. Some had seen European bullying of Chinese in the ports of Southeast Asia, and others knew of the key role of the church in Spanish domination of the Philippines. Ch'en protested that if the Nan-yang trade was prohibited, in some coastal areas half the people would lose their livelihood. Moreover, the Southeast Asian countries did not depend on China for rice; sometimes rice was imported from them when harvests were bad along the Chinese coast. Ch'en's protests were ignored. His proposal for stricter measures against European encroachment fared only a little better. He called for strict enforcement of the old controls of foreign trading ships, such as removing their guns while

\textsuperscript{42} Fu, \textit{A documentary chronicle of Sino-Western relations}, Volume 1, p. 127.
\textsuperscript{43} Fu, \textit{A documentary chronicle of Sino-Western relations}, Volume 1, p. 141.
they were in port. This was approved, but enforcement remained perfunctory. His plea for renewal of the old bans on Roman Catholicism was accepted, but then enforcement was suspended.45

The Ch‘ing government’s attitudes toward European trade in these years were those of watchfulness but general confidence in its ability to keep control. As far as we can tell from the English translation of its rules, control of potentially dangerous foreigners was not one of the avowed purposes of the abortive guild of 1720. In one memorial of 1724, K‘ung Yü-hsün, governor-general of Kwangtung and Kwangsi, pointed out that only a few merchants from each ship came to Canton to trade, the crews staying on the ships at Whampoa. Trade proceeded tranquilly and equitably, and all foreigners were sent away again when the winds were right. “Thus the customs receipts are increased, people from afar are duly impressed, and there is nothing that can give rise to further trouble.”46

There was no contradiction between these pro-trade attitudes and the anti-missionary policies of these years. The K‘ang-hsi emperor seems to have thought that the restrictions imposed after the Tournon legation had given him a tamed Catholic mission. The missionaries were not seen as threats to the Ch‘ing government’s security. Traditional Chinese theories of foreign relations warned against allowing potentially dangerous foreigners to see too much of the empire. However, in the last years of the K‘ang-hsi reign, Jesuits were sent on imperially ordered mapping expeditions in many remote areas. The anti-missionary policies in the Yung-cheng period were justified in terms of the Christian threat to cultural orthodoxy, and may in part have been caused by the involvement of some priests in the politics of the succession, but the emperor’s famous discourse on the defects of Christianity does not mention the danger of subversion of the empire by missionaries and their converts.47

This perception changed in the 1740s, and with that change and others in that decade would come more security-conscious policies toward European trade. But for the time being the court concentrated on finding ways to tax the growing trade and to keep its own tax collectors honest.

In the basic structure established in the 1680s, the superintendent of maritime trade was changed every year. Many of those appointed to this post were bondservants of the Imperial Household Department, but it is not clear that all were. The tolls were based on the pattern developed in the late Ming. Duties, which averaged about 5 to 6 percent ad valorem, were paid on all

45 Fu, A documentary chronicle of Sino-Western relations, Volume 1, pp. 122–7.
46 O-erh-t’ai et al., eds., Yung-cheng chu-p‘i yü-chih (1738; Taipei, 1965), pp. 56a–b; Fu, A documentary chronicle of Sino-Western relations, Volume 1, p. 139.
47 Fu, A documentary chronicle of Sino-Western relations, Volume 1, pp. 155–6.
imports and exports according to elaborate schedules for every type of good. Each ship paid a “measurement” fee in discrete levels – 1,250 taels, 1,500, 1,750 – based on its measurement between the masts and across the beam. In addition, everyone from the superintendent down to the clerks and soldiers demanded presents and fees. The tax quota was reduced to a mere 40,000 taels in 1699, and as the trade grew thereafter, the superintendent diverted much of the growing income into the private purse of the emperor, sometimes taking so much that even this modest public quota could not be filled. Steady growth of European trade, with documented annual visits, can be traced from the successful visit of the French Amphitrite and the frustrating one of the English Macclesfield, both in 1699. Dermigny estimates that forty-three English ships and twenty-three French ones visited Chinese ports between 1698 and 1715. The English tried three ports: Chou-shan, with merchants coming out from Ningpo to trade with them; Amoy; and Canton. The French seem to have concentrated on Canton from the beginning. The English abandoned Chou-shan in 1703, and tried it only occasionally thereafter. They found official extortion, unreliable mercantile practices, delays while merchants and officials went back and forth to Ningpo, and a lack of unity among the officials, especially when the Chou-shan local officials tried to manage things in their own interest and exclude their Ningpo-based superiors. Many English ships went to Amoy in these years, especially country traders from Madras, but it was not used consistently after the Anne incident of 1715. The Amoy mercantile community was oriented more to maritime trade in Chinese ships than to waiting for Europeans to come. Amoy people had some bitter memories of European marauding in the area and of oppression of Chinese in Manila and other European-ruled ports. Moreover, although southern Fukien was the home of many important foreign-trade merchants, some of them seem to have had trouble maintaining their business there, possibly because of the difficulties of the trade routes from the tea- and silk-producing areas. In 1715, for example, two merchants got into debt difficulties trading with the English at Amoy, and had their ship taken by the English as described earlier, but managed to trade at Chou-shan and finally settled at

49 This basic summary of the Canton trade is largely based on the chronologically ordered summaries in Morse, The chronicles of the East India Company trading to China. The best guides to the many facets and multi-archival challenges of studying the trade are Dermigny, La Chine et l’Occident, and Paul A. Van Dyke, The Canton trade: Life and enterprise on the China coast, 1700–1845 (Hong Kong, 2003). Other important studies are Ch’en Kuo-tung (Anthony Ch’en), The insolvency of the Chinese hong merchants, 1760–1843 (Taipei, 1990); and Weng Eang Cheong, The hong merchants of Canton: Chinese merchants in Sino-Western trade (Richmond, 1997).
With the unstable and evolving politics of control on the Ch'ing side and the split between the old and new East India Companies among the English, stable relations were not to be expected. The improvisations of people at home in this confusion, like one Alexander Hamilton (d. 1732), occasionally could give both sides what they wanted. In 1700, when an English warship broke up in a botched repair at Amoy, Hamilton co-operated with the Ch'ing authorities to make sure that none of the other English ships departed without taking along a share of the personnel of the lost ship.\(^51\)

For the Europeans, too, it was clear by 1715 that Canton was the most satisfactory port. Several reasons for this can be suggested. It was farther from the centers of silk and tea production than Amoy or Ningpo, but the overland trade routes from Kiangsi and Hunan to Canton were highly developed and efficient. Unlike Amoy, Canton had a large and rich hinterland of its own, which made supplies of goods for export more flexible and reliable. Goods brought in from other areas for local consumption could be diverted into foreign trade when necessary. Later in the century there was local production, most of it not of high quality, of silk and porcelain for export. The large and prosperous trade with Siam, based mainly on Siamese investment and shipping, had its Chinese terminus in Canton.\(^52\) This trade and the thriving hinterland contributed to the general prosperity and substantial capital resources of the Canton merchant community. Here also there was experience in dealing with Europeans and organizing large-scale sales of Chinese goods to them, a heritage from the great days of the Macao trade. Because Canton was a provincial capital, the governor and the superintendent of maritime customs maintained direct supervision of relations with foreigners, and the Chinese merchants were accustomed to maintaining close relations with the high officials. The Europeans did not always like the results of such close relations, but they provided a more stable and organizationally sophisticated framework for the growth of trade than had been available at either Chou-shan or Amoy.

At Canton in 1699 the English dealt with at least two merchants who had traded with foreigners in the 1680s or earlier, one of whom spoke Portuguese. Several of them, in the “client-merchant” mode that had so vexed the Dutch in the 1660s and 1670s, claimed the protection of individual high officials and sometimes used their masters’ influence to hamper each other’s

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\(^{50}\) Morse, *The chronicles of the East India Company trading to China*, Volume 1, pp. 102, 105, 122, 124, 128, 134–5.


\(^{52}\) Viraphol, *Tribute and profit.*
At all three ports in these first years, merchants sometimes sought to evade or renegotiate contracts. The Dutch had no trouble with such reneging earlier, and it diminished later in the eighteenth century as the trade grew and the two sides developed considerable mutual trust and understanding. Worse, the trade at all three ports in 1702–4 was hindered by the appearance of so-called “Emperor’s Son’s Merchants,” who claimed a monopoly on trade with foreigners and frightened off all competitors. Some had experience in foreign trade and had gone to Peking to obtain their monopoly privileges; none, however, had anything approaching an adequate stock of goods to sell. Most had obtained their monopoly privileges by gifts to the heir apparent, Yin-jeng, or his notoriously corrupt entourage, but one had “the same Authority from the Emperor’s Fourth Son,” so apparently the already powerful Yin-chen was also involved in these disruptive efforts to squeeze foreign trade. At Canton in 1704 the superintendent of maritime trade finally intervened, and an Emperor’s Son’s Merchant was persuaded to accept a payment of 5,000 taels and yield to a combine of merchants headed by the very able Leanqua and Anqua, who moved back and forth between Amoy and Canton.\footnote{Morse, \textit{The chronicles of the East India Company trading to China}, Volume 1, pp. 85–108.}

By 1717 European trade at Canton had grown from the two ships in 1699 to twenty. The English and French were joined by the Ostend Company, chartered by the Holy Roman Emperor, based in the port of Ostend in what is now Belgium, but almost entirely a creature of English investment, ship-building, and commercial staffing. Chinese officials usually wanted to avoid the difficulties that arose from foreigners dealing with unreliable or insubstantial merchants; Chinese merchants frequently sought to maintain their profit margins by agreeing among themselves on import and export prices. Thus in December 1720 sixteen leading firms formed a merchant guild with official backing. Only these firms would be allowed to sell foreigners any goods except small handicraft items and porcelain, and on porcelain sales a non-member had to pay 30 percent of the sale price to the guild. No firm was allowed to transact more than half of the trade with any one foreign ship. But in 1721, with the advice and co-operation of several merchants, the English protested this restraint to the governor-general, who ordered the dissolution of the guild. One of the co-operating merchants, Suqua, then broke with the rest of the former guild members to offer tea at lower prices, and remained a leading merchant and a key ally of the English for at least a decade thereafter.\footnote{Morse, \textit{The chronicles of the East India Company trading to China}, Volume 1, pp. 109–45.}

In this case rivalry among the merchants and a change of mind by one high official were sufficient to break the guild. The officials had approved

\footnote{Cheong, \textit{The hong merchants of Canton}, pp. 37–44.}
it partly to avoid trouble with foreigners, but then had found that it produced trouble.

In this as in so many other spheres, the Yung-cheng years were marked by a struggle for fiscal regularization through the transformation of informal and private fees into formal and public sources of revenue. The superintendent’s office was abolished in 1723, and its duties entrusted to the governor, Yang Wen-ch’ien. Yang combined efforts to increase imperial revenues with efforts to make his own fortune. In return for a payment of 200,000 taels, he gave a monopoly on foreign trade to an exclusive guild (chuan-hang) of Suqua and five other leading merchants. This guild was noticed by the Dutch in 1729. But by 1736 the Dutch reported that about twenty firms were involved in foreign trade. The English sometimes were allowed to buy from other merchants, but under the name of one of the six and probably with a fee to that firm. During Yang’s years in control the presents and fees previously paid were made part of the public revenue and regularized into a single payment of 1,950 taels per ship. One English account of the late 1730s shows this sum being shared in an astonishingly regular and meticulous fashion, from 1,606.201 taels for the emperor down to 1.2 taels for the Nan-hai county magistrate and for the chief military officer at Macao. Yang Wen-ch’ien also levied a tax of 10 percent on all of the silver imported by the foreigners, which constituted over 80 percent of their cargoes’ value in this period. As a result of these changes, in addition to collecting the full quota of 43,750 taels, he was able to transmit to the Imperial Household Department 48,000 taels. Yang reported that he had uncovered and transferred to the public revenue private fees totaling 38,000 taels for that year, a total public revenue of almost three times the previous quota. In the course of these changes, individual connections between officials and merchants in the old “client-merchant” mode became impossible. Merchants depended on the hoppo’s approval as one of a group licensed for the foreign trade. These merchants from the beginning also functioned as “security merchants,” standing security for the payment of tolls on each foreign ship and the good behavior of its merchants and sailors. Already in the 1720s tolls were more likely to be paid by the Chinese merchants than by the foreigners, and the merchants expressed fears of being “bamboozled” if the foreigners did not obey the officials. In the Dutch records of their first visit in 1729, it is clear that the merchants trading with them were obliged to pay their

The first known English reference to a security merchant as such is from 1736, but it seems to refer to an already well-established institution. In the first two years of the Ch'ien-lung reign, when fiscal rationalization efforts again were widespread, there was talk of cancellation of the practice of collecting 1,950 tael per ship and 10 percent of the silver traded. The Europeans declared themselves willing to make large payments to the officials and merchants, if the changes were made, but it is not clear what altered. The office of the superintendent of maritime customs, revived in 1729, was maintained with only brief interruptions to 1739, then abolished and its duties shuffled among various high officials, always in the hands of a Manchu, in the security-conscious 1740s. It reached definitive form in 1750 with the revival of the superintendency, which thereafter was always in the hands of a bondservant of the Imperial Household Department, with provisions for concurrent reporting of customs revenues by the governor-general. Total reported revenue in 1750 was 466,000 tael, and by the end of the century it was more than a million per year. The regular quota was raised slowly, but it seems that more than three-fourths of this revenue always went to the Imperial Household Department. Another private surcharge on the rates on goods was transferred to the public revenue accounts in 1757, but there was no end to the creation of new surcharges and private fees, which probably equaled the burden of the public revenue on the trade.

In these conditions of regular and predictable official management, the trade continued to grow. The period from 1715 to 1739 was also the longest period in the eighteenth century in which there was no general European war that could lead to conflicts among Europeans in Chinese ports or waters. The Ostend Company was a formidable competitor from 1715 until 1727, when English and Dutch diplomacy at the court of Vienna secured its dissolution. In 1728 the Dutch East India Company, dissatisfied with the quality of tea obtained from the junks coming to Batavia, began direct voyages from Amsterdam to Canton. From 1735 on, it again relied on voyages to China from Batavia, until 1757, when it resumed direct voyages from Amsterdam. From 1731 the Danish and the Swedish East India Companies were also regular traders at Canton. Total annual exports of tea in the 1740s were five times that of

60 Morse, The chronicles of the East India Company trading to China, Volume 1, p. 247.
61 On many of these negotiations, see Van Dyke, Merchants of Canton and Macao.
64 See chapter 1 in Jörg, Porcelain and the Dutch China trade.
Macao’s trade continued to prosper, especially in the transportation of tutenague (lead–zinc alloy, mined in Kwangtung) to Goa for use in the Indian brass industry.  

This growth in trade was not accompanied by policy discussion important enough to be recorded in the shih-lu (veritable records) or other important document collections, nor by formal diplomatic activity. In both respects the contrast with the complexities and sensitivities of Ch’ing–Russian relations in these years is striking. There were four embassies from maritime European sovereigns between 1700 and 1740, but all were motivated by crises in the Christian missions, not by commercial problems. The papal legations of Charles Maillard de Tournon and Cardinal Mezzabarba were rarely, if ever, called tribute embassies, although kowtows by the legates and condescending favors from the emperor maintained the fundamentals of imperial ceremonial superiority. Their stays in Peking were longer and their opportunities for negotiation with the emperor greater than they would have been within the embassy regimen. The third papal legation, of Plaskowitz and Ildefonso, was called a tribute embassy, recorded as one in the Ta Ch’ing hui-tien shih-li (Statutes and precedents of the great Ch’ing), and handled largely according to embassy protocol.  

The Portuguese embassy of Alexandre Metello de Sousa e Menezes, received in Peking in 1727, was sent by the king of Portugal in an effort to persuade the Yung-cheng emperor to modify or abandon his anti-Christian policies. Sent directly by a monarchy growing rich from Brazilian gold and diamonds, it was much better planned and more richly provided with presents than the shabby Portuguese embassies of 1670 and 1678. The Portuguese monarchy was especially inclined to acts that would present it as the great supporter of the mission because of its struggle to maintain Portuguese patronage over Asian missions against the encroachments of France and the papacy. When the ambassador left Canton for Peking he was allowed to bring a suite of more than forty men, and he received from the Ch’ing authorities an advance of 1,000 taels of silver toward his travel expenses, both departures from the precedents for earlier embassies but within the structure of the tribute embassy system. Imperial officials acknowledged, according to a Portuguese source, that the embassy could not be compared with “the common embassies of ordinary tribute bearers.” The ambassador objected to every instance in which he was referred to as “paying tribute,” and insisted on being called an envoy “presenting congratulations,” but as we saw in relation to the 1670 embassy, this verbal change did not place this embassy outside the tribute framework. In Peking he insisted on being allowed to present...
his credentials in person to the emperor. This was granted and duly recorded in the regulations as a variation in embassy routine that could be allowed if the ambassador had orders from his sovereign to insist on it. He kowtowed repeatedly and without hesitation. Despite deviations from embassy routine and recognition of the special character of his embassy, from the Ch’ing perspective it was much more firmly within the tribute tradition than the first two papal legations had been. On the advice of the Peking Jesuits, the ambassador did not bring up the missionary problem in his meetings with the emperor, and left with nothing more than the faint hope that he had gained a little goodwill for his monarch and his faith.  


68 K. N. Chaudhuri, *The trading world of Asia and the English East India Company, 1660–1760* (Cambridge, 1978), pp. 385, 396–7, 408. Information and statistics in the "Patterns of Trade" section are based on Chaudhuri, chapters 15 and 17, and pp. 533–9, 546; Jörg, *Porcelan and the Dutch China trade*, pp. 74–93, 304–9; the sections on various commodities in Dermigny, *La Chine et l’Occident*; and Morse,
to its flavor and its stimulating qualities, but also to its being a means of
taking a bit of warm refreshment with sugar. Tea also became very popular in
the Netherlands, but seems to have been much less commonly used elsewhere
in Europe. The English and Scottish market remained the great magnet that
shaped the trade.  

This did not lead immediately to English domination of the transport of
tea from China. Great Britain taxed tea imports at 80 to over 100 percent
of the sale price at the London auctions, making it extremely profitable to
smuggle tea into the kingdom. It seems likely that at many times in the
eighteenth century, half of the tea consumed in Great Britain was illegally
imported. Even as the quantities consumed grew rapidly after 1763, the
scope and sophistication of smuggling grew proportionately. The smugglers
sometimes provided teas of better quality and in wider assortments than those
legally sold by the East India Company, and contributed to the development
of a genuinely national market by distributing their imports from all the
coasts of Great Britain rather than just from London. The tea destined to
be smuggled into Great Britain was bought in China by the agents of various
nationally chartered European companies, and found its way into smuggling
channels from their home ports, such as Copenhagen, Amsterdam, and Ostend,
and those in Normandy and Brittany. Competition in Canton gave Chinese
officials and merchants considerable leverage in dealing with each nationality,
and occasionally forced prices up, especially when one competitor tried to
corner the market in a particular variety. The competition also stimulated the
competing companies to increase their purchases and to hold their sale prices
down, all of which helped to increase the consumption of tea in Great Britain
and Europe.

The tea exported to Europe came largely from the hilly areas of Fukien,
Kiangsi, and Chekiang. The growing export market tapped a vast and sophisti-
cated system of production for domestic markets, with many varieties based on
location, size and type of leaf, and the mode of processing. Europeans in Canton
normally checked samples of tea being offered by a particular merchant, then
placed their orders. The teas were spot-checked during packing, and generally

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69 Wills, “European consumption and Asian production in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries,” pp. 133–47.
were found to be remarkably consistent within a batch purchased. The Dutch and the French had resident tasters in Canton for much of the century, the English not until the 1790s. The hong merchants allowed the Europeans not only to refuse teas not up to sample, but to return for reimbursement any chests that had arrived in Europe in unsatisfactory condition.\footnote{Mui and Mui, *The management of monopoly*, pp. 41–2.}

In the tea-producing areas the Canton interests maintained a substantial but not controlling presence. In the early nineteenth century, the two greatest merchant houses, Poankeequa and Howqua, owned some tea plantations of excellent reputation; the Howqua (Wu) family was reported to have owned land in Wu-i, Fukien, before it came to Canton. The hong merchants also had agents in the market centers of the tea-producing areas, and they may have directly supervised some tea processors (ch’\'a-chuang). Some processors owned their own tea plantations. But the bulk of the co-ordination of planting, picking, processing, and transporting to Canton for sale to foreigners was based on market mechanisms, not vertically integrated organization. The most important contribution of the Canton trade was the steady flow of silver advanced by foreigners to the Canton merchants and by the latter to up-country merchants or direct to processors, a flow that did much to smooth out the inherent difficulties of co-ordination and credit in a trade involving such a large number of small, independent operators. Typically tea was grown in small plots and harvested by the households of the owners, who might sell the leaves fresh or do some preliminary processing. The processors carried out additional steps of preparation, sorting, mixing, and packing for shipment. All of this required a great deal of hand labor, some of it highly skilled. As the trade grew, the local labor force was supplemented by immigrants from impoverished nearby regions, who became tenants, shopkeepers, and processors. Here and on the complicated transportation route to Canton, we find an unsettled society full of people willing to work for very low wages and seeking to supplement those wages by petty trading and smuggling. This, and the fact that these people lived largely outside the silver economy, helped make possible the low and steady sale prices in Canton even in the inflation of the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries.

The general picture of the growth of tea exports to Europe is reasonably clear, although much statistical refinement and careful use of all available European archives still needs to be done. It seems safe to say that between 1720 and 1740 the total weight doubled from about 30,000 piculs to about 60,000, doubled again to about 120,000 by 1765, and again to 240,000 by 1795.\footnote{Dermigny, *La Chine et l’Occident*, Volume 2, p. 539. A picul was a unit of weight in the tea trade, and is said to be based on the load a porter with a carrying pole could carry. It is estimated to be about 140 pounds; 30,000 piculs would be about 2,000 tons of tea.}
From the 1770s on there was a shift toward finer and more expensive kinds of tea, especially congou (*kung-fu*), and away from Bohea teas. It seems likely that the smugglers led this shift and the English East India Company lagged behind. The Continental companies that supplied the smugglers shifted earlier and more rapidly than the English East India Company. The shift to finer varieties and a more selective European market may have strained the coordinating capacities of the old system of free commercial relations among growers, processors, and merchants and stimulated more direct intervention in the up-country processes by the Canton merchant houses; it is not clear, however, how far this process had gone by 1800.

There was a special charm to pouring one’s Chinese tea from a Chinese pot into a Chinese saucer or cup, even when the porcelain pieces were made to European order with shapes and decorations quite unlike those made for the market in China. The most important type of porcelain brought to Europe was the famous blue-and-white ware that had been one of the leading products of the great porcelain center at Ching-te-chen in Kiangsi since the early Ming. Much smaller quantities were exported of *blanc de Chine*, made at Te-hua in Fukien, and of the products of other potteries. Goods that were not as fine, bought for Southeast Asian markets and occasionally for Europe, were the products of many kilns, including some in the Canton area. Blue-and-white ware made for the Chinese market had been exported since the early days of trade in Macao and Manila, and was widely admired in Europe. As Ching-te-chen revived after the Ming–Ch’ing transition, export merchants at Canton co-operated with manufacturers in developing wares in shapes and sizes that made them useful as well as ornamental in European homes: cups with handles, pots for coffee or chocolate as well as tea, soup bowls and tureens, and plates and platters of various sizes. The Europeans supplied drawings and occasionally models of the shapes wanted, which were forwarded to the manufacturers in Ching-te-chen. Another interesting example of the adaptation of Ching-te-chen production to the export market was the production there of large quantities of polychrome pieces imitative of the Japanese Imari ware, which had become popular in Europe in the 1600s.

Ching-te-chen was also the main center for making figurines, huge vases, and other elaborate *Chine de commande* pieces to order for the European market. Chinese porcelain painters would decorate these and more conventional and utilitarian pieces with any design furnished by the European

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74 See Jürg, *Porcelain and the Dutch China trade*, for an excellent integration of the histories of art, companies, and an industry and trade in China. Also see Robert Finlay, *The pilgrim art: Cultures of porcelain in world history* (Berkeley, 2010).
buyer. These designs included heraldry, Masonic emblems, Catholic motifs (despite the proscription of that religion in China), and figures and landscapes drawn from European “chinoiserie” images rather than Chinese portrayals of their own country and people. From the 1730s on, much porcelain was sent to Canton unpainted. Painting and final firing were done there by firms that specialized in decoration for export. Many shops near the foreign factories kept large quantities of porcelain on their shelves for foreign buyers. These shops supplied much of the porcelain exported by individual Europeans in their private trades. The companies bought from the shops and also made larger contract purchases from the hong firms. From the 1740s on, European buyers were especially interested in buying matched “services” – tea sets, chocolate sets, dinner sets, and so on. Some of these were on hand in the shops, but European definitions of what constituted a proper service changed almost year by year, making necessary an increasing amount of special ordering. To the degree that the shopkeepers’ business had been a cash one, this probably stimulated an increased use of credit. In special orders, half of the price was advanced by the purchaser, who had the right to refuse the goods delivered and to insist that the order be made over. The Dutch were told that at Ching-te-chen the individual items of services – pots, cups, saucers, plates – were ordered from different specialized kilns, making the co-ordination of sizes and the matching of decorations an astonishing triumph of the Chinese penchant for co-ordination through market mechanisms rather than through increasing the scale of organization.77

Both Chinese and Europeans found the porcelain trade full of difficulties. Chinese merchants complained of high risks and low profits, especially on custom orders. Europeans found it difficult to keep up with the rapid changes in orders from Europe and information on changing European tastes. Dutch records show unstable relations with Chinese suppliers. The East India Company sometimes relied on the shopkeepers, who may have had a better specialized knowledge of porcelain, and sometimes gave all their business to a few hong merchants who had greater capital resources and were willing to carry out this difficult and not very profitable trade for the sake of good relations. The new regulations in 1760, discussed later, did not put the shops out of business. The most important of them were required to move to a guarded street near the foreign factories, and they could sell to the European companies only by paying fees to the hong merchants, but apparently the sale of porcelain to private parties was exempted from the hong monopoly.

Porcelain rarely constituted more than 5 percent of the value of the exports of a company. In the late eighteenth century, exports of it do not seem to

77 Jörg, Porcelain and the Dutch China trade, p. 124.
have kept up with the general growth of the trade. Private traders had to take what they could find on the Canton market. The companies showed little interest in new initiatives to overcome the problems of co-ordination with European taste and demand. The quality of porcelain available for export may have been declining. The Chinese merchants complained increasingly of the exactions by officials. These persistent difficulties mattered much more from the 1770s on, because in Europe ordinary Chinese blue-and-white ware had to compete with the growing production of English stoneware, including the elegant work of Wedgwood, and Chine de commande had to compete with the fine porcelains of Meissen, Sèvres, Copenhagen, and many more, responding to European taste without time lags or cross-cultural distortions. Thus, while tea remained exclusively a product of China until the nineteenth century, porcelain exports faced increasing competition, in which they were weakened by long distances, the complex structure of the trade in China, and the weight of official extortion in the late eighteenth century.

In exporting raw silk and silk fabrics, China engaged in a much more complex competition with other sources of supply. It is possible that some of the Chinese merchants involved were aware of these competitive situations to some degree, but we have found no evidence of this. Europe had its own silk industry, largely in France and Italy, and also imported large quantities of Persian silk in the well-established Levant trade. In the seventeenth century, the English and the Dutch East India Companies sought to establish a trade in raw silk direct from Persian ports to Europe, but they encountered many frustrations. Far more important for the companies' silk trade was the growth of their trade with Bengal from the 1650s on. Bengal silk was purchased and sold for lower prices than Chinese silk, and the profit margins usually were better than those on Chinese, both in Japan and on the European market. The Europeans were also attracted by the relative stability of trade in Bengal in the decades when the Dutch had lost their entrepôt on Taiwan. Both they and the English lacked stable connections in China and struggled to maintain their trade in Tongkin (northern Vietnam) as another source of silk. There were short-lived booms for Chinese raw silk in the Netherlands in 1685 and around 1700, but in general exports of raw silk played a small part in the steady growth of European trade at Canton in the early eighteenth century.

78 See chapters 6 and 7 in Glamann, Dutch–Asiatic trade, and chapter 15 in Chaudhuri, The trading world of Asia and the English East India Company.
80 Hoang Anh Tuan, “From Japan to Manila and back to Europe: The abortive English trade with Tonkin in the 1670s,” Itinerario 29 No. 3 (2005), pp. 73–92; and Hoang Anh Tuan, Silk for silver: Dutch–Vietnamese relations, 1637–1700 (Leiden, 2007).
The Bengal silk trade continued to grow, providing a cheaper raw material for less exacting manufactures. Chinese silk was comparable in quality and cost to the Italian product, but English weavers could make little use of it until the 1730s, when they learned the Italian technique of twisting its very fine fibers into the “organsin” needed for the warp of very fine silk fabrics. There were no substantial imports until after 1750, when the duties on Chinese raw silk were reduced to equal those on Italian. Dutch imports became regular at the same time, suggesting that a substantial part of them was for re-export to England. There may have been Ch’ing restrictions on raw silk exports as early as the 1730s, with somewhat more regular limits of eighty or a hundred piculs per ship from about 1763. From 1767 to about 1790, Great Britain imported 1,600 to 1,800 piculs of Chinese raw silk per year, representing an investment at Canton of up to 500,000 to 1,000,000 taels, a substantial share of its exports. But these imports declined in the 1790s as those from Bengal, now securely under English control, continued to grow. Raw silk was much less important in the Dutch trade, and negligible for the French, Danes, and Swedes. The great hong merchant Poankeequa had a special source of stability in his business in the dispatch of a junk full of raw silk and silk goods to Manila every year.81

The causes of these late shifts are not at all clear. By 1790 the English Company was exporting “only the superior kind” of silk produced in Chiangnan, while the English country ships and those of other countries exported much of the “cheaper Canton silk.”82 In contrast to the tea trade, there seems to have been no end to the complaints by European merchants at Canton about deceptive packaging and uneven quality in the raw silk they purchased. This was an expensive and complexly graded commodity, requiring great care on the part of the purchaser, as the profits to Chinese merchants successful in passing off low-grade silk must have been considerable. It is possible that such practices became more prevalent among the hard-pressed Canton merchants in the 1780s, when the English in Bengal were devising better systems of quality control, helping to shift the center of the raw-silk trade from Canton to Calcutta.

The trade in silk goods involved problems of quality control and changing tastes as complex as those in porcelain, and much harder to understand today. We do not understand all the terminology, and have little of the kind of specialized scholarly literature that has been produced on export porcelain and Indian textiles. Moreover, fine silk fabrics, not breakable and taking up very little space in a chest, were ideally suited to the private trade of East

81 Van Dyke, Merchants of Canton and Macao.
India Company employees, making the figures we do have for Company exports almost useless for estimating the volume of the trade. Throughout the seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries there were networks of merchants and weavers specializing in export goods close to major ports: Macao and Canton to 1640, and the Fukien ports under Cheng’s control in the 1640s and 1650s. In the 1720s, the English were told that there were no more weavers in the Amoy area, since the English had stopped going there. Dutch records contain names of entrepreneurs in the Canton area who specialized in producing various kinds of silk goods for export, sometimes from patterns or samples supplied by the Dutch.\textsuperscript{83}

In the seventeenth century, the Dutch Company had bought Chinese silk goods primarily for sale in Japan and other Asian markets. As European taste for Asian silks and cottons and for constant novelty in their decoration grew from the 1680s on, the Dutch made a few attempts to order such goods on their voyages to China or through traders coming to Batavia, but concentrated their efforts in Bengal, leaving purchases of Chinese silk goods to the English. English East India Company investment in these goods peaked early, between 1712 and 1719. English efforts in the 1730s to overcome quality control problems and to obtain top-quality goods seem to have had little success. After about 1760 the English Company ceased dealing in Chinese silk goods, leaving them entirely to the private trade. The Dutch Company did buy them, but never at more than about 10 percent of their total investment.

European lists of exports from China contain many other items in relatively small quantities, including China root, rhubarb, cassia, ginger, alum, mercury, lacquer goods, wallpapers, and paintings on glass. Sugar and tutenague were important in the “country trade,” especially for sale in India. “Nankeen” cotton cloth bulked large in a few cargoes in the 1780s and 1790s, and became more important after 1800. Finally, China was a substantial exporter of gold from the early Ch'ing until the 1750s. Europeans had been profiting from the fact that the price of gold in terms of silver was lower in China than in Europe and in India, but this price rose in the eighteenth century, and Brazil emerged as an abundant new source of supply, so that the purchase of Chinese gold was no longer profitable for European traders. English investments in gold peaked in 1732, at almost 200,000 taels of silver. The Dutch continued to buy some gold until 1779, probably because of its importance for the purchase of Indian cottons for sale in Indonesia.\textsuperscript{84}

\textsuperscript{83} Jörg, Porcelain and the Dutch China trade, p. 84.
\textsuperscript{84} See chapter 3 in Glamann, Dutch–Asiatic trade, and Dermigny, La Chine et l’Occident, Volume 1, pp. 416–33.
For most of the eighteenth century, European exports from China were financed primarily by payments in silver, there being no goods that the Europeans could trade to the Chinese in sufficient quantities for the tea, silks, and porcelain they wanted to buy. The English were anxious to sell their woolens in China but found they could make no profit from them. In their search for commodities to use in their trade with China the English finally developed the opium trade. On each of these points important qualifications need to be made, and many puzzles remain.

Until 1750, goods formed only 2–5 percent of the value of the English Company’s cargoes from London to China. But in 1775 the sale of such goods accounted for 400,000 of the 1,000,000 taels of funds available for investment. In 1789, with English Company investments in the Canton trade at more than 4,000,000 taels, goods from Europe accounted for slightly more than a million. Lead, brought in part as ballast and used in China to make shot for firearms, sold steadily but did not contribute much to this growth. The large trade in English clocks, French mirrors, and so on was almost entirely in the hands of the private traders, is not included in these figures, and cannot be adequately estimated. The growth in funds from selling goods was in woolens: 180,000 taels’ worth in 1761, 340,000 in 1775, 1,000,000 in 1789, 2,000,000 in 1799, and 2,800,000 in British and American trade in 1828. Other European companies were also importing smaller quantities of woolens.

The English were not happy with the prices they received for their woolens, which were not rising and barely equalled the costs of purchase and transportation, but it covered costs, and they were willing to sell at these prices to mollify agitation in England against the English East India Company for exporting bullion but doing nothing to stimulate the export of English manufactures. Chinese merchants sometimes complained that the increasing quantities of wool being imported were piling up unsold in their warehouses, but the woolens were being sold in increasing amounts. The sale of woolens was contributing to covering the cost of tea and supporting cloth industries in England and elsewhere in Europe. We do not know what made these increased sales possible. It is probable that the markets for woolens were in the north. The English noted in 1794 that a flood in the Yellow River valley had reduced demand for their woolens. Charles de Constant said they went to the far ends of the empire.

85 Morse, The chronicles of the East India Company trading to China, Volume 2, pp. 6–7, 172–3.
86 Morse, The chronicles of the East India Company trading to China, Volume 2, pp. 50, 179; Volume 5, p. 159.
87 Morse, The chronicles of the East India Company trading to China, Volume 2, p. 257.
Europeans trading at Canton also imported a variety of goods from Southeast Asia, the most important of which were the pepper of Java and Sumatra, sandalwood from eastern Indonesia, and tin from northern Sumatra and the Malay Peninsula. For the English Company, it does not seem that these imports ever provided more than 5 percent of their funds in Canton. They were able to bring larger amounts of pepper and tin in the late eighteenth century, but these increases did no more than keep pace with the growth of the Canton trade as a whole. These imports were much more important for the Dutch Company, which had privileged access to sources of pepper and tin in island Southeast Asia.89 The great Chinese merchants of Canton were also active participants in trade with Southeast Asia in their own shipping.90

The great Chinese merchants of Canton were also active participants in trade with Southeast Asia in their own shipping.90 The British began to bring Indian cotton to China about 1785. By 1792 it reportedly was accounting for more than 1,500,000 taels of the British investment at Canton of some 4,000,000 taels.91 These imports, largely handled in the country trade, continued to grow in the nineteenth century. China’s other major import from India in this period was opium. Opium had been known in China and elsewhere in Asia for centuries. Taken by mouth, it could ease fevers or stomach pains but did not produce narcotic euphoria or addiction. That was possible only when opium was combined with tobacco and smoked. In the early eighteenth century both this practice and the inhaling of something like a vaporized pure extract were reported to be widespread on the north coast of Java east of Batavia, with many Chinese involved in distribution and sales.92 Dutch imports of opium from Bengal to the Indonesian Archipelago tripled between 1680 and 1720.93

When opium first arrived on the China coast is not clear. The Dutch trading there in the 1680s recorded no hint of a demand for it. Early in the eighteenth century we find references to English Company ships selling opium in Sumatra, Java, and the Malay Peninsula, but not in China. English Company ships did not bring opium from India to China, but it was asserted in 1733 that for years it had been “a usual thing” for ships coming from Madras (almost entirely private ships in the country trade) to bring opium for sale in China.94 Macao’s trade with India may have been another channel for

93 Prakash, *The Dutch East India Company and the economy of Bengal*, pp. 150–1.
early opium imports, and Chinese returning from Java may have brought the drug as well as the habit with them. The first imperial prohibition of opium, dated 1729, was based on information about trade in coastal Kwangtung and Fukien; there also is good evidence of opium smoking in Taiwan at that time. It has been estimated that imports carried by Europeans at first were only about 200 chests per year. By the 1760s imports ran about 1,000 chests a year, and it was asserted that almost every country vessel brought some. In 1780 more than 1,300 chests were imported, in 1786 about 2,000, and in 1800 an estimated 3,000. The rapid growth after 1780 was a result of changing circumstances both in India and in China. In Bengal the English East India Company had asserted a monopoly on opium production and sale in 1773, and began organizing production and distribution and encouraging its export. In China the affluence and demoralization of the Ho-shen years may have provided the means and the motive for the spread of the opium habit. The spread of corruption by officials facilitated the distribution and sale of an illegal drug.

The English Company sold its opium at auction in Calcutta and kept its distance from the trade carried on by private merchants. In the 1770s and 1780s much opium was sold along the coasts of the Malay Peninsula and Sumatra, some of it perhaps to Chinese. Soon the Ch'ing empire became the most lucrative market. There, too, the trade was kept separate from the controlled trade at Canton. Opium was channeled through Macao or through various coastal anchorages. Macao also carried on a vigorous opium trade of its own, tapping Portuguese-connected sources of supply in India and buying at the English Company auctions in Calcutta.95 With a few marginal exceptions involving Portuguese and Armenian intermediaries, the Canton hong merchants had nothing to do with importing opium. When the Company experimented in 1782 with sending opium on its own account through the Canton system, it found the hong merchants were reluctant to stand security for the ship and had to accept a below-market price for the opium.

There were strong financial connections between these ostensibly separate channels. The private opium traders insisted on immediate payment in silver, since they would have no legal recourse if defrauded on a credit transaction. Their purchase of Chinese goods at Canton did not absorb all the silver they earned from opium, so traders were able to deposit large quantities of silver into the Company’s treasury in Canton in return for bills payable by the Company in London. In 1787 more than 1,500,000 taels were paid into the

95 Angela Guimarães, Uma relação especial: Macau e as relações luso-chinesas, 1780–1844 (Lisbon, 1996).
Company's Canton treasury in this way. We have only a few hints of the more established Canton merchants' involvement in the opium trade. One of the new merchants of 1782, Sinqua, had previously been in the opium trade. In 1786 two Chinese merchants asked the Company to pay them for goods they delivered by giving them bills on Calcutta, presumably so that they or others could use these bills to purchase opium without moving large quantities of silver.  

The figures presented are rough indicators of trends. Much work remains to be done in several archives before existing quantitative documentation is fully assembled and assessed. The same caution must be exercised in relation to estimates of silver imports and their effects on the Ch'ing economy. One study estimates that total European exports of goods (tea, silk, porcelain, etc.) from China were worth less than 1,000,000 taels per year in the 1720s, about 3,500,000 in the 1760s, 4,400,000 around 1780, and 6,400,000 in the 1790s. Until the 1760s, 80–90 percent of these exports were paid for by silver brought by Europeans, perhaps 800,000 taels in the 1720s, and 3,000,000 in the 1760s. In the 1790s Chinese merchants were buying more than a million taels' worth of woolens and perhaps an equal amount of Indian cotton from the British, and buying from all foreigners at least 2,000 chests of opium at about 250 taels per chest, or another 500,000 taels. Adding another 500,000 taels for imports of other goods and by other nations, this rough estimate of the value of imports other than silver is about 3,000,000 taels. That is almost half of the estimated 6,400,000 taels' worth of goods in exports. This would imply that China's net import of silver of about 3 million taels of silver a year had hardly risen since the 1760s.

There are many difficulties with analyzing import prices. It is not surprising that our sources on foreign trade show steady inflation of some prices in the port where the impact of these silver flows was most direct. The pepper price series is the most reliable, presenting fewer difficulties of varying quality or alloy. Price changes for one important import and two exports are summarized in Table 7.1.  

Morse, *The chronicles of the East India Company trading to China*, Volume 2, pp. 121, 137.


Table 7.1. Estimated prices at Canton (in silver taels) and percentage change

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Commodity</th>
<th>A 1680–1730 prices</th>
<th>B 1760s prices</th>
<th>C B/A</th>
<th>D 1790s Prices</th>
<th>E D/A</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Raw silk, first grade,</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>per picul</td>
<td>155</td>
<td>265</td>
<td>176%</td>
<td>290</td>
<td>193%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gold, per tael</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>15.7</td>
<td>143%</td>
<td>17.5</td>
<td>159%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pepper, per picul</td>
<td>7.5</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>173%</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>200%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

table and the low and stable prices of imports of woolens and exports of tea noted in earlier paragraphs.

In this growing trade, then, the Europeans obtained tea, silk, and porcelain. In return the Chinese, in addition to silver, received pepper, other Southeast Asian goods, Indian cotton, and woolens. They also bought opium, a shift in use patterns that was not as general as the English shift from drinking ale to tea and of tragically contrasting character. European tastes for luxuries involved Chinese silks and porcelains. Ch'ing officials may have owned English clocks, but these and other European imports had a small effect on Chinese culture. Silver imports, by increasing the quantity of monetary silver in circulation, may have postponed the effects of the debasement of copper coinage on the copper–silver exchange ratio, at least in regions where the silver economy was strongest. But silver imports had little direct effect on those not involved in the monetized silver economy. Partly because they lived in the copper-cash economy, and partly because many worked for subsistence wages or less, the number of people involved in tea production increased, but their remuneration did not rise.

It is plausible to see in Ch'ing maritime trade involvements by about the year 1800 a sort of paradigm of the situation of the commodity producer in the present era of global capitalism: the prices of the most important commodity exports do not rise, and even if the country has a positive balance of trade, that is of little benefit to the producers or many of its ordinary people. Meanwhile, the low prices of its exports contribute to the spread of their consumption in the importing countries. This pattern was developing before the efficiencies of modern industrial production had an impact, and without colonial or other political domination. The Ch'ing government's control of foreign trade was in most respects tighter and more defensive in the 1780s than it had been a half-century earlier.

The Ch'ing empire in the mid-eighteenth century was an energetic society with considerable cultural and social diversity. Management of the Canton trade and other relations with maritime Europeans generally were differentiated and stable, but the growth of trade led to strains, especially as the Canton merchants, overspecialized and burdened with quasi-bureaucratic responsibilities, could not find the financial resources to manage the growing trade and local political demands. A result was that on two occasions a crucial differentiation between merchants and missionaries broke down, and worries about missionaries affected the government’s policy toward the Canton trade. Although we must avoid looking at these years in the light of the great crises of the next century, it seems clear that after 1780 Ch'ing authorities and maritime Europeans, including some new types fresh from the plunder of Bengal, were on a collision course.  

In the early 1740s, Sino-European trade was touched by global changes. The War of Jenkins’ Ear (1739), merging into the War of the Austrian Succession (1740–48), brought English and French warships to Chinese waters. Commodore George Anson, after raiding the coasts of Chile and Peru and crossing the Pacific, refitted his ship near Macao and later returned with a captured Manila galleon and its cargo of almost a million taels of silver. These were precursors of an Anglo-French struggle for worldwide maritime dominance that would push the English into building an empire in India and thereby transform their relations with China, and sixty years later would lead to the English occupation of Macao. The Ch'ing authorities were quite capable of the adaptations these events required. Anson was allowed to hire carpenters and smiths to repair his ship. When he insisted that his warship was exempt from the tolls paid by trading ships and sailed past the Bogue forts without a customs pass, the officials who had failed to stop him were dismissed, but a precedent for the exemption of warships was established and generally honored thereafter.

Major changes in Chinese trade and settlement in Southeast Asia can also be seen from about 1740. Chinese traders concentrated less on such major

100 The chronological sections that follow draw on Morse, The chronicles of the East India Company trading to China; Dermigny, La Chine et l’Occident; and chapter 1 in Jörg, Porcelain and the Dutch China trade. Each of these works is chronologically organized.


102 Fu, A documentary chronicle of Sino-Western relations, Volume 1, pp. 175–6.
centers as Manila, Batavia, and Bangkok, and spread out into many small ports and rural areas, frequently becoming partly assimilated into the local society. In one of these centers this process was accelerated by an upheaval that was noticed even in Peking. At Batavia in 1740, an ill-conceived plan to deport illegal Chinese immigrants to Ceylon (Sri Lanka) led to a Chinese uprising; 10,000 Chinese were killed in its suppression and in the massacres that followed. To the east of Batavia along the north coast of Java, a tension-filled political system, in which powerful Chinese allied with the Dutch to exploit both Javanese and poorer Chinese, dissolved in civil war and the massacre of more Chinese.\textsuperscript{103} Ch’ing coastal officials discussed the advisability of prohibiting Chinese trade with Java, but finally the emperor decided not to do so, stating that since many people in coastal areas depended on trade for their livelihood, it would be hard to prohibit trade with one country without prohibiting trade with all, and that the Chinese who had been killed “were born in Java, and thus are not different from the native barbarians.”\textsuperscript{104} Attitudes toward émigrés in Southeast Asia were nuanced and sometimes inconsistent. Ch’ing officials seem not to have objected to men with Chinese names coming to Canton in charge of Siamese tribute embassies, and occasionally sought information from émigrés about affairs in their countries of residence.\textsuperscript{105}

Under the arrangements settled on around 1730, most of the management of relations with Europeans was delegated to a few trusted merchants. This seems to have worked well through the 1740s. There were a few signs of tighter enforcement of old rules, and the security merchant system was formalized with imperial approval in 1745.\textsuperscript{106} A turn toward stricter enforcement was accelerated by the effects of a crisis. This had its beginning in efforts to suppress the Catholic communities that were under the guidance of Manila-based Dominicans in Fu-an, Fukien.\textsuperscript{107} This repression began like many other local campaigns. Then the officials saw that these were well-organized communities with many churches and lay sodalities, and that communication was kept up with Manila and lists of converts were sent there. There were many literati

\textsuperscript{103} Johannes T. Vermeulen, De Chineezen te Batavia en de troebelen van 1740 (Leiden, 1938); chapter 12 in Nagtegaal, Riding the Dutch tiger; Willem G. J. Remmelink, The Chinese war and the collapse of the Javanese state, 1725–1743 (Leiden, 1994).

\textsuperscript{104} Fu, A documentary chronicle of Sino-Western relations, Volume 1, p. 174.

\textsuperscript{105} John E. Wills Jr., “Functional, not fossilized: Qing tribute relations with Đa Viết (Vietnam) and Siam (Thailand), 1700–1820,” T’oung Pao 98 Nos. 4–5 (2012), pp. 439–78.

\textsuperscript{106} Cheong, The hong merchants of Canton, pp. 93, 204; Van Dyke, The Canton trade, pp. 11–12.

converts. A crowd of thousands of people followed as five missionaries were taken away as prisoners in 1746. One of the five was executed in April 1747. The officials’ alarm increased when a Spanish ship came to Amoy with a request for the release of the other missionaries. Two key converts fled to the ship, and an unrelated rebellion broke out in Chien-ning. The other four missionaries were executed late in 1748. Catholicism was now seen to be capable of local organization involving both elites and commoners, with strong organizational ties with a foreign power. Both Catholicism and foreign trade in Chinese ports were perceived as political threats.\footnote{\textsuperscript{108} For the basic Spanish documentation on this episode, see J\'ose Mar\'\i a Gonz\'alez, \textit{Misiones dominicanas en China (1700–1750)} (Madrid, 1952–8); for the Chinese contexts, see Eugenio Menegon, \textit{Ancestors, virgins, and friars: Christianity as a local religion in late imperial China} (Cambridge, MA, 2010).} As a result, the emperor ordered a thorough investigation throughout the empire to uncover and break up local Catholic communities.\footnote{\textsuperscript{109} Fu, \textit{A documentary chronicle of Sino-Western relations}, Volume 1, pp. 178–85.}

The governor of Fukien had reported that the arrested missionaries and their Chinese aides confessed to having received assistance from Macao. According to the report, each church at Macao received funds from abroad and used them to support church activities in one province of China. The churches in China made lists of the foreign names of their converts and sent them to a foreign king, who donated funds in proportion to the number of converts.\footnote{\textsuperscript{110} Fu, \textit{A documentary chronicle of Sino-Western relations}, Volume 1, pp. 179–80.} These lists seemed especially menacing in their subversive potential. Who could tell what the motives of the foreign preachers in China might be? The magistrate of Hsiang-shan county, where Macao was located, was ordered to investigate, and he did so late in 1746 and early in 1747. He was alarmed to find that there was a special establishment in Macao, the Seminario de Nossa Senhora do Amparo, with a staff of Chinese Christians, devoted to converting Chinese to the forbidden faith. In addition to the Chinese Christian population in Macao there were communities in nearby counties, and every year many believers came from them and even from other provinces to worship in Macao during the Lent and Christmas seasons. It was clear that the Seminario, a center of cultural and potentially of political subversion, must be closed at once, and the Macao authorities were so informed. They protested, but eventually acquiesced. The Ch’ing authorities went on to work out a comprehensive set of regulations for Macao that settled some local difficulties as well as the original problem. These regulations were carved in both Chinese and Portuguese on stone tablets that were set up in Macao in 1749, supplementing the principles similarly engraved on stone in 1614–17. All efforts to convert Chinese to Christianity were forbidden. Macanese were
forbidden to go hunting in nearby areas, to buy Chinese children, or to harbor Chinese criminals in their homes. Portuguese jurisdiction in Macao was severely limited. For all punishment of Chinese, or for punishment of Europeans for crimes punishable by death or banishment under the Ch'ing code, the Portuguese courts and the Chinese local magistrates were to have joint jurisdiction.\[111\]

The general repression of Roman Catholicism and especially the new impositions on Macao provoked another embassy from the king of Portugal. The ambassador, Francisco de Assis Pacheco de Sampaio, arrived at Macao in 1752. He reported that he had received assurances that he was not being received as a tributary ambassador. Since it was a first embassy to the Ch'ien-lung emperor, it probably was labeled an “embassy presenting congratulations,” as its predecessor had been. In Peking in May and June 1753, the emperor received the ambassador at the Ch'ien-ch'ing Gate in the Forbidden City, received the royal letter from his hands, later was present at one of the banquets for him, had the ambassador's portrait painted by Castiglione and came to see it, gave the ambassador another audience at which he gave him a jade ju-i, and invited him to enjoy the dragon boat races at the Summer Palace. These were extraordinary gestures of favor, but they were largely personal gestures by the emperor, not precedent-setting elements of a formal system. The ambassador performed “the customary ceremonies” on all occasions. Neither this embassy nor any other European embassy between Paats in 1685 and Titsingh in 1794 was received before the full capital bureaucracy at an ordinary audience or other occasion prescribed by the regulations. Pacheco de Sampaio, like his predecessor, decided not to mention the Catholic missions to the emperor. The powerful Fu-heng, grand secretary, trusted general, and imperial in-law, was cordial and seemed inclined to disavow the previous policy of repression of Catholicism, but this did not lead to any change of policy. For the Europeans, embassies still offered no opportunities for negotiation and formal agreement. For the Ch'ing emperors and their officials, European embassies were oddities, managed in ad hoc fashion, scarcely part of a system that could guide policy.\[112\]

\[111\] Pao Yü, Hsiang-shan hoien chib [Ch'ien-lung k'uan-pen 1750 ed.]) (Taipei, 1968) 8, pp. 26b–46a; and Portugal, Agência Geral do Ultramar, Divisão de Publicações e Biblioteca, Instrução para o bispo de Pequim e outros documentos para a historia de Macau (Lisbon, 1943), pp. 33–9.

European trade at Canton expanded in the brief interval of peace among the European powers, from 1749 to 1756. Anglo-French antagonism remained high and led to fights among sailors at Whampoa. A petition presented by the supercargoes of the English East India Company in August 1753 gives the impression that tensions and grievances at Canton were accumulating rapidly. They complained about slow unloading of ships, stealing from boats on the river, and the petty exactions of customs officials, constant themes of European merchants in Chinese harbors from the 1660s to the 1860s. They also complained of “very unhandsome Chops [proclamations] which have lately been affixed in public parts of the City and Suburbs accusing us of Crimes, the mention of which, is horrible to us: to them we attribute the frequent Insults we meet in the Streets.”

This is the first sign we know of suggesting the popular anti-foreignism in the Canton area that was to be a constant factor in Sino-foreign relations for a century or more. No doubt it was stimulated by the growing number and constant belligerence of sailors at Whampoa. Perhaps it was reinforced by the official repression of Catholicism and control measures at Macao, which may have given new courage to local commoners and elites who resented their Chinese Christian neighbors and tended to link all foreigners with them.

The first point in the 1753 petition was as follows:

We desire we may not be troubled with Securities for our Ships, and that whoever we purchase Goods of, or sell Goods to, they be answerable to the Government for the Duties to be paid on them. Those Merchants who are Securities for our Ships, are so distressed on account of Duties, which they are made answerable for, altho’ they are neither the Purchasers or Sellers of the Goods, on which the Duties are due, that our Trade greatly suffers thereby.

This is an excellent summary of one aspect of the security-merchant problem. In the 1750s it was also reported that many small and unreliable merchants were buying goods from foreigners on credit and then paying their debts in inferior goods or not at all. Since this was described as resulting in burdens on the security merchants, apparently they were expected to guarantee payment of debts to the foreigners as well as of duties to the government. All these burdens probably increased after 1750 as the trade grew and more of it was not through the security merchants.

That was only one side of the difficulties for the security merchants. The other involved the import of clocks and other fine European mechanical contrivances and craft goods in what was known as the “singsong trade.” This importation was largely through the permitted private trade of employees of

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the English Company. The purchase of such rarities was the prerogative of the imperial court, which reportedly allotted 30,000 taels per year for the purpose. The superintendent of maritime customs required the security merchants to purchase them when the ships arrived; the foreigners, being aware of this, demanded high prices. The superintendent then bought them from the security merchants, frequently for less than they had had to pay. Because it was English ships that provided this trade, it was especially burdensome to be a security merchant for such a ship, and in 1754 the English found it extremely difficult to find a merchant who would be willing to stand security for any of their ships.\footnote{Morse, \textit{The chronicles of the East India Company trading to China}, Volume 5, pp. 10–14.}

In 1755 these difficulties pushed the two parties in opposite directions, the English trying to break out of the restrictions and frustrations at Canton, the Ch’ing authorities working to strengthen and systematize the controls there. The new Ch’ing regulations made the English even more anxious to break out, which made the Ch’ing authorities even more determined to control them. By 1760 the Ch’ing had won. In 1755 the English Company sent one ship to investigate the possibility of trade in the Ningpo area. The Chekiang superintendent of maritime customs welcomed it and promised the English good trading conditions there, but we do not know how much trade was carried on. The Ch’ing court was aware of this voyage, and noted a report that some of the Chinese servants on the ship did not have queues, but it did not immediately forbid English trade there. When the English returned to Ningpo in 1756, they did some trade but encountered many difficulties, which they attributed to dissension among the officials and the intrigues of Canton officials and merchants, who hoped to make it impossible for them to trade anywhere but at Canton. The duties, which had been lower than those at Canton, were raised to the Canton rates, and the governor-general advised the English to trade at Canton in the future.\footnote{Morse, \textit{The chronicles of the East India Company trading to China}, Volume 5, pp. 49–53.} The court was already worried about the possibility of growth of foreign trade at Ningpo and hoped the increased duties would be enough to discourage it.

A Spanish ship was allowed to trade at Amoy in 1756, but it too may have increased the court’s uneasiness about spreading foreign contact.\footnote{Fu, \textit{A documentary chronicle of Sino-Western relations}, Volume 1, pp. 197–8.} So may the discovery of Catholic missionaries and convert communities in Chiang-nan. When the English came again to Ningpo in 1757, there was much delay and confusion, but finally they were not allowed to trade at all and were told that they must never come again. The English were convinced that this represented the final victory of the Canton interest. No doubt this was an important factor,
but Chinese documents make it clear that other factors were involved. In one
document the fear is expressed that if many foreign ships come and go to
Chekiang, “they will come to know our border areas very well,” a revival
of traditional fears of foreign spying that we have suggested were somewhat
weaker earlier in the century. Another document states that they must be kept
away so that Chinese “rascals will not lure and invite the foreigners and so
cause trouble,” echoing the traditional account of the Wako disasters in that
area in the 1550s. An edict of 1757 is especially striking. If many foreign
ships come to Ningpo, “in the future foreign ships will gather like clouds,
and [foreigners] will remain there for longer and longer times, so that it will
become another Macao. This is of great importance for an important part of
our coastal frontier and for the customs of our scholars and people.”

In 1754 six of the most powerful hongs, or firms, including Poankeequa,
worked out an arrangement to control the shares of imports going to each of
them and to the other firms. For the Ch’ing authorities, these moves by the
merchants seemed to present an opportunity to solve some of the financial
problems of the security merchants by giving them a monopoly on foreign
trade, and to strengthen control of the foreigners by making it the clear
and complete responsibility of the same merchants. There were ten hongs
that were qualified to serve as security merchants. The smaller “shopkeeper”
merchants managed to secure a modification of this monopoly by which they
would form themselves into guarantee groups of five under the supervision of
a security merchant and could participate in the trade with his approval. But
the trade in tea and raw silk was strictly limited to the security merchants, as
was the singsong trade. The interpreters also were brought more completely
under the control of the security merchants, and the security merchants and
the interpreters were made clearly responsible for the good conduct of the
foreigners.

In 1759 the English at Canton sought to present their grievances directly
to the imperial court without the interference of the “Canton interest,” which
seemed to be encircling them. James Flint, who had been left in China as a
boy in 1736 to learn the language, was sent north on a small ship. Finding all
access barred in the Ningpo area, he went on to Tientsin, where the presenta-
tion of his petition brought about, in less than a week, the dismissal of the
Kwangtung superintendent of maritime customs and the dispatch of imperial
commissioners to investigate the situation in Canton. By sending a foreigner
who knew Chinese by sea to the vicinity of the capital, the English had

117 Liang, Yüeh hai-kuan chih 8, p. 18, 21; Fu, A documentary chronicle of Sino-Western relations, Volume 1,
pp. 200–2.
118 Van Dyke, Merchants of Canton and Macao.
unwittingly reinforced the growing Ch'ing concern about spies and set off another round of restrictive measures. When the commissioners reached Canton, they summoned the supercargoes of the foreign companies and informed them that the superintendent of maritime customs had been dismissed and that under his successor all abuses would be corrected. They also ordered an intensive search for the Chinese who had helped Flint write the petition, spurred by repeated references in imperial edicts to “treacherous people in the interior” who must have helped Flint. It turned out that Flint had been helped by his Chinese teacher, who was beheaded. Flint was imprisoned for three years.¹¹⁹

Having dealt with the scapegoat superintendent, the foreign spy, and his treacherous adviser, the Ch'ing court and the Canton authorities turned in the spring of 1760 to the elaboration of a new set of regulations that would set the pattern for trade at Canton until the Opium War. Their basic provisions and subsequent developments can be summarized as follows:

1. Foreigners were forbidden to stay in the factories in Canton after their ships left. Chinese merchants were to settle accounts with them promptly so that they would have no excuse to delay their departure. Foreigners always went to Macao for the winter, but up to 1760 and again from about 1763 onward some of them remained for a few weeks to wind up business after the ships left.

2. The hong merchants were responsible for the conduct of the foreigners to whom they rented living and warehouse space. Thus the authorities hoped to limit access to them and keep track of their comings and goings. The area of the foreign “factories” along the riverfront became an isolation zone, with no access to the walled city and allowance for only occasional outings to a temple on an island across the river.

3. Chinese were forbidden to borrow from foreigners. The court had understood this to be among the grievances presented by Flint. Also, the foreigners in Canton were not allowed to hire Chinese servants. Both prohibitions, however, were consistently violated.

4. Foreigners were not allowed to send letters into the interior without official permission. The authorities seemed to be especially concerned about communication between Macao and Jesuits serving in Peking.

5. More troops were to be stationed at Whampoa to maintain order among the large number of sailors there. This was the last in a series of steps to control violence in that area. From 1754 on, French sailors were allowed

ashore only on French Island and English sailors on Danes Island, while others could use both. The shops on the islands were not supposed to sell strong drink, but frequently did so.\footnote{120}

The restrictive trend also made the authorities open to other proposals. The short-lived prohibition of raw-silk exports and the later quota system were examples of this. Also, the English reported in 1760 that the hong merchants were trying to obtain official approval for a scheme in which they would abandon independent trading with foreigners and contribute fixed shares of capital to a “public guild” (kung-hang, usually referred to by the Cantonese pronunciation “cohong”), which would have as a single unit the same monopoly on foreign trade as they had held previously as competing firms. Poankeequa saw his chance in the officials’ desire to have everything under tight control and now would be a major participant. The proposal was approved, despite the protests of the foreign merchants. The governor-general, echoing a theme much more common in the state papers of these years than it had been earlier, told them, “If you cannot get a tolerable profit upon your goods, you must not in future bring any, as it is of very small consequence to this country.”\footnote{121} They also sought to split the combine by offering advantageous terms to any merchant who would make a separate contract, but to no avail. The cohong obviously was advantageous to all the Chinese merchants, except possibly the strongest, since they could virtually dictate import and export prices. The officials thought in terms of “fair prices” rather than competitive price setting, and at this time probably were receptive to any proposal that seemed to offer greater control of Chinese and foreign merchants and fewer opportunities for particular alliances between them. They surely understood that the cohong arrangement would make it easier for all the merchants to share the burden of the singsong trade, which continued to make them unwilling to stand security for English ships and was causing the English supercargoes to do all they could to discourage the import of clocks and other curiosities.

The “factory” buildings along the waterfront provided ample and flexible space for warehousing goods and for the residential and business spaces of the foreign companies. They were modifications of local building designs, and it was not until changes were made in the nineteenth century that they gave a strong impression of being a foreign enclave.\footnote{122} The daily routine of

\footnote{120} Morse, *The chronicles of the East India Company trading to China*, Volume 5, pp. 85–98.  
\footnote{121} Morse, *The chronicles of the East India Company trading to China*, Volume 5, p. 93.  
trade involved a good deal of haggling, some of it about the quality of tea samples, but generally it went smoothly. There was not much cultural interchange, but friendly comings and goings were maintained. In 1761 the English invited other Europeans and Chinese merchants to celebrate the accession of George III, with lanterns, fireworks, and an average of one and a half bottles of claret per person. William Hickey recorded a succession of dinner parties at Poankeequa’s country estate in 1769. On the first evening the Europeans laughed while the Chinese attempted to eat European food with knife and fork, while on the following evening it was the turn of the Chinese to laugh at the foreigners trying to eat Chinese food with chopsticks. The highlight of the first dinner was a Chinese opera in which an actor, doing his impression of an English naval officer, bounded on stage shouting, “Maskee can do! God Damn!” whereupon the Chinese shouted, “Truly have muchee like Englishman.” At Whampoa each of the ships had an excellent band, and they all played at sunrise and sunset every day, the music coming from various directions across the water making a delightful effect.

The strongest hong merchants in this period were Poankeequa (or Puan or P’an Khequa), frequently in conflict with a powerful combination of Tan (Ch’en) Chetqua, Chai (Ts’ai) Hunqua, and Sweetia (surname Yen). The English continued their efforts to break the cohong, and in 1768 Tan Chetqua switched to a temporary alliance with Poankeequa. The two of them made a separate contract with the English, taking all their woolens and getting a favored position in their silk purchases in return. By 1771 two of Poankeequa’s three opponents were dead and their firms in less capable hands. The cohong was moribund, and strenuous efforts to dissolve it no longer were necessary. Poankeequa did not explain this to the foreigners. He accepted 50,000 taels from the English – there is no evidence that the other foreigners were even asked to contribute – and took credit for the formal dissolution of the cohong. He remained by far the wealthiest and most influential of the hong merchants until his death in 1778, and his son was an important figure until after 1800.

The best picture of these routine interactions now available is in Paul A. Van Dyke, trans. and ann., *The Canton–Macao dagregisters, 1762*, revised by Cynthia Viallé (Macao, 2006); Paul A. Van Dyke, trans. and ann., *The Canton–Macao dagregisters, 1763*, revised by Cynthia Viallé (Macao, 2008); Paul A. Van Dyke and Cynthia Viallé, trans. and ann., *The Canton–Macao dagregisters, 1764* (Macao, 2009).


Van Dyke, *Merchants of Canton and Macao*.

Recent studies of the hong based on Western and Chinese sources are Van Dyke, *The Canton trade*, and his *Merchants of Canton and Macao*. Important earlier studies are Ch’en, *The insolvency of the Chinese hong*
After 1771 the hong merchants still had their monopoly over the silk and tea trades, but now they were free to make their own contracts and settle their prices individually. Competitive bidding and adjustments of supply and demand were important, but there also was a year-by-year negotiated trade in which the hong merchants agreed to take certain shares of the English imports of woolens in return for the right to supply the same fractions of their tea exports. Only about two-fifths of the English tea exports were apportioned in this way, and we do not know how important this system was for the other nationalities. Although the London directors were not happy about the negotiated trade, it was a sensible response to circumstances and was advantageous to both parties. The hong merchants’ once-ample capital resources were strained by the growth of the trade. For necessary advances to their suppliers they depended on importers’ supplies to them of silver or readily salable commodities. The English had to sell woolens to placate domestic opposition to the English East India Company, and needed every possible source of funds for their growing purchases of tea. Woolens were salable in China, but not readily salable, partly because the largest markets were far from Canton. Thus the Chinese merchant would be much more willing to take his share of the woolens if he was assured that he would have a similar share in the profits of the tea trade.

From the early 1770s on, European trade at Canton was supported by large amounts of silver from India. English private fortunes amassed in the unbridled exploitation of Bengal were invested in Danish and Swedish trade with China, the earnings then being used to buy bills on London. English private traders based in India steadily expanded their trade with the hong merchants in Canton and also loaned money to them. Silver earned by the private traders was paid into the English Company’s treasury in Canton in return for bills drawn on the East India Company in London. But the normal hazards of trade involving huge cash advances to suppliers were increased by the politics of this period. We can see in the English records a growing number of cases of blatant extortion by officials after the rise of Ho-shen in 1775–6. This contributed to the hong merchants’ difficulties in repaying their debts. Later debt cases resulted not from European loans but from the unwise trading practices of some of the less well-established hong merchants and


the ruthless price manipulations of the private traders. Hong merchants and Canton authorities made conscientious efforts to arrange for the repayment of the debts by working out schedules of deferred payments and contributions by other merchants. All of these disputes were complicated by creditors who were contentious, hard-to-please individuals, not representatives of great companies with a stake in the continuity of the trade.

The continued health of the Chinese merchant community required a stable source of common funds to repay the debts of bankrupts and to take some of the official “squeeze” off individual merchants by making presents to the officials on behalf of the whole guild. This was accomplished by the levying of small extra duties on imports for a guild hall (kung-so/consoo) fund. Hints of this can be found in English sources as early as 1755, and the “Consoo Fund” was clearly established by 1780. With this important merchant-managed levy and the frequency of woolens-and-tea share agreements, aspects of European trade at Canton functioned as a single unit almost as much as they had in the cohong of the 1760s.

In 1782 five new firms were admitted to the maritime trade guild and made to stand security for each other. Morse writes of the re-establishment of the cohong in 1775 and in 1782, but it does not seem that there ever was a return to the complete amalgamation of capital and comprehensive price fixing of the early 1760s. The firms were assigned to stand security for foreign ships in strict rotation. Sometimes the assignments and rotations were virtually dictated by the foreigners. This seems to have worked well at first, but by 1786 the naming of security merchants was again a source of tensions between the English traders and the Canton authorities. In the 1780s and 1790s separate deals by individual Chinese merchants were common in trade with the companies, and were the general rule in the country trade and in the private trade of English East India Company employees. Many merchants not part of the guild also got a share in the country and private trades. A guild merchant might guarantee such a transaction, but if something went wrong with it an aggrieved foreigner had no recourse to the authorities. Nor were the measures of co-ordination sufficient to save the guild merchants from bankruptcy. Pressure on them for funds to contribute to military campaigns, special gifts for the emperor, and so on was unremitting, as was the general “squeeze” by provincial officials and superintendents of maritime customs. Several of the new guild firms of 1782 were in serious trouble by 1792, and six more were added in that year.

The Europeans deplored each restriction and extra charge in this system, but within the general context of Ch’ing restrictions on foreign contact and

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128 Van Dyke, The Canton trade, p. 100.
129 Morse, The chronicles of the East India Company trading to China, Volume 2, p. 82.
130 Morse, The chronicles of the East India Company trading to China, Volume 2, p. 197.
corruption in the late Ch'ien-lung period, it is remarkable how well it served the interests of the merchants on both sides. A huge trade was smoothly co-ordinated, exacting quality control was generally maintained, and large transactions were agreed to and carried out on the simple word of individuals.

NEW DIRECTIONS, 1780–1800

The pattern of official control and merchant monopoly at Canton and of business conduct in the factories seemed to persist past 1800, in some ways right down to the Opium War. But this apparent continuity masked basic changes that already could be seen before 1800. The coasts of the Pacific were being linked to Canton by European and American ships. The Resolution and the Discovery refitted in the Canton area in 1779, after Captain James Cook's death in Hawaii, and La Pérouse's ships called at Macao in 1787 after their exploration of the North Pacific. Three ships called from Botany Bay, the first English settlement in Australia, in 1788, the year of its founding. Manila was opened to foreign trade and rapidly became enmeshed in the growing English country trade network. Ships bringing furs from the northwest coast of North America began going to Canton in the 1780s. Some Chinese sailors and artisans even signed on for a voyage to North America. Some of these ships were American, part of one of the most striking trends of the 1790s. The first American ship to trade at Canton arrived in 1784. By 1800 American trade constituted 15–20 percent of the total Western trade at Canton. This rise was matched by a sharp decline in Continental European trade. The Dutch East India Company was moribund by 1790 and finally was abolished in 1799. French trade at Canton was badly managed and unprofitable even before it was virtually eliminated by the events of the French Revolution and the wars with England.

The English dominated Canton trade after 1780, not just by default of their competitors, but also by their own growing wealth and power at home and in India, and by one long-overdue policy change. In the wars of 1776–83 the English lost part of an empire in North America but extended their power in India and the Indian Ocean, making a revival of French power impossible. In 1784 William Pitt (1759–1806) as prime minister pushed through the

131 Morse, _The chronicles of the East India Company trading to China_, Volume 2, p. 151.
Commutation Act, reducing the duties on tea from more than 100 percent to 12.5 percent, which destroyed at a stroke the business of smuggling tea into Great Britain that had been so important to the European Continental companies trading at Canton. In 1792 Continental Europe’s trade at Canton measured in tonnage of shipping and in tea exports was less than half that of 1783. In the years 1799–1806 total tea exports averaged more than 280,000 piculs per year, of which almost 50,000 went to America, less than 30,000 to Continental Europe, and about 200,000 to England.\textsuperscript{135} These English exports were between three and four times English exports in the 1780s. This pace of growth would have been impossible without the immense growth of the country trade from Calcutta and other Indian ports in opium, cotton, and other commodities. In 1792–3 bills drawn on London by country traders amounted to 34–7 percent of the English East India Company’s investment funds in exports from Canton.\textsuperscript{136}

Free trade as an ideology had little effect on European relations with the Ch’ing empire before the 1830s, but free trade as a fact, as a source of dynamism and trouble, can be seen from the 1760s on. Even when country traders traded legally at Canton, they traded with individual merchants inside and outside the guild, subverting its control. Conversely, Ch’ing officials expected the European companies to control the private merchants of their own countries, but they were never able to do so. The opium trade was completely beyond the control of the Canton system. The two networks of uncontrolled private trade, European and Chinese, met in Southeast Asia, especially along the Straits of Malacca.\textsuperscript{137} Trade with Chinese in that area had been an important early focus of English country trade from Calcutta in the 1770s. The English settlement of Penang in 1786 gave this contact a secure center that soon began to attract Chinese emigrants, some of them recruited by the English East India Company at Canton.

While its existing institutions of control of trade at Canton were being subverted and outgrown in the 1780s, the Ch’ing state was moving toward ever tighter and more strict enforcement of them. Some of the reasons for this were endogenous to the Canton system. Superintendents of maritime customs sought to maximize revenue from the trade in order to make their own fortunes. One was supposed to have amassed more than a million taels in his one year in office.\textsuperscript{138} They also had to send large presents to court

\textsuperscript{136} Morse, \textit{The chronicles of the East India Company trading to China}, Volume 2, p. 201.
\textsuperscript{137} Nordin Hussin, \textit{Trade and society in the Straits of Melaka: Dutch Melaka and English Penang, 1780–1830} (Copenhagen, 2007).
\textsuperscript{138} Jörg, \textit{Porcelain and the Dutch China trade}, p. 68.
notables, and to send up to a million taels a year to the Imperial Household Department for the emperor’s use. In 1792, at the height of the extortions of the Ho-shen regime, a superintendent told the Macao authorities he was under great pressure to send at least a million taels a year to the court.\textsuperscript{139} Separate records on trade and its taxation were kept by the superintendents and the provincial officials and then compared at the end of each year. The result was an increase in incidents of undisguised extortion and of petty enforcement of rules. Hong merchants had to pay large sums in order to be allowed to continue in the business of a deceased father or uncle. In contrast to the early hong merchants who came with wide experience in business, some of it in Southeast Asia, and who retained multiple sources of funds, the late eighteenth-century hong merchants were tightly focused on the trade with Europeans and were so burdened with the associated costs and troubles that soon it was hard to find anyone who would take over the assets and responsibilities of such a position.\textsuperscript{140}

Foreigners had other grievances. Ships arriving or departing without cargo were frequently subject to delays and obstruction because empty ships yielded no duties and reports of them might lead to questions from Peking. Trade might be stopped before the Chinese New Year so that the hoppo could close his books without reporting too great an increase in revenue. Another cause of the restrictive trend was violence at Whampoa, where thousands of European sailors spent the trading season on their ships. Brawls were especially frequent in the 1790s, a decade of continual Anglo-French war and of mutinies in the English fleets at home. These incidents do not seem to have led to any new institutions or practices, but they contributed to the Ch‘ing perception of the Europeans as dangerous and needing strict control.

This restrictive trend can also be traced to sources that had little or no direct connection to the European trade at Canton. The rulers and elite of the Ch‘ing empire in 1780 were competent, cautious, and conservative, aware of the limits of their control and of the effects of corruption. The coast again was a danger zone with a major rebellion on Taiwan in 1786–8 and large-scale piracy, much of it based in northern Vietnam, in the 1790s.\textsuperscript{141}

Correspondence between the Portuguese authorities in Macao and the Canton bureaucracy in the 1790s suggests a situation almost out of control, with a

\textsuperscript{139} Jin Guoping and Wu Zhiliang, eds., Correspondência oficial trocada entre as autoridades de Cantão e os procuradores do senado: Fundo das chapas sínicas em português (Macau, 2000), Volume 1, p. 428.

\textsuperscript{140} See chapters 3 and 4 in Ch‘en, The insolvency of the Chinese hong merchants. Some of these suggestions on the sources of the hong merchants’ difficulties are drawn from Cheong, The hong merchants of Canton.

\textsuperscript{141} Dian H. Murray, Pirates of the South China coast, 1790–1810 (Stanford, 1987); Guimarães, Uma relação especial, pp. 108–68; Robert J. Antony, Like froth floating on the sea: The world of pirates and seafarers in late imperial south China (Berkeley, 2003).
large number of people moving around and engaging in petty crime, and pirates and opium ships lurking in the outer islands.\footnote{142} Seaborne threats to the security of the empire did not always lead to restrictive policies against European trade, but the court of the 1780s had little of the self-confidence and breadth of vision that K’ang-hsi had shown in 1716. Moreover, in the 1780s there was a renewal of the worries about subversion by missionaries and Catholic converts that had catalyzed the turn toward more restrictions in the 1740s. In 1784–5 four Italian Franciscans were discovered not far from a rebellious area in Shensi, and, being accused of serving as cannoners for the rebels, were thrown into prison.\footnote{143} The result was a revival of the fear of links between Catholicism and rebellion, a fear that since the 1740s had never entirely died out. The court groped for an understanding of how there could still be Chinese Catholics moving around the empire, maintaining their churches, and aiding clandestine European priests.\footnote{144} A new repression of Catholic communities all over the empire was ordered. When one Chinese priest managed to take refuge in Macao, the Portuguese refused to give him up and the Canton authorities inexplicably backed down.\footnote{145}

In addition to contributing to the general perception of Europeans as dangerous and requiring special control, this incident led directly to the Europeans’ most important new grievance in these decades, namely their treatment within the Ch’ing legal system. There had been two previous cases of murder, the handling of which had aroused European apprehensions. In the first, in 1772–3, a British sailor was accused of killing a Chinese. The Portuguese court of Macao found him innocent, but the Ch’ing authorities insisted that he be turned over to them. The Portuguese complied, and he was executed.\footnote{146} In the second, in 1780, there seems to have been no doubt that the right man was found guilty of a murder, but the Europeans were disturbed by the fact that a Ch’ing law court had tried and executed a European for the murder of another European.\footnote{147} In some earlier cases of this kind, the authorities had


\footnote{143} Fu, A documentary chronicle of Sino-Western relations, Volume 1, pp. 299–300.

\footnote{144} Chung-kuo ti-i li-shih tang-an-kuan, Ming Ch’ing shih-ch’i Ao-men wen-t’i tang-an wen-hsien hui-pien, Volume 1, pp. 421–97.

\footnote{145} Morse, The chronicles of the East India Company trading to China, Volume 2, p. 107.

\footnote{146} Morse, The chronicles of the East India Company trading to China, Volume 2, pp. 182–5. A.M. Martins do Vale, Os Portugueses em Macau (1750–1800) (Macao, 1997), pp. 79–85 lists this case among ten homicides in Macao, 1766–93, that led to negotiations with the Ch’ing authorities. Preliminary research shows that six of these cases can be traced in Ch’ing archival documentation.

\footnote{147} Morse, The chronicles of the East India Company trading to China, Volume 2, pp. 59–60.
allowed the Europeans involved to settle the matter and punish the guilty party themselves. In neither case was there any doubt that the execution was a legitimate penalty under Ch'ing law.

In 1784 two Chinese in a boat were killed accidentally by the discharge of a salute from the country ship Lady Hughes. The gunner who had fired the salute feared for his safety and went into hiding. The Canton authorities, acting on their own principle of group responsibility, seized the supercargo of the ship and stopped the trade of the English East India Company in order to force the surrender of the gunner. Eventually he was surrendered to the Ch'ing authorities and executed. According to the Ch'ing code, an accidental killing was nominally punishable by death, but commutation to a fine of 12.42 taelles of silver was mandatory. In previous cases, starting with a Dutch one in 1665, such a fine and a payment to the family of the victim had always been sufficient. This kind of settlement was accepted again in 1807. In the Lady Hughes case, however, although the Canton officials pointed out that the gunner had not intended to kill anyone and asked if he could be released and sent away, the emperor explicitly described it as a case of killing in a brawl, which made the death penalty legally possible, and decreed that the loss of life must be atoned for. This drastic departure from norms and precedents becomes somewhat comprehensible when we note that the Lady Hughes incident took place about a month after the above-mentioned excitement about a Chinese priest fleeing to Macao. The edict ordering the execution also discussed the court’s concern about communication between foreigners in Canton and Macao and the priest-astronomers in Peking, about the dangers of foreigners causing trouble and plotting with local people in Kwangtung, and about missionaries sneaking into the interior. After ordering the execution, it went on to explain that the offender could not be pardoned, “particularly during this critical time when we are detecting and investigating the Europeans [the missionaries] who have secretly penetrated into various provinces.”

The pressure to hand over a culprit, the principle of group responsibility, and the lack of any evidence of a fair trial convinced the English Company’s council in Canton that Englishmen would never be safe in China until they were exempted from Chinese jurisdiction. One partial form of such exemption, which would also free them from many restraints on their trade, would be an

149 Wills, Pepper, guns, and parleys, pp. 118–19.
150 Morse, The chronicles of the East India Company trading to China, Volume 3, pp. 40–6.
151 Fu, A documentary chronicle of Sino-Western relations, Volume 1, p. 297.
152 Morse, The chronicles of the East India Company trading to China, Volume 2, pp. 106–7.
island or other territory under English control. Already in 1781 the English had speculated that if Macao should ever “fall into the hands of an enterprising People, who knew how to extend all its advantages; we think it would rise to a State of Splendor, never yet equalled by any Port in the East.” Similarly, in the 1780s the French expressed some interest in obtaining a settlement in Taiwan or in taking over Macao. Thus with the Lady Hughes case as a catalyst, the whole package of European demands for freedom of trade, extraterritoriality, and territorial concessions began to come together, and the English government became involved in pursuing these demands.

The East India Companies were at once mercantile and quasi-governmental. So was the Chinese maritime trade guild. At Canton both retained their key roles well into the nineteenth century. But on the European side the two elements were present separately as well as in their company amalgam. Along with the growth of private trade came direct intervention by Western governments in the relations of their citizens with the Chinese. There were only modest changes at Canton. In 1779 Admiral Vernon intervened on behalf of the private merchant debtors, over the strenuous objections of the East India Company’s servants to this infringement of their authority, and his presence gave new impetus to Ch’ing officials’ efforts to settle the debtor case.

The presence of a French consul from 1777 and an American consul from 1786 was necessary because these countries had no company monopolies in the China trade. The Prussian consulship of Daniel Beale from 1787 was simply an English private merchant’s convenient guarantee of immunity from East India Company control. Before the year 1800, others would claim to represent Denmark, Genoa, and even Poland, and this type of consulship became more common after 1800. In 1787 the French naval officer d’Entrecasteaux visited Canton at the end of a voyage of reconnaissance east of the Philippines, with instructions to seek to counter the growing English domination and to discuss with the Ch’ing officials the difficulties the French had with the hong merchants over debts and other issues. In a curious throwback to Balthasar Bort in the 1660s, d’Entrecasteaux even offered the Ch’ing officials the aid of French ships against the rebels on Taiwan, but apparently he accomplished nothing. Finally, in these years Lisbon was seeking to bring Macao under more direct control. Instructions were sent in 1783 to give the governor

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153 Morse, The chronicles of the East India Company trading to China, Volume 2, p. 68.
155 Morse, The chronicles of the East India Company trading to China, Volume 2, pp. 47–9; Fu, A documentary chronicle of Sino-Western relations, Volume 1, pp. 291–2.
156 Morse, The chronicles of the East India Company trading to China, Volume 2, pp. 150, 206–7.
greater authority, which included a veto over the decisions of the Senate and the establishment of a royal customs house.

Far more important was a general revival of European interest in conducting formal diplomacy at Peking that would include not only ambassadorial visits, but also the establishment of resident envoys. This was the appropriate form of intergovernmental diplomacy within the European international order, and interest in it was bound to increase with direct involvement of European states. The interest in formal diplomacy also was a corollary to the Europeans’ hostility to the “Canton interest.” It was thought that no justice or honest response to their grievances was to be expected from the officials at Canton, but something might be accomplished if grievances, including those about the Canton officials, could be presented directly to the imperial court in Peking. This line of reasoning, already to be found in the instructions for the Dutch embassies in the late seventeenth century, ignored the extent to which the Ch’ing polity was based on balance of authority and mutual dependence between court and provincial officials. The court depended on provincial officials for information about provincial conditions and for enforcement of its edicts, and rarely would act on provincial affairs except on the advice of the officials concerned.

The first effort to establish a Western-style diplomatic presence in the capital was the attempt of the Portuguese government to make the newly consecrated Bishop of Peking, Alexandre de Gouvea, a de facto resident envoy and an advocate of Portuguese interests in Peking. He was dispatched in 1783 with instructions to carry out major changes in the government of Macao and to seek from the imperial court comprehensive improvements in its status, including the revocation of some of the limits of Portuguese jurisdiction there that were embodied in the decisions of 1749. De Gouvea remained in Peking for more than twenty years in the emperor’s service, but it is not known if he managed to accomplish anything for Macao.\(^\text{158}\) The second attempt was an embassy from the Spanish viceroy of Mexico that arrived at Canton via Manila in 1787, hoping to go to Peking and obtain permission to export Chinese mercury (quicksilver) for use in the Mexican silver industry. But the ambassador was to finance his embassy with the sale of 2,000 fur pelts, and when these sold poorly he was forced to give up.\(^\text{159}\)

Much more ambitious and important revivals of formal diplomatic activity were the English and Dutch embassies of the 1790s, which expressed the European frustrations, proclaimed some of their new ambitions, stimulated


Ch'ing defensiveness, and revived Ch'ing illusions about the relevance of the tributary order in structuring relations with Europeans. In 1787 the London government sent Lieutenant-Colonel Charles Cathcart as ambassador to China, with instructions to complain about the vexations the English had suffered under the officials and merchants at Canton, “in contravention of the Orders and Intentions of the Imperial Courts,” and propose the cession of a depot for English trade, where Chinese might remain under Ch'ing jurisdiction but where Englishmen would be subject to their own laws and courts. Cathcart, however, died on the voyage out.\textsuperscript{160}

In 1792 an experienced and able diplomat, George Lord Macartney, was named ambassador, and eventually a large and imposing embassy of ninety-five persons set sail in September of that year.\textsuperscript{161} Macartney was instructed to seek changes in trade conditions and the cession of a trading depot. But his embassy had other goals, which amounted to nothing less than the presentation to the Ch'ing elite of the new world of science, industry, and the order of nation-states. Permission to establish a resident minister in Peking was to be sought. Prompted by the new manufacturing interests, the government sent samples of their products with the embassy in the hope of opening new markets for them. In order to impress the court with English science and technology, the presents included a planetarium, an orrery (clockwork model of the planetary system), a great burning glass, ornate clocks, and (singular gifts to the lord of Ching-te-chen) Staffordshire vases and figures by Josiah Wedgwood. Other items sent for public display included a diving bell; an air balloon; an air pump; and apparatus for demonstrating experiments in electricity, mechanics, and so on.\textsuperscript{162}

The ambassador, his deputy ambassador, George Leonard Staunton, and their suite arrived by warship in the Gulf of Chihli at the end of July 1793. Other European tribute embassies had regularly come to Peking by the inland

\textsuperscript{160} Morse, The chronicles of the East India Company trading to China, Volume 2, pp. 154–71.


route from Canton. The English knew this but deliberately sent their embassy as close to the capital by sea as possible, and when they informed the officials at Canton it was too late for any counterinstructions to be issued. As a result, permission was received from Peking for the embassy to enter China by way of Tientsin. As long as the embassy conformed to the general rules for tribute embassies, it would be extremely satisfying for the emperor to enroll as a tributary the English, who had been trading at Canton for a century without “coming to be transformed.” Moreover, the English were among the more troublesome foreigners at Canton, and the embassy would provide a good opportunity to show them the Ch’ing empire’s superior culture, good order, prosperity, and military strength, and, by kind treatment, to draw the English into the reciprocities of human feelings. At first all went well; the pennants on the boats taking the embassy up to T’ung-chou near Peking proclaimed it to be an English embassy bringing tribute, but Macartney turned a blind eye to them. There was some difficulty about the presents. The emperor was at the summer retreat and hunting park in Jehol (modern Ch’eng-te), and normally the presents should have been taken there. But some of the scientific instruments were much too delicate for that difficult journey, and Macartney insisted that they remain in Peking. Finally they were set up in the Yüan-ming yüan, the summer palace northwest of Peking. According to Dr. Dinwiddie, the “mechanic” in the embassy, the officials of Peking were uninterested in seeing any experiments demonstrated and viewed the planetarium and other presents “with careless indifference.” The Ch’ing had already adopted in their own calendrical calculations the superior Western astronomical methods. Macartney eventually realized that the court officials were not impressed with elaborate clockwork because they already had so much of it, the results of the endless stream of “singsong trade” items that hoppos and other high Canton officials bought and then presented at court: “our presents must shrink from the comparison and hide their diminished heads.”

Even before Macartney reached Peking, the accompanying officials insistently explained to him the ceremonies of the audience and urged him to practice the kowtow. This is odd; there was a place for such practice in the ordinary routine of an embassy, after it was well settled in the capital, when its presents were delivered to the Ministry of Rites. Perhaps the officials already saw in the arrival of this unexpected and inexplicable embassy, or in the demeanor of the ambassador and his suite, signs that these foreigners might not bend easily to Ch’ing ceremonial conventions. It is also clear that the Ch’ien-lung court at this particular moment was extremely sensitive to issues of ceremonial manifestations of its superiority, as a result of the whole

163 Macartney, An embassy to China, p. 125.
anxious aftermath of its botched military intervention in Annan in 1788, its
subsequent recognition of the ruler it had sought to overthrow, Nguyen Hue
(1753–92; r. 1788–92), and its ostentatious reception of an embassy from
Annan headed by a “double” taking the role of Nguyen Hue himself.\textsuperscript{164} The
kowtow was the issue that would turn an exercise in mutual bafflement into
a conflict that embittered attitudes on both sides and has dominated Western
historiography on the embassy. It seems likely that all previous European
ambassadors to Peking had performed the kowtow. To Macartney, an experi-
enced and able senior diplomat in the European tradition, ceremonial issues
had to be properly handled in order to place his sovereign hierarchically as
the full equal of all other sovereigns and inferior to none. But protocol was
essentially preliminary to the negotiations that were the real business of an
embassy. For the Ch’ien-lung emperor and his ministers, ceremony was the
core of the business of an embassy. The superiority of the Son of Heaven was
a basic principle of the tribute embassy routine. In relations with Inner Asian
peoples it was supplemented by efforts to build strong personal connections
with other sovereigns. It seems likely that the Ch’ien-lung court’s success in
this more personalized diplomacy contributed to its efforts to present a cour-
teous face to the English and to divine if the English were sincerely impressed
and friendly in return. The court’s efforts were doomed to failure. In their
efforts to be neither too lenient nor too strict, the Ch’ing officials had no fund
of prior knowledge or experience with European diplomats on which to build.
Conversely, Europeans’ recent inexperience with the embassy institution pro-
vided little foundation for English hopes for substantive negotiations in the
capital. There was no reason to expect that a form of ceremonies could be
arrived at that would satisfy both sides. The English were plunging into a
milieu about which they understood very little, while expecting that reason
and progress would carry all before them.

On the kowtow question, Macartney had little guidance from his instruc-
tions, which merely ordered him to conform to all ceremonials of the Ch’ing
court “which may not commit the honour of your sovereign or lessen your
own dignity, so as to endanger the success of your negotiation.”\textsuperscript{165} Ch’ing
officials soon became aware that the English would create many difficulties
concerning ceremonial forms and were ready to be patiently persuasive with
them, recognizing that this was their first visit to the Celestial Court.\textsuperscript{166}

\begin{footnotes}
\item[164] Wills, “Functional, not fossilized,” pp. 439–78. See chapter by John Whitmore and Brian Zottoli in
this volume.
\item[165] Morse, \textit{The chronicles of the East India Company trading to China}, Volume 2, p. 217.
\item[166] Chung-kuo ti-i li-shih tang-an-kuan, \textit{Ying-shih Ma-chia-erh-ni fang-hua tang-an shib-liao hui-pien},
pp. 13, 149, docs. 56, 205.
\end{footnotes}
compromise Macartney suggested that he would be willing to perform before the emperor any ceremony that a Ch'ing official of equivalent rank would be willing to perform before a portrait of George III that he had brought along. This was not an altogether implausible suggestion. Ch'ing envoys had performed the kowtow in person before Russian sovereigns in 1729 and 1731. But the Ch'ing officials rejected it and instead permitted the ambassador to perform the same ceremony before the emperor as he would before the king of England, simply kneeling on one knee. Since it was not proper to kiss the emperor's hand, as he would have his sovereign's, this was omitted. According to his journal and the accounts of several members of his suite, this was the ceremony that was performed at his audience. It is likely that the moment at which their non-conforming was most noticeable was when the emperor entered into the audience tent and the English party knelt and lowered their heads repeatedly, conspicuously higher than the surrounding rows of officials prostrating themselves. Like the Portuguese ambassadors, Macartney was allowed to deliver the king's letter into the emperor's own hands. The ceremony took place on September 14 in a large circular tent in the vast grounds of the summer park at Jehol. To the Ch'ing officials it must have seemed preferable to allow the modified ceremony rather than admit defeat and send the embassy away. Although it was not in Peking, and not before the assembled metropolitan bureaucracy in the great courtyard before the T'ai-ho-tien, it is clear that news of it did reach the capital and that in later dealings with English and Russian envoys Ch'ing officials hardened their stance and did not countenance any deviation from court ceremony. The account of the event in the Ch'ing Veritable records gives no hint that anything unusual had taken place.

Macartney and his party were received by the Ch'ien-lung emperor twice more: at the entertainments to celebrate his eighty-third birthday, when they may have once again stuck out above a prostrating throng, and before they made a tour of Jehol, when they were shown the imperial hunting park, the lake, and the Buddhist temples and lamaseries. These sights made a great impression on Macartney, as his journal indicates. Reading of all this splendor and considering how strongly the temples and palaces of Jehol echoed the Ch'ing triumphs in Inner Asia, it is not hard to understand how the emperor and his court could take such a remote view of Canton and the people who traded there, seeing them as a source of trouble but also, of course, of revenue and graft. Jehol had been the scene of some of the empire's greatest

168 Fu, A documentary chronicle of Sino-Western relations, Volume 1, pp. 325–6.
successes in drawing foreigners into a web of human feelings and mutual obligations, and they could expect similar efforts to prevail with the English. Macartney also had conversations with Ho-shen and Fu-k'ang-an.171 The latter, who had just returned from commanding the Ch'ing expedition into Nepal, was openly hostile, perhaps because he knew something of the English conquest in India and efforts to develop relations with Nepal and Tibet. Ho-shen was more cordial, but neither in Jehol nor back in Peking later was he willing to respond to any of the ambassador's efforts to discuss business with him. A note delivered to Ho-shen on October 3, however, did elicit an imperial edict giving somewhat more detailed explanations as to why the English requests were being refused.172 The embassy left Peking on October 7. It was not allowed to leave the way it arrived. The entourage traveled south by the canal and river route, and arrived in Canton on December 19.173

The court's response to the embassy had been apparent in instructions to the Canton officials before it left Peking:

Perhaps they intend to spy; this definitely cannot be allowed ... After the tribute envoy arrived he made many entreaties and repeatedly pestered us. It seems that these foreigners after all are ignorant ... perhaps they may conspire to stir up trouble in Macao, and we must be prepared to guard against it.

He added,

We now realize that England is the most powerful country of the Western Ocean states. Moreover, we have heard that they have been used to plundering the merchant ships of other Western Ocean countries on the high seas. Therefore, in the regions near the Western Ocean the foreigners fear their bullying.174

None of this annoyance or unease was allowed to show in the famous imperial edict to George III, which, in the light of the other documents concerning the embassy, seems less self-assured and more defensive in its assertion of traditional ideas. The request to have an English envoy resident at the capital was rejected on the grounds that it did not conform to the Celestial Empire's fundamental system. Many communications to the governors of coastal provinces focused on the rejection of this proposal and the prevention of any nonroutine contact.175 The new governor-general at Canton, who had accompanied Macartney on part of his journey south, made some effort to understand and deal with English grievances at Canton, but to no permanent

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171 Macartney, An embassy to China, pp. 120–9.  
172 Peyrefitte, Un choc de cultures, pp. 296–9.  
effect. The English tried to keep up the contact with the imperial court. At the end of 1795 further presents from George III were received at Canton and eventually transmitted to Peking. But in connection with this transaction it was noted that by a recent edict the officials at various places along the coast were ordered to determine the contents of any letter brought by European embassies, or by other methods, and, before forwarding it to Peking, to refuse to accept it if it contained a request for an extension of privileges or other changes “contrary to the Established Customs and Laws of the Empire.”  

The Ch’ing officials had managed to maintain most of the appearances of the tribute embassy and were more determined than ever to defend the entire institution as the obligatory form of dealing with an envoy from any country that came to the imperial court. Even the fact that an embassy had come, albeit a troublesome one bearing impossible requests, seemed to stimulate a renewed focus on the tribute system in relation to dealings with Europeans. Much attention was devoted to the Macartney embassy, for example, in the writings of Liang T’ing-nan, the nineteenth-century historian of foreign trade institutions at Canton. The impression of relevance was strengthened in 1794 by the return to Peking of the Dutch, who had been the first European tributaries to the Ch’ing.

This last Dutch embassy was sent by the commissioners-general who were in charge of the financially and organizationally moribund Dutch East India Company, but the initiative came from a typically ambitious and restless son of the new age, A.E. van Braam Houckgeest, who had served the Dutch in Canton, then emigrated to America, then rejoined the Dutch Company as head of its Canton establishment. After the embassy he again settled in the United States and dedicated his account of the embassy to George Washington. After the Macartney embassy, the officials at Canton seem to have been worried about the complaints that his embassy had carried to Peking and anxious to find some other group of foreigners that would send a less troublesome embassy. They told Van Braam that the Portuguese and the English were planning to send embassies to congratulate the emperor on the sixtieth anniversary of his reign, and surely the Dutch would not want to be left out of this important occasion. Van Braam promptly reported this to Batavia, urging that an embassy

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177 Liang, Yi yüeh hai-kuan chih and Liang T’ing-nan, Yi yüeh-tao kung-kuo shuo (1846; Taipei, 1968).
be sent. Although it is not clear what they hoped to accomplish given the decrepitude of the Dutch East India Company and its China trade, the Batavia authorities sent the distinguished Isaac Titsingh as ambassador, naming Van Braam his second.

Arriving in Canton in September 1794, Titsingh found that Van Braam's recommendations had been based primarily on his own ambition and gullibility. None of the other Europeans had sent embassies, and there had been only a vague possibility that they would do so. The Canton officials then made sure that the embassy would be beneficial to them and useless to the Dutch by demanding a promise from Titsingh that he would not make any requests or complaints in Peking, and that he was going simply to congratulate the emperor. Titsingh, fearing that otherwise his embassy would not be allowed to go at all, gave the promise.

The great celebration of the emperor's sixtieth jubilee would be around the lunar New Year, which fell on January 21, 1795. The Dutch embassy would be even more advantageous to the reputations of the Canton authorities if it participated in the great occasion. Titsingh told the Canton governor-general he would co-operate if the emperor wished them to be present, thinking that this would be impossible because of the great distance. But the emperor approved the suggestion, and the embassy party was sent off on a hurried, cold, miserable, exhausting journey that reached Peking in only forty-nine days. In Peking they were treated with many signs of imperial favor, including an invitation to a theatrical performance within the palace. Some officials expressed sympathy for the miseries they had endured on their rapid trip north. They saw the emperor on several occasions, including a splendid entertainment at the Summer Palace with brilliant illuminations of the buildings. They performed the kowtow whenever they were told to do so. They were present at the New Year's banquet for tributary envoys in the Pao-ho tien, a formal occasion primarily for Inner Asian and Korean tributaries in which no previous European envoy seems to have participated. The presence of tribute envoys at a New Year banquet was one of the longest continuities in the history of Chinese foreign relations, stretching back to the early years of the Later Han dynasty (25–220 CE). Titsingh and Van Braam made no requests and accomplished nothing for their masters. For their hosts their presence had been profoundly reassuring and deluding.179

After the year 1800 the basic continuity of the Canton trade and the lack of other forms of legal contact were punctuated by moments of conflict. The worry about ambassadors who might not perform the kowtow led to the

rejection of the Russian ambassador Golovkin in 1806 and the fiasco of the Amherst embassy in 1816. In 1808 Ch'ing fears about English aggression along the coast became reality when an English force occupied Macao to prevent a possible French occupation. The court sent vehement edicts ordering the foreigners to leave and the Canton officials to deal firmly with them. The Canton officials suspended English trade, and after three months the occupiers withdrew. This appeared to be another success for the basic Ch'ing policy of taming foreigners by controlling their trade. The court demoted several officials for not having expelled the foreigners immediately, but in fact the Canton authorities had no forces that would have been effective against the English.  

The history of Ch'ing relations in the eighteenth century with maritime Europeans was not a prelude to the Opium War, but tensions over the growth of trade, foreigners’ grievances, and the Ch'ing government’s defensiveness were factors already present in 1800.

SOME CONCLUSIONS

No European ambassador believed that he was presenting tribute on behalf of his monarch to the Son of Heaven, but that is what all the embassies discussed in this chapter were recorded as doing in Ch'ing documents, and we know of no evidence that anyone in the Ch'ing elite conceived of them differently. The Europeans knew they were involved in a system that generally implied paying tribute, but they convinced themselves in several ways that their own status was not tributary. The Dutch did not care about ceremonies and forms as long as they saw that in fact the Ch'ing received embassies from powerful and independent monarchs. The Portuguese conformed with ceremonies but insisted on a change in nomenclature (“embassy presenting congratulations”), which they wrongly believed put them outside the tribute conventions. Macartney, conversely, turned a blind eye to banners proclaiming his “tributary” status but was intransigent on the kowtow. All sustained a Ch'ing illusion; all except possibly the Dutch operated under their own illusion that they were not doing so. All went to Peking with some measure of hope that they were circumventing the obstructions of provincial officials and were about to do business with the real center of decision-making. But the tribute embassy was a ceremonial institution, not a medium for negotiation and binding commitment. The only effective negotiations resulting from a tribute embassy were those carried on by the Peking Jesuits after the departure of the Portuguese embassy of 1678.

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180 Fu, A documentary chronicle of Sino-Western relations, Volume 1, pp. 369–77.
In Ch‘ing bureaucratic compilations, European embassies were fitted into a pattern of regulation so that they seemed parts of a system. Many of the rules were real enough to the ambassadors who confronted them. There were only ten recorded European tribute embassies in the first 156 years of Ch‘ing rule in Peking, and there were two spans of forty years when none were received. Only the four Dutch embassies were to any degree results of prompting by the Ch‘ing side.\(^{181}\) European motives were varied and unsystematic. In the early Ch‘ing the Dutch sought trading privileges, and the Portuguese looked to the survival of Macao. The eighteenth-century Portuguese embassies presented the Portuguese monarchs as protectors of Asian missions, while Macartney brought to Peking the vigor and self-assurance of the new national–commercial–industrial order.

The Dutch had to send embassies to the early Ch‘ing court if they wanted to trade in Chinese ports, and for a few years the old Ming system was applied to them. Their trade was limited to that carried on in connection with tribute embassies or permitted on a case-by-case basis closely tied to the embassy institution. This was less a principled reversion to the Ming system than a by-product of restrictions on maritime trade directed against the Cheng regime in Taiwan. From the 1680s on, European trade in Chinese ports was tacitly disassociated from the rules for tribute embassies. The turn toward more restrictive policies regarding maritime trade after 1750 brought, before Macartney, no European diplomatic efforts that would confront and perhaps challenge Ch‘ing practices. It is possible, indeed likely, that the precedents of the Ming tribute system and its brief revival in the early Ch‘ing helped to make such restrictions seem right to Ch‘ing officials. These same precedents and the fortuitous renewal of embassy activity in the 1790s may have enhanced the tendency of nineteenth-century statesmen and statecraft scholars to draw on earlier Chinese ideas about foreign relations in their efforts to deal with radically new challenges. But these are at best fragments of an explanation of the story of European relations with the Ch‘ing government before 1800.

How, then, can these fragments be fitted back into some more comprehensive view? The handling of traders, the management of embassies, and the changing policies toward missionaries and converts can be seen as a set of defensive policies that were loosely linked but were oriented against different threats: threats of disorder along the coast, challenges to the ceremonial supremacy of the Ch‘ing emperor, threats to the integrity of Confucian culture, and the danger of subversive organization by the agents of a foreign religion. The causal links among these types of defensiveness were contingent and

\(^{181}\) This count omits the first and second papal legations. The forty-year gaps were 1686–1727 and 1753–93.
Ch'ing relations with maritime Europeans changed through time. Ch'ing statesmen were quite capable of distinguishing between desirable and dangerous aspects of foreign relations. Only in the case of Macartney was there even a suggestion of challenge to the ceremonial supremacy of the emperor. This was an important reason for the court's strong negative reaction to this embassy, but it came at the very end of the period discussed here. The increasing worry about Christian corruption of cultural orthodoxy in the 1720s did not lead immediately to restrictive policies toward foreign trade. The strongest links were between perceptions of Catholicism as a source of political subversion and turns toward trade restriction in the 1750s and 1780s. In both periods the increase in the number of foreign ships and sailors in Canton increased security concerns.

This growth of trade must also be studied in relation to the impressive gains of commerce and productivity in the Ch'ing empire in these decades, on which there is a growing literature in Chinese, Japanese, English, and other languages. Foreign trade was a stimulus to economic growth, through the import of silver and the considerable economic benefits of the large exports of tea. The organization of the trade at Canton and its linkages to the areas where tea, silk, and porcelain were produced also offer abundant evidence of the sophistication of Chinese producers and merchants and their ability to increase the scale of their enterprises.

The Canton system became a less adequate framework for trade late in the eighteenth century partly because the volume of trade outgrew it and partly because of changes in political economy that involved both Canton and Calcutta. Credit in the form of advances from the foreign purchaser to the Canton merchant to the upcountry supplier was increasingly necessary. Silver and readily marketable imports were supplied increasingly by the growth of private trade from Bengal, which at the same time was destructive of the stability of the Canton system. Some of this trade was in opium, which circumvented the system entirely, while the private traders' demands for debt collection drew the hong merchants into political difficulties. Both the hong merchants' need for money and their political difficulties were exacerbated by the exactions of Ho-shen and his henchmen from the late 1770s on.

Students of European expansion in maritime Asia have emphasized the dynamism of the country trade and its contribution to the growth of European influence even in the early eighteenth century, when the great East India Companies still seemed to dominate the situation. Another set of "country traders," the Chinese overseas merchants, were an important part of the picture of Chinese maritime trade and of the Ch'ing court's policy decisions about trade with Europeans. After 1740 an increasing number of European private traders reached Canton. There was a pattern of Chinese emigration dispersing into many areas rather than concentrating on a few major ports, and the connections
between overseas Chinese and private European traders in Southeast Asia had many ramifications. These trends were beyond the direct control of European Companies and governments as well as beyond the direct control of the Ch'ing government. The growth of these connections, and later the spread of the opium trade in Southeast Asia and on to the China coast, were given new impetus by the growth of English power in Bengal. This new empire, restless, rapacious, optimistic, intolerant of settled forms and commercial restrictions, and ultimately bringing military power in its wake, set maritime Europe on a collision course with the Ch'ing empire.
When the rebel forces of Li Tzu-ch‘eng passed through the gates of Peking in April 1644, the only European in the capital was the Jesuit priest Johann Adam Schall von Bell (1592–1666). A few years earlier the Ch‘ung-chen emperor (r. 1628–44) ordered Schall to make cannons for the defense of the city. According to Schall, on hearing the news of the advance of Li’s forces the emperor tried to flee the city, but eunuchs thwarted his efforts and fired upon the emperor with the same cannon he had ordered Schall to cast. Schall had served the Ch‘ung-chen emperor for nearly two decades and declared that as a ruler he was “almost the greatest in the world and second to none in the goodness of his character,” but “with no companion and abandoned by all, through his imprudence [he] perished by an unworthy death at the age of thirty-six.” The Ming empire that had lasted 276 years was now extinct.

Although the emperor, to my sorrow, did not follow me when I showed him the way of salvation, yet he merits a deep lament because he not only sustained Christianity, which had been maintained in China and in the court by his grandfather [the Wan-li emperor, r. 1572–1620], but he also praised and fostered it, to the maximum advantage of his subjects. He would have done even more had he not died such a violent and untimely death.¹

With such a noteworthy expression of sympathy for the last Ming monarch, Schall alluded to the uncertain fate of Christianity under the new regime.

During several days of terror in Peking, Schall personally stood guard over the Christian community. In late May, as the forces of general Wu San-kuei,

now allied with the Ch'ing government, compelled Li Tzu-ch'eng to abandon the city, Schall again witnessed the burning of houses and palaces. When Ch'ing forces under Dorgon (1612–50) entered the city, the new conquerors ordered all Han Chinese to leave the newly designated Manchu or Tartar area of Peking. Within two days Schall successfully petitioned the new regime to allow the Jesuit residence to remain where it was. It was his first major step in cultivating a relationship with the Manchu leadership. In September the Manchu regent, Dorgon, appointed Schall director of the Bureau of Astronomy (Ch' in t'ien-chien). This act implied continued forbearance of Christianity and Christian communities in the territory coming under Ch'ing control.

In the early years of the Ch'ing consolidation, there were up to 100,000 Christians throughout the empire. The Jesuits in Peking developed more contacts with the Ch'ing court, but some of their confreres in the provinces maintained connections with Southern Ming loyalist courts or with the rebel Chang Hsien-chung (1605–47) in Szechwan. The commitment of such Christians as Ch' u Shih-ssu (1590–1651) and P'ang T'en-shou (1588–1657) to the Ming prince of Kuei (1623–62), who was proclaimed to be the Ming Yung-li emperor late in 1646, enabled the Jesuits Michael Boym (1612–59) and Andreas Koffler (1612–52) to baptize a significant number of the remnant imperial Ming family. As the Ch'ing forces took control of the Canton region in November 1650, the Ming Grand Dowager Empress (d. 1651), who had been baptized with the name Helena, wrote to Pope Innocent X (r. 1644–55) and to the Jesuit Father General, Francesco Piccolomini (1582–1651), to send more missionaries to China. Boym, accompanied by a Chinese convert known as Andreas or Cheng An-te-lo, personally delivered these messages in Rome, then returned in 1658 to Kwangsi via Tonkin in northern Annan (modern Vietnam), only to discover that the Southern Ming cause was hopeless. Unable to re-enter Tonkin and seriously ill, Boym died the following year and was buried near the border.

During these same years, Schall's stature in the capital continued to rise. In 1650 the Shun-chih emperor (r. 1644–61) granted him a large plot of land to build a church. The South Church (Nan t'ang), as it was later called, was erected in the form of a Latin cross, with a beautiful high altar and four side

chapels. The inscriptions on the interior walls explained the Decalogue, the Eight Beatitudes, and the articles of the Catholic faith. Besides presenting an inscription of four characters in gold for the interior of the church, the emperor also ordered the carving of a stele granting imperial authorization for the construction of the church. The stone stele is presently imbedded in the interior side of the east wall of the compound that surrounds the South Church.\(^4\) In his essay *Tseng T'ien-chu hsin-t'ang chi* (“In honor of the new Catholic Church”), Liu Chao-kuo (*chin-shih* 1643), who served in the *Hung-wen yiuan* (Office for the Advancement of Literature), related his conversation with Schall about his plans to build the church, and also about Schall’s replies to his questions concerning the calculation of positions of the stars and the planets. Liu pointed out that Schall told him that the bishop wanted the church to be large enough to accommodate the Christian community in Peking.\(^5\)

After Dorgon’s death in December, 1650, the young Shun-chih emperor abolished the regency and assumed control over the government. His personal relationship with Schall “was indeed more that of grandfather and grandson than that of emperor and subject.”\(^6\) Two years after ascending the throne, the emperor wrote a special decree conferring on Schall the title *t'ung-hsian chiao-shih* (“religious teacher who comprehends the mysterious”). Underlining the significance of publishing a calendar for the advancement of a dynasty, the decree pointed out that Hsü Kuang-ch'i (1562–1633) had first recommended Schall to be a reformer of the calendar. The emperor stated that when Schall’s name had been recently presented to him, he already knew that Schall conducted himself perfectly in the Bureau of Astronomy and faithfully fulfilled his duties. The bestowal of the title was, in the eyes of the emperor, truly deserved. Because of this special relationship between them, Schall explained at length the tenets of Christianity in the hope of converting the emperor, but by 1658 the latter had turned to Ch'an Buddhism. Nonetheless, six months before the emperor’s death from what may have been smallpox, he supposedly sent Schall an apologetic note, declaring, “Your law [Christianity] is already

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\(^5\) Liu Chao-kuo’s essay is in Archivum Historicum Societatis Iesu, *Japonica et Sinica*, iii, 24 (intorno V), pp. 3a–6b. In 1650 no bishop resided in Peking. Presumably the reference is to the bishop in Macao.

widely spread. Through your exertions the science of astronomy has become known.”

The K’ang-hsi emperor (1654–1722) succeeded to the throne in 1661 with a regency dominated by Oboi (d. 1669) in place. Christian communities existed in all the provinces except Yunnan and Kweichow, although the turmoil at the fall of the Ming had taken its toll. A number of church buildings, such as those at T’ai-yüan (Shansi), Wu-ch’ang (Hu-kuang), Nan-ch’ang and Kanchou in Kiangsi, and Foochow (Fukien), had been destroyed by fire. When the Ch’ing government ordered those living on the coasts of Shantung, Kiangsu, Chekiang, Fukien, and Kwangtung to move thirty or more li (ten or so miles) inland as a countermeasure to the raids of Cheng Ch’eng-kung (1624–62) (known in the West as Koxinga), churches and residences in Fukien were razed as part of a scorched-earth policy. Such property losses, however, were offset by the continuing growth in the number of converts. According to an official report, there were 114,000 Christians in 1663, resulting from the efforts of no more than two dozen missionaries, mostly Jesuits along with some Dominicans and Franciscans. Despite the confusion in a country still caught up in civil disturbances, the prospects for the spread of Catholicism appeared hopeful.

Three leading scholars, Ku Yen-wu (1613–82), Huang Tsung-hsi (1610–95), and Wang Fu-chih (1619–92), after the transition to the Ch’ing era, declined to have any direct relations with the new imperial court or with any foreigners. Blaming the Ming collapse on the intellectual failings of its leaders, they strove to return to practical learning they felt could be discovered in the histories and classics. Toward the end of the seventeenth century and the beginning of the next, these concerns generated a type of empirical research emphasizing textual criticism, bibliography, and epigraphy. Other literati in early Ch’ing made concerted efforts to assimilate the mathematics and astronomy brought by Jesuit missionaries. There were also literati developing new ideas on the reconciliation of Confucian and Christian principles, perhaps most strikingly found in the work of Chang Hsing-yao (1633–c. 1715) of Hangchow. Among literati in Chiang-nan and other provinces the residual

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7 Dunne, *Generation of giants*, p. 353.
10 David E. Mungello, *The forgotten Christians of Hangzhou* (Honolulu, 1994), pp. 12–39. For the direct contacts of Schall with Huang Tsung-hsi, see Xu Haisong, “Hsi-hsüeh tung chien yü Ch’ing-tai Che
effects of the interest in Western learning and Christianity that had developed in the late Ming period lingered. As the Ch'ing government widened its control over more provinces, Schall’s position at the court had some positive influences on the attitudes of provincial officials towards missionaries and converts. However, Schall’s role at court was subject to scrutiny and the possibility of dramatic change.

**SCHALL ENCOUNTERS YANG KUANG-HSIEN**

The involvement of the Jesuits with the court in Peking was vital to the Catholic mission in the Ch'ing empire. Because of their service in astronomical calculations and calendrical matters, there was an implicit confidence that the new regime would allow their confreres and other missionaries to preach. By the same token, if the accuracy of their astronomical work was challenged, the place of Christianity would be endangered. In 1660 Yang Kuang-hsien (1597–1669) led an attack against Schall and his system of calendar-making. The imperial officials during the last days of the Shun-chih reign and the first years of the K'ang-hsi reign paid no heed to Yang’s criticisms. But in a memorial of September 15, 1664, Yang charged Schall with several errors in astronomical calculations and declared that Christianity filled people with false ideas. Quoting from the *T'ien-hsueh ch’uan-kai* (A survey on the propagation of the learning from Heaven) by the Christian convert Li Tsu-po (d. 1665), a court astronomer working under the guidance of Schall, Yang decried Li’s suggestion that the Chinese were descendants of the Hebrews. In contrast to Li’s view that 3,701 years after the first man, the Lord of Heaven gave the Ten Commandments to Moses on Mount Sinai, Yang exaggerated Chinese chronology by claiming that “From the chia-tzu of the establishment of the world ... till now there have been 19,379,496 years in all. If Jesus is the Lord of Heaven, all the periods before the emperor Ai [r. 6–1 BCE] of the Han dynasty lacked Heaven.” Of course “Heaven” was a pervasive term...
in the early classics. Along with his memorial Yang forwarded his essay blaming Schall for choosing an inauspicious day for the burial of an infant prince. This charge caught the attention of Manchu officials, who started an investigation. In his tract, *Pu te-i (I could not do otherwise)*, Yang further developed his views on the absurdity of Christianity. He demonstrated a limited understanding of basic Christian teachings, such as the incarnation and redemption. From Yang’s perspective Matteo Ricci’s (1552–1610) use of the classics to uphold Christianity was an affront against Confucian principles. Despite the arguments of missionaries and distinguished Chinese Christian literati who supported Ricci, Yang and some other literati perceived a wide chasm between the organic cosmology of Ch’eng–Chu Confucianism and the fundamentals of the Christian worldview.\(^\text{12}\)

Although Li Tsu-po’s work had contained a preface by a censor, and the Jesuit Ludovico Buglio (1606–82) tried to answer Yang’s charges in his *Pu te-i pien (I could not do otherwise – refuted)*, these were insufficient to prevent the regent, Oboi, from siding with Yang. In November 1664, Schall, seventy-two years old and already stricken with some paralysis, was imprisoned, along with his confreres, Ferdinand Verbiest (1623–88), Gabriel de Magalhães (1610–77), and Buglio. By April 30, 1665, the emperor received the decision of the Ministry of Rites, which condemned Schall and seven others in the Bureau of Astronomy to death by slicing or dismemberment of the living body. The emperor spared their lives and told the Ministry to deliberate again on the penalties to be meted out to them. The revised decision was to flog, imprison, and banish them. But on May 17 the emperor rescinded the Ministry’s order and set free Schall and the others. This act of clemency was taken against the backdrop of an earthquake that struck Peking and then a fire that broke out in one of the palaces. In the eyes of several court officials these events were portents of Heaven’s displeasure. However, five of Schall’s Christian converts, including Li Tsu-po, who had worked with him at the Bureau, were executed. With the exception of three Dominicans in Fukien who remained hidden for some time, all the other missionaries – twenty-five Jesuits, four Dominicans, and one Franciscan – were brought to Peking and then ordered to be banished to detention in Canton. Not one church in the empire remained open.\(^\text{13}\)

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\(^\text{13}\) In his writings to religious superiors, Magalhães objected to Schall’s taking official posts in the court, but later changed his opinion. See Irene Pih, *Le père Gabriel de Magalhães, un jésuite portugais en Chine*.
Before Schall died in 1666, his opponent, Yang Kuang-hsien, was appointed to head the Bureau of Astronomy, despite his own protests that he had almost no knowledge of astronomy. His ineptitude was uncovered in part through the efforts of the K'ang-hsi emperor, who started to take personal charge of the government in August 1667, but was still struggling against the dominance of his regent, Oboi. In December 1668 the emperor summoned the Jesuits still in Peking and ordered an investigation of the defects in Yang’s proposed calendar for 1669. Yang’s incompetence was exposed.14 Several months later an imperial commission reported that the Western system was accurate, and the emperor declared that in the future the calendars were to follow these new methods. Verbiest was appointed to replace Yang, who, dismissed from office and condemned to death, received an imperial commutation and was allowed to return home because of his age. An imperial edict on September 5, 1669, posthumously restored Schall’s titles and ranks, and allowed the Jesuits then in Peking to practice their religion.

From 1668 to 1670 the young emperor conducted extensive conversations concerning astronomy, mathematics, and European culture with Jesuits at the capital, Verbiest in particular. These aroused hope among the missionaries in Canton and outside China that the status of Christianity could change for the better. The Jesuits spoke to the emperor about the critical situation in Macao that had begun in 1662 when the regents, including Oboi, prohibited all maritime trade and ordered all Chinese to evacuate the city of Macao. These talks contributed to the court’s positive attitude toward the embassy of Manoel de Saldanha, which arrived in Macao in 1667. Saldanha reached Peking in June 1670. En route from Canton Saldanha’s Jesuit chaplain visited a number of Catholic communities that had been without the services of a priest for five years because of the exile of all missionaries to Canton. The emperor granted many favors to the ambassador and his retinue as a sign of his more positive attitude towards the Jesuits and the transition to his personal rule.15 In March 1671 the Jesuits learned that the missionaries in Canton would be allowed to

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15 Wills, Embassies and illusions, pp. 82–126, 193–236.
return to their stations in the interior. Not until September of that year were they able to do so.

THE CANTON CONFERENCE

The exile of the missionaries to Canton had at least one positive result. Their enforced gathering there gave them an opportunity to discuss missiological issues. In conference from mid-December 1667 to late January 1668 with their Dominican and Franciscan counterparts, the Jesuits deliberated over the Ricci strategy of inculturation, especially concerning the Chinese rites issue. Despite discussions that at times were quite polemical, the participants finalized a series of resolutions that sought to guide future mission policies.

With his extensive knowledge of Chinese literature, Matteo Ricci, the founder of the Catholic missions in China in the modern era, sought a common ground for Christianity and Chinese civilization. Seven years before his death, he issued a directive that accepted the literati’s periodic ritual veneration of Confucius as academic, not religious, and that declared that the common veneration of ancestors was not superstitious. Some months later he qualified this last point by noting that such veneration was perhaps not superstitious, in that some external signs associated with the ceremonies might be so construed. Moreover, Ricci affirmed that, besides T’ien-chu (Lord of Heaven), the two expressions T’ien (Heaven) and Shang-ti (Lord on High), could be used to designate the Christian concept of God in Chinese. Such views and practices, which were to form the core of the Chinese Rites Controversy, later alarmed the Dominican Juan Bautista de Morales (1597–69) and the Franciscan Antonio de Santa Maria Caballero (1602–69) upon their arrival in the Ming empire in 1633. The Dominicans and Franciscans, as well as the Jesuits, sought to achieve unanimity on these difficult questions. Discussions with the principal Chinese converts and exchanges of letters led to some understanding of the differences involved. The Jesuits and their converts accepted the principles of Ricci. But the nature of the discussion changed significantly when it was moved

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from China, where all concerned were aware of the difficulties in interpreting Chinese practices and the nuances of the Chinese language, to Rome, where such awareness barely existed and could not be expected. Reluctant to support the views of Ricci, the Dominicans brought the matter to the attention of the Congregatio de Propaganda Fide (commonly called Propaganda). Its 1645 condemnation of the Confucian and ancestral ceremonies of veneration was endorsed by Pope Innocent X. To offset this viewpoint, the Jesuits sent Martino Martini (1614–61) to Rome to present their case. By a decree of March 1656, the Holy Office condoned the ceremonies. Because of the discrepancies between the two Roman documents and the ensuing confusion on the mission, the Holy Office in 1669 ruled that both decrees were binding according to the questions and circumstances that caused them to be issued (juxta exposita).

Just one year before the decision was reached in Rome, the exiled missionaries in Canton argued for more than forty days, both orally and in writing, about pastoral practices such as administering the sacraments; the role of the catechists; the propriety of the priest at Mass having his head covered; the practice of some converts inscribing the names of Jesus, Mary, or the saints on the doorposts of their houses; and so on. The penultimate of the resulting forty-two articles declared, “As to the ceremonies by which the Chinese honor their master Confucius and the dead,” the 1656 position of the Holy Office was to be followed absolutely. The reason was that the contents of the latter decree were based on “a very probable opinion, to which it is impossible to offset any evidence to the contrary.”

This attempt to reach an accord among the religious orders was short-lived. Later that year Caballero wrote a learned essay against the policy statement in reply to a letter from Luis da Gama (1610–72), the Jesuit Visitor for the Vice-Province of China and the Province of Japan. The Dominican Domingo Navarrete (1618–86) signed the conference minutes, but then he slipped out of Canton in December 1669. Back in Rome he was not successful in obtaining a formal reconsideration of the earlier decisions, yet his writings there and elsewhere in Europe raised doubts in the minds of some Catholic intellectuals about the Ricci policies of inculturation.

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After the missionaries left Canton and returned to the provinces to reopen their churches, they encountered a better reception among the Chinese. In 1675 the K'ang-hsi emperor visited the South Church in Peking and presented his personally written inscription, Ching T'ien (Honor Heaven), to the Jesuits. With imperial permission this was recopied for installation in all the Jesuit churches in China to manifest to everyone, but especially to provincial and lesser officials, the attitude of the reigning emperor towards Christianity and the Catholic mission. The Jesuits understood T'ien as a possible alternate name for T'ien-chu (Lord in Heaven, or God), but some of the other missionaries held that it was a materialist or idolatrous meaning so that the inscription should not be allowed in a Christian church. Over the next few decades this dispute became a major element in the Rites Controversy. Yet most of the missionaries understood that the imperial inscription itself was a means of protecting the churches from destruction, since removing such an imperial epigraph could incur serious political repercussions.

Serving as director of the Bureau of Astronomy and on good terms with the emperor, Verbiest continued Schall's practice of staying informed about the new governors and other high officials who were posted to the provinces. He also called on those who visited Peking and recommended to them the Christians and the missionaries in the regions they controlled. Honored by this attention from an influential person at court, these officials gained a better understanding of the foreign religion and not infrequently assisted the missionaries on the local scene.

The closer the relationship of Verbiest with the emperor, the more responsibility was placed on the priest-astronomer's shoulders. Since the Western methods of astronomical observation proved more accurate than those of the Chinese, Verbiest was asked to make a number of instruments for the imperial observatory. In 1678 he published the K'ang-hsi yang-nien li-fa (Perpetual calendrical methods of the K'ang-hsi era), a work that included calculations of positions of the five planets, as well as solar and lunar eclipses for two thousand years, and other pertinent calendrical data. Besides such research, Verbiest received imperial orders, similar to those given to Schall, that he was to manufacture cannons that were needed to protect the empire against the rebellion of the Three Feudatories. Despite his protest against such a directive, Verbiest developed the foundries for the cannons and the methods of calculations for

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testing them. Moreover, he contributed to Chinese knowledge of the world with his  
"K'un-yü ch'üan-t'u (Complete map of the terrestrial globe), with the zero 
meridian drawn through Peking. Cartographic data presented descriptions 
of animals unknown to the Chinese and located them as close as possible to 
the countries they inhabited. Additional details included the distances of the 
various kingdoms from China and the form of government in each of them.23 
In addition, Verbiest composed in Latin a grammar of the Manchu language 
and a translation into Manchu of the first six books of Euclid, which Ricci 
earlier had translated into Chinese. Above all, he was the author of several 
important treatises on Christian doctrine in Chinese.24 It is noteworthy that 
his writings on astronomy,25 and especially his map, attracted the attention 
of Japanese in the late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries, despite the 
Tokugawa government’s general ban on the importation of books associated 
with Christianity.26

22 See Giovanni Stary, "The ‘Manchu cannons’ cast by Ferdinand Verbiest and the hitherto unknown 
title of his instructions," in Ferdinand Verbiest, S.J. (1623–1688): Jesuit missionary, scientist, engineer and 
diplomat, ed. John W. Witek (Nettetal, 1994), pp. 215–25; and Shu Liguang, "Ferdinand Verbiest and 
the casting of cannons in the Qing dynasty," in ibid., pp. 227–44.
23 See Lin Tong-yang, "Aperçu sur le mappemonde de Ferdinand Verbiest, le K’un-yü-ch’üan-t’u," in Succès 
et échecs de la rencontre Chine et Occident du xvie au xxe siècle, ed. Edward J. Malatesta and Yves Raguin (San 
Francisco, 1993), pp. 145–73; and Christine Vertente, "Nan Huai-jen’s maps of the world," in ibid., 
pp. 257–63.
24 John W. Witek, "Presenting Christian doctrine to the Chinese: Reflections on the Jiaoyao xulun of 
Ferdinand Verbiest," in Ferdinand Verbiest, S.J. (1623–1688): Jesuit missionary, scientist, engineer and 
diplomat, ed. John W. Witek (Nettetal, 1994), p. 451. For further studies about some of Verbiest’s 
philosophical and religious ideas in this same collection, see Nicolas Standaert, "The investigation of 
things and fathoming of principles (gewu qiongli) in the seventeenth-century contact between Jesuits 
and Chinese scholars," in Ferdinand Verbiest, S.J. (1623–1688): Jesuit missionary, scientist, engineer and 
 writings of Father Ferdinand Verbiest," in ibid., pp. 421–36. See also John W. Witek, "Explaining the 
sacrament of penance in seventeenth-century China: An essay of Ferdinand Verbiest (1623–1688)," in 
The Christian mission in China in the Verbiest era: Some aspects of the missionary approach, ed. Noël Golvers 
(Leuven, 1999), pp. 55–71. On the extensive project of translating European philosophical texts into 
Chinese, see Adrian Dudink and Nicolas Standaert, “Ferdinand Verbiest’s Qiongli Xue (1683),” in The 
Christian mission in China in the Verbiest era: Some aspects of the missionary approach, ed. Noël Golvers 
(Leuven, 1999), pp. 11–31; and Noël Golvers, "Verbiest’s introduction of Aristoteles latinus (Coimbra) 
25 Lists of Verbiest’s Chinese and Manchu works are in Louis Pfister, Notices biographiques et bibliographiques 
comp., Ming Ch’ing chien Yeh-su hui-shih i-chu t’i-yao (Taipei, 1958), pp. 390–2. For those in the Vatican 
Library, see Yu Dong, Catalogo delle opere cinesi missionarie della Biblioteca apostolica vaticana (xxi–xxvii sec.) 
26 Minako Debergh, "Les cartes astronomiques des missionnaires Jésuites en Chine: De Johann Adam Schall 
von Bell à Ignace Kügler et leur influence en Corée et au Japon," in Western learning and Christianity in 
China: The contribution and impact of Johann Adam Schall von Bell, S.J. (1592–1666), ed. Roman Malek 
For the amusement of the emperor Verbiest made various mechanical toys. Of all of them perhaps the most significant was “the first, documented, automotive machine,” which he built, successfully ran, and later described in his *Astronomia Europaea*.27 His confrere, Claudio Filippo Grimaldi (1638–1712), constructed hydraulic machines, including a clock. To fulfill the emperor’s desire to learn Western music, Tomas Pereira (1645–1708) regularly conducted lessons and made an organ and other musical instruments for the palace.

Verbiest realized that if the mission was to be successful, more men were needed. Hitherto all missionaries entered China via Macao and were subject to the system of the *padroado*; that is, the papal grant to the Portuguese crown of all the rights and duties of the missions in Asia, except the Philippines. This included financial support from the king of Portugal, but the increased number of Jesuits could no longer be maintained by a royal stipend. The entry of Dominicans and Franciscans by way of the Philippines created tensions not only between religious orders but also among their sponsors, Spain and Portugal. Since its founding in 1622, Propaganda continued to seek control of all the missions. The Portuguese *padroado*, with its claim over China through the Bishop of Macao, and the choice of Jesuits alone to labor in *padroado* territory, were obstacles to Propaganda’s goal. It was not clear in the first decades of Propaganda’s existence that its challenge of jurisdictional matters would lead to opposition against the Ricci policy of inculturation. Yet even in 1659 Propaganda had declared that missionaries were not to seek for any reason to persuade peoples to change their customs, as long as they are not openly contrary to religion and morality. Indeed, what could be more absurd than to transplant France, Spain, Italy, or some other part of Europe to China? It is not that which you are to import, but the Faith, which neither repulses nor scorns the usages and customs of any people, as long as they are not perverse, but which desires that they be guarded with all the respect which is their due.28

If this statement, originally addressed to the vicars apostolic sent to China, Tonkin, and Cochin China (the southern and central parts of modern Vietnam),

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had been heeded, the controversy over the Chinese rites might have taken a different turn.

Aware of the financial and personnel needs of the mission, Verbiest wrote an open letter to his confreres in Europe. This appeal of August 1678 asked for Jesuits well versed in philosophy and theology and ready to adapt to Chinese customs. On that same day he also wrote to the Visitor, Sebastian d’Almeida (1622–82), in reply to a request for Verbiest’s views about a native Chinese clergy. This issue had been discussed by several missionaries of different religious orders in China, but no uniform policy had been determined. Verbiest indicated that in China Western missionaries’ foundation for preaching the Christian religion was less firm than in other countries where a missionary apostolate was also being carried out. He claimed that from the remote past until the present, the Chinese had an aversion toward other nations. Their laws did not readily accommodate foreigners in their borders. The Manchus were incorporating this Chinese attitude, but of course not applying it to themselves. Those missionaries who returned from exile in Canton were barely tolerated and would not be readily replaced. Verbiest emphasized that the Christian mission was tied to the success of European astronomy and dependent on the will of the emperor, but this basis remained uncertain.

Many Chinese had become adept in Western methods of calendar-making and were independent of the Jesuits. Whether Verbiest’s successor at the Bureau of Astronomy would be European was even more uncertain. Verbiest hoped that in the future there would be two or three Western astronomy experts to work at court in order to aid missionary personnel in the provinces. He warned that if there were no missionaries at court or if they were expelled from court, it would be impossible for any missionary to remain in the provinces for any extended time. These were some of the premises Verbiest used to build his argument for the development of a native Chinese clergy to be trained in China, not elsewhere. Verbiest did not live to see his plan for a native clergy become fully operational. But within a year of his death, a major step was achieved when three Jesuits, Wu Li (1632–1718), Liu Wen-te (1628–1707), and Wan Ch’i-yüan (1631–1700), were ordained in Nanking in August 1688 by the Dominican bishop, Lo Wen-tsao (1615–91). Before his death Verbiest had looked to France for new missionaries, which would add to the existing religious jurisdictional issues for the mission in China.

FRENCH JESUITS AT THE CH'ING COURT

In the late seventeenth century, France sought to expand its influence in Asia, but had no established global commercial networks comparable to those of Portugal, Holland, and England. The first successful French ship to voyage to China arrived in 1699. Science became part of the search for approaches to Asia, as astronomers in France began to discuss the need for comparative astronomical data from the Near East and Far East. When Philippe Couplet (1623–93), who had known Verbiest since their days as Jesuit novices in Belgium, visited King Louis XIV of France (r. 1643–1715) in 1684, French learned circles had concrete plans for such astronomical investigations. The French king decided to send several Jesuits to China on the ships that would take his envoy to Siam (Thailand). After their arrival in Siam, they were to sail to China by any means available. Lisbon refused Versailles’s request for passports to China for these royally sponsored Jesuit mathematicians, but did not object to their entering Macao. In Rome the Jesuit General accepted the French plan on condition that the Jesuits obey the directives of Propaganda when they acted as missionaries in places controlled by the vicars apostolic. When the Jesuit General notified Propaganda about the imminent departure of the Jesuit mathematicians, the cardinals wrote to Paris to stop the trip, but it was too late.

In early 1685 the Jesuits Joachim Bouvet (1656–1730), Jean de Fontaney (1643–1710), Jean-François Gerbillon (1654–1707), Louis Le Comte (1655–1728), and Claude de Visdelou (1656–1737) left France and finally arrived in Peking on February 7, 1688, ten days after Verbiest’s death. The royal mathematicians of Louis XIV were to make astronomical observations and study Chinese literature. Some of them were expected to return to Paris, where they would translate Chinese books for the royal library. From the five Jesuits the K’ang-hsi emperor chose Bouvet and Gerbillon for service at court. The others were allowed to live anywhere in the empire. Bouvet was soon occupied in translating Western books on geometry, philosophy, and medicine. Gerbillon accompanied Pereira north to Nerchinsk in the eastward-expanding territory of the Russian Empire. Both participated there in 1689 as interpreters and negotiators of the first treaty the Ch’ing government signed with a European

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In 1676 Verbiest had assisted Ch’ing officials in their discussion with Russian representatives in Peking, and he was later instrumental in having Pereira named a member of the Ch’ing delegation. Verbiest’s aim was to develop an overland route from Europe to China through Siberia that would replace the sea route, which the Dutch increasingly controlled to the detriment of the travel of missionaries and the shipping of the Catholic nations. Despite the successful conclusion of negotiations at Nerchinsk, the missionaries never gained access to this route, although Russia maintained its commercial relations and diplomatic contacts with the Ch’ing government.

From 1687 to 1692 attacks on Christianity by several officials in Chekiang, especially in Hangchow, eroded the previously tranquil status of the Catholic mission. In March 1687 the Peking Jesuits received a copy of a book written by a military official in Chekiang claiming in several sections that Christianity was one of the false and seditious sects against which an imperial decree, issued just the year before, had warned. The missionaries appealed to the emperor to have the sections excised and asked him to grant full toleration for Christianity. The emperor agreed to order the removal of the sections, but mentioned nothing about tolerating Christianity. Later that year, on a southern tour of the provinces, the K’ang-hsi emperor visited Hangchow and summoned Prospero Intorcetta (1625–96) to an audience. Seeing his advanced age, the emperor told Intorcetta that he need not follow the entourage, but could remain in his residence. Not long after this imperial favor, Chang P’eng-ko (1649–1725), the governor of Chekiang and a friend of Yang Kuang-hsien, decided to enforce the 1669 decree banishing Christianity. He ordered the local officials to change the church into a temple, to burn the wooden blocks for printing books stored in Intorcetta’s residence, and to denounce Christianity as heterodoxy against the state. It was several months before the emperor learned about Intorcetta’s plea for help from his confreres in Peking. After receiving the deliberations from the relevant parts of the imperial bureaucracy, the emperor declared that since the Westerners admired civilization, helped in calendar-making and in the negotiations with the Russians, and had committed no crimes nor caused trouble by their religion, it was unjust that their religion be prohibited. The Edict of Toleration of March 22, 1692, promulgated in all the provinces, was a watershed for the missionary effort. Before this, the missionaries could preach their faith; now the Chinese were at liberty to accept

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In 1670 the emperor had issued his well-known “Sacred Edict” (Sheng yü), sixteen maxims that remained the basis of many clan rules during the Ch’ing dynasty. The seventh of these injunctions urged the abjuration of heretical religions. By the 1692 Edict of Toleration the emperor made clear to the empire that Christianity was no longer to be placed in that category.

MAIGROT’S DIRECTIVE

Through a complex series of efforts between 1680 and 1700, Propaganda began to establish an ecclesiastical hierarchy for China that was independent of the Portuguese padroado. Catholic missionaries who were not Portuguese or Jesuits were appointed as either bishops or vicars apostolic. One of them, Charles Maigrot (1652–1730), of the Missions étrangères de Paris, as vicar apostolic of Fukien reopened the Rites Controversy just one year after the Edict of Toleration. On March 23, 1693, he published a directive condemning the use of the terms T’ien and Shang-ti to designate God and prohibiting Christians in the vicariate from participating in rites honoring Confucius and their own ancestors. He also condemned as false and scandalous the propositions that Chinese philosophy, correctly understood, contained nothing contrary to Christian law, and that by the use of the term t’ai-chi (supreme ultimate) the ancient sages sought to define God as the first cause of all things. Maigrot was carrying out the papal assignment to inquire about the rites issue, which was becoming an important topic of discussion in France. He was concerned that accommodation to indigenous customs would not be appropriate for the increasing number of converts because Catholicism might thereby lose its identity. His directive, although limited to Fukien alone, served to reopen the Chinese Rites Controversy both in Europe and in China. The Christians in Fukien were perplexed by his moves, and at times openly voiced their opposition.

Before the full impact of this controversy was felt, the Catholic mission continued to grow in China. The 1696 accord between the padroado and the Holy See created a better geographic distribution of missionary territories. Portugal received the privilege of designating titular bishops to the three

dioceses of Macao, Nanking, and Peking. Beyond these, Pope Innocent XII (r. 1691–1700) reserved the right of creating vicariates apostolic. In 1701, there were 117 missionaries in twelve provinces of the Ch'ing empire: fifty-nine Jesuits in charge of seventy residences and 208 churches; twenty-nine Franciscans in charge of twenty-one residences and nineteen churches; eighteen Dominicans in charge of eight residences and six churches; six Augustinians in charge of six residences and four churches; and fifteen diocesan clergy, mostly members of the Missions étrangères de Paris, in charge of nine residences and seven churches.36 In some instances several religious orders were in the same city, e.g. Canton, Foochow, Tsinan, and Ningpo, but more frequently they were located in different places. This remarkable growth occurred in the thirty years after 1671, when the emperor allowed the small band of two dozen missionaries to return to their provincial posts. The K'ang-hsi emperor had raised the status of Christianity still further in 1693 by permitting the French Jesuits to build a residence in Peking. Completed in 1703, the North Church (Pei t'ang) that was erected near the residence added significantly to the presence of Christianity in the capital.

Some of the principal Christians in the early Ch'ing era were members of families who had become converts during the Ming period. By her outstanding leadership, Candida Hsü (1607–80), grand-daughter of Hsü Kuang-ch'i, the famous scholar-official and collaborator with Matteo Ricci, arranged for the opening of 135 churches and chapels in and around Shanghai.37 Widowed at an early age, she became such an important benefactress to the Jesuit missions that upon her death the Jesuit Father General ordered three Masses to be offered by all Jesuits for the repose of her soul. Her son, Basil Hsü Tsuan-tseng, (1627–96?) received a chin-shih degree in 1649 and became a provincial judge in Yunnan. He was later a censor at court and was implicated in the Yang Kuang-hsien calendar controversy. Restored to his former status after Yang was ousted from office, Hsü Tsuan-tseng became known for his poetry and for his essay Yü-ying t'ang ch'iian shan wen (Descriptions and advice on philanthropy for


It is one of the few sources from that era indicating that in Yunnan from 1675 to 1696 there were 5,480 unwanted children found on the roads and brought to a foundling institution.

In the latter half of the seventeenth century, missionaries published several works that expanded European awareness of Chinese civilization. Many of these authors had temporarily returned from China as procurators for the missions, and, after staying a year or more in Europe, departed to return to Canton or Macao. Having witnessed the rise of the Ch'ing dynasty, Martino Martini wrote a short description of it in his *De bello Tartarico in Sinis historia* (Antwerp, 1654). Many editions and translations of this work appeared thereafter. He also completed the *Novus atlas Sinensis* (Amsterdam, 1655), with its general map of China and maps of each Ch'ing province. Lists of ancient and modern names of towns and cities, population statistics, and descriptions of flora and fauna were included. His *Sinicae historiae decas prima* (Munich, 1658) was for a long time the only history of China before the Christian era based on Chinese sources. Additional chronological data became available in Europe in *Nouvelle relation de la Chine* (Paris, 1688). Its author, Gabriel de Magalhães, had not returned from China but continued to work with Schall and Verbiest. His study filled in some gaps in Europe's knowledge of the Middle Kingdom by describing Chinese literature, social customs, public buildings, commerce, manufacturing, and navigation. Just one year before that study appeared, Philippe Couplet, who had an audience with Louis XIV, dedicated his *Confucius Sinarum Philosophus* (Paris, 1687) to the French king. In discussing traditional Chinese thought, including the Four Books, Buddhism, and Taoism, he commented on Ricci's method of solving the difficulties that the missionaries had encountered in China. In 1693 the K'ang-hsi emperor sent Bouvet as his envoy to the court of Versailles in order to thank the French monarch for his assistance in starting the French Jesuit mission. Not long after his arrival in France in March 1697, Bouvet completed his *Portrait historique de l'empereur de la Chine* (Paris, 1697) and *L'estat présent de la Chine en figures* (Paris, 1697). The first study sought to flatter Louis XIV and gain his support for the China mission by comparing the splendor of his court and his virtuous rule to

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that of the K'ang-hsi emperor. The latter book contained a series of engraved figures depicting life in China. The similarity of the two monarchs made an impression on Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz (1646–1716), who translated the Portrait in his Novissima Sinica (Hanover, 1697, 2nd ed. 1699). Through correspondence with Bouvet he learned about the binary arithmetical system of the Book of change.\footnote{41}

On a different scale, Louis Le Comte, who returned to France several years before Bouvet, published his Nouveaux mémoires sur l’état présent de la Chine (Paris, 1696–8).\footnote{42} Essentially a collection of fourteen letters addressed to various nobles, it contained a wide range of substantive comments on China, from its government and antiquity, its books and morality, to the progress Christianity had already achieved. Further editions of many of these works and translations into the principal languages of Europe helped to disseminate knowledge of China. In the opening years of the eighteenth century, a series of volumes about missionary endeavors in the East Indies and China stirred the imagination of the reading public in Europe. The Lettres édifiantes et curieuses first appeared in 1702; by 1776 there were thirty-four volumes. Reprinted in several French editions even in the following century, the series was also translated, in whole or in part, into German, Italian, English, and Spanish.\footnote{43} Despite some flaws in editing and perhaps at times an overly idealistic portrayal of China, these letters established an appealing image of China for such leaders of the Enlightenment as Voltaire, Diderot, and Montesquieu. Conversely, the Catholic mission served as a selective cultural conduit running east. A considerable collection of works in European languages were retained in the library of the North Church in Peking, although they were not generally accessible.\footnote{44}

**PAPAL LEGATIONS TO THE CH'ING COURT**

In 1693 Charles Maigrot, besides promulgating his directive against the Chinese rites, also had sent a copy with an exposition of his views to Propaganda in order to institute a judicial process on the issue in Rome. For


\footnote{43} The editions and their contents are described in Henri Cordier, *Bibliotheca sinica: Dictionnaire bibliographique des ouvrages relatifs à l’Empire chinois* (Paris, 1904–8), Volume 2, pp. 926–52.

\footnote{44} Hubert Verhaeren, ed., *Catalogue de la Bibliothèque du Pé-l'ang* (1949; Paris, 1969).
seven years (1697–1704) a special commission of cardinals pondered the conflicting interpretations presented by both sides. Once a digest of the material was completed, the cardinals and their consultants were expected to present their views. Then the Holy Office would make its decision. But this process took considerably longer than the spokesman for Maigrot, Nicholas Charmot (1645–1714) of the Missions étrangères de Paris anticipated, since other business kept qualified theologians from considering the case. Differences of opinion among lesser officials involved in the process led Charmot to influence the Holy Office in Maigrot’s favor. After reading Le Comte’s *Nouveaux mémoires*, Charmot observed that Le Comte had changed the traditional view of the Jesuits in China. Schall and Verbiest limited themselves to the same claim as Ricci; that is, that the rites as practiced by the Chinese were probably not superstitious. But in place of probability, Le Comte claimed, according to Maigrot’s spokesman, that it was certain that they never had an idolatrous or even a superstitious significance. To expedite the decision in Rome, Charmot asked the Archbishop of Paris, Louis Noailles, to present Le Comte’s views to a committee of theologians from the Collège de Sorbonne at the University of Paris. The committee’s prompt denunciation in 1700 contributed to some degree to the policy that Rome announced not many years thereafter.45

Later in 1700, the Jesuits in Peking, at the insistence of their confreres in Europe who alerted them to the debates taking place there, asked the emperor for a clarification on the rites issue. They wanted to know whether they were correct in stating that Confucius was honored as the master of all men but that no rank or happiness was sought from him, that ancestor veneration was intended as a sign of remembrance of the ancestors, and that the souls of the ancestors did not dwell in the tablets erected in their honor.46

The emperor supposedly replied that their statement on these matters was accurate. Not all the missionaries, including some Jesuits, considered putting such a request before the emperor to be prudent, but the Jesuits at court realized that interpreting customs so integral to the Confucian state was an imperial prerogative alone. In their view the emperor was not being called upon to decide a question in Christian theology, but to verify what certain Chinese rituals signified in practice.


None of these arguments was found convincing in Rome. In 1701 the initial decision was taken against Ricci’s method of inculturation. Three years elapsed before a decree was made final, in November 1704, accepting Maigrot’s arguments and confirming his prohibitions. As a consequence of the initial decision, the papacy planned to send a legate to China to investigate all ecclesiastical issues and above all to enforce the decree on the Chinese rites that would follow. Charles Maillard de Tournon, a bishop and later a cardinal, left Rome in July 1702 and arrived in Canton in April 1705. During his visit to India on his way to China he condemned the Malabar Rites – that is, accommodations to south Indian culture somewhat analogous to the Ricci perspective of inculturation in China – and thus showed what might be in store for the China mission. Only thirty-four years of age, the legate was too young in Chinese eyes for such an important post. One of his first encounters with ecclesiastical affairs in Canton was his receipt of a manuscript in Chinese. Entitled *T’ien hsieh pen-i* (*Essential meaning of the teaching of Heaven*), this work by Bouvet claimed that the Chinese, both in antiquity and now, had known the true God under the terms *T’ien* and *Shang-ti*. Since the approval of the head of the Han-lin Academy, Han T’an (1637–1704), was placed where the episcopal imprimatur was normally found, Tournon refused to approve its publication.47 Tournon ordered the Bishop of Peking to confiscate all the printed copies and the Jesuits were to take an oath that no other copies existed. In fact, the study had never been printed, although Tournon could not be convinced otherwise.

In a memorable audience with the emperor in late December 1705, Tournon proposed the establishment of an apostolic nunciature in Peking. As a delegate of the Pope, the nuncio would be expected to have the integrity and understanding needed to act as a liaison between the Holy See and the Ch’ing emperor. His secondary function would be to centralize direction of all missionary activity in China.48 After the emperor rejected this proposal and failed to persuade the legate to reconsider the rites issue, Tournon, already ailing in body and in spirit, left the capital in August 1706. On behalf of the legate, Maigrot, with his limited command of the Chinese language and less of its literature, discussed the rites with the emperor in Jehol (Ch’eng-te). When the K’ang-hsi emperor asked if he had read the Chinese works of Matteo


Ricci, Maigrot replied he had read some parts (quelques endroits de ses livres). Moreover he was not able to read all four of the Chinese characters above the throne when the emperor made that request.49 K’ang-hsi summarily dismissed Maigrot from his presence and notified Tournon about the proceedings.50

A few months later the emperor ordered all the missionaries to apply for a certificate (p’iao) that was to be issued only after the recipient promised to remain in China for life and to follow the practices of Ricci. The legate, Tournon, then stopping in Nanking on his way to Canton, issued the Nanking Decree of 1707, forbidding the missionaries to comply with the imperial order. In so doing Tournon knew he had the support of the 1704 papal decision against the Jesuit interpretation of the rites, although he did not yet have the formal document. The hostility of the emperor, the challenge to the padroado implicit in Tournon’s mission, and the discord that developed among the missionaries contributed to the Portuguese decision to detain the legate in Macao, where he died in 1710. The Nanking Decree forced the missionaries to choose between the legate and the emperor. Within a year fifty-seven missionaries (Augustinians, Franciscans, and Jesuits) had requested the certificate while they sent an appeal to the Pope against Tournon’s decree. The others were allowed to leave the Ch’ing empire freely or were expelled for not complying. Realizing the gravity of the controversy and convinced that the Pope would be persuaded by the reasonableness of his views, the K’ang-hsi emperor sent four Jesuits as his envoys to the Pope. None ever returned to China. Two drowned at sea near the Portuguese coast, one died in Spain after he left Rome, the last died at the Cape of Good Hope while on his return trip to Canton. Just a few days before the emperor’s death in 1722, a mausoleum was erected in Canton in honor of this last envoy, Antonio Provana (1662–1720).51

49 See Maigrot’s own admissions in Charles Maigrot, Opus R.D. Maigrot Episcopi. Cononensis apud Sinenses (Mss. Latin 176c8), Bibliothèque Nationale de France, Paris, pp. 337, 371, and ff. This codex of 902 pages divided into eighty-two chapters is on the Tournon legation in China.

50 Translations of the basic documents are in Noll, 100 Roman documents concerning the Chinese Rites Controversy; for the emperor’s view of Maigrot’s inability with the Chinese language, see the reproductions of the contemporary documents in K’ang-hsi yü Lo-ma shih-chieh kuan-hsi wen-shu ying-yin pen (Peiping, 1932), pp. 21–3; also see Collani, “Charles Maigrot’s role in the Rites Controversy,” pp. 149–84.

Missionaries in the provinces encountered profound ethnocentrism and cultural conservatism in response to their preaching. In Foochow a Jesuit missionary noted in 1703 that the disdain of the Chinese, even the common people, for all other nations was one of the greatest obstacles to their conversion. Even when they realized that Christianity was holy and sound, they still coldly asserted that it was a foreign religion not found in Chinese books. They asked, “Is there anything good outside China and any truth that our learned men have not known?” To answer that type of question and also the inquiries that some Jesuits sent to them, several Christian literati, by carrying out research in the Chinese classics and other sources, wrote a number of essays on the Rites Controversy. After the persecution of Christianity in connection with the Yang Kuang-hsien episode in the 1660s in Peking, the Dominican Francisco Varo (1627–87) arrived in Fukien in 1671 and some time later published *Pien chi* (*A debate on memorial rites*). Presented as a dialogue between a missionary and a scholar from Fu-an, Fukien (a center of Dominican mission activity), questions and answers were developed to understand the meaning of memorial rites. In 1681 the Jesuit Simão Rodrigues (1645–1704) accidentally found a copy of this small work. In his opinion the argument of the book had merits, but it did not clarify the meaning of *chi* (memorial rites). He encouraged Christian literati to read the work and to write their own critiques. The result was a number of essays on the topic that had significance for the controversy about the rites. Yen Mo, a native of Chang-chou in Fukien, whose Christian name was Paul, composed several essays about memorial tablets and rites. In these essays Yen addressed two principal questions: were the Chinese rites religious in nature? Was the practice of the rites intended to seek benefits and blessings? After tracing the original meaning and various uses that memorial rites had accrued over time, Yen concluded that there never was a practice of any unusual rites that considered the ancestors as gods and paid homage to them as such. Moreover, rites dedicated to ancestors were expressions of the recollection of and love for the dead, not seeking blessings from them. This argument he demonstrated in an essay on rituals for ancestors in which he drew upon his reading of the Chinese classics and his examination of the words used in the rituals since the T’ang dynasty (618–907). This indicated to him that no family, from the common people to the emperor, used a word


In his reply to Varo’s essay that had raised doubts, Yen agreed that in the Book of rites there was a passage about memorial rites that included praying, and rewards and punishments for the descendants. But this meant that one prayed to Shang-ti (deity on high) and the other gods, not to the ancestors. He concluded that in the rites for ancestors there was no evidence that they were petitions for blessings.

An allied question was whether the souls of the dead resided in the wooden tablets inscribed with ancestors’ names that Chinese erected in their homes. These did not signify, the Christian literati argued, that the ancestors’ souls were in the tablets, but that the latter were the foci of expressions of filial piety by which to show one still served the dead as one had served them when they were living. Chang Hsing-yao, mentioned earlier in connection with the inscriptions of the church in Hangchow, indicated in his essay explaining sacrificial rites that it was only in the Ming dynasty that the use of such name tablets had been imposed by the Chia-ching emperor. The tablets were a means to express one’s sincere love for the ancestors. Even though their souls were not present, a person could not change his mind about serving the dead and remembering them as if they were alive. Chang stressed that if their souls were good, they would enter Heaven; if not, Hell was their destiny. He asked rhetorically whether it was so important that the souls be present in the tablets. Although many of these essays were composed in Fukien and Chekiang, apparently few, if any, of the opponents of the Jesuit viewpoints cited them.

Even if they had not become converts, there were other Chinese literati who held positive attitudes towards Christianity. In 1702–3, the Jesuits compiled testimonials in favor of the Chinese rites with Chinese texts and Latin translations that were forwarded to Rome. At least seventy-one literati from Nanking, Soochow, Kan-chou, and elsewhere signed separate documents in defense of the Jesuit view. About forty chin-shih joined them. Intended to show solidarity among the lay Christians with Ricci’s approach, these testimonials also contained the signatures of Wang Hsi (1628–1703), Chang Ying (1638–1708), and several other non-Christian leaders in Peking, including a

54 Chi-tsu k’ao, Archivum Romanum Societatis Iesu, Japonica et Sinica, I, 41, 1a, p. 10, as discussed by Lin, “Chinese literati and the rites controversy,” p. 69.
55 Ssu-tien shuo, Archivum Romanum Societatis Iesu, Japonica et Sinica, I, 40, 7a, pp. 44–5, as discussed by Lin, “Chinese literati and the rites controversy,” p. 73.
descendant of Confucius. It is noteworthy that such scholars were willing to support in writing a non-Chinese teaching whose standing at court was becoming more uncertain as elite culture was emphasizing its Confucian heritage. Such support from Christian and non-Christian scholars helped the further development of Christianity, despite the reduced number of missionaries after Tournon’s visit.

Chinese scholars were prompted to view Christianity as acceptable to their society not merely because of the 1692 Edict of Toleration, but also because of the availability of Chinese essays explaining Christian principles. Of the many works in the opening decades of the eighteenth century two remained most influential: *T’ien-chu shih-i* (True meaning of the Lord of Heaven) by Matteo Ricci, and *Wan-wu chen-yüan* (True origin of all things) by Giulio Aleni (1582–1649). Both books discussed such topics as the existence of God and the immortality of the soul, and also showed how Christian thought differed on these points from several Chinese philosophical principles. Originating in the late Ming intellectual encounter between Western learning and Confucian learning, these and other works provided an intellectual foundation for the ongoing dialogue in Chinese about Christianity.

**WESTERN MEDICINE AND MAP-MAKING**

The initial respect of the K’ang-hsi emperor for the Western missionaries and their religion was based on the expertise of some of them in astronomy and mathematics. Throughout his reign, he called on them to participate in additional projects. Toward the beginning of 1692 he asked Bouvet and Gerbillon about various illnesses in Europe and their cures. After getting their written report, he told them to set up a pharmaceutical laboratory in the palace and to write detailed analyses of their results. This activity led to their preparation of a collection of illustrations on anatomy accompanied by

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Chinese translations from one of the best French works on the topic. This five-year project, completed by Dominique Parennin (1665–1741), never received imperial authorization for publication. Although the emperor encouraged the dissemination of many kinds of knowledge, he allowed few scholars to consult the three manuscript copies of these medical essays (two in Peking and one in Jehol). Consequently this field of Western learning had little effect on the development of Chinese medicine of the day. Nonetheless, when the emperor in 1693 sought a remedy from bouts of fever he was suffering, he took some South American quinine that Jesuits, through court officials, sent to him. His cure led him to esteem Western knowledge of medicine, which he relied on a few more times during his reign. Several Jesuit brothers were pharmacists who opened their dispensary to the public, so that in times of persecution they would see patients and exhort those whom they knew as Christians to be steadfast in their faith.

One of the most arduous tasks that the emperor assigned to the missionaries at court was the compilation of an accurate map of the Ch‘ing empire. The initial steps in ascertaining the accuracy of the Western methods of combining astronomy and geography occurred as early as 1682, when Verbiest determined the longitude of Mukden in Manchuria. In 1686 imperial officials surveyed the border with Korea. For this newly assigned mapping project, which lasted from 1708 to 1717, the emperor ordered Manchu and Chinese officials to assist the missionaries. The principal cartographers were Jean-Baptiste Régis (1663–1738) and Pierre Jartoux (1668–1720), assisted by several Jesuit confreres and by an Augustinian, Guillaume Fabre-Bonjour (1669–1714). After calculating the exact positions of the Great Wall and the surrounding areas, they sent the results to Peking. The expedition went to Manchuria, then Shantung, Shansi, and Shensi, and eventually the other Ch‘ing provinces, and Taiwan. Upon consulting the maps and gazetteers of each city and province, they interrogated the civil and military officials of the area. Unquestionably this experience gave the missionaries a clearer perspective of the complexity of the peoples, dialects, and different customs of the empire. When possible, they preached to the Chinese and the non-Chinese in areas where no missionary had ever entered. In Tibet, lamas, trained by Manchus and Chinese, conducted the survey; in Korea, the Chosôn king’s officials did so. The product of this extensive geographical enterprise was presented to the throne in 1719 as the


60 For a survey on medicine, including translations from the Lettres édifiantes, see Yazawa Toshihiko, ed., Chūgoku no igaku to gijutsu: Iezusu kaishi shokanshū (Tokyo, 1977) especially pp. i–xviii.
The Kang-hsi emperor was pleased with the results. Its subsequent printing in Paris from 1730 to 1734 was also appreciated in Europe, where no cartographers had ever accomplished such a feat.

In addition to such large and relatively public enterprises as the mapping project, the Kang-hsi emperor was interested in new ideas about the classics, especially the Book of change. After Joachim Bouvet, originally assigned to the map expedition, was forced to return to the capital because of injuries suffered in a fall from his horse, the emperor began to inquire about his views on that text. Upon his return in 1698 from Paris, where Bouvet had served as an emissary for the Kang-hsi emperor, he realized how enamored the emperor had become of Buddhism. Bouvet recognized that his expectation that the emperor would some day embrace Christianity was illusory. Indeed, this had been clear after the abortive Tournon legation. But discussions of the Book of change and other classics with the emperor provided Bouvet with an opportunity to explain Christian philosophical principles that he found in the classics. Bouvet’s methodology consisted in accepting Chinese philosophy as compatible with Christian principles and the Book of change as an epitome of the best moral and physical doctrine of the Chinese tradition. From his reading, Bouvet became convinced that the authors of the ancient classics and the ancient kings knew the mystery of the Trinity and thus adored the same God as the Christians. On these key concepts, especially from the Book of change, he built a system later called figurism; that is, an attempt to find “figures” of the Old Testament in the Chinese classics. For Bouvet and the several Jesuits who espoused his cause, the truths of Christianity were hidden in the Chinese characters whose veil had to be lifted in order that the Chinese might readily accept Christianity. Attracted to this movement were Jean-François Foucquet (1665–1741) and Joseph Henri de Prémare (1666–1736). The latter was one of the most accomplished Western scholars of Chinese language and literature. Foucquet, a Jesuit missionary in Kiangsi province, received an imperial summons in 1711 to work in Peking with Bouvet on the

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Book of change. He remained in the capital until November 1720, when the Jesuit Father General, learning about Foucquet’s refusal to accept a confrere as a legitimately appointed superior, ordered Foucquet to return to France. Later Foucquet became a bishop at Propaganda in Rome. Foucquet’s desire to present figurism to the Holy See as a possible means of solving the Rites Controversy was never realized. Figurism was no vain curiosity on the part of its few Jesuit adherents, but a serious and intellectually bold attempt to understand the profound ideas beneath the surface of early Chinese texts.

THE SECOND PAPAL LEGATION AND ITS AFTERMATH

In September 1710 Pope Clement XI (r. 1700–21) rejected the petitions of those who had appealed against the Nanking decree of Tournon. Delays in the transmission of letters for several years prevented authenticated copies of the papal decision from reaching the Bishop of Peking, who did not reside in the capital. Not until early 1715 did the bishop attempt to promulgate the decision. The Lazarist missionary and skilled musician Theodoric Pedrini (1670–1746) disclosed the contents of the papal decision to the emperor. After reading a Chinese translation, the emperor reiterated his past ordinances against those who would violate Ch’ing laws and customs. Another apostolic constitution, Ex illa die (March 1715), reiterating Maigrot’s views and strongly rejecting the Ricci approach to these issues, arrived in Peking by late August the following year. The emperor again refused to accept such papal positions as applicable. In the so-called “Red Manifesto” of October 1716 that was to be distributed to all ships leaving from Canton, and also to all those traveling overland with the Russian caravan then in Peking, the emperor declared that only upon the return of the four envoys that he had sent to Europe would he have a basis for evaluating such papal pronouncements. The emperor’s appeal for information about the envoys was frustrated because they never returned to China.

63 Witek, Controversial ideas in China and in Europe, pp. 263–74.
65 The “Red Manifesto” was written in Manchu; Chinese and Latin versions were then added. Several original printed copies of this trilingual document are extant in libraries in Europe and in the United States. See Standaert, Handbook of Christianity in China, p. 362. Excellent reproductions are in Exotic printing and the expansion of Europe, 1492–1840: An exhibit (Bloomington, 1972), pp. 70–2; and Monique Cohen and Nathalie Monnet, Impressions de Chine: exposition Bibliothèque nationale (Paris, 1992), pp. 118–19.
66 On his return trip to China, Antonio Provana, SJ (1662–1720) died at sea near the Cape of Good Hope. Fan Shou-i (1682–1753), who accompanied Provana to Europe and became a Jesuit there, was aboard
During the last decade of the K'ang-hsi reign there were several signs of bureaucratic intrigue involving Chinese Christians, missionaries, and other Europeans. One example is Fan Shao-tso (chin-shih 1691), a censor, who openly attacked Christianity and demanded that it be rooted out of the empire.67 The role of the censors was to avert public disorder and to point out the faults of magistrates and other officials. An event that occurred in his family was considered by Fan to be a symptom of social disorder. Known to be hostile to Christianity, Fan was a native of Wen-an district, in Shun-t’ien prefecture, about twenty-four li from Peking, where French Jesuits had recently established a Christian community. He had a grandson who married a Christian neophyte. Fan’s family had agreed to the marriage, even to the extent of assuring the bride that she would have freedom to practice her religion. After the wedding ceremony, the bride was conducted to a room with several well-adorned idols. Her mother-in-law and several other women insisted that she should pay homage to the idols, but she steadfastly refused that day and several days later. At that point Fan, the grandfather of the bridegroom, wrote a memorial attacking Christianity and urging its proscription. The emperor received the memorial on December 23, 1711, just as he was preparing to go on a hunting expedition. He ordered the Ministry of Rites to consider the matter and report to him. This caused consternation for the Jesuits and other missionaries at the court since the Ministry of Rites was not considered to be sympathetic to Christianity. No decision had been reached by January 14, 1712, when the Jesuits at court learned about another memorial that Fan had sent to the emperor, this one outlining his proposal for opening a canal between Wen-an and Pa-chou in Shun-t’ien prefecture. Technically such a project belonged to the Ministry of Works under the direct supervision of the emperor. The emperor’s reply, appearing in the capital gazette that reported capital actions and was distributed to the provinces, depicted Fan as an ignorant, inconsiderate person who knew nothing about dikes and whose proposal was impracticable. As this dealt with a separate issue from Fan’s first
memorial, this imperial edict contained no hint whether the government would rule in his favor on the matter of proscribing Christianity.

In his attack on Christianity Fan claimed that the Christians followed a false and dangerous doctrine that claimed the Lord of Heaven had given a soul to a man called Jesus, born in Judea of the Virgin Mary during the time of the Han dynasty. According to them, Jesus suffered and died on a cross in expiation for the sins of everyone. In fact, Fan added, Christians referred to themselves as sinners. For the most part they were poor people or in a mediocre social position. By putting images of God in their houses, reciting their prayers, and putting crosses on their doors, Fan wondered if they were not trying to overthrow the government. Since there were a great number of Christians near the imperial capital, Fan feared that Christians would soon inundate the empire. His recommendation to the emperor was that none of them should be allowed to put any sign of Christianity on their doors, nor should they possess any images in their houses. If such images were found, they were to be destroyed. Nor would the Christians be allowed to assemble, day or night. Those transgressing these orders were to be punished and the leaders executed, he proposed.

Fan may have expected the Ministry of Rites to support his view, but instead he received a rejection. The ministry cited past imperial edicts that had allowed the preaching and practice of Christianity. Since these edicts had not been issued lightly, they were not to be revoked without serious reasons. Above all, the Ministry pointed to the 1692 Edict of Toleration, which had been granted because the conduct and service of the missionaries were beyond reproach. The ministry advised that Fan's memorial was unacceptable. This recommendation to the K'ang-hsi emperor was immediately endorsed by him. Fan's proposal to ban Christianity was rebuffed, just as his memorials about building dikes and a canal in his native place had been rejected. Fan's standing as a censor was weakened, as the Ministry of Rites and the emperor in 1712 still supported the 1692 Edict of Toleration, six years after Tournon's abortive legation ended in Peking.68

In 1717 another attempt to drive Christianity from the Ch'ing empire was made, this time in Canton. Ch'en Mao (c.1651–c.1719), the regional commander there, charged that foreign merchants and missionaries threatened the security of the empire. In his view Canton was fast becoming another Batavia, controlled by the Dutch, or another Manila, controlled by the Spanish, both

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68 For additional aspects about Christians in the capital, see John W. Witek, “The emergence of a Christian community in Beijing during the late Ming and early Ch'ing period,” in Encounters and dialogues: Changing perspectives on Chinese–Western exchanges from the sixteenth to eighteenth centuries, ed. Wu Xiaoxin (Sankt Augustin, 2005), pp. 93–116.
of which Ch'en had recently visited. He urged the emperor to ban the spread of Christianity and to reinstitute past restrictions on trade. Ultimately the emperor decided that missionaries with a certificate (p'iao) would be allowed to preach, at least for the time being. The trade of foreigners at Canton was to continue, but he forbade Chinese maritime trade to dangerous places like Manila and Batavia.69 The emperor was confident that his officials were powerful enough to control the foreigners at Canton, even as he trusted the missionaries to complete the sensitive mapping project. He was still waiting for a positive reply from Rome concerning his envoys despite pressures from some capital and provincial officials who recommended stringent repression of missionaries and Chinese converts.70

During these uneasy years, Pope Clement XI made a further attempt to resolve the Rites Controversy by naming Archbishop Carlo Ambrogio Mezzabarba (1685–1741) legate to Peking. To announce the archbishop’s mission, Pope Clement XI sent two envoys in advance with a letter addressed to the emperor. Mezzabarba’s first audience on December 31, 1720, and several later ones, gave evidence of his tact and diplomatic finesse. Yet upon reading the translation of the 1715 papal constitution Ex illa die, the emperor was displeased with its contents. Further negotiation, which included the legate’s granting of eight permissions to Chinese Christians that modified the constitution, led to an agreement that the status quo would be maintained until Mezzabarba’s return from Rome with new instructions from the Pope.71 The permissions, later issued in the legate’s pastoral letter from Macao in November 1721, allowed Christians to have in their homes ancestral tablets inscribed with the names of the dead without the statement about the tablet as the “seat of the soul,” but portraying relevant Catholic beliefs. A tablet probably made according to these norms is preserved in the Bibliothèque nationale, Paris; it prominently displays the symbol of the cross and succinctly explains that the son or grandson set up the tablet as a reminder of his debt to his forebears, not so that their spirits might dwell in it.72 This was a significant, nuanced


70 Some scholarship has incorrectly claimed that the emperor banned Christianity in 1717; see, for example, Chu Wei-cheng, Coming out of the Middle Ages: Comparative reflections on China and the West, ed. and trans. Ruth Hayoe (Armonk, NY, 1990), p. 223. But the emperor, without news about the four envoys he sent to Europe, told the Chinese officials to wait several years for such a possible prohibition. See CSL-KH (1978), Volume 6, 272, p. 3626, and 277, pp. 3698–9; Fu, A documentary chronicle of Sino-Western relations, pp. 126–7.


72 A reproduction is in Dunne, Generation of giants, p. 293.
integration of Chinese culture and Catholic belief for many ordinary converts. Moreover, the legate’s letter authorized all those Chinese ceremonies concerning the dead that were not superstitious or suspect, but merely civil. Such measures breathed a spirit of inculturation, but did not settle the controversy.

The K'ang-hsi emperor’s experiences with Mezzabarba were more positive than those he had had with the first papal legate, Tournon. At a formal banquet in February 1721 he asked Mezzabarba to present imperial gifts to the Pope. He also announced the appointment of the Jesuit Antonio de Magalhães (1677–1735) as the imperial envoy bearing gifts for the king of Portugal. Although the gifts for the Pope and the king were lost in the fire and sinking of the Rainha dos Anjos off the coast of Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, the papal legate and the imperial envoy continued their journey to Lisbon. After meeting the Portuguese monarch, Mezzabarba proceeded to Rome. Arriving in Rome in May 1723, Mezzabarba learned that several missionaries of various religious orders believed that the permissions caused more confusion. Propaganda, unwilling to review the papal decisions on the Rites that had already been issued, recommended to Pope Innocent XIII (r. 1721–4) that he write a letter to the emperor instead. Several months after the Pope’s death in March 1724, news of the death of the K'ang-hsi emperor in December 1722 reached Rome and negated any plans for the return of Mezzabarba to the Ch'ing empire. Benedict XIII (r. 1724–30), learning from several missionaries that the Yung-cheng emperor was well disposed toward Christianity, sent five priests to congratulate him on his ascent to the throne. Only two were allowed an audience in Peking; afterward all of them left China. Antonio de Magalhães later returned to Peking, where he had an audience with the Yung-cheng emperor on November 24, 1726.

THE YUNG-CHENG EMPEROR AND CHRISTIANITY

During the last two decades of the K'ang-hsi reign the question of imperial succession remained contentious. Upon the death of the emperor in 1722 a struggle erupted among several of his sons and their contending factions. The prince who became the Yung-cheng emperor took control, but rumors about his legitimacy persisted. The bureaucracy was debilitated by decades of somewhat lax supervision. Under these circumstances the new emperor

73 João de Deus Ramos, História das relações diplomáticas entre Portugal e a China (Macao, 1991), pp. 105–76.
74 A description of some of the gifts is in Emily B. Curtis, "Fouquet’s list: Translation and comments on the color ‘Blue Sky After Rain’," Journal of Glass Studies 41 (1999), pp. 147–52.
adopted a policy that led to tightened control over officials, clear affirmation of his cultural commitments, and severe repression of princes and their supporters who had opposed his rise to power. In this environment those calling for harsher measures against the missionaries saw the possibility that their voices would be heard. For Christians, the situation became much worse because several of them were prominent allies of the rival princes. These included the convert sons of Sunu (c.1648–1725), a prominent Manchu official, and João Mourão (1681–1726) a Jesuit priest who shared years of exile in Hsi-ning with the former prince, Yin-t'ang (1683–1726), and who eventually was put to death.

The new emperor had not considered Christianity in a favorable light before he came to power. One year after his rule began, he ordered that missionaries, even those with an imperial certificate, had to move to Canton. To the Yung-cheng emperor, Christianity had deluded commoners and was useless. He imposed a crackdown on Christians so that in future no one would be allowed openly to accept the teaching. In the provinces, missionaries were deported, despite the imperial decree granting up to half a year for the move. About 300 churches and residences were confiscated. Some missionaries tried to hide in the mountains or on small junks. Some witnessed their churches being changed into grain storehouses or academic halls. In Peking the emperor continued to suppress the political opponents who had opposed him during the struggle for succession.

In an address on the occasion of the birthday of the Buddha and coincidentally the arrival in 1727 of the Portuguese ambassador, Alexandre Metello de Sousa e Menezes, the Yung-cheng emperor indicated that his objection to Christianity was its claim to be the sole truth in opposition to what Christian followers claimed were the heterodoxies of Buddhism and Taoism. In his realm, he continued, a foreign religion would be banned only if its adoption harmed the commoners’ normal way of life. In his opinion this was precisely the result

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of many irrational features of Christianity. Since China and Europe had their respective religious traditions, the European religion need not be practiced in China. Yet because Westerners were expert calendar-makers and their king presented tribute, the Ch'ing government would continue to employ their talents.\textsuperscript{79}

The use of Catholic missionaries at court, despite the general proscription of proselytizing their religion in the empire, can be seen in the lives of some Jesuits who labored there during the reigns of the Yung-cheng and Ch'ien-lung emperors. Antoine Gaubil (1689–1759), who arrived in Peking in April 1723, claimed not many years later that though the emperor looked askance at Christianity, he needed the missionaries for the Bureau of Astronomy, for the conduct of contacts with Russia, and to operate European scientific instruments. Gaubil, “the greatest European sinologue of the eighteenth century,” according to Paul Demiéville, had been designated a royal mathematician by Louis xv.\textsuperscript{80} He replaced Dominique Parennin as the director of an imperial academy to teach Latin to future Manchu and Chinese diplomatic interpreters. How long the academy lasted and whether any Manchu or Chinese officials became sufficiently proficient in Latin to serve as negotiators in Ch'ing–Russian relations are questions that await further research. Instrumental in furnishing Chinese and Manchu books to the Imperial Academy in St. Petersburg, Gaubil was nominated to be one of its members. In 1751 the Royal Society of London also honored him with membership for his efforts in obtaining scientific information about China. His comparative chronology of the Bible and Chinese history, which included detailed analyses of astronomical data, broadened the discussion of these subjects among French scholars.\textsuperscript{81} His work provided a basis for the general European reconsideration of Chinese chronology.

Some missionaries were influential as writers about the history of China. Joseph de Moyric de Mailla (1669–1748) produced the \textit{Histoire générale de la Chine}, a translation and précis of the \textit{T'ung-chien kang-mu} (Summary of the Comprehensive mirror for aid in government) by the Sung dynasty philosopher Chu Hsi (1130–1200). Extended to include the early Ch'ing era, it was a major influence on the developing Western historiography about China. A successor of de Mailla was Jean-Joseph Amiot (1718–93), who arrived at the Ch'ing court in 1750 and devoted his talents to studies of the Chinese people

\textsuperscript{79} Fu, \textit{A documentary chronicle of Sino-Western relations}, pp. 155–6.


and their languages and dialects, as well as their history and arts. The result of his efforts began to appear in 1776 as the Mémoires concernant l’histoire, les sciences, les arts, les mœurs, les usages, &c. des Chinois: Par les missionnaires de Pékin.82 Both of these publications helped form European views on China during the nineteenth century.

A different, but significant, role in the intercultural relations of China and Europe was that of the Jesuit brother Giuseppe Castiglione (1688–1766), the missionary artist whose Chinese name, Lang Shih-ning, is so well known among educated Chinese today that his Western origins are at times overlooked. During his early years of service for the K’ang-hsi emperor, Castiglione concentrated on paintings of natural history. For the Yung-cheng emperor, who never allowed him to present them in person, he completed several panoramic paintings of battles and ceremonies. The Ch’ien-lung emperor (r. 1736–95), however, visited Castiglione’s studio to admire his outstanding talents. On several occasions, the Jesuit pleaded with the emperor to overturn the condemnation of Christianity and to allow all religious orders to preach in China.83 Although the emperor was unwilling to accede to these requests, Castiglione continued his work by painting representations of the imperial conquests of the Ölöds and with the planning and construction of a summer palace, Yüan-ming yüan (the Garden of perfect clarity), a few miles northwest of the capital.84

THE MISSIONS AND THE CH’IEN-LUNG EMPEROR

During the early years of the Ch’ien-lung reign missionaries in Peking hoped that the new emperor would personally decide on the issue of the Christian presence in China and not delegate it to his ministers, who they thought were generally ill-disposed toward Christianity as harmful to Chinese civilization. Adopting a policy similar to that of his father, the Ch’ien-lung emperor


retained missionaries to serve in the capital, even allowing replacements to come, but he continued the ban on their presence in the provinces during his entire reign. In a society whose elite sought to defend the cultural tradition against internal and external challenges, and while imperial edicts forbade missionary activity and conversion, the Catholic mission could maintain itself only by keeping a low profile. Yet incidents of discovery and repression, especially when the court intensely feared secret societies and rebellion, threatened their survival. A major persecution lasting several years developed when foreign missionaries were discovered ministering to Chinese Christians in Fu-an, Fukien, in 1746. The governor of Fukien, Chou Hsüeh-chien, reported on the foreign connections, financial subsidies, and also the “magic tricks and mysterious conduct” prevalent among these groups. The vicar apostolic of Fukien, Pedro Sanz, OP (1680–1747) was executed, and four other Dominicans were slain in their prison cells. The emperor ordered local officials to investigate and take action against any Christian groups they found. Some reported that they had done so, but local Christian communities survived in Fu-an and elsewhere.

Although not a supporter of the Catholic mission, the Ch'ien-lung emperor did not necessarily accept at face value what Chou Hsüeh-chien reported. In July and August he had done so, and the Grand Council recommended that Chou should deport to Macao all the foreign missionaries who were arrested. Chinese converts who were most guilty and could not be reformed or re-educated were to be severely punished, but the ignorant people who had been misled were to be freed. The emperor agreed with this approach. However, when Chou sent a long memorial in November 1746, the emperor said that although Chou had exaggerated in his statements, he was to sentence the guilty according to the law.

85 For reports on the 1746 persecution, see José María González, Misiones dominicanas en China (1700–1750) (Madrid, 1952–8), Volume 2, pp. 172–212; and his Historia de las misiones dominicanas de China, 1900–1954 (Madrid, 1955–60), Volume 2, pp. 313–420; see also an account by the Jesuit Jean-Gaspard Channeau (1711–55) to Madame de Sauveterre de Saint-Hyacinthe, Lettres édifiantes et curieuses, Volume 3, pp. 804–25. The five Dominicans were among the 120 persons canonized by Pope John Paul II in Vatican City on October 1, 2000.

86 Eugenio Menegon, Ancestors, virgins, and friars: Christianity as a local religion in late imperial China (Cambridge, MA, 2010).

The last general persecution of the Catholic mission occurred in 1784–5, when the government learned that four Franciscans, then in Hupei, intended to travel to Kansu. Just a few days before, the emperor had approved the judicial sentences of several rebel leaders of the Muslim uprising in 1781 in that province. Concerned about a possible Muslim–Christian conspiracy, officials moved swiftly to conduct trials of the missionaries and Chinese Christians. By late summer of 1785, despite its lengthy investigation, the government found no evidence of a conspiracy, but had uncovered clandestine missionary operations in the provinces. The central government’s policy toward local officials in areas where missionaries were reported and arrested was to punish them with removal from office, assess fines, and demote them several grades in rank. This had the contrary effect of causing officials to overlook rather than report the presence of missionaries and converts.

Another factor that threatened the Catholic mission’s survival in the Ch’ien-lung era was the apostolic constitution, *Ex quo singulari* (1742), which definitively condemned the Chinese rites and explicitly revoked Mezzabarba’s “eight permissions.” This papal injunction caused discontent among Christians, and especially missionaries living clandestinely in the provinces, because no uniformity in its interpretation and execution could be readily achieved. Even Rome realized that circumstances and customs varied greatly in China, and later instructed the bishops that the goal was to have Chinese Christians gradually accept the rites of the Roman Church as their own. Such a policy included the abolition of performing the kowtow (*k'o-t’ou*) in all social and ceremonial settings, the prohibition of using even the Christianized form of ancestral tablets, and the requirement that Christians both absent themselves from the funerals of pagan relatives and exclude pagans from Christian funerals. These proscriptions caused serious problems for Chinese Christians and missionaries, especially the bishops who were ordered to enforce them. Despite the unanimous agreement of the bishops that the kowtow was only a civil act, their petition to Rome was not heeded. In April 1777 the Holy Office declared that the kowtow was intrinsically superstitious and thus forbidden.

The question of the ordination of native Chinese to the priesthood was never fully resolved by the Jesuits, Propaganda, or any other group working in China through the eighteenth century. Lo Wen-tsao (1615–91, Gregory Lopez), a Dominican, had been named bishop in the late seventeenth century,

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and a number of Chinese, including Wu Li, the famous painter, became priests.\(^9\) Propaganda and the missionaries saw that the viability of their work would depend heavily on an indigenous clergy, especially during the periods of persecution. In 1725 and in 1785 Propaganda seriously discussed the issues, consulted with various ex-missionaries who had been to China, and sought further views from the missionaries. Some believed that foreign leadership of the Chinese church was still needed. When persecution in China abated, Propaganda dropped further discussion of the topic.\(^9\) Chinese priests, albeit few in numbers, continued to serve their people. There were no other Chinese bishops, however, until Pope Pius XI consecrated five Chinese priests in a ceremony in Rome in 1926.

The suppression of the Jesuit order, the Society of Jesus, in Europe adversely affected the mission in China. In 1762 the Portuguese government ordered its officials in Macao to arrest all Jesuits there and deport them back to Europe. Spain and France soon followed the Portuguese lead. The Bourbon kingdom pressured the papacy for a total suppression of the Society of Jesus, which occurred in July 1773. The ex-Jesuits were allowed to continue their pastoral work in China on condition that they accept the brief of suppression that was announced in Peking in 1775. Propaganda administered the property of the former Jesuits and tried to send its own missionaries. But the new arrivals were imprisoned and then expelled from China. After prolonged negotiations in Europe, the Lazarists (members of the Congrégation de la Mission, who are also known as Vincentians) arrived in Peking in 1785 and took control of the North Church. Despite the efforts of the survivors of the French Jesuit mission and of the newly arrived Lazarists and others in Peking and elsewhere, the French Revolution and the Napoleonic Wars undermined the entire foreign missionary enterprise in China. Funds and personnel from Europe became scarce. By the time the Ch'ien-lung emperor died in 1799, the vitality of the Catholic mission in China was seriously impaired.

Such impairment did not mean the total disappearance of Catholicism in China. During the reign of the Chia-ch'ing emperor (r. 1796–1820), there were about 200,000 to 215,000 Catholics spread through nearly all the


\(^9\) The issue was also connected with the attempts to introduce literary Chinese into the Catholic liturgy. François Bontinck, *La lutte autour de la liturgie chinoise aux xviiie et xviiiie siècles* (Louvain, 1962), pp. 389–400; see also Chaves, *Singing of the source*, pp. 47–80.
eighteen provinces.\textsuperscript{92} Despite the prohibition against foreign missionaries, several managed to circulate in the provinces, where there were never enough native clergy. The first areas adversely affected by these shortages were Hunan, Hupei, and the lower Yangtze region. For example, after 1790 there was no bishop in Nanking for fourteen years. The frequency of local rebellions during the Chia-ch'ing period created chaotic conditions that left congregations much more on their own. Some persevered under local leadership, but others declined.

In 1805 the government in Peking learned that a missionary had sent Rome a map of parts of China. This led to another overall investigation of Catholic practices and institutions, especially in the Peking area, and the imposition of severe sentences on Chinese and Manchu Catholics, above all converts among the bannermen. The new imperial policy of repression and eradication resulted in execution, not deportation, of missionaries discovered in the provinces. Converts were to abjure their faith; refusal meant execution or exile. Searches for and destruction of all Catholic publications, including the woodblocks, were also begun.\textsuperscript{93} These new policies were not uniformly effective. One of the most flourishing missions of that time was in Szechwan, where 1,848 adults and more than 2,000 children were baptized in 1807. The arrest of a Chinese priest in Shensi in 1811 set off a more general persecution. Several Christians were arrested in Ch'eng-tu, Szechwan, and exiled to Ili (in the northern part of modern Sinkiang). This did not adversely affect the Christian presence in Szechwan, which remained substantial due to the continuing efforts of the Missions étrangères de Paris and the indigenous clergy.\textsuperscript{94}

Events in Peking in 1811, meanwhile, led to further repercussions against Catholics in an environment of serious concern about the early reports of opium smoking in the south. In June the governor-general of Kwangtung and Kwangsi notified the court that Westerners were smuggling opium. He argued that they knew it was contraband, but brought it to make a profit. To stop the use that was beginning to affect other parts of the country, the supply must be cut off, he told the government, a policy that his instructions to the Western merchants in Canton underscored. In July the emperor issued an edict in

\textsuperscript{92} Standaert, \textit{Handbook of Christianity in China}, p. 383.

\textsuperscript{93} \textit{Ta Ch'ing Jen-tung Jai (Chia-ch'ing) huang-ti shih-lu} (T'aipei, 1978), Volume 3, 142, pp. 206–261, Volume 4, 143, 1a–2a, 144, p. 9b, 145, pp. 1a–2b (hereafter CSL-CC (1978)); with selected translations in Fu, \textit{A documentary chronicle of Sino-Western relations}, pp. 350–7.

reply to a request from the Ministry of Justice for new regulations to punish Westerners preaching their religion. If they published religious books and promoted assemblies, and if a bannerman accepted this teaching and referred to a preacher with the title “Father,” both were to be executed by strangulation without delay. If these preachers affected only a few persons but did not accept the title, they were to be imprisoned and wait for strangulation at the autumn assizes. Those who followed Catholicism and did not know how to return to the true teaching were to become slaves in Heilungkiang. The emperor insisted that the Westerners at the Board of Astronomy were to calculate the calendars and not have any contact with bannermen or commoners. Those not skilled in any science or craft were not to stay in Peking, but were subject to deportation to their own countries. The Ch’ing court had reached a turning point in its attitude towards the presence of westerners in China.

CONCLUSION

During the late Ming period Matteo Ricci had created a path for Christianity to re-enter China by his openness to its language, culture, and history. His efforts were facilitated by Chinese literati who entered into dialogue with him. Later, the continued presence of his Jesuit confreres in Peking through the late Ming and early Ch’ing periods aided other religious orders in establishing mission stations from which to evangelize the cities and rural areas. The number of missionaries was never large, even in the most significant period of growth before the outbreak of the Rites Controversy at the end of the seventeenth century. It is difficult to fathom, centuries later, how the issue of inculturation could have divided, so harshly at times, those who preached the love of God to the Chinese. The amount of eighteenth-century printed polemical literature on this issue is enormous, and the number of manuscripts in various languages in European libraries is quite vast. Moreover, the Ch’ing archives have documentary materials still to be consulted. No presentation of the Rites Controversy can yet claim to be definitive, as we only can outline some major trends of that complex issue.

95 See Fu, A documentary chronicle of Sino-Western relations, pp. 381–5. These measures differed from some of those of his father, the Ch’ien-lung emperor. In 1785 he freed twelve missionaries who had been incarcerated for their clandestine preaching but then were allowed to stay in the churches in Peking or return to their own countries. See Witek, “The emergence of a Christian community in Beijing during the late Ming and early Ch’ing period,” pp. 114–15.


97 The first full-length Chinese study of the Rites Controversy was by Li T’ien-kang, Chung-kuo li-chih cheng: Li-shih, wen-hsien ho i-i (Shanghai, 1998). For the first book on the topic in Japanese, see Yazawa Toshihiko, Ch¯ugoku to Kirisutoky¯o: Tenrei mondai (Tokyo, 1972).
The impact of the Catholic missions in the early and middle Ch'ing periods was largely determined by the attitude of the five emperors. At the outset of the Shun-chih reign the missionaries received permission to preach, but Chinese converts could not legally become followers of the foreign religion until K'ang-hsi's 1692 Edict of Toleration. No longer considered a heterodox sect, Christianity was given an opportunity to attract Chinese and Manchus. During the Yung-cheng and Ch'ien-lung reigns such openness no longer existed, and the Chia-ch'ing reign was more repressive. Both the imperial court and the literati were still willing to make use of astronomy and arts from the West, yet as early as 1700 Wang Yüan (1648–1710) listed Westerners along with Buddhist monks and nuns, Taoist priests, Muslims, prostitutes, and actors as totally undesirable in Chinese society. He proposed deporting all Westerners, who should then be denied all relations with China. Li Kung (1659–1733), a follower of the philosophy of Yen Yüan (1635–1704), later edited Wang's work and included the comments of a number of its readers. He indicated that one could retain those missionaries "who have talents as mathematicians or technicians, but their doctrine" was to be "banned." 98

After the first years of persecution under the Yung-cheng emperor, Chinese and Manchu reactions towards Christianity took various forms, from the highest officials down to the lowest classes. The conversion of several Manchu princes led to the conversion of their wives and entire households. Such was the case of several sons of Sunu in the latter part of the K'ang-hsi period and during the early years of the Yung-cheng reign. Much later, some of their descendants were discovered as Christians and exiled to Ili in the crackdown in 1805. For example, two great-grandsons of Sunu refused to retract their belief in Catholicism. Their names were removed from the Manchu genealogy and they were ordered to wear the cangue for six months before leaving for exile in Ili. 99 Other members of the ruling elite in the capital and elsewhere became converts and continued to serve the state, but kept the fact of their conversion secret. Te-p'ei (1688–1752) was baptized at the age of thirty and under the Ch'ien-lung emperor served as governor or governor-general in several provinces, including Anhwei, Fukien, and Kiangsi. He supported the efforts of Chinese Christians to practice their faith and did not harass missionaries who clandestinely had entered those areas. In general, Manchus relied on Christian writings in Chinese to develop their knowledge of the

new religion, for only a few such works were translated into Manchu. In censoring Catholic publications in Chinese, for example Verbiest’s little book *Chiao-yao hsü-lun (An introduction of doctrinal essentials)* of 1670, the Chia-ch’ing emperor was especially indignant that Manchu bannermen had become Christians. He ordered them to study Manchu, read the books of the Chinese sages, and follow the doctrine of the Confucian classics. Since by no means were they allowed to accept Buddhism or Taoism, he questioned how they could believe in the Western religion. Relatively little scholarly attention has focused on the Manchu Christians and their impact in this era, although a number of them were directly related to the imperial clan, which had its own rules and deities, different from those of the Han Chinese.

From the onset of the persecution under the Yung-cheng emperor to the beginning of the Opium Wars in 1839, Christianity perdured in China. When the K’ang-hsi emperor died in 1722, there were about 200,000 Christians from all walks of life. The Peking court continued to seek the expert services of the missionaries in astronomy, music, horology, and other types of Western learning and technology. Their presence at court meant that the churches in Peking were able to remain open for most of the rest of the eighteenth century. Missionaries not directly engaged in service to the emperor were pastors in these churches and were able to work in mission stations up to the Great Wall and in other parts of Chihli (modern Hopei). Knowledge of these activities in the capital area encouraged Chinese Christians elsewhere to continue their religious practices despite the lack of direct contact with missionaries.

Well-trained male and female catechists were vital to the continued presence of Christianity in China. It was not uncommon for a missionary during the K’ang-hsi reign or earlier to visit each of his mission stations scattered over an entire province once or twice a year, if at all. The catechists held sessions for those interested in becoming converts and were able to verify the conduct of neophytes before they were baptized to formally enter the Church. Catechetical literature in Chinese composed by Dominicans, Franciscans, Jesuits, and others was readily printed and reprinted with woodblocks stored in the local church compound. There are also examples of lay Christian authors who wrote on the reconciliation of Confucian teachings and Christianity in works appearing in the late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries. Among them were Chang Hsing-yao, who described how Christianity completed Confucianism in his 1705 study called *T’ien-chu-chiao ju-chiao t’ung-i k’ao (Similarities and


differences between Christianity and Confucianism) and Yen Mo in his Ti t'ien k'ao (Investigation of the terms Lord and Heaven). By 1730, however, there were only a handful of native Chinese priests and a few foreign missionaries who had secretly entered China to take care of so many Christians dispersed over a vast territory. It was the catechists who led the common prayer services by reading the Scriptures and the lives of the saints. They reminded the community about the observance of the holy days and feast days of the church. Since church buildings had been confiscated and some had been destroyed, services were conducted in less obvious venues. Peasants in the fields sang the litanies or chanted hymns as part of their liturgy. Children learned from their elders and thus continued such practices. In a number of instances Chinese Christian women entered marriage and then converted their husbands and entire families. Nor can one overlook the Chinese from families in the interior of the country, not just from Macao, who studied for the priesthood at the College of the Holy Family set up by an Italian diocesan priest, Matteo Ripa (1682–1746), in Naples from the late 1720s, or in the colleges of the Jesuits in France from about 1740. The influence of these men after their return to China has not been fully explored. At the end of the Ch'ien-lung reign, Christianity in China was predominantly in Chinese hands.

\[102\] On Chang’s study, see Mungello, The forgotten Christians of Hangzhou, pp. 96–111. Hsü Kuang-ch’i in the late Ming had introduced the concept of Christianity “completing” Confucian teachings. For a penetrating analysis of Yen Mo’s essay, see Nicolas Standaert, The fascinating God: A challenge to modern Chinese theology presented by a text on the name of God written by a 17th century Chinese student of theology (Rome, 1995), pp. 61–78. Additional comments on Yen Mo’s essay are in Huang, “Pei hu-lüeh ti sheng-yin,” pp. 139–46.

\[103\] Lettres édifiantes et curieuses, Volume 3, p. 785, and Volume 4, p. 91.

\[104\] For a biography of Ripa, see Christophe Comentale, Matteo Ripa, peintre-graveur-missionnaire à la cour de Chine: Mémoires traduits, présentés et annotés (Taipei, 1983). The manuscripts of Ripa’s journal are being published in Ripa, Giornale (1705–1724). About the two Jesuits, Kao Jen (1732–95) and Yang Te-wang (1733–98?), both from Peking who went to Paris and returned to China, see Dehergne, Répertoire des Jésuites de Chine de 1552 à 1800, pp. 133–4, 301.
In the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, calendrical learning involving mathematics and astronomy was transformed by foreign influences, but medicine largely developed within its own traditions. Missionaries, Jesuits in particular, transmitted European learning to China to aid their proselytizing. Their imported knowledge had different impacts on various branches of Chinese learning. Contrasting these two fields of learning, this chapter considers how knowledge and practices of studying natural phenomena were embedded in a sociocultural milieu whose institutions, processes of knowledge production, and training of practitioners shaped the reception of foreign influences.

These two fields of learning were located at opposite extremes of imperial control in the production of natural knowledge. The imperial court scrutinized calendrical learning, which required complicated computations. Though calendrical knowledge was used to produce almanacs that imperial subjects consulted to select auspicious dates for all sorts of events in their daily life, it was also used for predicting regular as well as unusual celestial events that were considered prognostic signs about the future of the empire. The emperor, as the Son of Heaven, monopolized the right to issue the calendar. The calendar authenticated the emperor’s connection with Heaven and reaffirmed his Mandate of Heaven. Calendrical learning was thus closely associated with the legitimacy of a dynasty. Every dynasty issued and named its own calendar, even when the calendar was identical to the one used by the previous dynasty, as was the case at the beginning of the Ming (1368–1644). For alien-led dynasties, such as the Yüan (1279–1368) and the Ch'ing (1644–1911), establishing and imposing a calendar proclaimed their possession of the Mandate of Heaven and legitimized their position as rulers of the empire. Those who were unwilling to subjugate themselves to the new imperial order, such as Ming loyalists, expressed their resistance by refusing to adopt the new dynasty’s calendar. Through the process of calendar-making, issues such as the legitimacy of the dynasty, the power relationship between the emperor and his subjects, and the
negotiation of ethnic boundaries under conquest dynasties were represented as problems of knowledge and culture.

The situation for medicine was quite different. Although missionaries also transmitted European knowledge about anatomy and *materia medica* to China,\(^1\) the impact of their medical knowledge did not compare with that of calendrical learning. Calendrical learning was closely associated with the dynasty’s legitimacy and was under tight control, but medical knowledge operated in a laissez-faire environment. This influenced the production of medical texts and knowledge and shaped the relations between physician and patient. The second part of this chapter considers the condition of medical knowledge and medical practices in Ch’ing times.

The quest for natural knowledge was by no means an independent enterprise; it was framed within the world order centering on the dominant ideology and the imperial system.\(^2\) The discrepancies between handling the two traditions of knowledge considered here remind us that efforts to map traditional natural knowledge onto modern scientific categories do little to help us understand earlier attempts at making sense of the natural world. Juxtaposition of the different trajectories of medical and calendrical learning clarifies the production and practices of natural knowledge in seventeenth- and eighteenth-century China.

**CALENDRICAL LEARNING**

In the seventeenth century, Chinese calendrical practitioners adopted European astronomical techniques from Jesuit missionaries who traveled to China to save souls but ended up serving as technical functionaries at the imperial court.\(^3\) When Jesuits arrived in China in the 1590s, Chinese calendrical learning was in crisis. Ming astronomers were no longer able to master the complicated computational techniques bequeathed by their Yüan predecessors and had difficulties revising the calendar as it lost accuracy after two centuries.\(^4\) Officials of the Bureau of Astronomy (*Ch’in-t’ien chien*) could

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\(^{1}\) Fan Hsing-chun, *Ming-chihsi-yang ch’uan-ju chih i-hsüeh* (Shanghai, 1943).


\(^{4}\) This does not mean that the astronomers were incompetent to carry out important work. From the extant observations of Mercury, we can infer that Ming official astronomers had faithfully performed their duty. Thatcher E. Deane, “Instruments and observation at the Imperial Astronomical Bureau during the Ming dynasty,” *Osiris*, 2nd series 9 (1994), pp. 126–40.
neither produce an accurate calendar nor predict with precision important
events such as solar eclipses. The computational problems were due in part
to the accumulation of errors from using the same calendar constants for 200
years, and in part to the failure to adjust for the transfer of the Ming capital
from Nanking to Peking, about 550 miles to the north.5 The court astronomers
were responsible for errors in the calendar, as they officially had a monopoly
on astronomical knowledge and private calendrical studies were forbidden.
Most of these men transmitted their positions and knowledge along family
lines. This intellectual legacy was sufficient for producing annual calendars
but inadequate for correcting calendrical errors. As one seventeenth-century
official in the Bureau of Astronomy later admitted, they dared not revise the
calendar calculations for fear that the discrepancies might become worse.6 By
the sixteenth century, Ming officials were aware of profound problems with
the official calendar and proposed reforms, but the defensiveness of the court
astronomers made corrections impossible. Widespread political corruption by
the late Ming also impeded efforts to correct the calendar. In this disfunc-
tional environment Ming emperors ignored reform proposals and continued
to sanction the use of error-producing calendrical methods.7

The arrival of Jesuit missionaries in the late sixteenth century accelerated
the long-standing impetus for calendar reform. Although their primary goal
was proselytizing, the Jesuits benefited from the imperial desire for an accurate
calendar to establish their own foothold in the Ming court. This tactic was in
keeping with the Jesuits’ strategy to convert China to Christianity from the top
down. The Jesuits reckoned that since the offices of the Bureau of Astronomy
lay within the Forbidden City, the spatial proximity to the throne increased
their chances of converting the emperor. Matteo Ricci (1552–1610), the most
prominent of the Jesuits in China at this time, was confident this strategy
would bear fruit and tried to obtain resources and technological support from
Rome.8 From that time on, Jesuits at court gradually assumed the role of
technicians, serving imperial needs without achieving their religious goal of
converting an emperor.9

6 Hsü Kuang-ch'i, “Yüan-ch'i,” in Hsin-fa suan-shu, ed. Hsü Kuang-ch'i et al. (c.1640; Taipei, 1983),
pp. 4–5.
7 Willard J. Peterson, “Calendar reform prior to the arrival of missionaries at the Ming court,” Ming Studies
8 Pasquale M. d’Elia, Galileo in China: Relations through the Roman College between Galileo and the Jesuit
scientist-missionaries (1610–1640), trans. Rufus Suter and Matthew Sciascia (Cambridge, MA, 1960),
pp. 6–7. This strategy was consciously followed by later Jesuits; see Jacques Gernet, China and the
9 Elman, On their own terms, pp. 190–222.
Following a failure by Chinese astronomers to predict a solar eclipse in 1610, one court astronomer, an acquaintance of Ricci, proposed the translation of Western astronomical books and noted the precedent set when Muslim astronomical texts had been translated during the early Ming.\(^\text{10}\) In 1613, Li Chih-tsaö (1565–1629), an official who was a Christian convert, suggested that the task of calendar reform be assigned to the foreign missionaries. However, the throne did not respond to this request, and efforts to involve Jesuits proved impossible in the aftermath of the persecution of 1616, when they were arrested and deported back to Macao.

In 1629 officials in the Bureau of Astronomy again failed to predict a solar eclipse. The newly enthroned Ch’ung-chen emperor (1611–44, r. 1628–44) decided to allow reform of the official calendar system. The emperor’s support brought the Jesuits a new chance. A special division headed by Hsü Kuang-ch'i (1562–1633), another important official who had converted, was set up within the Bureau of Astronomy to translate Western astronomical texts and manufacture astronomical instruments based on Western models. At this time, there was concern that Manchu invasions from the northeast and bandits and peasant uprisings in the northwest challenged the mandate of the Ming dynasty.

As they assisted in revising the Ming calendar system, the Jesuits made considerable effort to acquire the most recent European methods. This strategy meant that the missionaries besieged their superiors and correspondents in Europe with requests for astronomy-related information. Trips were made to Europe to obtain books, and Jesuits skilled in astronomy and other sciences were recruited. Among the recruits, Giacomo Rho (1593–1638) and Adam Schall von Bell (1591–1666) played the most important roles in the reform. Also approached were Galileo Galilei (1564–1642) and Johannes Kepler (1571–1630), two of the best-known astronomers in Europe. Although Galileo did not offer his help, Kepler went so far as to send astronomical tables. Thanks to the efforts of the Jesuits, the modified heliocentric system developed by Tycho Brahe (1546–1601) was transmitted to Ming China. Other Jesuits’ imports included telescopes, Tychonic instruments, trigonometry, and logarithmic formulas invented by John Napier (1550–1617) in 1614.\(^\text{11}\) These offerings became indispensable tools for later astronomers. With the transmission of new instruments and tools, the Jesuits profoundly transformed the techniques and foundations of calendrical learning in China.

\(^{10}\) Chang, _Ming shih_ 31, p. 528.

Although historians of Chinese science such as Joseph Needham celebrated this event as the victory of a more advanced Western astronomy over an obsolete Chinese one, the situation was more complicated. Despite their recent participation in Rome in instituting the Gregorian calendar, in China the Jesuits had to tailor their techniques to fit the existing Chinese calendrical framework. For example, many of the definitions for astronomical parameters were different, so the Jesuits were unable to use the astronomical data that had been generated by Chinese astronomers. In order to utilize the new information and instruments from Europe, they had to modify the parameters without changing the overall structure of the calendar. The Chinese system divided a day into 100 units, whereas the European system divided it into 96 quarters of an hour. The four-unit discrepancy made Chinese astronomical tables unusable for the Jesuits.\(^\text{12}\) To employ European astronomical techniques, the Jesuits had to use European units of time. Likewise, the circumference of a circle was changed from 365.25 degrees to 360 degrees in order to use European trigonometric tables.\(^\text{13}\) A cosmological concept as fundamental as the shape of the Earth was transformed to match the geometrical astronomical model used in Europe. The shape of the Earth went from being conceived as flat to spherical.\(^\text{14}\)

Among all these adjustments, the imposition of an intercalary month was the most disturbing because the Chinese calendar, a lunar–solar system, was fundamentally different from the European Gregorian calendar, which was primarily a solar calendar. The Chinese interpolated seven intercalary months within each nineteen-year period to adjust for the differences between solar years and lunar years and assure the arrival of seasons at the appropriate times. To insert intercalary months properly, the Chinese employed a system of fortnightly periods (chien-ch'i). The traditional Chinese method, called “averaged fortnightly periods” (p'ing-chien-ch'i), equally divided the 365.25 days of a year

\(^\text{12}\) The Jesuits in charge of calendar-making realized the significance of maintaining the European units in the Bureau of Astronomy so they could easily incorporate European tables and information in their tasks. This problem was finally settled in 1669 after the missionaries were cleared of charges laid by Yang Kuang-hsien; see Noël Golvers, *The Astronomia Europaea of Ferdinand Verbiest, S.J. (Dillingen, 1687): Text, translation, notes and commentaries* (Nettetal, 1993), pp. 70–1.


Calendrical learning and medicine, 1600–1800

into twenty-four fortnightly periods of about fifteen days. The Jesuits used so-called fixed fortnightly periods (ting-chieh-ch'i) setting up fortnightly periods by dividing the ecliptic, the constant path that the sun appears to travel, into twenty-four points ($15 \times 24 = 360$). Each fortnightly period occupied fifteen degrees of the ecliptic. They chose fixed fortnightly periods in order to more accurately predict celestial phenomena such as eclipses of the sun. However, this trade-off confused the rules for setting up intercalary months that had been used in Chinese society for thousands of years. After these changes, the calculation of intercalary months was solely vested in the hands of calendrical experts. Such radical transformations meant that court astronomers had to be re-educated, and this contributed to acrimony among different groups within the Bureau of Astronomy that persisted for decades.

Despite the efforts of Hsü Kuang-ch’i and the Jesuits working at the capital, jettisoning the traditional Chinese calendrical methods did not proceed smoothly. From the establishment in 1629 of the Western astronomical section in the Bureau of Astronomy, Hsü Kuang-ch’i and his Jesuit consultants faced challenges from other astronomers in the bureau and from a private astronomer, Wei Wen-k’uei, who claimed to be able to fix the calendar. Hsü routinely asserted the superiority of Western astronomical methods as a general defense. From 1629 until his death in 1633, Hsü presided over several demonstrations of the comparative accuracy of Western astronomy. Such contests functioned to demonstrate the superiority of Western astronomy and to verify the relative precision of the new astronomical tables and instruments.

Although Hsü and his Jesuit colleagues demonstrated their skill in predicting celestial phenomena, the Ch’ung-chen emperor hesitated to give them his approval. Making the situation more complicated, another astronomical section, led by Wei Wen-k’uei, was set up in 1634 after Hsü’s death. Because of these circumstances, four astronomical systems unhappily coexisted at the court during the last decade of the Ming. 15

Many astronomical constants had to be modified by the Jesuits. Because of the political, cultural, and procedural implications these modifications would have, the Ming emperor was careful about changing the calendar. The Jesuits also had to make necessary adjustments to their astronomical tables and instruments after moving the European system to China. Moreover,

15 The four systems were the original Ta-t’ung calendar, the Muslim calendar, the Western calendar, and another Chinese system produced by a Chinese astronomer, Wei Wen-k’uei. For the feud among Chinese astronomers and the Jesuits, see Wang P’ing, Hsi-fang li-suan-hsüeh chih shu-ju (Nan-kang, 1966), pp. 55–62. Willard J. Peterson, “Learning from heaven: The introduction of Christianity and other Western ideas into late Ming China,” in The Cambridge history of China, Volume 8: The Ming dynasty, 1368–1644, part 2, ed. Denis C. Twitchett and Frederick W. Mote (New York, 1998), pp. 833–7.
the Ming dynasty much earlier had assimilated Muslim astronomy into the court astronomical system and given it a place in the Bureau of Astronomy. The Ch'ung-chen emperor followed this precedent and simply treated Jesuit astronomy as one of the astronomical systems serving his interests. He also expected astronomers from different astronomical traditions to be working together for him. More than once, he ordered all the astronomers to co-operate with each other to produce a consistent and accurate calendar.\(^\text{16}\)

In addition to the institutional and technological factors that prevented the Ming emperor from endorsing the Western calendar, cultural factors certainly played a role in the astronomical competition in late Ming. The Jesuits were aware of these issues. Adam Schall von Bell pointed out that Chinese critics used the term “Western methods” (hsi-fa) to describe Jesuit astronomy in their attacks upon the foreign missionaries, while the Jesuits and their defenders instead called their astronomy “new methods” (hsin-fa).\(^\text{17}\) This struggle over labeling indicates the cross-cultural nature of the conflict. The Jesuits were depicted as outsiders in the same way as were the Manchus, who had become an increasingly worrisome threat to the Ming dynasty while the calendrical reform was under way.

The Ming emperor finally decided to recognize the superiority of Jesuit astronomy and proclaimed the adoption of a new calendar in 1643, with the proviso that the name of the calendar was to remain unchanged.\(^\text{18}\) But the Ming dynasty was under imminent threat, and the following year peasant rebellions and Manchu invasions overwhelmed the Ming capital. Ironically, the fruits of calendrical reform fell into the hands of the Ming government’s enemies and helped to authenticate the Manchu claim to having the Mandate of Heaven.

**Defending Chinese calendrical traditions: the 1664 calendar case**

The fall of the Ming presented great opportunities for the Jesuits. As soon as the Manchus occupied Peking, Adam Schall presented them with the new calendar originally prepared for the Ming emperor. Astronomers in different departments of the Bureau of Astronomy also dedicated their proposed calendars to their new masters after the dynastic transition. To demonstrate the accuracy of his calendar, Schall requested permission to make new astronomical instruments for the observation of solar and lunar eclipses. A month later, he brought his new tools to the new emperor: a telescope, a map, a sundial, and

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\(^{17}\) Needham, *Mathematics and the sciences of the heavens and the earth*, p. 449.

\(^{18}\) Chang, *Ming shih*, p. 543.
an armillary sphere. Accompanying these gifts was a statement attacking traditional Chinese methods.19 During the intervening month Schall’s prediction of a solar eclipse was demonstrated as more accurate than those of the Chinese and Muslim astronomers. The Shun-chih emperor (1638–61, r. 1644–61) and his advisers endorsed Schall’s calendar by imperial edict, naming it Shib-hsien (Following the decree of Heaven). The cover of the printed calendar bore the phrase i hsi-yang hsin-fa (“[this calendar was compiled] according to new Western methods”).20 At the end of 1644, Schall was appointed director of the Bureau of Astronomy. To affirm his identity as a servant of God, he declined the offer, although he expressed his willingness to otherwise serve the emperor at any time. After his protestations, Schall eventually accepted the offer. This successful exchange between the technical knowledge of the Jesuits and the political power of the Manchu rulers brought legitimacy to both sides.

Although the emperor had accepted the Jesuit calendar, this did not mean he was rejecting the Chinese and Muslim methods. After the Jesuits and their associates took over the Bureau of Astronomy, they tried to protect the fruits of their struggle through the strict control of astronomical knowledge. Soon after Adam Schall’s astronomical predictions made in 1644 were confirmed, an imperial edict ordered all the officials in the Bureau of Astronomy to learn the new, foreign methods or lose their positions. Examinations were then set up to test the qualifications of the officials and apprentices in the bureau. In the end, most of those who worked in the bureau learned Western astronomy in order to keep their posts. However, Schall strongly resisted teaching those who had already been trained in Chinese and Muslim astronomy because of the hostility they had shown the missionaries since the late Ming. It was Christian converts who became his most welcomed pupils. Eventually, the Muslim section was abolished.21 However, this did not mean that the Jesuits had vanquished their competitors once and for all. The personnel in the Muslim section were transferred to other sections in the bureau, where they awaited their opportunity to take vengeance.22

20 Needham, Mathematics and the sciences of the heavens and the earth, p. 449.
In 1657, Wu Ming-hsüan, the former director of the Muslim section, in an effort to be restored to his status, brought an accusation against Schall. Though Wu failed, this incident was a warning that enemies of the Jesuits stood ready to retaliate. Yang Kuang-hsien (1597–1669), a merchant who was a self-proclaimed proponent of Confucian ideas, decided to wage a campaign against this “evil” religion (Catholicism) in 1659 and 1660 after viewing a picture of the crucifixion. He brought a series of accusations against the Jesuits, and against Schall in particular. In addition to charges against Christianity, he argued that Jesuit-inspired changes in the calendar were intended to subvert the authority of the dynasty itself. He pointed out, for example, that there was a “misplaced” intercalary month in the 1661 calendar the Jesuits had compiled as well as several changes to calendrical practices that had long been associated with the Confucian legacy. He also cited the inauspicious choice of the date for the funeral of the son of the Shun-chih emperor’s favorite concubine. Yang’s initiative, however, ended in failure.

In the midst of the conflict between Yang Kuang-hsien and the Jesuits, the political situation changed suddenly when the Shun-chih emperor died from smallpox in 1661. The new emperor, K’ang-hsi (1654–1722, r. 1662–1722), was only a child. As a result, imperial power was vested in the hands of four Manchu regents who faced resistance from several quarters: the remnants of the Ming dynasty in the south who were using Taiwan as a base for raids on the new empire, Han Chinese literati in the Chiang-nan area, and the powerful Three Feudatories in the south. The preservation of the Ch’ing empire was the central occupation of the Manchu regents and they did not shy away from violence. A prominent example is the literary inquisition in 1663 against a group of scholars assembled to compile an unauthorized history of the Ming dynasty, which led to considerable bloodshed. Utilizing this political event, the Jesuits were able to attack Yang Kuang-hsien. They implied that Yang had been involved in the Ming history case, for Yang had written the two characters Ming shih (“Ming history”) in a preface. Yang, however, was exonerated for lack of evidence that his intention was subversive.

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Yang took advantage of his exoneration to renew his attack against the Jesuits. This time, he crafted his tactics to fit the new political situation: he accused the Jesuits of treachery. According to Yang, the Jesuits were assembling converts and setting up churches all over the empire. They behaved no differently from those secret religious sects that had caused previous dynasties so much trouble. Their treacherous intent, furthermore, was enunciated on the cover of the calendar they had edited: the words *i hsi-yang hsin-fa* ("according to new Western methods") written there could not have been more obvious. According to Yang, these words clearly showed that the Jesuits had furtively compromised the authority of the emperor by subjugating the calendar to Western religious power. In addition to these accusations, Yang also re-presented his earlier memorial in which he had attacked the Jesuits for altering Chinese calendrical practices in order to undermine the dynasty's legitimacy.²⁸

Upon receiving these serious charges, the Ch'ing authorities responded immediately by jailing the missionaries in the capital, including Schall, as well as the converted astronomers in the Bureau of Astronomy. A series of trials was held to investigate each of Yang Kuang-hsien's accusations. During the proceedings, Yang filed further charges, ones that he had already presented to the Ch'ing authorities in 1660. In 1665, the verdict of guilty was delivered on the latest count that Yang had added—choosing the wrong date for the funeral of the son of Shun-chih’s favorite concubine—and Schall and the converted astronomers were sentenced to death.²⁹ The Jesuit mission was banned and the missionaries were to be deported to Macao. Before the executions could be carried out, a strong earthquake struck north China. Factions at court interpreted the earthquake as a warning from Heaven that the verdicts were unjust. The regents reported on the case to the grand empress dowager, K'ang-hsi's grandmother, who was on good terms with Schall. She promptly called for Schall's release. An amnesty was later proclaimed, and all of the other charges were dismissed. Although Schall and his fellow Jesuits were released, five converted Han Chinese astronomers were executed. This bloodshed constituted an exercise of Manchu sovereignty over their Han subjects: the converts' submission to the authority of the Pope by converting to Catholicism was not allowed within the Ch'ing empire.

Schall died soon after his release. The missionaries were removed from the Bureau of Astronomy, and Yang Kuang-hsien was appointed director.

Although Yang tried to decline the appointment because he was ignorant of the techniques of calendar-making, he finally accepted. The Chinese and Muslim astronomical systems were temporarily restored. However, errors in the calendar occurred and Yang was unable to fix them. Yang eventually faced a situation similar to the one that had doomed the missionaries: many officials who remained in the Bureau of Astronomy now trained in Western astronomy were reluctant to co-operate and worked only grudgingly.\textsuperscript{30}

The young K'ang-hsi emperor expressed concern about the astronomical irregularities and the inaccuracies in the calendar that could undermine his legitimacy. In particular, the powerful regents remained a threat to his rule. In 1668 K'ang-hsi issued an edict ordering Yang Kuang-hsien and Wu Ming-hsüan to co-operate with the missionaries so that they could make a more reliable calendar. In another edict issued on the same day, the emperor demanded a series of predictions of the sun’s position on the coming days.\textsuperscript{31} Yang and Wu tried to avoid the test but the emperor refused to excuse them. In front of high officials who served as witnesses, the Jesuit Ferdinand Verbiest (1623–88) performed successful predictions by using the gnomon. Both Yang and Wu denied the legitimacy of the test because Verbiest’s predictions, though more accurate, were not without discrepancies. After Verbiest’s successful performance, K’ang-hsi also authorized the Jesuits to review the 1669 calendar made by Wu Ming-hsüan. In order to assure himself of the credibility of Western astronomy, K’ang-hsi ordered more astronomical observations to be performed during the following year. Once these had been successfully completed, K’ang-hsi proclaimed the missionaries the victors and authorized them to prepare the calendar for the coming year. The missionaries and the converted astronomers had been vindicated. Yang, on the other hand, would have been punished were it not for his advanced age. The case was closed. The Jesuits, after five years, had reclaimed their reputation and their role in calendar-making for the court.\textsuperscript{32}

Because K’ang-hsi had approved the use of Jesuit astronomy to produce an accurate calendar, he also had to confront the troubles accompanying the Western mission and the symbolic implications of their calendar. For a Manchu emperor to present himself as a Confucian ruler, Yang Kuang-hsien’s accusations against the Jesuits had to be taken seriously. After the case was closed and the positions of the missionaries and their Chinese followers in the Bureau of Astronomy had been restored, the official in charge of the

trial memorialized to reinstate the Jesuit mission. K'ang-hsi turned down the request and imposed new restrictions on the spread of the mission. Despite the missionaries’ efforts to protect Christianity under these circumstances, they could only maintain their base at court. To win imperial endorsement, they had to surrender their religious objectives in exchange for assuring the acceptance of their astronomy. This compromise stymied their goal of converting the emperor and thereby the Ch'ing empire to Christianity.

K'ang-hsi further ordered the five characters i hsi-yang hsin-fa (“according to new Western methods”) on the cover of the calendar to be replaced by the words Ch'iu-n't'ien chien tsou-chun yin-tsao Shib-hsien li-jih (“Shih-hsien calendar published by the Bureau of Astronomy with imperial authorization”). Moreover, the Ming collection of Western mathematics and astronomy entitled Ch'ung-chen li-shu (Calendrical treatises of the Ch'ung-chen reign), produced during the 1630s and 1640s, was reissued in 1669 with a new title, Hsin-fa li-shu (Calendrical treatises in accordance with the new methods). This compendium had been presented to the Shun-chih emperor in 1646 with the title Hsi-yang hsin-fa li-shu (Calendrical treatises in accordance with the new Western methods). Both the Ming Ch'ung-chen emperor and K'ang-hsi avoided association with the word “Western” (hsi), whereas Schall never gave up his symbolic struggle to use the word. With the new wording, the K'ang-hsi emperor exerted total imperial control over the calendar.

The dispute between the missionaries and Yang Kuang-hsien was no less about who was in the proper position to organize knowledge than it was about who was in the proper position to organize the social order. In his attack on the missionaries, Yang contended that he knew only the principles (li) of calendar-making but not the methods (fa). As long as one understood the principles, the technical problems associated with traditional methods could be solved by a group effort on the part of Confucian scholars. According to Yang, calendrical learning, so crucial to the legitimacy of the empire, should not be monopolized by foreign experts who believed in an absolute authority higher than the emperor and knew nothing about cultural practices associated with the imperial calendar. This knowledge had to be managed by Confucian scholars who managed other aspects of the social order and understood every

cultural aspect of the calendar. Technical experts who were not Confucian scholars had no business interfering in calendrical affairs. Yang envisioned a social order in which these scholars monopolized calendrical knowledge, and in which as the managers of the social order they were also the masters of knowledge. Despite Yang’s incompetence in astronomy, many later Ch’ing scholars shared his vision of calendrical learning and the social order.\footnote{Chu, “Scientific dispute in the imperial court,” pp. 7–34.}

\textit{Reshaping Chinese astronomy}

After the 1664 calendar case was settled and the K’ang-hsi emperor extended his patronage, Western astronomy came to replace indigenous calendrical traditions. Chinese astronomers had to confront the newly endorsed Western astronomy as an imperially sponsored system. Western astronomy and the mathematical methods upon which it rested became indispensable to all who involved themselves in calendrical learning during the late seventeenth and the eighteenth centuries. The association of Western astronomy with Western religion, however, was disturbing, as was the obsolescence of traditional calendrical methods, which were considered part of the legacy that Chinese scholars inherited from ancient sage kings. Under such circumstances, an ideological reformulation was called for, one that incorporated Western astronomy into a revitalized Chinese calendrical tradition and legitimized the existence of both. It was here that Mei Wen-ting (1633–1721) made his contribution to Chinese calendrical learning.

Unlike Yang Kuang-hsien, Mei Wen-ting was an expert in calendar-related learning. He wrote about geometry following the format of Euclid’s \textit{Elements}. Interested in the geometry that the Jesuits transmitted, Mei studied the properties of various polyhedra and corrected some of the Jesuits’ mistakes. He also investigated inscribed figures and discussed the nature of this complicated set of geometric problems. He was able to reduce a difficult three-dimensional geometric problem to two dimensions by the ingenious use of projection. He also proved some trigonometrical theorems using the methods he had designed.\footnote{Liu Tun, “Ch’ing-ch’u li-suan ta-shih Mei Wen-ting,” \textit{Tzu-jan pien-cheng-fa t’ung-hsün} 6 No. 1 (1986), pp. 52–64. Li Ti and Kuo Shih-jung, \textit{Mei Wen-ting: Ch’ing-tai chu-ming t’ien-wen chu-hsüeh-chia} (Shanghai, 1988). Hashimoto Keizō, “Bai Buntei no sūgaku kenkyū,” \textit{Tōhō gakubō} (Kyoto) 44 (1973), pp. 233–72.} This brief list of his accomplishments could be extended. However, Mei was commemorated by later scholars as one of the greatest Chinese mathematicians, not strictly because of his deep mathematical skills, but because he was a Confucian scholar who was able to forge new links between
Chinese and Western calendrical studies. He thereby redirected the research of the next generations.

In addition to studying Western astronomy, Mei also pursued the analysis and reconstruction of ancient Chinese calendrical learning. He began his studies in astronomy in an effort to reconstruct the system of the Ming calendar, and in 1662 he produced a systematic account of how he had completed his project. His methods were similar to practices then current in evidential studies (k’ao-cheng); that is, collecting, correcting, and reconstructing ancient texts. He highlighted questions that he had been unable to solve. Mei Wen-ting took collation seriously and considered it the basis for calendrical investigations. Unless the texts had been properly collated and reconstructed, Mei decided that no positive insight was possible.

Mei Wen-ting also laid down a foundation for his methodology. Mei argued that ancient sages observed phenomena in the heavens in order to create a calendrical system that corresponded to the patterns (li) in the heavens. Therefore, when they set up the calendar, they also established its ongoing principles (li). At the same time, Mei further argued that the sages’ calendar expressed numerical relationships (shu) derived from patterns (li) in the celestial phenomena. Conversely, principles (li) could be fathomed through an investigation of numbers. However, the sages of antiquity were unable to predict the minute heavenly variations. Later scholars had more data and were able to discover these minute changes and take them into account in calendar-making. The enterprise of calendrical learning thus proceeded through accumulation, with each past calendar contributing to technical progress without changing the principles established by the ancient sage kings. Mei contended that by meticulously studying the calendars of the past, the hearts (hsin) of the later scholars were able to comprehend the hearts of the ancient sages and apprehend the eternal principles (li) of calendars.

Thus, even though the calendar of Mei’s time in many ways surpassed its antecedents, in his view it was necessary to preserve and study ancient calendrical systems.

Moreover, Mei Wen-ting considered calendrical studies to be included in the core of the Confucian precept of the investigation of things in order to fathom the Principle (ko-wu ch’iung-li). His emphasis on the importance of technical aspects of calendrical studies led Mei to reject the claims of men such

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as Yang Kuang-hsien who were satisfied with understanding the principles of calendrical learning without bothering with detailed calendrical calculations. According to Mei, numerical relationships (shu) do not go beyond principles and principles do not go beyond numerical relationships. Without engaging in complicated calendrical computation, the principles of the calendar could not be comprehended.\(^4^2\) Although Mei maintained the primacy of principles (li), his view went against Chu Hsi’s system, in which numbers (shu) were subordinate to the holistic coherence (li) that dominated the phenomenal world, a view which scholars such as Yang Kuang-hsien had supported.

By claiming that calendrical learning was a crucial part of the Confucian enterprise, Mei Wen-ting wanted to explain why the Ming state had prohibited private calendrical learning. He argued that calendrical learning and astromancy had been different branches of knowledge, and that calendrical learning was a Confucian art. The law prohibited astromancy, not calendrical studies, or so Mei claimed. Although astromancy focused on foretelling the future, calendrical studies supported kingly governance. The ban on astromancy was not total; the law only prohibited those who manipulated omens in order to disturb the social order.\(^4^3\)

Like Yang Kuang-hsien, Mei considered calendrical learning a collective endeavor for all Confucians.\(^4^4\) He suggested that the transmission of calendrical learning be carried on in lineage schools and academies (shu-yüan), which, though they prepared the students for the examinations, largely excluded calendrical learning from their curriculum.\(^4^5\) He also emphasized the importance of intellectual exchange among interested scholars. For Mei, the inefficient exchange of astronomical information was due to secrecy among astronomers and lack of interest among Confucian scholars. Mei also urged his contemporaries to provide detailed citations so other scholars could trace their sources and evaluate their contributions. Mei Wen-ting’s vision of calendrical learning and efforts to implement it were typical of evidential scholars at this time.\(^4^6\)

From 1668 on, at more or less the same time as Mei Wen-ting was acquiring expertise in calendar-related knowledge, the young K'ang-hsi emperor was receiving instruction in mathematics, astronomy, and calendars from the Jesuits, especially Verbiest.\(^4^7\) The emperor chose to use the better-transmitted and more accurate technical knowledge related to calendars introduced by

\(^4^3\) Mei, Chi-hsiüeh-t'ang wen-ch'ao 5, p. 5a.
\(^4^4\) Mei, Chi-hsiüeh-t'ang wen-ch'ao 2, pp. 3b–6b.
\(^4^5\) Mei, Chi-hsiüeh-t'ang wen-ch'ao 1, pp. 34a–35b; and 4, p. 16b.
\(^4^6\) For the use of “citation” and channels of communication among evidential scholars, see Elman, From philosophy to philology (1984), pp. 172–98, 203–7.
Westerners. In a short discourse in 1704 on the methods of triangle calculation that was prepared after the emperor had read some of Mei Wen-ting’s writings but before they met, the emperor pointed to the many contributions to calendars made in antiquity. He recalled the notorious calendar case, instigated by Yang Kuang-hsien at the beginning of his reign, when he was still a boy, that had revolved around less-than-adequate knowledge of calendars. The K’ang-hsi emperor reminded his readers that the controversy in 1668 had erupted when the Bureau of Astronomy proposed adding an unprecedented second intercalary month to the next year’s calendar. The emperor recalled that he had spent years studying astronomy (t’ien-uen) and calendar methods (li-fa), so he had a general understanding of the technicalities. Everyone knew, the emperor said, that there were differences between ancient and modern methods, but they did not know that even though calendrical knowledge had originated in what he called the central country (chung kuo), this knowledge had been transmitted long ago to the far West (chi-hsi), where Westerners (hsi-jen) had preserved and refined it. In other words, the K’ang-hsi emperor was embracing the position that there need be no hesitation or criticism about adopting new and Western learning because it was fundamentally ours.

By the end of 1705, tensions between the missionaries and the Manchu emperor grew over the interpretation and adoption of Chinese rites. The so-called Rites Controversy erupted, and the motives of the missionaries, who controlled the calendrical knowledge associated with the legitimacy of the dynasty, were again under suspicion. As the K’ang-hsi emperor acknowledged, ever since the Yang Kuang-hsien incident of the 1660s he had been troubled by the disputes over the two calendrical traditions. Now K’ang-hsi had to deal with a vexatious situation. One of his actions was to commission an astronomical and mathematical compendium to make available the technical secrets of the missionaries so that his subjects could gain access to this knowledge. Although Mei Wen-ting did not participate in the project because of his old age, his work provided intellectual justifications for this project by fusing the two calendrical traditions.


50 K’ang-hsi yu Lo-ma shih-chih kuan-hsi wen-shu (Taipei, 1974), pp. 7–39; see the chapter in this volume by John W. Witek.

51 Ch’ing Shih-tsung, *Sheng-tsu t’ing-hsün ko-yen* (1730; Taipei, 1972), pp. 69a–b. The document mentioned that it was a competition between Schall and Yang in measuring the shadow of the sun. However, judging from other materials, “Schall” should be “Verbiest.”
Although in his earlier writings Mei Wen-ting had sporadically alluded to the idea of “Chinese origins of Western learning,” he did not work out the details of this thesis until he met the K'ang-hsi emperor in 1705. This meeting between a Confucian astronomer-mathematician and the emperor was arranged by Mei’s patron, Li Kuang-ti (1642–1718). For three consecutive days, K'ang-hsi and Mei discussed mathematics and astronomy, and the relationship between Chinese and Western calendrical learning was one of the key issues in their discussions. After the meeting, Mei developed the idea of the “Chinese origins of Western learning” specifically to resolve the emperor’s doubts.  

Why was the claim about the “Chinese origins of Western learning” so significant for the K'ang-hsi emperor? Mei Wen-ting’s promotion of the slogan “Chinese origins of Western learning” (hsi-hsiieh chung-yuan) implicated a significant issue – attitudes about what is foreign – that involved both the Manchu conquerors and the Westerners’ knowledge. A century earlier, in late Ming, Western learning, including calendrical, astronomical, and mathematical knowledge, had been presented in discussions and publications as coming from the Far West (t'ai hsi) and therefore clearly foreign. From the early 1630s Jesuit missionaries were introduced to and employed by the Ming government at Peking, where they worked alongside and in competition with experts in calendrical traditions identified since early Ming as Muslim (hui-hui). In this regard, “foreign” was not as significant an issue as “new.” In late Ming, resistance to Western learning was episodic and largely restricted to those whose interests were being affected. The Ch'ung-chen emperor (r. 1628–44) and his high officials had accepted that the reform of the Ming calendar could draw on Westerners’ calendrical knowledge. After the accession in Peking in the spring of 1644 of the Shun-chih emperor (r. 1644–61), there were two official calendars in circulation. In the south, a succession of regimes that sought to reconstitute the Ming dynasty continued to use an essentially unreformed Ming calendar system. The new Ch'ing regime recognized Schall’s expertise after he had served the Ming court, and it instituted a calendar reformed on the basis of new Western learning already presented to the Ming government. The issue of acceptance of foreign knowledge was not easily raised in territory controlled by the Ch'ing government after 1644. In the 1660s, when Yang Kuang-hsien denounced the pernicious influence at court of Schall and his associates trained in Western methods, he criticized them as foreign, with the implication that the new Ch'ing dynasty, following the tradition of the sages, should reject them. In those years Wang Hsi-ch'an (or -shan) (1628–82) was

one of the first scholars outside the government to compare extensively and critically earlier Chinese astronomy and calendrical learning with the recently introduced Western system. Wang argued that anticipations and early versions of such knowledge could be found in traditional Chinese texts. After Wang’s death, Mei Wen-ting recognized parallels but also differences between Chinese and Western ideas and practices in his writings and when he met with and received patronage from high Ch’ing officials.

The K'ang-hsi emperor’s embrace of the idea of “Chinese origins of Western learning” gave Mei Wen-ting grounds to pursue it. What Mei did was make a detailed textual study to figure out the route of transmission as the basis for the narrative. Mei first traced the origins of Western calendrical learning back to the mathematical classic Chou-pi (The gnomon of Chou), which had not been taken seriously by Chinese scholars. According to Mei, calendrical learning originated in ancient China and had been spread by court astronomers who had fled China during a period of political chaos in ancient times. As Chinese calendrical learning spread abroad, it was applied uniquely to the cultural needs of individual societies, which developed their own calendrical systems and religions. The Indians refined what they had learned and created Buddhism. The Muslims and the Christians, both having once believed in Buddhism, created their own religions once they were capable of making their own calendars. One had a calendar based on twelve lunar months; the other’s calendar was based on a solar year. Consequently, their festivals are different from Chinese ones. Mei concluded that the symbolic and cultural significance of the calendar could not be displaced, though the methods used to draw up the calendar could be imported. Furthermore, he argued that since China was a Confucian state, the traditional method that had averaged fortnightly periods and a way to determine the intercalary month – two vital components for determining the first day of the new year and of each month (cheng-shuo) – should still be used.

Mei Wen-ting further argued that the standard Chinese explanations were superior because China was the land of the sages, men who had taught the five human relations (wu-lun). Mei argued that although the Earth was a sphere, the “middle” land (chung t’u) where the sages had been born was located on the “face” (mien) of the Earth. Just as the face of a human being was where the vital

54 Mei Wen-ting, Li-hsüeh i-wen pu [c.1705], in Li-suan ch’üan-shu (Taipei, 1983), pp. 56–7.
spirit gathered, the middle land generated sages who had followed the way of Heaven in establishing civilization. China was located at a pivotal position because its civilization was better than others. Although the philosophy and the benevolence of Buddhism and Christianity were profound, they neglected the important relationships between father and son and between king and minister, as taught by Mencius. Moreover, the Chinese language was the only orderly language, whereas other languages often reversed proper word order. Westerners who had traveled to several countries also admitted that they had never seen so brilliant a civilization as China. The superiority of China, the ancestor of all civilizations, was constructed on its moral and cultural values. Mei's arguments for the cultural significance of the Chinese calendar, especially his insistence on the use of the standard explanations, were in the mode Yang Kuang-hsien inaugurated.

Equally important, by making Western astronomy the legatee of traditional Chinese calendrical practices, Mei was able to legitimate the use of the Western methods in his own work. By placing Chinese calendrical learning at the origin, Mei was also able to urge Confucian scholars to revive their own traditions through the search for and reconstruction of ancient texts. By so doing, Mei paved the way for a synthesis of astronomy, mathematics, and evidential studies to make technical knowledge a requirement for a Confucian scholar.

In 1713, the K'ang-hsi emperor appointed Mei Wen-ting's grandson, Mei Chüeh-ch'eng (1681–1763), to work on the grand compendium of mathematics and astronomy that later was completed under the title Lü li yüan yüan (Origins of pitchpipes and the calendar). The theory of the “Chinese origins of Western learning” constituted the genealogical mechanism by which Chinese and Western methods would be assigned their proper places. Mei Chüeh-ch'eng, though not serving in the Bureau of Astronomy, stayed in the capital and became the key figure in spreading Mei Wen-ting’s calendrical studies to eighteenth-century astronomers.

Although the formulation of “Chinese origins of Western learning” was officially adopted, Mei’s proposal to restore the standard calendar explanations was never accepted. The Manchu emperors may have feared that a restoration of the calendar system using the method of averaged fortnightly periods might lead to the same calendrical chaos that had occurred in the late Ming.

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Moreover, it was not clear whether the Chinese and Western methods were compatible at the level of specificity required for an accurate calendar. As a result, Manchu emperors continued to entrust calendrical matters to the missionaries. However, by appropriating both the discourse of “Chinese origins of Western learning” and Western astronomy, Manchu emperors weakened the symbolic resources of the Jesuits by making both Western and Chinese knowledge subordinate to imperial interests.

Evidential studies and calendrical learning in the eighteenth century

After Mei Wen-ting, the study of Chinese mathematics and astronomy underwent a dramatic change that persisted to the end of the Ch’ing dynasty. In the eighteenth century, mathematics and astronomy received attention as fields of study rather than as tools for calendar-making.\(^6^0\) Mathematics and astronomy were used to verify the dates of texts and historical events, reconstruct ancient calendars, investigate ancient celestial phenomena, and reconstruct the original shape of objects recorded in the classical texts. Calendrical learning no longer was a handmaid to metaphysical and moral persuasion; the relationships among these intellectual fields changed.\(^6^1\) Mathematics was now thought of as independent and separate from calendrical learning. The social status of mathematics and astronomy and of their practitioners also rose as more scholars devoted themselves to research in these disciplines. A few scholars were even willing to sacrifice their pursuit of an official career in order to study mathematics.\(^6^2\)

These changes in the status of mathematics and astronomy affected many literati. Biographies of mathematicians and astronomers later were accorded a place in the Ch’ing dynastic history.\(^6^3\) At the end of the eighteenth century, Juan Yüan (1764–1849), with help from Li Jui (1768–1817) and others, constructed an intellectual genealogy of astronomers and mathematicians to legitimate and celebrate these changes. As his Ch’ou-jen chuan (Biographies of astronomers and mathematicians) was expanded by later Ch’ing scholars, more and more evidential scholars came to be included in the newly applied category of ch’ou-jen (astronomers and mathematicians).


This new intellectual trend was, according to Lo Shih-lin (1774–1853), the result of the labor of Mei Wen-ting, Chiang Yung (1681–1762), and Tai Chen (1723–77). Mei had enthusiastically advocated the ancient methods, but he believed that many of the ancient mathematical and astronomical texts had been lost. Chiang and Tai expanded Mei Wen-ting’s intellectual legacy, rediscovered and collated many of these valuable ancient texts, and brought ancient calendrical methods back into scholarly discourse. Building on the work of these predecessors, Ch’ien Ta-hsin (1728–1804) “searched for truth in material things” (shih-shih ch’iu-shih) and developed a comprehensive vision that earned him the accolade of the most outstanding astronomer and mathematician of the Ch’ing.  

Chiang Yung and Ch’ien Ta-hsin were accomplished evidential scholars interested in calendrical learning, but they had very different opinions about it. Part of a new generation of scholars, Ch’ien criticized Chiang on technical and metaphysical grounds, which ultimately involved acknowledging the distinction between Chinese and Western calendrical methods. Ch’ien attacked Chiang for blindly following Western methods and being manipulated by Westerners. The conflicts between Ch’ien and Chiang were situated at two different levels. On a technical level, Ch’ien doubted that the length of a tropical year (sui-shih) was a constant. At a philosophical level, Ch’ien doubted that any system could fully explain the physical nature of the universe.  

Ch’ien’s hostility toward Westerners was later integrated into the Ch’ou-jen chuan that his friend, Juan Yüan, and disciples compiled. For Ch’ien Ta-hsin, Juan Yüan, and their contemporaries, the development of calendrical learning had to take place within the indigenous Chinese tradition. Cultural boundaries between Chinese and foreigners were a central concern. However, these men were not so biased as to propose that Western astronomy be completely phased out. Like Mei Wen-ting, they sought to relocate the relative cultural positions of Chinese (chung) and Western (hsi) calendrical learning to protect the legacy of the ancient sages, which evidential studies aimed to decipher. They employed the notion of the “Chinese origins of Western learning” to justify their intellectual stance, developing a “Chinese” method which was a hybrid of Western and ancient methods while preserving the cultural boundaries between the Chinese and the Westerners. In this intellectual atmosphere, Chiang Yung’s favorable attitude toward Western methods disturbed some literati because of its tacit adherence to a more tolerant attitude toward the Westerners.

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64 Lo Shih-lin, Hsi ch’ou-jen chuan (1840; Taipei, 1982), p. 646.
65 Ch’ien Ta-hsin, Ch’ien-yen t’ang wen-chi (c.1810; Taipei, 1968), pp. 320–2.
66 “Ch’ou-jen chuan fan-li,” in Juan Yüan, Ch’ou-jen chuan hui-pien (1799; Taipei, 1982), pp. 1–5.
Chiang Yung’s preference for Western astronomical theories and techniques was rooted in his belief that Western astronomy had described the actual motions of the heavens through its cosmological models. This opinion had been popular among Chinese astronomers such as Mei Wen-ting who adopted Western astronomy in their research. Western astronomy contributed not only to the computations of calendar experts, but also to the Confucians’ quest for principles (li) embedded in the physical world’s patterns as revealed in numerical relationships (shu). Moreover, these scholars held that Western methods had surpassed Chinese methods in precision and accuracy. Chiang, an eminent evidential scholar himself, remained faithful to Chu Hsi’s thought and attempted to establish a comprehensive system of knowledge based on the classic Book of Change. Chiang maintained that an astronomer might concern himself with the methods of calculating, but a Confucian was intellectually compelled to also take into account the particular principles (li) behind the phenomenal world, with the ultimate goal of restoring the inclusive Principle (li). Western methods, therefore, better satisfied Chiang’s purpose. Standing on this conceptual ground, Chiang attempted to undermine the arguments of Yang Kuang-hsien and Mei Wen-ting, both of whom suggested that the averaged fortnightly period method was the only legitimate calendrical method for a Confucian emperor and empire. Chiang Yung directly criticized Mei’s proposal to accept any method so long as its principles (li) were sound and useful. Chiang argued that a true principle (li) was different from an apparently true one. The long tradition of Chinese methods demonstrated only their antiquity, not their truth. If truth and antiquity cannot both be attained, Chiang asserted that he would rather give up antiquity.

Despite his intellectual regard for Western methods, Chiang Yung did not neglect the cultural significance of traditional Chinese calendrical methods that Yang Kuang-hsien and Mei Wen-ting had defended. Chiang wrote his tribute to Western astronomy alongside Mei’s argument for the superiority of Chinese civilization owing to China’s central (chung) location on the Earth. Chiang asserted that Mei’s explanation was more than a mere proclamation of superiority, but a profound insight that reached into the Principle (li).

Nevertheless, Chiang Yung’s openness towards Western astronomy was not shared by the next generation of evidential scholars, represented by men such

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67 Chiang Yung, Shu-hsieh [also titled I Mei. 1844 Shou-shan ko ti’ung-shu ed.] (1740; Shanghai, 1936), pp. 30–2.
68 Chiang, Shu-hsieh, p. 273.
70 Chiang, Shu-hsieh, pp. 12–13.
as Ch'ien Ta-hsin and Juan Yüan, who did not believe that the universe was as regular as Mei Wen-ting and Chiang Yung had thought. For Mei and Chiang, the universe operates in accord with the Tychonic geo-heliocentric model, with the Earth at the center, the sun and moon revolving around the Earth, and the five planets revolving around the Sun. Ch'ien and Juan also rejected the premise that there was a single cosmological model that could truly account for the operation of the universe, whether it was a geocentric, geo-heliocentric, or heliocentric system. This change in attitude stemmed from the introduction of a new astronomical theory in the eighteenth century.

After the Rites Controversy, missionaries continued to serve as imperial astronomers and improve the precision of the calendar. In 1742, Jesuits introduced the use of ellipses to replace the deferent and epicycles system in their models of planetary motion. In 1760, Michel Benoist (1715–74) presented an account of Copernicus's (1473–1543) heliocentric system to the Ch'ien-lung emperor as a gift on his fiftieth birthday. However, this new cosmographical system seems to have caused more confusion than clarification because the Jesuits failed to offer any explanation of this alternative Western theory. Although Benoist presented the Copernican system only as a means to simplify calculations and did not make claims about the truth of its cosmology, the concept of a moving Earth raised serious doubts among Confucian literati. As Juan Yüan pointed out, this system reversed the positions of above (the moving celestial sphere) and below (the static Earth). Therefore, it was divorced from the classics (ching) and betrayed the Confucian way.

The new theory convinced a generation of astronomers in the late eighteenth century that irregularities in the universe were beyond human understanding. The Westerners had changed their model of the universe from the Aristotelian geocentric to the Tychonic geo-heliocentric system and then to the Copernican heliocentric system. The Jesuits did not explain differences among the systems but simply presented them as a unified, continuous Western tradition. The Jesuits' practical attitude encouraged them to use the best astronomical methods available and to disregard European religious disputes surrounding these different cosmologies. Although Chinese astronomers at this time claimed that China was the origin of Western learning, in fact Westerners were the source of new astronomical information and mathematical knowledge. The generations of Mei Wen-ting and Chiang Yung thought that the Tychonic geo-heliocentric system came close to representing the real universe. They tried to understand the system's principles and corrected what they

believed to be wrong. However, the introduction of Kepler’s model of elliptical orbits and the Copernican heliocentric system aroused a deep skepticism among the younger generation of Chinese astronomers who, following the missionaries’ leads, believed that all these models were only different bases of astronomical computations and did not represent the actual structure of the universe. As Tai Chen pointed out, the universe was extremely profound and the accuracy of astronomical calculations decayed over time. Minute variations could be detected only after a long time. Therefore one needed instruments and methods to reconcile these variations and to revise the calendar whenever discrepancies appeared. Since human beings were unable to fathom the secrets of the universe, Tai Chen turned his attention to the relationship between the kingly way and calendrical learning. After all, that was the purpose of calendrical studies. Tai asserted that respecting heaven and diligently attending to the welfare of the people defined the kingly way. The ruler was not, therefore, required to know the minute details about the heavenly bodies. Even if the motions of the five planets were unusual, the sage was only expected to attend to his own conduct, not to predict planetary motions. The calendrical predictions and the motions of heavenly bodies would eventually fall out of alignment, Tai observed. Astronomers designed calendars in accordance with regularities, and recorded abnormalities for future revisions. The sage kings used astronomical instruments to understand the operation of heaven so that they might match human affairs with the pattern and flux of heaven.

Tai’s arguments reveal an acceptance of the fundamental irregularity of the universe, an irregularity that precluded the success of human efforts to make a perfect calendar once and for all. Though a sage king would need the assistance of astronomers and astronomical instruments to understand celestial phenomena, it was not possible to exhaust the profundity of the universe. Consequently, the urgent task of the sage kings was not to exhaust every aspect of celestial phenomena, but to understand the Sun and the Moon, since they directly influenced the livelihood of their subjects. The irregular aspects of the universe led Tai to emphasize the symbolic significance of calendrical learning and its direct link to the ruler’s responsibility to take care of his people. Technical details, though important, were not the first priority for a sage king.

75 Tai, Tai Chen ch’ian-chi, pp. 239–40.
77 Chu Pingyi, “Western astronomy and evidential study: Tai Chen on astronomy,” in Current perspectives in the history of science in East Asia, ed. Kim Yung Sik and Francesca Bray (Seoul, 1999), pp. 131–44.
Tai Chen’s opinions on calendrical learning reflected the general views of his time. In a letter to Tai Chen, Ch’ien Ta-hsin criticized Chiang Yung: “The ways of heaven are extraordinarily profound. They simply cannot be exhausted by one person’s method ... The deferents, equants, and epicycles in the new method are artful calculations, not reality.”78 Unable to explicate how the universe operated, neither Western nor Chinese astronomy could claim the privilege of possessing the regular patterns (li) regarding the universe. Some scholars even argued that because Western cosmology was so problematic, the Chinese method must be superior. In agreement with Ch’ien Ta-hsin, Juan Yüan contended that the Westerners simply made up theories about the universe as if they were able to explain why an event happened (so-i-jan) in taking the course it did. But Westerners had changed their models several times over the course of a century. Not only did these theories mutually contradict each other, but also some of them violated the Way in the Confucian classics. Only the Chinese method, which explained the course of events as they are, could be effective.79 Scholars such as Juan Yüan no longer believed in the possibility of accurately depicting the motion of the universe. Instead of making up grand but false theories to account for what the universe was like, the Chinese method limited itself to describing phenomena. This more limited goal, he argued, showed intellectual integrity. Some scholars now sought to overturn the distinction between why an event took its course (so-i-jan) and the event as it ought to be (tang-jan). These scholars rejected the missionaries’ claim (based on an Aristotelian account which the Catholic Church warranted) to be able to understand causality (so-i-jan). At the same time, in the second half of the eighteenth century, some of these scholars rejected Chu Hsi’s claim that Principle (or coherence, li) was why (so-i-jan) phenomena in the natural world unfold as they are perceived to do. These scholars preferred to understand li as patterns embedded in individual things which could be elucidated by investigating their numerical relationships (shu). In this new intellectual climate, Ch’ien Ta-hsin concluded that Mei Wen-ting had been able to manipulate the Western theories, whereas Chiang Yung had simply been used by the Westerners.80 Western astronomy was again considered one of several methods that might be used in astronomical calculation, neither superior nor inferior to Chinese methods, but it was no longer a reliable representation of the universe.

Although these scholars believed that the irregularity (or incoherence, in an anti-Chu Hsi sense) of the universe could not be completely grasped by human efforts, this did not mean that they accepted Yang Kuang-hsien’s idea

78 Ch’ien, Ch’ien-yen t’ang wen-chi, p. 321.  
79 Juan, Ch’ou-jen chuan hui-pien, p. 610.  
80 Ch’ien, Ch’ien-yen t’ang wen-chi, p. 320.
that the theory of the calendar was more important than its calculation. On the contrary, these later scholars sought to improve their technical knowledge by reviving understanding of ancient Chinese calendrical learning, a program Mei Wen-ting had inspired. During the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, many scholars such as Tai Chen poured energy into rediscovering and reconstructing ancient mathematical texts. Not only did their efforts involve evidential scholarship, they also applied Western mathematics to their enterprise. Many young talents in the early nineteenth century were attracted by this program, and developed theories of solving systems of simultaneous linear equations and higher-order equations through a study of Sung–Yüan mathematical texts. Together they created another high point in the history of Chinese mathematics.  

Manchu emperors and calendrical learning

The Rites Controversy after 1705 forced the Jesuits serving at the Ch'ing court to explicitly express their loyalty to the emperor. They could be either servants of the Pope or savants of the emperor. Ricci’s strategy of accommodating Christianity to Chinese culture while demonstrating the superiority of Christianity through European scientific achievement over time could not be maintained. Ch’ing emperors after K’ang-hsi exerted strict control over the missionaries, exploited their technical expertise at court, and prohibited proselytizing in the empire. This, however, did not mean that the Manchu emperors were xenophobic. They continued to be fond of Western painting and music and understood the usefulness of Western sciences, particularly military technology, although the enthusiasm of the Yung-cheng and Ch’ien-lung emperors was not as great as that of the K’ang-hsi emperor.

By the eighteenth century, many literati were well versed in mathematics and astronomy, even though almost none of them had been appointed to the Bureau of Astronomy. Both Mei Wen-ting and his grandson Mei Chüeh-ch'eng had dedicated their lives to calendrical research, but neither one ever served as an official astronomer in the bureau. Scion of a long line of astronomers and recipient of an honorary chin-shih degree from the K'ang-hsi emperor because of his astronomical expertise, Ho Kuo-tsung (d. 1766), though sometimes involved in the affairs of the bureau, served mainly as a regular civil bureaucrat. The Ch’ing government seems to have made an effort to reserve the positions in the Bureau of Astronomy for Jesuits and those they trained. In the emperors’ eyes, Han Chinese literati and foreign missionaries

82 Juan, Ch’iu-jen chuan hui-pien, pp. 518–22.
were two distinct groups serving different purposes and operating in different milieus.

Despite the vigorous efforts of Han Chinese literati to address the cultural significance of the calendar, during the Ch’ien-lung period the government acknowledged only a small portion of their concerns. What was accepted was not relevant to the precise computation of the calendar but did have cultural significance for Han Chinese.\(^{83}\) The Manchu emperors rejected the proposal for setting the calendar according to the traditional Chinese method of averaged fortnightly periods. The Manchu emperors released Western knowledge to literati by publishing a series of astronomical and mathematical encyclopedias. They also involved literati and missionaries in projects to translate Western astronomical and mathematical works. The missionaries and the Confucian astronomers were effectively segregated from each other while the emperor stood between them, controlling the flow of information, mediating conflicts between the two groups, and enjoying the legitimacy that both groups conferred on him.\(^{84}\)

**MEDICINE**

*Physicians in an open market*

Soon after Matteo Ricci arrived in China in 1583, he noticed differences between Chinese and European medical practices. Ricci wrote that Chinese medical practitioners relied on pulse diagnosis and herbal medicine and worked in a largely unregulated environment. There was virtually no entering barrier for those who wanted to practice medicine. Although most physicians learned their skills from a teacher, the trained and untrained coexisted equally in the market.\(^{85}\)

Low barriers to entry entailed intense competition. Not only did physicians compete with each other, they also faced competition from itinerant healers (*tsou-fang-i*), quacks, religious healers, and amateurs, particularly in


the Chiang-nan area. Increases in population and prosperity in Chiang-nan contributed to the demand for medical care and spurred competition among physicians. After the establishment of the Ming dynasty, governments at all levels retreated from the responsibility for health care and left it to the local elites. Although medical officers were set up in local governments, they were not considered regular officials. They were selected by the local government and given licenses, but they exerted no power or standards on physicians about medical practices. Except at court, no examinations were given to physicians and no licensing restrictions were imposed upon medical practitioners. Although the K'ang-hsi emperor noticed the low quality of physicians, he did nothing about it. A famous physician, Hsü Ta-ch'un (1693–1771), once proposed the licensing of medical practitioners, but his proposal was rejected. Physicians continued their practices unchecked.

An effect of the fall of the Ming dynasty was an increase in the number of physicians. Chang Lu (1617–98?), for example, observed that many literati had become physicians in early Ch'ing in lieu of seeking appointments as officials in the new government. These physicians promoted each others' reputations, enabling many literati households to produce a physician. Later, Chao Hsüeh-min (1719–1805) wrote that fortune-seekers flocked to this lucrative business, which further lowered standards.

After early Ch'ing, many scholarly physicians were literati frustrated in the examinations. In addition to pursuing an income, some literati became physicians primarily to take care of their own health or that of their family members. Some learned their skills from a master, while others acquired medical knowledge by reading medical texts, which were readily available at

91 Preface in Chang Lu, Chang shih i t'ung (1695; Shanghai, 1995–9), p. 179.
92 Chao Hsüeh-min, Ch'uan-ya (1759; Shanghai, 1995–9), p. 185.
93 Hsü, Forgotten traditions in ancient Chinese medicine, p. 367.
94 Chao, Medicine and society in late imperial China, pp. 25–48.
that time. Many combined both routes. The story of Kao Shih-shih (1637–?) illustrates how a literatus became a physician. Kao first became a teacher to support his mother and himself while he prepared for the examinations. After he realized that he would never pass even the lowest-level examination, he became a doctor. He learned the art from a certain Mr. Ni, who used medical primers, popular prescription books, and medical verses as textbooks. Kao began his medical career at the age of twenty-three, and soon became famous. However, he was aware that his prescriptions were not always effective. In 1664, at the age of twenty-eight, he developed severe diarrhea and was almost killed by other physicians due to their ineptitude. He resolutely refused further medication and recovered after several months. Kao reflected that his medical practices were probably no better than those of the physicians who had almost cost him his life. He condemned the widely circulated prescription manuals and instead learned medicine from Chang Chih-ts'ung (1610–74). Kao read medical classics and eventually wrote his own treatises on medicine. Although he believed that he had made progress, others considered him biased because of his preference for warming types of medication.

Kao Shih-shih’s experience was far from exceptional. Other sources describe similar careers for physicians in the Ming and Ch'ing periods. This process of self-teaching has several implications. Medical learning was stratified by different layers of texts. The medical classics attributed to ancient sages were at the top of the hierarchy. Other texts of the earlier medical masters constituted the middle stratum. Their status was often subject to dispute during this period. An example is the disputes between Ch'ing adherents of the Eastern Han physician Chang Chi (c. 160–218) and proponents of later Sung–Yuan medical masters. In the bottom layer were medical primers, popular texts on prescriptions or formulas, and rhymed medical texts, which were easier to memorize. Proficiency in various texts in the hierarchy in effect differentiated physicians into different strata. Although book learning by no means implied better medical skills, erudition in texts of various kinds often convinced the physician of his skill. He would then present himself before the patient as a competent physician. Moreover, the emphasis on textual knowledge as a way of distinguishing between the status of physicians implies that the barrier for entering the profession was low for men who were literate. As long as one could read, one could access some medical knowledge, express

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95 Angela Ki Che Leung [Liang Ch'i-tzu], "Sung Yüan Ming ti ti-fang i-liao tsu-yüan ch'u-t'an," Chung-kuo she-hui li-shih p'ing-lun No. 3 (2001), pp. 219–37.
96 Kao Shih-shih, I-hsièh chên-ch'üan (1699; Nanking, 1983), p. 73.
97 Angela Ki Che Leung [Liang Ch'i-tzu], "Medical instruction and popularization in Ming–Qing China," Late Imperial China 24 No. 1 (2003), pp. 130–52.
98 Chao, Medicine and society in late imperial China, pp. 44–8.
one’s own opinion on medical matters, and even become a physician on one’s own. Text-reading ability also allowed an educated person access to medical knowledge, which readers could then use to critique physicians. Tensions between physicians and patients mounted as a result. Furthermore, although medical classics were thought to be the highest form of medical knowledge, medical primers occupied a pivotal position for medical students. Not only did simplified medical texts often serve as a starting point for medical learning, contemporaries often considered medical classics vague and difficult. Some literati complained that few physicians were capable of reading the medical classics. Although the basic conceptual framework of medicine was derived from these classics, most physicians started from, and probably depended on, the primers and other medical texts written for contemporary readers. In this way direct knowledge of medical classics functioned as a marker of distinction among physicians.

The existence of the social category of “Confucian physician” (ju-i) as a distinct phenomenon since the Sung period (960–1278) did not signify either professionalization or specialization in the medical field. “Confucian physician,” either as a self-designation or as an accolade from others, was a label for physicians that separated them from other healers and implied an elite status in the field. For a physician, whose profession was not highly regarded at the time, to assume a Confucian identity, he had to meet certain expectations. He was expected to be against self-interest, to be benevolent to his patients, and to sympathize with their sufferings. He should not seek profit from destitute patients, and should co-operate with local officials to provide free medical care to the needy during an epidemic or famine. The practice of these kind and generous deeds not only benefited the patient, but also boosted the fame of the Confucian physicians. In addition, Confucian physicians often employed rhetoric that paired medicine with statecraft and medical classics with Confucian classics so as to elevate the status of medicine. They were expected to apply Confucian morals in their medical practices just as other literati scholars did in their areas of inquiry. Competence in a specific textual tradition became an important criterion to differentiate practitioners in the medical field.

In contrast to physicians who operated clinics and attended their patients on call, itinerant healers occupied the lower end of medical business. Their...
practices differed in important ways from those of physicians. Itinerant healers removed teeth, moles, films on the eyes, and insects in the body. They tended to prescribe stronger medicines that caused vomiting, diarrhea, and sweating to create obvious effects, sometimes at the expense of the patients' health. In contrast, physicians in the Ch'ing period often prescribed weaker medicines to reduce the discomfort of their higher-status customers, even at the cost of effectiveness. Sometimes, itinerant healers made fake medicines or sold cheap ingredients for high prices. They occasionally colluded with each other to pry money from their patients. They might also fight each other and destroy each other's businesses. The itinerant healers did not depend on text-based learning, but on experience, and with their practical training they were often able to cure difficult diseases. Their patients were not limited to human beings but could include domesticated animals, insects, and plants. As wanderers were considered a potential threat to the social order, itinerant healers commonly were stigmatized as pure profit-seekers despite their abilities.104

Religious healers also were popular in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. They prognosticated the development of illness by divination and provided ritual services to ward off the evil spirits causing the disorder. They sometimes were accused of bribing maids of rich families to acquire information about sick members of the family, and then asking for money to perform the ritual services needed to cure the illness. Religious healers might combine herbal medicine with talismans and rituals to cure their clients. Although they occupied an important sector in the medical market, religious healers were despised by Confucian physicians, who complained that religious healers did more harm than good.105

Medical practice during this period also was divided by gender. Like lower-class healers, female healers relied more on skills with their hands than on knowledge drawn from texts.106 They were able to perform minor operations, assist at childbirth, administer acupuncture, and give massages. Their clients were often women and children. They also performed ritual healings. Despite the skills of female healers, men, whether physicians or not, often mistrusted them. Due to gender segregation at the time, for most health issues women required female health-care providers, who could see them more easily than a male physician. These female healers, often labeled “granny” (p'o), were thus

104 Chao, Chyuan-ya, pp. 184–6.
in demand. The rare example of a female physician, T’an Yün-hsien (1461–1554), had underscored her status as a female physician (nü-i) and used this term in the title of her book of case histories so as to differentiate herself from other female healers.107

Textual knowledge did not distinguish skill levels among different kinds of medical practitioner. Chao Hsüeh-min made a cynical remark that many rich and famous physicians were not necessarily more effective than itinerant healers. On the contrary, he argued, many itinerant healers understood the properties of herbs and precisely diagnosed pulses. According to Chao, techniques that itinerant healers used were not so different from those of scholarly physicians, and some were worth recording. Itinerant and religious healers were familiar with the same medical prescriptions physicians used, and although they might resort to talismans and other magical healing methods, so did physicians.108 In Chao’s opinion, because they had to cure the patient quickly, itinerant healers had three virtues: they were convenient, cheap, and quick.109

Text, knowledge, and distinctions

Competition among medical practitioners pushed physicians to distinguish themselves from other kinds of healer. Writing medical treatises became one of the most important means by which physicians promoted themselves and demonstrated their knowledge to well-off potential customers. In addition to traditional commentaries on medical classics and prescription books, new genres of medical writing appeared, such as case histories (i-an), medical discussions (i-lun), and medical discourses (i-hua).110 As types of writing on medicine diversified, printers promoted medical books in general. The act of publishing medical books was often considered a good deed that helped to accumulate good karma, particularly during times when epidemics raged. Moreover, networks for collecting medical information and producing medical texts spread throughout society. Physicians and their disciples, amateurs of medicine, drugstores, and even households kept books or manuscripts that had been copied from other medical texts. The desire for medical information contributed to the wide circulation of printed medical books and manuscripts.

108 Chao, Medicine and society in late imperial China, pp. 269–78.
109 Chao, Ch’üan-ya, p. 183.
110 For the catalogues of medical cases before mid-Ming, see Yen Shih-yün, comp., Chung-kuo i-chi t’ung-k’ao (Shanghai, 1990–3), Volume 4, pp. 4927–9; Christopher Cullen, “Y’ťan (case statements): The origins of a genre of Chinese medical literature,” in Innovation in Chinese medicine, ed. Elisabeth Hsu (New York, 2001), pp. 297–323; Chao, Medicine and society in late imperial China, pp. 185–94.
One striking feature of medical writing in late Ming and Ch'ing was the repetitious content. Medical texts employed a method similar to what has been called “commonplace writing” in Europe, a combination of cut-and-paste extracts from previous works with supplements to create a new natural-philosophy book. This was also a common practice in China since the late Ming period, particularly in the area of technical texts. Charlotte Furth’s discussion of the formation of the Chi-yin kang-mu (To benefit yin: A comprehensive guide) points to this practice. Wu Chih-wang (d. 1629), who compiled To benefit yin, was a friend and colleague of Wang K'eng-t'ang (c.1552–1639). They both passed the chin-shih examination in the same year. Wu’s book copied Wang K'eng-t'ang’s Fu-k'o chung-sheng (Guidelines of gynecology) with a rearrangement of the order of Wang’s texts. This minor adjustment allowed Wu to claim authorship. He also proudly proclaimed that his book was easier to use and that he should be credited for making the contents more user-friendly. Intriguingly, Wang K'eng-t'ang’s work was not original. He directly lifted many passages from works by Hsüeh Chi (1487–1559). This mode of textual reproduction was even more prevalent in prescription books, in which authors copied prescriptions from earlier sources to assemble them into a book with the title as the only new feature. The production of medical knowledge in late imperial Chinese texts largely proceeded through adding something, such as one’s opinions or extra material recontextualized from other sources, to the repository of existing knowledge.

As medical texts proliferated, so did medical opinions based on categories such as yin-yang, five phases, meridians and channels (ching-mo), and six excesses (liu-yin) set forth in medical canons from the Han period (202 BCE–220). Physicians drew on commonplace writings to compose their texts with their elaborations of the corpus. The ability to command concepts derived from medical classics legitimated knowledge claims made by physicians. There being virtually no superior authority to impose standards on medical knowledge, the proliferation of interpretations led to debates, factionalism, and confusion.

The disputes over warm-factor disorders (wen-ping) and cold-damage disorders (shang-han) are an example of a debate over a significant theoretical issue in scholarly medicine during the Ch'ing period. A curious feature of this debate is that the central concept, warm-factor disorders, had no clear definition. Physicians varied in what a warm-factor disorder was and what the treatment should be. “Warm-factor disorders” as a diagnostic category had a long


112 Furth, A flourishing Yin, pp. 159–62.
history by the seventeenth century. It had appeared in medical classics such as the *Huang-ti nei-ching* (Yellow Emperor’s inner canon) (c.200 BCE) and *Shang-han lun* (Treatise on cold-damage disorders) (c.219 CE). Later physicians mentioned warm-factor disorders intermittently, but during the outbreak of epidemics in the late Ming warm-factor disorders became an important category in medical discourse.\(^\text{113}\) In 1642, Wu Yu-hsing (1592–1672), who had witnessed the ravaging epidemics, published his *Wen-i lun* (Treatise on warm-factor epidemic disorders). Wu claimed that traditional etiology fell short in accounting for the ferocious and contagious nature of epidemics. Traditional explanations had attributed the cause of epidemics to the unseasonal circulation of *ch'i*. Wu, however, contended that though unseasonal, the circulation of regular *ch'i* (*ch'ang ch'i*) could not have resulted in such harmful disasters as epidemics. It was, Wu argued, heterogeneous *ch'i* (*tsa ch'i*), which was regionally specific and could not be part of the normal circulation of *ch'i* that led to epidemics.\(^\text{114}\) With this assertion, Wu was assigning a single cause to different kinds of epidemic. Wu argued that the heterogeneous *ch'i* first penetrated the human body through the mouth and nose, lodged in the internal membrane at the center of the body (*mo-y¨uan*), then attacked the stomach, and spread from there to other parts of the body.\(^\text{115}\) This pathology had fever (*je*) as its major symptom. Wu prescribed what he called “bringing down” (*hsia*) as the primary treatment. However, bringing down could cause imbalances within the body and weaken the patient. Therefore managing the timing of restoring the patient’s strength while bringing down the harmful *ch'i* was the key to successful therapy.

Although many of Wu Yu-hsing’s prescriptions for epidemic diseases had been recorded in the *Treatise on cold-damage disorders*, Wu claimed that cold damage (*shang-han*) was caused by the regular *ch'i* and that its pathology process differed from that of warm-factor disorders. Even though some of his prescriptions were the same as those of the *Treatise on cold-damage disorders*, the way he used them was different.\(^\text{116}\) Wu pointed out that most physicians of his day believed only in cold damage and misdiagnosed warm-factor disorders, thus causing high casualties.

As long as Wu Yu-hsing retained the term warm factor (*wen-i*) for epidemics, his rejection of cold damage (*shang-han*) as the sole pathogen for externally contracted (*wai-kan*) disease did not cause much confusion. However, Wu was more ambitious and attempted to formulate a general theory for externally

\(^{113}\) Helen Dunstan, “The late Ming epidemics: A preliminary survey,” *Ch'ing shih wen-t'i* 3 No. 3 (1975), pp. 1–59.


contracted disease, the role the general theory in the *Treatise on cold-damage disorders* played. Wu claimed that real cold-damage disorders were rare, and that most diseases were of the “warm” (*wen*) type. To make this claim, Wu extended the meaning of the term *wen-i* to provide the ground for his new theory. He contended that the term “warm-factor disorder” (*wen-ping*) mentioned in the *Treatise on cold-damage disorders* should be understood as *wen-i*, with the character *wen* (pestilence, with a disease radical) taken as a variation of the original character *wen* (warm, with a water radical). For Wu, the meanings of these two characters are identical. After equating “warm-factor disorders” with “febrile epidemics,” Wu explained that both warm-factor disorders and febrile epidemics can be called epidemics (*i*) because their contagious feature is similar to the word “corvée” (*i*), which is levied on everyone.\(^{117}\) With this etymological manipulation, Wu set out to correct the “mistakes” in important passages in previous medical writings that discussed warm-factor disorders and epidemics. He thereby tried to channel the entire history of these discussions into his own conceptual framework as warm-factor epidemic disorders (*wen-i*).

The *Treatise on warm-factor epidemic disorders* was the first specialized text dedicated to a discussion of epidemics.\(^{118}\) However, Wu’s ambitious search for the why (so-i-jan) or cause for an event taking the course it does by mapping etiology and clinical encounters within the textual tradition created a new set of problems debated at great length by later scholars of warm-factor disorders.\(^{119}\) Were Wu’s new etymologies for *wen-i* and other terms acceptable? Can warm-factor disorders be treated by cold medicine? What type of *ch‘i* causes warm-factor disorders? What is the pathology? Is the “bringing-down” method suitable for the weaker, more delicate bodies of southerners? Ultimately, if a classic such as the *Treatise on cold-damage disorders* no longer served as a guideline for physicians, what was its canonical status? Who had the final say concerning the meaning of the canon?\(^{120}\)

The later debates about warm-factor disorders (*wen-ping*) and cold-damage disorders (*shang-han*) to a large extent were caused by Wu Yu-hsing’s ambitious but theoretically ambiguous account of the key term in his own work. Wu’s mastery of medical classics, theoretical discussions, and philology situated him as one of the scholarly physicians. Some of the medical practitioners who subscribed to his theory of warm-factor disorders, such as Yeh Kuei

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\(^{117}\) Wu, *Wen-i lun*, p. 54.  
\(^{119}\) Wu, *Wen-i lun*, p. 59.  
(1667–1746), Wu T'ang (1736–1820), and Wang Shih-hsiung (1808–90), were hereditary physicians in the Chiang-nan area. Their social origins were indistinguishable from some practitioners who espoused the *Treatise on cold-damage disorders*, such as Yü Ch'ang (1585–1664), K'e Ch'in (1662–1735), Yu I (d. 1740), Hsü Ta-ch'un (1693–1771), and Huang Yüan-yü (1705–58). Both camps were capable of commanding the medical textual traditions and composing their own treatises, which allowed them to participate in the debates of their era.

Unlike the calendrical debates, medical disputes rarely achieved closure. The rise of evidential scholarship in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries did not resolve the debates about warm-factor disorders and cold-damage disorders. Physicians simply could not settle medical disputes through textual investigations since they disagreed on conceptual frameworks for understanding diseases rather than on facts about diseases. Even those who supported the *Treatise on cold-damage disorders* and denied that its place as a general explanatory construct could be supplanted by Wu's theory of warm-factor disorders complained that the treatise's compiler, Wang Shu-ho (c. 280), had confused the order of the texts. If Wang Shu-ho was incapable of knowing the correct order of the text, later physicians were also incapable of reading it correctly. Hsü Ta-ch'un compared the debates over the *Treatise on cold-damage disorders* to the controversy over the order of the sections of the *Great learning*, or over the authenticity of certain sections of the *Book of documents*.

The debates over warm and cold disorders are only one example in the field of scholarly medicine that demonstrates how little consensus there was among physicians. Medical opinions circulated in a medical market that, without official sanction or control, was open to anyone interested in expressing his opinion. Clients chose from among numerous theories, practitioners, remedies, and prescriptions.

*The moral economy of healing*

Since there were different medical services and opinions available in the market, determining who was a competent physician whose opinion was trustworthy was a vexing problem. The lack of an institutional mechanism to certify the qualifications of physicians and to standardize medical knowledge and practices heightened patients’ anxieties, because they had little information to

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121 Chao, *Medicine and society in late imperial China*, p. 80.
122 Yü Ch'an, K'e Ch'in, Huang Yüan-yü, and Chang Chih-tsung staked out these several positions.
judge the skill of medical providers. They often relied on fame or recommendation in seeking medical help. In addition, clients collected information to guard themselves against malpractice. If they were literate, they might learn about medicine themselves. Equipped with medical knowledge, they might test the knowledge of prospective physicians. Particularly in a literati family, those who knew about medicine often intervened in the healing process with their own opinions.\textsuperscript{124} In addition to seeking medical information, patients often changed doctors and sought other types of healing when they felt that a treatment had failed, or when they accepted another person’s recommendation. A Jesuit in China, Álvaro Semedo (c.1585–1658), was surprised by how quickly Chinese patients changed their opinions of a physician.\textsuperscript{125} Rich families could invite a group of doctors for a joint diagnosis.\textsuperscript{126} It was not uncommon for a patient’s family to invite other physicians for second opinions about a previous physician’s treatment. Patients also resorted to different treatments at the same time. Their social network, involving relatives, friends, and neighbors, provided information that further complicated clinical encounters.

One of Wu Yu-hsing’s case histories documented this perplexing clinical experience for both physicians and patients. Wu once diagnosed a patient with warm-factor disorder, while other physicians invited by the family considered it to be a case of cold-damage disorder. The family did not trust Wu because his opinion ran counter to the diagnoses of physicians who had previously seen the patient. After different family members invited different physicians several times, they remained unable to reach an agreement as to what to do or whom to trust. The patient, who was a fortuneteller, decided to let fate determine for him and resorted to divination. Following the outcome of the divination, he adopted the opinion of the majority and was promptly killed by the treatment. Wu’s comment on this dramatic event was that this patient had been killed by what he used to make a living – divination.\textsuperscript{127} The patient’s suspicion of physicians and the speed with which he replaced them revealed how deeply mistrusted medical providers were. It seems that patients were easily convinced of the skill of a given physician or the effectiveness of a therapy when based on others’ recommendation while at the same time mistrusting physicians generally.

\textsuperscript{125} Álvaro Semedo, \textit{The history of that great and renowned monarchy of China}, trans. anon. (1641; London, 1655), pp. 57–8.
\textsuperscript{127} Wu, \textit{Wen-i lun}, pp. 28–9.
When a patient and his family aggressively sought available methods of healing, natural or supernatural, their reaction to the outcome often caused problems for physicians who had lost control over the treatment, but whose reputation suffered if the patient did not recover. As the physician Hsü Ta-ch’un observed, many patients brought maltreatment on themselves. Some patients simply invited a physician without inquiring about his skills. They tended to rely on other people’s recommendations or on the physician’s eloquence. They sometimes complained that a cure was too slow and changed doctors in the middle of treatment. Some were fond of physicians who were meek and kind. Others cherished their money more than their lives. Those who occasionally browsed through medical literature worsened the doctor–patient relationship even further. Having little experience in medical practice, these people often considered themselves more knowledgeable than physicians simply because they had indiscriminately read some medical texts. They often intervened in the healing process, provided their own opinions, and even recommended other physicians. The situation became unmanageable when many people became involved in the process and further confused the patient. Hsü commented, however, that those interfering in the healing process were able to gain the patient’s trust largely because the physicians of the day were often not knowledgeable enough to convince their clients.128

In complaining about patients’ mistrust towards physicians, Hsü Ta-ch’un went so far as to argue that a physician’s harming the patient was not a crime because a patient who did not trust his physician thereby brought about his own death. Hsü believed that whoever damaged a life would eventually receive retribution. If there were many physicians who had caused many casualties but continued to enjoy prosperous lives, it must be, Hsü reckoned, that fate had condemned the patients via the hands of the physicians, who were exonerated as being simply the instruments in effecting that destiny.129 Hsü exonerated doctors as passive executors of fate. Hsü Ta-ch’un’s description of patients’ unco-operative behavior underscored the difficulty physicians had in imposing their authority on their patients and their frustration at being unable to be more helpful. On the other hand, patients’ behavior that Hsü considered inappropriate was in part a response that patients took to protect themselves from incompetent physicians.

The problems within the medical profession caused by incompetent doctors and fickle patients were not resolved during the Ch’ing. A leading scholar in late Ch’ing, Yü Yüeh (1821–1906), who reviewed the tradition of medical learning, sarcastically suggested eradicating physicians (fei-i). He pointed to

patients’ anxieties over the deterioration of their own health while protesting
the physicians’ inability to be more helpful. According to Yü, there was
virtually no way to ensure the skill of a physician unless one tested him.
However, it would be reckless to test a physician’s skill at the expense of
one’s own health. As a result, the patient would be better off without a
doctor, he argued. Yü complained that contemporary physicians relied only on
pulse diagnosis and prescribed remedies accordingly. However, their remedies
often failed miserably. Yü thought that medications and physicians could be
separated. If one experienced illness, one should just purchase drugs oneself and
treat one’s own symptoms.130 Yü used, or rather abused, his achievements in
evidential scholarship to argue that physicians were unimportant and should
be discarded from society. Unlike contemporary scholarly physicians who
believed that the origin of medicine could be traced back to the ancient
sage Shen-nung (the Divine Husbandman), Yü concluded that the specialty
occupation of being a physician was invented during the Spring and Autumn
period (770–473 BCE). Before this period, people relied on ritual healers
(wu) to cure their ailments. During the Han dynasty, the status of ritual
healers as a specialty declined and physicians began to dominate the field of
medicine. Yü then proceeded to demonstrate that the main tricks of the trade,
pulse diagnosis and drugs, were not reliable. The pulse was generated by the
nine visceral systems (chiu tsang). However, the ancients had never agreed on
what these systems were. Moreover, the famous compendium known as the
Shen-nung pen-ts’ao ching (The Divine Husbandman’s materia medica), which most
doctors depended on to identify drugs, was supposedly first composed during
the Warring States period (475–221 BCE), but according to Yü the text had
undergone a confused process of re-editing and annotation. He further asserted
that the names of ingredients differed in different geographical locations and
time periods, and new medicines had been added in later times. Thus one
should not trust the tradition of Chinese materia medica to identify a certain
drug. Since the tricks of physicians made them untrustworthy, there was
no need for the existence of physicians in society. One could prevent illness
simply by cultivating one’s heart (hsin) through accumulating good deeds.131
Although Yü’s textual investigations reveal interesting features about the
practices and history of traditional Chinese medicine, his main concerns were
the fraudulent tendencies of the physicians and the problems caused by their
dubious skill. Yü’s series of essays were a culmination of the tense relationship

131 Yü Yüeh, “Fei i lun,” in Ch’un-tsai t’ang ch’üan-shu (1899; Taipei, 1968), Volume 3, pp. 2103–8; Yü,
between patients and physicians about which Hsü Ta-ch'un had complained earlier.

While physicians and patients lacked an institutional mechanism to promote trust between them, appeals to supernatural powers were grafted onto the medical cosmology as an external medium to ensure that medical encounters would conform to moral expectations in society. Medicine, like calendrical studies, though in quite a different form, was closely tied to the problems of social order and moral discipline in the Ch'ing period.
During the two hundred years from the Manchu conquest of the Ming in 1644 up to 1850, officials, clergy, and ordinary people, whether sympathetic, indifferent or hostile to Taoism, had their own definitions of Taoism that were coherent from their own perspective, and yet all could be quite different from one another.¹ There was no Taoist church under a unified authority that could impose a compelling interpretation of Taoism, even though several institutions reformed Taoist practices according to their own understanding.

For the Ch'ing imperial state, at least in its own normative texts, Taoism (Tao-chiao) meant a scriptural legacy, particularly the texts contained in the Taoist canon (Tao-tsang), as well as the clerical institutions, the officially sanctioned Taoist clerics (tao-shib) and their temples and monasteries (tao-kuan) that transmitted these texts and the ritual and self-cultivation practices they outlined. This official view excluded a vast field of local cults and rituals in which Taoist clerics played a leading role. The elite sections of the clergy worked with bounded views, although not exactly with the same lines as the state. They disapproved of certain activities of nonelite clerics, and they did not recognize as “Taoist” such practices as spirit possession and sexual techniques commonly associated with Taoism in vernacular literature and thus, implicitly, by many ordinary Chinese. Before, during, and after the Ch'ing period, “Taoism” was a contested category. The aim here is not to provide a normative definition of Taoism but to present people and institutions that claimed to be Taoist and explore what roles they played in Ch'ing society.

Beside confronting varying Ch'ing uses of terms for Taoism, the historian also confronts the existence of many different Taoisms in local contexts. During the first two centuries of the Ch'ing, regional variation seems to be more important than general historical change as the most relevant factor of analysis. The way Taoism fitted into local societies and religious landscapes changed

¹ I am grateful to Liu Xun and Paul Katz for their comments on drafts of this chapter.
from one area to the next, with macro-regional, local, and even micro-local variations. Such variation took many forms, including cult patterns, clerical traditions, music, ritual, and art. Such differences are beginning to be understood, mostly through ethnography, and there now are a number of regional histories of Taoism, but most of these histories tend to illustrate a shared narrative of universal “Taoist decline” through local examples instead of exploring what is specifically local about each local form of Taoism. Furthermore, people moved and carried Taoism with them, so tracing the history of Taoism in the Ch’ing is also enmeshed with the history of migrations and of sinicization of populations in the southern and south-western parts of the Ch’ing empire.

Simultaneously, certain empire-wide institutions, such as the state bureaucracy, elite Taoist clerical institutions, and some cult networks also shaped the course of Ch’ing Taoism, so a purely local geographical approach would obscure some crucial features of Taoist history. The present discussion hints at the local forms of Taoism by referring to bibliographical references that explore local Taoisms in much more detail, but it focuses on general patterns that could be observed in many or most regions.

There are few studies on the history of Taoism under the Ch’ing for two main reasons, one ideological and the other practical. The ideological reason is the dominance of a theme of “decline” invoked by historians to describe late imperial and modern Taoism. It was first put forward by Taoist reformers during the early Republican period in order to justify their own reform projects, as well as by Christian missionaries, and has since been adopted by politicians and scholars alike, both in China and in the West. Since the end of the twentieth century, the genuine interest in late imperial religion in general, and Taoism in particular, has resulted in solid research. The other reason is the paucity of sources available during most of the twentieth century, when Taoist books were hard to come by, and most attention was paid

2 For a preliminary survey of variations in musical traditions, see Ts’ao Pen-yeh and Wang Chung-jen, eds., Chung-kuo tao-chiao yin-jiueh shih-liueh (Taipei, 1996).
3 See, for instance, Chao Liang et al., comps., Su-chou tao-chiao shih-liueh (Peking, 1996). One study that focuses on the question of the local nature of Taoism by showing how Cantonese Taoism is different from that of other areas is Lai Chi Tim (Li Chih-t’ien), Kuang-tung ti-fang tao-chiao yen-chiu: Tao-kuan, tao-shih chi k’o-i (Hong Kong, 2007).
to exploring the Taoist canon (first modern edition in 1926) and its texts from the earliest periods. The publication of huge numbers of late imperial Taoist and other relevant sources since the 1990s has radically changed the prospects for research by making available a quantity and variety of Taoist resources for this later period. The present discussion is partly based on these recently published sources by the author and other scholars.

This recent research has shown that it is hard to sustain the still widely accepted theme of the decline of Taoism in the Ming and Ch’ing periods, at least in any quantitative terms. Most arguments about decline tend to focus either on effectiveness of organization (but usually with a teleological goal of heralding the necessity of a centralized, church-like Taoist organization like that first invented in the twentieth century) or on elaboration of doctrine. Arguments about a lack of new doctrinal developments within Ch’ing Taoism can be countered by pointing out that the vast majority of Ch’ing Taoist writings so far have been ignored by modern scholarship. While it is true that the effervescence of Taoism during Sung–Yüan times was followed by a long phase of consolidation under the Ming and Ch’ing, there was a large production of Taoist spirituality books in late imperial times that await critical inquiry. Another argument raised in support of the “decline” thesis is that Taoism became increasingly “popular,” which is also based on a twentieth-century reformist and intellectualist view of Taoism. Signs of Taoism becoming an ever more crucial part of ordinary peoples’ lives and being reinterpreted by them could equally serve to support an argument for Taoism’s “success.” Rather than using the ideologically charged notions of decline and success, this chapter attempts to see both the structural place of Taoism in Ch’ing society up to the Opium War, and the major areas of change.

What knowledge and image of Taoism did Ch’ing laypersons have? Looking at popular literature, such as theater, novels, and storytelling, or art, or some local sources such as epigraphy, we can get some idea of what Ch’ing people knew and thought about Taoism. Both Taoist ritual and self-cultivation suffused Ch’ing culture. The basic ideas behind Taoist self-cultivation were widely disseminated through art (including temple murals, statues, illustrated books, etc.) and narratives (notably in devotional hagiography and storytelling). Immortals were found in many parts of Ch’ing material culture,

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6 The major collections of sources published during the last few decades include Hu Tao-ching et al., comps., Tsang-wai tao-shu (Ch’eng-tu, 1992–4); San-tung shih-i (Ho-fei, 2005); Kao Hsiao-chien, ed., Chung-kuo tao-kuan chih ts’ung-k’an (Nanking, 2000); Chang Chih and Chang Chien, eds., Chung-kuo tao-kuan chih ts’ung-k’an hsü-pien (Yang-chou, 2004). These last two collections comprise nearly a hundred gazetteers of Taoist temples and mountains, of which sixty-six are from the Ch’ing or Republican period. The Tao-tsang ching-hua has 108 titles, mostly late imperial self-cultivation texts.
from teacups to wooden carvings. Ch'ing novels present a great number of Taoist figures and deities; some novels are devoted entirely to Taoist themes, such as those telling the stories of the Ch'üan-chen patriarchs. This was one of the most influential ways to diffuse the lore of this Taoist order in Ch'ing society. Taoist themes in literature are not limited to specific figures. Late Ming and Ch'ing novels incorporate the whole ritual structure and theology whereby Taoists represent and tame demons. The role of Taoist bureaucratic deities — city gods (ch'eng-huang), the deity of the Eastern Peak (Tung-yueh ta-ti) — and the judicial and penitential rituals whereby people interact with these deities are also recurrent features in Ch'ing literature.

Even more important, Ch'ing opera was intimately linked to Taoism and Taoist motifs in its content as well as its performance. To a certain degree a history of Ch'ing Taoism could be a history of Chinese opera, even though the most basic materials are still lacking for such a project. During the mid- and late Ch'ing, secularized theaters appeared in the largest cities, but opera was still largely performed in ritual contexts, and in some cases by Taoists themselves. During the twentieth century, a number of Taoists who could not make a living from performing rituals became professional musicians and actors.

On the other hand, clerical constructions of Taoism, such as the division of the Taoist clergy into two orders, Ch'üan-chen and Cheng-i, hardly appear at all in the cultural productions linked to Taoism and were certainly unknown to most people who visited temples and occasionally requested services from the local Taoists. Popular sources do note the clear distinction between elite Taoists who were treated with awe, local priests, and the mendicant Taoist clerics. A mendicant cleric, a commonly encountered figure, was regarded with mixed feelings, including fascination and fear as well as derision. This distinction played into anticlerical discourses that were common among Ch'ing elites. Many intellectuals claimed that they honored Taoism. They routinely engaged in studying the Lao-tzu and Chuang-tzu, and sometimes self-cultivation texts as well, while rejecting the lower clergy as frauds and “false Taoists.” However,

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7 See, for instance, Li Yen, Ming Ch'ing tao-chiao yü hsi-chü yen-chiu (Ch'eng-tu, 2006); Liu Shou-hua, Tao-chiao yü Chung-kuo min-chien wen-hsüeh (Taipei, 1991); and Wu Kuang-cheng, Pa hsien ku-shih hsi-t'ung k'ao-lun: Nei-tan tao-tsung chiao shen-hua ti chien-kou chi ch'i liu-pien (Peking, 2006).
9 One example among many is the Hsing-kan-hsi ritual theater of central Chekiang that was performed by Taoists: Hsü Hung-t'ü, Che-chiang hsing-kan hsi (Taipei, 2007).
some officials and literati writers who professed contempt for run-of-the-mill Taoists also expressed respect for a few elite clerics’ culture and spirituality. It is not clear to what extent such attitudes were shared by the nonelite sectors of society, but the growth through the Ch’ing period of lay devotional and spirit-writing groups, which often tended to bypass the Taoist clergy with direct access to the gods and immortals, can be seen to parallel elite anticlerical feelings. In short, attacks on Taoists by some officials and literati did not mean rejection of Taoism as a whole, but rather were attempts to wrest the prestige of Taoism away from clerical institutions.

POLITICAL CONTROL OF TAOISM UNDER THE CH’ING

Taoism in the Ming dynasty was officially defined as comprising two orders, Ch’üan-chen and Cheng-i, that operated as distinct ordination systems for Taoist clerics. The official recognition by the Ming state of the two orders meant that any person who had been ordained within either of these two systems was legally a bona fide Taoist. The same assumption, with qualifications, remained valid under the Ch’ing. Some of the clerics belonging to one of these two orders began by the mid-Ming to create lineages (fa-p’ai or tsung-p’ai), such as Lung-men and Ch’ing-wei ling-pao, a trend that intensified under the Ch’ing. As a result, the many different new Taoist traditions that had emerged between the tenth and fourteenth centuries underwent a process of slow integration into either of the two official orders, a process that was already well under way but not completed by 1644. Independent ordination centers that were prominent up to the fourteenth century gradually declined into near oblivion by the late Ch’ing. Their original ritual traditions were in many cases transmitted, but under the umbrellas of the Ch’üan-chen and Cheng-i orders.

This was the basis of a kind of covenant, expressed in many Ming Taoist sources, according to which the Ch’üan-chen and Cheng-i orders were mutually dependent, with the Ch’üan-chen order providing an ascetic and spiritual tradition and a monastic organization, and the Cheng-i order providing the liturgy. This was formalized and codified when the Taoist canon was compiled during the early Ming, a protracted process that eventually ended in 1444. The Taoist canon included important recent texts such as the Tao-men shih-kuei (Ten rules for the Taoist) written by the forty-third Heavenly Master Chang

Yü-ch'u (1361–1410). As the Ch'ing government never undertook the compilation of a new canon, this early Ming edition remained the fundamental source for these texts into the twentieth century.

Ming Taoism was characterized by a close interaction with the court, notably around the cult of Hsüan-t'ien shang-ti (Supreme Emperor of the Dark Heaven), Chen-wu (Perfect warrior), organized by Taoists and actively supported by the court. Alliances between certain Taoist clergy and members of the imperial family (in particular empresses and princes who had strong involvements with Taoism, in many cases being themselves ordained), as well as eunuchs and members of the military nobility, were opposed by the civil bureaucracy that identified itself ever more closely with Confucianism. The heritage of this tension, which linked Taoism with lax imperial governance, was visible in the lingering hostility among some literati through the Ch'ing period, even though Taoism was much less passionately supported by the imperial family.

**Court and state relationships with and use of Taoism**

Under the Ch'ing regime, Taoism continued to be amalgamated as one of the Three Teachings and therefore as acceptable, or orthodox in a loose sense. In Ch'ing this status as acceptable was interpreted differently according to the level of society involved, the context, and the form of Taoism. Most historians of the period have perceived a thoroughly anti-Taoist outlook on the part of the Ch'ing government, and posited that this outlook caused a decline of Taoism's standing and influence in society. As more studies have been conducted and more sources have become available, a more nuanced picture emerges. While the Ch'ing court did not support Taoists as lavishly as its Ming predecessor had, it also left them alone to a greater extent, thus freeing them of both the beneficial and the harmful effects of imperial embrace. The bureaucracy did not act uniformly in its relationships with Taoism. The dominant mode of that relationship was indifference. When the state did engage with Taoism, the effects were mixed. The government supported certain cults, for instance the further canonizations of Hsü Chen-chün in 1803 and Lü Tung-pin in 1804, as well as lesser Taoist deities throughout the course of the dynasty. It repressed others. Officials employed and funded the Taoist elites associated with Lung-hu shan (Dragon-Tiger Mountain) while trying to cut them off from their own networks of support. The Ch'ing government's policies toward Taoism and Taoists cannot be described as uniform or coherent.

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Religion and ritual life around Ch'ing emperors hinged on a fundamental opposition between state ritual and ritual at the court; that is, places and persons managed by the Imperial Household Department (Nei-wu fu). The first was mandated by the code and minutely described in various normative texts, most of them following Confucian liturgy. Court ritual was the private domain of the emperor and his family, and was neither mandated by any code nor consistently represented in official records. This realm was much less constrained by rules than state ritual, and much more inclusive and pluralistic. During the Ming and early Ch'ing, Taoists were active in both realms, but were excluded from participation in state ritual in 1742.

During the early Ch'ing, following Ming usage, Taoist musicians performed during a number of state rituals, notably the most sacred of all, the sacrifice to Heaven. These Taoists, presumed to be devoted solely to the service of the state, were employed by the Temple of Spirit Music (Shen-yüeh kuan) under the Court of Imperial Sacrifices (T'ai-ch'ang ssu), and they were lodged at a monastery on the west side of the Altar of Heaven (T'ien-t'an) compound in Peking. In 1742 the Ch'ien-lung emperor (r. 1736–95) decided that Taoist participation offended correct Confucian ritual. He dismissed the Taoist musicians and ordered that they be replaced with Confucian musicians wearing Confucian clothes. The emperor complained that when not on duty, the Taoists performed rituals for other people to supplement their income, which he thought was unfitting for court affairs. The Temple of Spirit Music was renamed in 1755, and continued to be staffed with Confucians.

The decision was part of a larger string of decisions aimed at reducing the influence of Taoism at the acme of the state. The Ch'ien-lung emperor was reversing some policies of his late father, the Yung-cheng emperor (r. 1722–35), who had co-operated with Taoists. He sought to bring clerical institutions under closer government control.

In contrast to the abrupt 1742 dismissal of Taoists from involvement in state rituals, Taoist activity within the court did not undergo such a radical reform. Emperors' interests in Taoism varied; it was high under Yung-cheng, and then low under Ch'ien-lung and his successors until the Tz'u-hsi regency (1861–1908). But such variations did not much affect court ritual. The same Ch'ien-lung emperor who excluded Taoists from state rituals and who

14 Yü Min-chung et al., comps., Jih-hsia chiu-wen k'ao (c.1785; Peking, 1983), Volume 3, 58, pp. 941–2.
16 Vincent Goossaert, “Counting the monks: The 1736–1739 census of the Chinese clergy,” Late Imperial China 21 No. 2 (2000), pp. 53–8. Taoists servicing the mausoleums of the dynasty’s founders in Shen-yang were maintained, however; see Ch’ien-t’ung Li-p’u tse-li (1851; Taipei, 1966) 170, pp. 8h–9b.
did not share his father’s enthusiasm for religious debates also did not halt Taoist activities inside the court. Taoist services, along with Confucian, Chinese Buddhist, Tibeto-Mongol Buddhist, and shamanist ones, continued to be performed at court. The difference was mostly one of the emperor’s personal involvement. The Yung-cheng emperor was knowledgeable about Taoist liturgy, designed liturgical implements, and pursued Taoist self-cultivation regimens. His son, the Ch’ien-lung emperor, delegated such concerns to the clerics themselves. Why did the court continue to need Taoism? Like the other religions, Taoist rituals were perceived as contributing to the protection of the imperial family and the empire, notably through the cult of the emperor as a deity.

On a vast array of occasions the court commanded and paid for the performance of special Taoist rituals, managed by the Office of Palace Ceremonial (Chang-i ssu) of the Imperial Household Department. Celebration of a festive or mournful occasion was not limited to one place, and the holding of simultaneous services by priests of the same or different religions was considered desirable. Therefore the major junctures in the court’s liturgical calendar, notably the emperor’s birthday, as well as the death of members of the imperial family and times of emergency (natural disasters or wars), were marked by simultaneous Chinese Buddhist, Tibeto-Mongol Buddhist, and Taoist services in various places, inside and outside the imperial city. These services were all mandated by the court, and sometimes eventually noted in palace regulations if they became regular.

The Taoist clerics serving at the court were recruited from among several categories of persons. Some were occasionally invited from temples in the city; some were palace personnel (eunuchs, in particular) trained as ritual performers. The top clerics were a corps of elite Taoists from Lung-hu Mountain in Kiangsi, numbering up to forty-eight during their eighteenth-century heyday, each with an official position as ritual official (fa-kuan) and posted in various Taoist temples, notably the Ta-kuang-ming tien (Great Hall of Light), just west of the Forbidden City, where the grandest Taoist rituals for the emperor were celebrated. Coming from the most prominent Taoist families of southern China, these Lung-hu clergy had prestige. Their leader, beside having a high title in the official clerical bureaucracy, could also enjoy the informal status of an imperial chaplain. The most famous of them was Lou Chin-yüan (1689–1776), a Lung-hu Mountain dignitary who became the chaplain of the Yung-cheng emperor in 1727 and remained at court until the 1750s.¹⁹ The

number and prestige of the court ritual officials declined somewhat after the end of the eighteenth century, and because of court budget cuts there were only about twenty left by 1850, but they remained a solid presence of elite Taoism in the immediate vicinity of the emperor.

_Taoism and the state at the local level_

Some Ch'ing observers linked the role and influence of Taoist chaplains at court with larger policies and the fate of Taoism. But Taoist clergy's participation at court and imperial patronage of a few favored clerics and temples bore little connection to the situation of Taoists in society at large and their relations with local officials. Officials were not necessarily fully aware of Taoist ritual at court, and the policy of replacing Taoists with Confucians for state rituals was not followed at local levels. Relationships between officials and Taoists at the local level hinged on other forces that had to do with implementing the Ch'ing code (Ta Ch'ing lü-li) and its interpretation as filtered through local officials' own religiosity. The code itself mostly required restrictions on rituals and controls over the clergy.

The Ch'ing code articulated an essentially Confucian vision of society. It banned a range of religious practices and organizations. According to the law, all congregations based on voluntary membership were illegal. Visits to temples by women were forbidden. Because the cult of Heaven and the Big Dipper were imperial monopolies, no commoner could pray to Heaven or the Big Dipper, which technically made almost any Taoist ritual illegal. Similar interdictions were promulgated by governors or magistrates at the local level. Large-scale temple festivals (sai-hui) that often had a Taoist ritual at their core were theoretically forbidden or severely curtailed, as were opera shows, rituals outside temples, and processions.

In practice, however, the situation was very different. Despite the substantial number of edicts, bylaws, and local magistrates' decisions geared toward enforcing the Confucian vision, Ch'ing officials from 1724 to 1840 devoted most of their efforts in religious policy towards controlling, with poor results, so-called sectarian movements, including Christianity. As organized religions with imperially recognized clergy, Buddhism and Taoism received little interference from the state. The archival collections of imperial documents in

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20 For example, "Lou Lo erh tao-jen," in Yüan Mei, comp., _Tzu pu-yü_ (1788; Shanghai, 1986), pp. 357–8; Yüan Mei credits Lou Chin-yüan with saving Taoism from a threat of comprehensive suppression.


22 Ta Ch'ing hui-tien shih-li (1899; Peking, 1991), ch. 766.
Peking and Taipei pertaining to religious questions mostly relate to sectarian threats and rebellions. Ch'ing local officials rarely confronted local religion head-on, although a few zealous social reformers considered it a priority. The dominant mode of relationship was negotiation. Officials allowed tacitly or explicitly most religious activities while insisting on curbing what they considered excesses, such as “immoral cults” or extreme forms of public female piety.

Taoist clergy engaged in all aspects of these negotiations, but usually they themselves were not targeted. The classical Taoist liturgy, such as the large-scale communal offerings (chiao), was not banned; it was even actively patronized by some officials and members of the local elite. In many places, for the “ghost festival” on the fifteenth day of the seventh month, local officials would hire Buddhists and Taoists to perform salvation rituals in front of public temples such as the city god temples (ch'eng-huang miao) for the benefit of their community’s suffering souls. Ch'ing officials would rely on Taoist clerics for public prayers in times of need, such as droughts, epidemics, and locust invasions; prayers for rain, in particular, often involved co-operation between officials and Taoists, and if the prayers were successful, awards and honors resulted for the Taoists. Ch'ing officials also used Taoist temples as public spaces for a variety of purposes, such as staged debates for local literati or for organizing charity.23 Local officials also hired Taoists to manage for them temples listed in the register of statutory sacrifices (ssu-tien) that they had to maintain but had not the means or interest to manage directly, such as those at city god temples or fire god temples (huo-shen miao). Thus the same officials who had hostile relationships with unregistered local Taoists worked at the same time in close collaboration with elite, registered Taoist clerics. When associations of local elites organizing a chiao went to local officials to ask for authorization, this was normally granted.24 Officials objected to what we would call the para-liturgical aspects of the festivals, such as processions, theatricals after nightfall, and the participation of women. Magistrates took care to distinguish Taoist and Buddhist rituals in a strict sense, which were not a problem, from other celebrations around them even though this distinction did not make much sense to the local populations, for whom the festival

24 The Pa-hsien Archives contain detailed documents from the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries showing this routine acceptance by local officials of Taoist rituals if organized by local elite groups.
was an indivisible whole that encompassed clerical performance of rituals and communal celebrations.

Besides regulating temples and festivals, Ch'ing local officials were also committed to monitoring the clergy, and there, too, their actions were less repressive than normative texts imply. The legal situation of the clergy was the result of a process of assertion of state control over religious institutions that had begun as early as the fifth century. During the late imperial period, Taoist and Buddhist clerics were treated together in a single legal category called Buddhists–Taoists (seng-tao), recognized by the imperial state as a legal status with specific rights and duties. By contrast, most other categories of religious specialist were either ignored or banned by the authorities. Tolerance for the vocation of Buddhist and Taoist clerics went with many constraints: the state imposed limitations of age, responsibilities towards parents, and overall quotas for entry into the clergy. For certain offenses the penalties were heavier if the culprit was a cleric rather than a layperson. Clerics convicted of an offense or of violating their own rules (ch'ing-kui) were to be returned to secular status.

The laws of the Ch'ing dynasty embedded in the code or gathered in the collections of jurisprudence paid most attention to the licensing of clerics through ordination certificates (tu-tieh), and separating “real” clerics from “fake” ones. Special controls, notably through the mutual responsibility system (pao-chia), were applied to itinerant clerics, whom officials feared for their potential for causing a disturbance, or because they might be criminals in disguise. In times of panic and sorcery scares, some officials and parts of the populace demonized itinerant clerics, some of whom were lynched. In more ordinary times, they were regularly expelled from a county by its magistrate, but just came back. Begging Taoists and Buddhists, especially in the cities, were considered a fact of life. More generally, the legal texts developed an ideal of secluded monastic ascetics as acceptable clerics, but betrayed an obsession about clerical collusions with laypersons. For this reason, official protection of Buddhist and Taoist clerics stopped when they crossed the boundaries of their legitimate field of action, e.g. practicing within a monastery or managing a temple, and began to preach to crowds and organize congregations. Countless local congregations openly existed without any official hindrance, but

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25 This did not refer to a specific text of clerical rules, in which magistrates were not interested, but to general principles, notably celibacy.

26 See notably Ta Ch'ing hui-tien shih-li, ch. 501.

occasional sanctions reminded everyone that this was mere toleration subject to the magistrate’s approval and the local situation. For instance, an 1833 case from Shantung reports that a Taoist manager of a small temple formed a congregation that gathered on the first and fifteenth days of the month to recite scriptures. The investigating magistrate found out that these scriptures were standard Taoist texts, and that nothing even remotely sectarian was involved; he had the Taoist condemned anyhow. Such action was more likely the effect of a denunciation than of a concerted policy to monitor all local clerics and their actions.

County offices did not keep detailed and accurate records of the religious establishments and specialists in their jurisdiction. Earlier dynasties might have kept better records of clerics because they were legally exempted from corvée labor, but, since the abandonment of the corvée system in the late sixteenth century, being a cleric had become a fiscally irrelevant category. Ch’ing attempts to control clerics were occasional, top-down campaigns chiefly motivated by concerns over social order. In 1667 there was an attempt at an empire-wide registration of clergy. The procedures are not known in detail, and the low numbers reported do not suggest a thorough census. A second campaign took place from 1736 to 1739, when a census of the Buddhist and Taoist clergies was conducted in each county by each magistrate. As a result, 340,000 clerics were issued an ordination certificate. Around 45,000 of them were Taoists. About half of those were classified by officials as Ch’üan-chen Taoists, somewhat lesser numbers as Ch’ing-wei ling-pao Taoists, and fewer as nonelite, “at-home” Taoists (huo-chü tao-shih). The census was not sustained by follow-up measures, and the 1736–9 lists of locally registered clerics were not kept up-to-date at each county magistrate’s office. Local gazetteers support the inference that the information available to magistrates about the number of temples and clerics in each county was sketchy. As a result, while officials favored elite Taoists linked to the state through managing state-recognized temples and performing rituals for the state, they seldom attempted to exert control over the vast majority of local Taoist practitioners. The first nationwide, sustained effort at registering temples and clerics was made by the Republican government in Nanking after 1928.

In addition to being subject to specific laws, Taoists also answered, in theory, to a specific bureaucratic administration. The Ch’ing clerical administration

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28 Chu Ch’ing-ch’i, comp., Hsü tseng Hsing-an hui-lan (1840; Taipei, 1968) 4, p. 5a. Susan Naquin, Peking: Temples and city life, 1400–1900 (Berkeley, 2000), p. 558, also documents a few cases of Peking clerics arrested by the police for forming congregations or fund-raising, but such instances appear to have been marginal.

29 Ta Ch’ing hui-tien shih-li, ch. 501.

30 Goossaert, “Counting the monks.”
followed the Ming model.\textsuperscript{31} The central Taoist administration, called the Central Taoist Registry (\textit{Tao-lu ssu}); its Buddhist counterpart, the Central Buddhist Registry (\textit{Seng-lu ssu}); and the Tibeto-Mongol equivalent, the Lama Office (\textit{La-ma yin-wu ch’u}), were all headquartered at Peking, with eight clerics each, all with ranks in the civil service hierarchy.\textsuperscript{32} In Peking, the Central Taoist Registry’s eight officials, nominally at the head of the clergy concurrently with the Lung-hu Mountain administration, held respectable positions with a salary. The clergy in the Central Taoist Registry had to organize on demand rituals for the government, the court, or the person of the emperor. During the late eighteenth century, both the Central Taoist Registry and Central Buddhist Registry, formerly under the control of the Ministry of Rites, were put under the supervision of the Office of Palace Ceremonial. Beside their role in organizing rituals for the government at the capital, the Central Taoist Registry officials also had to generate and transmit documents pertaining to local clerics for different government offices.

There were local Taoist clerics officially assigned to each level of regional administration, from the prefecture to the county. These local clerical officials, however, were neither ranked nor paid. They were not provided with an office, but they fulfilled their functions at the temple or monastery where they stayed. According to the Ch’ing statutes, each time one of these clergy positions was vacant, a competent Taoist was to be nominated from among the whole clergy. In many places, appointing someone to the position was the prerogative of the abbot of a local major temple or monastery. Moreover, in the case of Taoists, officials serving in the administration of the Central Taoist Registry also could be in the administration of the Chang Heavenly Master on Lung-hu Mountain, who was nominally head of all Taoists and had Taoist officials under his command. In practice, some local Central Taoist Registry Taoists also held positions in the Lung-hu Mountain hierarchy and they conducted their administrative and liturgical affairs with both local civil officials and the Lung-hu Mountain administration. During the Ch’ing period, local gazetteers record that in many places the positions were not filled and nobody cared about them, which points to sharp differences between different counties, some with an established Taoist elite connected to the state, and others without such elites and regular channels between the ordinary clergy and the state. A survey of the Buddhist and Taoist officials listed in the administrative geographical section


\textsuperscript{32} \textit{Ch’in-ting Li-pu tse-li} 170, pp. 1a–2b.
of the *Ku-chin t'u-shu chi-ch'eng* (*Synthesis of past and present arrays and writings*) (1728) shows that of 1,582 counties and prefectures that are mentioned, 497 had a functioning local Taoist official.

The Central Taoist Registry officials were also required by law to control the behavior of local clerics, but in practice local officials dealt with cases involving clerics and temple affairs without referring at all to clerical authorities. Most litigation involving Taoists had to do with disputes over temple property, or accusations of immoral behavior on the part of lay temple managers. The lawsuits were as a rule initiated by members of the temple community. In a minority of cases, magistrates asked the local Taoist officials for their opinion, but adjudicated on their own, often, but not invariably, in favor of literati and against clerics. Taoism had a low level of institutional independence, even though under usual circumstances temples and monasteries were left alone by local officials. Officials rarely intervened in the clerical communities, letting them be self-governed unless a serious crime was reported. Nomination to the position of manager of one of the largest temples usually required official approval, but few cases record that officials actively participated in such processes.

**Elite and nonelite Taoists**

Through legislation and administrative practice, the Ch'ing government and its officials as individuals recognized and reinforced a social stratification of the Taoist clergy. They co-operated with elite Taoist clergy while ignoring and occasionally repressing nonelite ones. Elite Taoists comprised abbots, managers of central temples, and officials both in the Heavenly Master's own administration and in the state's Central Taoist Registry. These elite Taoists enjoyed high social prestige and close relationships with officials and local elites. They dabbled in local politics and charities, provided well-paid ritual services for officials and rich merchants, and engaged in highbrow self-cultivation practices with a few select disciples. They fully partook in elite lifestyles, engaging in painting, poetry, and other such activities, as well as prescribing medicine. Biographies of Ch'ing Taoists in local gazetteers feature a large share of such elite Taoists remembered by literati friends for their cultural achievements as much as for their ritual or self-cultivation practices. While there was a rather dense presence of Taoist elite clergy in the richest parts of the empire, such as in Chiang-nan, they were absent from large tracts of the rural northern and central provinces.

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Below the elite layer were much larger strata of local temple managers and at-home Taoists, ministering to the commoners, without large symbolic or material resources but with established rights over temples or well-delimited territories. Below them, in a marginal situation, were Taoists without their own territory or temple, including mendicant wandering clerics. For instance, an early nineteenth-century source describes Taoists gathering each morning at a gate in Soochow waiting for a day job of performing small rituals, in contrast to a few rich and influential elite Taoist families in the same city. Among all of these categories, we find clerics affiliated with Ch’üan-chen and Cheng-i as well as clerics not affiliated with these China-wide orders, although mendicant Cheng-i clerics seem to be unheard of.

Elite Taoists and some among the more modest clerical strata tried to solidify their position by forming lineages. This process of lineage-building that began during the mid-Ming was a major feature of the Ch’ing Taoist clergy, and a direct effect of its relation to the imperial state. These lineages were not at all schools (in the sense of distinct doctrinal or ritual traditions) but master–disciple genealogies transmitting property as well as social and political status. Just as in the case of biological lineages, a religious lineage organization was initially a marker of elite status that gradually from the fifteenth to the eighteenth century expanded to include larger sections of the population, but still distinguished established, state-affiliated clerics (who had a lineage) from those who did not. The religious lineage by the late Ming had become a legal, property-holding entity with assets or contractual rights in temples, and its members’ status as state-registered clerics was transmitted from master to disciple. The official license or ordination certificate (often held in the name of a past master earlier in the lineage genealogy) served as proof of such registration and status. The Ch’ing government encouraged such hereditary succession to religious status and positions. After the 1736–9 census of Buddhist and Taoist clergy, each licensed cleric was supposed to train...
one disciple and to transmit his or her license to him or her, so that in the successor generation one cleric would have official status in the name of his or her religious ancestor.\textsuperscript{37}

In contrast to most cleric-run temples that belonged to one lineage, the few public monasteries that operated as major training centers for all clerics in theory belonged to the whole of the clergy and were open to members of all recognized lineages, although many Buddhist and Taoist public monasteries were controlled by religious lineages under institutional arrangements of various types. Monasteries, both Buddhist and Taoist, kept comprehensive and regularly updated lists of these lineages, which were also sometimes included in clerical breviaries. They verified bona fide ordained clerics as opposed to outsiders and self-declared Taoists.\textsuperscript{38} Inscription in a religious lineage was thus a precondition to live and work in a religious institution, which is similar to the requirement to belong to a certain biological lineage as a necessary condition to having settlement rights in a village.\textsuperscript{39} In religious as well as biological lineages, there was a strong impetus to enforce clear-cut boundaries between members and outsiders in order to assuage recurring worries about intruding outsiders. Stories of fake clerics abound. At the same time, members of those lineages were usually free to also join other types of religious community, such as devotional associations or territorial communities. Indeed, Ch'ing clerical lineages seem to be just a particular type of lineage sharing most features with biological lineages, both being tools with which segments of local society could organize themselves and integrate within the imperial system.

In society at large, certain biological lineages, formed by different smaller lineages that chose to merge, invented new genealogies to support their new arrangement. Similarly, religious lineages also forged alliances in order to manage large-scale assets. This was the case of some large urban temples of the late Ming and Ch'ing periods that belonged to, and were run with the blessing of the state by, alliances of Cheng-i Taoist families within the same religious lineage. In some of these lineages, father-to-son succession was the norm; in others, master-to-disciple was more common. Some of the best-documented cases are at the Hsüan-miao kuan (Hsüan-miao Monastery) in Soochow, the T'ien-bou kung (Queen of Heaven Temple) in Tientsin, and the

\textsuperscript{37} Goossaert, “Counting the monks,” pp. 45–53.


city god temples in Shanghai, Hangchow, and K'un-shan. Their organization was similar to that of a large biological lineage. They were divided between lineage segments, each having a share, not necessarily equal, in the corporate property and management of the lineage and temple as a whole. The various branches all claimed to have been founded by disciples of the temple's founding ancestor, typically a Lung-hu Mountain dignitary placed there by the Ming government. They together controlled a monopoly on providing lucrative religious services within the temple, and they managed that monopoly by contractually sharing rights (e.g. on such a day, in such a hall, etc.) between the branches. Such arrangements provided for a closed and stable milieu of elite Taoist clerics in lineages that controlled local religious resources uninterrupted from the mid-Ming to the late Ch'ing. The milieu was quantitatively small when compared to Buddhist and Confucian elites, but the Taoist elite proved remarkably resilient, and, considering its size, influential in society.

By contrast to the Taoist elite, who were registered by the government and thus had privileges that they transmitted through their lineages, most Taoist clerics were not registered, and usually not organized in lineages. They transmitted their practices to sons or disciples, and knew the transmission back a few generations, but these transmissions were not embedded in a larger lineage with genealogies, “ancestor” worship, and common property. They operated below the purview of the state. Notably, sources such as local gazetteers hardly ever mention the vernacular priests, even though they do appear occasionally in anecdotes and in polemical literature, in which often they are characterized not as Taoists but as exorcists and spirit-mediums (shi-hu-wu). Such mentions only make sense when illuminated by present-day ethnography on these specialists. Elite Taoists, to varying degrees according to place, had relationships with local unofficial Taoists, but there do not seem to be any remaining archives of the Taoist bureaucracy, such as the Heavenly Master administration, that would contribute to understanding the nature of such relationships. But we have documents such as the lists of the local ritual traditions for which the Heavenly Masters could grant ordinations, included in the T'ien-t'ieh yii-ko (Heavenly Master ordination procedure), the earliest extant of which was compiled in 1651 under the fifty-third Heavenly Master, Chang Hung-jen (1625–67), and revised by the eminent Soochow Taoist Shih Tao-yüan (d. 1678), with a preface dated 1658. It suggests that Ch'ing


Taoist elites were well acquainted with all the major local ritual traditions, at least in the south.

The relation of elite and nonelite Taoists to the Ch'ing court, the government, and local officials, especially county magistrates, provides one perspective on Taoism. Another perspective is provided by considering Taoists who organized themselves into clerical ordination systems, the Cheng-i and Ch'üan-chen orders in particular.

**CHENG-I CLERGY AND CHANG HEAVENLY MASTER**

Presenting a general overview of the Cheng-i clergy is difficult, because they were much less unified than the Ch'üan-chen order, and basic affiliation terms, even Cheng-i itself, had somewhat different meanings in different local contexts. The Cheng-i order was the heir of the first known Taoist communal institution, the Church of the Heavenly Master (T'ien-shih tao), reputedly founded in 142 CE by Chang Tao-ling. The complex gradation of ordination ranks found in medieval Taoism disappeared after the tenth century, probably because of a lack of central Taoist authorities and proliferation of new ritual traditions. The only differentiation still observed in Ch'ing times was between ritual masters (kao-kung or fa-shih), who could perform the most sacred audience rite central to the grand chiao offerings or death rituals, and minor priests, working as acolytes or performing minor rites on their own. The Cheng-i clerics described themselves in terms of two overlapping categories, often but not always called Taoist priest (tao-shih), performing rituals according to solemn classical liturgy (k'o-i), and vernacular priest (fa-shih, shih-kung, or tuan-kung), performing exorcistic rituals (fa). It is important to note that these two categories refer to two distinct roles, but that often a single Taoist cleric could be initiated in both capacities and, according to the occasion, be a Taoist priest or a vernacular priest.

Since the Ming dynasty, Taoist priests (tao-shih) who did not perform any exorcistic rites and thus implicitly were upholding the grand tradition were known as Ch'ing-wei ling-pao priests, a term denoting a general category as well as a name for various lineages of these elite Taoists. There were several regional traditions of Ch'ing-wei ling-pao Taoists, but they were relatively compatible. The most noted among them published large liturgical compendia that attempted to standardize and unify ritual practice throughout the

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43 The variants Ch'ing-wei, Ling-pao, and Ch'ing-wei Cheng-i also were used.
By contrast, the local ritual traditions of the vernacular priests that seem to first appear in their modern form under the Sung dynasty (960–1279) are distinctive. We do not have enough material to write their history in late imperial times, but we know that some of them, such as Lü-shan Taoists in Fukien, Kwangtung, and Kiangsi provinces, and Mei-shan Taoists in Hunan and Kwangsi provinces, were and still are widespread. Fieldwork has turned up huge numbers of Ch'ing manuscripts in the collections of Taoists from these local traditions.

Most Cheng-i clerics (whether tao-shib or fa-shib) were married and lived at home; they were known as at-home Taoists (buo-chü tao-shib). Many maintained relationships with local temples where they officiated regularly, but they did not live in them or manage them. Other clerics concentrated on offering services to families and had little involvement with temples and communities. All of them had a family altar (t'an) with a head priest and acolytes, the latter being family members or disciples. This altar was physically located in the head priest’s home or in a separate building (called tao-shib t'ang or tao-kuan). This was not a temple but a place where Taoists performed rituals and dealt with clients. These married Cheng-i clerics operated within an area, in some cases enjoying a monopoly over a given territory. There also are examples of Cheng-i clerics who were temple managers, living within the temple either as celibates or with their families.

The Cheng-i order in the late imperial period had only one central training and ordination institution: the Chang Heavenly Master (Chang t'ien-shib) patriarchy on Lung-hu Mountain in modern Kuí-hsi county, eastern Kiangsi. The patriarchy had been active and sponsored by the state since at least the eighth century. The precise title and the level of honors conferred by the imperial state on the Chang Heavenly Masters changed under successive dynasties. The term “Heavenly Master” (t'ien-shib) was not officially used in titles after 1368, but was still common in Ch'ing nonofficial usage. It was replaced formally by the more modest “True Man” (chen-jen). Until the end of the empire in 1911, a member of the Chang lineage inherited the title and role of Chang Tao-ling to be overseer of Taoism and protector of its orthodoxy. For more than ten centuries, the aristocratic, well-connected Chang lineage held...
sway at Lung-hu Mountain, supported by a large retinue of elite Taoist priests serving as the Heavenly Master’s officials. During the Ming and Ch’ing periods, these elite priests were known collectively as ritual officials (fa-kuan) and held official, if not paid, status in the imperial bureaucratic hierarchy. The function of Heavenly Master was usually transmitted from father to son, occasionally to a nephew. Sources document a reliable genealogy from about the twentieth generation to the present, when a contested sixty-fifth Heavenly Master is still living in Taiwan. During the Ch’ing period, there were successively ten Heavenly Masters. The fifty-second, Chang Ying-ching (d. 1651), appointed in 1636 during the Ming dynasty, was officially reconfirmed in the Ch’ing as Heavenly Master in 1649 with a similar rank and prerogatives as he had had under the Ming. The sixty-first, Chang Jen-cheng (1820–1902), received his title in 1862.

Heavenly Masters traveled to the imperial court for audiences, and to various places, in particular Chiang-nan cities such as Hangchow, Soochow, and, later, Shanghai, to perform rituals, hold ordinations, and select new ritual officials (fa-kuan). They also sent their ritual officials on missions. However, the Heavenly Masters spent most of their time on Lung-hu Mountain supervising their clerical bureaucracy. The Ming court and government had usually been generous patrons of the Heavenly Masters institution. The Ch’ing state at first continued the Ming policy of generosity toward the Chang Heavenly Master and maintained his titles and rank at their high Ming level (second rank). Under the Ch’ien-lung reign, however, the government moved toward reducing both his formal titles and privileges and his actual powers in supervising the Taoist clergy. In 1742, while being confirmed as the fifty-sixth Heavenly Master and having an audience with the emperor at Yuan-ming yuen (Old Summer Palace) in Peking, Chang Yu-lung (d. 1766) was barred from further audiences at the court. In 1748 the Heavenly Master’s position was lowered from first to fifth rank.\(^{47}\) It was raised to the third rank in 1766 when the newly enthroned fifty-seventh Heavenly Master, Chang Ts’un-i (1752–1779), succeeded in obtaining rain at imperial request.\(^{48}\) After forty-seven years of being banned from court audiences, the Heavenly Master was granted one audience every five years from 1789, but then in 1819 he was banned again and forever. On the whole, the official status of the Chang Heavenly Master was significantly lower during the nineteenth century than it had been up to the Yung-cheng reign.\(^{49}\) However, although the Chang Heavenly Master

\(^{47}\) Hosoya, “Kenyū chō no Seiikyō,” pp. 572–4, 581–4, who sets right the dates of these decisions.

\(^{48}\) Hosoya, “Kenyū chō no Seiikyō,” p. 584.

institution received diminished state honors and funding, Taoists were present on official duty at court to serve the emperor’s liturgical requirements.

Declines in official standing did not much affect the prestige of the Chang Heavenly Master institution with the Taoist clergy and the population at large. This prestige rested less on imperial recognition than on inherited legitimacy. The Chang family, the oldest clerical lineage within the Taoist clergy, had promoted a theory of hereditary charisma and legitimacy that provided the spiritual qualities necessary for a physical person, originally Chang Tao-ling in the second century, to be able to restore order to the universe by expelling demons and to guarantee the covenant between humanity and the Tao. This inherited spiritual capacity was confirmed by numinous objects handed on from one Heavenly Master to the next, notably Chang Tao-ling’s sword, a critical tool in exorcistic work, as well as his seal of authority, bearing the name of Chang Tao-ling’s diocese. Other seals were later granted to Heavenly Masters by emperors and were added to their paraphernalia.50

The assessment by many historians of a decline in the institutional status of the Chang Heavenly Master over the course of the Ch’ing dynasty remains an open question. Abundant anecdotal evidence suggests that the Heavenly Master maintained respect and patronage up to the end of the dynasty. The state policy most detrimental to the Lung-hu Mountain institutions sought to prevent the Lung-hu Mountain ritual officials from touring the country to ordain local Taoists and levy fees or contributions from them.51 However, repeated mentions of such tours during the nineteenth century suggest that the policy of isolating the Lung-hu Mountain Taoists from their networks of support was not successful.

The simplest, and most common, service offered by the Heavenly Master institution was the sale of talismans invoking the protection of Chang Tao-ling. These talismans were common throughout the empire, notably during the apotropaic rites of the Dragon Boat Festival (Tuan-wu chieh) during the fifth month.52 The manufacture and sale of talismans on an industrial scale was a major source of income for the Lung-hu Mountain institution, which printed and sold them directly as well as through a network of Taoist temples.53

51 Ta Ch’ing hui-tien shih-li 501, p. 8a; Ch’iin-ting Li-pu tse-li 170, pp. 3b–4b, mentioning a case in 1815 when the Heavenly Master was punished for having sent his fa-kuan on ordination tours; Goossaert, “Counting the monks,” p. 54, quoting archival material dated 1739; and Hosoya, “Kenryū chō no Seikyō,” p. 588 n. 12.
53 Chang, Chung-kuo Lung-hu shan t’ien-shih tao, pp. 105–9. In Ts’ai-heng-tzu, Cb’ung-ming man-lu (Taipei, 1969), pp. 6b–7a, a high official goes all the way to Lung-hu Mountain to request, and pay dearly for,
variety of other talismans, also empowered by the Heavenly Master’s seal, were available for sale. Chang Heavenly Masters distributed talismans, plaques, or other documents stamped with their seal to temples, presumably in exchange for a donation.

The Chang Heavenly Master and his ritual officials were sought after to perform exorcistic rituals. Anecdotal evidence shows that such high-profile and expensive services mostly had high-ranking officials and rich merchants as patrons, or in a few cases, local communities that pooled their resources. Patrons requesting the Heavenly Master to deal with demons afflicting them would either invite him to come and perform in person, or write and request punitive action at a distance, often through the real and otherworldly networks of city god temples, but always through the bureaucratic means of writing petitions and filing suits in the courts of the other world.

Another crucial function of the Lung-hu Mountain institution was the ordination of Taoist clerics and the canonization of local saints and gods, which worked the same way; that is, there was a conferral of a liturgical register (lu), which bestowed a rank within the spiritual hierarchy of the universe. During the early stages of the Heavenly Master church, all devotees were ordained and received a liturgical register, but only priests received ordinations for the highest ranks. The practice of ordaining laymen gradually declined, but in the Ch’ing period some favored lay disciples still received from the Heavenly Master ordination that conferred on them ritual protection without requiring any liturgical practice on their part. Laypersons thus ordained included wealthy merchants and high nobility. A Manchu imperial prince was ordained by the fifty-sixth Heavenly Master, Chang Yü-lung, in 1754.54

The details of the various ordination ranks, each with their specific registers, are described in Lung-hu Mountain ordination procedures (T’ien-t’an yü-ko). On top of the complex hierarchy of ranks were the Ch’ing-wei ling-pao ordinations. Taoists initiated in vernacular traditions, such as Lü-shan or Mei-shan, were also welcome and ordained, but at a lower rank and with a pledge to practice “orthodox Taoism” only. The Lung-hu Mountain institution thus worked by incentives rather than punitive methods to maintain relative control of Taoist practices while still being inclusive. The Chang Heavenly Masters’ approach was not to suppress or ban deviant practices, as this would have been impracticable, but to entice, with the prestige of ordinations, Taoists of local traditions to bring their practice closer to orthodox standards. This

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approach was not unlike the state’s policy of co-opting or reforming local cults in order to make them appear more Confucian.

The aim of having Lung-hu Mountain ordinations be discriminating and inclusive is spelled out most clearly in an ordination certificate obtained in 1704 at Lung-hu Mountain by a Taoist priest and still held by his descendants. The document, granted by the fifty-fourth Heavenly Master, is entitled “Certificate granted to K’ang Sheng I-lang, holder of the Chang-hsi altar, by the Management Office of the Heavenly Master’s residence.”

The certificate states that it is given in order to “eliminate heterodox mediumistic rites,” and that the Heavenly Master was charged to maintain Taoist orthodoxy, but the interdiction of mediumistic rites often had been disregarded. Officials of the Heavenly Master’s residence, while traveling on their way to sacrifice to the Five Sacred Peaks, had concluded that the mores in Hunan province had lapsed to the point where orthodox and heterodox practices were hopelessly mingled. The Heavenly Master decided to send his ritual officials to rectify these practices and to award ordination certificates to pure Taoists, and he received official approval from the Hunan governor for a ban on impure practitioners. The ritual officials were sent to each village to “check the liturgical standards [of local Taoists], ordain [the pure practitioners], and thereby counter heterodoxy and mediums.”

The priest to whom the certificate was given was called K’ang Sheng I-lang, a typical Hakka ordination name, from southeastern Hunan. K’ang had to declare that he practiced orthodox Taoism and would not transgress Taoist rules; if he lapsed into devious practices, Lung-hu Mountain officials would not fail to notice it, and he would be referred to provincial authorities for punishment, according to the certificate. This certificate envisioned a close co-operation between Taoist clerics and provincial government officials to maintain orthodox religious practices. This was certainly a sincere hope on the Lung-hu Mountain side, but one that through the eighteenth century came to be less supported by officials. Many officials disapproved of interference by the Chang Heavenly Master and his delegates in local religious affairs. In any case, the certificate shows that the Chang Heavenly Master officers exalted the superiority of Ch’ing-wei ling-pao clerics, and that vernacular priests, including the Lü-shan Taoists, far from being excluded from its ordinations, were among the most active clients. This is further documented by other fieldwork reports and Taoist families’ genealogies.

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Hakka genealogy even claims that formerly not only priests but all Hakka people were ordained by the Chang Heavenly Master. This claim is linked to the practice of Hakka followers of Lü-shan Taoism of giving ordination names to all humans, their ancestors as well as the living.

The Heavenly Master could nominate human Taoists to places in the spiritual hierarchy of the universe, and he could nominate gods. There was a belief in the late imperial period that the Chang Heavenly Master nominated all city gods and earth gods (t'u-ti kung). Ch'ing sources report that the Heavenly Master received all gods – his officials and appointees – in audience at the New Year. He was reputedly knowledgeable about all the deities and spirits active in the world. A late eighteenth-century anecdote tells of a magistrate who planned to destroy an illicit temple but decided to check with the Heavenly Master about the identity and status of this temple’s god. In other cases, members of the local community wrote or went to Lung-hu Mountain to request canonization for their gods, which the Heavenly Master granted in exchange for a payment. One particularly remarkable illustration is a scroll representing the canonization ritual of a local god by the Heavenly Master in 1641.

The process of Taoist canonization (tao-feng) is distinct from government canonization (kuo-feng). Major gods found throughout the Ch'ing empire received both rituals, but many local gods only had a Taoist canonization or only a government canonization. However, the two bureaucratic processes of canonization could be linked. Three brothers named Chiang from the Sung period were worshipped in a temple in Hangchow. The gazetteer of this temple records their canonization in 1808 by the local government. It also cites documents issued by the Heavenly Master’s residence that claim a precedent: when the government canonizes a god, the Heavenly Master is requested to memorialize the Jade Emperor to secure a confirming canonization edict from the Heavenly administration. It is not impossible that officials requested the Heavenly Master to act in this way, or maybe this was the Heavenly Master's

p. 79, documents a case of a Hakka priest who, while being ordained at Lung-hu Mountain, swore never again to practice certain “heterodox” rituals.


59 Wang, “Chang t’ien-shih chih yen-chiu,” p. 127; Hamashima Atsutoshi, Sōkan shinkō: Kinsei Kōnan nison shakai to minkuan shinkō (Tokyo, 2001), pp. 320–2, quotes several cases of canonizations of city gods and other deities in Chiang-nan by the Heavenly Master through the course of the Ch'ing period.


61 Little and Eichmann, Taoism and the arts of China, cat. 82.

initiative, but in either case, the Heavenly Master’s claim was reported by the compilers of the temple gazetteer. These documents imply the Heavenly Master was willing to work as a branch of the government headed by the Ch’ing emperor. The Heavenly Master’s administration was not acting on its own initiative, but completing a canonization process initiated by members of the imperial bureaucracy.

An anecdote recorded in a nineteenth-century collection suggests the extent of the prestige and significance of canonizations granted by the Heavenly Master. This anecdote tells of another Hangchow temple, devoted to General Shih. The temple keeper was ashamed that the god did not have a title, although he enjoyed a successful cult and handsome revenues. More importantly, the lack of title prevented the temple from organizing a procession because the untitled general could not be placed in the divine hierarchy that dictated the ritual greetings that would be exchanged with other temples visited during the procession. In 1829, the temple keeper in Hangchow sent an envoy to the Heavenly Master’s residence with a gift of 300 silver dollars to ask that the general have the title of earl (po), which was duly granted.

Chang Heavenly Masters’ officials tried to work with the civil bureaucracy in conducting ordinations and canonizations, but often they trespassed the limits to their autonomy set by the bureaucracy. These trespasses sometimes met with punishments, as the imperial institution needed the Chang Heavenly Master less than he needed it. During the Ch’ing period there was an uneasy co-operation between the authority and bureaucracy of the emperor and that of the Heavenly Master, although there was no doubt as to where the preponderance of power lay. The imperial state and the Heavenly Master institution shared similar hierarchical conceptions of society and state, and their projects of integrating all local communities in a universal framework were complementary as much as they were competitive.

THE CH’UAN-CHEN CLERGY

The Ch’üan-chhen order, created around 1170, was one of a number of Taoist movements founded by charismatic leaders teaching self-cultivation techniques. These movements were instrumental in spreading inner alchemy

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64 Paul R. Katz, Demon hordes and burning boats: The cult of Marshal Wen in late imperial Chekiang (Albany, 1995), chapter 5, discusses similar situations.
(nei-tan), a tradition of self-cultivation formed during the ninth and the twelfth centuries, that was based on earlier Taoist immortality techniques, but was more speculative, less complex in visualizations, and largely devoid of the secrecy of earlier esoteric traditions. The Ch’üan-chen order was founded by Wang Che, better known by his style name, Wang Ch’ung-yang (1113–70). The movement primarily developed under his disciples, notably Ch’iu Ch’u-chi, often referred to by his style name Ch’iu Ch’ang-ch’un (1148–1227), who reorganized it into a centralized ascetic order with himself as patriarch. It was recognized as an independent order both by the Chin and Yuan governments and by other Taoists. The distinction between the Ch’üan-chen order and the Cheng-i order was officially acknowledged under the governments of the Ming and the Ch’ing. The self-cultivation techniques that Ch’üan-chen masters taught and practiced ranged from the body cultivation (yang-sheng) promoting well-being, robust health, and long life, to more advanced methods, transforming rather than consolidating the body, and leading to transcendence represented as immortality. Cheng-i clerics practiced these techniques as well, but were much less involved in teaching them than Ch’üan-chen clerics were.

The founding of the Ming dynasty and its new religious policies spelled the end of the autonomy enjoyed during the Yuan period by religious organizations, notably the Ch’üan-chen order. Under the Ming, Ch’üan-chen temples were absorbed by local religious communities, the Ch’üan-chen patriarchy disappeared, and the unified order loosened, eventually coalescing into various Ch’üan-chen lineages. The ascetic tradition lived on. Certain Ch’üan-chen monastic practices and a part of its ordination and consecration procedures survived under the benevolent supervision of the Cheng-i Taoists who formed the Taoist clergy’s official leadership that was appointed by the Ming government. Some Cheng-i clerics took on Ch’üan-chen identities. This institutional arrangement of Taoist clergy changed in the mid-seventeenth century with a far-reaching reorganization carried out by the so-called seventh and eighth generations of the newly constituted Lung-men lineage, and


68 On the Ch’üan-chen order, see the articles in the special issue on Ch’üan-chen in *Journal of Chinese Religions* 29, 2001.

69 For a study of the continuity of Ch’üan-chen ascetic practices of enclosed meditation through the Yuan, Ming, and Ch’ing periods, see Mori Yuria, “Zenshin zahachi: Gen Min Sei no Zenshinkyō girei o chūshin ni,” in *Tōhōkaku no shinsuisen*, ed. Fukui Fumimasa (Tokyo, 2003), pp. 459–97.

70 Ordination is the admission of an individual Ch’üan-chen Taoist by his master and his peers at the end of his or her novitiate; consecration, which takes place at a later date and concerns some but not all ordained Ch’üan-chen Taoists, is a collective, advanced training and taking of vows in a public monastery.
notably by Wang Ch'ang-yüeh (d. 1680). After the turn of the seventeenth century, several local Ch'üan-chen traditions had been organizing themselves along the lineage model, and they gradually came to call themselves Lung-men and use a shared genealogy that traced an invented filiation back to Ch'iu Ch'u-chi. The Lung-men masters successfully claimed a monopoly over the Ch'üan-chen tradition and the right to revive (actually, to a large extent, reinvent) the Ch'üan-chen institutions of the Yüan period, notably public monasteries and consecration procedures. There is a clear continuity in ideology and self-cultivation practices, but there appears to be less on the level of institutions. These institutions reformed the Ch'üan-chen order, which expanded its extensive network through the Ch'ing period.

The rise of the reformed Ch'üan-chen order constitutes in many scholarly narratives the most important phenomenon in Ch'ing Taoist history, but it is not a well-understood phenomenon. Wang Ch'ang-yüeh is a figure shrouded in mist. There is no contemporary record of him, only later hagiographies, most famously the Chin-kai hsin-teng (Lamp for the heart from Chin-kai Mountain) of the early nineteenth century, which mythifies him for the purposes of bolstering local claims. According to hagiography, Wang practiced ascetic self-cultivation in various Taoist mountains of north China and met various masters, all unknown to historical sources, who initiated him by stages and eventually set him on course to revive the Ch'üan-chen public monasteries and the consecration system. This Wang Ch'ang-yüeh reputedly did in 1656 as abbot at the Pai-yün kuan (White Cloud Temple) in Peking, the site of the grave of Ch'iu Ch'ang-ch'un and the seat of the Ch'üan-chen patriarchy until 1368. Wang taught Taoist practice in general, and the importance of observing the precepts (chieh) received during consecration in particular. He also revised and rearranged the precepts to be conferred on ordinands, but it is not clear if Wang's reforms influenced nineteenth-century practices. His sermons focused on a vision of transcendence accessed through self-discipline. They were transmitted as what became known as the Lung-men hsin-fa (Heart method of the Lung-men lineage). Wang Ch'ang-yüeh held his first consecration ceremonies in 1656 in Peking and then, in 1663, he embarked on a sort of missionary tour to central China, where he held consecrations in various

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places, including Hangchow, Soochow, and Wu-tang shan. While the details are not clear, this period saw the emergence of a generation of Ch'üan-chén leaders of noted intellectual and organizational achievements, some of whom were Ming loyalists who turned to religion rather than serve the Ch'ing.

The expansion of the reformed Ch'üan-chén order was cumulative. In the aftermath of the Manchu conquest, some local officials entrusted Ch'üan-chén clerics with rebuilding local religious institutions as well as civic tasks. For instance, in the Nan-yang region in southern Honan, which had suffered extensive destruction, local military officials as early as 1644 worked in co-operation with Ch'üan-chén clerics, who took over the most important Taoist temple there, the Hsüan-miao Monastery (Hsüan-miao kuan). In Manchuria during the first decades after 1644 Ch'üan-chén clerics established both mountain centers and urban centers, notably the T'ai Ch'ing kung (Palace of the Great Ch'ing) in Mukden (modern Shen-yang), founded in 1677 and reaching prominence in the late eighteenth century. Ch'üan-chén clerics later took over central temples from Cheng-i clerics in Szechwan. In Kwangtung, this process did not begin before the turn of the eighteenth century. In southern Chekiang, Ch'üan-chén takeovers date from the mid-nineteenth century. In all cases, local officials' support seems to have been significant.

Ch'üan-chén expansion in many parts of the Ch'ing empire was related to local conditions. There is no evidence for a concerted, top-down policy from the Ch'ing state that favored Ch'üan-chén Taoism over the Cheng-i order, even though some officials were aware that the Chin and Yuan dynasties, which the Ch'ing leaders honored as predecessors, had done so. Wang Ch'ang-yüeh himself claimed explicit support from the K'ang-hsi emperor for his project. He seems to have been awarded a title, although not a high-ranking one. Support was more likely for his person rather than for a comprehensive Ch'üan-chén revival. There was a general affinity between some Ch'ing literati's religiosity and the reformed Ch'üan-chén order that favored close co-operation, and thus local rather than imperial support for Ch'üan-chén leaders and their projects of institution building. This affinity encompassed shared practices such as spirit-writing, which had had close connections with the Ch'üan-chén order.

75 For Kwangtung, see chapter 3 of Lai, *Kuang-tung ti-fang tao-chiao yen-chiu*; for Chekiang, see Wu Ya-k'uei, *Chiang-nan Ch'üan-chén tao-chiao* (Hong Kong, 2006); Ts'ao Pen-yeh and Hsü Hung-t'u, *Hang-chou Pao-p'ú tao-yüan tao-chiao yin-yüeh* (Taipei, 2000); and Ts'ao Pen-yeh and Hsü Hung-t'u, *Wen-chou Pin-gyang Tung-yüeh-kuan tao-chiao yen-yüeh yen-chiu* (Taipei, 2000); for Szechwan, see Li Ho-ch'un and Ting Ch'ang-ch'ün, *Ch'ing-yang kung Erh-hsien-an chih* (Ch'eng-tu, 2006).
and its patriarchs since the Yüan period, and also with its involvement with individual self-cultivation, individual arts such as painting and calligraphy, and knowledge of medicine. The emergence in some places of charismatic Ch'üan-chen leaders, able to mobilize resources for large networks of clerical and lay disciples as well as associations for self-cultivation practice and charity, may explain why the Ch'üan-chen expansion succeeded in some places and failed in others. In any case, the transfer of control of central Taoist temples to Ch'üan-chen clerics only happened in times of crisis, either a general crisis such as the post-conquest chaos, or conflicts inside a temple. Ch'ing officials would not on a whim take the initiative to remove or change Taoist institutional leaders.

The uneven expansion of the Ch'üan-chen order indicates that it was not the result of a systematic policy of Ch'ing emperors. In some areas, such as the North China Plain or the Shansi–Szechwan region, the order became institutionally, although not numerically, dominant, with several major monasteries, and important numbers of clerics spread among local temples. But the Ch'üan-chen presence was patchy in Chiang-nan, for instance. Some Cheng-i elite clerics, such as Shih Tao-yüan, a leading Taoist from Soochow who worked on Lung-hu Mountain and also served at the K'ang-hsi court, were interested in Ch'üan-chen and joined the Lung-men lineage while maintaining their previous affiliations in the Cheng-i order. Although there were Ch'üan-chen hermitages in Chiang-nan, central temples were almost always run by Cheng-i Taoists. As a result, Ch'üan-chen clerics were a minority. I estimate the number of Ch'üan-chen clerics as being in the range of 20,000 in the late nineteenth century. Among them, female clerics were a sizeable fraction, maybe in the range of a third, but with important regional variation. This was a much higher proportion than among Cheng-i Taoists, among whom women were extremely rare.

During the Ch'ing period the Ch'üan-chen clergy was divided into more than thirty lineages, but dominated by one of them, the Lung-men. The dominance was numerical, since about two-thirds of all Ch'üan-chen clerics were Lung-men. This situation was similar to the Buddhists', among whom the Lin-chi lineage represented a comparable proportion. The dominance of the Lung-men lineage was also institutional, as it held a monopoly over the consecration procedure. The prestige of the Lung-men lineage in Ch'ing society can hardly be overestimated. In several areas, local Taoist lineages and some lay devotional groups, although not Ch'üan-chen in the sense that they

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did not perform the Ch'üan-chen liturgy and had no involvement with the Ch'üan-chen consecration system or monasteries, called themselves Lung-men and used the Lung-men generational poem for their ordination names.

Ch'üan-chen Taoism shared many organizational characteristics with Buddhism. The order was based on a limited number of public monasteries (shih-fang ts'ung-lin). An early twentieth-century list named twenty-five,77 which, like Buddhist monasteries, provided consecration and training to all its clerics. Smaller training centers on some mountains drew both lay pilgrims and monks visiting Taoist holy sites and looking for masters. These key training institutions were nodes on the map of Ch'üan-chen geography, and many clerics visited them as they spent months or years traveling through the provinces of China. The majority of Ch'üan-chen clergy, though, did not live in these prestigious centers, but served as managers of temples owned by their clerical lineage or by lay communities.

The most important function of the Ch'üan-chen monasteries was to organize consecrations. Ch'üan-chen clerics, like their Cheng-i coreligionists, started as novices for a period of initial training, then were ordained by their master as priests and thereby inscribed in a lineage and given a Taoist name and costume. Some of them later joined a collective session of intense advanced training in a monastery and were consecrated by taking precepts that implied celibacy, vegetarianism, and other rules.78 Ch'üan-chen consecrations are not well documented before the nineteenth century, when it seems that the major monasteries organized one or two consecrations per decade for between thirty and several hundred ordinands on each occasion.

The abbots and other dignitaries of the public monasteries were the Ch'üan-chen elite, part of empire-wide networks they employed as they traveled from one monastery to the next. These elite Ch'üan-chen monasteries had local institutions branching out from them and connecting with local society. The usual image of a Ch'üan-chen Taoist cleric in Ch'ing times is a celibate and vegetarian monk, living in a monastery. Probably not more than ten percent of the Ch'üan-chen clergy lived in a monastery. Most lived in small temples or at home. In some areas the Ch'üan-chen clergy was almost exclusively female. In certain regions, probably most Ch'üan-chen Taoists were married and ate meat (although not all meats).79 Only the elite clerics managing large temples or monasteries that served as training institutions were celibate and vegetarian.

77 Yoshioka Yoshitoyo, Dōkyō no kenkyū (Kyoto, 1952), p. 221; Liu, “General Zhang buries the bones,” p. 69.
78 For details, see Goossaert, The Taoists of Peking, pp. 144–53.
Even now in Kwangtung, celibate, vegetarian Ch'üan-chen clerics are literally unheard of. This is increasingly the case in other regions.

Elite Ch'üan-chen clerics connected differently with local society in different regions. In some places beginning in the nineteenth century, networks of spirit-writing altars with initiated lay devotees were the Ch'üan-chen order's base, as in Chiang-nan and Kwangtung. In other areas, such as the North China Plain, the economic basis for Ch'üan-chen clerics was being hired by local communities to be their temple managers. In yet other areas, networks of married priests performing Ch'üan-chen liturgy were the mainstay of Ch'üan-chen Taoism. For instance, Ch'en Chung-yüan (1736–95), who was active in Kuan county, Szechwan, codified a liturgy that combined classical Ch'ing-wei ling-pao liturgy with some Ch'üan-chen elements as well as regional Szechwan cults. He set up an initiation system for priests practicing this liturgy. In the plain around Ch'eng-tu, this system became a major part of the local religious landscape, practiced by married Taoists belonging to the Lung-men lineage. The relative unification of the system found expression in the printing of their liturgical compendium, Kuang-ch'eng i-chib (The Kuang-ch'eng ritual system), in contrast to most ritual traditions in which only manuscripts were used.  

The picture that emerges from these regional differences in the Ch'üan-chen order is of a prestigious name in Ch'ing society, commanding respect from large parts of officialdom and local elites because of its rich literary and scriptural heritage, its famed historical role in safeguarding Chinese culture during the Mongol invasions, and its close association with a demanding tradition of spiritual inquiry and self-cultivation, much like the Ch'an tradition of Buddhism. Because of its prestige, the name Ch'üan-chen was claimed by a large variety of persons and groups, thus becoming a contested “brand” or adaptable ideology. The small network of large monasteries and their elite clerics, focusing on discipline, claimed to be the genuine Ch'üan-chen teaching. Others had other interpretations of Ch'üan-chen, such as local spirit-writing cults and local ritual traditions. There were important ideological variations in the different local forms of Ch'üan-chen teachings, with the clerical elite stressing discipline, and local Ch'üan-chen traditions having a more salvationist message.  

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Rather than sharply distinguishing the Ch’üan-chen and Cheng-i orders as two forms of Taoism, it seems more helpful to see that they played rather similar roles. Usually not hostile to each other, the elite clerics of both orders tried to be in close co-operation with the Ch’ing state. Along with the pursuit of homogenization and standardization on the elite level, countervailing processes of localization occurred when Ch’üan-chen and Cheng-i clerics managed central temples. In these cases, local nonelite Taoists cultivated their links to elite Taoists while pursuing local religious forms. These processes included adopting local music that merged with their liturgy; transmitting their liturgy to local groups, such as at-home Taoists, devotional groups, and lay amateur ritualists; and also adopting and refashioning local deities. An example of this differentiation is Wu-tang shan, one of the most active among sacred Taoist mountain sites during the Ch’ing. Elite Ch’üan-chen and Cheng-i communities operated there, but distinctive music evolved, as well as specific martial arts practices, such as the T’ai-chi-ch’üan.82

TEMPLES AND RITUALS IN LOCAL SOCIETY

For centuries local entities variously led by local elites – heads of lineages, wealthy landowners, merchants, literati, and former officials – had organized such activities as schools, charities, medical services, local security, and support networks that in effect competed with and gradually diminished the role of local institutions led by Buddhist or Taoist clerics.83 This process was gradual and continued through the Ch’ing.

The gradual takeover by lineage, merchant, and other local entities does not imply that Taoism declined. Merchant guilds could adopt Taoist saints as their patrons,84 and often co-operated closely with Taoists by requiring rituals for themselves and their patron saint or for the whole city, such as in cases of fire and other disasters. They employed Taoists to manage their shrines, and they held meetings in Taoist temples, such as the Tung-yüeh miao (Temple to the God of the Eastern Peak). Any description of religious life in most, if not all, parts of the Ch’ing empire would feature large-scale communal celebrations with Taoists performing for local territorial organizations, as well as involvement of Taoist clergy offering a range of services to individuals, such as death rituals and exorcisms, private icon consecrations, and healing.85

83 See David Faure, Emperor and ancestor: State and lineage in South China (Stanford, 2007).
85 For Taoist rituals in late-Ch’ing Peking, see chapter 6 of Goossaert, The Taoists of Peking.
particular, Taoists performed communal rituals of purification and renewal (chia) in villages and neighborhoods at regular intervals of several years. In times of emergency they performed communal fire chiao or plague-expelling chiao.

Local lay communities that were organized around the cult of their saints relied on Taoist and Buddhist clerics’ services for many ritual needs, notably placing their cult within a universal framework of meaning, morality, and an overall economy of salvation. Buddhists and Taoists, notably the latter, contributed to the growth of local cults by providing hagiographies, scriptures, and liturgies tailored to the needs of these cults, and performing rituals for them. In order to be consecrated, many cults needed to sponsor a Taoist chiao offering ritual. While this phenomenon has been in evidence since the T'ang dynasty (618–907), many local cults received scriptures, titles, and liturgical texts from Taoists during the Ch'ing. This has been called the “Taoist liturgical framework” of local cults. The notion of a Taoist liturgical framework is a model that was developed from fieldwork observation in southeast China, where Taoists are particularly numerous and in close co-operation with local cults. Historical evidence from other regions shows that comparable processes had been at work in other parts of China, even though in north China the liturgical framework provided by Taoists was apparently less commonly used by local communities.

Taoists’ roles in providing a liturgical framework were important, but they often did not control festivals and temples; lineages or local elites and merchant corporations did. Taoist clerics managed only a small proportion of temples active in the Ch'ing period. For instance, in Peking by the early twentieth century, they managed 116 out of 1,140 temples. Local gazetteers compiled in the Ch'ing, sometimes complemented by modern ethnographic surveys, provide evidence that in most counties only a few temples were controlled by Taoists. These temples were devoted to one or another of the great Taoist cults found empire-wide; that is, a cult of a deity whose scriptures and hagiographies are found in the Taoist canon. The deities for the dominant cults in the Ch'ing period included Hsüan-t'ien shang-ti, the deities of the

87 For the great plague-expelling rituals in Hangchow and Wen-chou during the Ch'ing period, and a discussion of the role of Taoism in such massive celebrations, see chapter 5 of Katz, Demon hordes and burning boats.
89 Stephen Jones, In search of the folk Daoists in north China (Farnham, 2010), conclusion, argues that there was little equivalent of the “liturgical framework” in most of modern north China, even though Taoists (or lay amateurs performing Taoist rituals) frequently participated in village-wide celebrations.
hell-bureaucratic hierarchy, the local earth god of villagers, the city god of county seats, the deity of the Eastern Peak, and, at the pinnacle of the hierarchy, the Jade Emperor (Yü Huang). Other deities included the Three Officials (San Kuan). Lü Tung-pin and deities associated with immortality cults and with the stars governing fate, notably the Tou-mu (Mother of the Dipper) cult, were particularly encouraged by Ch’üan-chen clerics during the Ch’ing.

In most counties, the Taoist institutional presence was small but crucial. The temples that the clerics controlled often were at the center of local networks of several kinds, organizing local clergy as well as local communal religious life in terms of festivals and processions. The central temples, run by either Ch’üan-chen or Cheng-i clerics, served as training centers where Taoists from smaller temples or married priests went to be ordained or undergo further training. Furthermore, these central temples were also points of contact with Taoists in other provinces and with centers of authority, such as the Chang Heavenly Master headquarters on Lung-hu Mountain or great Ch’üan-chen monasteries. They were a place of articulation with the state, as these were the institutions that housed the local branch of the Taoist clerical bureaucracy. Some of these central temples were just called city god temples or Eastern Peak temples. Others still bore the name of the old Sung and Yüan dynasty systems of official Taoist temples, called Hsüan-miao kuan, one for each county.

Examples of how Taoist central temples functioned come from the seventeenth century onwards in the area extending between Shanghai and Nanking, where each local community (village or neighborhood) annually collected spirit-money from each household in the name of the local earth god as “tax” to Heaven. Local leaders brought this “tax” together with the statue of their local earth god in procession to the local central temple, usually the temple for the city god, the Eastern Peak deity, or the Jade Emperor, which were managed by Taoist clerics, to burn the spirit-money. This ritual was called “dispatching heavenly taxes.” While this practice was apparently specific to the area between Shanghai and Nanking, the connection between Taoist clerics, city god temples, and local social organizations was found in many


91 See, for instance, the case of Kwangtung; the Hsüan-miao kuan in Canton was run by Cheng-i Taoists in direct connection with Lung-hu Mountain; the Hsüan-miao kuan in nearby Hui-chou was run since the early eighteenth century by Ch’üan-chen clerics, and both operated as central temples: Lai Chi Tim [Li Chih-t’ien], “Kuang-chou Hsüan-miao-kuan k’ao-shih,” Chung-yang yen-chiu-yüan li-shih yü-yen yen-chiu to chi-k’an 75 No. 3 (2004), pp. 445–513; and chapters 2 and 3 of Lai, Kuang-tung ti-fang tao-chiao yen-chiu.

92 Hamashima, Sōkan shinkō, pp. 205–19.
parts of the Ch'ing empire, and appears as a characteristic feature of Taoism from the late Ming to the late Ch'ing. Most city god temples were managed by Taoists, often the local Taoist elite clerics, connected to the Heavenly Masters, who invoked the city gods and used their temples to organize trials against demons and baleful spirits when their powerful rituals were required.93

Below the central temples there were a number of smaller temples or hermitages owned by Taoist clerical lineages handed down from master to disciple. Some of them were built through ascetic fund-raising. Most of the Taoist clergy living in temples were hired on a contractual basis as a manager (chu-ch'ih) of a temple owned by a lay community.94 County magistrates appointed and paid clerics as managers in official temples and upheld their contractual rights to serve in temples owned by lay communities. Probably most numerous of all were the Taoist clergy who did not live in or manage a temple, but had a ritual service center, either in their own home or, in urban contexts, in a downtown business area, where they met clients.95

It is difficult to draw a line between cults that emanated from local society but existed in a Taoist liturgical framework and those that Taoist clerics developed on their own initiative, such as the cults at Taoist central temples. Another category of regional cults was those closely associated with Taoist clerics but organized with networks of pilgrimage and branch temples. One such major Taoist cult, that of Hsüan-t'ien shang-ti or Ch'en-wu, had been prominently promoted by the Ming imperial house and remained a core cult promoted by Taoist clerics throughout the empire during the Ch'ing period. The Hsüan-t'ien shang-ti cult was officially recognized, but with less emphasis under the Ch'ing. Locally, the cult flourished and become a regional cult in the area around Wu-tang shan, Hsüan-t'ien shang-ti's holy site in northern Hupei. Pilgrimages to Wu-tang shan took on massive proportions during the Ch'ing. They were supported by pilgrimage associations, often in close co-operation with local Taoist clerics and temples, from throughout Hupei and southern Honan, but also from as far away as Soochow or Shansi. Such pilgrimage associations had existed during the Ming, but they seem to have become more numerous during the Ch'ing.96 In these areas, the pilgrimage

95 For the Taoist businesses in late Ch’ing Canton, see Lai Chi Tim [Li Chih-t’ien], “Min-kuo shih-chi Kuang-chou shih ‘Na-mo tao-kuan’ ti li-shih k’ao-chiu,” Chung-yang yen-chiu-yuan chin-tai-shih yen-chiu-so chi-k’an 37 (2002), pp. 1–40.
associations and the Hsüan-t'ien shang-ti branch temples’ networks became a major element of the social and religious landscape, and with a strong Taoist identity.

Another example was the cult in northern Kiangsi of Hsü Chen-chün (the Perfected lord Hsü, a title given to Hsü Hsün, fl. fourth century) in northern Kiangsi. Hsü was regarded as the “patriarch” (tsu-shih), a title also used for Hsüan-t'ien shang-ti, by Taoists and by local society in general. Kiangsi merchants, who created powerful commercial banking and trading networks over much of the Ch'ing empire, took the cult of Hsü Chen-chün with them and established shrines for him in all their guild halls. This cult spawned a distinct textual tradition called ching-ming (Pure Brightness), which was maintained by both Ch'üan-chen and Cheng-i clerics. Like the Hsüan-t'ien shang-ti cult, the Hsü Chen-chün cult was organized as networks of branch temples and pilgrimage associations converging on the saint’s home temple, the Wan-shou kung near Nan-ch'ang in Kiangsi.

These strong Taoist regional cults produced most of the extant Taoist art from the Ch'ing period. Beside Taoist art related to self-cultivation, there were remarkable local traditions of painting, sculpture, and other arts focused on the local “patriarch” (tsu-shih) and the Taoists who served him. They presented living and past Taoist elite clerics and the local gods they served placed within the grand cosmological framework that Taoist ritual also enacted.

LAY TAOIST PRACTICES

While some lay initiates engaged in Taoist liturgy during the Ch'ing period, for the most part Taoist rituals were performed by clerics. Lay initiates were involved to a greater extent with scriptural, devotional, or self-cultivation practices. For many elite lay practitioners of Taoism, the core of their practice did not involve organizing rituals or building temples, but rather reading, writing, and distributing books related to Taoist practices and scriptures, and, more pervasively, spirit-writing cults.

97 Akizuki Kan’ei, Chūgoku kinsei dōkyō no keisei: Jōmyōdō no kisoteki kenkyū (Tokyo, 1978).
99 Little and Eichmann, Taoism and the arts of China; Yu Tzu-an [Yau Chi On] and Yu Hsieh-hua [Yau Hok Wa], Shu-ch'ai yü tao-ch'ang: Tao-chiao wen-wu (Hong Kong, 2008).
100 Yu and Yu, Shu-ch'ai yü tao-ch'ang, section iv, pp. 23–7, showing Ch'ing portraits of Ch'üan-chen patriarchs.
101 Yu and Yu, Shu-ch'ai yü tao-ch'ang, section iv, p. 18, for a Taoist pantheon from Soochow; and many other examples in this catalog.
Many books written by and for Taoists were published during the Ch'ing period. There are well over five hundred titles, and many more, notably liturgical manuals and spirit-writing books, await discovery and perhaps a modern re-edition. Most Taoist books written during the Ch'ing were individual works that can be divided into two broad categories, those printed and in open circulation, and those usually as manuscripts with restricted circulation, and usually transmitted only from master to disciple. Most liturgical works were of the latter type. Exceptions were standard scriptures (ching) and litanies (ch' an), used by lay devotees and clerics alike, and widely distributed by temples and charitable associations. By contrast, printed works included self-cultivation books, mostly essays and collected teachings by individual living masters, or by immortals, whose words were revealed through spirit-writing, as well as hagiographies, gazetteers of Taoist temples and mountains, and doctrinal works. The printed books were found in scholars’ libraries and listed in their catalogs.

The market for religious books, Taoist books in particular, in Ch'ing times was vibrant and unstructured. Taoist institutions such as monasteries or temples rarely played a large role in book production. The central temples discussed above that played a crucial role in the institutional and ritual life of Ch'ing Taoists were less active in their intellectual life. An exception is the Mei-hua kuan (Plum Blossom Temple), on Mount Chin-kai, northern Chekiang, with a large library that was used to publish collections and scriptures. Many of the books were published by religious presses that did not specialize in Taoism, but also published morality books, devotional texts such as the pao-ch' ian (precious volumes), and literature. Such publications were typically paid for by the author's disciples or patrons. Taoists themselves may have been individually active in the distribution of books. A nineteenth-century Chüan-chen cleric spent his life raising funds for printing and distributing Taoist and morality books, but there was no apparent Taoist institutional support for such individual initiatives.

The most authoritative textual resource for late imperial Taoists was the huge, imperially sponsored Taoist canon. It had been printed in 1445, and the printing blocks were kept at the Great Hall of Light. In late Ch'ing the Pai-yün kuan (White Cloud Temple) in Peking and a few other Taoist temples had copies. Before the modern reprinting in 1926, copies of the entire Taoist canon...
The Taoist canon were extremely rare. It was treated as a precious object that enhanced the prestige of any central temple, mostly the largest Ch’üan-chen monasteries, that possessed a set. It was not much used as a resource for textual studies. Pai-yün kuan leaders undertook to restore a complete set of the canon, but did not make it widely available. For that reason, few Taoist clerics, and even fewer laypeople, had access to all the works in the collected canon.

Beside the Taoist canon, another large collection of Taoist books was the Tao-tsang chi-yao (Essentials of the Taoist canon). Although its name suggests a direct relationship, the Tao-tsang chi-yao contains a quite different set of texts from those in the Taoist canon. It was a selection of texts revolving around the cult of Lü Tung-pin and associated self-cultivation practices. Most important, it was not compiled by Taoist clerical institutions, but by lay groups. The first edition was made by a lay Taoist devotee and high official, Chiang Yü-p’u (1756–1819). It was enlarged and re-edited in 1906 at a major Ch’üan-chen monastery in Szechwan, the Erh-hsien an (Abbey of the Two Immortals). Chiang as an official stationed in Peking maintained an active spirit-writing cult to Lü Tung-pin during the first years of the nineteenth century and received inner-alchemy (nei-tan) and soteriological scriptures through this medium. The cult included a number of high officials as members, and created a lineage called the T’ien-hsien p’ai (Lineage of the Celestial Immortals). The Tao-tsang chi-yao consists of some 200 texts selected from among existing collections of Taoist books for their relevance to the practice of Chiang’s group, notably hagiography, poetry, and self-cultivation, as well as around 100 texts from the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, many of them revealed through spirit-writing both in earlier Lü Tung-pin shrines and in Chiang’s own group.

As reflected in both individual titles and the lists of contents of the more extensive publication projects such as the Tao-tsang chi-yao, the largest category of non-liturgical books published by Taoists under the Ch’ing is self-cultivation works, including commentaries on alchemical classics of earlier periods, poetry, didactic essays, charts, and records of question-and-answer sessions between a master and his disciples. Another important category is

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107 On the diffusion of Taoist body charts during the Ch’ing, see Catherine Despeux, Taoïsme et corps humain: Le Xiuzhen tu (Paris, 1994).
anthologies and primers on self-cultivation, which suggest that self-cultivation practices were not restricted to a small set of ascetic virtuosi, but were engaged in by many educated Chinese, even if superficially or for limited health- or strength-enhancing purposes. Taoist clergy and other practitioners shared with literati a common interest in texts such as *Lao-tzu*, *Chuang-tzu*, and *Book of change*, but also alchemical and Buddhist classics, as well as medical and aesthetic pursuits. Examples of Ch'ing scholars engaging in such Taoist pursuits are numerous, and the case of the aristocratic Manchu Wan-yen clan is exemplary. Members of this clan, which produced numerous high-ranking officials, for over two centuries devoutly worshiped Lü Tung-pin, practiced self-healing, and maintained ties with Ch'üan-chen monasteries.

The most influential Taoist authors of the Ch'ing period shared much with Confucian writers. A representative case is Liu I-ming (1737–1821), one of the best-known Ch'ing inner-alchemy (*nei-tan*) authors. Although a Ch'üan-chen cleric, Liu never assumed a leading position at a Taoist institution, but traveled among various monasteries, mostly in the Shensi–Kansu area. He built his own group of disciples, who helped publish his collected works, *Tao-shu shib-erh chung* (*Twelve works on the Tao*), a collection of commentaries on Confucian and Taoist classics and essays on self-cultivation. While Liu did not set up any institution or formal school by himself, his writings achieved instant success in Taoist circles because of his incomparable mastery of the Taoist, Buddhist, and Confucian spiritual heritage.

Taoist self-cultivation rarely took a communal form, but rather was organized as small groups consisting of master and disciples, sometimes within temples and monasteries, or just as often outside any institution. Each group had a sense of their distinct spiritual identity. In contrast to the Ch'üan-chen and Cheng-i ordination systems, and to local ritual traditions, practices of self-cultivation were fluid, without clear boundaries. As certain texts proved influential, they were repeatedly re-edited and received commentaries. They spawned more or less distinctive intellectual traditions that eventually gained a designation such as “western lineage” or “eastern lineage.” Such designations appeared more during the twentieth century, when Taoist identities, “schools,” and traditions were radically reinvented along lines that did not exist during the Ch'ing period. The texts behind these traditions had a major impact on Ch'ing Taoists, but one must be wary of reading back post-1900 constructions of distinct schools. Among such unstructured traditions, the

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most influential seems to have been the Wu–Liu “school,” a term that does not appear before 1897. It refers to the corpus of texts attributed to Wu Shou-yang (1574–1644) and Liu Hua-yang (1735–99), two figures claimed as Lung-men patriarchs. Their texts were credited with a more systematic, comprehensive, stage-by-stage exposition of the inner-alchemy (nei-tan) self-cultivation procedures than earlier texts, and also for having thoroughly cleansed the tradition of so called heterodox elements such as sexual practices. These texts were well known and studied among elite Taoists and lay adepts, but they were not necessarily the most widely distributed among society at large. It is likely that the most important media for transmitting Taoist texts and self-cultivation practices were the spirit-writing groups and the so-called sectarian traditions.

Lay congregations constituted around mediumistic spirit-writing (fu-luan, or fu-chi) cults were a common form of religious organization throughout the Ch'ing period. Spirit-writing cults connected to Taoist immortals existed long before the Ch'ing period, and scriptures revealed by this means feature among the writings from the Sung, Yüan, and Ming periods. In a spirit-writing séance, after inviting deities, one or two mediums hold a stick (typically made of willow wood) that is possessed by a deity and spontaneously writes characters in a tray of sand or ashes. An assistant records the characters on paper. Texts thus revealed range from simple answers to factual questions to poems, essays, and long scriptures. More numerous and more institutionalized during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, spirit-writing groups became a major expression of Taoist practice. Not all spirit-writing groups can be classified as Taoist. Taoist groups identified themselves as part of an existing Taoist lineage and primarily worshipped Taoist immortals. Other groups focused on revelations of morality books (shan-shu) and on charity, with a discourse that encompassed Taoism but was not exclusively identified with it. Many spirit-writing groups worshipped Wen-ch'ang ti-chün, who was seen as embodying Confucian teachings, along with Patriarch Lü, who represented Taoist teachings. During the nineteenth century, Kuan-ti gained prominence as another “Confucian” figure, and later still Chi-kung as a Buddhist figure in spirit-writing milieus. I will not deal with morality books here, even though they were a major venue for disseminating Taoist ideas and values in Ch'ing society.

Other groups focused on providing individual services such as divination

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110 The collection Wu-Liu hsien-tsung that became the reference book for this tradition during the twentieth century was only compiled in 1897; it contains two works by Wu (Hsien-fo hsueh-tsung yü-lu and T'ien-hsien chung-li chib-lun tseng-chu) and two by Liu (Hui-ming ching and Chin-hsien cheng-lun), that all were in circulation before the date of the compilation.

111 On morality books during the Ch'ing, see notably Yu Tzu-an [Yau Chi On], Shan yü jen t'ung: Ming Ch'ing i-lai ti tz'u-shan yü chiao-hua (Peking, 2005).
and healing. Almost all Ch'ing spirit-writing cults practiced self-cultivation, ritual, morality, and healing, with varying emphasis. Healing services were a crucial aspect of Taoist spirit-writing groups, with medical recipes being revealed by the immortals, and drugs produced and distributed by the adepts. Groups also diffused medical divination slips (yao-ch'ien), and Taoist clerics themselves were often also doctors providing traditional medicine and ritual cures. Spirit-writing groups formed a whole, with people, ideas, and texts circulating intensely between all of them, Taoist or not. Spirit-writing groups were an important venue for Taoist ideas, typically embedded in a Three Teachings framework, that were formulated and disseminated among Ch'ing elites. One of the ideas that circulated with increasing intensity through the seventeenth, eighteenth, and nineteenth centuries was an elite reformulation of an old eschatological paradigm. In this reformulation, the gods, most importantly the Jade Emperor, seeing the utter moral depravity of humans, decided to send demons down to Earth to mete out collective punishments until most humans were annihilated, and only the morally pure would be able to start a new era (kalpa) of peace. In that soteriological scenario, savior deities (notably Lü Tung-pin and Wen-ch'ang; after the year 1800 also Kuan-ti and even later Chi-kung) intervene and obtain from the Jade Emperor a reprieve during which they will reveal scriptures to humans and engage them to reform (and save) themselves. This narrative provided the doctrinal foundation for the spirit-writing groups’ attempts at moral reform, combining self-cultivation, charity, and community activism.

Historical Taoist figures, such as the Ch'üan-chen patriarch, Ch'iu Ch'u-chi, and invented ones communicated with adepts through spirit-writing, but the most important immortality cult during the Ch'ing period involved Lü Tung-pin, healer, patron saint of numerous guilds, master in self-cultivation techniques, and increasingly, during the Ch'ing period, a universal savior. Temples dedicated to Lü Tung-pin, often named Ch'un-yang kung (Palace of Purified Yang) or Lü-tsu miao (Temple of Patriarch Lü), were found in most counties of the empire. Many had spirit-writing altars and lay congregations practicing scripture reading and charity, all in the name of Patriarch Lü. The Lü Tung-pin cult had been active in revealing inner-alchemy manuals and instructions to individual adepts since at least the mid-Ming period, but the revelations multiplied during the Ch'ing, and now included complex doctrinal scriptures with eschatological contents. One of the most famous

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revealed texts is the *T'ai-i chin-hua tsung-chih* (*The secret of the golden flower*),\(^{113}\) a poetic exposition of the self-cultivation process in a highly contemplative mode, possibly first revealed in 1666, and subsequently revised by various groups.\(^{114}\)

The principle of direct instruction from the immortal to the adept in inner-alchemy training through spirit-writing had been present long before the rise in the late eighteenth century of more formal organizations devoted to the production and dissemination of Taoist texts. They shared common features such as the cult of Lü Tung-pin and other immortals, spirit-writing, self-cultivation, reading Taoist scriptures, and charity, but their practices were not standardized. A few were consolidated into institutionalized networks, but most were independent, and in some cases they were in competition, as can be seen in the variant versions of the same text, such as the *Lü-tsu ch'üan-shu* (*The complete works of Patriarch Lü*). The first version was produced by the *Han-san kung* (Palace Encompassing the Three), an influential spirit-writing temple in Wu-ch'ang, Hupei, and other groups later produced their own versions. Some spirit-writing groups had intimate ties with Ch'üan-chen clerics, even though clerical leaders were ambivalent about spirit-writing and apparently did not practice it within monasteries. Some spirit-writing groups called themselves Ch'üan-chen disciples. In general, the formal acceptance of adepts as disciples by Lü Tung-pin or some other immortal was by means of spirit-writing. The disciples were given ordination names, in some cases from the early nineteenth century on, in accordance with the Lung-men lineage poem, and trained in inner-alchemy spiritual practice as well as Taoist liturgy.\(^{115}\)

A major figure in the milieu of Ch'ing Taoist spirit-writing cults is Min I-te (1748/58–1836). From a literati family, Min was cured of childhood illnesses by Ch'üan-chen clerics. He served as an official for some time before retreating to a temple where he was pivotal in merging the tradition of literati spirit-writing and Ch'üan-chen Taoism. Within the larger framework of the Lung-men lineage, Min created a new lineage that initiated large numbers of adepts. These adepts were members of an extensive network that eventually had seventy-two spirit-writing halls, known as branch altars (*fen-t'an*), affiliated with the central altar at the *Mei-hua kuan* (Plum Blossom Temple) (also named *Ch'üan-yang kung*), a temple on Mount Chin-kai, a low hill near Hu-chou, in northern Chekiang. Most of these altars were located in temples, often

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Lü Tung-pin temples, but there were also some in urban central temples, such as city god temples. These temples organized large festivals and co-ordinated community services typical of philanthropic foundations and gentry spirit-writing cults. The adepts interested in self-cultivation included officials, doctors, and merchants, as well as large numbers of women. Others were clergy ministering to local communities, but usually married and living at home. Branches of this new lineage network founded by Min I-te spawned new branches of their own. The largest had thousands of members in cities, notably Shanghai, until 1949. Some published extensive genealogies.

Min I-te was a great scholar of Taoism. He built a large library, the Ku-shu yin-lou, at Mei-bua kuan, that became a major center of learning. Like so many other religious collections, it was largely burned down by the Taiping rebels around 1860. What survived was dispersed during the twentieth century. Min I-te collected, edited, and commented on various scriptures. In addition, he and his group produced many new texts through spirit-writing, and he published them as Ku-shu yin-lou tsang-shu (Books held at the Ku-shu yin-lou) and Tao-tsang hsii-pien (Continuation of the Taoist canon), both first published in 1834, with many texts included in both collections. Continuing themes developed earlier by lay Taoist groups, Min I-te’s ideas centered on how to apply an inner-alchemy worldview to a larger collective soteriology.

Comparable lay Ch’üan-chén congregations emerged on a similarly large scale in Kwangtung a few decades later, from a clerical base in local Ch’üan-chén centers, notably the Lo-fu mountains, but they did not undertake major publication or charitable projects until after the Taiping Rebellion. In Szechwan, lay Taoist spirit-writing groups were also active by the turn of the nineteenth century, if not before. For instance, Fu Chin-ch’üan (fl. 1817) was a Taoist who transmitted both Ch’üan-chén and other Taoist traditions, such as Ch’ing-ming. He proselytized and established successful spirit-writing altars in eastern Szechwan. Other lay Ch’üan-chén groups, taking Chang San-feng as their patriarch, were also active in Szechwan. Among them, Li Hsi-yüeh (1806–56) established a number of spirit-writing groups.

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117 For the history of Hong Kong Taoist spirit-writing halls and their origins in nineteenth-century Kwangtung, see Yu Tzu-an [Yau Chi On] and Wei Ting-ming, comps., Tao-feng pai-nien: Hsiang-kang tao-chiao yü tao-kuan (Hong Kong, 2002); chapter 4 of Lai, Kuang-tung ti-fang tao-chiao yen-chiu; Lai Chi Tim [Li Chih-t’ien], “Hong Kong Daoism: A study of Daoist altars and Lü Dongbin cults,” Social Compass 50 No. 4 (2003), pp. 459–70; Bartholomew P. M. Tsui, Taoist tradition and change: The story of the Complete Perfection Sect in Hong Kong (Hong Kong, 1991).

118 Hsieh Cheng-ch’iang, Fu Chin-ch’üan nei-tan su-shiang yen-chiu (Ch’eng-tu, 2005); Ch’ing, Chung-kuo tao-chiao shih, Volume 4, pp. 195–211.

119 Huang Chao-han [Wong Shiu-Hon], Ming-tai tao-shih Chang San-feng k’ao (Taipei, 1988).
Compiled Chang’s revelations in *Chang San-feng chüan-chi* (*The collected works of Chang San-feng*), first published 1844, as well as his own essays.

Related to the spirit-writing phenomenon is another major development of Ch’ing Taoism, the emergence of female alchemy (*nü-tan*). This variant tradition of inner alchemy (*nei-tan*) as specifically applied to the female body developed during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Although there were female practitioners from the beginning of inner alchemy, and earlier discussions of differences between the practice of males and females, the appearance of female alchemy shaped a distinct religious practice for female Taoists. Female alchemy texts were mostly revealed within the framework of Lü Tung-pin spirit-writing cults and often in connection with lay Ch’üan-chen circles. They were a consequence of the active participation of women within these cults. Through the practice of alchemy in general, and female alchemy in particular, lay women gained the status of religious masters. The first female-alchemy texts appeared in a medical context during the 1630s, but fully fledged exposition of the system apparently formed as spirit-writing revelations in the circles around Min I-te and his master, Shen I-ping (1708–86). These texts were included in the collections published by Min I-te, and were later integrated in the more comprehensive anthologies of female alchemy produced by Ch’üan-chen editors in 1906 in Szechwan.

Female alchemy was a technique that flourished in a wide variety of social contexts. The practice of female alchemy and the literature associated with it enhanced the status of women and may have contributed to the creation of sororities, in the sense of exclusively female organizations. Some *Hsien-t’ien tao* (*Prior Way to Heaven*) communities had an anti-marriage, and possibly lesbian, outlook. But female alchemy also was part of the religious life of great gentry families. One example is the celebrated Hangchow poet Ch’en Wen-shu (1775–1845) and his family. In a long preface to his anthology of songs, titled *Hsi-leng hsien yung* (*Odes to the immortals of West Cooling Bridge*), devoted to immortals who had lived in Hangchow, Ch’en provided a candid spiritual autobiography, describing the various stages of his own initiations in various lay Ch’üan-chen communities. Exhausted and ill after strenuous years as an official, Ch’en first became interested in inner alchemy as a self-healing practice. He experienced a miraculous cure by an immortal. He then became involved in a spirit-writing altar where he became a disciple and where immortals guided him in his inner-alchemy readings. A female relative of his, herself a disciple of Min I-te, initiated him in higher-level practices. Ch’en,

who formally became a disciple of Min after the latter healed him, renewed this relationship in earnest, immersing himself in the Ch'üan-chen scriptural legacy. Ch'en traveled between various spirit-writing altars in Hankow, Soochow, Shanghai, and Hangchow, where he continued to receive further instruction. He also saw to it that all female members of his extended family were initiated.\textsuperscript{121}

A number of regional religious movements fusing Confucian, Buddhist, and Taoist elements flourished during the late Ming and Ch'ing periods. Many had Taoist self-cultivation regimens as a core element, as seen in extensive treatment of such regimens in the books they produced.\textsuperscript{122} Lay devotional networks using the Eternal Mother eschatology were another major venue for the transmission of self-cultivation techniques. The scriptures (\textit{pao-ch'\u00e3n}) of these groups had circulated since the fifteenth century, and used inner-alchemy (\textit{nei-tan}) vocabulary. However, in the Ming period, the inner-alchemy content in these texts did not refer to a consistent set of practices. During the Ch'ing period, a number of lay devotional groups wrote and discussed in more detail inner-alchemy asceticism as a way to salvation that was parallel to devotional practices that transmitted more regular, elaborated forms of Taoist self-cultivation techniques.\textsuperscript{123} This was the case for the \textit{Hung-yang chiao} (Vast Yang Teachings) and the \textit{Pa kua chiao} (Eight Trigrams Teachings), which had an inner-alchemy manual as a founding scripture. These movements were active in north China during the Ch'ing period.\textsuperscript{124} The \textit{Hsien-t'ien tao} movement was more prevalent in the south. It put particular emphasis on Ch'üan-chen self-cultivation. Some Taoist clerics are known to have taken part in the activities of these devotional groups,\textsuperscript{125} but more important, these groups transmitted and

\textsuperscript{121} Ch'en Wen-shu, comp., \textit{Hsi-leng hsien yang} (Hang-chou, 1883).

\textsuperscript{122} See Kenneth Dean, \textit{Lord of the three in one: The spread of a cult in Southeast China} (Princeton, 1998) for the \textit{San-i-chiao} in Fukien; also see Ma Hsi-sha and Han Ping-fang, \textit{Chung-kuo min-chien tsung-chiao shib} (1992; Peking, 2004), pp. 1006–33, on the movement founded by Liu Y\u0101nn (1768–1855) in Szechwan; and Volker Olles, \textit{Ritual words: Daoist liturgy and the Confucian Liumen tradition in Sichuan province} (Wiesbaden, 2013).

\textsuperscript{123} Daniel L. Overmyer, “Quan-zhen Daoist influence on sectarian ‘Precious volumes’ from the seventeenth century,” in \textit{Tao-chiao y\u0101 min-chien tsung-chiao yen-chiu lan-chi}, ed. Lai Chi Tim [Li Chih-t'ien] (Hong Kong, 1999), pp. 73–93. The data discussed in Overmyer’s article are mainstream \textit{nei-tan}, not specifically Ch'üan-chen.

\textsuperscript{124} Ma Hsi-sha, “Tao-chiao yü Ch'ing-tai pa-kua chiao,” in \textit{Tao-chiao yü min-chien tsung-chiao yen-chiu lan-chi}, ed. Lai Chi Tim [Li Chih-t'ien] (Hong Kong, 1999), pp. 94–117. Later Pa-kua preachers composed “five watches poems” (\textit{wu-keng tz'u}) to train disciples. The genre of the “five watches poems” was popularized by Ch'üan-chen clerics and is characteristic of their \textit{nei-tan} poetry.

\textsuperscript{125} For instance, the \textit{Pai-y\u0101n kuan} in Chia-hsien (northern Shensi) was founded during the early seventeenth century by Ch'üan-chen Taoists who later were integrated in a local devotional tradition called Hun-yu\u0101n: Jones, \textit{In search of the folk Daoists in north China}; Y\u0101nn Ching-fang, Li Shih-pin, and Shen Fei-hsüeh, \textit{Shan-hsi sheng Chia hsien Pai-y\u0101n-kuan tao-chiao yin-y\u0101eh} (Taipei, 1999).
printed on their own Taoist self-cultivation texts and taught these to a larger audience than the Taoist clerics had. The Hsien-t'ien tao movement formed during the early eighteenth century and became the matrix of many of the twentieth century's largest new religious groups. During the Ch'ing period, a number of Hsien-t'ien tao groups claimed Ch'iüan-chen patriarchs as their own, and mid-Ch'ing texts by Hsien-t'ien tao leaders contain spiritual poetry in a Ch'iüan-chen style.¹²⁶ During the twentieth century, some Hsien-t'ien tao communities turned into Ch'iüan-chen temples, notably in Hong Kong.¹²⁷

In Ch'ing society lay Taoist practices had two main expressions: local communities using Taoist rituals, and self-cultivation and charitable congregations. Both were vibrant forms of a shared Taoist religious heritage. In the large Taoist temples run by elite clerics, the two often came together. For instance, the White Cloud Temple (Pai-yüan kuan) in Peking was a venue where guilds and neighborhoods organizing large rituals and pious female associations that practiced female alchemy came together around the leading clerics. Similarly, large temples devoted to a city god or other central temples in the Chiang-nan area housed both large-scale communal festivals and spirit-writing groups. This overlap undermines a certain vision among twentieth-century intellectuals who portrayed Ch'ing Taoism as marginal and Taoists as despised “magicians.”

¹²⁶ Notably the Wu-ch'i lao-tsu ch'iüan-shu (Ch'eng-tu, 1992–4) by the Hsien-t'ien tao patriarch, Yüan Chih-ch'ien (1761–1834). It is a collection of six different anthologies, which, beside the eschatological themes, employs mainstream nei-tan discourse.

Intellectual endeavors between the 1640s and 1720s began under the shadow of late Ming in two main ways. First, the leading figures until the 1680s were born under the Ming dynasty. Their fathers, their teachers, and their peers were also all born before 1644. They were immersed in and responsive to the late Ming intellectual scene, when the dominating discourses for educated men included the following: varying promotions of emphases, tracing back to Wang Yang-ming (1472–1529), on heart (hsin, or mind) as individuated and intuitively apprehensible manifestations of coherence (li, or principle or pattern); recognition of the set of so-called Ch'eng–Chu interpretations of the classical texts that privileged coherence, that were at the core of preparations for success in the examinations, and that were necessarily oriented to the past; production of specialized work that in varying degrees was intended to convey practicable guidance, for example in agriculture, medicine, cultural practice, and statecraft, generally sourced in earlier materials without strong, overarching ideological structures; Western learning, conveyed in books translated by Jesuit missionaries and their collaborators, and spanning astronomy, general knowledge, and ethical and religious teachings; engagement in creative, individual cultural production (wen), especially in writing and painting, which tended toward the unique, idiosyncratic, or even wild (k'uang), which was justified in terms of sentiments (ch'ing) as opposed to coherence (li), and which inherently remained fragmented and in tension with past practices; and Buddhist learning, promoted by authors who sought by their writings and personal contacts to have Buddhism more fully integrated into elite educated circles. These alternative emphases were interpenetrating rather than discrete and self-contained, and all were beneficiaries of the enhanced activities in producing, printing, and distributing books in the late Ming period.¹

Second, all of the leading figures, by the fact of their living on in early Ch'ing, individually had experienced the end of the Ming dynasty. Each had witnessed violence and knew persons who had died in the wars. As individuals, each went through a transition, perhaps a crisis, in which he had to accept that a phase in his life, associated with the Ming dynasty, was over. The when, how, and where of the transition varied case by case, but minimally it included changing to a hairstyle acceptable to representatives of the Ch'ing government. It often included a change of one’s public name. Most of these men are portrayed in historical studies as non-collaborators (i-min), a term which conveys the sense of men who in some usually unspecified way were left over or left out – disengaged – after the fall of the Ming dynasty. Some had achieved status in the Ming examination or official hierarchies and then declined or resisted taking examinations or accepting appointments as officials under the Ch'ing government. Such men readily meet the historians’ criteria for being “left over from the Ming” and they significantly were not “men of Ch'ing” (Ch'ing jen), although of course they lived under the new regime. By opting out, these men were not collaborators with the new regime, but they did not necessarily or usually continue as resisters either, even in cases where they briefly served the reduced Ming regimes after 1644. Theirs was a form of studied noninvolvement. In this sense they were non-collaborators. Applying the designation of non-collaborators to other men who had not served Ming emperors, particularly those born in the Ch'ung-chen reign (1628–44), dilutes the term as an identifying criterion, but it is sometimes used to refer to men who were too young to have ever served the Ming but opted out of serving the Ch'ing in deference to the stance of certain of their elders. In this respect, they were non-collaborators without being left over from the late Ming.

Although the end of the Ming dynasty was a political event and in every case the occasion for a personal transition with repercussions, for the purposes of intellectual history the term “non-collaborator” (i-min) bears no explanatory power because it is difficult or impossible to demonstrate that the end of the Ming causally affected an individual’s particular intellectual production. Given the diversity of available intellectual alternatives for educated men in the first half of the seventeenth century, there was no late Ming consensus, no shared orthodox dogma or faith, and no clear-cut criteria for determining truth to undergo a “crisis of faith.” In that context, there was no intellectual crisis (“crisis” in the specific sense of a critical turning point) centering on the

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and Peterson, “Learning from heaven: The introduction of Christianity and other Western ideas into late Ming China,” in ibid., pp. 789–839.

2 See Peterson “Confucian learning in late Ming thought.”
aftermath of 1644. If there was no general intellectual crisis, did late Ming strands in intellectual endeavor simply persist across the dynastic change in 1644? Some did. Some did not. Living in the shadow of responses to the late Ming repertoire of intellectual endeavors and their own individual experience of the end of the Ming imperial regime sometime after 1644, the leading figures involved in learning after 1644 enjoyed a certain freedom. They could continue to choose. They existed in a conceptual space between resisters to the death, true loyalists to the Ming cause, and collaborators, who made their compromises with the Ch'ing government by accepting official appointments or Ch'ing examination degrees. Most of the contributions to learning in the early Ch'ing period to 1680 were achieved in this space.

As well as men who were “left over” from late Ming and non-collaborators in early Ch'ing, there were also unsettled issues left over from late Ming. A main issue, a perennial one going back to Confucius in the Analects, was how to respond to the question, what should one do in fulfillment of the process called learning (hsüeh) in a restricted sense of true, correct and exemplary learning? How to learn entailed further questions about cultivation, effort, and accumulation, but one outcome of the process of “learning” that was generally presumed to be good is the state called knowing (chih), both as knowing about something and as knowing how to do something. Taking knowing as a good entailed two more general questions: how does (or should) one establish that the particulars associated with one’s accumulated knowing are true or correct or good, both in connection with the phenomenal world and in connection with timeless moral values (both terms which raise still more questions), and what, if anything, should one do with what he has when he has achieved a state or condition of “knowing”?

The intellectual tradition stemming from Confucius included many attempts at addressing such questions and their variants. By late Ming, the two dominant sets of answers derived from Chu Hsi, particularly associated with his commentary on, or explanation of, the Great learning, and from Wang Yang-ming, and particularly his revisions of Chu Hsi. The question of learning and its ancillary questions had been answered in a variety of ways over the 2,000 years from Confucius’ time to late Ming, but they had not been settled. They were still open-ended questions.

LIU TSUNG-CHOU’S LEGACY

In the last two decades of the Ming dynasty, the most prominent exponent of teachings associated with Wang Yang-ming’s emphasis on learning based on one’s own heart (hsin) as the foundation of moral judgments and actions

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was Liu Tsung-chou (1578–1645), a *chin-shib* in 1601. One of the few men who sustained a reputation for moral integrity while also serving the Ming government off and on, Liu went to Nanking in the summer of 1644 to join the reconstituted Ming government there. Critical of the leaders he found in power, he resigned and returned home to Shan-yin (Shao-hsing) in Chekiang. In 1645, as his province was being invaded by Ch'ing troops, Liu supposedly told his followers that when the Ch'ung-chen emperor, whom he had personally advised many times in Peking, hanged himself in the spring of 1644, he did not choose to die loyally because he was a commoner stricken from the register of officials. When Nanking was surrendered to Ch'ing forces in the summer of 1645, he did not choose to die because he was already out of office when the new Ming emperor ran away. Now, Liu told his followers, he would die because his homeland, Chekiang, was being invaded. In the summer of 1645 Liu Tsung-chou stopped eating, and after twenty days he passed away. His choosing to die rather than try to live under a new ruling house as a non-collaborator (*i-min*) was further proof that Wang Yang-ming's teachings sustained moral integrity.

The dilemma of what to do was left to his students and followers who did not choose to die. In spite of Liu Tsung-chou's resistance to Buddhist adaptations, some of his followers decided after his death that Buddhism was both a political refuge from the new regime and an appropriate move in their cultivation of innate moral knowledge (*liang chih*) as espoused by Wang Yang-ming. Others sought non-Buddhist solutions. How to understand Wang Yang-ming's emphasis on heart (*hsin*, or mind) and what to do with Liu Tsung-chou's legacy were major problems for his surviving followers. Ch'en Ch'üeh

Ch'en Ch'üeh (1604–77) became a locally prominent, critical proponent of the ideas of Wang Yang-ming and Liu Tsung-chou. Ch'en's case is an example

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6 The earlier case of Kao P'an-lung provides a comparable example. See Peterson, “Confucian learning in late Ming thought,” pp. 761–6.

of how Wang's emphasis on acquiring learning by discovering one's original heart continued to be attractive after 1644.

In summary, Ch'en's life is rather bland, especially when considered against the background of the great upheavals at the middle of the seventeenth century. He achieved a local reputation in Hai-ning, northeast of Hangchow, Chekiang, as a talented, morally scrupulous young man, but he never qualified for the provincial-level examination. Ch'en's unfocused style of life started to change in the autumn of 1643, when in his fortieth year he went to Shan-yin in Chekiang to call on the famous Liu Tsung-chou. Ch'en was with a friend he had met a few years earlier, Chu Yüan (1611–45), who was one of Liu's leading followers. Meeting the renowned old teacher and hearing and reading more about his ideas, Ch'en was stimulated by the gathering of Liu's many students for "discourses on learning" (chiang-hsüeh). Recognizing Liu Tsung-chou as his teacher, Ch'en returned to Shan-yin in the first month of 1644 and again the next year. A few months later, Liu Tsung-chou starved himself to death rather than live under a new regime. Chu Yüan as a devoted disciple also killed himself when the order for males to cut their hair according to the Manchu style reached Hai-ning. Chu Yüan's rationale was that just as Yen Yüan, the disciple of Confucius, said he could not die while Confucius was alive, Chu felt that as Liu's disciple he could not live when Liu was dead. In this sense Chu was dying for the sake of Liu Tsung-chou, not for the Ming dynasty. Ch'en Ch'üeh criticized himself for not doing enough to serve his newfound teacher during his lifetime, but he did not choose to die. Unlike Chu Yüan, Ch'en Ch'üeh lived on after the end of the Ming regime. He returned to Hai-ning and lived a quiet, uneventful life, the last decade or so as an invalid. In 1647 he symbolically changed his names, to Ch'üeh and Ch'ien-ch'u, to mark a new phase in his life. After his death Ch'en Ch'üeh was called a non-collaborator (i-min), although he had never served the Ming dynasty. Ch'en Ch'üeh's involvement with the emphasis on learning based on the primacy of heart (hsin, or mind) should be regarded as an early Ch'ing phenomenon. It was not obviously related to his choosing to live without collaborating with the new Ch'ing regime. Rather, by the act of taking Liu Tsung-chou as his teacher, Ch'en Ch'üeh later found his calling in life.

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10 Ch'en Ch'üeh, Ch'en Ch'üeh chi, p. 239.

11 Analects, 11.23. Chu Yüan had adopted Yen Yüan's name.

12 Ch'en Ch'üeh chi, pp. 308–9.


In his 1659 preface for a printing of a selection of his friend Chu Yüan’s writings, Ch’én Ch’üeh gave his own retrospective, more nuanced version of where he had been before he began to try to clarify the teachings of their master, Liu Tsung-chou. Ch’én confessed that he had been uninterested in the issues involving coherence (li, or principles) and had not been concerned with assessing them, but in 1643 he began to learn more on a boat trip with Chu Yüan, who was deeply involved in those issues. Chu declared that his learning was rooted in the teachings of Wang Yang-ming and explained his critical assessment of Ch’eng–Chu theories. Ch’én was not convinced, and when Chu Yüan adduced Liu Tsung-chou’s explanations, Ch’én still was not convinced. At that time he had accepted the conventional criticism that the interpretations built on Wang Yang-ming’s notion of “innate knowledge” (liang chih) were too close to Ch’ān Buddhism, and that Ch’eng and Chu had long been respected by Confucians (ju), which was reason enough not to challenge them. Even after Ch’én met Liu Tsung-chou and listened to Chu Yüan’s further explanations, he thought his own understanding of their ideas was superficial.15 Exactly when Ch’én Ch’üeh changed his mind is left unclear, but after the suicides of Liu and then Chu in 1645, and the death of Ch’én’s wife in 1650, Ch’én Ch’üeh devoted the remainder of his life, almost three decades, including the last fifteen years while he suffered from a debilitating illness, to reading, thinking, talking, and writing about the ideas he had previously disdained.16

On a more overtly philosophical plane, Ch’én Ch’üeh claimed that at the core of Chu Yüan’s and Liu Tsung-chou’s teachings going back to Wang Yang-ming was the ideal, in his words, of “cautiously never turning against one’s originating heart,” which entailed one’s knowing and correcting his faults as he takes action.17 According to Ch’én, Wang Yang-ming’s key term, “innate knowing” (liang chih), could only mean “originating heart” (pen hsin). Wang’s prescriptive slogan, “extending one’s innate knowledge of the good” (chih liang chih), could only mean “cautiously never turning against one’s originating heart”; it could not mean the liberating, spontaneous, intuitive knowing claimed by too many later Confucians who sought to emulate Wang Yang-ming. Ch’én explained Liu Tsung-chou’s slogan, “taking care in solitude” (shen-tu), using the same terms.18 Ch’én was situating himself as the authentic interpreter of Liu Tsung-chou’s and Wang Yang-ming’s teachings; he was revivifying a late Ming fashion in the early Ch’ing period.

15 Ch’én Ch’üeh, Ch’én Ch’üeh chi, p. 239.
16 Huang Tsung-hsi, “Ch’én Ch’ien-ch’u mu-chih-ming,” in Ch’én Ch’üeh chi, shou chüan, p. 2.
17 Ch’én Ch’üeh chi, p. 239.
To justify himself and his interpretation of the central importance of “originating heart” in the process of learning, Ch'en Ch'üeh focused on discrediting the Great learning, the text that was the foundation of Chu Hsi’s grand project of learning based on “fathoming coherence” (ch'iuang li) through “investigating things” (ko wu). Pointing to the origins of the Great learning as a chapter in the Book of rites (Li chi), a Han compilation, Ch'en tried to pull the rug out from Ch'eng I’s and Chu Hsi’s treating the opening section of the Great learning as a reliable expression of Confucius’ ideas, and of the ten sections of elaboration as the ideas of his disciple, Tseng Tzu. Ch'eng and Chu were mistaken, Ch'en wrote again and again. Their ideas, expressed as the Learning of the Way (Tao hsüeh) and learning based on coherence (li hsüeh), were not in fact the ideas of the sages. Ch'en was not the first to come to this assessment of the Great learning, as some of his contemporaries pointed out, but many of his contemporaries did not accept it or were dismissive. Chang Lü-hsiang (1611–74), for example, acknowledged that the Great learning was not directly from the hands of Confucius and Tseng Tzu, but insisted that it was still unacceptable to claim the text did not correctly represent their teachings. Ch'en’s rejection of the canonical status of the Great learning as one of the Four Books was part of his attack on Ch'eng–Chu teachings that were built on the concept of coherence (li) existing externally to our minds.

Ch'en Ch'üeh presented his philosophical rejection of the implication of the ideas in the Great learning through a series of letters and exchanges collected in the 1650s under the title Ta hsüeh pien (Critiques of the Great learning). Ch'en’s main complaint against the Great learning and the interpretation that Chu Hsi had imposed on it was the overemphasis on knowing (chih) at the expense of acting (hsing), which led to Ch'an-like thinking. In this complaint Ch'en Ch'üeh was following Wang Yang-ming. Ch'en argued this point with his contemporaries, who resisted his disestablishing the Great learning, which for two centuries had been accepted as a foundational text in the Ming imperial system. In one of his letters to Chang Lü-hsiang, Ch'en wrote,

21 The opening of the “Ta hsüeh pien” has a note with the date 1654, and an appended note dated 1659. Ch'en Ch'üeh chi, pp. 552, 559. In a postface dated 1655 for the “Ta hsüeh pien” collection, Ch'en wrote that he began to make it “in the sixth month of last year,” i.e. 1654. Ch'en Ch'üeh chi, p. 609.
Learners who follow and trust [the *Great learning*] are extremely stupid. The *Great learning*'s emphasis on knowing is as if to say that as soon as one is investigating [things] and extending [his knowledge], there is nothing else to do in learning [i.e. in the conscious actions that are moral in the experiential world]; this is the basic thrust of the *Great learning* [as interpreted by Chu Hsi]. Although shunning Ch'an Buddhism, by celebrating the *Great learning*, Ch'eng I and Chu Hsi undoubtedly drove later generations into Ch'an.  

Ch'en Ch'üeh was arguing against taking knowing as a static or permanent state of mind one could attain, as in enlightenment. He sought to recover the idea that for the sages, “knowing” involved a continuous, reflective process connecting with what one is doing in acting morally. The *Great learning* was misleading because it prioritized knowing over acting.

Chang Lü-hsiang tried to argue that knowing must occur before acting by deploying a simple analogy. “When one is to take a step forward, he first sees [i.e. knows where to step], and only then will he succeed in proceeding [i.e. in taking the next steps, or acting].” Ch'en Ch'üeh conceded the analogy, but then turned it to his advantage:

That being so, then when one is to proceed to a certain place, he would first have to see the steps [he must take]. You are able to see your [next] steps inside a room, but [while still in the room] are you able [literally] to see your steps outside the room? ... If you want to see the steps outside the room, you must proceed [i.e. take an action by moving] out of the room and only then are you able to see [i.e. know] your [next] steps outside ... My saying that knowing is advanced [e.g. one knows where one now is] only after one's acting has advanced [e.g. one has taken the steps to arrive here], lies exactly in this.

In his critical evaluations, Ch'en Ch'üeh did not altogether exempt Wang Yang-ming. Although Ch'en’s emphasis on acting accorded with Wang’s axioms about “knowing and acting are united as one” and “there is no priority in knowing and acting” – that is, they must proceed simultaneously – Ch'en found an inconsistency. The *Great learning*’s obvious (to Ch'en Ch'üeh) prioritizing of knowing was in effect followed by Wang with his precept of extending one’s innate knowledge (*chih liang chih*), which assumes that knowledge of what is good comes before extending it in action. This had led later men into relapsing into a claim of spontaneous knowing held without effort, which Ch'en opposed as false learning. Ch'en Ch'üeh was adamant in his argument against the notion of “sudden” knowledge:

For the gentleman, the process of learning is a life-long process [as Confucius is quoted as saying of himself in the *Analects*]. So the process of knowing also is a life-long process. [Knowing being an ongoing process rather than a static, innate state,) consequently one who today knows about the “highest good” (*chih-shan*) under today’s conditions then

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23 Ch'en Ch'üeh chi, p. 588.
tomorrow will know about a [new] “highest good” under tomorrow’s conditions. It is not that one is able simply to know it [i.e. the highest good], nor that one can holistically know, nor that my intellect and knowledge can presume completely [to know the highest good].

Even the sage rulers of antiquity, Ch'en Ch'üeh pointed out, are reputed to have shown caution and trepidation rather than easy confidence that they knew everything:

The principles (li) of our world are unlimited and an individual’s mind is limited. When someone who arrogantly trusts himself considers his knowing to be without deficiencies, he must be the world’s biggest ignoramus, so how wouldn’t he with one morning’s worth of his great insight be casual about the daily unfolding of the principles of the affairs of our world?

This might be taken as criticism of, for example, Wang Yang-ming’s sudden realization in 1509 that within his own nature he already had the means of attaining the way of a sage man, but that does not seem to have been Ch’en’s intent. Ch'en Ch'üeh’s complaint here is not even so much with those who misconstrued Wang Yang-ming’s notion of innate knowledge of moral good. They were the followers of Wang who held that his teaching implied the sufficiency of apprehending one’s original mind (pen hsin), and thus no further cognitive effort is required. Ch'en’s inclusive interpretation was that Wang Yang-ming’s insight about “extending one’s innate knowledge of the good” (chih liang chih), Liu Tsung-chou’s slogan “taking care in solitude” (shen-tu), and even Ch'eng Hao’s emphasis on the primacy of showing respect (chu-ching), all could be understood to line up consistently with the teaching of the sages of antiquity. Even though Liu's, Wang's, and the Ch'eng brothers’ teachings all might be construed to be about “knowing,” Ch'en was confident in his claim that for all of them showing respect was an essential, continuously required operational step.

Ch'en Ch'üeh criticized Wang Yang-ming on textual grounds. According to Ch'en, when Wang realized he could not base his concept of extending innate moral knowledge on Chu Hsi’s established version of the text of the Great learning, Wang turned to the so-called “ancient text” (ku pen) version as it appeared in the Book of rites (Li chi), and Wang’s followers later sought to use the so-called “stone inscription classic” (shih ching) version of the Great
learning. This showed, Ch'en claimed, that Wang was searching through and choosing texts to justify his ideas rather than deriving interpretations directly from the sages' texts, as Ch'en thought he himself was doing. Ch'en was demonstrating sensitivity to the issue of the authenticity of any given text invoked in support of an argument. This issue had been raised repeatedly through the sixteenth century, and in Ch'en's time it was receiving more attention than he was prepared to give it. Although Ch'en Ch'üeh could make arguments based on texts, he did not accept that what he meant by “learning” (hsüeh) was based on texts.

For Ch'en, the process of “learning” involved “rectifying the heart” (cheng-hsin); that is, not deviating in one’s actions from the latent directive powers in the “originating heart” (pen hsin). He explicitly rejected Chu Hsi’s program of learning starting from investigating things (ko wu). “Aiming to read books and thereby to fathom coherence is no different from acting in a dream. What is called ‘knowing without acting’ is to end up with no [actual] knowing.” Ch'en condemned his contemporaries who continued to confuse reading books (another process stuck merely in knowing) with actual learning – that is, learning how to act. Continuous pursuit of acquisition of more knowledge was fruitless, Ch'en asserted, in an attempt to block the current trend toward scholarly, intellectual endeavors. “In our times men of learning mostly put aside what is already clear and day after day they seek what is not clear to them. Of course what is not clear may not necessarily be able to be sought, but when they appear to succeed in their search, it is merely knowledge that was already clear.” That is, they already innately “knew” whatever was significant and knowable; the rest of the knowledge derived from investigation of things is ephemeral and worthless. Ch'en’s own ideas would be the needed corrective. Ch'en wanted to save his contemporaries from this fault, just as he wanted to save them from presuming on the adequacy of innate knowing as a state or condition of one’s heart.

Ch'en’s motive for getting the meaning of these ideas correct was not mere pedantry. His argument was that when teachings are in disarray, everyone loses contact with his “originating heart” in everything he does. His claim was that for five or six hundred years (i.e., going back to the times of Ch'eng I and Chu Hsi), men had been discussing the grand philosophical ideas such as coherence (li) and human nature (hsing) as if they could surpass Confucius and Mencius. They had heedlessly appropriated Buddhist ideas and accepted key ideas from authors other than the sages. Given this corrupt transmission, Ch'en asked, “How could humans not become wild animals, and how could the central

29 Ch'en Ch'üeh chi, "Ta hsüeh pien," p. 588. 30 For example, Ch'en Ch'üeh chi, p. 559.
31 Ch'en Ch'üeh chi, p. 97. 32 Ch'en Ch'üeh chi, p. 460. 33 Ch'en Ch'üeh chi, p. 97, written in 1655.
states (*chung-kuo*) not become barbarian?"\(^3^4\) The world has lost the Way. The solution, according to Ch’en Ch’üeh, is to set aside philosophical debates and emphasize “the goodness of one’s originating heart” (*pen hsin chih liang*). This would lead to genuine scholarship and genuine men. In an obvious jab at followers of Chu Hsi, Ch’en wrote that any Confucian (*ju*) who wanted to fathom coherence and fully manifest his human nature, and who tried to pursue broad learning and moral cultivation without starting from the goodness of one’s own originating heart, would end up merely being broad; this would be using false means to acquire false learning. Ch’en Ch’üeh tried to show that Chu Yüan’s and Liu Tsung-chou’s teachings reduce to the concept of “originating heart” (*pen hsin*), even though they used different words.\(^3^5\) If everyone read the writings of Liu and Chu and grasped the message of not turning away from one’s originating heart, which Ch’en claimed was the central message in both even if left unsaid, then the mind that held that Heaven would not destroy our culture (such as the mind of Confucius in *Analects 9.5*) and that unified everything at the court of Yü (that is, the sage ruler Shun) would be transmitted to present and future generations.\(^3^6\)

Ch’en Ch’üeh clearly thought his contemporaries should and could rely on learning based on their own originating hearts rather than on text-based learning, regardless of the texts, even his own.

With his emphasis on “originating heart” and on doubting or disputing appeals to authority, Ch’en Ch’üeh was an extreme example of philosophical self-reliance, or reliance on one’s self, one’s heart, one’s mind. Although Ch’en Ch’üeh was certain he stood against Ch’an Buddhist influences on “us Confucians,” the emphasis on one’s own heart as the seat of morality had been perceived as more a threat than an opportunity at least since the founding of the Tung-lin Academy at the beginning of the seventeenth century. The threat, which Ch’en Ch’üeh’s ideas exemplified, was to the intellectual elite’s cohesion, and after the fall of the Ming dynasty efforts were made to move away from arguments that favored relying on one’s own heart or mind as the starting point for true learning, even when accessing that heart required effort, experience, and action, as Ch’en Ch’üeh stressed. Ch’en disparaged the idea prevalent among his contemporaries that merely “reading books” constituted learning, but by the 1660s the claim was gaining favor that critical handling of textual evidence was the primary means to a secure, sharable basis for durable “knowing.”

\(^3^4\) *Ch’en Ch’üeh chi*, p. 240. This passage was not included in the print version of Ch’en’s preface to Chu Yüan’s writings in 1659 because of its anti-Ch’ing implications. Ch’en seems to be casting himself in the role of a latter-day Mencius. (See *Mencius*, 3b9.)

\(^3^5\) *Ch’en Ch’üeh chi*, pp. 240–1.  

\(^3^6\) *Ch’en Ch’üeh chi*, p. 241.
Contentions over the transmission of learning based in one’s own heart

After formally recognizing Liu Tsung-chou as his teacher in 1644, Ch'en Ch'üeh remained involved in the veneration of Liu, his criticisms and revisions notwithstanding. In 1655 Ch'en edited a compilation of Liu’s recorded discussions. Ch'en’s main rival as builder and protector of the legacy of Liu’s contributions to learning would turn out to be Huang Tsung-hsi (1610–95), who had more claim than Ch'en to being a student in close contact with Liu Tsung-chou. Huang had acknowledged Liu as his teacher in 1626 on the eve of the death of his father in prison. In the 1650s Huang reinvolved himself in Liu’s teachings, and he did not condone Ch'en’s revisions of their teacher’s ideas. In 1666 Huang Tsung-hsi went to Hai-ch'ang, where Ch'en was living, to participate in a meeting for discourses on learning. Huang used the occasion to call on Ch'en, and they spent a day in conversation although Ch'en was already ill. In the ensuing years Huang and Ch'en exchanged letters discussing their interpretations of learning. Ten years later (1676) Huang again went to Hai-ch'ang, but by then Ch'en was too ill to rise from his bed to receive him.

After Ch'en Ch'üeh died the next year, his eldest son went and asked Huang Tsung-hsi to write the tomb inscription because they were fellow students of Liu Tsung-chou. Huang wrote that he could not but comply because there were almost no other students of Liu surviving in Chekiang. In the tomb inscription Huang lauded Ch'en for the many talents he had shown as a young man as well as his scrupulous moral conduct and his disinclination to accept patronage. Huang acknowledged how quickly Ch'en Ch'üeh had settled down from his unrestrained ways after meeting Liu Tsung-chou in 1643, and also how quickly Ch'en achieved recognition as one of Liu’s superior followers. Huang reported on Ch'en’s involvement in making his own bamboo hats and his predilection for dressing in old-style clothes, but Huang implied that Ch'en’s actions were idiosyncratic, and he overlooked Ch'en’s moral intent. Huang insinuated that Ch'en Ch'üeh’s approach to learning was also idiosyncratic. According to Huang, Ch'en went against established interpretations (e.g. Wang Yang-ming’s and Liu Tsung-chou’s) with what Ch'en discovered from his own mind (hsin). “Thus he had many theories that startled the world,” wrote Huang in the tomb inscription. Ch'en was firm in his convictions, and “would close his eyes to argument and remain impassive,” a comment that may reflect Huang’s own experience in his conversations with Ch'en.

39 Huang Tsung-hsi, “Ch’en Ch’ien-ch’u hsien-sheng mu-chih-ming,” in Ch’en Ch’üeh chi, pp. 2–3. For an account of the disagreement that sympathizes with Huang, see Lynn A. Struve, “Chen Que versus Huang
In addition to the tomb inscription, which recorded personal details, Huang wrote several more versions of a critique of Ch'en's ideas that still carry the title of tomb inscription, but which are more in the style of the critical "source-book" (hsüeh an) format that Huang was working on for what would be his influential Ming ju hsüeh an (Source book of Ming Confucians' learning). In one critique Huang gave a selection of Ch'en's iconoclastic interpretations of key phrases that earlier commentators had misunderstood, or so Ch'en claimed. An easy example is the quotation of Ch'en's reductive handling of the teachings of Chou Tun-i (1017–73) about having no desires. Ch'en Ch'üeh wrote,

Chou's teaching of "have no desires" is Ch'an without being Ch'an. We Confucians only speak of having few desires, not of being without desires. The heart of a sage man is no different from the heart of an ordinary man. What an ordinary man desires is just what a sage man desires. A man's heart originally does not have what is called heavenly coherence (t'ien-li) [that is, universal coherence that is external to the human himself]; heavenly coherence correctly is derived from the actualization of a human's desires. A human's desires being congruently in the right place is actual heavenly coherence [i.e. the coherence is a function of the human's actions; it is not external to him in its origins, as Chu Hsi claimed]. It follows that if there are no human desires, then it can be said that there is no heavenly coherence.

Huang's wry comment was that

Ch'en Ch'üeh's pronouncements generally were like that. He only perceived the brain [t'ou-nao, and not the heart, or mind] in the learning of the sages. Consequently, in some cases he was profoundly on the mark in identifying deficiencies in various Confucians' ideas; in other cases what he argued for was the ideas of all the other Confucians.

Elsewhere Huang Tsung-hsi noted that Ch'en Ch'üeh went beyond what was proper when he alleged that the Great learning was an accretive text that did not come from Confucius. By being dismissive of Ch'en Ch'üeh's idiosyncratic, antiauthority, skeptical, and even iconoclastic views, Huang was implicitly making room to establish himself as reconciler of the plenitude of teachings advanced during the Ming period, particularly those passing through Wang Yang-ming, that emphasized heart (hsin, or mind), and as the authentic transmitter of the ideas of Liu Tsung-chou, who was Huang's, as well as Ch'en Ch'üeh's, teacher.

Like Ch'en Ch'üeh, who received a visit from Huang in 1666, other followers who were developing their own interpretations of Liu Tsung-chou's teachings


40 See the note on p. 9, “Ch'en Ch'ien-ch'u mu-chih-ming,” in Ch'en Ch'üeh chi, shou chüan.
41 Cited by Huang Tsung-hsi in his “Ch'en Ch'ien-ch'u mu-chih-ming” (second version), in Ch'en Ch'üeh chi, shou chüan, p. 7.
had encounters with Huang Tsung-hsi in the late 1660s. In the autumn of 1667 Huang and two associates in Shao-hsing reopened the Cheng-jen Academy, where Liu Tsung-chou had participated in discourses on learning but which had remained unused for more than twenty years. The idea was to protect and preserve the authentic transmission of Liu's teachings. In a letter in 1667 Huang denounced one of Liu's followers for writing a piece that cast doubt on Liu's controversial teaching that moral “intention” must be unsullied by evil and therefore must reside in the original good heart itself. The disciple's son arrived to accept Huang's corrections, and the next year the disciple himself formally submitted to Huang.44 Another of Liu Tsung-chou's disciples destroyed completely the drafts he had written on Liu's ideas after he met with Huang in 1667 and read some of his interpretations of Liu's teachings; he also accepted Huang as his teacher.45 In 1669 Yün Chung-sheng (1601–78), who had served Liu Tsung-chou as a leading disciple,46 went to Yü-yao in Chekiang to meet with Huang. Yün wanted him to write a preface for Yün's new book, *Liu tzu chieh-yao* (Essentials of Master Liu).47 Supposedly Yün said, “Nowadays you and I are the only ones who truly understand our teacher's learning, so our interpretations cannot be other than united, but on the passages where our departed teacher spoke of where intention (i) resides, there is still a need for you and me to compromise.” To which Huang replied, “The point on which our departed teacher differed from all the other Confucians (ju) [of his time] was precisely on ‘intention.’ How can it not be clearly brought out!”48 Huang was not interested in compromise, and eventually Yün Chung-sheng's book was lost.49

The position that Huang was defending was Liu Tsung-chou's insight about the place of moral intention. That is, since a moral action is based in one's original or originating heart (pen hsin), which Wang Yang-ming crucially defined as a state prior to any distinction of good and evil, and since a purposeful action has to have had a (moral) intention antecedent to it in order to be a moral action, that intention, Liu claimed and Huang agreed, has to exist prior to the action in the phenomenal realm and therefore exist in the (pure, original) heart, or mind, and also be prior to any distinction of good

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45 Huang Ping-hou, *Huang Tsung-hsi nien-p'u*, p. 34.
47 Yün's title echoed Kao Pan-lung's book, *Chu tzu chieh-yao* (Essentials of Master Chu), with the implication that Yün was to Liu as Kao was to Chu; that is, in the authentic line of transmitters of correct teachings.
and evil. Liu’s claim was one more step away from Chu Hsi, who had assigned the heart and intention to the phenomenal realm where good and evil are choices, and good is not innate other than as a potential. Yün Chung-sheng and some of Liu’s other disciples sought to stay aligned with Chu Hsi at least on the question of the locus of moral intention. On a mundane level, the tension between Yün and Huang also was over who was to be the authentic interpreter, and heir, to Liu Tsung-chou’s legacy. In all of these confrontations with followers of Liu Tsung-chou’s teachings, men who had been living his ideas for two decades, Huang Tsung-hsi sought to assert his dominance as he was in the process of rediscovering for himself Liu’s teachings about how learning must be based on one’s own heart.

Sun Ch'i-feng’s claim

Liu Tsung-chou’s followers were not alone in promoting the late Ming emphasis on heart (hsìn, or mind) during the early Ch’ing period. Before Huang Tsung-hsi even began to assert himself in Chiang-nan, in the north the main proponent of learning based on the heart was Sun Ch'i-feng (1584–1675). Sun was a precocious provincial degree holder (chü-jen in 1600) who never attained the higher degree or held an official position in the Ming government. His reputation was enhanced when he aided Tung-lin partisans in the 1620s, but he declined subsequent recommendations to office. He lived six decades under the Ming dynasty, and then three more decades after the Ming ended. Sun suffered under the disruptions at the time of the dynastic change, and had family properties expropriated for Manchu bannermen. From 1652 on he lived in a village in northern Honan and taught the students who came to him as the most celebrated Confucian teacher in the north. He adamantly refused to serve the Ch’ing, and his status as a non-collaborator (i-min) is beyond question, although he accepted protection from Ch’ing officials.

In his teachings Sun sought to transmit what he understood as the tradition of learning passed on by Wang Yang-ming. Sun spent some thirty years compiling the selections for his Li hsüeh tsung chuan (Transmission by the masters of learning involving coherence), first printed in 1666 in twenty-six chüan. Sun’s concern was re-establishing the “correct transmission” (cheng-t’ung) from the great masters of Northern Sung through Chu Hsi and Lu Hsiang-shan (1139–92) to Wang Yang-ming and Ku Hsien-ch’eng (1550–1612), founder of the Tung-lin Academy that had been so important to Sun. Reducing the “correct transmission” to eleven men and leaving out his slightly older contemporary,

50 Wang Mao, Ch’ing tai che-hsüeh, pp. 433–48. Also see Hummel, Eminent Chinese of the Ch’ing period, pp. 671–2.
the famous Liu Tsung-chou, Sun was claiming for himself a place in their line of transmission. Notwithstanding the rhetoric of reconciliation implied by the title of his book and his inclusion of Chu Hsi and his Northern Sung antecedents who emphasized coherence (li) in the line of transmission, Sun clearly recognized significant differences among the masters. He noted, for example, that Chu Hsi and Wang Yang-ming differed on the import of the crucial term ko wu (investigating or going out to experience things, for Chu Hsi; rectifying or keeping external phenomena from impinging on one’s heart, for Wang Yang-ming).51 There was no element of mediation in Sun’s commitment to the fundamental importance of innate knowing in the heart (hsin, or mind) as interpreted by Wang Yang-ming. Sun had no time for “investigating” in Chu Hsi’s sense. If one were to follow Chu Hsi, investigating one thing today, another thing tomorrow, all sorts of writings, thousands, tens of thousands of verbal remains, is merely to give cogent explanations of heart (hsin) and human nature (hsing). If numinous knowing does not originally reside in one’s heart, how would he be able to understand the writings’ affinities to coherence (li) [that Chu Hsi maintained is there], or to comprehend the meanings?52

Sun Ch’i-feng accepted Wang Yang-ming’s treatment of “things” (wu) as objects of comprehension and that all things thus are in one’s knowing. “My mind (hsin) originally has these things [that are known].”53 Sun’s idea was that even Heaven (t’ien), in reference to what some held were its active roles, as in Heaven’s command (or fate, t’ien ming) or cosmic coherence (t’ien li), is in (or of) the mind (hsin). “The mind gives rise to Heaven and to fate.”54

For Sun Ch’i-feng, teaching for more than fifty years in a time of turmoil and danger, the message of self-reliance was simple but boundless in its potential:

Someone asked me, in learning what does one learn? I said, One only learns to be a sage man ... He said to me, Chung-ni [i.e. Confucius, the sage] is the sun and the moon, and just as with heaven, one cannot rank with and ascend up with him [as we are told in Analects 19.24]; is a mere bird [like me] able to learn [to fly to the heights you imply]? I said, The sun is high above in the heaven; the heart is internal in the man. Of course acting as heaven or the sun and moon cannot be learned, but one is only learning to do what is in his heart.

51 Sun Ch’i-feng, “Fu Wei Ta-lu,” in Hsia-feng chi, ch. 7, as cited in Wang Mao, Ch’ing tai che hsüeh, p. 437. For a discussion of Sun’s agenda in compiling the Li hsüeh tsung chuan, see Thomas A. Wilson, Genealogy of the way: The construction and uses of the Confucian tradition in late imperial China (Stanford, 1995), pp. 173–5, 236–43.
Taking the ten thousand things in the realm of heaven-and-earth as its realization (t’i), one’s mind (hsin) achieves its success in the realm of our quotidian drinking and eating [i.e. the mundane phenomenal processes we all experience]. Consequently I say that [when one is truly learning how to act, one should] in one’s daily practice without deviation constantly put into effect what is within one; directly pursue what is innate, before a mark is made [from the outside]. By understanding heaven through fully realizing what is in one’s heart and understanding one’s nature, one accomplishes what the sage man was able to do.\(^55\)

That is to say, one learns while doing ordinary activities to be a sage man. This is pure Wang Yang-ming-ism. Sun was diminishing the value of what is written in books, even in the classics and in the works of the eleven thinkers since the Northern Sung that he celebrated. He compiled several books of earlier authors’ words; he wrote extensively, using words; he used words in his teaching; but Sun’s emphasis was on what he called wordless coherence (wu-tzu li).\(^56\) Sun’s anti-intellectualism was, if anything, more extreme than Huang Tsung-hsi’s, who criticized him for mixing in too much Ch’an Buddhism.\(^57\) According to Huang, Sun was not sufficiently analytic in his comments on the earlier thinkers he claimed to be following. Huang’s reading of Ming Confucian learning was in comparison more inclusive, if not more pluralistic, but perhaps their essential difference was that Sun had deleted the southerner Liu Tsung-chou from the transmission of correct learning and implicitly sought to make a place for himself. Huang Tsung-hsi had to dislodge Sun to save Liu, and of course also to promote Huang’s own role as Liu’s intellectual heir.\(^58\)

In 1673 Sun Ch’i-feng sent Huang Tsung-hsi a copy of his compilation Li hsüeh tsung chuan (Transmission by the masters of learning involving coherence), which had been printed in 1666.\(^59\) By this time Huang was working on his own rival compilation, Ming ju hsüeh-an (Source book of Ming Confucians’ learning), which he more or less completed the year after Sun’s death,\(^60\) but he did not see it into print until the 1690s. However, Huang was explicit in his dismissing as inadequate Sun’s effort at providing an account of Confucian learning to the end of the Ming dynasty, and thus as a possible guide for men of their day.\(^61\)

**HUANG TSUNG-HSI TO 1678**

Huang Tsung-hsi (1610–95) is one of the most important figures in early Ch’ing intellectual history. He made himself into the most prominent follower of Liu Tsung-chou, who had renewed the emphasis on heart (hsin) advocated by

\(^{55}\) Sun Ch’i-feng. “Ssu-shu chin chih hsü,” cited in Wang Mao, Ch’ing tai che-hsüeh, p. 446.

\(^{56}\) Several examples are given in Wang Mao, Ch’ing tai che-hsüeh, p. 446.

\(^{57}\) Wang Mao, Ch’ing tai che-hsüeh, p. 448.

\(^{58}\) Wang Mao, Ch’ing tai che-hsüeh, p. 448.

\(^{59}\) Huang Ping-hou, Huang Tsung-hsi nien-p’u, p. 38. Huang Tsung-hsi, Ming ju hsüeh an, ch. 57, p. 1372.

\(^{60}\) Huang, Huang nien-p’u, p. 40.

\(^{61}\) Huang Tsung-hsi, Ming ju hsüeh an, ch. 57, p. 1371.
Wang Yang-ming. Huang’s involvement with Liu Tsung-chou began under unhappy circumstances. In 1626 Huang’s father, a 1616 chin-shih who had served as a censor, was arrested at home in Yü-yao, Chekiang, for openly siding with officials affiliated with the Tung-lin opposition to the eunuch leader, Wei Chung-hsien (1568–1627). Before he was killed in prison in Peking, Huang Tsung-hsi’s father ordered his son to place himself under the supervision of Liu Tsung-chou. Huang Tsung-hsi’s mother and grandfather put the burden of vengeance onto his shoulders as the eldest son. In 1628, after the accession of a new emperor and the demise of Wei Chung-hsien, Huang went to the capital and physically attacked individuals whom he held to have been implicated in his father’s death. Huang thus became a famous young man before he was twenty.

Huang spent the next fifteen years, through the 1630s, in activities characteristic of other young men of his social standing at the time, including other sons of Tung-lin martyrs. He built a network of friendships as he participated in literary societies and social gatherings in Chekiang and in the Ming southern capital at Nanking. He traveled to scenic places. He started a family. (His first son was born in 1629.) He pursued his interest in music and music making. He wrote poems, lots of poems. He visited well-known book collections and built his own collection, sometimes with manuscript copies of works he found in others’ libraries. He read all kinds of books. Over the course of two years, he methodically read through his father’s manuscript copy of thirteen reigns of the veritable records (shih lu) of the Ming dynasty, and also the twenty-one dynastic histories. In addition to reading the histories as ordered by his father and the classical curriculum necessary for the examinations, Huang read books on music, calendars, astronomy, and mathematics. He read widely in the Buddhist and Taoist canons, according to later accounts. In his pursuit of learning, Huang never abandoned books, although Liu Tsung-chou tried to warn him that preparing to pass the examinations and reading books were not the proper means to learn (hsüeh).

Huang nevertheless counted himself as someone who followed the teachings of Liu Tsung-chou. Liu visited the Huang family in Yü-yao in 1628 to offer

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63 Huang Ping-hou, Huang Tsung-hsi nien-p’u, pp. 11–12. Huang completed the nien-p’u in 1873, and it was revised for a printed edition in 1892, the year before he died. Hsiü Ting-pao, p. 331.
65 Huang, Huang nien-p’u, pp. 14–21.
66 Hsieh Kuo-chen, Huang Li-chou hsüeh-p’u (Shanghai, 1956), ch. 8, 1.
67 Chiang Fan, Han-hüeh shih ch‘eng chi (Taipei, 1965), ch. 8, 1.
68 Huang Tsung-hsi, “Ch’en Ch‘ien-ch’u mu-chih-ming,” in Ch’en Ch‘üeh, Ch’en Ch‘üeh chi, shou chüan, p. 5. Also see Huang Ping-hou, Huang nien-p’u, p. 35.
his condolences after Huang’s father’s body had been returned from Peking for burial. Huang returned the visit the next year.\(^69\) In 1629, when Liu was to debate at a meeting for discourses on learning with a teacher whose followers were inclined toward Ch'an Buddhism and would support him at the meeting, Huang organized more than sixty well-known literati from Chiang-nan and Chekiang, his friends, to come and support Liu’s side, including by drowning out the voice of Liu’s opponent in the debate.\(^70\) In spite of such incidents, Huang seems to have spent more time in the 1630s with his friends in literary societies, traveling back and forth between Shao-hsing and Nanking, as well as preparing for the provincial-level examination, which he never passed, than in attendance on Liu Tsung-chou or in meetings for discourses on learning to discuss issues centering on the heart (hsin). In 1642 in Peking, Huang failed in what turned out to be the last examination he tried.\(^71\) Even without a higher degree, Huang had a sense of his own importance that he thought distinguished him from his vulgar contemporaries:

Formerly men who engaged in learning learned the Way, but nowadays men of “learning” are men who learn to scoff. Anyone who demonstrates resolve, they scoff at as being self-promoting. They scoff at anyone who aims to help society at large as being in pursuit of success and profit. Anyone who reads and writes books is scoffed at as fooling around and lacking purpose. Anyone who cares about government affairs they scoff at as being a vulgar bureaucrat.\(^72\)

And so on. They scoff at Chu Hsi’s learning as inadequate, and Wang Yang-ming’s as Ch’an Buddhist learning. They scoff at the Tung-lin leaders for wrecking the country with their partisanship. To cap off his ironic derision of all this unproductive scoffing and bickering, Huang borrowed some words from Su Shih to ridicule the words of the scoffers: “They are like hogs’ grunts and dogs’ farts.”\(^73\) The implication is that those vulgar contemporaries were scoffing at Huang for having these interests; he was too good for them. This sort of condemnation by Huang echoed Liu Tsung-chou’s criticisms of his contemporaries over the previous decades. In 1643 one of Huang’s friends, with some hyperbole, praised Huang as a follower of Liu Tsung-chou of the highest rank. Huang did not warrant this accolade until two decades later.\(^74\)

In the fourth month of 1644 Huang Tsung-hsi was at home in Yü-yao when the news of the fall of the Ming government in Peking reached Chekiang. His


\(^{71}\) Huang, *Huang nien-p’u*, p. 20.

\(^{72}\) Huang Tsung-hsi, “Ch’i kuai,” in *Huang Li-chou wen-chi* (Peking, 1959), p. 485. From some of the internal references I infer that this undated piece was probably written in the late 1630s.


\(^{74}\) Huang, *Huang nien-p’u*, p. 21.
newest son was a year old, and his mother had just passed her fiftieth birthday. Huang joined with Liu Tsung-chou to go to Hangchow, and then to Nanking to accept the call to serve the newly reconstituted Ming government there. Because of the factional strife within the government he could not stay. Huang returned to Chekiang, where he managed to escape capture or worse.75 The year 1644 foreshadowed the next fifteen years or so, during which he was frustrated in his efforts to be involved with re-establishing a Ming regime in the south at the same time that he had to try to evade dangers that threatened him and his family. After moving around in Chekiang for a while, in the sixth month of 1645 Huang walked two hundred li to Liu Tsung-chou’s home in Hangchow, but Liu had already removed himself to a remote village, so Huang took side paths to reach him there. By the time Huang arrived, Liu had gone without food and water for twenty days and was on the verge of death.76

Huang walked home, and moved his mother to safety in a village away from Yü-yao. When his district’s city submitted to Ch’ing representatives, Huang and two of his brothers mobilized several hundred men from around the Huang home of Huang-chu-p’u in Yü-yao and led them to join the camp of the Ming resistance under the regent, Prince Lu.77 Huang helped in the defense of eastern Chekiang, and also helped prepare the Ming-sponsored calendar for the next year.78 In 1646 he continued to serve in the group seeking to restore the Ming, but when the Ming leadership suffered defeats and moved south to Fukien, Huang went home. Over the next several years he continued his calendar studies, which became one of his areas of scholarly expertise, along with music.79 He was called on to apply his understanding of calendar systems when he rejoined the Ming court after it returned north to the Chekiang coast in 1649, but he soon went home to move his mother to safety again as more disturbances broke out in the mountains. This probably was the end of his overt involvement in the cause of a Ming restoration.

As the Ch’ing military gained control in eastern Chekiang after 1650, Huang remained in peril of arrest for his previous activities, as happened that year to one of his younger brothers.80 Thereafter Huang and his family mostly lived in out-of-the-way places, although that was perilous, too. In the spring of 1656 Huang and his three younger brothers were held by mountain bandits and released (ransomed?) after the intervention of two of Huang’s high-ranking former associates in the Ming rump government.81

75 Huang, Huang nien-p’u, p. 23. 76 Huang, Huang nien-p’u, p. 24.
78 Huang, Huang nien-p’u, p. 24. 79 Huang, Huang nien-p’u, pp. 25, 28.
After another narrow escape, Huang mostly stayed at his family’s mountain retreat at Hua-an-shan, but he continued to travel around to visit famous mountains and friends, perhaps in aid of covert activity to plan resistance to the Ch’ing presence. Near Nanking he called on Fang I-chih, whom he knew from their Nanking days in the 1630s. Fang by this time (1660) had taken refuge as a Buddhist monk and also was no longer apparently involved in the cause of a Ming restoration. Perhaps stimulated by Fang’s interests in the Book of change (Chou i), Huang the next year finished his own little book, I hsüeh hsiang shu (Figures and numbers in studies on the Change) while in the mountains at Hua-an-shan. Having carried all his Ming learning (and many of his books) through the turmoil of the fall of his dynasty, Huang was entering a new phase of his life in the 1660s, as he turned more to writing and re-engaged with learning.

**Huang’s re-engagement with learning**

One more indicator of this new phase is Huang’s completion in 1662 of a set of short essays on recommended government and social institutions, practices, and ideals under the title Ming-i tai-fang lu (Records awaiting a new dawning). Although the new, K’ang-hsi reign period began in 1662, Huang’s work does not seem to have been written as advice for the Ch’ing court, which was still controlled by Manchu regents who had been dominant at the end of the previous reign and who were uninterested in further incorporation of Ming political practices. It also seems unlikely that Huang would write it as long-term advice for any lingering contemporary claimants to Ming rulership. Their interest in the early 1660s was short-term survival as Ch’ing forces were pushing them to the southern edges of the empire. It may be that Huang wrote not for some unspecified future ruler, but for his fellow literati who in 1662 were still relegated to the margins of imperial power. The Ming-i tai-fang lu presents Huang’s considered views on government based in part on reading history and in part on his own and his teacher’s fragmented experiences in serving the Ming dynasty. Huang was critical of Ming political practices and institutions.

Although Huang was a resister and then a non-collaborator (i-min), he nevertheless did not support restoring the highly centralized Ming system. Huang in effect was continuing a perennial Ming-period struggle over the question of whose empire it is: the individual ruler’s (and his dynastic house’s)

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82 Huang, Huang nien-p’u, p. 31.
85 For a consideration of Huang’s motive see de Bary, Waiting for the dawn, pp. 177–8.
or the empire’s subjects’ collectively led by literati? One of Huang’s answers was that if a ruler claims all the benefits of holding power, he must also end up bearing all the costs himself instead of trying to impose them on the ruled. Huang’s idea was that a ruler would recognize it was not in his interest to bear all the costs and thereby he would recognize he could share the benefits in order to make sharing the costs more palatable for his subjects. This was a pragmatic, not a moral, argument. No Ming or Ch’ing emperor showed much sympathy for this sort of claim, but it made Huang’s *Ming-i tai-fang lu* attractive to anti-monarchy, pro-democracy readers in the twentieth century.

Huang reiterated another argument against the ruler’s monopolizing power that was rooted in the classical past:

[The sage rulers] in the earliest times did not pass on rule to a son, but passed it to a man of demonstrated accomplishments; they viewed the position of a ruler (t’ien-tzu) as revocable, like that of a high official or chief minister. Subsequently, [i.e. since the earliest dynasties] rulers passed on the position to their sons, but the position of chief minister was not passed on to his son. Not all sons of rulers were men of accomplishment, but if the ruler could rely on passing the position of chief minister to a man of accomplishment as an adequate remedy [for his son’s deficiencies], then the ruler had not sacrificed the intention of passing rule to a man of accomplishment. But when the position of chief minister has been abolished [as was the case since 1380, when the first Ming emperor decided that he and his dynastic heirs should not tolerate the position because it infringed on their direct power as the ruler] and in just one case the son of the ruler [who inherits] is not accomplished, there is no one who is accomplished acting on his behalf. Then is not even the intention of passing [the position of ruler] to a son lost [as happened in 1644, when the dynasty fell, in part for lack of ministerial leadership]? If the emperor were to share the benefits as well as the costs of power with subjects of the empire, and executive authority with a chief minister, who makes the decisions when there is a choice?

Huang had a nontraditional answer, which again shifts power away from the ruler:

What the ruler regards as so is not necessarily so, and what the ruler regards as not so is not necessarily not so, and thus the ruler does not venture to determine on his own what is so or not. Determining what is so and not so is done collectively in places of learning.

Places of learning – schools, academies, meetings for discourses on learning – had been the venues in late Ming for the formation of literati (shih) individually and collectively. They were controlled by the likes of Liu Tsung-chou and,

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increasingly active in these venues from the 1660s, Huang Tsung-hsi. He was showing the connection between learning and political power. By arguing at large for the political connectedness of learning, Huang was following Liu in moving the tradition stemming from Wang Yang-ming’s teachings, based on the individual’s moral mind, away from any implication of being self-centered and apolitical. Huang’s assertions in the Ming-i tai-fang lu were based more on his reading history than on any overt claims of innately founded moral knowledge. Nevertheless, to the question of where Huang derived the authority to make these political judgments that did not defer to tradition or to present-day rulers, the answer would seem to be that he had a moral certainty that was similar to Liu Tsung-chou’s when he had submitted strong, even disquieting, advice to the Ch’ung-chen emperor in the 1630s.

From the 1660s on Huang Tsung-hsi pursued both sources of knowledge – writings based on history-related texts and writings about learning based on one’s originating heart – and thus he carried on both his father’s emphasis on history and his teacher’s emphasis on moral philosophy based on one’s heart. Huang was hardly unique in his interest in history; that is, records of past events. Late Ming authors wrote about Ming history, and especially recent events, but often in the form of anecdotes. This practice continued into early Ch’ing, with accounts of the last reigns of the Ming, Southern Ming, and the local tumult during the years of dynastic changeover. There was a strong interest in witnessing and revising to set the record straight, especially by survivors. Huang’s efforts were distinguished from many of his contemporaries’ by the scale he sometimes attempted, and by his assiduity in searching out and compiling for publication original manuscript sources held in private hands. Huang was an avid collector of texts, and he made recorded visits to nearly all the famous book collections – private family libraries – in Chekiang and Chiang-nan. In one instance, in 1666, Huang traveled for three days in remote parts of Chekiang with a book dealer, and came home with three large bundles of materials.

The texts Huang collected were at the core of his three large-scale compilations. He assembled over 340 chapters (chüan) for his Ming shih an (Dossiers on Ming history), which did not survive intact. A few of his related,  


91 Huang Ping-hou, Huang nien-p’u, p. 34.  
92 Hsieh Kuo-chen, Huang hsüeh-p’u, p. 68.
shorter historical works, on the calendar systems of the Ming and Southern Ming, and on the political events of the late Ming and Southern Ming reigns that he observed, are extant.\textsuperscript{93} Some of these materials were made available at least indirectly for the compilation of the imperially sponsored history of the Ming dynasty beginning in the 1680s.\textsuperscript{94} Another large-scale project, which is extant in manuscript and in a much revised (by others) print version, was Ming wen an (Dossiers on Ming prose).\textsuperscript{95} In his preface Huang wrote that he worked on compiling the selections for the Ming wen an from 1668 to 1675 and accumulated more than 200 chapters (\textit{ch"uan}) of selected prose pieces, with emphasis on three periods: the beginning of the Ming, the Chia-ching reign (1522–66), and the last reign, the Ch’ung-chen period (1628–44), three moments of great challenge for literati, according to Huang. His purpose was not to show that Ming writers – not even one, he said – surpassed the great writers of previous dynasties, a point he readily conceded, in part because Ming writers had to spend so much time on examination essays.\textsuperscript{96} Even though the Ming writers as persons, and their corpus, did not surpass the earlier writers, there are individual pieces that do because they were unprecedented in expressing profound sentiments (\textit{ch’ing}). Regardless of the qualities of the person, success in expressing sentiments makes the prose piece a success, and thus worthy of anthologizing by Huang. And Huang reported that he had cast his net widely in searching out unrecognized genres. “Looking back over the past three hundred years, there are no fewer than a thousand authors whose writings have been preserved by their families, some with several \textit{ch"uan} and others with hundreds. Among them how can there not be one or two expressions of perfect sentiment?”\textsuperscript{97} A century later Huang and his son, who doubled the size of the anthology, were praised for being so inclusive, but also he was accused of overemphasizing sentiment (\textit{ch’ing}) and being too uncritical about literary merit.\textsuperscript{98} Huang’s concern was with individual pieces by individual authors. Although it is unstated, the implication here is that perfect expression of sentiment (\textit{chih ch’ing}) has to be particular and from the heart. His anthology thus was a record of both historical materials and heart-based materials.

These two aspects of Huang Tsung-hsi’s intellectual pursuits – learning based on past texts and heart-based learning, both as expressed in writing by individuals – are strongly present in his most influential compilation, Ming \textit{ju}
hsüeh an (Source book of Ming Confucians’ learning), in sixty-two chapters (chüan). He completed it in 1676, although he composed prefaces for it in 1692, when it was first prepared for printing. Part of Huang’s motive was to produce an alternative account of the Ming Confucian tradition to Sun Ch’i-feng’s self-promoting Li hsüeh tsung chüan, which had been printed in 1666. 

Sun did not have a place for Liu Tsung-chou, and Huang’s Ming ju hsüeh an in effect presents Liu as the culmination of Ming philosophical inquiry centered on learning based on one’s heart (hsin hsüeh). Another part of Huang’s motive was his desire to establish his own place in that tradition. By 1666 some twenty students had gone to Huang to receive formally his instruction, and some of them stayed to become his leading disciples. With them the next year he restarted the academy at which Liu Tsung-chou had taught. Huang married one of his daughters to Liu’s eldest grandson and heir, and he gained some control of Liu’s literary remains. At around this time Huang wrote that for twenty years, during his withdrawal into remote places to escape the dangers, he read and reread the works of Liu that he had previously (before 1644) neglected. He felt that he must defend Liu’s teachings (as seen above), and that he could highlight and emend them where appropriate. Given this latter purpose, it is clear that we should not read the Ming ju hsüeh an as the work of a disinterested historian exploring the diversity of Ming Confucian thought. In Huang’s presentation, Wang Yang-ming’s teachings were the center, to which precedents led and from which a number of variants spread. Liu Tsung-chou was the recipient of those teachings, and he correctly reintegrated them at the end of the Ming period. Huang framed the Ming ju hsüeh an by opening with a selection of long quotations of Liu Tsung-chou’s comments on earlier Confucians’ learning, and concluding with a long dossier (an) of Liu’s own teachings. Readers were left with the impression that Huang himself was, via his teacher, the authentic interpreter of the learning of Wang Yang-ming, as contained in Huang’s own judgments on Confucian learning.

99 Huang Ping-hou, Huang nien-p’u, p. 40. It is noteworthy that in 1676 Huang received a printed copy of the early version of the Jih chih lu from Ku Yen-wu. Huang, Huang nien-p’u, p. 39. Huang was quite ill in mid-1692 when he received news of the projected first printing of the Ming ju hsüeh an. He dictated another preface, and his son wrote it down. Huang nien-p’u, p. 49. Huang Tsung-hsi probably never saw the first complete printed version of 1693. See Julia Ching’s “Introduction,” in Huang, The records of Ming scholars, pp. 27–8.

100 See above, on Sun Ch’i-feng.

101 Huang Ping-hou, Huang nien-p’u, p. 33.


103 Huang Ping-hou, Huang nien-p’u, p. 35.

104 Huang Tsung-hsi, Ming ju hsüeh an, 62.1507 and 1512. Also, Huang Tsung-hsi, “Meng tzu shih shuo, t’i tzu’u” (The Master’s comments on Meng-tzu), quoted in Wang Mao, Ch’ing tai che-hsüeh, pp. 396–7. Huang assembled Liu’s comments on the Mencius to make a seven-chüan book.
Huang's judgments about Ming learning

Huang’s own interpretations were not expressed in systematic essays or in verbatim records of his own discourses on learning (chiang hsüeh) in which he actively participated during the 1660s and 1670s, and continued to do so in the 1680s.\(^{105}\) He built his interpretations into his critiques of what he found in the complicated, diverse Ming Confucian heritage that he did so much to order and explicate. Huang’s strategy in the Ming ju hsüeh an was to arrange his selected materials into dossiers (an). Most of the dossiers were organized around a teacher and his main students or followers, although in some sections the connections seem tenuous,\(^{106}\) and more than forty men were included individually in fifteen chüan under the heading “Various Confucians” (chu ju). Huang identified affinities based on what he called the master purpose (tsung chih) of the learning promoted by the particular teacher. Huang explained, “In general, any [given teacher’s] learning has a master purpose, from which he gets his power and which serves as an introduction to his learning.”\(^{107}\) His presentations of selections of the previous thinkers’ teachings provided Huang the occasion to convey his own critical views. Huang’s approach was shown in his handling of two of the major philosophical issues that concerned Wang Yang-ming’s followers in Ming and on into Ch’ing times.

The first issue was the relation between li (coherence, often rendered as principles and Principle) and ch’i (matter, physical particles). Chu Hsi and those who followed him held that li and ch’i are categorically distinct, and that li acts on ch’i; that is, coherence causes portions of physical particles to take the particular, bounded form and motion that we experience as coherent things and processes in the phenomenal realm. This proposition was resisted by some in Ming, notably by Wang T’ing-hsiang (1474–1544) and later by Liu Tsung-chou. Joining this resistance, Huang Tsung-hsi blamed Wang T’ing-hsiang for not going far enough. Huang held that li was only a name for a property of a cluster of particles (ch’i) in certain conditions. He criticized Wang T’ing-hsiang for not recognizing that


\(^{106}\) See, for example, the examples given in Zhao Jie, “Reassessing the place of Chou Ju-teng (1547–1629) in late Ming thought,” Ming Studies 33 (1994), pp. 1–11.

\(^{107}\) Huang Tsung-hsi, Ming ju hsüeh an “Fa-fan,” p. 17. See Julia Ching’s translation in Huang, The records of Ming scholars, p. 45. Ching’s translation of “tsung chih” is “main doctrine.” On early Ch’ing reactions to the claims about a master purpose, see Wang Fan-sen, “Ming mo Ch’ing ch’u suu-hsiang chung chih tsung-chih,” in Wang Fan-sen, Wan Ming Ch’ing ch’u suu-hsiang shih lun (Shanghai, 2004), pp. 108–16.
particles take a myriad [of forms as] particles, and coherence (li) is only a unitary coherence [or principle], so coherence is the basis of no particular thing [among the myriad phenomena that are constituted of particles]. Sung Confucians [such as Chu Hsi] spoke of [a particular] coherence (li) being able to give rise to [a particular phenomenon constituted of] particles, but that only is to think mistakenly of li as a sort of thing (wu, or entity) [rather than as a property that is not categorically distinct]. Wang opposed them [i.e. the Sung Confucians such as Chu Hsi], but he still fell into this deviation.\(^{108}\)

Huang Tsung-hsi produced several versions of a simple formulation that was radical in intent. He wrote that Wang T'ing-hsiang, for example, still “did not understand that in the realm of heaven-and-earth [i.e. the realm of phenomena] there only are particles (ch'i) and there is no coherence [li, as a separately existing something]. What is called li [as patterns, not Chu Hsi’s coherence] is the orderliness of particles themselves, and merely accorded this appellation.”\(^{109}\) In other words, according to Huang, li should be understood as nothing but a name given by Ch'eng I and Chu Hsi to the constancies and regularities that humans perceive or infer in the realm of physical particles (ch'i), which are always in flux.

Huang gave a more elaborate version of this point:

The continuous flow of the great transformations [that is, the processes in the universe, the realm of heaven-and-earth] goes on day and night, never stopping or resting. That which we perceive as self-altering are particles [that is, the continuously existing stuff that constitutes the universe]. [There are regular alternations, such as] ebbing and rising [of tides] and filling and emptying [of lungs. There are regular sequences, such as] summer necessarily following spring and winter necessarily following autumn. [There are temporary stabilities of being, such as] a human not turning into some thing, and some thing not turning into a human, and grass not becoming a tree and a tree not becoming grass, that have been so for eons. [All such alternations, sequences, and stabilities] that we perceive as regular are patterns (li). As for this distinction between what is altering and what is perceived to be [regular and not altering and therefore inferred by Chu Hsi to be the basis for certain knowledge,] it is so in humans, too. That which [we experience as] altering, such as [the heart’s] being pleased or displeased, being sad or joyful, being in a condition of potentiality or being realized, being in a condition of motion or quiescence, and being in a state of endless cycles, is all human heart [hsin, or mind, the durable substrate of these many conditions]. Human nature is [what might appear to be] unaltering, such as [what in Mencius 6A6 is referred to as the “hearts” of] compassion, shame, deference, and judgment, and [what in Mencius 6A9 is referred to as what is good in a man even though confronting its] “repeated dissipation” and “new shoots” appearing from stumps.\(^{110}\)

\(^{108}\) Huang Tsung-hsi, Ming ju hsüeh an, 50, “Chu ju hsüeh an,” chung, 4, p. 1175.

\(^{109}\) Huang Tsung-hsi, Ming ju hsüeh an, 50, “Chu ju hsüeh an,” chung, 4, p. 1175.

Thus human nature (hsing), like a pattern (li), is apparently a regularity that some infer has thing-ness. Such assertions by Huang that li are inferred patterns, properties that have no separate ontological standing, explicitly overthrow Chu Hsi’s system. According to Chu Hsi, li (as coherence) is that by which any particular thing constituted of particles (cb’i) is as it is (i.e. coherence is what Chu Hsi called the so-i-jan, the that by which each and every particular phenomenon is as it is), and also that which determines what that thing ought to be as it develops (i.e. coherence is the so-tang-jan, the that by which it ought to be so), which can be moral. For Chu Hsi, this coherence (li) is the moral potential in a human; it is a human’s nature (hsing). Huang thus was rejecting the basis of morality as propounded by six centuries of Chu’s followers as well as by the Ming government.

Huang Tsung-hsi’s dismissal of Chu Hsi’s fundamental propositions that coherence (li) is a separate something having agency, and also that it is the basis for moral awareness and action, created a problem for Huang. Moreover, throughout the Ming ju hsüeh an Huang persistently rejected as Buddhistic any claim that seemed to require that “heart” (hsin) was “mind,” and that it must be understood in the sense of consciousness only, or any other transcendent or metaphysical or mystical sense. According to Huang, the particles (cb’i) constituting each human’s heart manifest themselves in patterns, but Huang also rejected any conflation of patterns in the heart with patterns in the particles comprising the other ten thousand things in the realm of heaven-and-earth (as Chu Hsi did, in his assertions that coherence is unitary). Huang refused any implication that the patterns are only in humans’ hearts and not in the external things but projected onto them (as some of Wang Yang-ming’s followers, and maybe Wang himself, believed). The latter view would make the patterns (li) a product of the conscious mind (or heart) rather than particles, comprising the phenomena, themselves manifesting the patterns. Without recourse to the concepts of li or hsin referring to something having separate ontological standing, and treating them as merely being propositional items, Huang had to work out an answer to the question of the foundation of morality. Committed to the unitary reality of the phenomenal world constituted of and by physical particles (cb’i), Huang did not abandon the terms li and hsin. He reinterpreted them.

The Ming ju hsüeh an provides a nice example of Huang’s finesse in handling the question of the foundation of morality. In the early sixteenth century, an interpretation was advanced that since there must be a directing power making the world that we experience, and if Chu Hsi’s idea of coherence (li) is

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a merely descriptive term for what is spontaneously so (tzu-jan) and does not “do” or “cause” anything, and if particles (ch’i) are physical and incapable of directing themselves (which in part was why Ch’eng I and Chu Hsi promoted the idea of li as an explanation for what makes things as they are and why they ought to be so), then only “mind” (hsin) understood as an immaterial intelligence (hsii ling) is able to do that directing. In his comment on this claim, Huang wrote,

Someone who treats coherence, particles, and mind as tripartite [that is, three categorically distinct somethings] does not understand that in the realm of heaven-and-earth there only are physical particles (ch’i). Their cyclical movements are just patterns (li). What a human has as his heart also are particles. If particles themselves were unable to be the directing power (chu tsai), how could summer inevitably follow spring and winter inevitably follow autumn, or grass and trees grow and wither [only in that order], or cold and hot weather succeed each other, or physical environments on earth have different strengths and weaknesses, or celestial bodies (specifically, planets) have westward motion and retrogression, or humans and other living things come into being and later end? [The implication for Huang is that neither the claim about the heart’s or mind’s being immaterial intelligence, nor Chu Hsi’s claim about coherence being what makes these things so, is necessary or tenable.] What could cause these phenomena to be as they are? All are sets of particles (ch’i) acting on themselves as the “directing power.” Because of this capacity to be the directing power, some named it li [coherence, but it is still just what is done by particles themselves]. In this world there are some events that are not possible for particles [e.g. summer following autumn, an impossibility rather than exceptional irregularity or an abnormality, which particles not in the usual pattern sometimes effect], and this is a what-ought-to-be-so of patterns (li). If there were nothing that is impossible for particles, then they would be incomplete [i.e. there continually would be new, unprecedented phenomena and thus no regularity]. Particles having the capacity to be the directing power with intelligence (ling), their patterns (li) also are held to have intelligence.112

In this formulation, Huang was back close to Chu Hsi, except that rather than coherence (li) causing the patterned phenomena constituted by sets of particles, the patterns are a function or property of the particles themselves in motion. Particles are self-directing, according to Huang Tsung-hsi. Importantly, Huang and his readers were most concerned with the portion of particles (ch’i) that constitute each individual’s heart (hsin). “Even when it is in a human, this [so-called] immaterial intelligence consists of particles. The directing power in one’s immaterial intelligence is just these patterns.”113 It seems clear that Huang was allowing that, functionally, patterns (li) in the heart, which is constituted of an assemblage of physical particles, are the directing power and basis of morality in each human.

112 Huang Tsung-hsi, Ming ju hsüeh an, “Ch’un-gen hsüeh-an” 3, p. 46.
113 Huang Tsung-hsi, Ming ju hsüeh an, “Ch’un-gen hsüeh-an” 3, p. 47.
A second major philosophical issue that Huang Tsung-hsi handled in his comments in the *Ming ju hsüeh an* was the meaning and role of human nature (*hsing*) in moral awareness and moral action. Chu Hsi, following Mencius, located human nature in the heart and accepted that it is good; Chu Hsi added the interpretation that human nature was the moral coherence (*li*), i.e. the source and standard of “should,” in humans, and treated it as the central moral term. One of Wang Yang-ming’s big departures from Chu Hsi was to construe the heart (*hsin*) itself rather than the human-nature portion of it as the center of moral concern and the basis for all moral knowledge, which Wang held was innately or inherently in each human. Huang Tsung-hsi quoted Wang Yang-ming’s endorsement of the inseparability of human nature (*hsing*) from the particles (*chʻi*) in which it is manifested: “When particles [are present], then a particular human nature [is manifested], and when there is a human nature, then [its particular] particles [are present]. Fundamentally, there can be no separation of human nature and the particles [in which it is present and manifest].”

Huang added the comment that Wang’s view left room for further consideration. Wang assigned human nature (*hsing*) to the realm of physical particles (*chʻi*).

Because human nature was in the morally mixed realm of particles in which good and not-good are both manifest, for many of Wang Yang-ming’s followers the goal of accessing the heart, especially the “originating heart” (*pen hsin*), became the object of their efforts to move beyond the good–evil distinction. Liu Tsung-chou was reinforcing Wang Yang-ming when he wrote, “In the end, there is nothing to call ‘nature’ that is apart from the realm of physical particles,” although he continued the emphasis on the heart and its innate knowledge of moral good.

In his interpretation of human nature, Huang Tsung-hsi took another step or two that had the effect of moving back toward Chu Hsi. Huang sought to re-establish the importance of the term “human nature” (*hsing*) while insisting that everything, including the hearts of humans, are constituted of particles (*chʻi*), and that patterns in general, and the patterns of the heart specifically, what are known as human natures, are properties of particular portions of particles. Huang stressed that the heart is the organ of thinking and perceiving, and the locus of sentiments and human nature. Criticizing the view of Lo Chʻin-shun (1465–1547), an advocate of the parity of particles with coherence, Huang commented, “Hearts [i.e. the particles that constitute them] have only two states: motion and quiescence. Phrases such as ‘quiet and not...
moving’ and ‘affected and subsequently connected with’ are referring to [the particles of the heart being in] motion or quiescent. Sentiments (ch’ing) pass through the states of motion and quiescence [a claim that everyone granted]. Natures (hsing) also do so.”117 In other words, Huang viewed human nature not as an unchanging, determinate something that is the basis for the timeless morality inherent in every human, as Chu Hsi taught, but as variable. Huang argued that variability in human nature did not obviate its moral implications. As he explained, a pattern (li) of particles of air is to be hot in summer and cold in winter, and the exceptional occurrence of cold days in summer and hot nights in winter does not negate the basic pattern. Analogously, occurrences of human behavior that are less than good do not negate the basic pattern of human nature, which is to act for good. To not understand this is to not understand the Mencius, Huang contended.118 Although it is a property of the particles of the heart, human nature is, or includes, the pattern (li) of being good as its normal or mean state.119 The conduct of the sage is proof that this is so. “The sage human’s following these regularities [in the motions of the particles of the heart] without altering is what some name as ‘human nature.’”120 But where does the motive come from for any man, including a sage, to act consciously in conformity with the regularities that are the human nature (hsing) in the heart’s particles?

The answer, which Huang implied he found partly in the teachings of Wang Yang-ming and more fully in Liu Tsung-chou’s, is a person’s (moral) intention (i). Moral intentions, which Huang distinguished from thought processes in the heart such as being consciously inclined (nien), are unsullied by sentiments (ch’ing) or excessive ratiocination (ssu), and are prior to, not an outcome or result of, knowing (chih).121 Moral intention is the impulse in the heart to acquire moral knowing and initiate moral acting, both of which involve phenomena (wu, or things), and these are the objects of humans’ moral intentions. Huang readily granted that the objects of our moral efforts as given in the Great learning, such as self, family, state, and the entire social world of all under Heaven, inherently are “things,” but these may be transitory and not constant or permanent, and therefore not crucial for true moral knowing. According to Huang,

118 Huang Tsung-hsi, Ming ju hsüeh an, 50, “Chu ju,” chung, 4, p. 1174.
119 Huang Tsung-hsi used the term chung ch’i to convey the idea of a mean state. He seems to have derived it from his calendrical studies, as astronomical observations required using means or averages and disregarding data that did not fit. See Wang Mao, Ch’ing tai che-hsüeh, p. 411.
121 Huang Tsung-hsi, Ming ju hsüeh an, 10, “Yao-chiang hsüeh-an,” p. 209.
After each human takes a form and has a spirit, then he has this [permanent moral capacity of moral] knowing. This knowing depends on the ever-present, ongoing processes of being pleased or displeased, being sad or joyful, and these sentiments are what are called “things” (wu) [as they are an inherent aspect of one’s heart]. Humaneness, duty, ritual performance, and knowledge, denominated as such after [the relevant moral knowing] is present, are not to be spoken of as patterns (li), but are things (wu, objects of knowing).\(^\text{122}\)

Huang’s argument was that the primary moral activity is clarifying the moral intentions (ming i) already, and always, in the heart, and that the moral impulses are real things in the heart.\(^\text{123}\)

The heart, with its patterns that are the basis of moral action, according to Huang, had been at or close to the center of concern for all Ming Confucians excerpted and evaluated by Huang in his book. It was probably in this spirit that Huang began his prefaces to the Ming ju hsüeh an with these somewhat problematic sentences: “Filling the heaven-and-earth is mind [hsin, or humans’ hearts]. Their alterations and transformations being immeasurable, they cannot but have innumerable differences.”\(^\text{124}\) The problem with this declaration is that, if he still meant “heart” (hsin) physically – that is, sets of particles (ch’i) constituting human hearts – then for Huang, following Wang Yang-ming and Liu Tsung-chou, who also had posited that everything, including hearts, comprises particles (ch’i), particles should be what is filling the universe. Presumably he meant that the particles that comprise the heart fill, in the sense of fully comprehend, the physical universe. The preface goes on, “Hearts having no fundamental permanence (pen t’i) [i.e. no discrete ontological standing separate from the particles], the ‘fundamental permanence’ [which each thinker thought he identified in his teachings that Huang cites] was just what was ultimately reached through his own effort. Consequently, ‘fathoming coherence’ [as Chu Hsi taught we should attempt to do] is actually fathoming the hearts’ innumerable differences and not fathoming the innumerable differences of the myriad things [in the external phenomenal world, as some, such as Huang’s contemporary, Fang I-chih, advocated].”\(^\text{125}\)

In effect, this is Huang’s grand explanation of why he compiled the Ming ju hsüeh an, which considers the master purpose (tsung chih) in the learning of several hundred Ming Confucian thinkers as revealed in the selections of their own words. They all in some sense put forth effort to attain what they thought was the “fundamental permanence” (pen t’i) of the heart – that was at

\(^{122}\) Huang Tsung-hsi, Huang Li-chou wen chi, “Ta Wan Chung-tsung lun ke-wu shu,” p. 434.


\(^{124}\) Huang Tsung-hsi, Ming ju hsüeh an, “Yüan hsü,” p. 9. Wang Mao, Ch’ing tai che hsüeh, pp. 430–1, considered this to appear to be contradictory to Huang’s expressed philosophical propositions about the role of ch’i. See Huang Tsung-hsi, Records, p. 41.

\(^{125}\) Huang Tsung-hsi, Ming ju hsüeh an, “Yüan hsü,” p. 9.
the center of their learning – and Huang’s compilation reviews critically the
diverse results. “In the records of the earlier Confucians, everybody is different,
which impresses our minds to be shifting and unstable.”\textsuperscript{126} Huang’s critiques
represent his efforts to restore order. The \textit{Ming ju hsüeh an} is the result of
Huang’s explicating others’ accounts of the foundations of morality based in
the heart (\textit{hsin}), where moral intentions have to be located for humans to act
on them. Huang was trying to save, by rearticulating and rejustifying, Wang
Yang-ming’s and Liu Tsung-chou’s learning based on the heart (\textit{hsin hsüeh}),
but interests were shifting away from it even as Huang compiled his book.
More consequentially, Huang saved learning based on the heart by giving it a
history, a history in the sense of a narrative that is still largely accepted as the
history of Ming Confucian learning.

By the late 1670s Huang Tsung-hsi was nearly seventy years old. He had
finished his large compilations of Ming textual materials. (He never completed
his project of compiling a source book of Sung and Yüan Confucians’ learning.)
He continued to attract students, to participate in meetings for discourses on
learning, and to visit friends and important book collections in Chekiang
and Kiangsu. He continued to contribute to the commemoration of Tung-lin
martyrs, including, of course, his father, and to the memory of the efforts
to extend the Southern Ming. He was well known and well respected. From
1678 on, Huang’s attention had another focus: the compilation of an imperially
sponsored history of the Ming dynasty.

\textbf{THE FIRST GENERATION PROBES SUNG LEARNING}

Even before Huang Tsung-hsi began seeking to establish his own authority
over the Ming intellectual heritage centering on cultivation of one’s moral
capacities, some of his contemporaries had been probing back to the Sung
period in order to reformulate the proper means of learning the way to
individual morality and social order. Not accepting Huang’s acknowledged
teacher, Liu Tsung-chou, and his version of Wang Yang-ming’s teachings, they
returned to Chu Hsi. Chang Lü-hsiang is a case in point.

Chang Lü-(or Li-)hsiang (1611–74), as a relatively poor young man with
only the lowest degree, went over to Shao-hsing in the spring of 1644 to learn
from the famous Liu Tsung-chou. Chang wrote about their interview, and
later he exchanged letters with Liu, but he did not become a formal follower
after Liu died the next year.\textsuperscript{127} With the Ch’ing government in control in
Chekiang, Chang continued to live a modest life, teaching. He maintained

\textsuperscript{126} Huang Tsung-hsi, \textit{Ming ju hsüeh an}, “Yüan hsü,” p. 9.

contact with Liu Tsung-chou’s follower, Ch’en Ch’üeh, exchanging learned letters with him, and Chang also wrote poignantly about Ch’en’s extreme grief at the death of one of his male indentured field workers.128

Even before Chang’s meeting with Liu Tsung-chou, he had been reading the Sung Confucian authors and not accepting the prevailing ethos that derived from Wang Yang-ming. Eventually Chang expressed his complaint that in his time, extending from late Ming into early Ch’ing times, most men preferred Lu Hsiang-shan (1139–91), who had emphasized introspective moral cultivation, more than Chu Hsi and his emphasis on learning from books in Sung times. They mostly venerated the Ming thinkers Ch’en Hsien-chang (1428–1500) and Wang Yang-ming while resisting Chu Hsi adherents Hsüeh Hsüan (1389–1464) and Hu Chü-jen (1434–84), who both stressed disciplined self-cultivation. Chang attributed these propensities to his contemporaries’ lazy preferences for the simple and unconstrained rather than the complicated and disciplined. He pointed to stultifying consequences.

Because so many have supported the Wang Yang-ming mode for the past hundred years, the writings of Ch’eng I and Chu Hsi have gone out of circulation while households do have books by Wang Yang-ming and Lu Hsiang-shan. Clutching these volumes, literati have already submerged their own senses, and accepting their teachers’ and peers’ views, they have galvanized their thinking, so they hold as primary what they have already taken in. Even if they were compelled to casually read through Ch’eng I and Chu Hsi, they would base themselves on the ideas of Wang and Lu and only notice the points of comparison.129

The consequences were dire, according to Chang Lü-hsiang, because their closed-mindedness precluded both the extension of knowledge and moral action.130 His disparaging characterizations of too many of his contemporaries’ failed approach to learning were congruent with other critiques made at this time. The problem was to present an alternative.

Chang Lü-hsiang sought to revalidate reading books, broadening learning, and acting for social betterment; that is, essentially the agenda of Chu Hsi’s teachings but without the encompassing emphasis on coherence (li). In Chang’s view, this would be a means to restore stability. In a long letter, more like a twelve-part, informal essay, dated 1644, Chang expressed his ideal:

Pursuit of [true] learning is a singular affair; it does not have branches. Notwithstanding this, men today preparing for examinations call what they are doing “examination learning”; engaging in principles of governance is called “administrative learning”; concern for morals is called “Learning of the Way”; perusing the sayings of various writers in antiquity


is called “ancient learning”; writing about history is called “historical learning.” Is it really branched like this? Learning is simply unitary, with what is called a coherent meaning [that was realized for us by sages with whom we share the same mind].

Chang was endorsing the old goals with the old rhetoric, which was not an effective or attractive method for the new generation. Chang did not have direct followers, and his collected writings, more than fifty chüan, were not printed until late in the nineteenth century.

Chang Lü-hsiang’s exact contemporary and fellow Chiang-nan resident was Lu Shih-i (1611–72). Like Chang, Lu even before the fall of the Ming government in 1644 was expressing his dissatisfaction with the prevailing instructions stemming from Wang Yang-ming on how to learn to understand morality and act morally. Also like Chang, Lu had some exposure to Liu Tsung-chou and his teachings, and did not become a follower. Lu, too, turned back to Chu Hsi for his explanations.

As a young man in his twenties Lu became interested in keeping a daily record assessing his words and deeds, on the model of the ledgers of merit and demerit (kung-kuo-kō) advocated by Yüan Huang (1533–1606). Lu soon abandoned the practice of daily self-examination. By 1637 he had switched to making notes on his readings, and these developed into his best-known writings, the Ssu pien lu (Records of my thoughts and analyses), a part of which was first printed in 1661 or 1662. Lu maintained his commitment to practicable morality, most notably in his participation in local charitable activities for famine relief under the auspices of a “society for doing good together” (t’ung shan hui) in the early 1640s. Except for a brief period of service as an adviser on the staff of a county magistrate, Lu Shih-i spent his adult life reading, thinking, teaching, talking (notably in meetings for discourses on learning), and writing note-like pieces that he arranged by topic. Over and over he criticized the inadequate understanding and commitment of his contemporaries.

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137 Ko Jung-chin and Wang Chün-ts’ai, Lu Shih-i p’ing-chuan, p. 38. Pages 38–48 survey Lu’s writings of more than two hundred chüan and their publishing history.
Lu’s approach to learning in effect involved acting out his interpretation of Chu Hsi’s teachings. A contemporary raised the long-standing criticism that Chu Hsi’s explanation of how we should “extend knowledge” (chih chih) as set out in his annotation and discussion of the Great learning was fragmenting and misleading in contrast to Wang Yang-ming’s direct and immediate explanation, which involved discovering one’s originating heart (pen hsin). In response, Lu Shih-i contended that Chu Hsi’s was the straightforward one. For him, “extending knowledge” meant “fathoming the coherence” that is also in phenomena external to our hearts. Lu pointed out that Wang Yang-ming introduced the term “innate good” (liang) in order to advocate “extending our innately good knowledge” that was inherent on our minds independently of any external phenomena. By offering an important distinction of his own, Lu Shih-i explained why Wang’s view was inadequate:

Among the affairs in this world, there are some that can be known without deliberating about them, such as mind, human nature, and the way of morality [which are timelessly, unchangingly so because they are the result of coherence]. There are others that we know only after engaging in learning, such as names for things, external phenomena themselves, relative measures, and numerical relations. If we take the simple example of the patterns in the sky (t’ien wen) [made by celestial figures], this is knowledge classical scholars (ju) should have, but for times, positions, and cyclical paths of the sun, moon, and planets, one must look at writings and charts. Only then is one clear about them. If he simply depended on his “innate knowing,” what would it “extend” to? Consequently, the two words “fathoming coherence” (ch‘iong li) contain “extending innately good knowledge” but not vice versa.  

To explain the importance of the activity of extending one’s knowledge as he understood it, Lu made the point that the difference between humans and beasts is that humans can extend their knowledge and beasts cannot. Ordinary people neglect this difference but moral men develop it. How, Lu asked, can someone who is learning look lightly upon this one word, “extend”?  Extending thus was not applying innate knowledge but taking in, accumulating, and transmitting more knowledge.

Lu made specific recommendations to his contemporaries about what they needed to learn:

What men of today ought to learn should not be limited only to the six disciplines [liu i, of ancient times, which they have been neglecting, according to Lu], but also such other subjects as the patterns in the sky, geography, water management, and military affairs. Those are all useful to society and cannot be left out of the discussion. Conventional Confucians (ju) do not understand the learning involved with being internally a sage and externally a ruler; they only engage in lofty chatter about human nature and moral destiny.

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139 Lu Shih-i, “Ko chih lei,” Ssu pien lu chi yao, ch. 3, p. 6a (71).
which adds nothing to society, and will bring criticism for being irrelevant. Manipulating numbers and numerical relationships (shu), one of the six disciplines, is in fact more important than it might seem. In all such subjects as the patterns in the sky, systems of music and calendars, water control, military affairs, and agriculture, one must employ learning involving calculating (suan). One who does not understand calculating, or is not proficient, cannot be said to be useful to society.\textsuperscript{140}

There seems to be at least a faint influence here of the new Western learning, as there also does in Lu’s reminders to his readers that the classical texts have numerous references to Heaven (t’ien) as having agency, and Heaven should be respected.\textsuperscript{141} Thus in his book Lu Shih-i entered extensive notes on patterns in the sky (loosely, astronomy) and geography, as well as military, political, agricultural, and educational institutions and techniques, but the notes were just that – notes. Neither Lu’s method of “extending knowledge” nor the content of his notes set powerful examples for successor generations because their criticisms were not complemented by a new method.\textsuperscript{142}

**THE SECOND AND THIRD GENERATIONS OF MEN FOCUSING ON MORAL SELF-CULTIVATION**

Both Chang Lü-hsiang and Lu Shih-i died in the early 1670s without redirecting their contemporaries’ learning. The problem of what to do about the prevalence of perceived failures in the claims to re-establish self-cultivation of one’s morality as an appealing focus also motivated others of the second generation of Ch’ing men learned in the Confucian tradition. Born in the late 1620s and the 1630s, they were too young to have directly served the Ming emperor, but they were old enough to witness the turmoil during the years before and after the dynastic changeover. They generally began to find their voices by the 1660s on what to do to save the ideal of moral cultivation, even without Wang Yang-ming’s teachings about recovering one’s originating heart (pen hsin) and extending one’s innately good knowledge (chih liang chih). They also were willing to re-evaluate Chu Hsi’s ideas that moral understanding comes from “fathoming coherence” (ch’iung li) through reading books and introspection.


\textsuperscript{141} Yang Hsiang-k’ui, *Ch’ing ju hsüeh-an hsün pien* (Chi-nan, 1985) vol. 1, p. 611. See ibid., p. 608, for Lu’s acknowledging aspects of the use of numbers in Western learning.

\textsuperscript{142} However, Yen Yüan noticed him, and Chang Po-hsing promoted a shortened version of his book. Yang Hsiang-k’ui, *Ch’ing ju hsüeh-an hsün pien*, vol. 1, p. 605, made a similar point.
Li Yung

A prominent attempt at revision of the heritage of emphasizing moral cultivation and innate knowledge of good was made by Li Yung (1627–1705). Unlike Liu Tsung-chou, Sun Ch'i-feng, and Huang Tsung-hsi, Li Yung was poor, with limited educational opportunities. He resided in Shensi province, far from the Ming political and cultural capitals. Too young to have a Ming examination degree, Li perhaps would not qualify as a non-collaborator (i-min), but he steadfastly refused to participate in the Ch'ing government, even threatening to kill himself with a knife rather than accept an official recommendation to go to the capital for an examination in the 1670s. Surviving the murderous turmoil in the northeast through the 1640s, Li basically educated himself by reading broadly, of course in the classics and standard histories, but also in the Lao tzu and Chuang tzu, the Buddhist canon, and the Sung and Ming Confucians. Deciding that too many of the men claiming they were adopting the teachings of Wang Yang-ming had become uselessly self-indulgent, Li sought to promote a more vigorous, applicable interpretation of acting on innate knowledge of what is morally good (liang chih). In doing so he established a reputation for integrity and became a respected teacher in his region.

With limited contacts with the elite intellectual networks in Chiang-nan, Li Yung accepted what had been the prevailing convention that innate knowledge of good is in us as part of our human nature, and is shared by all humans as an aspect of our coherence (li). He tried to shift the emphasis by reaching back to the term “respect” (ching), which was an important element in Chu Hsi's teaching. For Li, the core idea was respecting what one starts with – that is, one's innate knowing – by learning to act on it. He acknowledged that over the centuries there had been many slogans that essentialized what Confucians (ju) propagated as the moral way: “being respectful and fathoming coherence,” “being spontaneous,” “reverting to one’s original nature,” and “extending innately good knowledge” were just a few of them that Li listed. He determined that underlying them all were the four words “Repenting transgressions, renew oneself” (hui kuo tzu hsin). “Repenting transgressions” was Li’s means to combat the mistaken interpretation that innate knowing

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143 Wu Huai-ch'ing, comp., Ch'en Chün-min, ed., Kuang-chung san Li nien-p'u (Taipei, 1992), p. 82. For brief summaries of Li Yung’s life, see Wang Mao, Ch'ing tai che-hüeh, pp. 448–50; and Hummel, Eminent Chinese of the Ch'ing period, pp. 498–9.

144 T'ao Ch'ing, Ming i-min chiu ta-chia che-hüeh su-hsüang yen-chiu (Taipei, 1997), p. 280.


146 Li Yung, Erh-ch'ü chi, ch. 1, quoted in Wang Mao, Ch'ing tai che-hüeh, p. 458. My translation here has a Christian overtone, which Wang Mao also noticed in Li Yung’s choice of words.
was effortlessly and faultlessly available. He thought correcting one's faults should be understood as renewal.

Li used an analogy to explain how he meant “renewal” (hsin):

Human nature is my own nature, my own moral power. I inherently have it. So why perform renewal? What I am calling renewal is reverting to the antecedent conditions (ku). It is like the sun in the sky. In the evening it sinks and in the morning it rises. In doing so its intrinsic light is neither enhanced nor diminished. Today it is no different from yesterday. Consequently, it [and we] can be constantly renewed. If one wanted to add externals [such as new knowledge] to his basic substance and call it “making new,” that would be the doings of someone who delights in the new and different, but that is not what the sage calls renewal.\(^{147}\)

According to Li Yung, renewal in his sense, a day-after-day effort at acting according to one's nature, making it shine brilliantly, is exactly what lay behind all the correct approaches, past and present, to social improvement. One does not simply and directly “have” innate knowledge. One has to renew it constantly. Renewal in this manner also obviates all the expenditure of words in discourses on learning (chiang hsüeh) and writing books,\(^ {148}\) although Li engaged fully in both of those activities after 1670.\(^ {149}\)

Li Yung wanted to balance intuitive moral understanding with learning (hsüeh) that required attention and effort. However, he drew a line at condoning the program of some of his contemporaries, including Ku Yen-wu, who came to call on him in 1663.\(^ {150}\) They were too immersed in extending their broad learning and textual studies, which distracted them from more important matters:\(^ {151}\)

If one sets aside activities involving the highest good and does not go to [or investigate (ko)] them, the coherence (li) of his body, heart, intention, knowing, family, state, and world is not fathomed [which is what Chu Hsi taught is the purpose and result of “investigating things”], and if, delusionally immersing himself in this task, he wants to investigate one thing after another in all the complexity he will fall into fragmented confusion. This is to be broadly involved with things, but it is not “investigating things.”\(^ {152}\)

Li Yung continued to advocate for, and live, the approach of Wang Yang-ming’s followers to learning.

At times Li Yung expressed his views radically to show the intensity of his commitment. “In learning, one must peel the skin to see the bone, strip

\(^ {147}\) Li Yung, Erh-ch'ü chi, ch. 1, quoted in Wang Mao, Ch'ing tai che-hsüeh, p. 459.

\(^ {148}\) Wang Mao, Ch'ing tai che-hsüeh, p. 458.

\(^ {149}\) See T'ao Ch'ing, Ming i-min chiu ta-chia che-hsüeh su-huang yen-chiu, p. 285.

\(^ {150}\) Wu Huai-ch'ing, San Li nien-p'u, pp. 27–8.

\(^ {151}\) Li Yung, “Ta hsüeh,” Ssu shu fan shen lu, ch. 1, quoted in Wang Mao, Ch'ing tai che-hsüeh, p. 461. Li's book was printed in 1683, the year after Ku Yen-wu died.
Learning Based on Intuitive Knowing

the bone to see the marrow, penetrate to the most primal, go through to the inner nature, with reckless abandon.”

Drawing inspiration and vocabulary from the *Chuang tsu* and *Lao tsu*, he incorporated the techniques of forgetting, nonattachment, and emptying one’s mind, means that were congruent with Wang Yang-ming’s famous teaching about the Four Negatives. In a letter to Ku Yen-wu, who was most unsympathetic to these ideas, Li Yung tried to explain that the “emptying” that he, and Chuang Tzu and Lao Tzu, were talking about was quite different from Buddhists’ uses of such terms. “Lao’s and Chuang’s ‘emptying’ is emptying the mind [in the sense of being without prejudice and predilection], but there still is no emptying of the coherence (li),” a distinction Buddhists do not observe, Li claimed. He wrote that whether through sudden enlightenment or enduring cultivation, one has to look into his own heart for moral good and act based on that understanding. For Li, to read all the books produced since the beginning of writing or to examine all the things in the entire cosmos is to sink into irrelevance.

To the end of his life Li Yung maintained his reputation for moral integrity. He stood out as one of the best-known teachers in the northwest. Shortly before Li died, the K'ang-hsi emperor was progressing in Shensi and inquired about Li Yung. Old and sick, Li was able to evade intense pressure from local officials for him to appear in person before the emperor. After several days of probing, the emperor excused him and sent him some gifts. When Li’s son came to offer thanks on behalf of his father, the emperor inquired about Li’s health, and then asked about what books Li read. Li’s son said that when young his father had no teacher and may have read in a random manner, but in his later years he would look at nothing other than the Six Classics, the Four Books, the compendium of Sung authors’ writings about human nature and coherence, Chu Hsi’s digest of the *Comprehensive mirror*, and the recorded sayings of the Sung and Ming Confucians. And, Li’s son added, knowing well in 1703 what the emperor wanted to hear, Li’s students were urged to read only these books. It was clearly awkward by this time to advocate for revising the Chu Hsi heritage.

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A less compromising figure among the second generation is Yen Yüan (1635–1704). He arrived at an extreme position in rejecting Wang Yang-ming’s and Chu Hsi’s interpretation of how to pursue learning and living, both in their original expression and in their late Ming, early Ch’ing versions. Yen’s solution was to go back to Confucius himself. It took him a while to arrive at this view. In 1638 Yen’s father, who had been adopted into the Chu family, left their village south of Peking, in what became Hopei province, abandoning his wife and son, to go with a Ch’ing raiding party back to the northeast.\(^{158}\) Even after his mother remarried in 1646,\(^{159}\) Yen lived as a grandson in the Chu family, devoted to the couple he knew as his paternal grandparents. At his grandfather’s behest Yen prepared for the examinations, never with much success, and on the side indulged himself in various enthusiasms, including studying medicine and Taoist longevity techniques, never with much satisfaction. In his mid-twenties, when he had started taking students in order to support himself, Yen liked the teachings associated with Wang Yang-ming.\(^ {160}\) Then in 1660 he became serious about the major Sung Confucian thinkers after reading the selections in the early Ming imperial compilation entitled *Hsing li ta-ch’üan* (*Compendium of teachings on human nature and coherence*),\(^{161}\) but his interest did not last. By the time he was in his thirties Yen was having increasing doubts about what he had been reading, including Chu Hsi’s reforms of family rituals that were in wide circulation and which Yen had tried to take literally, even at great pain to himself.\(^{162}\) Yen went in 1664 to call on the renowned Sun Ch’i-feng, who lived in retirement in northern Honan but attracted many students and visitors by promoting his own synthetic version of Ch’eng–Chu and Lu–Wang teachings, but Yen did not succumb to Sun’s influence.\(^ {163}\) Yen wanted to practice, to act out, what he thought were the true values set out for society by the sages in antiquity. That became his main criterion.

A more traumatic change began in 1668, when the woman who had raised him died. While suffering in deepest mourning for her, Yen learned that she


\(^{162}\) Yen Yüan, “Ts’un hsieh pien,” in *Yen Yüan chi*, pp. 73–74. Yen gave a brief account of his attraction to and fall away from Ch’eng–Chu teachings.

\(^{163}\) Li Kung, “Yen nien-p’u,” p. 718. On Sun Ch’i-feng, see above. It should be noted that Ku Yen-wu also visited Sun later in 1664.
was not his grandmother, that his father had been adopted, and that he was not a Chu. As his grief waned, Yen came to the realization that what had been taught by the Ch'eng brothers, Chu Hsi, Lu Hsiang-shan, and Wang Yang-ming — that is, the prevailing version of Confucian teachings he had been studying — were all influenced by Ch'an Buddhism and were vulgar forms of learning; they were corrupting and not what was important. Instead, Yen realized that correct learning (cheng hsiüeh) involved practice, as represented, for example, in the six disciplines (liu i) of ritual and musical performance, archery and carriage driving, and writing words and manipulating numbers, all associated with the great figures of the Duke of Chou and Confucius. These realizations — negative and positive — were an intellectual turning point in Yen's life, as his chief disciple years later pointed out. The next year Yen changed the slogan of his study, where he taught, from “thinking about antiquity” (ssu ku) to simply the word “practice” (hsi). It was only later that he heard about Lu Shih-i’s stress on learning the six disciplines (liu i). Finally, in 1673, after the death of the man that he grew up thinking was his father’s father, he changed his surname to Yen and re-established his place in the Yen lineage.

This renaming signaled Yen Yüan’s final break from his adoptive family, which was occurring over a period of years, and his more consequential separation from the intellectual conventions of his time. In a conversation toward the end of his life with Li Kung, who became his student in 1679, Yen reflected on how the turn in his intellectual life began:

Before my southward trip I still followed Ch'eng–Chu teachings and accepted the idea that they were in the tradition of the sages. But on that trip I saw that everyone [of the followers of Chu Hsi there] was a Ch'an Buddhist, and their lineage of teachings was vacuous and in opposition to those of Confucius’ followers. [I realized] it was necessary to split off Ch'eng–Chu teachings [from the Confucian tradition] in order to start on the path of Confucius and Mencius. I determined that their path was incompatible with the Ch'eng–Chu one, and that I did not want to be an unthinking conformist in the so-called tradition of the Way (tao t'ung) [claimed for Ch'eng and Chu].

For the rest of his life, Yen Yüan over and over made scathing criticisms of the celebrated Sung thinkers.

166 This may be alluding to Yen’s 1664 visit to Sun Ch'i-feng in northern Honan.
167 Li Kung, “Yen nien-p’u,” p. 774. This passage is also cited in Ch'ien Mu, Chung-kuo chin san-pai nien hsüeh-shu shih (Taipei, 1966), p. 159, and is differently translated by Immanuel C. Y. Hsi in Liang Chi-ch'ao, Intellectual trends of the Ch'ing period (Cambridge, 1959), pp. 40–1. Ch'ien Mu’s interpretation was that Yen Yüan’s ideas were close to those of his fellow northerner, Sun Ch'i-feng (p. 179), but Yen was rejecting what Sun stood for, which involved Sun’s accepting and adopting the Sung–Ming transmission of Confucian learning in order to place himself in that line.
Yen made a collection of his own short notes, usually a sentence or two, that scoffed and derided sayings of Chu Hsi that had been recorded and printed by his disciples. With regard to a sentence articulating Chu Hsi’s fundamental claim – “As for fathoming coherence [being available everywhere], every affair and every entity has its own particular dynamic coherence (tao li)” – that makes each phenomenon develop as it does, Yen Yüan commented on this with a sigh, “My head aches [at such proposals]. If one grasps the old means of acting on the Way and the old starting points of the direct followers of Confucius, [claims by Chu Hsi of] these sorts all belong to the category of making a joke.”

This is not analysis or intellectual engagement with points of disagreement; it is polemical and rhetorical, as are many of his other “critiques” (p’ing) in this collection. In a letter Yen declared,

I think classical scholars (ju) in Sung times [e.g. Ch’eng I and Chu Hsi] are like a person who gets hold of a route book and looks into one area after another. He may satisfy himself that he comprehends the routes of the entire empire, and everyone else might laud him for knowing about routes. In fact he has not taken even one step. He has not reached any place, but [in effect] circled around in waste land.

Reading a book about doing something does not equal doing that something. This simple idea became an essential insight for Yen’s new program.

Not only were Sung and Ming Confucians self-deluded and ineffectual, they were culpable. Yen Yüan said repeatedly that over the past 500 years they were responsible for society’s ills:

I have sometimes presumptuously hypothesized that if the Confucians (ju) of the Sung period and the honored men (chih-tzu) of late Ming had lived in the time of the great sage rulers of antiquity, their learning and moral convictions would have been discriminated against. Moreover, I fear they would not have avoided being prohibited for promoting false learning [as Chu Hsi’s teachings were at the end of his life] and being executed for forming a faction [as some of the Tung-lin partisans were in the 1620s]... If we actually have led others astray by having lost the tradition of true learning, then how can we Confucians (wu ju) avoid responsibility for the disasters of the present age!

This was very close to blaming certain late Southern Sung literati and late Ming literati for the disasters of the fall of their dynasties.

Yen concluded from personal experience that what essentially was wrong in Chu Hsi’s teachings was that he and his followers had reduced the precept of going to external phenomena to fathom their coherence, and so enhance one’s understanding of practical moral values, to the twofold prescription to devote

169 Cited in Ch’ien Mu, Chung-kuo chin san-pai nien hsüeh-shu shih, p. 165. Also translated in Liang Ch’i-ch’ao, Intellectual trends in the Ch’ing period, p. 41.
“half the day in quiet sitting and half the day in reading books.”\textsuperscript{171} Both were utterly useless, according to Yen, even for the purpose of “investigating things” (\textit{ko wu}), and certainly for anything that could be called “learning” (\textit{hsüeh}).\textsuperscript{172} Quiet sitting could be dismissed as Buddhistic, but reading books? Yen had a radical answer when someone asked about a sentence he had read, and memorized, ascribed to Confucius in the \textit{Doctrine of the mean} (\textit{Chung-yung}): “Love of learning is not far removed from wisdom” (or knowledge).\textsuperscript{173} To answer, Yen Yüan probed his questioner’s understanding of the word “learning.” He asked, “In your mind, must you first read a lot so you can smash any stupid views?” When the questioner agreed, Yen said no. “Have you ever thought about the understanding of affairs possessed by men with the lowest-level degree [as Yen Yüan himself had]? Men become stupid by reading books, and the more they read the more stupid they become. Those bookish men must only have self-referential knowledge [not wisdom, as in the \textit{Doctrine of the mean}], and thereby their stupidity only becomes more profound.”

A printing-block carver, Yen pointed out, handles many books, but that does not enhance his intelligence.\textsuperscript{174} All craftsmen who specialize become narrow. For Yen Yüan, gentlemen in ancient times showed that love of learning meant learning not only how to perform rituals and music, but also archery, carriage driving, writing words, manipulating numbers, and engaging in military and agricultural affairs. Learning meant learning how to do things, not learning about things. Yen’s argument was that loving to learn from books about human nature and its coherence does not bring one closer to knowledge or wisdom, as the questioner presumed it did.\textsuperscript{175}

Yen went further on the negative effects of too much reading. Not without sympathy, he told about some of the men he knew whose exhaustive devotion to books had ruined their health. He added, “There is not a single man today who spends his time sitting upright [reading books] in his study who is not a weakling. They are laughed at by military men and farmers. Is theirs manly behavior?”\textsuperscript{176} More broadly, Yen condemned his contemporaries for allowing themselves to be obstructed in their pursuit of learning. “There are three

\textsuperscript{171} Yen Yüan, “Yüeh Chang shih Wang hsüeh chih i p’ing,” “Hsi-chai chi yu” 6, in \textit{Yen Yüan chi}, p. 493. It should be pointed out that in Chu Hsi’s recorded sayings there are many instances where he reminds his followers that reading is a means, not an end, and they should seek true understanding, beyond the written words.


\textsuperscript{173} \textit{Chung-yung}, section 20. This translation is from \textit{Ta hsüeh and Chung yang}, trans. Andrew H. Plaks (London, 2003), p. 39. In \textit{Analects 6.2} Confucius is quoted giving the term “love of learning” a different spin.


\textsuperscript{175} Yen Yüan, “Ssu shu cheng wu” 2, in \textit{Yen Yüan chi}, p. 169.

\textsuperscript{176} Yen Yüan, “Ts’un hsüeh pien” 3, in \textit{Yen Yüan chi}, p. 73. Also in Ch’ien Mu, \textit{Chung-kuo chin san-pai nien hsüeh-shu shih}, p. 162. Yen’s comments on two of the men are translated in Wei-ming Tu, “Yen Yüan:
erroneous practices common among learners today: submerging themselves in texts, letting themselves be led by commentaries, and deluding themselves with other strands of thought. If they did not have these three practices [which distract them], they would certainly seek to regain the way of the sages.”

Calling into question his contemporaries’ received misconceptions about what constituted “learning” (bsüeb), Yen Yüan had to come up with better answers for the questions of how and what to learn.

The answer started with what Yen thought was the correct understanding of Confucius’ meaning in the opening sentence attributed to him in the Analects. The common, established meaning of the sentence is something like, “Is it not a pleasure, having learned something, to try it out (hsi) at due intervals.” Yen Yüan claimed that the two crucial words, learning (bsüeb) and practicing (hsi), had been misinterpreted since the Han period by being taken as primarily mental efforts, such as thinking, reading, discoursing, and writing. Yen’s interpretation was that Confucius intended for his followers to learn how to do things, to take actions, even when they were working with the texts that Yen acknowledged Confucius had helped to transmit – that is, what became known as the Book of documents, the Book of odes, the Book of change, the Ch’ün ch’iu (Spring and autumn annals) – as well as the traditions of music and ritual. The texts were not to be studied as a mental exercise. The texts aside, Yen argued, Confucius expected his followers to do things (hsi or hsi hsing) with what they learned. Learning how and practicing what Yao and Shun did involved three types of activity (san shib) – exercising virtuous power that corrects, performing beneficial functions, and enhancing well-being – and the Duke of Chou’s and Confucius’ three types of affairs (san wu), a rubric which covers the six types of moral power (knowledge, benevolence, sagacity, duty, loyalty, and harmony), the six types of moral relationship (being a son, a friend, a neighbor, a married in-law, a government officer, and a compassionate contributor to those in need), and the six disciplines (ritual and musical performance, archery and carriage driving, writing words and manipulating numbers).


177 Yen Yüan, “Ts’un hsüeh pien” 1, in Yen Yüan chi, p. 48. Also see Wang Mao, Ch’ing tai che-hsüeh, p. 270; and Ch’ien Mu, Chung-kuo chin san-pai nien hsüeh-shu shib, pp. 170–1.
conduct, as actions, not as ideals, according to Yen Yüan, are what the phrase from *Analects* 1.1, “learning and practicing them in a timely manner,” refers to.\(^{183}\)

To make his point, Yen had to shift the focus from the mental act of learning (with what was learned generally being left unspecified beyond being sages’ learning relevant to the Way) to a strict emphasis on learning physically how to do things. Yen wanted to do the efficacious, useful, moral activities that sages had learned how to perform and that were recorded in the classical texts. For Yen, what the sages did were practices (*hsü*) in the double sense of repetitions to improve, and also of implementations after one has learned how to act. Although Yen has been celebrated for his “practical learning,”\(^{184}\) what he meant by practice did not translate into what was practical in the ordinary sense of being expeditiously useful (e.g. carriage driving to go from here to there). Not even Yen thought that acting as Yao, Shun, the Duke of Chou, and Confucius was just doing things in an everyday sense to accomplish a mundane task; it was still a lofty aim of living each moment as a sage would do in that context.\(^{185}\) Of course Yen Yüan did not have a sage’s impact on his society, even though he tried to act in strict observance of the models, especially personal rituals, that he thought to be correct. His function was to attract the attention of his contemporaries, and of later generations, to his anti-intellectual critique of their hypocritical learning as usual.

Despite his castigation of their reading books, Yen wrote books, including detailed comments on the words and sentences in the Four Books and in Chu Hsi’s collected sayings. But Yen’s writings were prods, not crutches or ends. In his writings Yen tore apart the claims made for learning from books in a more radical manner than Wang Yang-ming had done. Wang taught that we could recover our innate, inner moral strength and act on it, without all that investigating, extending, and fathoming coherence in the manner that Chu Hsi called for. Wang Yang-ming certainly did more in his years of government service than the Sung thinkers had done, and more than Yen Yüan did. The main collection of Wang Yang-ming’s conversations and his discussions on issues connected with learning was called “records of traditions about practices” (*ch‘uan hsi lu*).\(^{186}\) Yen Yüan accepted that practice was the goal, but he did not follow Wang Yang-ming’s advocacy of introspection as

\(^{183}\) Yen Yüan, “Chu tzu yü lei p’ing,” in *Yen Yüan chi*, p. 252.


\(^{185}\) Tu, “Yen Yüan,” p. 534, evoked the term “lived concreteness” to characterize Yen’s aim.

\(^{186}\) In the introduction to his translation, W. T. Chan explained his choice of “practical living” for the translation of *hsü* in the title; see Wang Yang-ming, *Instructions for practical living*, p. xiii.
the proper means to learn how to act. For Yen, both the means and the goal were “practice.”

Compared to some of his contemporaries, Yen’s scholarly writings were idiosyncratic. He was not resorting to etymologies or commentaries or authoritative teachers or innate knowledge in a profound sense. A simple illustration comes from a passage in which he again claimed that he grasped what everyone else for over a thousand years had missed. Yen was addressing the usage of the word *hsi* (usually understood as bind, connect, attach, or suspend, according to context) in a passage from the *Doctrine of the mean* (*Chung-yung* 26): “The sky has numerous points of luminosity, and its and their extent are unfathomable; the sun, moon, planets, and constellations are suspended (*hsi*) in it [the sky], and the myriad things [on earth] are covered by it [the sky].”¹⁸⁷ This is Yen’s comment on the word *hsi* (as “suspend,” or “be suspended”):

No one for a very long time has clarified the meaning of the word *hsi* [in *Chung-yung* 26]. In 1674 or 1675 I was observing the figures (*hsiang*) in the night sky, when suddenly a shooting star came from the south. It rammed right into Wu-ch’ê [the star we know today as Capella in Aurige, near Gemini]. The big star shook, but in a moment the tremor settled, as if [Capella] was attached or suspended (*hsi*). The use of this particular word by the commentators [who wrote this section of the *Chung-yung*] must be from what they saw [which was comparable to what Yen observed]. I record this to leave it for someone who has more learning about [clearly “knowing how” is not required] the patterns in the sky [*t’ien wen* – loosely, astronomy].¹⁸⁸

To explain a word usage in a classical text, Yen Yüan was referencing his own experience, and linking it directly to men associated with the sage, Confucius. On what grounds would readers accept Yen’s opinion?

In the 1690s Yen Yüan was still living in an isolated village in central Hopei. He had students, a local reputation for scrupulous observance of rituals, and some writings. His reputation and some of his writings had made it to the capital.¹⁸⁹ He had not done much. In spite of his rhetoric condemning Chu Hsi’s followers for spending their efforts on reading commentaries, writing books, and engaging in discourses on learning, that is what in part Yen had been doing. His reputation was such that in 1696, when he was in his sixties, he was invited to serve as the head of a newly founded academy (*shu-yüan*) that was being planned in the southern corner of Hopei. The intention was to teach young men how to read the classics, but also to practice ritual, military, and agricultural skills, and the rest of Yen’s agenda. Before the academy could

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¹⁸⁷ *Chung-yung*, 26. My translation is more physical and specific to try and keep with Yen Yüan’s point.
¹⁸⁸ Yen Yüan, “Su shu cheng wu,” 2, in Yen Yüan chi, p. 171. My opinion is that Yen Yüan was seeing things. Capella did not shake because of a meteorite.
be launched, the site suffered during a severe flood, and Yen returned home. He died a few years later.\textsuperscript{190}

\textit{Li Kung}

Li Kung (1659–1733) was the student who did the most to disseminate Yen Yüan’s ideas and to establish Yen as a major figure in Confucian learning in the north. Li came from an educated, morally upright, and, especially after his father died in 1683, impoverished family in a village in Chihli (Hopei) not far from where Yen Yüan lived. On his father’s orders, Li went as a poor student in 1679 to seek instruction from Yen, and he then embarked on learning to practice (hsi) in accordance with what the sages had done. When he went back in the middle of the next year to call again on Yen, he heard that Yen had sold his concubine. According to what Li later wrote about the incident in his chronological account of Yen’s life, Yen had bought a girl because he was concerned about not having an heir, but he determined she was physically and mentally deficient. Feeling he had been cheated, Yen compelled the procuress to take the girl back and return his money, which he planned to use to buy someone else. When the girl was then to be sold to a Manchu bannerman, Yen felt regret about what he had done. The next month, Li arrived to chastise his teacher.\textsuperscript{191} At this point, the chronological account written still later (in 1736) about Li Kung supplies what purports to be the critical words he directed at Yen. Li said Yen could have released the girl, but he should not have in effect sold her back and put someone else in the position of being cheated. Brushing aside Yen’s excuses about how his recent eye ailment (Yen eventually lost the sight in one eye) had clouded his judgment, and stressing Yen’s own teachings about not being afraid to change when one has done wrong, Li got Yen to agree to make amends. Rather than delaying, as soon as they finished their meal they went together to find the procuress, gave her back the nineteen tael (liang) of silver, and sent the girl back to her father, who had sold her at the start of the affair.\textsuperscript{192} Whatever the exact details about what was said and done, the incident had the effect of bonding Yen and Li as they had put their moral convictions into practice. From that day on, Li followed Yen’s habit of keeping a daily record of self-examination,\textsuperscript{193} although it was not until almost ten years later that they carried out the rituals formally making them master


\textsuperscript{192} The incident is recorded in a later nien-p’u on Yen, quoted in Ch’ien Mu, \textit{Chung-kuo chin san pai nien}, p. 203. The speech is not recorded by Li Kung himself in his “Yen Yüan nien-p’u.”

\textsuperscript{193} Li Kung, “Yen Yüan nien-p’u,” p. 751.
and disciple. The year after that, in 1690, Li passed the provincial-level examination in Peking.

Although Li Kung also studied medicine to try to earn some money, he began to use his connection with Yen Yüan to secure positions tutoring in the households of officials and others. Thereafter he traveled more and farther than Yen Yüan ever did. Meeting and corresponding with some of the important scholars of the day, Li Kung propagated his master's ideas. A succinct testimony to Li's approach was given in a piece composed by Kuo Chin-ch'eng (1660–1700). As a preliminary, Kuo summarized his own educational experience, which was more or less standard at the time. As a boy he had learned to read the Four Books by explicating words and parsing sentences. He learned to write the standard poetry and essay forms. Then he concentrated on the classics and histories, memorizing passages and grasping the big ideas. Kuo said he thought, like most of his teachers and fellow students, that this was the way to pursue learning. Then in 1685, probably in Peking, he met the slightly older Li Kung. As a new proponent of Yen Yüan's ideas, Li said to Kuo,

You understand reading books. You do not understand pursuing learning. Reading books is not learning. Those now who read books tend only to be clear about vapid principles and to memorize empty words. By doing this, their spirit is spent. By doing this month after month, year after year, they are ground down. When finally they take themselves out into the real world, they are blindingly ignorant. Could the learning pursued by sages in antiquity have been like this! With the learning done by men in antiquity – ritual and musical performances, military and agricultural practices – they could cultivate their persons and extend practical benefits to others; their ordering the whole of society and bettering the livelihoods of commoners all resided in doing these. This is what is called [genuine] learning. Books! Only use them to inquire into these [ancient practices]. Concentrating on reciting and reading as your main concern is not learning. It is actually detrimental to [genuine] learning.

Kuo wrote about his reaction to Li Kung's words. "I was shocked. It was like gaining consciousness after passing out from drinking, like waking from a dream." Kuo also quoted Li Kung's explanation of where his startling views were coming from:

This learning [that I am advocating] is the correct transmission from Yao, Shun, the Duke of Chou, and Confucius that subsequently was obscured. In the present day, the promotion and clarification of it began with my master, Yen Yüan. His ideas are detailed in his writing called "Treatise on living learning" (Ts'un hsüeh pien) and can be observed.
Kuo Chin-ch'eng claimed that, impressed with these ideas, he had already given up his previous preoccupation with irrelevant texts for ten years when in 1696 Li was back in Peking with Yen Yüan's manuscripts on “living learning.” Kuo said he read them with great pleasure, enough that he was moved to write a preface (and probably contribute money) for the printed version, which finally was done in 1701. Declaring that learning has to be learning that is practiced (shih hsüeh), Kuo concluded his preface with a warning about the need to take Yen's work seriously by acting on what one had learned:

If we in our group [wu tang, by which Kuo seems to have meant the interested persons who were the intended audience for Yen's short book, although he may also have meant men like himself who were in the capital but were not participating in the Ch'ing government, or even were critical of it] do not put our full efforts into learning that is practiced, but only self-complacently think we have got something merely by holding this treatise, I fear that those literati with their irrelevant texts will ridicule us as being naked in the same bathwater with them.198

Over the next twenty years, it seems that Li Kung worked his persuasive magic again and again as he was employed as a tutor and received patronage in successive households of important men, including Ch'ing officials, from the northwest, to the capital, to Chiang-nan.199 All the time he was spreading the word about Yen Yüan, to whom he regularly returned.

His master’s criticisms of book learning and book writing notwithstanding, Li Kung acknowledged that the function of the classical texts was to serve as the sources for understanding what are the correct practices that we are to learn, but he urged that we not be prisoners of the classics:

When we put into practice (hsi hsing) the six disciplines, we must inquire into ancient times to have the standards for the present. That is, when ritual performances are deficient and musical performances are faulty, we should inquire into [what was done in] ancient times to have the standards for the present. When the practices in archery, carriage driving, and writing words are not quite authentic, we ought to have standards for the present and scrutinize them against those of ancient times. Manipulating numbers (shu, the sixth discipline) is rooted in ancient times, but it can be brought into congruence with the methods that have come from the Western Ocean countries in recent times.200

In such prescriptions, Li Kung was making practical effectiveness a more important criterion in learning than antique authenticity.

Archery is an example of his practical learning. Li Kung wrote that from his youth he had practiced archery but was never very good at it. He sought

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198 Kuo Chin-ch'eng, preface to "Ts'un hsüeh pien," in Yen Yüan, Yen Yüan chi, p. 37.
199 See the summary of Li’s employment in Hummel, Eminent Chinese of the Ch’ing period, pp. 475–80, and the list in Wang Mao, Ch’ing tai che-hsiüeh, p. 317.
200 Li Kung, as cited in Wang Mao, Ch’ing tai che-hsiüeh, p. 308.
instruction from other archers and read every book he could find. Finally in
his travels he met up with a nameless old man who transmitted the insights Li
sought. Li wrote a short (seventeen-page) “Hsüeh she lu” (Record of learning
archery). He wrote out the old man’s terse remarks on the method of archery,
and supplemented them with his own notes on bows, arrows, practicing,
strengthening, and so on. He also put in quotations from early texts about
archery. At the conclusion of his introductory note, Li expressed his hope
that his record would help others with one of the important disciplines from
antiquity.\(^{201}\) He was scrutinizing best current practice compared to what we
know from books about ancient times.

Similarly, Li Kung followed Yen Yüan in criticizing the influence of the
Sung Confucians. “At present those who pursue the Learning of the Way
[i.e. the teachings of Chu Hsi] are mostly directed at ideas about virtue and
action, but they leave aside the six disciplines.”\(^{202}\) Li went further than Yen
had in providing explicit arguments against the premises of the Learning of
the Way, which was built around the concept of coherence (li) as fundamental
to the world as it is and should be. Like others at the time, Li pointed out
that the word li seldom appeared in the sages’ classics, and when it did it
had the meaning of pattern or arrangement (t’iao-li). Li complained that since
Ch’eng–Chu teachings came to the fore in Southern Sung times, everyone
had been using the word li instead of tao (way). “Ways (tao) are only [proper]
relationships between humans (jen lun) and the multitude of affairs and things
[shu wu, with which they are engaged in an orderly, productive manner].”\(^{203}\)
That is to say, Li contended, the proper cardinal relationships – husband–
wife, father–son, and so on – developed originally as society came into being,
and so did the proper modes of dealing with the affairs of the phenomenal
world. These relationships became the sources from which, and these modes
of doing things became the practices through which, humans acted in concert.
As these relationships were repeated over and over, they cumulatively became
well-trodden paths of behavior, “and consequently were called ways (tao). The
multitudinous affairs (shu wu) were the actual activities or things done. The
word ‘way’ was an abstract term (hsü ming)”\(^{204}\) that referred to them. It was
Taoists, according to Li Kung, who expressed such ideas as “The Way gave rise
to heaven-and-earth.” But how, or where, Li asked rhetorically, could there
be something prior to heaven-and-earth (i.e. the universe), and why call it a

\(^{202}\) Li Kung, “Lun hsüeh,” ch. 1, in Yen and Li, Yen Li ts’ung shu, p. 996 (1.4a).
\(^{203}\) Li Kung, “Yüan tao,” in Li Kung, Shu ku bou chi, ch. 12, in Yen and Li, Yen Li ts’ung shu, p. 1314
(12.12b).
\(^{204}\) Li Kung, “Yüan tao,” in Li Kung, Shu ku bou chi, ch. 12, in Yen and Li, Yen Li ts’ung shu, p. 1314
(12.12b).
path or way if there was no person or thing to proceed on it. Li Kung’s contention was that “Where the sages’ classics speak of ways (tao), in all places it is an abstract word (hsü tzu); there is no separate, singular something outside the relationships and constancies of yin and yang [as real phenomena] that is to be called the Way or coherence.” By insisting that words such as way (tao) and coherence (li) were just that – words, abstractions, empty terms – Li Kung was challenging the foundation of Chu Hsi’s entire deontological project.

Li Kung was clear about the implications of his interpretations:

Affairs have patterns called li, and these are in the affairs themselves. Nowadays some [i.e. those who follow Chu Hsi] say the li [as coherence] is external to the affairs or events themselves, and this “coherence” would be something separate [from any and all events for which it is the coherence]. As li is an abstract word [or propositional item], can it be an entity (wu)? ... The advocates of the Learning of the Way emphasize [coherence as] the “that by which it is so” (so-i-jan) which Li held to be semantically, logically, and physically impossible. For him, a way is a way of doing something; there is no Way that itself does anything to the ten thousand things. A pattern is a pattern descriptive of something; no pattern makes the order we perceive. Ways and patterns do not cause those things – activities, affairs – that humans carry out in the realm of phenomena. Li argued that the pattern or proper ordering of how to do an activity must be inferred, or learned, by gaining facility in doing the activity, whether performing one of the sages’ six disciplines, or, in one of Li Kung’s analogies, artisans’ elegant needlework. There is no comprehensive, external “coherence” covering or causing these activities as an a priori condition, as Chu Hsi claimed. The process generates the pattern, not vice versa.

Li Kung did not neglect to refute the lingering effects of Wang Yang-ming’s claim that one just innately “knows” from one’s own mind the principles (li) of what one ought to do. Li described a contemporary whose position was that on the basis of his clear understanding of coherence (ming li) he correctly understood all of the classical texts, and even if a sage were to appear, this man said he would not trust in the sages. “I trust only in my own coherence (wu li).” Li Kung argued against such a view by saying to the man that he could not practice (hsi) medicine by relying on “my own coherence.” He could not

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205 Li Kung, “Lun yü chuan chu wen,” in Yen and Li, Yen Li ts‘ung shu, 2b (p. 894). Also cited in Wang Mao, Ch‘ing tai che-hsiüeh, p. 304, and in Yang Hsiang-k’ui, Volume 1, p. 351.
207 Li Kung, “Lun yü chuan chu wen,” 26a (p. 906); also cited in Wang Mao, Ch‘ing tai che-hsiüeh, p. 304.
208 Li Kung, “Lun hsüeh,” ch. 1, in Yen Li ts‘ung shu, p. 995 (1.1b).
explain the differences between similar things in different places. In addition, Li confronted the man with a revealing hypothetical example:

You and another person are in a dispute over some fields. The adjudicator hearing the case learns from old deeds that they are not your fields. He learns from witnesses that they are not your fields. He observes from the boundaries and terrain that they are not your fields. But you declare, “From the coherence in my heart (wu hsin chih li) I inherently consider them to be my fields.”

Such is the absurdity, Li wrote, of relying on claims of one’s own clear understanding of coherence or principles. Who would give in to such an arbitrary, evidence-defying claim of authority? Li was proposing that his readers learn how to do things.

Although Li Kung followed Yen Yüan in emphasizing personal moral action and in criticizing the followers of Chu Hsi and Wang Yang-ming for straying into irrelevancies or worse, he was more open than Yen to current scholarly trends. Li told of how he gradually became interested in commentaries on classical texts. He recalled that as he started his education under his father’s guidance and then when he went to Yen Yüan, he took two key terms from the beginning of the Great Learning as his focus. The term “lighting one’s inner moral force” (ming te), which he said he understood as the cumulative, scrupulous, moral cultivation of one’s person, was the guide for what, following Yen Yüan’s practice, he recorded in his diary; the other term was “having a kin-feeling for the commoners” (ch’in min), which meant acting out the six disciplines for the betterment of society. “I did not have time for working on the meanings in the classical texts.” Instead, Li said he generally accepted the conventional interpretations based on the annotations of the Sung Confucians and did not go deeply into the collected commentaries on the thirteen classics (that were denoted as such from Sung times on) or the writings of the Han classical scholars (ju), which were receiving interest from some of Li’s acquaintances. Around the time he was forty (i.e. around the year 1700), Li Kung worked with Mao Ch’i-ling (1623–1716) on musical practices as referenced in ancient texts, and Li wrote that he drew on Mao’s extensive knowledge. Li recorded that he also interacted with younger scholars such as Yen Jo-chü.

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209 Li Kung, “Lun hsüeh,” ch. 2, in Yen Li ts’ung shu, p. 1000 (2.3ab).
210 See Yang Hsiang-k’ui, Ch’ing ju hsüeh-an hsin pien, pp. 353–4, for a list of Li Kung’s more than thirty titles, mostly short works; almost half of the titles name the classical text that Li was considering in the work.
211 Li Kung, “Shih ching chuan chu t’i te’u,” in Shu ku hou ch, ch. 11, in Yen Li ts’ung shu, p. 1306 (11.7a). Li Kung did not accept Chu Hsi’s emendation of the word ch’in with the word hsin.
212 Mao Ch’i-ling at about this time arranged for the printing of Li Kung’s treatise on music entitled Li shih hsüeh yüeh lu in two chüan. See Hummel, Eminent Chinese of the Ch’ing period, p. 477. Li Kung later expanded this study.
and Wan Ssu-t'ung (1638–1702), among others, but he was interested in their classical learning only as a means of providing deeper understanding of moral practice and practical concerns for society; he still did not waste time on commentaries and annotations. Finally, in Li's account of his developing interests, only after he passed fifty and his master, Yen Yüan, was dead, did he begin to work on his own commentaries and annotations. For his final twenty years or so, Li Kung retired from tutoring and traveling. He tended his garden, and died in his seventy-fifth year.

Li Kung had broad contacts among the scholarly elite in his time, and he effectively spread Yen Yüan's reputation, but in the end Li did not redirect his contemporaries' interests as much as they did his. There were two main inhibitory factors working against Li's efforts. From the 1690s on, when Li was presenting arguments against the ideas inherited from Chu Hsi, the emperor himself and his most prominent intellectual advisers in the government were taking actions to enhance official support for Chu Hsi and his ideas. Second, Li Kung and previous thinkers going back to Liu Tsung-chou, the prominent early Ch'ing advocates of personal moral cultivation based on intuitive knowledge, were stuck in an epistemological mire.

AN EPistemological MIRE

For all their differences and disputes, the early Ch'ing thinkers discussed above attracted attention in part because they maintained reputations for individual integrity that gave credibility to their ideas. Whether they were intentionally non-collaborators (i-min) or not, they did not serve the Ch'ing imperial government. They sought to work out a way of life that was not only practicable on a personal level but also extendable as moral social practice to restore order in the troubled times. In these aspects these early Ch'ing men in effect continued with the Tung-lin leaders' and Liu Tsung-chou's attempts at reformulating Wang Yang-ming's teachings, in part in order to block interpretations that seemed in late Ming and after 1645 to open avenues to self-indulgence (as in the famous case of Li Chih) or to Buddhistic withdrawal. Liu Tsung-chou and his followers recognized the need for effort, practice, and action. As Ch'en Ch'ueh pointed out, one could not just sit in the room; one had to stand up and go out to confront new social and political circumstances. Effort, practice, social benefit, and even applicable knowledge received their endorsements in varying degrees. However, the pivotal idea that they accepted and that marked them as advocating variants of Wang Yang-ming's teaching

\[213\] See below, for Yen and Wan, in chapter 13.

\[214\] Li Kung, "Shih ching chuan chu t'i tz'u," in Shu ku hou chi, in Yen Li ts'ung shu, p. 1506 (11.7b).
about extending one’s innate moral knowledge of good was their primary emphasis on self-based personal moral understanding. For all of them, morally correct action could only be based on that internal apprehension. They did not seek another foundation for moral judgments. In this sense, they implied that comprehension of the past in its historical particularity, as well as analysis of the phenomenal world as perceived by humans, is unnecessary and ultimately irrelevant to practicing morality. They used but were not dependent on other men’s words or books. They were not dependent on sensory or experiential knowledge. Since the 1520s, the last years of Wang Yang-ming’s life, this pivotal idea was attractive because it empowered individuals to rely on their intuitive apprehension and to free themselves from submission to external authority, whether authoritative books, such as the classics, or authoritative teachings, such as the Learning of the Way. At the same time, others criticized innate knowing (liang chih) as a disruptive concept, undermining authority. This tension existed through late Ming, and it did not dissolve after 1644.

The epistemological mire was this: if externals, whether experienced phenomena in the social world (including history) or authority (including state-sanctioned teachings), do not override intuitive knowing, then what and how are men to learn? If the innate knowing of honest men is not concordant, then whose learning is certain, or even to be accepted by others? What are the criteria by which a third party is to judge? If each individual is confident in his own intuitive apprehension based ultimately on a presumption of innate knowing, and if there is no external criterion to reconcile or overcome differences (as the discord between Ch'en Ch'üeh and Huang Tsung-hsi demonstrated), then the outcome is confusion and is not promoting social order. For those who emphasized personal moral cultivation, this was a dilemma, recognized or not, that did not go away. Others in the early Ch'ing period sought to escape from it by pursuing other ways to advance learning.
Even before the early Ch'ing extension of late Ming concerns with the justifications and processes of personal moral cultivation were bogging down in a so-called epistemological mire, already in late Ming there had been efforts to pursue alternative modes of learning.¹ These initiatives shared in the impetus to escape both from imperially sponsored Ch'eng–Chu “Learning of the Way” (Tao hsüeh) founded on universal coherence (li) and taught primarily through the medium of the Four Books, and from the implications of the claims made by Wang Yang-ming and his followers that one must find in one’s own originating heart (pen hsin) the innate knowledge of the good and act on it. The most consequential initiative was to redirect learning to be the means to accumulate new knowledge based on sources external to one’s own mind. This redirection retroactively in the eighteenth century was described as learning (knowledge) generated by examining evidence, and became labeled evidential or evidenced learning (k'ao cheng hsüeh, or k'ao ch'ü hsüeh). There are numerous definitions and characterizations of evidenced learning. A broad one would be a mode of scholarly inquiry into texts, particularly but not exclusively classical ones ... [using both] a range of philological techniques, rather than being narrowly exegetical, and assembled contextual materials, scrutinized for relevance and reliability, to construct an argument or interpretation about the content of texts to which readers could respond on the basis of the evidence offered and to which further evidentiary material could be adduced to support or refute any particular claim.²

The “examining” (k'ao) part of the phrase indicated an externally directed intellectual or cognitive activity that was in contrast to intuitively or innately apprehending moral values that are inherent in one’s mind. The notion of

² Peterson, “Confucian learning in late Ming thought,” p. 779.
“evidence” was understood both as a range of processes (to evidence, evidencing) and as data (the sources from which one discovers or produces facts and the facts so discovered in evidencing).

In the seventeenth century, an implicit categorical distinction was marked between facts discovered directly from perceptual experience and facts from texts, usually written sources, but spoken discourses could be included. Yen Yüan’s and Li Kung’s diatribes against book learning and discourses on learning illustrate this. A different sort of division was also generally observed between facts about the myriad things in the realm of heaven-and-earth (t‘ien-t‘i wan wu), or the universe, and facts about our human realm (t‘ien-hsia), especially those about things done by humans, all of which was still subsumed within the entire, unitary cosmos. We could complicate this divide between two realms – heaven-and-earth and human society – by adding a third realm indicating one’s own heart or mind, which was the most important source for a kind of factual, experiential knowing for the followers of Wang Yang-ming, and a fourth realm, not encompassed wholly by the realm of heaven-and-earth. This fourth realm was a conceptual realm that in the seventeenth century included Chu Hsi’s “coherence” when he explained it was prior to and not dependent on the realm of phenomena; it also included the referents for most concepts of Buddha and nirvana, and perhaps other deities, that required understanding them as something beyond or outside of the transitory, impermanent phenomenal world we ordinarily think we perceive; and it included the Catholic missionaries’ newly introduced concept of God, or the Lord in Heaven, or Deus, that by definition was beyond the time-bound phenomenal realm. This hypothetical, two-tier array (either from experience or texts) of four realms to which facts are related allows that different individuals could and did concentrate on certain portions of this array and neglect or reject others. A simple example is Yen Yüan’s stress on experiencing (in his terms practicing, hsi) instead of reading books, and his stress on social practice (of the six disciplines) instead of looking into one’s own heart. Whatever the realm to which the facts related, the turn to examining evidence was accompanied by a big question: how does one determine what is a “fact” that can reliably be accepted as evidence, and what is not? Li Kung’s example of an adjudicator’s approach to someone’s contentious claim, based on his innate knowledge that he held ownership of certain fields, suggested a range of means to establish a fact: documents (such as land deeds, which may be falsified), testimony of witnesses (which must be assessed for veracity), and one’s own personal observation and inference (which can be mistaken). Examining and assessing more evidence is the way to establish a “fact” without relying on the assertion of a supposed authority that something is so.

The implicit epistemological problem for those involved in individual learning in early Ch’ing was this: where to look for evidence (facts), and how
to assess the acceptability of that evidence as proof for accumulating certain (or true) knowledge that would contribute to the betterment of society.

FANG I-CHIH LOOKS TO THINGS

Already before the trauma of the fall of the Ming dynasty, Fang I-chih (1611–71) among the first generation of Ch’ing thinkers was seeking to redirect and broaden learning in all realms. Unlike any of the early Ch’ing figures considered in chapter 11, Fang succeeded in passing the highest-level examinations. A chin-shih in 1640, he was appointed to serve in the Hanlin Academy in Peking until his capture there by rebels in the spring of 1644.3 His maternal great-grandfather, both of his grandfathers, and his father were chin-shih degree holders and Ming officials. The T’ung-ch’eng Fangs were one of the handful of families that produced three generations in a row of chin-shih degree holders during the Ming period.

Coming from such a distinguished, well-connected, and well-off family that had succeeded within the system, Fang I-chih might be expected to follow conventional intellectual pursuits along with his examination preparation, and he did. He was a writer with a reputation for his command of a broad range of literary forms, and a painter. But from his family and his teachers he also received expert training in medicine, Buddhism, Taoism, numerical arts, and the Book of change. All of his privileges notwithstanding, Fang knew he lived in troubled times. In 1634 his home district, T’ung-ch’eng in what later became Anhwei province, was wracked by a local uprising and then a month-long siege by a rebel group from farther west. The district suffered repeated invasions by marauders in 1640–1. In 1639 Fang’s father was arrested and jailed under a sentence of death for his failures as governor of Hu-kuang province to contain rebellions there.4 Under these circumstances, Fang wrote of himself in 1639, “I am moved and want to do something. I feel for the age and want to help the times.”5 One of the things he did, aside from serving in the Ming government, was to begin seriously to immerse himself in articulating and


carrying out an approach to learning that involved evidence-based knowledge about phenomena in the realm of heaven-and-earth.

A portion of Fang’s efforts was first printed in 1664 in Kiangsi with the title Wu li hsiao chib (Notes on the patterns of things), in twelve chüan. A much larger collection, also of mostly note-like entries, was printed in 1666 with the title of T’ung ya (Comprehensive refinement). Between the time he had mostly completed the manuscripts (1643) and their being printed, Fang I-chih had to survive his capture in Peking by the rebels in 1644, his ransom from them, his involvement as an official in a remnant Ming government in Kwangtung, four years of hiding out in remote villages in Kweilin and Kwangsi to escape from Ch’ing troops, and his life-threatening capture by them in 1650. He was released by a Ch’ing commander, which allowed him to live the rest of his life as a tonsured Buddhist monk. After more formal Buddhist training in Nanking, Fang was serving as the monk in charge of a temple at famous Ch’ing-yüan mountain at Chi-an, Kiangsi, when his sons made arrangements with the local magistrate for printing some of his manuscripts.6 In his preface for the printed Wu li hsiao chib that he sponsored, the magistrate explained that the author had compiled the work thirty years (actually more like twenty) earlier to await others to provide collaborating evidence (p’ang cheng) and cumulative examinations (chi-k’ao). This juxtaposition of the terms “examine” (k’ao) and “evidence” (cheng) in print is an early anticipation of what became a standard term for a new approach to learning.7 The two books, Wu li hsiao chib and T’ung ya, came to be recognized as signal contributions in early Ch’ing to what was later known as evidential learning (k’ao cheng hsüeh).8

Fang I-chih’s original preface to the Wu li hsiao chib, dated the end of 1643, opened with a general challenge to his contemporaries’ understanding. It required a radical shift away from their concerns with heart, or mind, and moral reflection. Building on the ideas of his teacher, Fang sought to take phenomena or things (wu) in an expansive sense as the source of evidence and therefore the target of intellectual inquiry. His intent was to reject intuitive knowing and replace it with experiential knowledge:

All that fills the space of heaven-and-earth are things (wu). This is where humans attain life. Life being in our bodies, and our bodies being in the human realm, all that we perceive and utilize are events (shih); events (or activities) are a type of things [involving humans]. Sages made physical artifacts (ch’i) and beneficial methods so as to ease the lives of humans, and they made patterns (li) manifest so as to bring order to their hearts (hsin).

6 Fang I–chih, “Hsü,” in Wu li hsiao chib (Kiangsi, 1664) 1a–b. The magistrate’s preface and Fang’s own used his monk’s names, not the name Fang I-chih.
Particular physical artifacts (ch'i) certainly are things, and hearts are a type of things. [Notice that Fang does not say that patterns (li) are a type of things; they are attributes or characteristics.] Probing more deeply, we may say of human natures and their destiny that they are a type of things. Viewed comprehensively, heaven-and-earth is a type of thing.  

In this opening declaration Fang set out six types of things as objects, including ones involving moral action in the human realm and ones in the encompassing realm of heaven-and-earth as the universe. They all come under the rubric of “things” in Fang’s expansive sense. His intention was to reclaim intellectual and moral significance for external phenomena and not to limit ourselves to what is innately in our moral minds. 

In his preface Fang I-chih did not claim that the phenomenal world of things is transparently knowable. He took that into account by invoking, and reconstruing, a concept from the “Great Commentary” (i.e. the “Hsi tz’u chuan”) of the Book of change. In the “Commentary” the term chi was used to indicate the incipient stage, the subtle beginning, of each and every phenomenon, and particularly in events (shih) as a type of things; the further claims were made there that we can inquire into these incipient stages, that they are inferable, and that this inferred knowledge of them can be regarded as numinous (shen). Developing his idea from three generations of his family’s expertise in the Book of change, Fang I-chih used the term chi less as an initial stage of an event and more as a seminal force causing, producing, or giving rise to a particular phenomenon. (We might think of the instant of insemination out of which a complex organism develops.) Fang presented understanding the seminal force (chi), which was at the initial stage of any given phenomenon, as a complement to understanding the thing, or phenomenon, that we directly experience:

To make inferences about what cannot be known [directly through perceptions], we use what is known to assist us in it. The deeply hidden seminal force (chi) of every single material thing (wu) and every nonmaterial phenomenon (shen) are recondite but are known about through what is broadly extended, and they are the singular reality underneath layers of opacity.

By explaining that things have starting points in an underlying “singular reality” — that is, as well-springs or seminal forces, Fang was proffering a counter-explanation to Chu Hsi’s claim that coherence (li), a nonmaterial agency, is


the “cause” or “that by which it is so” (so-i jan) of each phenomenon and is prior to that phenomenon.

The preface to the Wu li hsiao chih also put forth a substitute for Chu Hsi’s central recommendation that we need to “fathom coherence” (ch’iung li) as the mental effort at the starting point for all moral and intellectual endeavors. Fang’s proposed method of inquiry had two aspects:

Profoundly searching out from where comes the web of imperceptible influences is what I call “comprehending seminal forces” (t’ung chi). What I call “material investigations” (chib ts’ei) are the substantive examining and inquiring into the particular causes (ku) of particular things [in the broadest sense], ranging from epochs of time down to plants, trees, and even minute insects, categorizing their natures and particular characteristics [as specimens], assessing what they prefer and dislike, and inferring their alterations and constancies. “Material investigations” subsume “comprehending seminal forces.”

Fang added that erroneously to concentrate on seminal forces (chib) or non-material phenomena (shen) (or, he might have added, on “coherence” in Chu Hsi’s non- or meta-phenomenal sense) is to leave things out of consideration altogether. Elsewhere Fang I-chih quoted his father as saying, “Those who distance themselves from [consideration of] the particles [ch’i, of which a thing is constituted] and try to grasp [a thing’s] coherence [li, as Chu Hsi’s followers were accused of doing] and those who sweep aside external things to venerate what is in their own minds [hsin, as Wang Yang-ming’s followers were charged with doing,] are all sick.”

Fang I-chih himself in another context extended an analogy to illuminate how to understand “material investigations” and “comprehending seminal forces” as two facets of his proposed method for examining things. His analogy began with planting the kernel from the pit of a fruit in the ground. After branches and roots have grown we can no longer find the kernel, which is an analogy for the imperceptible seminal force (chib). Fang pointed out that the eventual roots, trunk, flowers, and leaves of the whole tree (a material thing that we perceive) are to be considered as the completion or entirety of the kernel. “To understand the entirety of the tree and the entirety of the kernel, it is obvious one must not neglect the tree to seek [the original] kernel.” The fruit tree as a growing thing is dynamic. So is the process of a human properly caring for it, which in Fang’s analogy is built on correctly knowing about the

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14 Fang I-chih, “Ch’i lun,” in Wu li hsiao chih, 1.4ab.
tree as a material entity, or thing. “[Truly] understanding the entirety of the tree and the entirety of the kernel [both of which are dynamic things, and the one involves the other], one banks the dirt around the root, takes care of the trunk, picks off the insects, culs the fruit, prunes and trims, and does not neglect it; [as an activity (wu),] this is obvious.”¹⁶ For Fang, examining a thing included what is at the origin of a particular thing – its seminal force, in Fang’s vocabulary – as integral to the whole phenomenon as it extends through time, as humans act on and with it, and its benefits for the thing itself and for human society. The planted kernel leads to newly grown fruit containing kernels; there is no “once and for all” kernel on which our inquiry and knowledge ought to be stuck.

When Fang wrote about material (chih), he was indicating particles (ch'i) in their state when they are formed and perceptible. “All material [of a thing] is particles.”¹⁷ For readers who might not grasp that we can perceive the physicality of particles (ch'i), Fang gave some simple examples. In the winter when one exhales through his mouth, those particles (ch'i) appear like smoke. When someone is standing in the hot sun, vapors given off from the top of his head can be perceived as shadows cast on the ground. When the paper in the windows moves after striking a bell or beating a drum, it is particles that do it.¹⁸ Following Chang Tsai (1020–77), Fang held that all entities and material phenomena such as light, sound, and life processes are constituted of particles in motion. What is called “emptiness,” Fang wrote, is constituted of particles that have no form but are the source of dynamic yang particles and yin particles that continuously generate the myriad things.¹⁹ Explaining the connection between perceivable, material things and their imperceptible seminal forces, Fang wrote,

All things (wu) are constituted by particles (ch'i). All emptiness is made real by particles. Things have regularities (tse); emptiness also has regularity. We know about the recondite by means of what is broadly extended. When our knowing is precise to the smallest bit, that is its regularity; [its regularity] is evidence about its pattern (li) and is where its nonmaterial aspect (shen) resides.²⁰

Chang Tsai’s theory that everything is constituted of ch'i (particles) did not give much of an explanation of how sets of particles separate to form a tree or a butterfly; mostly he asserted each phenomenon was so of itself (tsu-jan),

¹⁸ Fang I-chih, “Ch'i lun,” in Wu li hsiao chih, ch. 1.4a.
²⁰ Fang I-chih, “Ch'i lun,” in Wu li hsiao chih 1.4b.
with no external agency as the cause. Chang’s contemporary, Ch’eng I, began to explain that the pattern (li) discernible in a thing is due to the coherence (li) that makes it as it is, its that-by-which-it-is-so (so-i-jan). In Ch’eng I’s and later Chu Hsi’s usage, the coherence of a thing is prior to and also inherent in the particular thing, making it as it is over time; the coherence for each particular thing was the same as the coherence of the universe; and coherence was why a thing is as it is and should be what it should be.21 Going against the Ch’eng–Chu teachings about coherence (li), Fang I-chih, along with other thinkers in late Ming and early Ch’ing, wanted to treat the coherence of a thing only as a perceived pattern, without its having causal agency or moral implications. He was reviving the term chi with the sense of seminal force to indicate that which is the root material cause of things. Importantly for Fang, a seminal force, even though only inferentially detectable, was part of the realm of matter.

Along the same lines, Fang also privileged the term “fire” (huo), one of the Five Elements (Fire, Water, Metal, Wood, Earth) that in combination earlier had provided an alternative systematic explanation of why things are and proceed as they do. For Fang, “fire” was not a meta-element; he showed it was used to explain many phenomenal states and processes. In this material sense, fire had the advantage of being perceivable but not tangible in the manner the other four elements are in their material states. Fire is apparently formless and adaptive. In his explanations, he exploited the usages that blurred perceivable fire with flame (which, he reminded his readers, had been received by humans from ancient sages for use in cooking), combustion, heat, motion, bodily processes, life, light, and the celestial bodies. Drawing on the explanations in medical texts, Fang held that illness and health, death and life, are all due to “fire,” partly in the sense of heat.22 As a formed state of a portion of particles, fire was readily seen as a proximate cause of things (including events) in a way that particles in their undifferentiated state were not.

Although Fang used terms such as “particles,” “seminal forces,” “Five Elements,” “fire,” and so on in the Wu li hsiao chih to refer to forms or stages of material (chih) and in effect as local causes of phenomena, he did not elevate them to provide systematic meta-explanations of all things. Later, writing in 1652, Fang was explicit in his dismissal of any materially causal role for the big terms that had been invoked by earlier thinkers. “Coherence (li) [in Chu Hsi’s sense], Particles (ch’i) [as great Emptiness in Chang Tsai’s theory], Supreme Ultimate (T’ai chi) [in Chou Tun-i’s sense], Spontaneity (tzu-jan), Mind (hsin) [in a Ch’an-like sense], and Unity [or One-ness, in a Taoist sense],

all of them cannot be other than invented terms (ming-tzu).”

Fang’s critical account, such terms had been employed to indicate “that-by-which” (so-i), but the terms are not referring to what is material (chih).

Fang’s book is more concerned with presenting information (a less exalted category than knowledge) about particular phenomena we experience, and he meant this information to cover a broader range than his term “material investigations” might seem to imply. The entries in the twelve chüan of the Wu li hsiao chih are clustered under fifteen headings, including ghosts and spirits and prognosticating, but also the human body, medicine, clothing and comestibles, and heaven-related topics such as wind, thunder, rain, light, sound, and calendar calculations. Some of the information involves explanations, but most of the entries can be characterized as descriptive.

In the Wu li hsiao chih, Fang I-chih offered tentative information rather than certain knowledge. A complicated, but short, illustration is an entry (three lines in the printed text of 1664) labeled “‘Earth roaming’ is the earth moving” (Ti yu ti tung yeh). Fang opened the entry by ascribing the term “earth roaming” to a so-called apocryphal text, supposedly from the Han period, known as the K’ao ling yao (“On the divine celestial luminaries”), which was attached to the transmission of the Book of documents. There the term was used in a claim that the earth has four “roamings”: at the winter solstice, which takes place 30,000 li above the (flat?) earth; at the summer solstice, 30,000 li below it; and at the two equinoxes, which occur just on (the plane of?) the earth. Fang did not explain or comment on the enigmatic physics of the claim, but in its original Han context at a minimum it had to do with the physical earth “roaming” or moving relative to the encompassing sky. Fang seems to have cited the passage as an early expression of a view that the earth in relation to the sky is not unmoving; it “roams.” Fang’s entry then gives another citation from a named source, a book called Pin t’ui lu (Records after the guests retire) by Chao Yü-shih (1175–1231) of Southern Sung. The relevant passage in Chao’s book considers the same quotation ascribed to the K’ao ling yao that Fang used, so it may have been his source for both passages. Fang wrote, “The Pin t’ui lu says, ‘The earth is continually moving without stopping, and [our not noticing it] is like a man sitting still on a boat not being aware the boat is going along.’” On both the K’ao ling yao passage and the boat analogy, Chao simply commented, “This theory is different.”

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24 Fang I-chih, Tung-hsi chün, p. 106.
26 Fang I-chih, Wu li hsiao chih, 2.37a–b. The passage cited is from Chao Yü-shih, Pin t’ui lu (Shanghai, 1983), p. 54. The modern editors ascribe the analogy to the “K’ao ling yao,” but Fang ascribed it to Chao himself.
from what he previously had said just about everyone affirmed; that is, the earth is dominated by stillness and the sky by movement. By including the two passages, without comment, in his book Fang was addressing them to a significantly new context. As is shown elsewhere in the *Wu li hsiao chib*, Fang had read in several of the translated books by Jesuits in late Ming that the Earth is an immobile sphere at the center of a series of concentric moving spheres carrying the Moon, Sun, planets, and stars in the heavens. Fang’s entry that has the label “Earth roaming” is earth moving” may have been subtle resistance to the claim that the Earth is immobile. A note added to the entry by one of his sons, Fang Chung-t’ung, lends support to this inference. He wrote, “Mr. Mu [that is, the Jesuit missionary Nicolas Smogulecki (1611–56), whom Fang I-chih cited elsewhere in the *Wu li hsiao chib*] also has a theory about the earth’s moving.” By Mu’s “theory” Fang Chung-t’ung was referring to the theory of Smogulecki’s countryman, Copernicus (1473–1543), who had hypothesized that the Earth moves around the Sun. Smogulecki discussed this theory in China, although Jesuits were not allowed to teach it. In his note Fang Chung-t’ung, who was much more accomplished in mathematical and astronomical learning than his father and may have met Smogulecki, changed the topic away from being about the Earth moving relative to the sky to being about tremors within the earth, a change which would seem to indicate that Fang Chung-t’ung rather than his father was the author of the label for the entry. After noticing Mu’s theory, Fang Chung-t’ung’s note goes on, “Within the earth are a lot of vacuous particles (*hsüeh’t’i*). When they move within, particular places have a slight movement [e.g. an earth tremor]. This is a constantly occurring phenomenon (*wu*). When it is strong, earth collapses and mountains shift [i.e. the earth quakes].” If Fang I-chih was opening a possibility to new knowledge by citing possible old precedents, his son was closing it in this example.

The sources of the factual information in the *Wu li hsiao chib* were mostly in other books, much more than Fang’s own observations. He suggested two dimensions for the range of books from which he drew: time, from

27 Chao Yü-shih, *Pin t’ui lu*, p. 54.
28 For examples, see Willard J. Peterson, “Western natural philosophy published in late Ming China,” *Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society* 117 No. 4 (1973), pp. 298–300. For some of Fang I-chih’s own more articulated doubts about information contained in late Ming books by authors including Jesuits on the diameter and distance of the Sun from the Earth and on the characteristics of rays of light, which are essential to calculating distances, see Peterson, “Fang I-chih,” pp. 389–92.
the present back to ancient times, and space, from the center to distant lands, especially far to the west.  

Fang quoted the assertion that “there are alterations in accordance with variations in place and alterations in accordance with variations in time; terms have changed even when the thing remained constant, so there are variations in what has been claimed in ancient and modern times. Without broad learning, how can one comprehensively understand this?” 

Fang added that he drew his evidence from texts deriving from the sages of antiquity, from traditions working with the Book of change, from Sung and Ming authors who reported on things (wu), and from the men recently arrived from the West. Referring to his sources and to his own writing, Fang concluded, “Sometimes doing material investigations, sometimes comprehending seminal forces, the one does no harm to the other.” Because his sources were books more than experiences were, the medium for his information was words.

Fang was clear that words (yen), in the sense of a means of expression, not simply written forms, were the main medium in which we accumulate and share knowledge. In an essay he dated 1641, Fang pointed out that one needs to use words to inquire, know, and speak about the inner and outer aspects of himself, the distinctions and relations between himself and others, and the differences between past and present. He asked rhetorically, “If one is unable to understand words, how could he be able to fully grasp that to which they refer?” Fang broke down three areas of knowing that each employ special sets of words (that is, nomenclature, not ordinary language) in order to understand special subsets of experience. The first area involved types of knowledge in handling human affairs:

There are specialized modes of speaking (chuan yen) about ethics, economic affairs, literature, crafts, political affairs, military communications, law, textual studies, record keeping, and use of analogies. Generally, each of these is involved with ways and with human nature and human destiny. There are some who, having a specialized mode of speaking about the Way of human nature and destiny [i.e., the followers of Chu Hsi], separate their concerns from human affairs and methods in order to clarify “mind” (hsin); they advance their own presumptions.

The implication is that such people are dooming themselves to irrelevance by their disregard for phenomenal things (wu). A second area of knowing involved adapting from specialized modes of speaking in endeavors that were self-described as outside or beyond human society, such as pursuit of life.

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after death, immortality-seeking, magical powers, eremitism, and so on. Fang allowed that with suitable adaptation these modes of speaking still could be a source of “material investigations” and “comprehending seminal forces.”

Thus he included knowledge referring to ghosts and divination in the *Wu li hsiao chih*. A third area of specialized knowing involved dealing with processes on a more interpretive level and not just sets of individual, particular phenomena. “As for the experts examining the realm of heaven-and-earth, their explanations involving [prognosticating based on] figures and numbers [as in the *Book of change*], and also music, calendars, phonetics, medicine and *materia medica*, all are comprehending based on what is material (*chih*); all are about the patterns of things (*wu li*).” The pattern of things was an important concern in many of the entries in Fang’s book that had that term in its title. Fang was recasting the evocative term *li* to mean pattern, not coherence as in Chu Hsi’s system. In addition to the patterns of things (*wu li*), Fang named two other realms that might be regarded as separate, although they are parts of the material (*chih*) realm. “Specialized speaking (*chuan yen*) about teachings dealing with good governance is about patterns or principles of maintaining social order (*tsai-li*). Specialized speaking about comprehending seminal forces (*chii*) is about ultimate patterns (*chii-li*) for how things exist. These [latter two modes of specialized speaking, about patterns of social order and about ultimate patterns] are comprehensive, yet are comprehending what is material.”

Fang’s book included less about these latter two; he focused more on things and the patterns of things.

Although speaking about things must be distinguished from material things themselves, we cannot, according to Fang, know about the latter, even on higher, integrated levels, without knowing about the words. Words are a problem. In what became his longest book, the *T’ung ya* (*Comprehensive refinement*), printed in 1666 in fifty-five *ch¨uan*, Fang included items on speaking about things (*wu*), as in the *Wu li hsiao chih*, but his emphasis shifted to be more about written words, their meanings, pronunciations, graphic forms, alone and in combinations, and variants, because, he explained at the beginning of the *T’ung ya*, they are altering over time and can differ between places. “We use pronunciations to comprehend the origins of ancient meanings. If later generations have already established the meaning, then classical scholars (*ju*) have resolved the difficulties and already have written authoritative accounts, so we only need to examine them.” His book is filled with

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40 Fang I-chih, *T’ung ya*, ch. 1, p. 79.
evidence – usually quotations – for enhancing or clarifying our understanding of words, names, terms, and usages about which he determined there was doubt that he could possibly resolve. Fang arranged his consideration of words into loose categories such as words related to the sky (including seasons and agricultural cycles) and the earth (including earlier place names and river systems); names relating to persons (duplicated given names, modes of address, names used to identify ghosts and spirits); appellations for offices and functions of government under different dynasties; terms for articles of food, clothing, useful objects, buildings, and other man-made things; and words used to name or describe plants, birds, beasts, insects, stones, and so on. He was not concerned with simply defining ordinary words and names; those could be found in more ordinary word books.

Fang pursued problems with words, many quite abstruse (or “refined,” 在的书名), and perhaps of interest only to super-educated readers like himself. A narrow example is his explorations of the duplicative term pronounced 梅梅 and assigned modern meanings associated with dim or hazy. Without explaining the meanings in its usages in early texts, Fang showed that utterances that seem to have been like the duplicative had been rendered with alternative characters, some with the same or similar pronunciations, some with other pronunciations, and with changes over time; he gave examples culled from the Book of documents, the Ch'u tz'u, the Huai-nan tzu, the Chuang tzu, T'ang rhyme books, and later authors’ usages and comments. Fang seemed most interested in presenting the phonetic and graphic slippages that had occurred by T'ang times, but he does not seem to have settled anything. In a bigger example, Fang pointed to a complicated area of meanings that had vexed scholars for more than 2,000 years:

The nomenclature (名) applied to plants, trees, birds, and beasts is the most difficult to examine. It alters over time for each region and each era. Spending the effort of a lifetime, Li Shih-chen (1518–93) [compiler of the great Pen ts'ao kang-mu (Complete materia medica)] corrected fifty or sixty percent of the errors made in T'ang and Sung [about the nomenclature for flora and fauna in earlier texts], but his book still has errors. One would have to traipse around the empire and understand all of the local languages; then he would be able to make a determination about them.

As his contributions toward resolving issues of materia medica nomenclature, Fang compiled seven chapters of notes in the T'ung ya; in some items he tried to correct Li Shih-chen.

41 Fang I-chih, T'ung ya, ch. 9, pp. 347–8.
Making a general point that also applies to his notes in the *Wu li hsiao chih*, Fang I-chih explained in his guidelines for the *T'ung ya* that he tried to give the names of the sources he quoted, previous comments on the point under review, others’ arguments, his judgment if he could arrive at one, and when he had doubts his deferral to others’ subsequent accumulation of more detailed evidence to reach judgments. Fang made clear he thought he was part of an ongoing tradition. “We literati live after the men of the past and have their copious, valuable, collective inheritance, so we must respect the names of those earlier men and not let them be lost.”

In his writings and compilations on things and words, Fang’s intention was to assess inherited knowledge, mostly transmitted in books, that had been achieved over the centuries. “Knowledge accumulates through ancient and present times, and living in the latter, we examine the past for what determines the present, but nevertheless we cannot be bogged down in the past.” He gave examples of progress in knowledge, such as moving from writing texts on bamboo strips with leather strings, as Confucius supposedly had to read, to texts on paper printed in ink from carved blocks of wood. He wrote that we are able to perform today music composed (supposedly) by Confucius, but so, too, can we perform more complex music that did not exist in his times. He wrote that we know where the sources of the Yellow River and the Yangtze are; the ancients did not. In T’ang times they thought the stars in the vicinity of the (unseen) southern celestial pole went into the sea, but since the arrival of the men from the Far West who had sailed in the southern oceans we have star charts that show how the southern stars go. Fang gave many more examples of later scholars correcting or supplementing the information in earlier texts. He added, “I have continually seen points left indeterminate for thousands of years suddenly being comprehensively examined and evidence sought.” This describes what he was presenting as results, however tentative, in the *T’ung ya*. Fang wrote, “How can I not be pleased that, being born in the present age, by inheriting the achievements made by past sages and sorting through the clarifications made by outstanding men, I am able, sitting amidst the collected knowledge of thousands of years, to reach balanced decisions!” Fang was clearly emphasizing that his readers should give precedence to accumulated knowledge over intuitive, heart-based knowing. This confident optimism was written as his Ming government was

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45 Fang I-chih, “Yin i tsa lun,” in *T’ung ya*, ch. shou 1, p. 5.
46 Fang I-chih, “Yin i tsa lun,” in *T’ung ya*, ch. shou 1, p. 5.
47 Fang I-chih, “Yin i tsa lun,” in *T’ung ya*, ch. shou 1, p. 5.
struggling to cope with severe threats within and without, and it was printed to be read as a contribution to learning as his society was emerging from the turmoil of the dynastic change.

Fang’s thematic phrase, “comprehend past and present” (t’ung ku chin), had an injunctive force. He did not mean it as encouragement to study history in the sense of the records of past and recent events. He was less interested in writing history than were some of his contemporaries. Rather, his meaning was that our knowledge should be cumulative and comprehensive, including all things and events, near and far, high and low, as they have changed over time. Without jettisoning his cultural heritage, but rather celebrating its high level of sophisticated refinement (ya) as a source of values, Fang was open to new knowledge. He included critical consideration of the newly available Western learning (hsi hsüeh), which was a major source of information for him. Even before he dressed and conducted himself as a monk, Fang followed his family’s acceptance of Buddhist and Taoist learning, which had been regarded as unacceptably other (i) by many of their peers. As a monk in charge of a temple at Ch'ing-yuan, giving lectures on Buddhist teachings, Fang did not abandon his commitment to learning or his connections with literati culture.

A Ch'ing official in Kiangsi, Shih Jun-chang (1619–83), who was a chin-shih in 1649, met the monk Fang I-chih several times in the 1650s and 1660s. Shih characterized him as someone with a proclivity for profound thinking whose learning probed the smallest details and whose grasp was comprehensive. “As for learning about such categories as heaven, earth, humans, and things, as well as figures and numbers, calendrical astronomy and music, medicine and prognostication [i.e. topics covered in the Wu li hsiao chih], he gives explanations from knowledge in his memory.” According to Shih, most literati and officials passing through Chi-an went out to Ch'ing-yuan to talk with the learned monk, who could discourse at impressive length on all subjects, including all the early schools of thought as well as the branches of Buddhist teachings. His knowledge was inclusive, not exclusive. Fang wanted to be able to give an account of the “antecedent conditions” (ku), or causes, of any given thing, affair, or word (yen or tzu). Whether for things or words, we must understand the past (ku) to understand the causes (ku) of the

52 Hummel, Eminent Chinese of the Ch’ing period, p. 651.
53 Quoted in Yu Ying-shih, Fang I-chih, p. 52.
54 Yu Ying-shih, pp. 52–3. Also see Peterson, “Fang I-chih,” pp. 163–4. In his 1664 preface to the Wu li hsiao chih, the Chi-an magistrate also lavished praise on the breadth of learning of the monk, including his knowledge of Buddhist teachings.
present. We must be able to understand what is in our present (chin) in order better to move on to the future.

With all of his accomplishments and his call for broad learning,\(^\text{55}\) including things in the realm of heaven-and-earth as well as in human society and culture, why was Fang I-chih’s influence on his future society so limited? His two longest books remained known, and praised, after they were printed in the mid-1660s, which was before the printing of writings of most of his famous contemporaries also born around 1610. Most of his other writings remained in manuscript form.\(^\text{56}\) It was not because for the final twenty years of his life he lived as a Buddhist monk, if we accept the testimony of Shih Jun-chang and others that Fang was still connected with some of his contemporaries who were immersing themselves in broad learning.\(^\text{57}\) Two of his three sons were involved in printing the manuscripts that he had begun to assemble in Peking before 1644 and afterward revised in the far south. They inserted notes for the printed \textit{Wu li hsiao chih}, and continued to work on some of the areas of knowledge their father had written about, especially related to mathematics and astronomy. But no set of Fang followers developed his particular, nondogmatic, open approach to learning that included phenomena in the realm of heaven-and-earth as well as the cultural tradition.

An important factor contributing to his limited influence was the circumstances surrounding his death, perhaps by suicide, in the Kan River near Wan-an during a storm on the night of the seventh day of the tenth month of 1671.\(^\text{58}\) Fang was being sent by boat under custody to Kwangtung to answer serious but unknown accusations.\(^\text{59}\) He had served there in the late 1640s as a high official in the Ming court that was resisting the Ch‘ing conquest. He subsequently may have spoken or written pro-Ming sentiments that could be construed as seditious. He certainly was a non-collaborator (\textit{i-min}), his contacts

\(^\text{55}\) The term “broad learning” (\textit{po hsüeh}) is from Analects 6.27, where it seems to refer more to being able to perform well in a broad range of cultural activities than to having knowledge about a broad range of subjects, as Fang exemplified.

\(^\text{56}\) A detailed survey of all of Fang I-chih’s known writings, including those that were printed separately and in collections, his extant manuscripts, and titles presumed lost, is provided in Hou Wai-lu and Mao Huai-hsin, “Ch‘ien yen,” in Fang I-chih, \textit{T‘ung ya}, pp. 27–62. In 1670 his sons were preparing to print some more of his writings.

\(^\text{57}\) For example, Fang in the 1660s was corresponding with Wang Fu-chih and sending paintings to Ku Yen-wu. See Jen Tao-pin, Fang I-chih \textit{nieh-p‘u}, pp. 267, 272–3. Jen, pp. 268, 270, gives the names of other literati with whom Fang was in contact. The editors of the modern edition of the \textit{T‘ung ya} give some examples of early Ch‘ing authors, including Li Kung in 1705, who cited the \textit{T‘ung ya}. They briefly discuss why Fang’s influence may have been limited. See “T‘ung ya chiao-tien shuo-ming,” in Fang I-chih, Fang I-chih ch‘ian shu, Volume 1, pp. 13–16.

\(^\text{58}\) Yu Ying-shih, Fang I-chih, p. 210. Yu has made the most persuasive, but still circumstantial, case that Fang died by suicide. Jen Tao-pin, p. 278, accepts that illness was the cause.

\(^\text{59}\) Yu Ying-shih, Fang I-chih, p. 232.
with Ch'ing officials such as Shih Jun-chang notwithstanding. When he died, Fang was under arrest and his family and friends were under suspicion. Fang's death did not immediately end the case in which two of his sons might also have been implicated, and it remained dangerous to publish his or their work or promote his ideas and reputation.60

But the circumstances of Fang's death in 1671 do not account for why his concerns centering on things and their associated words as they had accumulated over time in the realm of heaven-and-earth (t'ien-ti wan wu) became less the focus of scholarly attention than the cultural tradition and its associated texts.

KU YEN-WU EXHIBITS A NEW MODEL FOR LEARNING

If there could be a single progenitor for mainstream Ch'ing learning, it would have to be Ku Yen-wu (1613–82). The corpus of learning produced by Ku made him a model for some of his contemporaries and for later generations of scholars through the Ch'ing period, with different aspects of his scholarship receiving emphasis at different later times. In effect, he was selected for his continuing, changing roles by others rather than claiming them for himself. He set an agenda for critical, original, text-based learning that undid the two main intellectual commitments inherited from late Ming: examination-directed learning based on Chu Hsi's commentary traditions and system built on claims about coherence (li), and ideas about cultivation of one's self that were derived from Wang Yang-ming's claims about the intuitive apprehension of moral good (liang chih) by one's originating heart (pen hsin). Thinking he was recovering traditions and knowledge about the past, and thereby transmitting core values, Ku Yen-wu at the same time was an initiator of a new, tacit set of epistemological assumptions and a new model for advancing learning (hsüeh).

Life

Ku Yen-wu's life divides roughly into three major parts: his first three decades as a young member of a wealthy, well-connected, learned family in K'un-shan, Soochow prefecture, in the heart of Chiang-nan; the dozen or so years from the early 1640s to the mid-1650s, when he sought to redirect his life and survive multiple threats to his and his family's lives and well-being; and his last nearly three decades, when he was traveling in the north and

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producing his enduring contributions to learning, until his death early in 1682.  

Ku Yen-wu’s great-grandfather (chin-shih in 1553) and grandfather (chin-shih in 1577) both served as officials at the two Ming capitals. Ku’s own father did not pass the provincial examinations or serve in office. Ku’s elder brother passed the provincial examination in 1633, but Ku’s three younger brothers did not, and none of them held official appointments. His younger sister married into the Hsü family, which was rising to prominence in K’unsan. She was the mother of three sons who became chin-shih degree holders and rose to the highest ranks of civil officials in the K’ang-hsi period. Ku Yen-wu’s education was mostly in the hands of his grandfather’s younger brother, Ku Shao-fei, who lost his only son and adopted Ku as his and his son’s heir. Drawing on the family’s collection of printed and manuscript materials, Ku Shao-fei taught his adopted grandson to read widely in the standard historical sources, contemporary records, and such technical areas as astronomy, geography, and the military, all outside the usual curriculum for examination preparation, about which Ku Shao-fei was disdainful. Nevertheless, Ku Yen-wu also did the standard preparation in the classics and the Sung dynasty masters as well as in composing examination essays. He attempted the provincial examination three times, but for all his broad learning and detailed knowledge of contemporary politics that his adoptive grandfather instilled, Ku Yen-wu failed to pass. After the failure in 1639 he resolved to devote himself to reading and collecting materials on historical and geographical topics, efforts that later became the basis for his books. When his grandfather-by-adoption died in 1641 (his birth-father having died in 1626), Ku Yen-wu withdrew to enter mourning. His life was entering a period of instability and change. Ku concluded the mourning period for his grandfather-by-adoption in 1643, but rather than being able to continue to devote himself to his studies, he had to confront and survive a series of difficulties and threats over the next

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63 Ko Jung-chin and Wei Ch’ang-pao, I-tai ju tsung Ku T’ing-lin, pp. 3–6, have a summary of Ku Yen-wu’s early reading, based mainly on Ku’s own recollections.

advancement of learning in early Ch'ing
doezen years. First, in the spring of 1644 the news arrived in K'un-shan that
the northern capital had been occupied by Li Tzu-ch'eng's army and the Ming
emperor was dead. This was followed shortly by reports that Ch'ing troops had
taken the capital and that a rump Ming government was being reconstituted
in the southern capital, Nanking. Ku was involved to some extent in minor
official services for the new government in Nanking, but he was also concerned
with finding a safe haven for Ku Shao-fei's daughter-in-law, Wang, who was
Ku Yen-wu's mother-by-adoption. In the summer of 1645 Ch'ing armies took
Nanking as the remnant Ming government surrendered or fled. When Ch'ing
advance troops reached the city wall of K'un-shan, they met resistance, and in
the fighting Ku's two youngest brothers were killed, along with hundreds or
even thousands of others.65 Ku was with his mother-by-adoption in a remote
village and escaped the fighting. When she learned of the Ming defeats in
Nanking and K'un-shan, she determined to stop eating and die loyally with
her dynasty, which had officially commended her as a virtuous woman for
not marrying after her fiancé had died. Her dying injunction to her son-by-
adoption, according to Ku himself, was that he must not serve a new dynasty.66
It was at this juncture that he changed his formal names to Yen-wu and T'ing-
lin, and he adhered to her command for the rest of his life. For the next ten
years Ku Yen-wu moved about, mostly in Chiang-nan, in some contact with
remnant Ming governments that were set up farther south, and with men
who worked, or hoped, to revive Ming resistance in the lower Yangtze area,
centered on Nanking. Ku traveled under various names and guises, not only
to avoid local Ch'ing authorities but also to avoid enemies in K'un-shan who
sought to subvert him for their material gain. In 1655 a former servant of
the Ku family was prepared to testify that Ku Yen-wu was involved in plots
with southern Ming governments, and when the servant was drowned, Ku
was arrested and incarcerated.67 Influential contacts managed his release, and
the next year, 1656, he survived a murderous attack arranged by his enemies
in K'un-shan. By this time his elder brother and his birth mother had died.
Recognizing the danger of trying to stay in K'un-shan or even Chiang-nan,
Ku Yen-wu went north to Shantung in 1657.
For the remaining twenty-five years of his life Ku Yen-wu was an itinerant,
mostly in Shantung, Peking, Shansi, and Shensi, with a few forays back
to Chiang-nan.68 He visited famous and significant places; met and stayed

65 Ko Jung-chin and Wei Ch'ang-pao, I-tai ju tsung Ku T'ing-lin, p. 325.
66 For discussion of the details, sources, and implications of Wang's death, see Peterson, "The life of Ku
Yen-wu (1613–1682), part 1," pp. 133, 139–42.
67 Ko Jung-chin and Wei Ch'ang-pao, I-tai ju tsung Ku T'ing-lin, p. 327.
68 For a tabular summary of Ku's travels in the north, see the appendix in Peterson, "The life of Ku Yen-wu
(1613–1682), part 2," p. 247. A useful study of Ku's travels and contacts as influences on his scholarly
with numerous men of learning; obtained access to books, manuscripts, and inscriptions he otherwise might never have seen; and began to attract a few adherents and many admirers. He set up at least two residences in the north, but he was seldom at home. Somehow, in spite of all the traveling and sojourns with friends, with his nephews in Peking who were high-ranking officials, and with patrons, Ku managed to pursue the learning and write the books that brought him fame.

Although all of his writings from before he took the name Yen-wu in 1645 are lost, Ku left hundreds of occasional poems, letters, and prefaces that record his travels and contacts over his last four decades. They are a main source for understanding his reasons and motives for his commitment to learning as he sought to exemplify it. By his own accounts, Ku in the late 1630s had begun accumulating critical notes based on his widely ranging reading, but from the 1650s he became more focused. With some self-disparagement, he wrote in letters that it was only after he was fifty that he committed himself to the study of classics and histories, and that he realized the importance of studying materials related to rituals. 69 He ended up with a half-dozen or so influential works. During his lifetime, only two of Ku’s manuscripts were printed as books. 70 The first was printed in 1667. Yin hsüeh wu shu (Five writings on phonetics), in thirty-eight chüan, consists of studies on the original rhymes (and by inference original pronunciations) of written words in early classical texts, particularly the Book of odes and the Book of change, and Ku’s corrections of earlier, especially T’ang, scholars’ attempts at constructing tables of characters that rhymed. Ku wrote that he worked on these studies for more than thirty years. Even on his travels he worked on them, revising the drafts five times and recopying them three times. He was still revising while the printers carved the woodblocks. 71 Ku’s claim was that understanding the ancient rhyme schemes is required in order to read the classical texts correctly. This book has the main characteristics of Ku’s new model of learning. It is specifically based on evidence from ancient texts, it intentionally goes beyond what had been done before, it is provisional rather than definitive, and it provides a means for comprehending our world on a correct factual basis.


71 Ku Yen-wu, Ku T’ing-lin shih wen chi, “Yin hsüeh wu shu hou hsü,” pp. 28–9. This late preface is dated 1680, more than a dozen years after the first printing in 1667.
The other book printed in Ku’s lifetime shared these characteristics. It is the *Jih chih lu* (*Record of knowledge gained day by day*), printed in 1671 in eight *chüan*. Like the way he built his studies on ancient rhymes, Ku had accumulated notes since the 1640s on problems and discrepancies he noticed reading in his wide range of sources. If he later came across some earlier writer who noticed and resolved a problem or discrepancy, Ku would discard his own note on the matter. The notes he kept he shared with friends, and to satisfy their demands for copies, he finally decided it was more expeditious to have a partial set of his more finished notes printed, even though he had many more that he felt were not ready. (The more extensive set of records, in thirty-two *chüan* and edited by others, was first printed in 1695.) This became Ku Yen-wu’s most famous book. It stimulated a stream of commentaries, addenda, and corrections as later scholars in effect participated in Ku’s project.

At the end of his life Ku Yen-wu still was facing threats, and still on the road. In 1668 he was again jailed in a case that involved accusations of pro-Ming sentiments on top of contentions over his ownership of some real estate in Shantung, and again he escaped. In 1678 he learned that some officials intended to recommend him for the newly announced special examination for men with broad learning and outstanding scholarship (*po hsüeh hung ju*), to be held the next year to recruit eminent scholars to participate in the compilation of an imperially sponsored history of the Ming dynasty. In his letters written to ward off the recommendation, Ku said he would die rather than serve the new dynasty. In the end Ku avoided being recommended, but he never went back to Peking. On the first day of the new year, 1680, he composed a couplet that recalled that sixty years earlier, two emperors, the Wan-li and the T'ai-ch'ang emperors, had died in one year, and now, sixty years later and three thousand *li* away from the capital, where they died, there was a lonesome, loyal old man who was not yet dead. Not much more than two

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72 The date of the printing is also given as 1670 and 1672. I am following Ku’s letter that says, “The first edition of the *Jih chih lu* was printed in the *hsin-hai* year,” which corresponds to 1671. Ku Yen-wu, *Ku T'ing-lin shih wen chi*, “Yü you jen shu,” p. 195. In a later preface to the *Jih chih lu*, Ku indicated the year was 1670. “Ch'u k'o Jih chih lu tsu hsü,” in *Ku T'ing-lin shih wen chi*, p. 29.
73 Ku’s note that appears at the beginning of the table of contents of the *Jih chih lu*.
75 According to one count, ninety-four authors are included in the collected comments on the *Jih chih lu*. See Wang Mao et al., *Ch'ing tai che-hsüeh* (Ho-fei, 1992), p. 235.
76 Peterson, “The life of Ku Yen-wu (1613–1682), part 2,” pp. 234–41, for a summary of Ku’s involvement and the implications of holding the special examination in 1679 for recruitment of scholars. Also see below, chapter 13.
years later, still traveling in the northwest, Ku fell when he was getting on his horse, and he died a few days later. His body was returned to K’un-shan for burial.\textsuperscript{78} On the basis only of his two books that were printed before his death in 1682, if his other manuscripts had been lost, Ku Yen-wu would receive but little notice as an early contributor to the developing fields of historical phonology and philology and not much else. During his lifetime Ku’s reputation and influence in learning derived from his letters, prefaces, circulated manuscripts, and, we might infer, conversations with other men of learning.

\textit{Undoing the late Ming intellectual inheritance}

Ku Yen-wu’s intellectual proclivities, to the extent they are revealed in his writings, did not run to abstract, philosophical arguments, but the ideas he expressed included general claims and big ideas.\textsuperscript{79} This is clear in his negative assessments of two main aspects of the late Ming intellectual inheritance: Chu Hsi’s system, with coherence (\textit{li}) as the fundamental explanatory component, and Wang Yang-ming’s claims that our learning (about coherence) is based on the capacity of the mind (\textit{hsin}) innately to apprehend moral good (that is, coherence as the grounds for what one ought to do).\textsuperscript{80} To understand Ku Yen-wu’s learning, we have to understand what he was against. The man often characterized as a “Ming loyalist” was not content with perpetuating either what in late Ming times had been established doctrine sustained in the examination competition or the intellectual fashion promoted in meetings for so-called discourses on learning.

In a major revaluation, Ku Yen-wu tried to take the term “learning based on coherence” (\textit{li hsüeh}) away from those following in the tradition of Chu Hsi. As Ku put it concisely in a letter,

\begin{quote}
In my view the term “learning based on coherence” began to be used by men in Sung times. What would have been called “learning based on coherence” in antiquity is learning based on classics ... What now is called “learning based on coherence” is Ch'an Buddhist learning. It is not taken from the texts of the Five Classics, but is drawn from records of speech [by the Ch'eng brothers, Chu Hsi, and Wang Yang-ming, for examples] ... The \textit{Analects} is the record of the speech of the sages [i.e. Confucius and some of his disciples]. To
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{78} Ko Jung-chin and Wei Ch'ang-pao, \textit{I-tai ju tung Ku T'ing-lin}, p. 333.

\textsuperscript{79} Wang Mao conceded that from a history-of-philosophy perspective, Ku was not a philosopher, but he took positions that had implications for the history of philosophy. Wang Mao et al., \textit{Ch'ing tai che-hsiueh}, pp. 237, 250.

\textsuperscript{80} See Peterson, “Confucian learning in late Ming thought,” pp. 709–11.
neglect the record of the speech of sages and instead follow [the speech of] later Confucians is what I call not knowing what is basic.\textsuperscript{81}

In various ways and formats, Ku advanced his view that in the Han era and before, meaning was lodged in classical texts, and since the Sung period meaning was sought in Ch'an-like speculations such as “coherence” and “mind.” Part of Ku’s project was to rescue his and later generations from these deviations from correctly based learning.

Ku picked away at Chu Hsi’s vast scholarly corpus, often indirectly. For example, in his \textit{Jih chih lu} Ku denounced the use of arrays (\textit{t'u}) and numbers (\textit{shu}) in finding meaning for the \textit{Book of change}, a practice that became prominent in the Han period. Ku held that beyond the lines, and arrays of lines, in the trigrams and hexagrams there are no other “figures” (\textit{hsiang}), a position he associated with Confucius himself.\textsuperscript{82} That is, arrays of word and number relations that purport to reveal deeper meanings are mistaken or strained overinterpretations. The meanings are in the words of the classic. Ku praised Wang Pi (226–49) for stripping away the overlay of arrays and numbers even though Wang Pi in his commentary had brought in superfluous concepts such as dark or mysterious (\textit{hsüan}) and empty (\textit{hsü}).\textsuperscript{83} Ku could even praise Ch'eng I for intending to bring out the larger meanings (\textit{ta i}) in his commentary on the \textit{Book of change}. Ku was dismissive of the invocations of arrays and numbers that continued to re-emerge in the Sung period and later. He wrote, “The arrays (\textit{t'u}) of Ch'en T'uan (c.906–89) and the writings [which discover and elaborate systems of number relations (\textit{shu})] of Shao Yung (1011–77) are Taoist versions of the \textit{Book of change}.”\textsuperscript{84} By implication, Ku could not endorse Chu Hsi, whose own commentary on the \textit{Book of change} opens with nine arrays (\textit{t'u}), including the previously non-Confucian “\textit{Ho t'u}” (“Array from the Yellow River”) and “\textit{Lo shu}” (“Writing from the Lo River”), which are numerological, magic-number arrays, traced by some to Ch'en T'uan. In his commentary and other writings Chu Hsi subordinated number relations (\textit{shu}) to dynamic coherence, but Ku’s implied criticism is that Chu Hsi was making a claim for something beyond the words of the text of the \textit{Book of change}. For Chu Hsi that something was the existence of coherence (\textit{li}) in the phenomenal world and in the classical text. By displaying the coherence that “underlies” the \textit{Book of change} as a text and a divinatory practice, Chu Hsi was demonstrating the explanatory power of coherence in his system. Ku was trying to remove that prop of support from under Chu Hsi’s system.

\textsuperscript{82} “Kua yao wai wu pieh hsiang,” in Ku Yen-wu, \textit{Jih chih lu chi shih: Wai chi chung} (hereafter \textit{JCL}) comp. Huang Ju-ch'eng (1834; Shanghai, 1985) 1, p. 6a.
\textsuperscript{83} “Kua yao wai wu pieh hsiang,” in \textit{JCL} 1, p. 6a. \textsuperscript{84} “K'ung-tzu lun I,” in \textit{JCL} 1, p. 26b.
Ku expressed a similar but more specific criticism of Chu Hsi over the interpretation of the famous passage in the *Analects* (4.15) where Confucius said, “There is a unity threading through my way” (i.e. both his conduct and his teaching), and his disciple Tseng Tzu explained to the other disciples that the “unity” or “oneness” threading through what their master does and teaches is “doing one’s utmost” (*chung*) and “being empathetic” (*shu*). Tseng Tzu notwithstanding, there has never been universal agreement on what Confucius meant by a “unity threading” (*i kuan*) through his way. In his commentary on the *Analects* passage, Chu Hsi explained that the “unity” is a unitary coherence (*i li*); that is, the holistic, integral coherence in the sage’s heart. Chu Hsi gave an interpretation consistent with his philosophy built on coherence (*li*), a word and concept absent from the *Analects*. He subordinated Tseng Tzu’s explanation that deployed practical terms involving doing and feeling for others. Ku Yen-wu took the opposite tack, although he finessed their differences by trying to co-opt Chu Hsi’s interpretation. Ku began by quoting the comments on the *Analects* passage in the book by Chu Hsi’s teacher, Li T’ung (1093–1163):

The Master’s way was not separated from the realm of daily activities. In terms of exhaustively exerting oneself, that is called doing one’s utmost (*chung*), and in terms of extending oneself for others, that is called being empathetic (*shu*). These together are nothing other than the entirety of [the Master’s] great way.

According to Li T’ung, there are not two separate things (*chung* and *shu*, or inner and outer, or even conduct and teaching) here, but only a unitary whole, even though two words are deployed. Ku observed that “Chu Hsi’s main point in his ‘Explanation of doing one’s utmost and being empathetic’ is generally the same” as Li T’ung’s, but, Ku noted, in his influential commentary on the *Analects* Chu Hsi treated doing one’s utmost and being empathetic as lesser aspects of learning, and thus inadequate in themselves for expressing (as Tseng Tzu had done) the unitary way of the sage, Confucius. If this is what Chu Hsi intended (and it seems clear that he did), then in Ku’s view this would be treating the way of Confucius as separate from doing one’s utmost and being empathetic; in other words, as dichotomous rather than as a unity, which of course violates the point intended by Confucius in the *Analects* passage.85 Ku Yen-wu’s charge was that Chu Hsi had layered another interpretive element, coherence (*li*), onto an integral practical teaching.

With regard to displacing Chu Hsi’s system, Ku’s approach, more subtle and hard to pin down, was to emphasize the flow of historical events and thus changes over time. This undermined the essentially classical, ahistorical stance

85 “Chung shu,” in *JCL* 7, pp. 3a–b.
of Chu Hsi that the coherence (li) for ordering the world is forever available for us to discover in the ancient texts. Ku was disputing the implicit claim that with Chu Hsi’s help, the meanings embedded in the classics are transparent. According to Ku, “The worst disaster that afflicts men of learning is clinging to one [moral principle] and not changing.” This leads only to frustration and ineffectiveness. Elsewhere Ku referred to such men as “obstinate Confucians” (chii ju). “The learning of noble men (chun-tzu) is not like that. They adapt as events unfold.” According to Ku, we must recognize and adapt to the reality that, the world being in flux (which Chu Hsi certainly acknowledged), there are some not-good things that happen as well as good things (which Chu also acknowledged, while still maintaining that coherence is causally implicated in everything that is). Without explicitly disputing Chu Hsi’s fundamental idea of the existence of coherence (li) that is the means by which everything is as it is, Ku stressed that there is a historical dynamic that includes morally negative effects. This is a lesson Ku drew from the Mencius. “What the world produces over the long run is an alternation of order and disorder” (Mencius, 3b9). That is, disorder is incipient at the acme of flourishing order.” Ku’s examples are that when the followers of Confucius flourished and the texts of the Book of odes, the Book of documents, the Book of change, and the Ch’un-ch’iu (Spring and autumn annals) were edited and the standard practices for rituals and music were fixed, then “the writings of Lao Tzu and Chuang Tzu appeared at that time.” When in Eastern Han there were thousands of classical scholars, great commentaries were produced, and classical studies were brilliant, then “the teachings of the Buddha and the Taoists started to excite the world. From this we understand that creations of deviant theories (hsieh shuo) rise and fall with the times. Not even sages could eliminate this [dynamic].” By implication Ku was suggesting that if Chu Hsi was as great as his later, celebrated standing made him out to be, then that condition must have generated a negative effect, such as the “obstinate Confucians” who presumed on his authority. Again and again in his writings, Ku pointed to negative, immoral, disordering events and episodes in history, and he insisted we take them into account. Ku was arguing against any followers of Chu Hsi who confidently believed in one moral principle and clung to it. If Chu Hsi’s system is necessarily orderly, Ku’s contrary interpretation is that events unfolding over time are messy and sometimes not good; that is, incoherent. Ku did not contend with Chu Hsi on philosophical grounds, but sought to present “better” readings of classical and historical texts that did not overlay them with other concepts.

86 “Ken ch’i hsien,” in JCL 1, pp. 15b–16a.
87 “Kou,” in JCL 1, pp. 13b–14a. In a note Ku made clear that by Taoists he meant here the followers of Chang Tao-ling after late Eastern Han.
Ku did not approve of the term “learning based on coherence” (li hsüeh) and what it stood for. He disapproved of the term “learning based on mind” (hsin hsüeh) even more. In his discussion of “learning based on mind” in his Jih chih lu, Ku raised his objection to the notion of the “transmission of mind” (hsin ch'uan), which was given prominence in Chu Hsi’s preface to his commentary on the Doctrine of the mean and had remained at the forefront since then. Ku wrote,

Our hearts [hsin, but apparently not meaning “mind” in the abstract here] do not depend on any transmission. Ordering coherence is [according to Chu Hsi] what spreads through the realm of heaven-and-earth and is always the same as it takes effect at different times. [I say] coherence is implemented in our hearts, and we experience it in external events and entities. Our hearts [as the locus of cognition] are the means by which we distinguish right and wrong in connecting that coherence [or patterns to the particular situation]. Whether a person is morally accomplished or not, whether an undertaking succeeds or fails, even whether human society is orderly or chaotic, all lies in this distinguishing capacity [in our hearts and not in some externally existing “coherence”].

The words of the sages, available to us through the classical texts, transmit the way of holding to the mean. On the other hand, Ku argued,

The advocates of Ch’an Buddhist learning, regarding coherence as an obstacle, point to their own “minds” and say, “I do not rely on texts and written words; I simply transmit the imprint of [transcendent] mind.” But the learning of the sages, extending from a single [sagely] heart to its application in the world, the state, and the family, is nothing but the spreading of their perfect coherence. Everyone’s clearly and thoroughly understanding this, for millennia and without hiatus, has been the same, so why speak of “transmission” [of mind]?

Ku called on his readers to be concerned that Ch’eng I and Chu Hsi used Buddhist formulations such as “transmission of mind.” Ku was using “heart” instead of “mind” to refer to a functional, cognitive capacity to distinguish right from wrong in particular circumstances. He resisted the meaning of “mind” as a transcendent entity that could be transmitted generation by generation like a robe or a bowl. Ku’s target here was also Chu Hsi’s rival, Lu Hsiang-shan (Chiu-yüan, 1139–92), and, more particularly, Wang Yang-ming.

If Ku was circumspect in his dissents from Chu Hsi’s commentaries and system based on coherence (li) that existed outside the texts of the classics and the historical record, Ku was scathing in his denunciation of the pernicious effects of the teachings of Wang Yang-ming:

89 “Hsin hsüeh,” in JCL 18, p. 17a. 90 “Hsin hsüeh,” in JCL 18, p. 17b.
In earlier times there were instances of one man’s ideas changing the world and having [a baleful] influence that endured for over a century. [Examples are] the “pure talk” of Wang Yen (256–311) [that led to the takeover of the north by barbarians], and the “new theories” of Wang An-shih (1021–86) [that led to the takeover of the north by the Jurchens in 1126]. In more recent times, there is the example of “innate knowing” advocated by Wang Yang-ming [that led, in Ku Yen-wu’s judgment, to the fall of the Ming dynasty and the takeover of the north].

Ku’s argument was based on inferred effects, not on confronting Wang Yang-ming’s ideas in philosophical debate. In Ku Yen-wu’s view, Wang Yang-ming’s teachings about “innate knowing” had attracted many followers by the middle of the sixteenth century, and the interpretations proliferated. Chu Hsi’s teachings were neglected, except for the purposes of passing examinations. This was “one man’s ideas changing the world.” The outcome of this fashion for relying on one’s own “innate knowing” was a breakdown in shared, established social values. In this regard, Ku made much of the deleterious effects of Li Chih (1527–1602) and others whose ideas and behavior Ku Yen-wu blamed on Wang Yang-ming. “From early times, of the petty men who without scruples have opposed the sages, the worst was Li Chih.” Ku’s implication was that the breakdown of shared social values led to breakdown in social order, which then led to the fall of the Ming dynasty. Wang Yang-ming’s teachings were to blame. In arguing against Wang Yang-ming’s influence, Ku explicitly aligned himself with the Mencius (3B9) on the urgent need to combat wrong ideas that had pernicious effects and even caused political chaos.

The crucial fault of too many real and ersatz followers of Wang Yang-ming, epitomized in the example of Li Chih, was, according to Ku Yen-wu, that they were self-centered, and thus selfish and anti-social. Ku endorsed the idea that the sages of antiquity instructed others in virtuous conduct and social practice to be applied in the world at large; they did not teach about only directing one’s heart internally. The turn inward came with Lao Tzu and Chuang Tzu, who taught men to disregard the sages’ classical texts and the responsibility to aid in ordering society. The introduction of Buddhist teachings exacerbated this impulse with ideas about moving beyond life and death and entering Nirvana. When so-called men of learning in the Sung period promoted this internally focused tendency in their own discussions and

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91 “Chu tzu Wan-nien ting lun,” in JCL 18, pp. 30a–b.
92 Wang Mao, Ch’ing tai che-hs¨ueh, p. 246, wrote that there were three main ways to combat the “learning based on mind” of Lu Chiu-yuan and Wang Yang-ming: using the classical ideas of Confucius and Mencius; using the “learning based on coherence” of Ch’eng I and Chu Hsi; and using the social consequences or effects that could be ascribed to “learning based on mind.”
93 “Li Chih,” in JCL 18, p. 31b. On Li Chih, see Peterson, “Confucian learning in late Ming thought,” pp. 745–54.
writings, Ku asked rhetorically, “Were they not internalizing the Buddha’s [ideas] and externalizing our Confucian [teachings]? Internalize the Buddha and externalize the Confucians; these would be words from monks, so how could literati express their agreement with them!”\(^{94}\)

Ku Yen-wu denied that learning can be attained through introspection in a spontaneous flash of enlightenment. It can only be acquired with effort over time. “What would have been called ‘learning based on coherence’ in antiquity is learning based on classics, which cannot be comprehended without decades [of effort].”\(^{95}\) But Ku still saw a huge problem in Ming practice. Even apparent devotion for decades to mastering the classics had been corrupted in Ming times, Ku complained, by the examination system requiring the production of eight-legged essays (\textit{pa-k\u{u} wen}) using the commentaries associated with Chu Hsi’s teachings based on coherence. Again, his argument pointed to negative consequences. “From the time [in the late fifteenth century when strict requirements for] the eight-legged examination essay were put in force, learning based on antiquity was abandoned, and from the time [in the early fifteenth century when the imperially sponsored versions of the texts of the classics and of the Sung masters embedded in Chu Hsi’s system published as] the great compendia (\textit{ta ch’\u{u}an}) appeared, explanations based on the classical texts themselves were lost.”\(^{96}\) Ku’s rhetoric was extreme:

The Five Classics were lost when the Ch’in regime burned manuscripts, and the Five Classics were lost [again] when the [Ming] dynasty recruited literati [using examination essays necessarily based on established commentaries]. Nowadays those whose learning is directed at the examinations generally follow interpretations that are merely derivative and conventional; they are not able to comprehend and know the main meaning [of the classical sentences they have ostensibly learned].\(^{97}\)

This distraction of able men away from truly understanding the basis of good governance weakened the state and allowed enemies to prevail. For Ku Yen-wu, cause and effect were clear, and thus there was a need to change the causes of the extremely negative effects.

Changing the examination system or imperial sponsorship of Chu Hsi’s coherence-based system was not in Ku Yen-wu’s direct power. Not that Ku did not think about it:

\(^{94}\) “Nei tien,” in \textit{JCL} 18, pp. 13b–14a.

\(^{95}\) Ku Yen-wu, “Y\u{u} Shih Yu-shan shu,” in \textit{Ku T’\u{i}ng-lin shih wen chi}, 3, p. 62.

\(^{96}\) “Shu chuan hui hs\u{u}an,” in \textit{JCL} 18, p. 13b. Ku insinuated here that the loss of commitment to meticulous handling of the texts of the classics, which occurred at the beginning of the fifteenth century, was congruent with the Yung-lo emperor’s less than meticulous handling of the rules of succession.

\(^{97}\) “Chu tzu \textit{Chou i pen I},” in \textit{JCL} 1, p. 5b. Ku expressed the same strong point in “Ni t’i,” in \textit{JCL} 16, p. 19b.
Nowadays if one wanted to do away with the baneful effects of the present recruitment practices, one would need to set out a system for reading books and for inquiry and learning. Only if one temporarily halted the examinations and then after a few years reinstituted them could he recruit [truly learned and able] men.98

He was derisive about Ming and contemporary claims of “learning” that was generated from intuitive knowing (liang chibh) internally based on one’s own mind or heart (hsin). But what positively did he offer his contemporaries and successors to replace the modes of learning that had prevailed in late Ming?

Learning piece by piece

Ku Yen-wu declared his independence from the Ming intellectual inheritance in the title of his most influential book, the Jih chibh lu (Record of knowledge gained day by day). He explained in his first preface, dated 1670, that his title alludes to a passage in the Analects (19.5). There the disciple Tzu-hsia declared that if someone day after day knows that he still does not know enough, and month after month (and, we might suppose, year after year) does not forget or neglect what he has already mastered, then that person truly may be called someone who is “fond of learning” (bao hsüeh), almost in the early Greek sense of one who loves knowledge, a philosopher. Ku’s claim was that the acquisition of true knowing, or knowledge, required effort, and maintaining that knowledge also required effort. There is no plateau one can attain through understanding that there is coherence in the world or through apprehending that there is a transcending “mind” uniting everything. Ku explained in his preface that the knowledge that he had gained day by day took years to achieve. It was subject to revision and reflection before he would deem it suitable to “record” and share with others.99 Ku’s record (lu) of such knowledge was fundamentally different from the records of speech (yü-lu) that he condemned as characteristic of the Sung masters. A record of something said once did not have the same standing as a record of something that was arrived at as “known” only after it was worked on (in the sense Tzu-hsia might have meant) and was supported, even verified, with textual evidence.

Ku Yen-wu took a while to arrive at this view of knowledge as a product of a certain process of learning. He had been learning, in the simple sense of studying, since he started to read in his fifth or sixth year, and of course he continued to learn by reading and talking to others his whole life. But what he attained was not “knowledge” in the specific sense intended by his title.

98 “Ni t’i,” in JCL 16, p. 19b.
In two prefaces dated 1662, Ku recalled that after his failure in the 1639 provincial examination in Nanking, he embarked on collecting and collating materials related to historical geography. In one preface he wrote,

I was troubled by the many predicaments in the four main regions of the realm, and I was shamed by the meager means had by students of the classics [including me, for addressing the predicaments]. Thereupon I again went through the twenty-one dynastic histories. I also read gazetteers and other writings related to all the larger regions and districts of the empire as well as the collected works of famous officials and compendia of various government-related materials. I made records [i.e. notes] of what was pertinent [to the historical geographical condition of each of the several regions] and the manuscript notes grew to fill more than forty book-boxes. One portion became a record about places; the other became a book about what was beneficial or detrimental [strategically and economically about the provinces and border regions covered]. After the turmoil [of the dynastic change] much was lost, but I also continued to supplement the manuscripts.

In both of the 1662 prefaces Ku acknowledged that the compilation of materials was incomplete and uncorrected, but he was leaving the manuscripts for, he hoped, some later men with similar interests. The materials were mined by a string of later scholars, including his nephew, who began the compilation of an updated version of an I-t'ung chib (Gazetteer of the integrated domain) in the 1690s. Ku’s collections of materials were never turned into finished books of his own.

The accumulated manuscript notes, more than 200 chüan in the versions that are extant, have the character of compendia of selected source materials arranged by region, a genre that Ku did not pursue. Ku was not opposed to the assembly of source materials when it was done with care for the original texts:

Some books by Sung men, such as the Tzu chib t'ung chien (Comprehensive mirror for aid in government) by Ssu-ma Kuang (1019–86) and the Wen hsien t'ung k'ao (Comprehensive examination of important writings) by Ma Tuan-lin (1254–1325), were produced by the effort of a lifetime, and they became indispensable books for later generations. Unavoidably they had a few inconsistencies and mistakes [that later men could write about to correct]. However, later men [trying to emulate them] would produce more books with more inconsistencies and mistakes, and they would write more hastily and not transmit [the

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100 This is presumed to be a reference to a manuscript of 100 chüan with the title Chao-yü chib or Chao-yü chib. See Hsieh Kuo-chen, Ku T'ing-lin hsueh-p'u, pp. 158–60. In his 1662 preface for this book Ku said he drew from the (Ming) I-t'ung chib and gazetteers from provinces, prefectures, and districts, from dynastic histories, and from a thousand other works. He labored on these notes for more than twenty years, supplementing them as he could in his travels.


102 Hummel, Eminent Chinese of the Ch'ing period, p. 311.
original sources and knowledge achieved earlier]. This was so because they looked on producing a book as too easy and they sought to make their reputations quickly.\footnote{103}

What Ku opposed was the practice of expropriating someone else’s work. He cited the well-known examples of Kuo Hsiang (d. 312), who took over Hsiang Hsiu’s (d. c. 300) commentary on the 

\textit{Chuang tzu}, and Ho Fa-sheng, who was accused of taking over as his own the \textit{Chin chung-hsing shu (On the Chin restoration)} by Ch’ih Shao. “Since Chin times [in the third and fourth centuries] there have been men who altered and made their own the writings of someone else,” Ku complained, but “during the whole of the Ming period no one wrote a book that was not plagiarized.”\footnote{104} Ku repeated in a preface his blanket condemnation of his contemporaries’ malpractice. “In making a book, nothing is worse than altering the writings of previous authors and making them one’s own ... In the present age when men who write books fill the empire, they make their own what they have plagiarized from previous authors.”\footnote{105} Ku’s view was that preserving and transmitting original texts is a worthy undertaking, and so is understanding those texts in their original historical settings.

In 1667, a few years after he wrote prefaces for his never-finished manuscripts of collected materials on historical geography, Ku allowed his first book to be printed, under the title \textit{Yin hsüe h wu shu (Five writings on phonetics)}, in thirty-eight \textit{chüan}. Ku Yen-wu’s contributions to the historical understanding of the ancient sounds for written words, what we might call philology, show another approach to learning as a means to knowledge. Ku started from what was, and still is, a controversial premise. “I hold that reading the nine classics begins with examining the characters [with which the texts are written], and examining the characters begins with knowing the pronunciations (\textit{yin}) [that the written characters represent]. This applies as well to the texts of all the writers and schools of thought [of the early period] without exception.”\footnote{106} That is, the reader needs to understand the original pronunciation of the character in context before he can determine the original meaning when the text was composed. Ku gave example after example of misreadings based on misapprehensions of sounds.\footnote{107}

This was not a trivial matter for Ku, nor a concern only for specialists. Correct understanding of the original meanings of the words of the classics

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\begin{itemize}
\item \textit{Chu shu chih nan}, in \textit{JCL} 19, pp. 4a–b.
\item \textit{Ch’ieh shu}, in \textit{JCL} 18, p. 33a. Elsewhere (pp. 33b–34a) Ku made similar strong claims about the low value of books “written” by men in Ming times.
\item Ku Yen-wu, “Ch’ao shu tzu hsü,” \textit{Ku T’ing-lin shih wen chi}, 2, pp. 32–3. Ku assigned these opinions and words to his grandfather, but we can read them as his own.
\item Ku Yen-wu, “Ta Li Tzu-te shu,” \textit{Ku T’ing-lin shih wen chi}, 4, p. 76.
\end{itemize}}
was the means to understand the sages’ original intentions, which then would be the basis for any genuine restoration of order in society. In Ku’s view, problems began as the original pronunciations were lost, and problems had been compounded over the previous thousand years as later scholars of the classics added their own confused accounts of the ancient sounds:

The pronunciation for the Six Classics from the three dynasties [that is, Hsia, Shang, and Chou] has been imperfectly transmitted for a long time. As for the characters [in the Six Classics] being preserved for later generations, they often could not be comprehended by men in later times. Not being able to be comprehended, [characters in the classics] were unthinkingly emended in accordance with the pronunciation current in some later generation. When this happened, we have the problem of a classic being emended [and thus its meaning sullied]. Beginning with the emendations of the Book of documents under T’ang Emperor Ming [that is, Hsüan-tsung, r. 713–55], later men often did this too, but they would still note that such-and-such character in the old version of the text had been emended to such-and-such in the new version, and so the original character still was preserved. In the present day when printed editions are everywhere, all writings from before the Ch’in dynasty are expediently or subjectively emended without any mention of the character in the older version being such-and-such. In this way, not only is the pronunciation used by the men in antiquity lost, but so are the characters.

Ku’s purpose in the Yin hsüeh wu shu was to show how since Han times scholars’ understanding and representation of the ancient pronunciation, as determined by sets of words that rhymed in ancient times, having no regard for later, historical changes in the pronunciation, had introduced errors.

Ku developed a method to correct the earlier errors. Like earlier scholars, Ku’s focus was on the songs in the classic Book of odes, and he used other sources, including the Wings of the Book of change, for supplementary or collateral evidence. Sometimes where a rhyme was expected but the two characters did not rhyme in his reconstruction, Ku would explain that a localism (fang yin) had crept in. From the more critical perspectives of eighteenth-century and later scholars, Ku overemphasized the homogeneity of the language in the classics; the texts were more diverse in terms of the time and region of their “origin,” at least in the form in which they existed 2,000 years before Ku read them. Ku’s influence in the study of ancient pronunciations was not so much in his results as in his approach of doubting received “knowledge” and re-examining the direct and collateral evidence in order to achieve a “correct” understanding of the original meaning in the classical texts. Investigations of ancient pronunciations, graphic forms, and meanings of characters in classics and other early texts was a specialized form of learning that had precedents,

109 For a summary of Ku’s five works on phonetics of 1667, see Ko Jung-chin and Wei Ch’ang-pao, I-tai ju tsung Ku T’ing-lin, pp. 115–28.
but flourished after Ku Yen-wu’s time with more rigor. His efforts raised such knowledge to a new plateau.

As with his compilations of materials related to historical geography that were never finished, Ku did not pursue systematic, specialized work on historical phonetics after the 1667 printing of the *Yin hsüeh wu shu*. Instead of specializing, he was broad. Instead of anthologizing, as his contemporary Huang Tsung-hsi famously did, Ku sought to be original in a historical sense. This mode of learning was demonstrated in the first printing of eight *chüan* of the *Jih chih lu* (*Record of knowledge gained day by day*) in 1671, and he was devoted to it the rest of his life, with the results published posthumously in 1695 in thirty-two *chüan* under the same title.

Ku Yen-wu found a nice metaphor for how he thought of his method for acquiring the knowledge he published in 1671. In a letter tinged with overtones of excuse and self-justification, he wrote to someone,

> It has been said that the books put together by men today are like the copper coins minted by them. Men in antiquity extracted copper ore from the mountains, but modern men purchase old coins, call them scrap copper, and use it to remint [new coins]. Their reminted coins are crude and despicable, and even worse, they have taken something precious that was bequeathed to us by men in antiquity and utterly destroyed it so that it is not preserved for future generations. How is this not a double loss! You asked [in your letter to me] how many more *chüan* have been completed in my records of knowledge gained day by day, as if they would be made with scrap copper. In the year since we parted, by reading day and night and researching back and forth, I attained scarcely a dozen new items, but they may be copper extracted from the mountains.¹¹⁰

Ku was excusing himself for not producing more writings, but his justification was that he was not following the contemporary practice, extending back through the Ming period, of passing off the ideas, even the words, of previous writers as one’s own. Successive reinterpretations, whether rewriting and altering, as he charged Ming authors characteristically had done, or adding commentarial innovations, as he thought Sung authors had done, were to be condemned. Ku set a high standard. “One only writes about something after ascertaining that no one earlier had done it and it is what future generations cannot be without.”¹¹¹ His aim was “broad learning” (*po hsüeh*). Ku’s foremost student, P’an Lei (1646–1708), called it “the learning of a comprehensive Confucian” (*t’ung ju*), which extended through all historical periods and genres, and not just classics.¹¹²

There are many ways of dividing and subdividing Ku’s broad learning, beyond the specialized knowledge in his work on historical geography and

¹¹¹ “Chu shu chih nan,” in *JCL* 19, p. 4a. ¹¹² P’an Lei, “*Yüan hsü*,” in *JCL*, p. 1a.
phonetics. Ku himself pointed to three main areas covered in the *Jib chib lu*: knowledge he had gained with respect to handling the classics (*ching shu*); knowledge that could be applied in the ways or means of governing (*chib tao*); and knowledge on a broad range of other, culturally related, topics (*po wen*), including social mores. These three areas overlapped in their sources and their application. Here I consider a few of the pieces in which Ku thought he made contributions using newly dug copper.

In the *Jib chib lu* Ku applied his critical approach to characters and compound terms because knowledge of the cultural tradition (*wen*) is based on knowledge of written words (*wen*). He was less systematic than in his work on phonetics, but with more enduring results. He showed that in referring to written characters, “In the Spring-and-autumn period and before, they spoke of *wen*, not of *tzu*. Calling written characters *tzu*, Ku argued, began in Ch'in–Han texts, and subsequently referring to written characters as *wen* and *tzu* became common practice. Ku went on to critique the mistaken glosses and substitutions of earlier experts on words. Ku acknowledged the importance of the *Shuo wen chieh tzu* (*Explanations and explications of written words*), the great book on words compiled in Eastern Han by Hsü Shen (Shu-chung) and still regarded today as a reliable lexicon. The historically minded Ku Yen-wu recognized it also had problems:

> Since [the establishment early in the Ch'in–Han period of the standard form of characters known as] *li* writing, the achievements in Hsü Shu-chung’s *Shuo wen chieh tzu* have been the greatest for being able to bring out clearly for us the implications in the six main ways of forming characters, for causing the characters (*wen*) of the three ancient dynasties to be preserved for us today, and for enabling us to have some understanding of the origin [of the characters] made by the men in antiquity. Later scholars have all accepted that book as the standard in every detail. In my consideration, he was not always exactly right. For the written words (*wen*) in the Six Classics, he had the commentary traditions of Tso, Kung-yang, and Ku-liang [for the *Spring and autumn annals*], and explanatory comments by Mao Ch'ang, K'ung An-kuo, Cheng Chung, Ma Jung, and other [Han] Confucians [for other classical texts], but they did not necessarily agree. Hsü Shu-chung lived at the middle of the Eastern Han period, and what he had to base himself on was the explanations of only a dozen or so men like Liu Hsin, Chia K'uei, Tu Lin, and Hsü Hsün. Should we think it is so that he completely grasped the meanings that the men in antiquity [put into the characters with which the classic texts were written]? Maybe not.

Ku gave specific examples of early sources conflicting with explanations in the *Shuo wen chieh tzu*, and he warned its users now to be wary of its details and

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114 “Tzu,” in *JCL* 21, p. 18a.
avoid its errors.\textsuperscript{116} (Over the next 200 years, investigations into and revisions of the \textit{Shuo wen chieh tzu} became a specialized area of research.) Ku’s concern with rejecting dubious glosses and getting words and terms right, and not just in the classics, runs throughout his \textit{Jih chih lu}. Many of Ku’s explanations of words and terms are still reproduced in historical dictionaries.

Ku Yen-wu’s approach to the classical texts combined veneration with an attitude that was historical and skeptical. He venerated the texts and the ideas they conveyed because they were the closest he could get to the historical origin or source of all that he valued. But he also recognized that understanding the texts, the written words, had to be transmitted over time, so he also venerated those especially responsible for the correct transmission, beginning with Confucius himself. “In my humble opinion, Chung-ni [i.e. Confucius] was an unacknowledged ruler [who founded the classical legacy], his seventy disciples were the ones who helped ‘start the enterprise,’ and the twenty-two great masters of the classics were the ones who helped ‘leave behind a tradition.’”\textsuperscript{117} Ku was alluding here to \textit{Mencius} (1b14): “All a gentleman can do in starting an enterprise [that is, in establishing the rule of a true king] is to leave behind a tradition which can be carried on. Heaven alone can grant success.”\textsuperscript{118} The twenty-two great masters of the classics, Ku pointed out, were the ones enshrined in 647 by the second T’ang emperor in recognition of their contributions in transmitting the texts of the classics, mostly with annotations and commentaries. Imperial governments’ veneration of these masters continued without alteration to nearly the end of the Northern Sung period.\textsuperscript{119} Five Sung masters – that is, Chou Tun-i, the two Ch’eng brothers, Chang Tsai and Chu Hsi – were enshrined by the Southern Sung emperor Li-tsung in 1241, and in spite of his criticisms of some of their ideas, Ku was positive about the effects of their recognition by the Sung government, along with the 1267 elevation of Confucius’ disciples and followers, Yen Yüan, Tseng Tzu, Tzu-kung, and Mencius:

After this [imperial recognition], the state endorsed no alternative explanations [such as Taoist or Buddhist ones], and literati had no competitive, alternative social practices. During the Yüan and on into the Ming period, even though proper political inheritance from the rulers [in antiquity] was lost, the proper transmission of their teachings was

\textsuperscript{116} “Shuo wen,” in \textit{JCL}, pp. 20a–21a. As Ko Jung-chin and Wei Ch’ang-pao, \textit{I-tai ju hsung Ku T’ing-lin}, p. 136, point out, Ku was using a Sung dynasty version of the \textit{Shuo wen}.

\textsuperscript{117} Ku’s own note. “Chia-ching keng ting ts’ung ssu,” in \textit{JCL} 14, p. 23b.

\textsuperscript{118} \textit{Mencius}, 1b14, emended slightly from translation in D.C. Lau, \textit{Mencius} (London, 1970), p. 27.

\textsuperscript{119} “Chia-ching keng ting ts’ung ssu,” in \textit{JCL} 14, p. 22a. Ku listed the twenty-two as Tso Ch’iu-ming, Pu Tzu-hsia, Kung-yang Kao, Ku-liang Ch’ih, Fu Sheng, Kao T’ang-sheng, Tai Sheng, Mao Ch’ang, K’ung An-kuo, Liu Hsiang, Cheng Chung, Tu Tzu-ch’u, Ma Jung, Lu Chih, Cheng Hsiuan, Fu Ch’ien, Chia K’uei, Ho Hsiu, Wang Su, Wang Pi, Tu Yü, and Fan Ning.
preserved. This is Li-tsung’s great achievement [in enshrining the transmitters of the classical tradition, including Ch’eng and Chu].

Ku’s implication was that the great masters of the classical tradition, before the early T’ang and again before the end of the Sung period, by transmitting classical texts and classical values, and thereby securing the allegiance of the imperial system to those values, in effect crowded out rival traditions. But emperors also had made serious mistakes. In 1084 Shen-tsung had allowed the enshrinement of Hsün Tzu, Yang Hsiung, and Han Yü, none of whom had made a contribution to transmitting or annotating classical texts even though their writings were not incongruent with the sage’s ideas. The miscreant behind this error, Ku pointed out, was Wang An-shih. A worse culprit, who was the main target of Ku’s criticism, was the Chia-ching emperor (r. 1522–66), who for his own motives enshrined the likes of Ou-yang Hsiu and Lu Hsiang-shan. In making these assertions, Ku was arrogating to himself the authority to judge who helped “leave behind a [textual] tradition.”

Ku insisted that the transmission of the texts of the classics generation after generation, and dynasty after dynasty, was crucial and problematic. Its positive effects should be understood, but so should the negative effects of faulty transmission. Fundamentally, Ku’s assumption was that the texts of the classics – the words in which they are written and transmitted, and the order of the words – mattered. He was concerned that especially since the Han period commentators and editors had been changing the texts to suit their (mis)understanding or their interpretive whim, and even inventing what they claimed were classical texts.

The contents of the texts of the Five Classics in surviving the fires under the Ch’in had to include lacunae and errors, yet it is the lot of us unfortunate scholars born two thousand years later to trust in antiquity but to be skeptical. Those in more recent periods who gave explanations of the classics have not thought ill of liking to advance alternative ones. When their ideas that were alternative to others’ were not sufficient [to command assent], they would discard the standard glosses of the text of the classic and seek support in the writings of non-classical thinkers. If that still was not sufficient, then they would discard the contemporary version of the text and seek support in a distantly ancient one. If even that was not sufficient [to command assent], then they would discard the texts in the central state (chung kuo) and seek support in ones from overseas.

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120 “Chia-ching keng ting ts’ung ssu,” in JCL 14, p. 20b.
121 “Chia-ching keng ting ts’ung ssu,” in JCL 14, p. 22a.
122 “Chia-ching keng ting ts’ung ssu,” in JCL 14, p. 25a.
123 “Feng Hsi wei Shang shu,” in JCL 2, p. 35a. In this last sentence, Ku was alluding to his criticisms of Ming scholars and some of his contemporaries who were receptive to texts brought from Japan and also to Western learning. See Willard J. Peterson, “Changing literati attitudes toward new learning in astronomy and mathematics in early Qing,” Monumenta Serica 50 (2002), pp. 375–90.
The consequence of this disordering of the classical texts was disordering of social values and even the fall of a dynasty. “In the Wan-li reign (1573–1619), men were too fond of tampering with ancient texts, which led to men’s minds becoming deviant and their practices being degraded.”

To restore the integrity of the texts of the classics, Ku offered dozens of instances of passages that had been inadvertently or intentionally misplaced by some copyist or editor and then followed by others later. In his piece called “Investigating sequences of passages in the texts of classics” he commented, “The writings (wen) of the men of antiquity have been emended and transformed without warrant. The Six Classics emanated from men who were sages, and the antiquity they transmitted should not be presumptuously co-opted by men of later times.” In general, Ku endorsed the principle of honoring one’s antecedents. “For every type of [cultivated] activity, the men in antiquity necessarily paid homage to the men who started it ... In learning, they paid homage to great masters.” And so did Ku Yen-wu. But his homage was tempered by his critical reading of their work, and for every one of them he was able to find flaws and errors, and make corrections that he could record as new knowledge. Throughout the Jib chih lu he wrote comments such as K'ung An-kuo in his commentary said such-and-such and “it is not necessarily so,” or Wang Su said such-and-such and “this is wrong,” or Tu Yu in his commentary on the Tso chuan (Tso’s commentary) mixed up someone’s given name (ming) with his literary name (tzu). Ku was not partisan to any one commentary tradition from the T'ang period and before; he respected all the good ones by correcting them wherever he could. He did not take any of them as an unquestioned authority.

In addition to correcting the words and passages of the texts, Ku thought he also could correctly discover new meaning in the classical texts. For example, he revised the usual explanation of the demise of King Chou, the last ruler at Yin, in the eleventh century BCE:

Since ancient times, if after a dynastic house has maintained peace for a long time its systems and institutions become lax and its ruler’s orders are not implemented by his subordinates, then it must fall. Now everyone in the world knows that King Chou fell because he was not humane, but I say that is not completely so.

Ku acknowledged King Chou’s personal depravities and failings, but he also pointed out that the Shang dynasty of kings had been weakening for a long time, as evidenced by the “P'an Keng” and the “Wei tsu” (“Prince of Wei”), two

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texts included in the classic Book of documents. They showed, in Ku’s reading, that high officials were not heeding the king, and that then the commoners did not respect and submit to the dynasty’s system, including its punitive disciplines. Citing later parallel cases (but not the fall of the Ming dynasty, which was present by implication), Ku concluded, “These cases being so, if one explains the fall of King Chou and the rise of King Wu [as leader of the successor Chou dynasty] in terms of the most humane striking down the most inhumane, these are biased words and an explanation that does not get to the root causes of the events.”

In his reading of the classical text, Ku was setting aside the standard “moral” lesson usually applied – when an outrageously immoral ruler loses the right to rule, he is replaced by a moral ruler who founds a new dynasty – and instead proposed a general, political point based on the classical sources: a dynastic house that allows its systems of control to atrophy will be overthrown. Efficacy matters more than morality. This is a more obvious example than some of why Ku wanted the preservation and transmission of the original versions of the classical texts, which are historical documents, without the overlays and tinkerings that resulted from later bias, particularly a bias to impute moral meaning. Altering or misreading the text obscured a classical truth that applies in today’s world. Correct knowledge of the classical texts contributes to knowledge of how to conduct government.

Ku did not establish a closed commentary tradition of his own, one in which he would be the established authority on one or more classical texts, as the imperially sponsored commentaries compiled under K’ung Ying-ta (574–648) were in the T’ang period and later, and those of Chu Hsi and his associates were from early Ming, if not before. In classical learning, Ku’s open, historical approach to critical readings of the classics and their associated commentaries continued as the scholarly mainstream even after the Chu Hsi commentaries were re-endorsed and reprinted with the full weight of imperial authority in the early eighteenth century.

Ku Yen-wu’s approach to history texts was more critical and skeptical than to classical texts because they did not have the same standing, but correct knowledge and correct judgment about the past were essential. He approvingly cited a T’ang official’s claim in 823 that historical works compiled during the Han period “are secondary [but supplemental] to the Six Classics when it comes to exhorting men to do good and warning them against doing bad,” and, the official continued, even though over the intervening centuries history-based learning had atrophied, it would help if specific history writings were made part of the examinations at the capital. Ku commented,

\[130\] “Yin Chou chih so-i wang,” in JCL 2, pp. 12a–b. Ku was disagreeing here with Mencius 4A9.

\[131\] “Shih hsüeh,” in JCL 16, p. 25a.
“Nowadays the deficiencies of history-based learning are even worse than in T'ang times, but if one could recruit with something like those [proposed] methods, within a decade we would have literati [officials] with comprehensive understanding of systems of governance who might be of advantage to the dynastic house.” 132 In other words, writings from the past about the conduct of government offer positive and negative lessons that have practical application today. By learning about history, Ku thought his readers could uncover better methods of governance (chih tao).

Historical documents had to be handled more judiciously than the texts of Ku’s venerated classics. Ku endorsed Mencius’ caveat: “If we completely trust in a writing [shu; that is, a historical document, rather than the whole of the classic Book of documents (Shu), as this passage is sometimes construed], then it would be better not to have that writing” (Mencius, 7B3). Mencius was specifically referring to certain strips of text that he was sure were morally impossible and therefore could not be conveying historical fact. Ku Yen-wu added more generally, “In the present day we more and more have this experience”; 133 that is, we have a greater burden to confront and evaluate texts that purport to be historical documents but are frauds, not on moral grounds as Mencius had done, but on evidentiary grounds. Historical documents, what we might call primary sources or quotations from primary sources, had to be both preserved and, when necessary, corrected by historians with knowledge. The sources are what provide access to the past:

Consequently, if we are to trust in and be devoted to the past (ku), then the old books (chiu pen) must be preserved. If we become aware of lacunae and doubts [in the old documents, and also in the standard dynastic histories that cite them], then we ought to make emendations based on the whole corpus of [other relevant historical] texts. If this is not the responsibility of later noble men, then whose is it? 134

Part of Ku’s criticism was directed at the standard dynastic histories, twenty-one by his time, but also with an eye to the plans under way by the late 1670s for compiling an imperially approved history of the Ming dynasty. With his emphasis on preserving and transmitting “original” documents, historical as well as classical ones, Ku was caustic about Pan Ku’s rewriting materials from Ssu-ma Ch’ien’s Shih chi (Records of the historian) for his Han shu (Han history), Ou-yang Hsiu’s rewriting to make his Hsin T’ang shu (New T’ang history), and Chu Hsi’s rewriting of Ssu-ma Kuang’s Tzu chih t’ung chien. 135 In the Jih chih lu, Ku explained terms, practices, and institutions that are referred to in historical texts, including inscriptions, and were misunderstood or misused

134 “Chien pen erh shih i shih,” in JCL 18, p. 6a.
135 Ku Yen-wu, Ku T’ing-lin shih wen chi, “Ch’ao shu tzu hsü,” p. 32.
by later readers. He did not rewrite anyone’s work on history. Ku did compile historical materials on the late Ming and the Southern Ming reigns, on the establishment of imperial capitals, and on local areas.\footnote{Hsieh Kuo-chen, \textit{Ku T’ing-lin hsüeh-p’u}, pp. 162–8.}

An example of what Ku thought he could do with the detailed historical knowledge that he had achieved day by day from his broad reading is contained in one of his several gatherings that concerned local government. The entry in the \textit{Jih chih lu} was modestly titled, “Functions of governance in townships and hamlets.” Ku started with a long passage from the \textit{Han shu} (\textit{Han history}) describing the levels of local government set up by the Ch’\textsuperscript{in} emperor in the late third century BCE to control districts or counties (\textit{hsien}). A ranked, salaried magistrate (\textit{ling}) was appointed for each county with more than 10,000 households, and a lesser magistrate (\textit{chang}) for smaller counties. Each magistrate had a few ranked subordinates, also salaried, and some lesser officers. Below this handful of officials overseeing roughly 50,000 people, each hamlet (\textit{t’ing}) of about ten square \textit{li} had a headman; ten hamlets formed a township (\textit{hsiang}), which was led by three elders who received a nonofficial rank from the government. They had some underlings who went about the township. The three elders oversaw instruction of the local residents. Their underlings handled disputes and collected taxes. They also patrolled to be a check against thieves and bandits.\footnote{“Hsiang t’ing chih shih,” in \textit{JCL} 8, p. 9a.}

Ku supplemented the detailed description with citations to show that this system was at least partly practiced in Han times, but, Ku pointed out, “This system did not begin in Ch’\textsuperscript{in} and Han times.”\footnote{Tseng Yün-ch’ien, ed., \textit{Shang shu cheng tu} (Hong Kong, 1972) “Pan Keng” shang, p. 100.}

\footnote{Hsieh Kuo-chen, \textit{Ku T’ing-lin hsüeh-p’u}, pp. 162–8.} Ku was clear that the problem that Ku was concerned with was the possible reason for Ku’s purpose.

\footnote{John Patrick Delury, “Gu Yanwu’s mixed model and the problem of two despotisms,” \textit{Late Imperial China} 34 No. 1 (2013), p. 19, has a different interpretation of Ku’s purpose.}
was that the functions of the lower level of leadership under the magistrates had atrophied as more supervisory and controlling layers of government had been added above them. Ku was pointing out that even in his day imperial governments’ hierarchy of officials since Ch’in times had not developed below the level of the county magistrate, but had continued to be built above them. In his entry Ku cited text after text that witnessed this problem dynasty after dynasty, even into the Ming period.

Ku also assembled testimony on another source of the erosion of the power of local officials. From the beginning of imperial rule in Ch’in times, when the emperor first took power from regular officials and gave power to clerks, “the underlings with a knife [for erasing] and a brush [for writing],”¹⁴¹ as they were called in the Han period, local government was in trouble. Authority had been taken out of the hands of the regular officials and local leaders. This problem, Ku showed, existed to the present day, as exemplified by the insidious keepers of local government accounts.¹⁴² In these and other presentations of positive and negative historical evidence that implied the need for the ruler to grant regular, county-level officials more responsibility and autonomy, Ku Yen-wu was showing what needed to be done. He was not presenting his views as an opinion; he was making a case supported by historical evidence.

Ku presented evidence from multiple historical sources in support of his insights about contemporary political events. To examine what he held to be a fundamental failure in Ming imperial institutions, he traced the long-term decline in allowing active participation by close imperial relatives in the government. According to Ku Yen-wu, when emperors appreciated and employed members of the imperial clan, their dynasty was stronger, and therefore lasted longer, and when the clansmen were estranged the dynasty weakened. In Ku’s view, “Both the Han and T’ang systems in every reign employed imperial relatives as well as men of other clans as ministers in the capital and regional governors away from the capital.”¹⁴³ Ku gave many examples from Han and T’ang times. He cited sources from the eighth century showing T’ang emperors being defensive but still offering justifications for their relying on relatives to fill important positions. Ku observed that during the whole of the T’ang period there were eleven prime ministers who were from the imperial clan.¹⁴⁴ The situation changed under the Sung dynasty. Ku cited the complaint by Sung Ch’i (998–1061) that Chou and T’ang rulers had employed imperial kinsmen and accomplished men without any suspicions, but his own dynasty (i.e. the Sung) was not doing so:

¹⁴¹ “Li-hsü,” in JCL 8, p. 19a.
¹⁴² “Li-hsü,” in JCL 8, p. 20a.
¹⁴³ “Tsung shih,” in JCL 9, p. 23a.
¹⁴⁴ “Tsung shih,” in JCL 9, 24a.
As a result, most of the members of the imperial clan are mired in wealth and titles, but are arrogantly boastful and do not understand ritual or duty. The poor among them loaf and sponge. There is nothing they will not do. In name they are branches of Heaven [i.e. the emperor’s family], but in reality they are rubbish.\textsuperscript{145}

Ku Yen-wu added, without naming a source, that in Sung times such unworthy members of the imperial clan were vulgarly called “lieutenants of waste.”\textsuperscript{146}

There was a long-term trend of avoiding appointing younger imperial relatives to government. To make his point explicit, Ku Yen-wu observed, “This was exactly the state of affairs under the Ming dynasty.”\textsuperscript{147} Ku reported that, too late, under the Ch’ung-chen emperor (r. 1628–44) the government tried to start a system to specially appoint imperial relatives, but it did not work. In 1622 a member of the imperial family for the first time had achieved the chin-shih degree. There were twelve members of the imperial Chu family who obtained degrees in the Ch’ung-chen reign, but only one received an appointment to office, in Nanking.\textsuperscript{148} Ku blamed the long line of officials who had been serving the Ming emperors for almost 300 years without daring to speak out on this problem. Ku asked (probably rhetorically, because it was already too late for any restoration of the Ming imperial family), “Can later rulers not see from this that the ancient rulers’ employing their relatives alongside accomplished men was the means to lengthen the duration of their dynasty?”\textsuperscript{149} To demonstrate that earlier rulers did not understand this, Ku cited the Ming emperor’s refusal in 1449, after the grave crisis that year, to accept a recommendation to begin the practice of selecting a few imperial princes, who were spread around the empire, to come to the capital to aid in governing. In contrast, Ku argued, the Liu imperial family was able to achieve a full restoration of the Han dynasty in 25 CE, after the usurpation by Wang Mang (r. 9–23 CE), and again, briefly, in 221 after the Ts'ao family’s usurpation of Han imperial rule. According to Ku, “This was like a fallen tree’s having sprouts come out from it.”\textsuperscript{150} On the other hand, Ku also pointed out that all imperial princes holding territory on a hereditary basis were weakened or removed in the reign of Han emperor Wu. “This was why the Western Han was destroyed,”\textsuperscript{151} he bluntly declared. The failure of the Sung imperial family to reconstitute itself after the Mongols’ invasion, Ku said, shows it cannot compare to the Han. And of course neither could the successive failures of would-be Ming crown princes after 1644. Ku piled up more evidence, including reports on the impoverishment of.

\textsuperscript{145} “Tsung shih,” in JCL 9, pp. 24a–b.
\textsuperscript{146} “Tsung shih,” in JCL 9, Ku’s note on p. 24b.
\textsuperscript{147} “Tsung shih,” in JCL 9, p. 24b.
\textsuperscript{148} “Tsung shih,” in JCL 9, pp. 25a–b.
\textsuperscript{149} “Tsung shih,” in JCL 9, p. 24b.
\textsuperscript{150} “Tsung shih,” in JCL 9, pp. 25a–b.
\textsuperscript{151} “Tsung shih,” in JCL 9, p. 26a.
imperial relatives. His implication was clear. The attempts led by outside members of the Ming imperial family to restore the Ming dynasty were failures because they had little access to education, independent wealth, or experience in governing. Their officials looked down on them. They were pawns, not trained to be leaders-in-the-making.

Similarly, Ku Yen-wu used historical examples to construct moral judgments that should apply to some of his famous contemporaries. Ku’s stance was that literary achievement should not be allowed to exonerate or excuse someone’s lack of moral scruples. He named two of the most famous poets, Hsieh Ling-yün (385–433) and Wang Wei (699–759), as the two worst cases of literary renown clouding others’ judgments of them. According to Ku, Hsieh and Wang both betrayed their service obligations to their rightful ruler by submitting to a usurper, and then ambiguously reneging. Their having lofty literary reputations saved them, Ku claimed, from their contemporaries’ opprobrium. Later Wang Wei himself venerated Hsieh Ling-yün, who had been executed for political reasons. Ku was severe:

Most of the court officials involved in literary production supported Wang Wei [after he had submitted and collaborated with An Lu-shan’s forces when they occupied Ch’ang-an in 756]. For example, Tu Fu (712–70) referred to him as the eminent Wang, Assistant Minister of the Right. Can someone who served bandits ever be “eminent”? During the recent period of turmoil [a reference to the transition from Ming to Ch’ing], some men submitted themselves to a new dynastic house, but after their offers of service were rejected and they were let go, then they started to put out expressions of loyalty [chung, to the former dynasty] and resentment [fen, against the new one]. Some, with their names still disgustingly on the ersatz registers [of eligible appointees of the new dynasty], feign that they are revealing their “true” hearts [in their writings] to try to excuse themselves. I regard them as even more contemptible than Hsieh Ling-yün and Wang Wei.

Ku Yen-wu’s contemporary targets, whom he did not need to name, were two of the most famous literary figures of his time. Ch’ien Ch’ien-i (1582–1664), while serving as a leading minister in the refugee Ming government in Nanking, had led the surrender of that city in mid-1645 to the Ch’ing forces. Ch’ien went to Peking and served briefly as a Ch’ing official, and then he lived nearly twenty years as a writer who (some supposed) still secretly supported the Ming cause. The great poet Wu Wei-yeh (1609–72), a 1631 chin-shih who had served in the Ming government, accepted appointments as a Ch’ing official for several years in the 1650s before again retiring. In Ku’s view, the literary achievements of Ch’ien and Wu should not be allowed to be used to excuse their fault in collaborating. Ku Yen-wu was using examples

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153 “Tsung shih,” in JCL 9, pp. 27a–b.
154 “Wen tz’u ch’i jen,” in JCL 19, pp. 11a–b.
from history to condemn some of his contemporaries, but he was also using contemporary cases to pass judgment on individuals and groups in the past. For Ku, writing about history was not a morally neutral intellectual endeavor; values were locatable in the records of the past.

Ku Yen-wu also used historical testimony to show the undesirable effects of a dynasty’s having a heavily monetized economy. A fiscal system that required taxpayers – the bulk of whom were engaged in agricultural production – to pay taxes in a medium that they did not produce, as had been happening since late T’ang times, excessively burdened them. Ku pointed out with examples that there was some use of metal money going back to the Warring States period, but before mid-T’ang taxes were mainly set and collected in goods that were available in the local agricultural economy: grain, cloth, craft goods, special local products, and labor service. Ku showed that when the imperial government in late T’ang started assessing and collecting taxes in copper-based coins, and in late Ming in silver by weight, those policies caused serious hardships to village taxpayers. They also created distortions in prices when there were cash “famines” and silver “gluts,” and opened opportunities for more extortion and corruption at each level of government.\(^{155}\)

In piece after piece on government institutions, policies, and practices, Ku Yen-wu selected passages of historical materials that were evidence germane to a problem in order to reveal what had gone astray. Ku was showing the historical dimension of problems that had contemporary resonance. Although his judgment was behind his selections, he usually did not express himself on what should be done. He seemed to expect that his readers would examine the evidence (k’ao cheng) that he presented, learn for themselves, figure it out, and then act when they were in a position to do so. Ku was not presenting himself as an authority. He was presenting historical knowledge as the authority, and that knowledge was based on learning. This repository of knowledge made the *Jih chih lu* a major source to be consulted and quoted in the early nineteenth-century revival of interest in statecraft learning.

The third main area of knowledge to which Ku Yen-wu sought to contribute in the *Jih chih lu* was what he called being broadly learned in the cultural heritage (po wen). Being broad for Ku was not indiscriminate. It was not mere erudition, as he thought many of his contemporaries took it to be. For Ku, broad learning about the culture was as important as transmitting the classics and presenting knowledge about governing effectively. The implication in the *Jih chih lu* was that the resources of the cultural heritage could conceptually replace the role that coherence had in Chu Hsi’s system as the basis of moral and social values.

\(^{155}\) Ku, *Jih chih lu*, ch. 11, especially 11.20a–23a.
Ku uncovered his reading of the cultural heritage (wen) as a basis for right conduct by referencing the well-known statement by Confucius that begins, “The noble man has broad learning in expressing culture” (Analects, 6.27). Ku’s new interpretation was that proper activities of all types were expressions of culture. Acting in order to achieve the Way, as in the steps listed in the Great learning that involved conduct (rather than intending, knowing, and investigating), “from one’s own physical body, to his family, to his state, and to all under Heaven, as well as in using systems of measuring and enumerating, and in pronunciation and countenance, [when the conduct is correct, as a noble man’s is,] these are all expressions of culture (wen).”

Ku’s interpretation, that expressions of culture involved actions, depended on his readers knowing the next phrase in the Analects passage, which he did not need to quote: the noble man has broad learning “and he restrains himself by performing rituals” (Analects, 6.27). Referring to all these activities, Ku quoted from the Book of rites (Li chi): “Ranking and regularizing each and all of these is called ritual.” That is, Ku Yen-wu’s new interpretation of the Analects passage presumed that Confucius meant that cultural practice (wen) and ritual practice (li) were necessary complements to each other; the noble man does not go astray because he practices and is guided by both. To buttress this conjunction of cultural and ritual practice, Ku cited Confucius’ exclamation about acting noticeably differently when mourning the death of a wife of a paternal uncle compared to mourning for a paternal aunt or a sister (i.e. the difference between a relative by marriage and an agnate relative): “The understanding of this is from cultural practice (wen), it is from cultural practice!” It is not merely a difference in rituals. Ku quoted again from the Book of ritual: “Observing the mourning period of three years is the ultimate cultural practice (wen) in the way of being human.” And another quotation: “The main effect of ritual is to constrain us; the main effect of music is to inspire us. When we move forward as ritual is constraining us, our moving forward is a cultural act (wen); when we move backward as music is inspiring us, our moving backward is a cultural act (wen).” Ku gave more quotations to illustrate his point that for Confucius, acting on the basis of the cultural heritage (wen) in unprecedented situations or ones in which rituals do not apply, for example, had to be done even as one was being restrained by rituals.

161 “Po hsüeh yü wen,” in JCL 7, p. 7a, from Li chi, “Tsa chi,” Volume 2, p. 647. I have inserted the preceding sentence to the one Ku quoted from the Li chi in order to help make Ku’s point clearer.
Having shown that broad learning in the cultural heritage was a basis for acting correctly in accord with our culture, Ku took notice of his contemporaries’ failure. What Confucius meant “is vastly different in scope from students studying the culture (wen) in the Book of odes, the Book of documents, and the six disciplines.” Ku was using written texts (wen) to show that studying texts was not enough; one had to become broadly learned in acting in accord with the cultural heritage (wen). In his usage Ku implied that this broad sense of wen could be understood as the practices of civilized society.

The knowledge Ku Yen-wu had built up day by day and recorded in the 1670s from his inquiries into the classical, historical, and other texts was knowledge about the cultural heritage of men like himself. Chu Hsi taught that we should investigate things to fathom their coherence, and the coherence of the universe; by fathoming coherence we guide our thinking, and we then are able to act correctly in all the social realms in which we participate. Turning away from Chu Hsi’s formulation as being ultimately unverifiable, Ku Yen-wu tried to show an alternative approach to Confucius’ dynamic of broad learning restrained by ritual practice. Acquiring broad learning about the cultural heritage both as it had effectively developed and as it had been misunderstood and misapplied over the generations since the time of the sages, Ku thought, was the means to learn how to conduct ourselves morally and effectively in the present.

WANG FU-CHIHI THINKS FOR HIMSELF ABOUT THE PAST

Wang Fu-chih (1619–92) was like Fang I-chih in living his last decades in relative seclusion after a frustrated attempt to serve the Ming dynasty in the south. Wang was more isolated than Fang, with whom he corresponded. He kept in touch with only a few scholars, and he was not widely known. Some of his writings were printed, but much of his work remained uncirculated for more than a century. In the nineteenth and especially the twentieth century, Wang was elevated to become one of the great thinkers of early

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162 “Po hsiieh yü wen,” in JCL 7, pp. 7a–b.
163 Ian McMorran, “Wang Fu-chih and the Neo-Confucian tradition,” in The unfolding of Neo-Confucianism, ed. Wm. Theodore de Bary (New York, 1975), p. 413, points out that Wang had “virtually no impact on either his contemporaries or his immediate successors,” and concedest, “To this extent then, he was a peripheral figure.” In the late nineteenth century, Lo Cheng-chun, Ch'üan-shan shih yu chi, in Ch'ing tai ch'üan-chi t'ung-k'au, Volume 58 (Taipei, 1985), attempted to document Wang Fu-chih’s links to others and to show that he was not socially isolated. The most detailed account of the printing of Wang’s works, including some by his son in the late K’ang-hsi period, is in Liu Chih-sheng and Liu P’ing, Wang Ch’üan-shan chu-tso t’ung-k’au (Changsha, 1999), pp. 9–27. Two of Wang’s six titles on the Book of change (Chou-i) were given a positive notice by the editors of the Ssu-k’u ch’üan shu project in the 1770s. Wang Yün-wu, Ho-yin Ssu-k’u ch’üan shu t'ung-mu t’i-yao, ch. 6.33, pp. 85–6.
Ch'ing because of his putative patriotism and materialism.\footnote{For example, Wang Mao, \textit{Ch'ing tai che-hüeh}, p. 169, claims that in terms of “philosophy,” Wang Fu-chih was “the greatest,” but with the implicit criterion that it was a patriotic and materialist philosophy that he advocated.} Wang Fu-chih's writings, although not generally available in his lifetime, together represent an important example of new thinking about learning that was expressed as the first generation matured in the 1660s and 1670s.\footnote{Ian McMorran gives a justification for his study of Wang Fu-chih: It might “prove useful for the evidence it may reveal concerning the problems which confronted thinkers of the period.” However, McMorran looked for ideas “proposed by the proponents of the new Neo-Confucian realistic pragmatism.” McMorran, “Wang Fu-chih and the Neo-Confucian tradition,” p. 414. That is not my purpose.}

Wang Fu-chih was from Heng-yang, in the south of the less well-developed Ming province of Hu-kuang (which became Hunan in early Ch'ing times). He grew up in an environment dominated by Chu Hsi's views for the purposes of the imperially sponsored examinations, and he was aware both of Wang Yang-ming's views as promoted by his later followers and of the Tung-lin group's views on moralizing politics.\footnote{Ch'en Tsu-wu, \textit{Ch'ing ch'u hsüeh-shu ssu pien lu} (Peking, 1992), pp. 90–1. The most useful sketch in English of Wang Fu-chih's family background, life, and the early sources for them, is Ian McMorran, \textit{The passionate realist: An introduction to the life and political thought of Wang Fuzhi} (1619–1692) (Hong Kong, 1992), pp. 1–23.} He passed the provincial-level examination to become a \textit{chü-jen} in 1642, but he did not take the \textit{chin-shih} examination or receive an appointment as an official before the Ming government collapsed in Peking in the spring of 1644. In 1648 Wang Fu-chih participated in the military resistance when Ch'ing troops moved into southern Hu-kuang. When that effort failed he made several attempts to join the rump Ming government farther south under the Yung-li emperor, whose family (an imperial Chu lineage, which was the basis of his claim to be an imperial prince) had been located in Hu-kuang. After those attempts to aid in the Ming restoration ended in failure and Wang almost lost his life, he withdrew to Hu-kuang. In 1653 he wrote of himself, “Retreating to a hidden, secluded branch, I await the dawn and the cock's crow (\textit{ming}, which is homophonic with the Ming dynasty).”\footnote{Wang Fu-chih, postscript to his “Chang-ling fu,” \textit{Chiang-chai wen-chi}, 8.4b, in Wang Fu-chih, \textit{Ch'uan-shan chüan-chi} (T'ai-chung, 1965), Volume 14, p. 10,816; also quoted in Ch'en Tsu-wu, p. 88.} He remained dedicated to the memory of the Ming dynasty and a non-collaborator (\textit{i-min}) to the end of his life. When Wu San-kuei had his forces occupy Hunan in 1674 and established his headquarters there for more than three years, Wang Fu-chih did not attempt to join their resistance to Ch'ing rule.

Although for his own safety Wang Fu-chih moved around in Hunan for twenty years and did not settle at his rustic home at Shih-ch'uan shan (from which his literary name, Ch'uan-shan, derives) until the 1670s, he was
embarked on his course as a thinker and writer from the early 1650s. By 1655 he had drafted his first book-length manuscript, his comments on the *Book of change*, to express his ideas on the big philosophical issues. About the same time, he wrote the *Huang shu* (A Book about yellow, as the symbolic color of the center), a critique of late Ming political issues that stressed the necessary distinction between barbarians and those at the center, in the central state (*chung kuo*). Wang went on to write his interpretive comments on the *Lao Tzu*, the *Book of documents*, the imperially sponsored 1420s version of the Four Books, the *Spring and autumn annals* with its *Tso commentary*, the classical ritual texts, and the *Chuang tzu*, among others. He compiled a historical record of the Yung-li reign, and wrote comments on the *Tzu chib t'ung chien* (Comprehensive mirror for aid in government) and on Sung history and politics. He was very much a historian in his thinking. Wang compiled a manuscript of notes on terms and concepts deriving from the classics, and on ones relating to the physical world, much later published as the *Ssu wen lu* (Records of thinking and inquiry). One of the last manuscripts Wang worked on was his comments on the Sung author Chang Tsai’s *Cheng meng* (Correcting the unenlightened). By one reckoning, using modern categories, Wang Fu-chih’s writings include more than twenty-three titles in 166 *chüan* on classical learning; there are fourteen titles in fifty-four *chüan* on history-related studies; there are thirty items in seventy-two *chüan* of studies on other writers; and there are more than a hundred *chüan* of his own poetry, letters and other occasional writings. Wang’s writings are mostly in the form of comments, sometimes just opinions, rather than explanatory arguments. He cited earlier authors, but more to refute them or for illustrative purposes than for support for his own assertions. He reinterpreted established terms to make his claims, but he did not always explain the grounds on which previous ideas should be discarded. Wang took as his own Chang Tsai’s argument that physical particles (*ch‘i*) and not coherence (*li*) are the basis of the real world. Wang Fu-chih was looking back before Chu Hsi to re-establish the basis for all learning.

From his background and experiences, Wang Fu-chih developed an open-minded, skeptical approach to learning that led him to reject the Ming intellectual inheritance in spite of his dedication to the memory of the Ming dynasty. In reaction both to Chu Hsi’s supposed over-emphasis on knowledge gained from book learning and to Wang Yang-ming’s emphasis on innate or intuitive learning, Wang wrote, “Learning makes no obstacle for thinking, and the broader the learning, the more far-reaching the thinking. When one’s

168 Ch’en Tsu-wu, p. 88.
170 Ch’en Tsu-wu, p. 90.
thinking is correct, there are achievements in learning, and when one’s thinking is under stress, he puts more hard work into his learning.” Wang’s statement can be taken as self-descriptive. But even after shaking off the domination of the lingering late Ming intellectual heritage that he blamed for the political collapse, his thinking and learning could not start from zero.

The precedent, or point of departure, that Wang Fu-chih settled on was Chang Tsai’s claim that the universe, all that exists, all entities and processes, and all that constitutes the human realm, including moral values, are functions of the motions of particles (ch’i); particles, of themselves, form the particular things we experience. Chang Tsai (1020–77) advanced this claim before the Ch’eng brothers began to explain that coherence (li) is that which causes everything to be as it is; for the Ch’eng brothers, coherence is what makes basic stuff, the particles, take the forms we perceive and experience. It is not clear when Wang Fu-chih fully adopted Chang Tsai’s doctrine of particles (ch’i), but it was there in his early writings and he was still writing about it at the end of his life. In one of his first manuscripts, Chou i wai chuan (An outsider commentary on the Book of change), Wang began with comments that explain one of its central terms, way (tao), as a physical force. His interpretation stressed the materiality of the phenomenal world addressed in the Book of change, and thus he redirected the meaning of the classic. “Cosmic forces (tao) are what are embodied within things in order to give rise to uses in the human realm.” For Chu Hsi, the word or concept tao in such a statement was a euphemism for coherence (li), but Wang Fu-chih made clear that that is not what he had in mind. “Cosmic force (tao) is something which is so of itself (tzu jan) [and not a function or result of coherence (li)]. Cosmic force, being so of itself, is not derived from humans.” When someone asked him, “The sky is not partial to yang; the earth is not partial to yin. What is it that causes this to be so?” Wang gave a simple answer: cosmic force (tao). In his use of the word tao as cosmic force, Wang Fu-chih may have thought he was returning to the usage of the word in the early commentary on the Book of change, but clearly he was eschewing Chu Hsi’s grand explanatory concept, coherence (li), even though Wang was not foregrounding particles (ch’i) in these comments. However, ch’i runs through his other writings as the fundamental explanatory term, as it had been for Chang Tsai.

171 Wang Fu-chih, Ssu shu hsûn i, ch. 6, 15a–b, in Wang Fu-chih, Ch’uan-shan ch’üan chi, Volume 6, pp. 4355–6. Wang was elaborating on Analects 2.15, which linked learning and thinking, and rejecting the interpretations by Chu Hsi and Ch’eng I.
174 Wang Fu-chih, Chou i wai chuan. 175 Wang Fu-chih, Chou i wai chuan, p. 2.
For Wang Fu-chih, the concept of ch'i as particles subordinated other terms. Following Chang Tsai, Wang held that ch'i as physical particles functioned not only in the concrete or substantive phenomenal realm (shih), but also in the realm of “emptiness” (hsü). Chang Tsai in effect had co-opted the concept of emptiness by making the term refer to the realm of undifferentiated, formless, dispersed particles (cb'i). That is, “emptiness” was not nothing; it was still all undifferentiated particles. Moreover, Wang Fu-chih argued that even political order and disorder (tao as political order and its absence) are the effects of the motions of particles. “Since instances of when political order prevails or not are all a matter of the particles, so they [i.e. the cb'i] are always being realized in the actual circumstances. Particles being realized in a pattern of order is the way prevailing, and their being realized in a pattern of disorder is being without the way.”

Particles are also the medium for mental or psychological phenomena, such as intention (i), which was a central concept for Huang Tsung-hsi, who also adopted the position that everything is based in cb'i, including purpose (chih) and sentiments (cb'ing). Wang wrote, “Intentions exist only within one’s [physical] heart, and particles also are within my corporeal body. Consequently, intentions and particles are paired. Particles being paired with intentions, intentions do, as we say, ‘stir up particles’ [sheng cb'i, i.e. produce anger].” He also wrote, “Sentiments are attached to particles, and the particles become active. When they are active, then good and not-good are let loose ... As for the activity of the particles, when they come from the blood, there is wildness; when they come from the spirit (shen), there is orderliness (li).” Wang was setting out a system of explanations that displaced Chu Hsi’s synthesizing coherence (li) and its reduction to heart (hsin) by Wang Yang-ming and his followers. By subordinating the functions of coherence and mind to particles (cb'i), Wang Fu-chih attempted to reverse centuries of conventional understanding.

In practice, Wang Fu-chih did not throw out the word li (coherence, in Chu Hsi’s system; order or pattern, as an ordinary word); he revalued it. To refute the claim in Chu Hsi’s system that moral virtue comes from coherence (li), Wang argued that we have to see first that there are two aspects to virtue (te): the virtue that comes from our nature as humans (which is a potential to be moral), and the virtue that comes from succeeding in implementing the Way (which is actualized by doing something that has a moral result).

178 Wang Fu-chih, Tu Ssu shu ta cb’iian shuo, ch. 9, 4b–5a, in Ch’uan-shan cb’iian chi, Volume 9, pp. 6838–9.
179 Wang, Tu Ssu shu ta cb’iian shuo, ch. 8, 21a, in Ch’uan-shan cb’iian chi, Volume 9, p. 6775.
180 Wang Fu-chih, Shih kuang cb’uan, ch. 3, 4b, in Ch’uan-shan cb’iian chi, Volume 3, p. 1906.
The two types of virtue are immersed in our hearts, Wang argued, but we cannot conflate our hearts with our natures. “The heart (hsin) does not derive from our nature (hsing). Moral virtue (te) does not derive from coherence (li). When one implements the Way and succeeds, then the success has come after learning [and is not based on some innate virtue].” The confusion, Wang argued, stemmed from the meanings of the term li. “In speaking of li, there are two meanings. One is the patterned order (t’iao li) in all the existing things in the realm of heaven-and-earth. The other is the perfected order (chih li) of fully complying with the five moral constancies or of humans’ accepting the ‘command of Heaven’ [which Chu Hsi glossed as the coherence of our moral human nature].”

Either of these senses, which are descriptive, precludes its being used to indicate the means by which something is so (so-i-jan), as coherence (li) did in Chu Hsi’s system. Wang Fu-chih’s agenda seems to have been to strip the important words in the texts on which he made comments of their Chu Hsi glosses and to introduce his own.

Like his acquaintance and correspondent Fang I-chih, Wang Fu-chih wanted to shift attention away from intangible “mind” (hsin) to things (wu) we perceive and experience. Wang extended the categories covered by the meaning of the term “things”:

Since wind, thunder, rain, and dew in the atmosphere are things, and mountains, hills, springs, and marshes on the earth are things, then the yin or yang and the soft or hard [as forces named in the Book of change] by which they are constituted are all things. Since the flying, underwater, mobile, and rooted [nonhuman] creatures are things, and the enriching, productive, advantageous, and useful [activities] of humans are things, then the successes or failures and the good or evil they constitute are all also things. More generally, since [the relationships of] father–son and elder brother–younger brother among humans are things, and the exemplary words and conduct of sages in the past are things, then the moral and ritual actions they constitute are all things.

In other words, any phenomenon in the perceivable world is a “thing.” With such explanations, Wang Fu-chih was pulling political, social, and moral values away from being in the notional realm of “above forms” (hsing erh shang), where Chu Hsi allowed coherence (li) to reside, and where Wang Yang-ming placed “originating heart” (pen hsin). Instead, Wang Fu-chih assigned values to the phenomenal realm where we experience “things” as entities and activities.

A major problem for Wang Fu-chih, and for his inspiration, Chang Tsai, as well as for his contemporary, Huang Tsung-hsi, was to explain how particles

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181 Wang Fu-chih, Tu Ssu shu ta chi’ian shuo, ch. 5, 28b–29a, in Ch’uan-shan chi’ian chi, Volume 9, pp. 6550–1. Wang was commenting on Analects, 8.11.

182 A comparable contemporary ambition might be René Descartes’s in constructing his own system to displace the prevailing Aristotelian one.

differentiated into all the particular things in the material world, continuously changing over time, that humans experience. Chu Hsi had answered the problem with his claim that coherence (*li*) is what causes particles to form all the things and processes that exist, but this answer was not available to Chang Tsai and not acceptable to Wang Fu-chih. Wang raised the problem explicitly:

As for “that which makes it so,” one cannot speak of it in fully manifest ways. As for “that which is able to be made so,” one is not able fully to put it in words. What one puts in words is speaking only of the particular things that have forms.’

This seems to mean that we can know and be articulate about what is, but not about why it is or what might be. But simply denying that one can speak adequately about “that which makes it so” (*so-i-jan*) and pushing instead a different explanatory term forward was not enough.

In a hypothetical dialogue, Wang Fu-chih engaged, but deflected, the big question about what causes things to be as they are. “Someone said, ‘As for the male not being partial only to yang and the female not being partial only to yin, that which causes them to be so is heaven-and-earth [i.e. the physical cosmos]. But as for the heaven’s not being partial to yang and the earth’s not being partial to yin [i.e. both include both], what causes them to be so?’” Wang Fu-chih’s simple answer to this was cosmic forces (*tao*), which prompted the next question. “Now you say cosmic forces cause the heaven and the earth to be as they are. This puts cosmic forces (*tao*) prior to heaven and earth.” This, the questioner suggested, implies endorsement of the *Lao tzu*’s putting the Tao (as the Way, and not merely cosmic forces) prior to heaven-and-earth, and by extension endorsement of Chu Hsi’s putting coherence prior to heaven-and-earth. Wang Fu-chih refused this interpretation:

Cosmic forces are deployed pure essences (*ching ts’ui*) of heaven-and-earth going in conjunction with heaven-and-earth without either being prior to the other. If cosmic forces came into being prior to heaven-and-earth, there would be a time when there were cosmic forces (*tao*) but no heaven-and-earth, and where would they [or it, if the word *tao* is taken to refer to a singular cosmic force] physically be located? And who [or what] would there be to label it as the Way? As for [the claim that] heaven-and-earth bring male and female to completion, does that mean [some “way”] moves among humans and by means of its “innate abilities” (*liang neng*) gives rise to alterations and transformations, and not that they are bestowed by what is supplied by the blue sky (heaven) and the yellow dirt (earth)? Then would this not entail that a “way” gives rise to heaven-and-earth, and moreover that it first exists and then creates [heaven-and-earth, an idea similar to the idea that Deus created heaven-and-earth, which Jesuit missionaries were promoting].”

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185 Wang Fu-chih, *Chou i wai chuan* 1.2.
By asking these rhetorical questions which his hypothetical interlocutor could not answer, Wang tried to bolster his view that there is no external, prior cause for things to be as they are. Wang Fu-chih wanted to use the word tao, but he wanted to restrict its meanings to be about forces – that is, particles in motion – and not to be about some primal or ultimate causal force.

Wang Fu-chih further subordinated the word tao by treating it as a function of particular things (ch'i), and not allowing the particular things to be a product or effect of some grand Way or of small ways that have to be construed as efficient causes and therefore prior. Wang also did not allow that tao had to be understood as a moral force that produced orderly outcomes in human society. In one of his sections Wang addressed the latter meaning first. “Human society (t'ien-hsia) is constituted only of particular things (ch'i) [in the sense of particular human activities]. Tao [as things] are the processes (tao) of the particular things, and the particular things cannot be said to be the things [produced or caused by] a Way [i.e. a tao in the sense of an ordering or moral force].”

Wang drew a distinction in how people should talk about what a tao is:

Humans in general are able to articulate the concept that if there is not a given tao [in the sense of awareness of what makes something morally so], then there is not this particular [moral] thing [warranted by that moral cause]. However, if there is this particular thing [in the sense of a good situation], what is the trouble if there is no tao [in the sense of awareness of what makes it morally so]? There may be something that a moral gentleman does not understand [and thus he does not know its way, chih tao], but a sage understands it. There are things a sage is not able to do, but an ordinary man or woman can do them. In the case where a person is ignorant of a particular tao [in the sense of the way to do something], this particular something is not fully accomplished [by him], but its not being accomplished in this case does not mean this particular something thereby does not exist.

The common mode of thinking – that a tao, in the sense of a way of doing something, comes before the something – in effect implies that a tao has an ontological standing separate from and prior to the phenomena for which it is the tao. Wang had something else in mind:

Only a few men are able to articulate that if there is not a given particular thing, then there is not that particular way [for it, in the sense of the way to do that something], but that is inherently what is so. In a vast wasteland [without humans] there is no “way” of bowing and yielding. In the time of Yao and Shun [society was so orderly that] there was no “way” for consoling [suffering commoners] and corporally punishing [malefactors]. During the Han and T'ang periods they did not have the “way” of our present times, so during the present there are many instances of our not having the “ways” of other times. If there are

no bows and arrows, there is no “way” of archery. If there are no carriages and horses, there is no “way” of driving.

And so on. “Thus, if there are no sons there is no ‘way’ of fathers, and no ‘way’ of elder brother if there are no younger brothers.” For Wang Fu-chih, a “way” of doing something is derived from the processes involving the pertinent things. “Consequently, a true proposition to articulate is that if there is not this particular thing, then there is not a ‘way’ for it, but others will not look into this [proposition and its implications for assumptions about a moral way].” Clearly Wang’s argument here also applies against Chu Hsi’s claim that the coherence of a thing somehow exists before that particular thing can exist; otherwise it could not be “that by which it is so” (so-i-jen).

In Wang Fu-chih’s handling of the term tao, the meanings change with the contexts to which his comments are directed. He must be seen as dealing more with words and philosophical concepts than with entities and processes to which the words refer. This is clear in certain examples among Wang’s comments. Wang explained that the word li (as pattern, not Chu Hsi’s coherence) does not refer to a tangible something, but is the word for the perceivable property of particles (cb‘i) in certain circumstances. He was explicit that the word tao (tao tzu) can be explained in the same manner. “Tao [the word] means certain, regular patterns (i ting chib li); adding the two words i ting to li, then you have tao.” Such explanatory comments are dealing with “words,” not the effective “things” themselves, such as tao and li that in various other thinkers’ usage cause phenomena to be as they are in the realm we experience. This may be a consequence of Wang’s starting point. By accepting that particles (cb‘i) are the foundation of reality, and that things (wu) in general and particular things (cb‘i) are what we humans are, and are involved in, Wang was treating the big ideas of coherence (li) and heart, or mind (hsin), as propositional items – words – and not as causal entities. Thus, in general, Wang Fu-chih’s critical comments are directed at reinterpreting words in earlier texts. His comments are not elements or components in a synthetic philosophical system, as much of what Chu Hsi said and wrote seems to be. In this sense, Wang Fu-chih may be said to be closer to his contemporaries, such as Fang I-chih and Ku Yen-wu, who were not “philosophical” either.

If the present phenomenal world is constituted of things composed of particles, then so were the past events in the historical record. The implication is that there is no deontic component – no separate and enduring moral Way – to be found in the historical past. In writing his extensive comments on

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188 Wang Fu-chih, Chou i wai chuan, 5.170. 189 Wang Fu-chih, Chou i wai chuan, 5.170.
190 Wang Fu-chih, Tu Ssu shu ta ch’iian shuo, ch. 9, 5a, in Ch’uan-shan ch’iian chi, Volume 9, p. 6839.
191 Wang Fu-chih, Tu Ssu shu ta ch’iian shuo, ch. 9, 5b, in Ch’uan-shan ch’iian chi, Volume 9, p. 6840.
portions of the historical record, and Sung history in particular, Wang Fu-chih was going against Chu Hsi’s view. Chu Hsi seemed to allow for studies of history to the extent that the intent was to reveal the moral coherence in past events. For Wang Fu-chih, the “value” to be found in the historical record was in gaining understanding of the results of actions and in reflecting on our own responses, not in confirming some inherent morality or immorality in earlier men’s choices and activities. Wang thought there could be bad as well as good effects from reading history, which nevertheless had to be a part of learning. He took the same fragment as Ku Yen-wu had from the beginning of Analects 6.27 as his point of departure: “The gentleman with broad learning in culture and brought back to essentials by rites ...” With reference to this fragment, Wang explained that

reading history also is part of being broadly [learned] in the cultural tradition, but Master Ch’eng [probably Ch’eng I] criticized Hsieh Liang-tso (1050–1103) for amusing himself with things [in the historical records] and thereby losing his moral commitment. What [Ch’eng] disliked about [Hsieh’s] losing his moral commitment was that he was being amused (lung). Being amused is what is called being pleased and playing around with something. Such [historical accounts] as the annals of Hsiang Yü [who contended to succeed as ruler after the collapse of the Ch’in dynasty in 207 BCE] in the Shih chi and the biographies of Tou Ying and Kuan Fu [in Han shu 52] are saturated with delightfully revealing details. When readers immerse themselves and do not put [the accounts] aside, they displace the usual emotional responses [we have in reading about the past]. Their spirits are dissipated and lose self-restraint.

Wang accepted Ch’eng’s criticism of someone’s finding only pleasure in reading historical accounts, but he also pointed out that some readers similarly amused themselves reading in the classical texts, with the same bad effects. “The commentaries [of the Spring and autumn annals, especially the Tso commentary] have a host of passages of this sort.” The solution, according to Wang, was to balance the broadening effect of reading by constraining or disciplining it with ritual, as said in the Analects passage. “If, approaching every [historical or classical text] with a reverential mind, and referencing each section, item, word, and sentence back to one’s own mind, one seeks to join it all into that which enlarges his moral commitment, then ‘broadening’ cannot be transgressive and the ritual observance is always present.” Wang pointed to several recent publications of historical compilations that “sought to contribute to others’ amusement, but Li Chih’s Ts‘ang shu (Book to conceal) was even more harmful. Those who are morally committed are not misled by it, so it can be

of broad learning in the cultural tradition.”\footnote{Wang Fu-chih, *Ssu wen lu*, *Ssu chieh*, “Ssu chieh,” p. 2.} In other words, Wang Fu-chih was not deterred by Li Chih’s notorious writings that upset conventional, moralizing judgments. Wang was doing something similar, though less flamboyantly. Wang Fu-chih’s comments on the historical record adopt a “realistic” standpoint, in the sense of eschewing finding the morality “in” the events. For Wang, the morality or values are in the physical heart of the prepared, or committed, reader. Thus his own writings thrust his value judgments on his readers. For example, he was strongly committed to denouncing invasions of the central state (*chung kuo*) by outsiders, such as Jurchens in Sung times and Manchus in his own time.\footnote{The classical account of Wang Fu-chih’s approach to writing about history is Chi Wen-fu, “Wang Ch’uan-shan ti shih-hsüeh fang-fa lun,” in Chi Wen-fu, *Wang Ch’uan-shan hsüeh-shu lun-tsung* (Peking, 1962), pp. 1–32. Also see Huang Ming-t’ung and Lü Hsi-ch’en, *Wang Ch’uan-shan li-shih kuan yü shih-lun yen-chiu* (Changsha, 1986), which stresses Wang’s patriotism and materialism.} This meant these works of his could not be published until more than a century later, when the Ch’ing government was otherwise preoccupied and his views found enthusiastic readers.

Wang Fu-chih intended that the broad learning he endorsed would be drawn from more than reading and commenting on historical and classical textual records. It included knowledge built on a continuing basis from our perceived experiences, not from our intuition. Extending Chang Tsai’s approach, Wang stressed the need to persevere in learning in order to take effective moral action. “When one is committed to better understanding, then even if his perceptions are extensive and he makes his knowledge new day by day, he does not as a consequence abandon broadening his learning,”\footnote{Wang Fu-chih, *Chang tzu Cheng meng chu*, “Chung cheng,” p. 133.} but he necessarily maintains that moral impulse to aim to act as a sage. Wang wanted men to be both critical and engaged. He shifted the emphasis in Ch’eng I’s characterization of the process of learning (*hsüeh*) as constituted by broadening one’s learning, questioning, and sincere conduct. Analytic thinking (*ssu*) was necessary, too. Wang’s extra step was to stress that the conduct, or practice, part of learning had been overlooked (implicitly by followers of Chu Hsi), and that the mere process of discussing learning had been taken as “learning” even when it did not involve any concrete actions.\footnote{Wang Fu-chih, *Tu Ssu shu ta ch’üan shuo*, ch. 4, 13b, in *Ch’uan-shan ch’üan chi*, Volume 9, p. 6438.}

When Wang Fu-chih was young, the question of how to learn (*hsüeh*) was predominantly answered by Chu Hsi in his gloss on the pivotal passage in the *Great learning*: the extension of knowing (*chih chih*) is a consequence of investigating things (*ko wu*), which in turn is associated with fathoming coherence (*ch’iung li*). In his shift away from Chu Hsi and his followers, Wang pointed to Confucius’ speaking of learning (*hsüeh*) and understanding (*shih*) in reference...
to himself in *Analects* 7.2. Wang Fu-chih allowed that learning “is a matter of investigating things and extending knowing,”\(^{200}\) but for Wang, and not, in his view, for Chu Hsi’s followers, these were both activities directed at external phenomena, not inner mental activities. This distinction is implied by Confucius’ separate use of the term “understanding.” For Wang, “Understanding is a matter of having a corrected heart and fulfilled intentions.”\(^{201}\) Moreover, Wang dropped Chu Hsi’s crucial addition of fathoming coherence. Instead, Wang turned to the new idea advanced by Fang I-chih in his recently published book *Wu li hsiao chih* (*Notes on the patterns of things*) of 1664.\(^{202}\) “Fang I-chih and his sons pursued learning based on material investigations (*chih* *ts’e*), actualizing learning and thinking as well as extending concrete achievements. Now the investigating of things is [a process of] going out to external things in order to fathom their patterns, but it can only be done by material investigations. Those, such as Shao Yung (1011–77) and Ts’ai Yüan-ting (1135–98), who posited a single principle (*li*) [such as numerical relationships in Shao’s case and musical relationships in Ts’ai’s] in order to fathom things are not actually investigating things.”\(^{203}\)

Wang Fu-chih spent the last decades of his life in relative isolation in Hunan. He wrote prolifically and expressed his new thinking in his comments on past texts. He did not develop a system of thought. If he had what Huang Tsung-hsi might recognize as a master purpose (*tsung-chih*), it would be his pervasive attempts to pull his potential readers away from what he regarded as abstract or empty concepts, such as Chu Hsi’s coherence and Wang Yang-ming’s mind. Treating coherence and mind as merely words, Wang emphasized that material particles (*ch’i*), and especially their manifestations as things, are what our cognitive faculties interact with through perceptions and reflective thinking. This approach had precedents, and was pursued by some of his contemporaries and also by later thinkers, so it is hard to say what was “missed” by Wang’s writings being kept out of circulation until long after his death.

Wang Fu-chih himself expressed dissatisfaction about his achievements. On the eve of his death in 1692, he composed a couplet as his own tomb inscription that negatively assessed two main strands in his life. “He embraced a lonely, frustrated indignation (fen) like Liu K’un’s [at his inability to restore the Chin dynasty in the early fourth century], which was not destined to be successful. He aspired to the correct learning of Chang Tsai, for which his strength was

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\(^{200}\) Wang Fu-chih, *Tu Ssu shu ta ch’üan shuo*, ch. 5, 19a, in *Ch’uan-shan ch’üan chi*, Volume 9, p. 6531.

\(^{201}\) Wang Fu-chih, *Tu Ssu shu ta ch’üan shuo*, ch. 5, 19a, in *Ch’uan-shan ch’üan chi*, Volume 9, p. 6531.

\(^{202}\) See above, on Fang I-chih.

not sufficient.” Wang Fu-chih’s unyielding integrity, like his contributions to learning, did not receive recognition until more than a century after his death.

The climate for the advancement of learning began to change in the late 1670s. At the beginning of the seventeenth century, when the Ming dynasty still ruled, imperial government had only minimal positive involvement in literati’s pursuits of learning. For example, in the 1590s a grand secretary sponsored an initiative to compile materials for a history of the first 200 years or so of the Ming dynasty, but direct government involvement in the project quickly dissipated. In the first three decades of Ch’ing rule, that was still the case, even though by the mid-1650s the overt dangers and disruptions associated with the new dynasty’s military-backed takeover had abated in the north and largely subsided in Chiang-nan. In contrast, in the last two decades of the seventeenth century and on into the eighteenth century, the Ch’ing government, including the emperor himself and certain officials and offices with specific charges and staffs, as well as serving and former high-ranking civil officials acting privately, were taking on major roles in the production of learning.

The change of climate occurred too late to have much effect on the first generation of Ch’ing thinkers discussed in chapters 11 and 12. They were born in the 1610s and if they were not dead they were in their sixties by the 1670s. The men identified as the second generation, mostly born in the 1630s, were in their mature years when the change began. Each of them had already turned or returned to his particular path of learning and had been writing while maintaining his stance of not collaborating; that is, not sitting for examinations or serving as an official in the Ch’ing government. Some of the first generation had survived being involved in the resistance associated with a succession of would-be Ming governments in the south. Only a few had been apprehended, but they remained vulnerable because of those earlier activities, even when their printed work included an endorsing preface from a serving

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Ch’ing official. All of the first generation developed their ideas and wrote what they wrote without officials, as delegates of the Ch’ing government, at any level exerting a detectable positive or guiding influence on their endeavors in the 1650s, 1660s and on into the 1670s.

At the same time, men of the first and second generations were aware of negative constraints, if not in what they wrote then certainly in what could be openly circulated or printed. Any expressions that could be construed as favoring the defeated Ming cause could put the writer in jeopardy, whether through extortion or legal proceedings. Most, if not all, of the writers knew of the devastating case in Chekiang in the early 1660s when some seventy men were sentenced to execution for their involvement in a private attempt to publish a general work on the history of the Ming period. Ku Yen-wu himself escaped being implicated in the case, but he knew and wrote sympathetically about two of the men who lost their lives. In 1668 Ku was jailed and tried in Shantung on an accusation of having been involved in his deceased brother-in-law’s earlier compilation of late Ming poems that included unacceptable words favoring the Ming dynasty and other men’s anti-Ch’ing sentiments. Ku’s connections with serving officials enabled him to escape the charge. Huang Tsung-hsi, with a more culpable past, also was protected by well-placed admirers. Fang I-chih died under a cloud of accusations in 1671, possibly because his unpublished writings contained evidence that his connections with the Ming cause in the late 1640s had not ended. Wang Fu-chih lived furtively and most of his many writings remained unpublished until the nineteenth century. There are many more examples that show that in early Ch’ing, before the 1670s, writers even if not in service to the government understood that there were risks that constrained what they could write, but no one was accused of criticizing Sung or Ming interpretations of ethical and textual issues or for new thinking. Threats came over writings relating to late Ming historical events and about what might be construed as denigrations of northern outsiders at any time.

The Ch’ing government in the Shun-chih period was not much involved in issues of how to pursue learning. Instead, the new government’s attentions

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2 See chapter 14 by Wang Fan-sen, below in this volume. On the other hand, T’an Ch’ien (1594–1658) in late Ming privately compiled, and in the 1640s and 1650s recompiled and expanded, a chronology of Ming history that was especially detailed for early Ming and the last two decades of Ming. His manuscript was unpublished, and survived largely unknown until it was edited and printed in the 1950s. See Goodrich and Chaoying Fang, *Dictionary of Ming biography*, pp. 1239–41; and T’an Ch’ien, *Kuo ch’üeh* (Peking, 1958).


were more directed to establishing local and territorial control, regularizing recruitment and appointment procedures, and suppressing lingering and potential resistance so that remaining advocates of a Ming restoration could not recover from successive retreats and defeats. By 1662 the last Ming claimants to lead the defunct dynasty were dead. That was also the year the reign of the nine-year-old K'ang-hsi emperor began, although he did not displace his regents and achieve direct rule until he was a teenager. K'ang-hsi confronted a new challenge in 1673, when Wu San-kuei, the general in control of the far southwestern provinces of Kweichow and Yunnan, was maneuvered by the emperor and some of his advisers into declaring himself in rebellion against the government in Peking. Wu initially attracted allies among leading Ch'ing military and civil officials across the southern, western, and northwestern provinces. The Manchu leadership struggled to mobilize to resist the rebellion and regain control, and gradually the emperor's forces prevailed. As a former Ming general who had switched to serve the Manchus in the spring of 1644, Wu San-kuei did not attract support from literati who were non-collaborators when he proclaimed his intention to restore the Ming dynasty. The military campaigns lingered on into the 1680s, but even before Wu died in 1678 the young emperor had already planned to take another calculated risk.

GOVERNMENT INITIATIVES IN SPONSORING LEARNING

In the first month of 1678, when the K'ang-hsi emperor was in his twenty-fifth year, he announced in an edict that since its inception his dynasty had honored scholars and held regular examinations to select men of talent. Now he was ordering his high-ranking officials in the capital and in the provinces to recommend men of high scholarly attainment and moral probity, whether already serving in government positions or not, to be summoned to the capital for a special recruitment examination. The emperor's intentions, or ulterior motives, in summoning scholars who had not passed through the regular examination system and were not officials, as well as ones who were degree holders and officials, have been the subject of speculation but remain unknown. However, his order marked a consequential change in the relation between independent scholars and those with official standing.

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6 Li Fu-sun, Ho cheng ch'ien lu, ch. 23, in Chao tai ti'ung shu (n.p.: Shih-chieh t'ang, 1833), pp. 5a-b. Li Fu-sun continued the work of Li Chi, who is sometimes credited as the author. Also see Lai Yü-ch'in, Po-hsüeh hung-ju yü Ch'ing ch'u hsüeh-shu chuan pien (Peking, 2010); and Hellmut Wilhelm, “The Po-hsüeh hung-ju examination of 1679,” Journal of the American Oriental Society 71 No. 1 (1951), pp. 60–6.
Even before 1678 the Ch'ing government had initiated compilation projects that had scholarly implications and had regular officials in charge. For example, after a short treatise on the Hsiao ching (Classic on being filial) was produced in the name of the eighteen-year-old Shun-chih emperor in 1656, a large-scale compilation of texts related to the Hsiao ching was ordered.\(^7\) The project languished. In 1676 the top-ranked chin-shih of 1659, Hsü Yüan-wen (1634–91), who was then serving in the Hanlin Academy, was put in charge of completing the work. After Hsü left office to return home to mourn for his mother later that year, his colleague Yeh Fang-ai (1629–82) took over. Yeh was Hsü’s fellow chin-shih of 1659, ranked third; he was from the same county in Chiang-nan; he also was in the Hanlin Academy with Hsü. By 1682, when Yeh died, the compilers under his direction had assembled 100 chüan of materials on being filial. They were organized by the status of the person – from emperor down to ordinary man – exhibiting filial behavior. Each section presented extracts from annotations and elaborations on the words of the classic itself and illustrious examples from various sources. Chu Hsi was a prominent source of comments. Graced with a preface by the K'anghsi emperor that stressed the importance of the principle of filial behavior in successful governance, the compilation was finally printed in 1690 as the Hsiao ching yen-i (Extended meanings of the Classic on being filial), under Yeh Fang-ai’s name.\(^8\)

A more prestigious project with broad political implications also lingered for decades. In 1645 a group of newly appointed grand secretaries (t'ai hsüeh-shih), including Feng Ch'üan (1595–1672) and Ning Wan-wo (d. 1665), who was a Han-chün bannerman in the Red Banner, were ordered to direct an office to begin compiling a history of the Ming dynasty.\(^9\) Little was done for three decades beyond gathering and perhaps tampering with official records. The expectation went unfulfilled that a “standard history” (cheng-shih) should be compiled.\(^10\) This changed with the K'äng-hsi emperor’s announcement in 1678 that provided the momentum to produce an imperially sponsored history of the Ming dynasty, which by then was definitively ended.

The high officials ordered by the emperor in 1678 to recommend men with broad learning and high scholarly attainment for the special examination must have depended on personal contacts and reputations to gather names. The details of men who had passed the provincial or metropolitan

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7 Hummel, Eminent Chinese of the Ch'ing period, p. 258.
8 Yeh Fang-ai et al., Hsiao ching yen-i (Peking, 1690), copy in the Princeton University Library collection. Also see Hummel, Eminent Chinese of the Ch'ing period, pp. 327, 902.
9 Li Chin-hua, Ming shih tsuan-hsiu k'ao (1933), Volume 1 of Ming shih lun ts'ang (Taipei, 1968), p. 1.
10 Li Chin-hua, Ming shih tsuan-hsiu k'ao, p. 25.
examinations were on file in the Ministry of Rites, and in the Ministry of Personnel if they had been appointed to an office. Few of the men to be considered for recommendation had published scholarly works that demonstrated their achievements. The men who had declined to compete in the Ch'ing examinations – that is, non-collaborators and younger men affiliated with them – also had published little, although some of them had manuscript copies of their scholarly work in circulation.

The case of Ku Yen-wu is instructive. It is easy to see that his public prominence as a learned man attracted attention in Chiang-nan and in the north. A proposal to recommend Ku was floated by Yeh Fang-ai. Yeh's background and career linked him to Hsü Yüan-wen, the son of Ku's younger sister, who was Ku's host in Peking in 1669 and later.\footnote{Peterson, “The life of Ku Yen-wu (1613–1682), part 2,” p. 224.} Yeh may not have met Ku, but he must have known of him before 1678. He also was aware of Ku's refusal to seek office under the Ch'ing. Although no direct evidence is available, the presumption is that Ku Yen-wu's being able to avoid having his name recommended in 1678 had to do with the influence exerted by his three nephews who had already held official positions in the capital, although they were home in mourning in 1678.\footnote{Hsieh Kuo-chen, Ku T'ing-lin hsüeh-p'u (Shanghai, 1957), p. 13; and Peterson, “The life of Ku Yen-wu (1613–1682), part 2,” pp. 236–7.} In contrast, Huang Tsung-hsi was not able to evade having his name submitted by Yeh Fang-ai. Huang was summoned, but his plea of illness was accepted as preventing him from arriving in the capital for the examination.\footnote{Li Fu-sun, Ho cheng ch'ien lu, 39a.} For Ku and the other non-collaborators, the danger was that if their names were recommended, then the emperor might summon them, and to refuse the imperial summons would risk reprisals for offending the authority of the government. What happened to Fu Shan (1607–84) illustrates the pressures that could be brought to bear.

From T'ai-yüan in central Shansi, Fu Shan failed what turned out to be his last attempt in a provincial examination in 1642. After the Ch'ing conquest of the area, Fu wore a yellow hat and gown like a Taoist cleric, and he never sat for a Ch'ing examination. In 1654 he was imprisoned on an accusation of having contacts with the southern Ming resistance. In the years after his release, Fu Shan supported himself as a medical practitioner, and he also gained renown as an innovative calligrapher with broad knowledge of past models of writing. Ku Yen-wu stayed with Fu Shan in 1663 on his first trip to Shansi, and then again on several of Ku's later trips.\footnote{Yin Hsieh-li, “Fu Shan nien-p'u,” in Fu Shan, Fu Shan ch'üan shu (T'ai-yüan: Shansi, 1991), Volume 7, pp. 5205, 5255, 5293–5, 5300, 5315, 5325, 5329, 5340–1. Also see Peterson, “The
written lengthy manuscripts on early history, it was perhaps more for his skills and knowledge as a calligrapher that he was nominated. Fu Shan’s pleas to be excused because of age and ill health were not allowed. He insisted he would not go to Peking, but officials in T'ai-yüan ordered that he forcibly be carried to the capital in the seventh month of 1678. There he refused all attempts to persuade or coerce him to enter the walls. He threatened suicide. Finally, Fu was allowed to return home without waiting for the examination, and he was awarded an honorary official rank by the emperor for “attending.” After the examination in the spring of 1679, the emperor excused Fu Shan and others who missed it from being obliged to attend again.

A similarly dramatic case involved Fu Shan’s acquaintance, Li Yung (1627–1705), who lived in Sian prefecture, Shensi. Li’s teachings emphasized moral cultivation, and he was suspicious of broad learning, as he told Ku Yen-wu when Ku called on him in 1663, but that did not disqualify him from being considered for recommendation to attend the special examination of men with broad learning. Li’s reputation as a teacher promoting moral integrity, and perhaps his status as a non-collaborator, were enough to induce provincial officials in Shensi to submit his name. Li was pressured by local officials in spite of his plea of illness. He insisted he would not go, even at the pain of death if they tried to force him. The provincial governor relented, and Li Yung was listed as not able to attend the examination because he was ill.

By one reckoning, 186 men were summoned in 1678 for the special examination to test men with broad learning and outstanding scholarship (po hsüeh hung ju). This was the well-precedented phrase used in the K'ang-hsi emperor’s edicts to refer to the qualities of the men he was intending to examine personally and recruit. As they began to assemble in the capital, the emperor accepted the proposal from his Manchu grand secretary, Songgotu (d. 1703), that a monthly stipend of three taels of silver and thirty liters of rice be provided for those candidates who had arrived in the capital and were waiting for the examination to be scheduled. The emperor cited cold weather as his reason for delaying, and then in the second month of 1679 he directed the Ministry of

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15 Li Fu-sun, Ho ch'eng ch'ien lu, 33a; and Yin Hsieh-li, “Fu Shan nien-p’u,” pp. 5340–5344.
16 Li Fu-sun, Ho ch'eng ch'ien lu, 11b. 17 See above, in chapter 11.
19 Li Fu-sun, Ho ch'eng ch'ien lu, 40a–b. Wu Huai-ch'ing, “Li Erh-ch'ü nien-p’u,” pp. 80–4. This year, 1678, Li Yung exchanged several letters with Ku Yen-wu, who was successfully avoiding being recommended. Wu Huai-ch'ing, p. 85.
20 Li Fu-sun, Ho ch'eng ch'ien lu, 5a, 7a and 68a. My numbers in this discussion are derived from Li Fu-sun’s data. Others give slightly different numbers. The examination was, and is, also referred to as the po-hsüeh hung-tz’u examination.
Personnel to set the date.\textsuperscript{21} The examination was held in the T’i-jen hall on the first day of the third month of 1679. Of those recommended and summoned, thirty-three men, including Huang Tsung-hsi and Li Yung, were listed as excused because of illness, mourning, or age. Officially 143 candidates sat for the examination, under the personal supervision of the emperor.\textsuperscript{22}

One of the two main parts of the examination was to compose a poetic exposition (fu) based on an enigmatic four-word phrase from the “Shun tien” section of the classic Book of documents (Shang shu, or Venerated writings). The four words, hsüan chi yü heng, had attracted a long train of explanations, with some commentators proposing they named some sort of astronomy-related instruments used in antiquity for observing the relative positions of the sun, moon, and five planets. This exact passage had been the subject of a discussion between the K’ang-hsi emperor and a few advisers, including Yeh Fang-ai, in the second month of 1678.\textsuperscript{23} The emperor was combining his new knowledge of astronomy and calendar-related matters with his increasing mastery of the texts of the classics. The candidates in the examination were expected to demonstrate their writing abilities as well as their detailed knowledge of a classical text that dealt with a sage ruler’s concern with celestial observations.\textsuperscript{24}

Fifty men passed.\textsuperscript{25} All of them, even those currently serving in capital or provincial posts, were assigned to work on compiling a history of the Ming dynasty and were awarded ranked positions, many in the Hanlin Academy, that were congruent with the different ranks, if any, that they already held.\textsuperscript{26}

Whatever the K’ang-hsi emperor’s motives were in holding the special examination and then assigning all fifty who passed to work on compiling a history of the Ming dynasty, the process brought in few men who had not already demonstrated their willingness to serve the new dynasty. This result does not sustain the prevalent interpretation that the emperor held the examination primarily to entice or trap non-collaborators, sometimes called Ming loyalists, into serving in his government.\textsuperscript{27} More than half of the fifty

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\item \textsuperscript{21} Li Fu-sun, Ho cheng ch‘ien lu, pp. 5b–6a.
\item \textsuperscript{22} The number 143 is given in Chung-kuo ti-i li-shih tang-an-kuan, K’ang-hsi ch‘i ch‘u chu (Peking, 1984), Volume 1, p. 403, under the first day of the third month.
\item \textsuperscript{23} K’ang-hsi ch‘i ch‘u chu, Volume 1, p. 353.
\item \textsuperscript{24} CSL-KH, 80.1b. Li Fu-sun, Ho cheng ch‘ien lu, 7a–b. See the discussion of the four-word phrase in Elman’s chapter in Cambridge History of China, Volume 9, Part 1, p. 488. Also see Chu Pingyi’s chapter in this volume, on the K‘ang-hsi emperor’s involvement in learning about astronomy, and Willard J. Peterson, “Changing literati attitudes toward new learning in astronomy and mathematics in early Qing,” Monumenta Serica 50 (2002), pp. 386–7.
\item \textsuperscript{25} Li Fu-sun, Ho cheng ch‘ien lu, 7b–8a, lists all fifty names. \textsuperscript{26} Li Fu-sun, Ho cheng ch‘ien lu, 8a.
\item \textsuperscript{27} A representative expression of this interpretation is in Frederic Wakeman Jr., The great enterprise: The Manchu reconstruction of imperial order in seventeenth-century China (Berkeley, 1985), p. 1083: “The Kangxi Emperor’s decision to hold the special examination ... was such a vital gesture of welcome to the
successful candidates already had attained a chin-shih or provincial degree in the Ch'ing examination competition. All of those men had served at least briefly in the Ch'ing government. Of the seventeen who passed without a higher degree, only five were listed as having no degree status at all. They were labeled unranked literati (pu-i). By virtue of their never having passed, and probably never having attempted, even a prefectural-level examination under the Ch'ing dynasty, the five men can be considered to have had no formal involvement with the new dynasty. In that sense, they were non-collaborators (i-min). At the same time, they were too young to have incurred their own direct obligation to be loyal (chung) to the Ming dynasty. The oldest of the five unranked literati, Chu I-tsun (1629–1709), did not take a Ming or Ch'ing examination until 1679, although for many years he had served on the staffs of Ch'ing officials in several provinces as a teacher or secretary. All the while he was acquiring specialized knowledge of bibliographical and epigraphical resources and personal connections with scholars. Chu I-tsun met Ku Yen-wu in T'ai-yüan in 1666, and thereafter they stayed in correspondence. Chu sent corrections to some of Ku's drafts in circulation. The youngest of the five, P'an Lei (1646–1708), who also was the youngest man to take the examination, had his own reasons for staying away from serving the Ch'ing other than indirect loyalty to the Ming dynasty. He was the young brother of one of the men executed in the aftermath of the 1662 Ming history case. He went north to Shantung to become the declared disciple of Ku Yen-wu in 1669. Ku knew the capital official who recommended P'an's name, but he did not impede either the recommendation or P'an's going to the examination. Ku did write a letter to the grand secretary who recommended another of the five unranked literati, Li Yin-tu (1631–92). Ku's letter urged that Li be excused because he had to care for his elderly mother, a plea that was not honored. The examination recruited candidates from Chekiang, Kiangsu, and Anhui, the region that experienced some of the most intense resistance to the Ch'ing takeover in the 1640s. The region provided more than two-thirds of the men summoned and a slightly higher proportion of the men who passed, higher percentages than in the regular, quota-controlled metropolitan examinations. Holding the special examination and then assigning the successful candidates

loyalists,” and “Kangxi was hoping to keep the old Ming loyalists from joining Wu Sangui.” Wu's rebellion was already waning by 1678, and none of the prominent non-collaborators had moved to join it. Also Spence, "The K'ang-hsi reign," p. 148, asserts, "The special examination was designed to integrate those of wavering or unproven loyalty into the regime."

28 Li Fu-sun, Ho cheng ch'ien lu, 10a–b. There were several more pu-i who failed the examination.

29 Lai Yü-ch'in, Po-hsi̍eh hsiung-fu, pp. 93–4.

30 Li Fu-sun, Ho cheng ch'ien lu, 17a, 20b and 23a. Also see Peterson, "The life of Ku Yen-wu (1613–1682), part 2," p. 239; and Hummel, Eminent Chinese of the Ch'ing period, pp. 183, 606, 616.
to work together on compiling a history of the Ming dynasty brought learned men together in the capital for a sustained period to participate in a scholarly endeavor. This project had a major effect on scholarly production over the next few decades.

Compiling a history of the Ming dynasty

A range of motives can be posited for why the men who had been specifically recruited for their broad learning were in Peking to take the examination in 1679. In a cautionary letter written at about this time to his student P’an Lei, Ku Yen-wu asserted that seeking examination success induced men to think of profiting themselves, and that publishing their personal writings induced men to think of enhancing their own reputations:

In general, that men of today pursue learning only to profit themselves is exemplified in the examinations. That other men, better than this, pursue literary endeavors and write books that can be passed down only to make a reputation for themselves is exemplified by all the so-called men of culture (wen jen) of the three hundred years of the Ming dynasty. A true noble man’s (chün-tzu) pursuing learning is not to gain profit for himself. Having a heart of a good man that is clear about the Way and being aware of how in the past chaotic conditions were turned back to what is correct, and also understanding how the situation of the empire has come to the extreme situation that it is in, he [the noble man] thinks about doing something and how to help save it.31

Each of these three motives – profit, reputation, and saving the world – might be discerned in the conduct of the group of men who took the special examination in 1679. For those men who were serving as county magistrates or in other low-ranking local posts, the examination could have represented the opportunity to move their careers onto a better path with an appointment in the capital. For men already serving in Peking, the examination offered the possibility of promotion to higher-ranked, more scholarly offices. Those with less than a provincial degree could see in a single, fast-track examination a chance at an appointment to a position. All of these possibilities presume a self-interested motive in taking the examination but cannot be demonstrated. More revealing is what some of those who passed did after being assigned to participate in producing a history of the Ming dynasty as a government project.

Some of the men came out of retirement after serving in the Ch’ing government. T’ang Pin (1627–87), a northerner from Honan, attained his provincial

degree in 1648 and a low-ranked *chin-shih* degree in 1652. He served a few years in literary offices in the capital, including in the historical records office, and then a few more years in various provincial posts. He retired on a plea of illness in 1659. After mourning his father’s death in 1664, T’ang became involved with moral philosophy, perhaps to rehabilitate his reputation in certain circles after his earlier embrace of service to the Manchus. T’ang went several times to visit the venerable Sun Ch’i-feng, who was living in Honan and about to print his account of the correct tradition of moral philosophy since Sung times that glossed over the differences between Chu Hsi and Wang Yang-ming. Sun, who died in 1675, praised T’ang Pin as someone who was uncompromising in acting with moral humaneness. This was a strong endorsement from a man famous for not collaborating with the Ch’ing government. In turn, T’ang wrote a preface for Sun’s book and promoted Sun’s idea of the unity of a classics-based tradition that emphasized personal effort in moral cultivation. By demonstrating his commitment to moral integrity, T’ang may have facilitated his path back into the emperor’s service at a high level after twenty years out of office. Passing the special examination in 1679, T’ang worked on the Ming history. He is credited with authoring many *chüan* of essays and biographies. He was appointed one of the directors in 1682. That year he claimed in a memorial to the emperor that much of the drafting was done and revisions were under way. By then T’ang Pin had attracted the confidence of the K’ang-hsi emperor, and he was moving on to other posts, later becoming a governor of Kiangsu province. Although T’ang Pin was honored by the emperor, and by the successor emperors to the end of the dynasty, his contributions to producing the history of the Ming were not the cause. He suited another of the emperor’s purposes. For T’ang Pin, the 1679 examination and the assignment to the Ming history group served as stepping-stones in restarting his career as a trusted official with access to the emperor. Wang Wan (1624–91) exhibited different motives. From Soochow and with a 1655 *chin-shih* degree, Wang served in posts mostly connected to the Ministry of Revenue until he retired home in 1670. He enhanced his reputation as a writer of exemplary prose by printing a collection of over sixty *chüan* of his prose and poetry in the mid-1670s. This book contributed to his being recommended for the special examination. After passing, Wang

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33 See above, chapter 11.

34 Quoted in Lai Yü-ch’in, *Po-hsüeh hang-ju*, p. 79.


36 Li Chin-hua, *Ming shih tsuan-hsin k’ao*, p. 29.

37 See below, in this chapter.

38 Li Fu-sun, *Ho cheng ch’ien lu*, 21b–22a; Li Chin-hua, *Ming shih tsuan-hsin k’ao*, p. 78; and Hummel, *Eminent Chinese of the Ch’ing period*, p. 840.
Wan received an appointment to the Hanlin Academy to work on the history of the Ming dynasty. He stayed only two years, but is credited with writing nearly 200 biographies. Wang retired to Soochow and his own writings, which he reassembled into a shortened collection of his prose in only forty chüan. This collection was handsomely printed in 1693, and a century later was included in the Ssu-k'u ch'üan shu. Although Wang made a major contribution in drafting parts of the Ming history, he continued to be seen more as a writer (a man of culture, in Ku Yen-wu's sense of the term) than as a historian or scholar. Wang went to Peking in 1678 to participate in an important writing project, and he did not stay long enough to hold other appointments, as some of his colleagues did. In contrast to Wang Wan, T'ang Pin was more of an advocate of an integrated view of learning about moral teachings and wanted to be a high official serving his emperor's interests.

The motives of the unranked literati, who passed without ever having served, seem of a different sort. They generally are treated in later histories as non-collaborators (i-min). Chu I-tsun went to the examination on recommendations from important officials for whom he had worked, and with respect from men of learning such as Ku Yen-wu. Chu and Ku met in T'ai-yüan, Shansi, in 1666. Two years later, Chu was serving as a secretary for the governor of Shantung and may have helped effect Ku's release from jail there. By 1678 Chu had already printed a collection of his miscellaneous writings. His accomplishments in several fields of learning, including collecting rubbings of stone inscriptions, were well regarded. Proud and confident, Chu was prepared when he passed in 1679 to express his ideas about the scholarly standards to be observed in producing the history of the Ming period. He argued for critically handling the official sources, especially the veritable records (shih-lu) for each reign. He urged supplementing them by drawing on manuscripts, rubbings, and printed works from the entire Ming period, including materials held in private libraries.

Appointed to the Hanlin Academy, Chu worked for four years on Ming history. He also worked on his own scholarly projects, which included collecting bibliographical information and writing a history of the Hanlin Academy. In a preface Chu I-tsun recalled, “In my middle years I was fond of copying books. After I became an official [in 1679], I had to borrow and copy materials held in the bureau of historiography and in the collections of learned literati and

39 Li Chin-hua, Ming shih tsuan-hsiu k'ao, p. 78.
40 Hummel, Eminent Chinese of the Ch'ing period, p. 840.
44 Lai Yü-ch'in, Po-hsiüeh hung-ju, pp. 101–2. Chu I-tsun cautioned against relying too much on the ti-pao. See Li Chin-hua, Ming shih tsuan-hsiu k'ao, p. 27.
officials in the capital.”

Chu’s official rank was reduced in 1684 when he was found to be bringing his own copyists into the Academy to copy official materials for his own projects. Chu resigned, but he stayed in Peking for a few years as a private scholar with good connections. While there he wrote his own well-documented history of the capital that listed some 1,600 titles as sources. By passing the special examination in 1679, Chu I-tsun made the transition from a self-constrained but well-regarded ordinary literatus (pu-i), one who worked on the staffs of high officials, to being a widely recognized scholar and appreciated writer who, as it turned out, worked on his own as a compiler and bibliographer for his scholarly peers, not for the imperial government. Passing the 1679 examination gave Chu a standing that as a non-collaborator he had chosen not to seek before.

P'an Lei’s path, before and after 1679, was more modest than Chu I-tsun’s. In 1678 P'an was in his early thirties, without status in the examination system, and with no scholarly output. He did not have the relationships through employment by Ch'ing officials that helped Chu. P'an was more clearly a non-collaborator than any other candidate who passed in 1679. And he was poor, so a possible motive for going to the examination was to have a chance at a government salary. P'an’s recognition as a young man of learning derived at least in part from his connection with Ku Yen-wu, whom he formally acknowledged as his teacher. One of the four examiners when P'an passed was Yeh Fang-ai, who had proposed to recommend Ku Yen-wu and who was close to Ku’s nephew, Hsü Yüan-wen. When P'an worked on the Ming history, the director of the project was Hsü Yüan-wen in 1679 and then Yeh Fang-ai. While serving under them, P'an submitted a proposal to the emperor about the need to search more widely for books that could be listed in the comprehensive bibliographical chapters (i-wen chih) of the projected Ming history. His argument, which drew on what his teacher had written, was that 60–70 percent of the books in earlier dynastic histories’ bibliographical chapters, which mostly recorded what was held in capital libraries, were now lost. In those cases when a copy of a book was held by a commoner, it too was likely not to survive over time. P'an pointed out that there was no way of even knowing what was extant from among the writings of Yüan and Ming men.

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45 Chu I-tsun, quoted in Lai Yü-ch’in, Po-hsiüeh hung-ju, p. 103.
46 Lai Yü-ch’in, Po-hsiüeh hung-ju, p. 103.
47 Hummel, Eminent Chinese of the Ch’ing period, p. 183; and Lai Yü-ch’in, Po-hsiüeh hung-ju, p. 34. An official with one of the largest private collections of books, Hsü Ch’ien-hsüeh, wrote a preface for Chu’s book on the capital; they had first met in 1650. Lai Yü-ch’in, Po-hsiüeh hung-ju, pp. 91, 94.
48 Lai Yü-ch’in, Po-hsiüeh hung-ju, p. 90, also stressed Chu’s connections with his peers. She noted that in the eighteenth century Chu ranked with Wang Wăn as an essayist and had high status as a poet.
49 Li Fu-sun, Ho cheng ch’ien lu, 23a; Lai Yü-ch’in, Po-hsiüeh hung-ju, pp. 35, 107; and Hummel, Eminent Chinese of the Ch’ing period, p. 606.
P'an's proposal was that instead of the compilers of the Ming history relying just on those books and documents held in the emperor's or the government's collections, this occasion should be used to initiate a major effort to bring writings from all parts of the empire to the capital.\(^{50}\) In another piece P'an made the argument that the office working on compiling a history of the Ming should be provided with nonofficial materials. He resisted the idea of relying on the veritable records (shih-lu) produced by the bureau of historiography over the course of the Ming dynasty. He pointed out that they were deficient in coverage and accuracy on the suppressed Chien-wen reign (1398–1402) and the aborted Ching-t'ai reign (1450–1456), and also for the final three Ming reigns. P'an named some of the unofficial historical accounts compiled during the Ming dynasty that covered the period before the seventeenth century.\(^{51}\) P'an Lei also urged that privately held copies of documents such as memorials and tomb inscriptions be ordered by the government to be submitted for use in the history office.\(^{52}\) Such nonofficial materials were essential for P'an as he drafted sections of the essays on economic affairs (shih-huo chih).

P'an was a scholar and historian. He was not an official. In a letter to P'an, probably written in 1678, Ku Yen-wu told his leading student what he would find in the capital by describing what Ku himself had witnessed earlier, in 1676, while staying with one of his important nephews:

Currently you are poor and hard-pressed, and have a chance to go to a household of importance. This is something few ordinary men would not want ... If you go, you will associate day and night with bullies and slaves. More than being unable to read and learn, you will certainly suffer by associating with those villains.\(^{53}\)

P'an lasted a few years as an official in Peking. In 1684 he was formally accused of having a bad attitude, as Ku, who was dead by then, had more or less predicted. P'an resigned from his post working on the Ming history and found ways to support his commitment to learning for another twenty years.\(^{54}\) The circumstances suggest that P'an's motive for attending the 1679 examination was not his own profit or fame, but participation in a scholarly project of political and cultural importance.

\(^{50}\) P'an Lei's memorial, quoted in Lai Yü-ch'ın, Po-hsüeh hung-ju, p. 113.


\(^{52}\) P'an Lei's discussion quoted in Lai Yü-ch'ın, Po-hsüeh hung-ju, p. 114.


\(^{54}\) Peterson, "The life of Ku Yen-wu, part 2," p. 242; and Hummel, Eminent Chinese of the Ch'ing period, p. 606.
For some men, the compilation of what would become the standard history of the Ming era also had a personal importance. Although he refused to take the special examination, Ku Yen-wu was still liable to be recruited to serve on the project. This happened to other men. Chiang Ch'en-ying (1628–99), who had failed many times in the regular examinations, was "inadvertently" not recommended for the 1679 examination by Yeh Fang-ai. After the examination, Yeh arranged for Chiang's appointment to the office working on the Ming history. Chiang drafted chapters on Ming law and some biographies. Similarly, one of the men who could not participate in the 1679 examination because he was in mourning was appointed to work on the Ming history on the recommendation of a director, Hsü Yüan-wen. Ku sought to head off the possibility of Yeh's trying to appoint him in a similar manner. Ku wrote Yeh a letter, reminding him that the previous year he had wanted to recommend Ku, but that was stopped. Ku said he had recently heard that in the office working on the history they were again thinking of bringing him in. Of course, Ku wrote, he was inadequate for such a task, as Yeh knew. Then Ku offered another reason why he could not join the project. “My foster mother, living in our house as an unmarried widow, took care of her mother-in-law and looked after me as her adopted son. She was foremost in virtue in Kiangsu.” She had received imperial recognition in 1636 for living as an exemplary chaste widow, and she chose to starve herself to die with her dynasty in 1645. “Her dying command to me, which contained the words, ‘Do not serve another dynasty,’ was written in her tomb inscription. Consequently, others can serve the government, but Yen-wu absolutely cannot ... If I were to be coerced, then I would commit suicide.” And that, Ku pointed out, would only add to his foster mother's reputation for moral integrity. At more or less the same time that he wrote to Yeh Fang-ai, Ku wrote a letter to the directors of the office writing the Ming history. He repeated the points about his foster mother's receiving imperial honors for her virtue and her dying command to him. He reminded them that previous dynastic histories included biographies of virtuous women, and he urged the history office to consider including his foster mother.

55 Hummel, Eminent Chinese of the Ch'ing period, p. 135.
56 Hummel, Eminent Chinese of the Ch'ing period, p. 355.
59 Ku Yen-wu, Ku T'ing-lin shih wen chi, p. 57. Her biography, much abridged from the draft Ku submitted, is in Chang T'ing-yü, Ming shih, 303, p. 7740. That biography stressed her living as a widow after her fiancé died before they could marry, and her cutting off her finger to make the medicine that cured her mother-in-law's illness. It does not mention that she starved herself to death rather than live under the
Ku Yen-wu also wrote a letter of advice to his nephew, Hsü Yuan-wen, in his capacity as the director of the history office. Ku opened with an expression of sympathy. “The men in your office themselves understand the difficulties in compiling a history.” One of the difficulties that Ku pointed to was gathering materials from around the empire. When an official notice to submit materials arrived in a local community, the people there, not wanting to be bothered, would report that they had no relevant writings. Or payments would be involved. Ku had a suggestion for his nephew. He remembered as a boy listening to his grandfather discussing with his friends the events they had read about in the capital reports (ti pao). These had circulated in manuscript until 1638, when they began to be printed in various versions. The history office could ask if households of literati and officials had any old copies. They could be used to get the details right about the last few Ming reigns, for which the official records were deficient. Ku also pointed to the Yuan shih (History of the Yuan), which had been compiled hastily in the Hung-wu reign (1368–98) at the beginning of the Ming dynasty. It was riddled with errors and most inadequate, in Ku’s judgment. Even though Ku Yen-wu clearly refused appointment to the Ming history project, he still wanted to make the finished product better. P’an Lei, in his different but related circumstances, may have held a similar intention.

Huang Tsung-hsi did not take the 1679 examination, but he, too, had a strong interest in producing a history of the Ming dynasty. He wrote letters to officials working on the project, including T’ang Pin, and he submitted copies of manuscript materials he had collected. Huang advised on the content of the drafts of the essays on geography and the calendar. He allowed his youngest son, born in 1643, to go to the capital to help in the work on the history without official standing. Most importantly, one of Huang’s leading students, Wan Ssu-t’ung, also went to Peking, with a send-off from Huang.

Wan Ssu-t’ung (1638–1702) is the prime example of someone who was not motivated by personal profit linked to examination success or to fame linked to publishing one’s own literary writings. Wan’s father had studied under Liu Tsung-chou in Chekiang in the late 1610s, and had met Huang Tsung-hsi in the early 1630s. It was almost inevitable that Wan Ssu-t’ung, with his mother and father both dead, would go with the three younger of his seven older brothers in 1659 to begin studying under Huang.

Ch’ing dynasty. Huang Tsung-hsi also submitted the biography of his deceased mother to the history bureau, and a summary was included in the Ming shih. Huang Ping-hou, Huang Li-chou nien-p’u (Peking, 1993), p. 42.

60 Ku Yen-wu, Ku T’ing-lin shih wen chi, p. 58.
61 Ku Yen-wu, Ku T’ing-lin shih wen chi, p. 58.
62 Ku Yen-wu, Ku T’ing-lin shih wen chi, p. 58.
63 Huang Peng-hou, Huang Li-chou nien-p’u, pp. 42–3.
Tsung-hsi.\textsuperscript{64} Even compared to historically minded contemporaries, Wan was immersed in reading and writing about history. In the 1660s he carefully read all twenty-one dynastic histories. In the 1670s he was teaching in Chekiang in a household that had unofficial manuscript copies of the fifteen verifiable records (\textit{shih-lu}) from the Ming dynasty. Wan consumed them, and they became a major source of knowledge and a focus of his interest in Ming history.\textsuperscript{65} Wan was still connected with Huang Tsung-hsi in 1678, when they both were considered for recommendation by Chekiang officials for the special examination. Because of his known expertise in Ming history, Wan was asked to go to Peking to work on the project without passing the examination. He went, with Huang’s endorsement, but not to accept appointment as an official in the office preparing the Ming history. Instead, Wan unofficially worked on it in the residence of the new director, Hsü Yüan-wen.\textsuperscript{66} Wan stayed on as a guest with Hsü Yüan-wen for more than ten years, even when Hsü in some years was promoted away from the history office to higher positions, finally becoming a grand secretary. Hsü retired in 1690 and died the next year.\textsuperscript{67} During these years, Wan Ssu-t'ung worked on drafts for successive directors of the Ming history project, first Yeh Fang-ai, and then, after he died in 1682, Ch'en T'ing-ching (1639–1712).\textsuperscript{68} By that time over 400 biographies had been drafted.\textsuperscript{69}

In the sixth month of 1684, the K'ang-hsi emperor was traveling northeast of Peking with a group of mostly Manchu advisers. At one overnight stop he prompted an evening discussion about assessing the Han officials who served him as grand secretaries. During the discussion the emperor commented that he had heard that Ch'en T'ing-ching now wanted to revise Yeh Fang-ai's drafts for the Ming history. He asked if it should be done. His advisers had not even heard of the plan. The emperor then observed somewhat gratuitously, “Han men really do not like others to cut and revise what they have written,” and the discussion moved on to other topics.\textsuperscript{70} This seems to indicate that the

\textsuperscript{64} Ch'en Hsün-tzu and Fang Tsu-yu, \textit{Wan Ssu-t'ung nien-p'u} (Hong Kong: Chung-wen ta-hsüeh, 1991), pp. 34–5, 60–1; and Hummel, \textit{Eminent Chinese of the Ch'ing period}, pp. 801–3.

\textsuperscript{65} Ch'en Hsün-tzu and Fang Tsu-yu, \textit{Wan Ssu-t'ung nien-p'u}, pp. 74–6.

\textsuperscript{66} Ch'en Hsün-tzu and Fang Tsu-yu, \textit{Wan Ssu-t'ung nien-p'u}, pp. 118–28, 134. One link between Wan and Hsü before 1679 was Wan’s nephew of his own age. The nephew was in Peking with a lower degree and was known by Hsü. The nephew was recommended by Hsü Yüan-wen to work in the Ming history office, which he did for nearly ten years before accepting appointment as a county magistrate. Hummel, \textit{Eminent Chinese of the Ch'ing period}, p. 804.


\textsuperscript{68} Li Chin-hua, \textit{Ming shih tsuan-hsiu k'ao}, p. 30. \textsuperscript{69} Li Chin-hua, \textit{Ming shih tsuan-hsiu k'ao}, pp. 29–30.

\textsuperscript{70} Chung-kuo ti-i li-shih tang-an-kuan, \textit{K'ang-hsi chi i chi chu}, p. 1194. (23rd year, 6th month, 23rd day).
drafts prepared by the first round of appointees to the history office were not deemed ready to present to the emperor.

The revisions proceeded. In 1694 Wan Su-t'ung moved with the drafts into the residence of the reappointed director, Wang Hung-hsü (1645–1723).71 Wang became a chin-shih in 1673, three years before his elder brother. Their father was a 1648 chin-shih, the beginning of five generations of the Wang family’s service to four Ch'ing emperors.72 In 1682 Wang Hung-hsü began a forty-year association with editing the Ming history when he was appointed a director.73 With intermittent years out of office for mourning and later because of accusations of corruption, Wang was back as a director in 1694, joined by Ch'en T'ing-ching, after the K'ang-hsi emperor ordered his grand secretaries and Hanlin officials to recommend some worthy scholars who could complete the compilation of the Ming history.74 Wang continued to host Wan Su-t'ung and his work until Wan died, in 1702.75 Wang went on to have the rank of minister of works and then of revenue. When he was forced to resign from all offices in 1709, Wang took Wan’s and other manuscript materials home with him to Kiangsu. Revising the drafts with a staff of his own, Wang in 1714 sent the court some 200 chüan of biographies. In his accompanying memorial Wang wrote that while in retirement he had worked with drafts prepared under the direction of T'ang Pin, Yeh Fang-ai, and Hsü Ch'ien-hsüeh (1631–94).76 (Wang left out mention of Wan Su-t'ung, who was not an official.) As a result, Wang was invited back to Peking to complete the Ming history. Just before he died in 1723, Wang Hung-hsü submitted in his own name a manuscript that became known as the Ming shih kao (Draft Ming history).77 But by then the K'ang-hsi emperor, who had started it all, also was dead, and completion of an acceptable manuscript that could be endorsed by the emperor was again delayed.

In the first year of his reign, the Yung-cheng emperor put the completion of the revision of the Ming history under the charge of one of his most trusted Han officials, Chang T'ing-yü (1672–1755). Chang concurrently held a succession of the highest civil offices in the capital, including head of the Hanlin Academy and grand secretary, but those subordinates assigned to the

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72 Hummel, Eminent Chinese of the Ch'ing period, pp. 822–3.
73 Li Chin-hua, Ming shih tsuan-hsiu k'ao, p. 30; and Hummel, Eminent Chinese of the Ch'ing period, p. 826.
74 Li Chin-hua, Ming shih tsuan-hsiu k'ao, p. 30; and Ch'en Hsün-tzu and Fang Tsu-yu, Wan Su-t'ung nien-p'u, pp. 182–3.
76 Li Chin-hua, Ming shih tsuan-hsiu k'ao, p. 31; and Ch'en Hsün-tzu and Fang Tsu-yu, Wan Su-t'ung nien-p'u, p. 224.
77 Li Chin-hua, Ming shih tsuan-hsiu k'ao, pp. 30–2. Wang Hung-hsü's version was later printed under the title Ming shih kao (Taipei, 1962).
history took other posts and not much was done. Chang ordered the editing efforts to restart in 1727–8, and the revising and recopying proceeded over the next few years. When his emperor died in 1735, Chang was awarded the highest civil honors and served as one of the four senior officials charged with guiding the new emperor. Chang T'ing-yü submitted a finished version of the history of the Ming in 1738. In its final form, which is the received version still in use and accepted as the standard dynastic history, it was printed in 1739 as the Ch'in-ting Ming shih (Imperiably ordered Ming history) in 332 chüan, with Chang T'ing-yü named as the compiler.\(^7\) The gestation of the Ming shih was exceptionally long, and it is assumed that some of the delay was due to concerns about Manchu sensibilities over certain matters and persons, including their pre-conquest subordination to Ming emperors and issues of how power and loyalties were transferred, or not, from 1644 on. Chang T'ing-yü had the confidence of his emperors, gained from his father's and his own devoted effectiveness at the highest levels of government. At the beginning of the Ch'ien-lung reign Chang was able to recommend and secure the young emperor's acceptance that a carefully prepared, well-vetted manuscript warranted imperial approval.

From the beginning the political implications of compiling the Ming shih were recognized as significant for everyone involved. It was a government project and ultimately under government control.\(^7\) Emperors and high officials, Han as well as Manchu, understood that they and their future reputations were directly and indirectly implicated in the history that was being made by producing the Ming shih. It was taking a place in the line of the previous twenty-one dynastic histories going back more than 1,600 years.\(^8\) Officials in charge of producing the history, such as Yeh Fang-ai, T'ang Pin, Ch'en T'ing-ching, Wang Hung-hsü, Chang T'ing-yü, and many more, each understood that to have his name attached was a guarantee that his name would be transmitted for generations. Scholarly literati, whether employed on the project, contributing from outside the government, or observing from afar, wanted a reliable record of the Ming dynasty, which had been served by their ancestors and teachers' teachers. But the Ming shih was not simply a memorial to a past dynasty. For many early Ch'ing literati involved in the advancement of learning, it represented a repository of evidence from which it was possible to infer values. That is, they were treating learning from the past as being on

\(^{7}\) Li Chin-hua, Ming shih tsuan-hsiu k'ao, pp. 33–7; Ch'en Hsüen-tzu and Fang Tsu-yu, Wan Sun-t'ang nien-p'u, p. 229; and Hummel, Eminent Chinese of the Ch'ing period, p. 55. Chang T'ing-yü's memorial presenting the printed Ming shih to the Ch'ien-lung emperor is in Chang T'ing-yü, Ming shih, pp. 8629–36. The printed version of 1974 has more than 8,500 pages.

\(^{7}\) This point was stressed in Ng and Wang, Mirror, pp. 239–43.

\(^{8}\) Chang T'ing-yü made this point in his memorial presenting the Ming shih. Chang, Ming shih, p. 8629.
a par with studying the classical texts or explicating the concepts transmitted from the moral philosophers of the Sung dynasty. Chang T'ing-yü referred to this use of the historical past in his memorial presenting the printed Ming shih to the Ch'ien-lung emperor. Chang wrote that the Ming shih would enable readers, by inspecting the traces of past events, to examine texts and find evidence (k'ao cheng) pertaining to the sources of what had succeeded and what had failed. The goal of making success and failure clear was what Ku Yen-wu had in mind for the purpose of the true moral man (chün-tzu). As process and product, the compilation of the Ming shih was an expression of the complex tensions and interactions between government control, through its institutions, and scholars as individual agents working on identifying shared goals.

HIGH OFFICIALS’ INDIVIDUAL INITIATIVES

Concurrently with the compilation and revision of drafts of the Ming shih, other big scholarly projects were initiated not only by the imperial government through its agencies and regularly appointed officials, but also by individual high-level Han officials. Most of these projects were less fraught with political implications than the Ming shih was, but they exhibited similar tensions between government control and individual purposes. Such tensions can be inferred from the activities of Hsü Ch'ien-hsüeh. A 1670 chin-shih, Hsü was the eldest brother of Hsü Yüan-wen and of course a nephew of Ku Yen-wu. While the brothers were in mourning for their mother in the late 1670s, Hsü Ch'ien-hsüeh began to compile texts from earlier sources about rituals, especially for funerals. He recruited other scholars to help expand the compilation as they added sections on other categories of ritual. By the time Hsü died in 1694, the manuscript amounted to 120 chüan. Two years later it was printed by his sons as the Tu li t'ung k'ao (Comprehensive examinations of readings on rituals).

At the same time as he was having the work done for his own big project, Hsü Ch'ien-hsüeh in 1682 briefly succeeded Hsü Yüan-wen and Yeh Fang-ai in directing the compilation of the history of the Ming dynasty. He also accepted the assignment to edit an anthology of ancient-style prose (ku-wen) selected by the emperor. During a discussion with other advisers in the summer of 1684 about his grand secretaries, the K'ang-hsi emperor asked for assessments of Hsü Ch'ien-hsüeh, and he agreed with the praise for Hsü's prose writing. “Who,” he asked rhetorically, “matches Hsü Ch'ien-hsüeh in preparing literary

81 Chang T'ing-yü, Ming shih, p. 8631.
works." As a leading grand secretary, Hsü was appointed in 1686 to assist and then in 1687 to direct the compilation of a revised compendium of geography-related texts covering all the provinces. This compilation eventually became the Ta Ch'ing i-t'ung chib (Gazetteer of the Great Ch'ing integrated domain).

Hsü Ch'ien-hsüeh was an active leader in court politics, and also in scholarly projects and the broader cultural milieu. In the second month of 1690, when Hsü was attending an audience, the emperor asked him if he knew of any more men in the realm who had broad learning and refined writing and of whom the emperor was unaware. Hsü answered that to his knowledge there was only one, Huang Tsung-hsi of Chekiang. Hsü told the emperor that although Huang was eighty, he had not given up writing. To head off a possible criticism from the emperor, Hsü added that Huang had previously been formally recommended by Hsü Yüan-wen. The emperor raised the possibility of summoning Huang to the capital to be considered for an appointment. Hsü replied that years earlier Huang had been unable to attend on the grounds of age and health, a reference to what happened in 1678, and said he worried that Huang would not be able to make the trip now. As Hsü knew, in 1683 Huang Tsung-hsi had made the shorter trip from Hangchow to Soochow prefecture to consult rare books held in Hsü Ch'ien-hsüeh's collection. At the time of his audience, Hsü was under a cloud from accusations of corrupt practices, and that spring (1690) he resigned from all of his high offices.

Hsü Ch'ien-hsüeh invited a few of the scholars working under his direction in the capital to accompany him back to Soochow prefecture. Just as Wan Ssu-t'ung, without an official appointment, had been supported in the residences of officials in Peking to help draft what became the Ming shib, scholars were supported privately by Hsü in the capital and then, in 1690, at his estate near Lake T'ai (T'ai hu). One of those who went was Yen Jo-chü (1636–1704). Yen had failed in the special examination in 1679, already having failed several times in the provincial examinations. Through the 1680s he worked on Hsü Ch'ien-hsüeh's staff in Peking. One of the projects on which he assisted was the geography compendium. Yen stayed two years in the south with Hsü Ch'ien-hsüeh, until the work had to end when Hsü lost his

84 The process of collecting materials on each province was already under way by 1683. See K'ang-hsi ch'i chü chu, pp. 988–9.
85 Huang Ping-hou, Huang Li-chou nien-p'u, p. 47.
86 Huang Ping-hou, Huang Li-chou nien-p'u, p. 44.
87 Hummel, Eminent Chinese of the Ch'ing period, pp. 310, 903.
89 Chang Mu, Yen Jo-chü nien-p'u, p. 70; and Hummel, Eminent Chinese of the Ch'ing period, p. 909.
standing as a retired official because of the charges brought against him in Peking. Another scholar who went south with Hsü in 1690 was Hu Wei (1633–1714). Hu had not succeeded in his attempts in the provincial examinations. He declined to be recommended for the special examination in 1679 by the high official who employed him in Peking as a private tutor for the family. His employer would be one of the four readers of the examination essays. Both Yen Jo-chü and Hu Wei, for their own purposes, made intensive use of Hsü Ch’ien-hsüeh’s private collection of rare books, one of the best in the empire. Both also went on to write their own scholarly works that made significant reinterpretations of the classical heritage through their investigation of textual evidence (k’ao cheng).

As for the big geography project they worked on under Hsü Ch’ien-hsüeh’s direction, the manuscript was sent to Peking in 1694 after Hsü’s death. Like the history of the Ming dynasty, the draft on the geography of the empire underwent numerous stages of revision by officials appointed by three successive emperors before finally being approved and printed in 1744 as the Ta Ch’ing i-t’ung chih (Gazetteer of the Great Ch’ing integrated domain), with Hsü Ch’ien-hsüeh named as chief compiler. Hsü’s work on scholarly projects, like his conduct as a high official and grand secretary, was partly to fulfill the emperor’s initiatives, but also to pursue his own purposes.

A contrasting example of the interactions between an individual high official’s projects and the emperor’s purposes is Li Kuang-ti (1642–1718). He and Hsü Ch’ien-hsüeh became chin-shih the same year, 1670. Li was from a much less wealthy and less well-connected family than Hsü, and from Fukien rather than from the center of Chiang-nan. As a new official Li learned Manchu, but his career in the bureaucracy developed more slowly than Hsü’s. From 1673 to 1680 Li was out of office and home in Fukien, where he was threatened by the war and intrigue that broke out there and in other provinces in the south. He managed to maintain the emperor’s trust in him through the 1680s and 1690s as he was back and forth, in and out of office in Peking. Li slowly rose in rank with each return to office, but without much influence on the conduct of government, which was in contrast to Hsü’s more political role.

90 Chang Mu, p. 77, 88. 91 Hummel, Eminent Chinese of the Ch’ing period, pp. 243, 335.
92 Hummel, Eminent Chinese of the Ch’ing period, p. 311.
95 On-cho Ng, Cheng–Zhu Confucianism in the early Qing: Li Guangdi (1642–1718) and Qing learning (Albany, 2001), pp. 51–67. Ng’s account of Li’s official career stresses a purported rivalry between Li and Hsü Ch’ien-hsüeh.
In the second month of 1689 Li Kuang-ti as the chancellor of the Hanlin Academy was in the entourage of the K’ang-hsi emperor on his second tour in Chiang-nan. On an evening visit to the old observatory in Nanking the emperor singled out Li Kuang-ti and interrogated him about his knowledge of stars, astronomy, and some of the history of learning about celestial phenomena. The emperor had been tutored in these subjects for more than a decade by Ferdinand Verbiest (1623–88). His purpose in questioning Li Kuang-ti seemed to be to show that he knew more about the sky than his learned high officials. Back in Peking later that year, Li Kuang-ti sought to remedy his publicly demonstrated deficiencies in astronomy-related knowledge. One of his efforts was to receive instruction from Mei Wen-ting, whom he recruited as his own expert. Mei had recently been brought to the capital to make his expertise available in correcting the draft chapters on the Ming calendar system for the projected history of the Ming. Li studied Mei’s writings and urged him to write more pieces that made technical subjects on mathematics, astronomy, and calendars more accessible. By 1691 Mei was living in Li Kuang-ti’s residence and benefiting from his patronage. Li was enhancing his own prestige by promoting new learning. He served from 1699 to 1705 in Pao-ting as the governor of the metropolitan area around the capital, and while there he brought in Mei Wen-ting to teach mathematics and astronomy to some of the young scholars in his employ. Li also presented drafts of Mei’s writings to the emperor. Li sponsored the printing of some of Mei’s writings, and on Li’s recommendation the emperor summoned Mei for an audience, and then extended discussions, during the southern tour in 1705. By that time Li was a grand secretary, a position he held until his death more than a dozen years later.

Li Kuang-ti’s knowledge of mathematics, astronomy, and calendar systems could never rival the K’ang-hsi emperor’s, but as a grand secretary he served well in advancing another of the emperor’s interests: the re-establishment of the pre-eminence of Chu Hsi along with Chu’s interpretations of the classics and the systematic aspects of the Learning of the Way. Chu Hsi’s teaching had received continuous imperial recognition as the standard for the civil service examination since the early fifteenth century. Chu Hsi’s selection and annotation of the Four Books continued as the foundational texts in the education of every aspiring literatus. But Chu Hsi’s prestige had eroded. There had been more than two centuries of challenges to and reinterpretations

96 Jami, *The emperor’s new mathematics*, pp. 74–7, 121–31. Jami takes into consideration both the official account and Li’s recollection of his exchange with the emperor.
101 Jami, *The emperor’s new mathematics*, p. 251; and Chu Pingyi’s chapter in this volume.
of the core ideas of Chu Hsi. His ideas about universal coherence (li) as the source of all moral and political values were doubted, refuted, or discarded in Ming and early Ch'ing times. His program of learning based on reading books and extending knowledge was criticized as being useless as a means of achieving morality and ordering society. However, the K'ang-hsi emperor did not subscribe to the doubts and criticisms.

As a boy and a young adult the emperor had learned Chu Hsi in his nearly daily sessions with his tutors in Chinese language and with his lecturers on classics and histories. It would have been easy for him to see Chu Hsi's ideas as a source of imperial order and stability, as it had been for some Southern Sung, Yüan, and Ming emperors before him, but that was apparently not the prevailing view on Chu Hsi among his Han officials. One morning in the fourth month of 1683, after listening to his lecturers explicate a couple of lines from the Book of change, the emperor looked at a few of the writings on topics from the classics submitted by T'ang Pin. T'ang was serving as a reader in the Hanlin Academy, having been a director of the project working on the history of the Ming dynasty. The emperor summoned T'ang into his presence to question him in person on some of what he had written. At one point in their discussion, the emperor scanned a few lines in an essay and asked him to say the main idea. T'ang Pin replied,

From Chou Tün-i to Chu Hsi, their learning was extremely subtle and uncontaminated, but later learning was mired in glosses and commentaries; it deviated from the essential ideas of Ch'eng I and Chu Hsi. Wang Yang-ming's learning based on extending one's innate knowledge went back to basics and returned to the original. Wang just sought to rescue later learning from its errors, but his sayings sometimes missed the mark, and his followers in their unsubstantiated views misconstrued his master purpose (tsung-chih) and provoked a proliferation of interpretations.

T'ang Pin said the task was to apply the truth in the learning from the sages (sheng-hsüeh) without adding one's own words. To this, according to the record of their discussion, the emperor approvingly nodded.


103 This point was made by Wing-tsit Chan, “The Hsing-li ching-i and the Ch'eng–Chu school of the seventeenth century,” in The unfolding of Neo-Confucianism, ed. Wm. Theodore de Bary (New York, 1975), pp. 545–6.


105 K'ang-hsi ch'i chü chu, p. 987.
proliferation of interpretations since. This view was still more inclusive than what the emperor preferred, but he saw how T'ang could be used. A year later in the course of a discussion about his grand secretaries the emperor said,

Someone who [truly] pursues learning the Way must personally act with vigor and manifest it in practical affairs, not just go with empty words. In recent years I have observed many Han officials in the government with reputations as men of the Learning of the Way, but when I probed their performances, their actions were not consistent with what they said.106

After giving a negative example, the emperor returned to his theme of what he expected, and he observed that T'ang Pin’s conduct was substantive, with no empty words. After some further discussion of the merits of his various grand secretaries, the emperor asked again about T'ang Pin. His advisers knew to praise T’ang. The emperor then went on to make his judgment clear:

From ancient times it has been difficult for someone to have an essential and comprehensive understanding of the learning of the Way. I have heard that T’ang Pin with that man named Sun from Honan has already given clear explanations [of the learning of the Way as transmitted from antiquity, to be distinguished from the contentious Learning of the Way from Chu Hsi’s time]. To esteem learning the Way as they have is coming close [to what I said was characteristic of someone who practices learning the Way].107

With endorsements such as this from the K’ang-hsi emperor, T’ang Pin went on to be one of most imperially lauded Confucians of the Ch’ing dynasty,108 apparently because he did not add any new ideas. In effect the emperor wanted Confucian learning to be about what could be put into practice by men in the government and others to promote social order. It was not to be about accumulating subtle points to be disputed in discourses on learning. Like T’ang Pin, the emperor glossed over what others at the time perceived to be consequential differences in doctrinal starting points between the tradition of learning based on coherence associated with Chu Hsi’s name (li hsüeh) and learning based on one’s own mind (hsin hsüeh), to which Wang Yang-ming’s name was attached. But not everyone did.

Huang Tsung-hsi still supported the turn Wang Yang-ming had taken away from his contemporaries’ interpretation of Chu Hsi. In the early 1680s not many had access to the long manuscript version of Huang’s Ming ju hsüeh an (Source book of Ming Confucians’ learning), although later he said some copies were in circulation.109 According to Huang, he had compiled it as

106 K’ang-hsi ch’i chü chu, p. 1194. Here the emperor seems to have been implying a distinction between Learning of the Way (Tao hsüeh) in a narrow sense, i.e. Chu Hsi’s teaching, and learning the Way in a more general sense of going back to the classics.


an alternative to Sun Ch'i-feng's account of the correct transmission of the Way of moral teachings. Before T'ang Pin died in 1687, scholars working on the history of the Ming had struggled over how to treat the teachings of Wang Yang-ming and his followers who emphasized recovering one's innate knowledge of moral good (*liang chih*) as a remedy for what they held were Chu Hsi's misleading teachings. One cause of the struggle was that in the early years of the Yüan dynasty the compilers of the *Sung shih* (History of the Sung) had created a new historiographical category: biographies of adherents of the Learning of the Way (*Tao hsüeh*). The new category was separate from the traditional category of the Confucian group (*ju lin*) of biographies of men who were recognized for making contributions as Confucians.¹¹⁰ The questions in the 1680s essentially were, should men who continued in Ming times to pursue Chu Hsi's Learning of the Way be treated separately from men who were to be included as Confucians (*ju*), as had been done in the *Sung shih*, and should men who emphasized Chu Hsi's ideas about coherence (*li*) be treated differently from the dissenters who followed Wang Yang-ming in prioritizing mind or heart (*hsin*)? Following the lead of Liu Tsung-chou, Huang Tsung-hsi put Wang's teachings at the center of his account of Ming Confucian learning. Around 1683 Huang wrote a letter to the history office, humbly, he said, because after all how could a rustic such as he address such famous, accomplished officials. Huang explained in detail how one had to know all the sources to assess correctly doctrinal affiliations, influences, and differences among the numerous Confucian thinkers in Ming times. He contended that the categories of learning based on coherence (*li hsüeh*) and Learning of the Way (*tao hsüeh*) should not be used to classify their biographies. His view was that the Confucian group (*ju lin*) was the only category that should be used for their biographies in a standard dynastic history.¹¹¹ This is what T'ang Pin, from his perspective as a proponent of Sun Ch'i-feng's views, also wanted. They were both “saving” Wang Yang-ming and his followers.

Some of the compilers of the history of the Ming blamed advocates of the primacy of innate knowledge for undermining morality in late Ming and thereby contributing to the fall of the Ming dynastic house. Much later, in the final version of the *Ming shih* published in 1739, the introductory statement of the three *chüan* of biographies under the heading of the “group of Confucians” (*ju lin*) acknowledged these issues and declared that Confucian (*ju*) was the correct, inclusive label. By deploying “Confucian” as the covering term and dropping “Learning of the Way” as a label for a set of separate biographies, the

¹¹⁰ The opening statement of the *ju lin* section of Chang T'ing-yü, *Ming shih*, 282, p. 7221. Ssu-ma Ch'ien in the *Shih chi* began what later became the convention of having a *ju lin* section of biographies in the dynastic histories.

compilers of the *Ming shih* were not distinguishing Chu Hsi’s Learning of the Way from the general term “Confucian.” They pointed to Chu Hsi’s declining influence among Ming thinkers after Wang Yang-ming, but they also noted the proliferation of interpretations of Wang Yang-ming’s new ideas.\(^{112}\) Having made that point, the editors of the Ming history then looked back at the founding Ming emperor. They reiterated what were already standard points: Ming T'ai-tsu rose as a commoner, took control during turbulent times, and settled the empire. These points might seem out of place in an introduction to the “group of Confucians” chapters, but the editors were praising Ming T'ai-tsu, the founder of a dynastic house, for establishing the guidelines for the duration of the Ming dynasty with regard to incorporating Confucians into the affairs of state. The achievements of Confucians were in aid of, not in opposition or indifferent to, the interests of the dynasty. This is a selective interpretation of relations between learned literati and emperors, particularly from the reign of the Yung-lo emperor on. The interpretation was intended to re-enforce the implication that the early Ch'ing emperors were continuing precedents set by Ming T'ai-tsu. After a few years of hesitation, he had instituted regular examinations based on learning of the classics, but without committing himself to assigning high offices only to degree holders and without endorsing partisan approaches to Chu Hsi’s Learning of the Way. The editors explained that they were presenting biographies of men in the “Confucians” group who had contributed to Confucian learning in support of the Ming dynasty, beginning with those who helped the commoner who became the first Ming emperor.\(^{113}\)

Li Kuang-ti was not assigned to work on the history of the Ming dynasty, but in 1681 he wrote a long essay entitled “Fundamental points for venerating Chu Hsi” (*Tsun Chu yao chih*). To defend Chu Hsi from a long-standing criticism, Li Kuang-ti claimed Chu held that coherence (*li*) and particles (*ch'i*) are unitary (i.e. one thing), that they are not distinct somethings, and that coherence (*li*) was Chu's term for what is constant, what should be, and what is spontaneously so in the phenomenal realm of particles (*ch'i*).\(^{114}\) Although he was arguing for praising Chu Hsi, on many points Li was critical of Chu’s exegeses.\(^{115}\) Li’s views evolved. He later wrote that only when he was over


\(^{114}\) Li Kuang-ti essay quoted in Yang Hsiang-kuei, *Ch'ing ju hsüeh an hsin pien* (Chi-nan, 1985), Volume 1, p. 711. This essay is partly translated in Ng, *Cheng–Zhu Confucianism*, p. 73. In defending Chu Hsi, Li Kuang-ti misrepresented him but moved closer to Huang Tsung-hsi’s view.

fifty – that is, around 1692 – did he suddenly understand the premise in
Chu Hsi’s teachings that \( lî \) (as coherence) makes things as they are in the
phenomenal realm, and that particles \((ch’i)\) do not act on coherence.\(^\text{116}\) In
1694–95, while he was in mourning for his mother but still in the capital, Li
spent time editing the writings of the Ch’eng brothers and Chu Hsi.\(^\text{117}\) Li was
going against the tide that prevailed during his lifetime of casting doubt on
Chu Hsi’s program of learning. For Li Kuang-ti, the correct transmission of
Chu Hsi’s teachings was the correct transmission of the Way (\( tao t’ung \)), often
understood as a kind of orthodoxy. Li also was of the view that the transmission
of the moral Way in antiquity, going back to the ancient kings and Confucius,
had been unified with the tradition of good governance (\( chih t’ung \)). For too
long the transmission of the two had been regarded as separable, which Li
held to be not acceptable.\(^\text{118}\)

As a grand secretary from 1705 to his death in 1718, Li Kuang-ti was in
close contact with the emperor.\(^\text{119}\) Li became the vehicle for the K’ang-hsi
emperor’s realizing his intention of strengthening the imperial endorsement
of Chu Hsi’s teaching and the teachings’ support for the imperial enterprise.
The emperor in 1712, his fiftieth year on the throne, ordered that Chu Hsi’s
tablet be placed with those of some of Confucius’ direct disciples in the hall
where worship of the great sage was carried out.\(^\text{120}\) At that time, after several
years of work, Li Kuang-ti and another grand secretary presented their newly
compiled \( Chu tzu ch’üan shu \) (Comprehensive compendium of Master Chu’s sayings
and writings). It was a selection of Chu Hsi’s miscellaneous writings and
recorded conversations from previous, separately published books.\(^\text{121}\) With
a preface by the emperor, it was printed in 1714 in sixty-six \( ch’üan \).\(^\text{122}\) The
emperor’s preface stressed that the purpose of the collection was to make
available Chu Hsi’s thought in his own words, rather than as interpretations
by others. It also stressed that these ideas were authoritative.\(^\text{123}\)

During an audience with a group of his officials at the end of the third
month of 1715, the emperor chastised them for not trying enough to improve
things, and for writing so much laudatory prose that was short on substance. Li

\(^{116}\) Cited in Ng, \( Cheng–Zhu Confucianism, \) p. 74.

\(^{117}\) Hou Wai-lu et al., \( Sung Ming li-hsüeh shih \) (Peking, 1987), Volume 2, p. 1021.

\(^{118}\) See examples cited in Hou Wai-lu, \( Sung Ming li hsüeh shih, \) p. 989.


\(^{120}\) Wilson, \( Genealogy of the way, \) p. 166; and Chan, “The Hsing-li ching-i and the Ch’eng–Chu school of
the seventeenth century,” p. 556.

\(^{121}\) Hou Wai-lu, \( Sung Ming li hsıeh shih, \) p. 1021; and Chan, “The Hsing-li ching-i and the Ch’eng–Chu
school of the seventeenth century,” p. 556.

\(^{122}\) Chan, “The Hsing-li ching-i and the Ch’eng–Chu school of the seventeenth century,” p. 544; and
Hummel, \( Eminent Chinese of the Ch’ing period, \) p. 474.

\(^{123}\) Hou Wai-lu, p. 1022; and Chan, “The Hsing-li ching-i and the Ch’eng–Chu school of the seventeenth
century,” p. 556.
Kuang-ti attempted to justify the officials' writings by agreeing that they did not have practicality (shih-ch'i), but the writers were following old precedents. To this the emperor replied that such writings might follow precedent, but the praise still need not be excessive. The K'ang-hsi emperor then went on to a more pointed critique:

You all are men who read books. Now the act of annotating a book is not to be treated lightly. One must deeply understand the intention of the past author and grasp its essentials, and only then can one annotate the book. But if the strength of one's learning is inadequate and he presumptuously annotates, the originally intended meanings are obscured. The meanings are clear in the books written by Chu Hsi. In the five hundred years since he wrote, there was no real criticism. All the annotations and explications were superfluous, and ultimately not different from the clever talk of Buddhists. Whenever I look at a modern annotation of [Chu Hsi's] books, it painstakingly looks for his point, but generally it is all private ideas of someone else. For example, among what Chang Po-hsing has written there is a work that is completely from T'ang Pin. He has other writings that are from Ming times, all by men of his part of Honan. In office Chang Po-hsing is untainted, but his annotations are unsatisfactory. When someone is a high official, others look up to what he has written as annotations, and they are easily deluded.\footnote{125}

At this point the emperor looked at Li Kuang-ti and said, “Have I not spoken to you of this? In this matter [of annotating], one ought to hit the mark, although doing so for each word is really most difficult.”\footnote{126} The emperor went on to add a further judgment:

In Master Chu's book, \textit{Chin ssu lu} (Reflections on things at hand),\footnote{127} the meanings are transparent. What is the need for further annotations? Yet Master Chu himself said that in it there were several places about which he was not certain. From this we can see that writing a book is not an easy task.\footnote{128}

To which Li Kuang-ti answered, “The Emperor's perception is most lucid. The old writings on human nature and coherence [alluding to the early Ming imperially sponsored compilation entitled \textit{Hsing li ta ch'i\'ian} (Great collection of works on human nature and coherence) of 1415] are not without problematic passages.”\footnote{129} Conveniently, another one of the grand secretaries pointed to a concern in a manner that suited the emperor's purpose. “The book on human

nature and coherence is not susceptible to annotation and explication [because it was compiled at the command of the Yung-lo emperor], but Your Highness could make it so.” And the emperor did make it so. He employed Li Kuang-ti to supervise two more compilations that would be in keeping with what the emperor declared an annotation should do.

Late in 1715 Li Kuang-ti, with the emperor’s endorsement, came out with a new “standard” commentary on the Book of change that was printed in twenty-two chüan. Based closely on Chu Hsi’s I pen i (Basic meanings of the Book of change), the new version was called the Chou i che chung (Balanced annotations of the Book of change). That same year the emperor approved printing the Hsing li ching i (Essential ideas (in the Learning of the Way) about human nature and coherence) in twelve chüan. This was a book of quoted passages selected by Li Kuang-ti, in consultation with the emperor, from the Hsing li ta chüan of 1415 that through the Ming period was the most available printed source of Sung authors’ interpretations of the Confucian tradition. Compared to the Ming compendium, Li’s selection, with some additions, reduced the length and number of quotations from more than forty Sung and Yuan authors. Li reorganized them to place more elementary learning and practices prior to discussions of lofty philosophical and cosmological concepts, and he gave even more relative space to Chu Hsi’s own words. Printed copies of the Hsing li ching i were intended to be available to schools in all parts of the empire as a new, standardized source book.

These three major publications reaffirming Chu Hsi’s interpretations were only a small fraction of the scholarly works produced under government auspices in the last two decades of the K’ang-hsi reign and on into the Yung-cheng reign. Imperially sponsored works were produced in several other domains of learning. In late Ming and again in the 1660s and 1670s, a number of scholars independently had prepared compendia, with different limits or foci, dealing with written words and compound terms. Etymologies, changes in orthography and pronunciation, and of course meanings were all considered. Word books were a long-standing scholarly interest going back to the Han period. In 1710 the K’ang-hsi emperor commissioned a new, comprehensive word book to supersede previous efforts. More than 40,000 separate written words (tzu) were entered. Printed by the government in 1716 as the K’ang-hsi tzu tien (K’ang-hsi reign canon of characters, or just the K’ang-hsi dictionary), and

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130 K’ang-hsi ch’i chü cha, p. 2161.
131 Hou Wai-lu, Sung Ming li-hüeh shib, p. 1022.
in circulation ever since, it was graced by a preface written in the emperor’s name. The preface declared that by compiling a unified, proper account of the meanings and pronunciations of written words, order in the governmental and social realms would be secured.134

The overall effect of this burst of publication late in the K'ang-hsi reign was that the government, and even the emperor personally, was taking control of texts and tools that would serve in the future as the imperially endorsed foundation for learning. In most of the compilations the names of one or more lead scholars were attached as editor, and the memorials accompanying the presentation of the work could include a long list of other editors, compilers, checkers, and copyists, but as in the Ming shih it remains opaque as to who did what when; these works were authorized rather than authored. (Chang Yü-shu (1642–1711), still credited as compiler of the K'ang-hsi tsu tien, died several years before it was completed.) The compilations were stamped with imperial authority, sometimes by starting the title with terms such as “by imperial order” (ch'in ting), and sometimes expressed in the form of an introductory text ascribed to the emperor himself, even if the contents did not always reflect the best scholarly understanding available at the time of compilation. For example, the K'ang-hsi tsu tien’s errors were recognized by scholars from the start, and thousands of mistakes were critically corrected in the nineteenth century for a revised edition.

The activities involved in understanding the practices, ideas, and words through which learning was pursued, produced, and transmitted had mainly been in the hands of literati (shih), whether serving in government or not, for more than 200 years. This was their culture (wen). The old K'ang-hsi emperor acted as if it came under his command. In his view, the tradition of morality-based learning was one with, supported by, and supportive of the tradition of good governance. But he could not control learning.

INDIVIDUALS’ CONTRIBUTIONS TO LEARNING IN
THE NEW CLIMATE

In the mid-1690s two important pieces of independent scholarship by individuals were printed. The two books arguably are to be regarded as the most important contributions to the advancement of learning produced in the early Ch'ing period, and both are still used as scholarly resources.

In 1693 Huang Tsung-hsi recalled that the previous year, when he was ill and could no longer write, he heard of a plan to print the manuscript he had

134 “Shang yü,” in Chang Yü-shu et al., K'ang-hsi tsu tien (Peking, 1716; copy held in East Asian Library, Princeton University). In this same decade, the K'ang-hsi emperor also commissioned word books, or dictionaries, for the Manchu and Mongol languages to set standards.
completed nearly twenty years earlier. He dictated some introductory remarks about the manuscript, remarks that he said his son was writing out for him. These were added as a preface (or two prefaces) to the long compilation that still is known as the *Ming ju hsueh an*.\(^{135}\) There are conjectures about why Huang waited until nearly the end of his life to allow (if indeed he did) the printing of what could be regarded as a controversial, and perhaps dangerous, book. He knew of and contributed by letters to the discussions in the capital over how to treat the biographies of Ming Confucians. He knew of the attacks on Wang Yang-ming and Wang’s followers who promoted the complex of ideas built on the concept of originating heart (or mind, *pen hsin*). Huang Tsung-hsi’s prefaces to the *Ming ju hsueh an* did not back down. The opening sentence in both declared, “That which fills heaven-and-earth is Mind.”\(^{136}\) Huang took pains to emphasize the diversity of views among the Ming thinkers whose works he had excerpted. “Unfortunately the gentlemen of today insist upon everyone taking the same path ... But the recorded discourses of the former scholars show that each of them was different, although they all reflected the mind-in-itself (*hsin t’i*), which is always changing and quite without rest.”\(^{137}\) Huang’s efforts to preserve a range of views, which his compilation did even as he added his own critical comments assessing the assertions and arguments of each man, contrast with the K’ang-hsi emperor’s interest twenty years later in making the transmission of the Way of morality stable, unitary, and supportive of the government.

At about the same time that the *Ming ju hsueh an* was being printed, P’an Lei was seeing to the preparation of Ku Yen-wu’s great opus, the *Jih chih lu*, for printing.\(^{138}\) When Ku died early in 1682, P’an Lei was in Peking working on the history of the Ming under the direction of two of Ku’s nephews. P’an wrote that he secured the draft of Ku’s manuscript from his family (probably from Ku’s adopted son) and went through it two or three times. P’an said he planned to work with Ku’s nephews to have it printed, but they both died before the work was completed.\(^{139}\) If anything in the printed *Jih chih lu* was offensive, the onus was on P’an Lei. In his preface for the book P’an made much of a distinction between the learning of a “comprehensive Confucian scholar”

\(^{135}\) Huang Tsung-hsi, preface to the *Ming ju hsueh an*, in Huang Tsung-hsi, *Huang Li-chou wen-chi*, pp. 379–80, and his two prefaces in Huang Tsung-hsi, *Ming ju hsueh an*, pp. 7–8, 9–10.


\(^{137}\) Huang, *The records of Ming scholars*, p. 41, with some adjustment to Julia Ching’s translation.

\(^{138}\) John Patrick Delury, “Despotism above and below: Gu Yanwu’s *Record of daily learning on power, money and morals*,” diss., Yale University, 2007, pp. 6–10, for a summary account of the history of the printing of the various versions of the *Jih chih lu*.

\(^{139}\) P’an Lei, preface in Ku Yen-wu, *Jih chih lu chi shih*, 2a–b (pp. 25–6). Hsü Yuan-wen died in 1691; Hsü Ch’ien-hsieh died in 1694.
(t’ung ju) and that of vulgar ones (su ju). The vulgar ones predominated in Ming times, when even the well-known writers were petty and superficial; they fell far short of the lofty aims of men in antiquity. On the other hand, according to P’an Lei, Ku Yen-wu had mostly memorized the texts of the classics and histories, had traveled widely, was never without a book, and constantly reviewed and checked his sources. The depth and breadth of his learning were respected by everyone, and scholars with all kinds of questions consulted him. They all knew, P’an wrote, that Ku was a “comprehensive Confucian.” P’an lauded the Jih chih lu as “broad in learning, acute in understanding, successful in showing the larger principles, and perspicacious in its use of the written word.” Ku investigated the evidence and corrected others’ errors. Ku’s open, critical approach that P’an Lei celebrated was re-endorsed in the early nineteenth century when an edition of the Jih chih lu was printed with the collected comments, additions, and sometimes corrections of Ku’s entries by some ninety scholars, including P’an Lei and four others who passed the special examination in 1679, as well as Yen Jo-chü, who failed it, and some of their notable contemporaries such as Mei Wen-ting and Li Kuang-ti. In this way Ku’s contribution to learning was open-ended. New evidence could be drawn upon to add to the accumulation of knowledge, if not day by day, as in the title Ku chose for his book, then year by year.

Around the year 1700 there were other important publications, even though they did not have comparable long-term influence. Chu I-tsun was dismissed from the Ming history project in 1684, but he stayed on in Peking for a few years to write and to build his collection of printed and manuscript copies of books. Although he was no longer a participant, Chu wrote letters to the Ming history board to join the argument against having a separate biographical category for those who followed the Learning of the Way (Tao hsüeh). According to Chu, the rubric “Confucian group” (ju lin) included those of the Learning of the Way; the latter did not control or define “Confucian.” Chu finished his greatest scholarly contribution in 1701, but printed only the first half of his Ching i k’ao (Examination of interpretation of the classics), which totaled almost 300 chüan. It is still a useful descriptive listing of extant, partial, and lost books as well as essays, with quotations as Chu saw fit, on the classics going back to late Chou times. By including and assessing close to “everything” in his bibliography, Chu provided a useful tool for broadening what was included in classical learning.

P’an Lei’s preface, 2a (p. 25).
Huang Ju-ching’s preface to the 1837 edition, in Ku Yen-wu, Jih chih lu chi shih, 4a–5a (pp. 13–15).
Chu I-tsun, quoted in Wang Mao, Ch’ing tai che-hsüeh, pp. 78–9.
Lai Yü-ch’in, Po-hsüeh hung-ju, pp. 102–97; and Hummel, Eminent Chinese of the Ch’ing period, pp. 183–4.
A more focused and challenging work was written by Hu Wei (1633–1717). He had tried but failed in the Ch’ing examinations. In 1678 he was tutoring the sons of an official who the next year served as one of the four examiners for the po-hsüeh hung ju examination, but declined the offer of his employer to recommend him. In 1690 he went south with Hsü Ch’ien-hsüeh to work on the compilation of what later became the Ta Ch’ing i-t’ung chih.\textsuperscript{144} Hu Wei acquired an expertise on the historical geography of names and places in the classics, particularly in parts of the Book of documents (Shu ching). Back in Peking in 1700, he completed his critical account of the arrays (t’u, sometimes called diagrams) that since Northern Sung had been attached, and still usually are, to the Book of change. Hu’s book, the I t’u ming pien (Clarification of the arrays in the Book of change), printed in 1706 in ten ch’uan, piled up convincing textual evidence that the “Ho t’u” (“Array from the Yellow river”) and “Lo shu” (“Writing from the Lo river”) were created by a tenth-century Taoist and were not from the sages of antiquity.\textsuperscript{145} Although previous commentators had hinted at Hu’s conclusion, he assembled, examined, and published textual evidence to support it. Hu applied his historical critical approach that he had used for handling geographical data to investigate what was an add-on to a classic, not the text of the classic itself.

A contemporary case of applying that historical critical approach with a focus on certain core parts of a classical text was a manuscript that Yen Jo-chü worked on for decades. The target of his inquiry was the set of texts that derived from a manuscript copy of the Book of documents in an “ancient style” of writing (ku wen) that supposedly was discovered in the Western Han period. The manuscript in the ancient style had sixteen more pieces (sometimes called chapters) than the previously known version, which caused problems for scholars in the Han period. The problems became worse in the early fourth century when a scholar presented his emperor with a new, even longer manuscript version of an “ancient-style” Book of documents. By T’ang times this version was accepted and endorsed by imperial authority as the standard text of the classic, and this status was maintained until the end of the nineteenth century. From the beginning, doubts and reservations were expressed about the parts that had their origins in the “ancient-style” manuscripts. Yen Jo-chü had many previous scholars on whom to draw when he began to put together his book that he eventually called Shang shu ku wen cheng (Evidence for a commentary on the ancient-style sections of the Book of documents).

\textsuperscript{144} See above, pp. 590–1.

\textsuperscript{145} The “Lo shu” is a three-by-three “magic” square composed of the numbers one to nine, with five in the center, in which the sum of each of the rows, columns and diagonals is fifteen. The “Ho t’u” is an array of the numbers one to nine, plus two more fives (i.e. ten) in an odd–even pattern centered on five. See Joseph Needham, Mathematics and the sciences of the heavens and the earth (Cambridge, 1970), pp. 55–9.
Yen built his case by showing discrepancies. One set of discrepancies involved the number and names of the pieces in the supposed second-century BCE version and the fourth-century version. Another type of discrepancy was the use of anachronistic words and terms. There were apparent discrepancies in the method for recording dates and events. And much more. At some point, presumably before 1690, when Huang Tsung-hsi was still writing, Yen Jo-chü sent him four chüan of the manuscript and asked for a preface. Huang wrote the preface. He sketched the many attempts to deal with the problems with the “ancient-style” version of the Book of documents, and he called them contradictory or unresolved. Huang said he agreed with much of what Yen assembled, but he was not prepared to endorse the doubting of the text of the classic itself. Huang stressed at the end of his preface that he understood what was at stake. Crucial passages from “ancient style” sections of the Book of documents were fundamental to the arguments in support of the learning based on coherence (li). The problems Yen was pointing to were a worm (tu) eating within that teaching. Huang concluded that his own explanations were “not necessarily irrelevant” to the evidence Yen was assembling. Yen Jo-chü’s book grew to be eight chüan when it was finally printed in 1745. Although his scholarship was lauded, and even expanded upon, his conclusions were not officially accepted and the received text of the Book of documents remained intact. Yen himself was subject to hostile criticism for his results that created doubt. The response was similar when Yen showed that the attribution of authorship of the Great learning to Tseng Tzu was erroneous.

Yen Jo-chü’s work more than any other established that the received versions of the texts of the classics, the foundation of the Confucian tradition and its inherited values, could be interrogated not just for “meaning.” The search for meaning was built into the process of learning. More than a thousand years of commentaries had not put a stop to the questions, and new answers, that continued to be generated. Rather, Hu Wei and Yen Jo-chü, among others, were questioning the integrity, and therefore the authority, of the received versions of the texts of the classics. They were treating the pieces of texts of the classics – the words and, by extension, the things, persons, and events to which the words referred – as artifacts that had histories, and the facts of the creation and transmission of each of the texts needed to be verified by.

146 I have followed the summary given in Wang Mao, Ch’ing tai che-hueh, p. 85. Benjamin A. Elman, From philosophy to philology: Intellectual and social aspects of change in late imperial China, 2nd rev. ed. (Los Angeles, 2001), pp. 215–17, gives examples of some of the other discrepancies that Yen brought out.

147 Huang Tsung-hsi, “Shang shu ku wen shu cheng hsii,” in Huang Li-chou wen-chi, pp. 310–1. The last lines of a different version of the preface were translated differently in Elman, From philosophy to philology (2001), p. 65.

148 Hummel, Eminent Chinese of the Ch’ing period, p. 910.
evidence rather than accepted without question. This skeptical, open-ended, problematizing approach to learning did not go away over the remainder of the Ch’ing dynasty. In this respect, neither the K’ang-hsi emperor nor the government controlled learning.

By 1700 if not before, the advancement of learning was proceeding in three distinguishable modes. One mode was learning produced by individual literati who were not employed as officials; they typically interacted in person or by correspondence with others interested in their topics, they usually had access to private collections of books, and they could gain subsidies to help in printing their books. In this mode, questioning and revising conventional knowledge were common practices. A second mode was pursued by literati who were or had been high officials; they had support staffs, paid by government funds or their own resources, and they could seek to advance their own agendas as well as that of their emperor. A third mode was the production of knowledge to be disseminated in pursuit of an imperial interest; literati who worked on these projects were listed in their dozens as compilers, checkers, and copyists in the memorials accompanying the submission of the finished product to the emperor for approval. In this third mode, collecting (and excluding), standardizing, establishing, and suppressing were common aims. The range of learning had changed. Compared to the active interest into the 1660s, by 1700 refining the ideas that could explain and justify personal moral cultivation based on one’s own heart was withering as an urgent concern. Philosophical analysis of the concept of *li*, the core idea for Chu Hsi in his system of learning, also was not attracting much attention. The major intellectual trend was acquiring new knowledge with correct details supported by textual evidence that would broaden and deepen understanding of the cultural heritage.
Political pressures on culture, scholarship, and thought were present in all eras of Chinese history, but the impact was particularly prominent in the Ch'ing period. In the past, scholars tended to connect the influence of Ch'ing political power on scholarship and culture with the famous “literary inquisitions” (wen-tzu-yü), but the impact of political pressures on culture was much broader. There were many reasons why this phenomenon was so prominent in the Ch'ing. One of the most important was that the Ch'ing emperors and many of the leaders were Manchus. The government remained sensitive to all texts written in the late Ming or early Ch'ing that expressed criticism or opposition to the Manchus. Moreover, from the early Ch'ing, but particularly during the reign of Ch'ien-lung, the government gave powerful protection and support on many levels to traditional culture, scholarship, and notions of political order. In an era in which power was highly centralized, the emperors of the high Ch'ing period exerted great influence on culture and scholarship.

In general, censorship was widespread during the Ch'ing era. Works discussing ethnicity were particularly sensitive and often prohibited, particularly texts or even passages that stressed Han identity, that made claims about barbarians (i-ti), or that used generic names for non-Han groups found in the classics, regardless of the historical era in which it was written or the group to which the name referred. Related to mentions of ethnicity are texts dealing with the Ming–Ch'ing transition and Ch'ing rule. All writing about the Ming–Ch'ing transition was suspect, especially references to massacres carried out by Ch'ing troops. Any texts directly or elliptically critical of Ch'ing rule were prohibited. Authors also learned to avoid writing anything that was detrimental to, or even just not supportive enough of, the morals and manners that the emperor thought should be the standard. On some occasions works were banned simply because the emperor did not like the ideas they conveyed, the style they used, or the persons and subject matter to which they referred. Besides writing regarding the government, any scholarship that conveyed heterodox views, including literary writing, historical studies, and philosophy,
was also questionable. A work could be banned if it was not faithful to the classics or not grounded in evidence. Beyond these broad categories, there were other texts that were banned for reasons that remain obscure.

There were several aspects to these pressures. Most overtly, the government directly banned certain works, punished authors of objectionable texts, and destroyed a large number of books during the compilation of the *Ssu-k'u ch'üan-shu* (*Complete collection of the four treasuries*) in the 1770s. These actions had effects that rippled through society.¹ The *Ssu-k'u ch'üan-shu* project sent a clear message regarding the sanctioned evaluation of different kinds of writing, including which titles were to be destroyed and not transmitted. The pressures induced self-censorship, including authors filtering their own writing. Finally, great stress was laid by the government in many arenas of culture on Confucian moral values (*kang-ch'ang*).

There were literary inquisitions in the sense of official inquiries into the culpability of writings and their authors, publishers, and owners in all periods of the Ch'ing. A rough estimate of major literary inquisition cases totaled approximately 170, more than any previous dynasty. Among them eleven cases were in the sixty years of the K'ang-hsi reign, twenty-five in the twelve years of the Yung-cheng reign, and 135 in the fifty-nine years of the Ch'ien-lung reign.² During the Ch'ing dynasty, imperial literary regulations went through several phases. In the first phase, from the Shun-chih (1644–61) through the K'ang-hsi period, regulations were comparatively permissive. The second phase lasted from the reign of Yung-cheng to the middle of the Ch'ien-lung reign, when controls were tightened. During the third period, associated with the compilation of the *Ssu-k'u ch'üan-shu* after the middle of the Ch'ien-lung reign, intellectual restrictions were at their height. From the late Chia-ch'ing period on, the incidence of literary inquisitions died down.

Restrictions on the private carving of woodblocks for printing books and on distributing them were already in place at the beginning of the Ch'ing dynasty.³ Some individuals felt the effect of this increasing suppression immediately. Ming dynasty loyalists were cautious and reminded their friends and families in correspondence to be extremely careful of what they wrote. Numerous incidents compiled in the *Ming i-min lu* (*Records of non-collaborators from the Ming*) involved people burning papers in their family’s possession when Ch'ing officials took over local offices.⁴ This widespread destruction of texts

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² At least twenty-one cases arose from the offender’s careless use of characters or mental instability.
⁴ For example, see Sun Ching-an, *Ming i-min lu* (1912; Hang-chou, 1985), p. 171.
was motivated by many reasons, but one main reason was the fear of becoming involved in legal procedures. Warnings to “speak softly and make no sound” had already appeared in a poem by Luo Yü, “Tieh lien hua” (“Butterflies lingering over flowers,” a tune title). Literati and commoners alike had begun consciously to restrict their public speech and private writings.\(^5\)

The first major literary inquisition case involved a work entitled *Pien-chi* (*Records of the recent changes*), stories of certain Ming loyalists who had died, written by the monk Han-k'o (1612–60). In 1647, the Ch'ing army already controlled Chiang-ning (formerly Nanking). One day in October, Han-k'o was hurrying to the south and was routinely checked by soldiers at the gate. Han-k'o had a travel certificate issued by Hung Ch'eng-ch'ou (1593–1665), a former Ming official who had surrendered and joined the Ch'ing in 1642. Since 1645 Hung had held the title of pacificator of Chiang-nan (*chao-fu Chiang-nan*) in Chiang-ning. When the soldiers carefully searched Han-k'o's belongings, they found his manuscript, *Pien-chi*. They immediately arrested him. The *Pien-chi* was destroyed by Ch'ing soldiers, so we are unable to know the exact contents. In punishment Han-k'o was exiled to Shen-yang, and died there in 1660. This case also involved a power struggle between Hung Ch'eng-ch'ou and the commander-in-chief at Chiang-ning, Pa-shan. It was alleged that Pa-shan punished Han-k'o as part of his power struggle with Hung Ch'eng-ch'ou. This was Pa-shan's way of showing his teeth to Hung. In 1648 a case involved offensive remarks in a preface written by Mao Ch'ung-cho (1612–60) for a commercially printed collection of examination essays. Mao had passed the provincial examination in 1645, the second year of the Shun-chih reign, but other details of his life are not known.

The most notorious case during the K'ang-hsi reign began in Chekiang in 1661, when the new emperor was just a boy. Chuang T'ing-lung (d. 1655) had bought an unfinished manuscript on Ming dynasty history that Chu Kuo-ch'en (1558–1632) had started to compile. Chuang, who was blind, recruited talented young men to prepare materials on the Ch'ung-chen reign (1628–44) and events during the Southern Ming (1644–62) resistance to supplement the draft. The book used the reign names of the Southern Ming, namely the Hung-kuang (1644–5), Lung-wu (1645–6), and Yung-li (1646–62) periods, and did not mention the Ch'ing reign title of Shun-chih. Chuang was already dead, but accusations of being anti-Ch'ing that were lodged against Chuang

\(^5\) Even exhortations to curb one’s speech from scholars to colleagues had to be done in a covert fashion. One could not blatantly admonish others to “refrain from discussing current affairs.” Often, metaphors in poems would be used to remind people to be careful of their speech and words. For example, one of the poems by the Chekiang poet Chin Nung (1687–1764) uses the metaphor of a sparrow to warn people to watch their words and actions. See Chin Nung, *Tung-hsin hsien-sheng chi* (Taipei, 1970) 4, p. 3b.
T’ing-lung’s family and associates led to the arrests of many people, and many executions. The Nan-shan chi (Nan-shan collection) case occurred in 1711. Tai Ming-shih (Nan-shan, 1653–1713), who had placed near the top in the chin-shih examination of 1709, had been interested in collecting materials on the Southern Ming reigns for many years. He was accused of using the reign title of the Southern Ming Yung-li emperor rather than the Shun-chih reign title. Tai was executed, and death was initially ordered for all those whose names appeared in Tai’s work as having helped to compile it. Eventually, the K’ang-hsi emperor pardoned over 300 people, although some were exiled. In the Yung-cheng reign, twenty-five literary inquisition cases occurred, including the one that prompted the emperor to write the Ta-i chüeh-mi lu (Record of great righteousness in resolving confusion). In the Ch’ien-lung reign, especially in the period from 1751 to 1783, there were 135 major literary inquisition cases in association with the compilation of the Ssu-k’u ch’üan-shu, among which forty-eight cases involved the confiscation and banning of books.6

The compilation of the Ssu-k’u ch’üan-shu in the 1770s marked the turn toward a more severe censorship. The catalogue of the Ssu-k’u ch’üan-shu divided the books that were collected into those that were reproduced in full (cheng-pien), those receiving notices (ts’un-mu) in the catalogue but were not fully reproduced, those that were expurgated (ch’ou-hui), and those to be completely destroyed (ch’üan-hui), an evaluative system that gave a guide to acceptable and unacceptable content. Moreover, each work was appraised in a short notice that also formed part of a more detailed system of indicators, according to which literati shaped the way they expressed themselves. The Ch’ien-lung emperor was initially interested in creating a resource that would aid scholars in their research. His professed goal was to “understand the past and promote scholarship,” and he later provided literati access to read, borrow, and copy by hand from one of the complete sets of the Ssu-k’u ch’üan-shu.7

But an atmosphere of suppression developed, and the negative impact of the book-collecting project on the general Han populace surpassed the positive aspects of providing literati with access to a wealth of textual resources. Even lower-level peasants were disturbed. The records in the Ch’ing-tai wen-tzu-yü tang (Archives of literary inquisition cases in the Ch’ing period) include reports that illiterate peasants who inherited book collections from scholarly ancestors

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6 Chang Ping and Chang Yü-chou, “Ch’ing-tai wen-tzu-yü ti cheng-t’i chuang-k’uang yü Ch’ing-jen ti tsai shu,” Hsi-pei shih ta-hsueh pao: She-hui k’o-hsueh pan 45 No. 6 (2008), pp. 62–70.
were nervous about owning books that they could not read but that could lead to their arrest, or even death. Descendants of T'ao Ju-nai (1601–83) provide an example of this mentality. When accused of hiding forbidden books that his grandfather once owned, T'ao's grandson confessed to officials that due to the impoverished state that had befallen his family, he had never read any of his grandfather's books. He assumed there were forbidden materials within these books, and adhering faithfully to censorship laws, he had decided to destroy his family's collection.\(^8\) There are numerous cases similar to T'ao's in the Ch'ing-tai wen-tzu-yü tang. The government at the time did not have the means to control every single woodblock or brush mark, and many books might have fallen through the cracks of official scrutiny if the public had not been mobilized.

Public notices posted in Kiangsu and Anhwei reminded city residents to quickly inspect their own collections, and exhorted those who lived far from cities to hand over their materials at once.\(^9\) Edicts issued in 1779 ordered local literati, students, and clerks to supervise the inspection of books in different towns in Kiangsu and other provinces.\(^10\) After the regulations were issued, local peasants as well as men with education aided the cause by monitoring and accusing each other. Documents included in the Ch'ing-tai wen-tzu-yü tang show that without lower-level informers the imperial inquisition would have lost much of its effectiveness. An example is the case involving Ch'en Hsi-sheng, who accused Teng Hui of owning prohibited books. On an earlier occasion Ch'en felt offended by Teng. Later, Ch'en attended the civil service examination and realized that restrictions on forbidden books were particularly severe. He remembered that one of the books that he traded to Teng was a forbidden book. He then accused Teng of harboring forbidden books.\(^11\) Cho Ch'ang-ling was indicted on the grounds that “the imperial palace despises markings within the margins, as well as the foolish circling of certain phrases. We will thus censor this poem based on these regulations.”\(^12\) The official who made these accusations wanted to display his allegiance to imperial regulations in the hope of increasing his own merits. He widened the definition of an offense related to the use of words in order to enhance his standing within the bureaucratic hierarchy. It is still surprising that something as trivial as

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\(^8\) Pei-p'ing ku-kung po-wu-yüan wen-hsien-kuan, comp., Ch'ing-tai wen-tzu-yü tang (1931–4; Shanghai, 1986), p. 353. For the complete case, see, pp. 351–7. Although T'ao Shih-lun claimed to be illiterate, his confessions were obviously given after careful deliberation.

\(^9\) See Teng Shih, Hsiao-hui ch'ou-hui shu-mu chin-shu tung-mu wei-ai shu-mu tsow-chiao tsu-chin shu-mu ho k'o ([China], 1907), ch. 1.


\(^11\) For details see Pei-p'ing ku-kung po-wu-yüan, Ch'ing-tai wen-tzu-yü tang, pp. 370–1.

\(^12\) Pei-p'ing ku-kung po-wu-yüan, Ch'ing-tai wen-tzu-yü tang, pp. 541–2.
circling characters would be worthy of censorship. Other books were censored on the charge of “the excessive use of unintelligible words,” or the inclusion of phrases such as *pi-shih* (“avoiding the contemporary world”) and *tiao-shih* (“mourning the times”). Under a normal literary atmosphere, words of discontent would not be associated with a longing for the Ming dynasty. Under the backdrop of this intense prosecution of literary cases, the two ideas became closely related, and literati at the time were subjected to intense intellectual pressure and self-regulation.

Under this environment of suspicion, literati became passive or silent in their writings. This self-suppression of the creative process was not limited to the literary realm, but also permeated all facets of society and culture. In contrast to the Ming literati’s preoccupation with governmental affairs, literati of the Ch’ien-lung reign generally shied away from discussion of contemporary political events in writing.

The most significant impact of these literary inquisitions was the psychological pressure they put on intellectuals. An early example of such tension was Wu Wei-yeh (1609–71). Wu wrote that during the Ming–Ch’ing transition years he secluded himself at home and severed all contacts with the outside world. However, because he was quite famous as a writer, he knew it would be difficult to avoid any involvement. As Wu wrote, “each time a case of literary persecution erupted in the southeastern part of the realm, I apprehensively awaited the arrival of prosecutors indicting me for works of poetry or history I have written.” As K’ung Shang-jen (1648–1718) noted in a poem written in response to a monk, “even monks are terrified by the possibility of bringing disaster upon themselves through the written word.” Accounts of this type are numerous and demonstrate the extent of the intimidation generated by literary inquisitions. Intimidation was prevalent in the private realms of Ch’ing intellectuals. It also involved virtually all sectors of literate society, including authors, printers, book dealers, readers, and others who participated in the alteration or destruction of texts.

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14 Pei-p’ing ku-kung po-wu-yüan, *Ch’ing-tai wen-tzu-yü tang*, p. 98.
16 Accusations of *yüan wang* (morbid fascinations) were prevalent during the Ch’ing dynasty. For example, Tai Ch’un-shih was accused of *yüan wang* in his last poem. See Huang Chün, *Hua sui jen sheng an chib i* (1943; Shanghai, 1998), p. 318.
LITERARY INQUISITIONS AND INTIMIDATIONS

In the K'ang-hsi and Yung-cheng reigns, offenders were mostly officials and distinguished literati. In the Ch'ien-lung reign, however, lower levels of literate society were involved. There were at least forty cases involving men who had only passed the lowest level of the civil service examinations, and at least fifty in which the offender did not have any standing at all in the examination hierarchy. Most of the cases had nothing to do with anti-Manchu ideology or treason, but punishments could be shockingly harsh. Frequently, there were sentences of decapitation or death by slow slicing.

Most of the texts that were banned in the K'ang-hsi period dealt with events in the Ming–Ch'ing transition or were deemed to contain "scheming words, deviant theories, and absurd talk." Books banned in this era include Chuang T'ing-lung's work on Ming history and Tai Ming-shih's writings that were mentioned previously. In the second year of the K'ang-hsi reign (1663) the Chuang T'ing-lung case ended with the execution of 221 people, including workers who had carved the woodblocks, merchants who had sold the printed book, literati who had proofread it, and officials involved with the case in its early stages. The victims' wives were given as slaves to officers at the frontiers. Overall the case touched more than 2,000 people. As for works with so called "scheming words, deviant theories, and absurd talk," there was, for example, the case of Chu Fang-tan (d. 1682), who had written that "The Middle Way (chung tao) is between the eyebrows, above the bridge of the nose," which was a reference to the brain. Chu insisted that the brain, not the heart (hsin), was the source of ideas and locus of memory. K'ang-hsi believed that this view was "eccentric, and contrary to the wisdom of the ancient sages."20

In the Yung-cheng reign, investigations often focused on writings by men associated with factional politics. For example, there was a ban on works by literati connected with the factions of Nien Keng-yao (1679–1726) and Lung K'o-to (d. 1728). Works that expressed a Han ethnic consciousness or violated imperial edicts were also prohibited and destroyed. The first big literary inquisition case of the Yung-cheng era involved the would-be rebel Tseng Ching (1679–1736). Tseng was accused both of anti-Manchu ideas and of spreading rumors about political plots involving the emperor's accession to the throne. Tseng had alluded to the cloud of suspicion that still surrounded the emperor's accession after the Yung-cheng emperor accused his brothers, Yin-ssu (1681–1726) and Yin-t'ang (1683–1726), of plotting against him when

19 Kuo Ch'eng-k'ang and Lin T'ieh-chün, Ch'ing ch'ao wen-tzu-yü (Peking, 1990), pp. 34–5, 39.
he had come to the throne. He imprisoned them, where they died the same year. He kept another brother under house arrest for his entire reign. After arresting Tseng Ching, Yung-cheng also banned Lü Liu-liang’s (1629–83) writings, because they had influenced Tseng Ching. All students at imperial academies were required to acknowledge Lü’s “crimes” and read Yung-cheng’s refutation, entitled the Ta-i chiêh-mi lu. Copies were sent from the capital, and more copies were produced locally.21 The writings of Ch'ü Tâ-chün (1630–96), who had been dead for thirty years, were brought to the emperor’s attention, and his books added to the list of forbidden texts. There also were several cases that touched on anti-Manchu expressions or the use of Ch'ing emperors’ taboo names, though the investigations were a continuation of attacks on Nien Keng-yao and Lung K'o-to and their supporters. An example is the banning of Wang Ch'ing-ch'i’s (1672–1726) Tu-i-t'ang hsi-chêng sui-pi (Jottings of a western journey from the Hall for Reading). In this book, Wang commended Nien as “one of the greatest people in the universe.” In addition, in 1726 there was the case of Ch'a Ssu-t'ing’s (d. 1727) question in the civil service examinations that quoted a line from the Book of poetry (Shih ching, no. 303), “Where the people rest.” Two of the characters, wei (a pre-classical copula verb) and chib (“to stop,” “rest”), were nearly the same as the two characters used in the name Yung-cheng, with the crucial differences that the two characters in the quoted line lacked the “top” that is in the two characters yung and cheng. To the emperor, the missing top implied thoughts about his decapitation.

Another kind of offence in the Yung-cheng reign was the violation of imperial edicts, though factional politics were involved in such cases as well. For example, in 1726 Hsieh Chi-shih (1689–1755) accused Yung-cheng’s favorite, T'ien Wen-ching (1662–1733), of “ten great crimes.” Three years later an official complained that Hsieh’s annotated version of the Great learning (Ta-hsüeh) slandered the Sung Confucian masters. Yung-cheng was enraged, though it is widely believed that this was also because he considered Hsieh to be a member of the clique of Li Fu (1673–1750) and Ts'ai T'ing (d. 1743). Convicted, Hsieh was sentenced to hard labor. There was also the case of the T'ung-chien lun (Discussion on the comprehensive mirror) by Lu Sheng-nan (d. 1739). In this book of seventeen chapters, Lu used historical events to reflect on his own times and to imply criticism of the emperor. At that time some Manchu princes wanted their own fiefdoms, which Yung-cheng vigorously

opposed. He was infuriated by Lu’s discussion of the benefits of an enfeofment (feng-chien) system. Lu was arrested and sentenced to public execution. As in the case of Hsieh, there were also unstated issues relating to factional politics. The official crimes of Hsieh and Lu – that is, an offensive interpretation of the Great learning and support for the idea of inheritable territorial control – were not major. The severity of their punishment was enough to set society on edge.

The focus of censorship shifted during the Ch’ien-lung era. Yung-cheng was concerned with eradicating factionalism, while Ch’ien-lung was concerned with erasing references to ethnic identities and historical memories of the transitional period from the Ming to the Ch’ing dynasty. Expressions that did not raise suspicion during the Yung-cheng era could implicate the writer’s entire household in the Ch’ien-lung era. Furthermore, the range of tabooed subjects widened during the Ch’ien-lung era, and the types of detail that were cited as incriminating increased. Considering the stability of Ch’ing imperial rule, what provoked this escalating suppression during Ch’ien-lung’s reign? More than four centuries earlier, as the Mongols’ political control stabilized during the Yüan dynasty (1260–1368), their restrictions on the Han population increased in severity. This suggests that the enforcement of rules and regulations is determined by the ability of the regime to impose its methods of control. Fears about the stability of the political system were not the main motivation. During the Ch’ien-lung reign, there were other types of prohibited writing that were unique to this period. These included books that were too favorable toward previous dynasties, works that were deemed to be inconsistent with the standards of dignity and ethics, works by officials judged to have been opportunists, and works that spoke unflatteringly of ministers judged to have been virtuous.

At any point in the Ch’ing dynasty, news of major cases traveled quickly and had a capacity to induce fear. Punishment was also arbitrary. The governor of Kiangsi, Hai-ch’eng (d. 1794), was one of the most thorough investigators of infractions, but he was himself executed after he was judged to have been not vigorous enough in pursuing the Tzu-kuan (Comprehensive dictionary) case. The crimes in these literary inquisition cases that involved improper political theory, slander of Sung philosophers, whimsical historiography, and so forth might seem trivial, but the severity of the punishments made writers avoid certain topics. This had a great impact on eighteenth-century intellectual culture.

22 Ting Yuan-chi, Ch’ing-tai K’ang Yang Ch’ien san ch’ao chin-shu yüan-yin chih yen-chiu, pp. 100–7.
24 See chapter 5 of Ting Yuan-chi, Ch’ing-tai K’ang Yang Ch’ien san ch’ao chin-shu yüan-yin chih yen-chiu.
To understand why literary inquisition cases increased so much during the Ch'ien-lung period, it is important to try to understand the Ch'ien-lung emperor's own thinking. Even more than his grandfather, the emperor saw himself as a ruler who was also the ultimate arbiter in the realm of culture and scholarship, within which he should exercise his political power. Ch'ien-lung demonstrated a strong commitment to Confucian teachings. He appears to have felt that these offered the greatest resources available for legitimizing and supporting the rule of his dynasty. He was critical of many aspects of the politics, culture, and scholarship of the late Ming period, when many points of view were in contention during a time of political breakdown. He criticized the struggles between the Tung-lin faction and eunuchs, the diversity of thought in Ming scholarship, and the conduct of prominent literati of that era, such as Ch'ien Ch'ien-i (1582–1664). Instead, Ch'ien-lung aligned himself with traditional culture and philosophy. Filial piety and loyalty were key terms in his writings, and he endorsed the traditional scholar–peasant–artisan–merchant ideal of social hierarchy. He wrote at great length about the importance of valuing the peasantry, and regarded this and the promotion of military training as fundamental to the stability and good order of his realm. Scholars have long recognized that his 40,000 poems are almost entirely devoid of any mention of drinking, singing, or dancing. Twenty of the literary inquisition cases that occurred during his reign related to charges of profaning the ancient sages, even though in his own writing the emperor could be critical of ancient books and their authors. He was interested in accuracy in philology and correcting geographical information. On occasion he used his high officials as research assistants. He sent the Shensi governor, Ch'in Ch'eng-en (d. 1809), to check firsthand on Chu Hsi’s statement that “the water of the Ching River [in Shensi] is muddy, and that of the Wei River is clear,” which led to the determination that the water of the Ching was in fact clear, while the Wei was muddy. Like his grandfather and father, Ch'ien-lung took an interest in philosophy, and stuck relatively closely to the ideas of Chu Hsi that principle (li) came before ch'i, that the processes of formed ch'i could not be understood without understanding their principles, and that human sentiments were in line with the universal principles. In short, the Ch'ien-lung emperor affirmed mainstream Confucian ideas as transmitted

in Chu Hsi’s interpretations. He was influenced by the critical scholarship of his own times, as traces of evidential learning occasionally appear in his writings. This intellectual trend became stronger during the latter part of his reign.

More important for the prosecution of literary inquisition cases was Ch’ien-lung’s conception of imperial power. From the K’ang-hsi period, the emperor was seen, and saw himself, as both secular ruler and cultural–religious authority (chia-chu). In the words of the minister Wei I-chieh (1616–86), he was combining the Way of the monarch and the Way of the teacher. Li Kuang-ti (1642–1718) stressed the ideal that the roles of leader of secular government and arbiter of cultural and moral values were combined in the person of the Ch’ing emperor. Ch’ien-lung consolidated this view, and wielded these two types of authority simultaneously and skillfully. The number of imperially supported texts produced during the Ch’ing is larger than the output of any other dynasty, and Ch’ien-lung’s reign saw the creation of more of these works than the reign of any other monarch. Many of the works had to do with the cultural tradition. They were distributed throughout the realm and were intended to shape his subjects’ understanding of the world. Like his grandfather, Ch’ien-lung drew on the Han cultural tradition to enhance the legitimacy of Manchu rule. Although he emphasized that the hua (civilized, Chinese) and the i (barbarian, outsider, non-Chinese) were of one family, he strove to excise from all books any passage that was unfavorable to Manchus or that implied disapproval of non-Han rulers in earlier periods.

Ch’ien-lung’s thinking was centered on being the ruler and was not aligned to any single ethnic consciousness. He accepted the three cardinal virtues (san-kang) and five constant virtues (wu-ch’ang), in which the minister is subordinated to his ruler as a son is to his father. Ch’ien-lung repeatedly expressed this idea. “The sovereign is the world’s teacher, and his tools for teaching the world are his ministers.”

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29 Yeh Kao-shu, Ch’ing ch’ao ch’ien-ch’i ti wen-hua ch’eng-t’s’e (Pan-ch’iao, 2002), pp. 125–32, 311–25.
30 Ho Kuan-piao argues that that view of absolute sovereignty was a constant part of Ch’ing ideology from K’ang-hsi through to Ch’ien-lung, and was not only demonstrated in emperors’ writings but also in the texts displayed at their palaces. One of the couplets written in the Yung-cheng reign at the Ch’ien-ch’ing Palace reads, “One man to rule the earth, The earth looks to one man.” In the East Pavilion of the Yang-hsin Hall, Ch’ien-lung personally wrote out one of K’ang-hsi’s edicts, the beginning of which is, “The rise and fall of chaos and order depends entirely on the person and the intent of the sovereign.” See Ho Kuan-piao, “Chien-kang tu-yü, chien-kang tu-tuan: K’ang-hsi, Yung-cheng erh ti ch’un-ch’ian ssu-hsiang ti i ko ts’e-mien,” Han-hsüeh yen-chiu 20 No. 2 (2002), pp. 294–7.
proper human relationships; the sovereign is present in all of the five relationships.” “Ministers receive orders from the sovereign, as children respect their fathers and wives serve their husbands. These things cannot be inverted.” 32

The Yü-p’i Li-tai t’ung-chien chi-lan (Imperially approved selections from mirrors for aiding government over several dynasties), which was compiled between 1759 and 1768, propounded an ideology of ministerial devotion in which the sovereign was at the center of all things. As he declared, “I am the ruler of all under Heaven (chen wei t’ien-hsia chu). All celebrations and rewards, punishments and authority, stem from me. Should the ministers have any opinions on public affairs, whether or not they shall be implemented depends on me.” 33 He constantly stressed ministerial loyalty and righteousness (chung i) as values in serving the emperor. He changed the posthumous name of the deified military hero Kuan Yü from Chuang-mu (Strong and Respectful) to Chung-i (Loyal and Righteous), and he altered the posthumous names of other historical figures, or otherwise reassessed them. The character for loyalty (chung) was used frequently for the posthumous names of ministers during the Ch’ien-lung reign. 34 All this was an unprecedented promotion of an ethos of “loyalty and righteousness,” values he expected in all of his subordinates, both civil and military.

Ch’ien-lung’s reign was long, and his ideas about loyalty underwent some changes. In the early years of his reign, Ch’ien-lung followed the concept of loyalty that previous Ch’ing emperors had adopted, which defined the Ming loyalists, who resisted the Manchu invasion, as obstacles to the founding of the dynasty. Ming loyalists were condemned in early Ch’ing official historical writings. In the later period, Ch’ien-lung switched the emphasis, concluding that Ming loyalists correctly had been loyal to the dynasty that they originally served, so they should be praised because of their deeds rather than criticized for resisting the Ch’ing takeover. This drastic transformation resulted in a surprise move by Ch’ien-lung while the Ssu-k’u ch’üan-shu project was still in progress. He issued an edict to withdraw official historical writings compiled in the early years of his reign that supported the previous applications of the concept of loyalty. 35 He decided that for those who lived under the Ming dynasty, loyalty meant loyalty to Ming emperors. Equally, for those who lived


34 See “Li san,” in Chao Erh-hsun et al., comps., Ch’ing shih kao (1927; Taipei, 1981) 84, p. 2541.

under the Ch'ing dynasty, loyalty meant loyalty to Manchu emperors. Thus he applied one notion of loyalty to authority to two different contexts, but the ideal was loyalty to one’s own emperor.

The large-scale censorship that Ch'ien-lung initiated as part of the Ssu-k'u ch'üan-shu project had two motivations. The first was to protect the legitimacy of Manchu rule, so all material that was not favorable to the Manchus was suppressed. Moreover, he wanted to point to examples in each dynasty in Chinese history of men who were disloyal to their own contemporary dynasty. Ch'ien-lung simultaneously, and wholeheartedly, wanted to “promote the cardinal virtues in ministers, now and in the future.” Moreover, he wanted to secure the established scholastic culture and habits of thought. On the one hand he wrote, “Compilation of the Ssu-k'u ch'üan-shu is a matter of gathering poems and prose that can serve as a moral guide for all people.” Furthermore, he wanted to promote the cardinal virtues in ministers, now and in the future.”36

Ch'ien-lung had ministers write things such as “the present task of investigating and destroying improper books is the duty of every person who reads.” 39 He repeatedly declared that prohibiting offensive books was intended to promote and protect universal moral values. Such comments suggest a close relationship between the Ssu-k'u ch'üan-shu project and the literary inquisition cases.

From studying antiquity to censoring expression

During the first fifteen years of Ch'ien-lung’s reign, from 1736 to 1750, when he still accepted the guidance of the two leading officials he had inherited from his father, the impression was of an empire at peace. Two events in the 1750s involving offensive texts suggest that the rosy glow of the first period was fading.

The first event was the case involving a memorial in 1751 purporting to be by Sun Chia-kan (1683–1753), an official known for upright conduct and frank speech. The text of the memorial had been circulated in at least ten provinces before it reached the emperor. The memorial, accusing the Ch'ien-lung emperor of ten great crimes, not only attacked the emperor himself, but questioned the legitimacy of the dynasty. Ch'ien-lung launched an investigation, but in the end the authenticity of the document remained undetermined.

36 Chung-kuo ti-i li-shih tang-an-ku-an, Tsuan-hsiu Ssu-k'u ch'üan-shu tang-an, p. 539.
37 Chung-kuo ti-i li-shih tang-an-ku-an, Tsuan-hsiu Ssu-k'u ch'üan-shu tang-an, p. 1433.
The other case involved P'eng Chia-p'ing (d. 1757). P'eng was charged with secretly collecting unofficial histories. An outspoken high government official, P'eng had retired to his hometown, Hsia-i, in eastern Honan. In 1757, eastern Honan suffered a famine, but local government officials hid the news of the disaster from the emperor. To help people in his hometown, P'eng decided to use the opportunity presented by the emperor's inspection tour to the south to disclose the truth. Ch'ien-lung was dismayed. He disliked disclosures that would destroy the image of the empire's peace and prosperity. He also disliked cases when local civilians, including local elites, criticized or accused local officials, which reminded the emperor that the social hierarchy could be jeopardized. After P'eng's action, two other local men with the rank of licentiate (sheng-yüan) also petitioned to the emperor while he was on his tour to the southern provinces. Ch'ien-lung suspected that there might be a group of discontented local people with P'eng Chia-p'ing as their leader. Although this was later found to be untrue, the emperor still resented P'eng and the licentiates for reminding him of the mismanagement of natural disasters by local officials. Later, the local magistrate escorted one of the licentiates, Tuan Ch'ang-hsü, to his home, where the magistrate found a copy of Wu San-kuei's 1673 proclamation of rebellion. This copy of the proclamation was sent to the Ch'ien-lung emperor. The emperor was stunned to find that Tuan had thickly underlined a part of the proclamation. The emperor therefore assumed that Tuan strongly agreed with it. The suspicious text reads as follows: “That barbarian ruler completely disregards the Way and engages in treachery and deviance with audacity. [Under his misrule] principled scholars all remain in lowly staff positions, while worthless fellows invariably occupy key assignments. The ruler and his ministers are all benighted, [which is causing the appearance of] comets and falling meteorites.”40 Ch'ien-lung was shocked that after more than 100 years, Wu San-kuei's proclamation could still be approved by Tuan.

Because of Tuan's case, Ch'ien-lung suspected that P'eng Chia-p'ing might also have collected texts like Wu San-kuei's proclamation. P'eng responded that he did not own Wu San-kuei's proclamation, but that he did possess unofficial historical writings of several kinds from late Ming. His books were confiscated. Ch'ien-lung severely punished persons for possessing historical texts about late Ming and early Ch'ing, including P'eng Chia-p'ing and the two local elites. However, he set free the local officials who had covered up the serious famine in eastern Honan. The scale of this case was small, but it reminded Ch'ien-lung that hidden throughout the realm were many unofficial

historical materials relating to the period from 1644 to the rebellion of the Three Feudatories (1673–81), many of which were not favorable about Ch’ing rule.

The frequency and scale of cases involving offensive texts generally changed after the beginning of the Ssu-k’u ch’üan-shu project. The aim of the project initially was to create a Confucian collection (Ju-tsang) that could stand alongside the great collections of Buddhist and Taoist literature, and more broadly to “study antiquity to aid our culture” (chi-ku yu-wen). At first there was no intention that the project would also involve the suppression of books or certain kinds of speech. Ch’ien-lung ordered the gathering of books so that the imperial palace could have a complete collection of the best versions of the best books. The initial reaction from all quarters was limited. Ch’ien-lung did not falter in his purpose. He issued a second edict stating that there would be no punishments for possessing books that contained characters that were taboo; he had always acted honorably and openly so there was no reason for people to distrust the project.41 After this edict, literati began to submit large numbers of books for the collection.

In both the collecting and the banning of books, the development of the whole process was improvised. Many initiatives did not come from the emperor himself, but from officials who, having understood the general intentions of the emperor, attempted to implement them, and in the process expanded on them and extrapolated from what the emperor had written. It was a process in which both the emperor and his officials were participants. In 1774, after the process of collecting worthy books had begun, Ch’ien-lung raised the idea of censoring pernicious books with the governor-general of Chekiang, Chung-yin (d. 1778).42 When Chung-yin transmitted Ch’ien-lung’s order to his subordinates, there was surprise among the governors. The addition of prohibiting books to a program that had aspired to facilitate the “study of antiquity to aid our culture” now elicited muted expressions of unease. Though they had no choice but to carry out the emperor’s orders, their qualms were reflected in documents of the time. Li Shih-yao (d. 1788) wrote frankly,

Previously, I had only paid attention to whether books were worthy of being gathered for the collection. I did not consider that [the project] could be used as an opportunity to root out private writings of petty officials who served the Ming, some of which contain taboo words and sentences and now circulated privately, and that this was a means by which the flow of wicked writing might be halted. In overlooking this, I have proved most dim-witted.43

41 Chung-kuo ti-i li-shih tang-an-kuan, Tsuan-hsiu Ssu-k’u ch’üan-shu tang-an, p. 68.
Re-enforcing the censoring aspect, Ch‘ien-lung blamed Kao-chin (1707–78), San-pao (d. 1784), Sa-tsai (d. 1786) and other high officials serving in Chiang-nan for not recognizing improper content in the books that they had gathered. The governors understood that Ch‘ien-lung had changed his mind and reneged on his earlier promise, though it was obviously not politic for them to point this out. Some chose to act as if the new aim had been part of the emperor’s original plan, and that they themselves had been working in this direction in any case, though now they had his explicit order they would implement it more forcefully. Ch‘ien-lung did not blame officials who took such an approach. Both sides saved face and the policy would be implemented.

In general, the Ssu-k‘u ch‘üan-shu project moved from buying books to searching for books, from gathering works one by one to comprehensive sweeps, and from paying attention to the book collections of literati to door-to-door searches of entire villages. As the movement spread throughout the empire, it became important to mobilize manpower to penetrate all levels of society. To uncover offensive books, the Kiangsi governor, Hai-ch‘eng, suggested the tactic of gathering the local ward headmen to transmit orders to households. Ch‘ien-lung approved of Hai-ch‘eng’s approach, and gave orders for provincial governors to implement it. From 1774 onward, provincial governors memorialized in response to Hai-ch‘eng’s plan. Aware of Ch‘ien-lung’s great sensitivity and strictness, they carried out the work conscientiously. In a short time, all the provinces used the local headmen in gathering books. The Honan governor, Hsü Chi, developed another tactic, which was to transmit orders to all households when the household placards were distributed. The effort to force every household in the empire to turn in books went as far as possible short of conducting door-to-door searches.

In order to complete the work of collecting books, most localities mobilized the lowest-ranking officials in the imperial bureaucracy, as well as the literate strata immediately below them, including clerks, schoolmasters, unemployed literati, book collectors, salt merchants, and those who worked in the book trade, including owners of bookstores and book-boats, street vendors and dealers in old books. Documents in the archives reveal a range of means used to mobilize personnel to uncover more books. “Order clerks and other low-ranking sub-officials to keep a watch on their local places. Ward headmen are to transmit orders to each household.” Some governors proposed, “It is more convenient for tribute students (kung-sheng) who are in their

native place to make investigations than for candidates already dispatched to other places.” San-pao ordered that “education officials should return to their native place to make investigations, and clerks should establish means of making checks throughout their areas ... If there were only one official per county this work indeed would be difficult.” Therefore, he suggested that “all county magistrates should meet with the education officials in their jurisdiction and carefully choose several who are rigorous and proper in their conduct and respected in the villages to assist them.” Most provincial governors issued similar orders. San-pao also sent men holding sinecure positions back to their home villages. “Their friends and relations will make it easier for them to carry out inquiries and proceed with the investigation work. They can be rewarded according to how many books they report, and in the future this can be considered as part of their evaluations.” In addition, there were orders for “book dealers to be commissioned to travel widely through cities, townships, and villages, and make careful searches in each place.” It was also proposed to “select capable book traders, provide them with a salary, and have them accompany competent education officials on searches.”

To guarantee the commitment of low-ranking officials to the collection process, regulations made individual inspectors responsible for specific regions and held them liable if forbidden books were later found within those regions. In a country without a modern police force, this was a thorough method for coercing the entire population to comply.

It is difficult to know much about the responses of ordinary people to the campaign. Despite the effort to transmit orders to all households through the ward headmen, officials still dispatched investigators to search for books out of fear that illiterate peasants would not have understood the orders. Ch’ien-lung took the search for suspect books extremely seriously. Any hint of a problem was pursued, with questions asked about the commitment of the investigators.

Because of the degree of sensitivity that was imposed, many innocuous books were dragged into the investigations.

Apart from the investigations of households, from the beginning of the campaign senior officials were also required to monitor their own staff, display orders, and make follow-up investigations into people known to have written or possessed censored works. The names, ages, and addresses of suspicious men were transmitted to government offices. As these methods did not produce the

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48 For example, the prefect of Shao-chou, Kao Kang, a Han-ch’in bannerman, was punished after his children were found with copies of Ch’en Chien’s *Huang-Ming shih-chi*. See Chung-kuo ti-i li-shih tang-an-kuan, *Tsuan-hsiu Ssu-k'u ch'ien-shu tang-an*, pp. 454–5.
intended results, two other procedures were instituted. The first was to order scholars to produce detailed lists of all the books they had in their homes. Examination candidates were required to do this when they gathered to take an examination. Orders were also given in each prefecture for schoolmasters to make lists of suspect books, and order all their students to check their family homes and report any works on the list. They should also check their neighbors’ and relatives’ homes. All places must be carefully searched. Pi Yüan (1730–97), the top-ranked chin-shib of 1760, hit upon a clever tactic:

Apart from the Six Classics (liu-i), the official histories, and school textbooks, which are not necessary to investigate, all books in the townships and villages, particularly compilations of poetry from the Ming period, unofficial histories (yeb-shib), and rare books, should be listed and sent to the government offices for examination. \(^\text{49}\) Knowing that most household book collections were quite limited, Pi Yüan first listed the common, acceptable types of books and then required that all other titles be reported for examination by local officials.

Another initiative involved the creation of procedures to control publishing. An order from San-pao prohibited unlicensed printing of books and mandated assessment of texts before they could be published. Both earlier and contemporary compositions had to be registered and sent to the local officials in charge of education for approval. If this was granted, these officers retained a copy of the work. San-pao also ordered carvers of woodblocks for books check to ensure that the works had the education officials’ seal to show that they had received official sanction, though this measure was not adopted on a large scale. \(^\text{50}\)

What kinds of texts were investigated? In the early stages, efforts concentrated on histories and compilations of poetry, but the movement’s scope widened to include, for example, clan genealogies (tsu-p’u), for which the focus was on genealogies with “crazy claims of connections” because of the tendency to include famous people of ancient and recent times in a clan’s genealogy. \(^\text{51}\) Local gazetteers became another target, which represented a new phase in the censorship work. Min O-yüan (d. 1797) was the first to recognize that gazetteers could be offensive when he saw that provincial and county

\(^{49}\) Chung-kuo ti-i li-shih tang-an-kuan, Tsuan-hsiu Ssu-k'u ch'üan-shu tang-an, pp. 184, 238, 511, 864–5, 867.

\(^{50}\) Chung-kuo ti-i li-shih tang-an-kuan, Tsuan-hsiu Ssu-k'u ch'üan-shu tang-an, p. 797.

\(^{51}\) For example, “Prefaces refer to ancestors from the Han dynasty and make absurd boasts. This is a bad habit of the Han people ... Genealogies that include such ridiculous claims in an attempt to gain prestige for the lineage ... should be destroyed along with the carved woodblocks used for their printing, which will suffice for a punishment. Local officials are also ordered to instruct the people to be content with their position in the world, and not engage in bad habits like this.” Chung-kuo ti-i li-shih tang-an-kuan, Tsuan-hsiu Ssu-k'u ch'üan-shu tang-an, p. 1215.
gazetteers’ sections on notable locals and the arts often mentioned the authors of prohibited books, or that sections on local historical sites had problematic accounts of local historical events. Min found that the Comprehensive gazetteer of Chiang-nan (Chiang-nan t'ung-chih) and the city gazetteers he read contained many poems by Ch'ien Ch'ien-i, Chin Pao (1614–80), Ch'ü Ta-chün and other censored authors. Ch'ien-lung immediately ordered, “Where sections on local history, personages, and the arts contain writings by such people, or details of their lives, or the titles of their works, this information is to be expunged.”

There are also numerous examples of gaps within local histories left in order to avoid sensitive topics. As early as 1672, Ch'ien Ch'eng-chih (1612–93) of Anhwei was forced to revise his history of Chiang-yin when he moved to that area. Ch'ien wished to record the stories of people who had been killed defending the city against Ch'ing troops, but was forbidden to do so by local officials. At the beginning of the Ch'ing period, such local interventions were still isolated cases, but by the Ch'ien-lung era, these local protocols had been re-enforced by imperial edicts. In particular, local gazetteers were prohibited from containing any mention of books, poems, writings, or events that had been forbidden. The severity of the literary inquisition was in no small part aided by the enthusiastic participation of local literati and county clerks. In an effort to display their fervent loyalty and add to their investigative laurels, they extended the scrutiny of writings and added to the severity of regulations. Many of the new regulations were first suggested by officials, and later approved by the emperor. In 1779, the provincial governor of Anhwei submitted a memorial informing the emperor that there were still many forbidden passages in local gazetteers. Ch'ien-lung quickly accepted this suggestion and ordered local authorities to “inspect thoroughly and eradicate meticulously.”

Local governments established special bureaus to check gazetteers. Having received an edict from Ch'ien-lung, the governor-general of Chihli ordered “all prefectures, districts, and counties to send all gazetteers to the provincial administration commission, who will select capable officials and establish an office to examine them.” The governor-general of Shensi and Kansu, Le-erh-chin, collected Kansu provincial and sub-provincial gazetteers in the provincial capital and established a bureau with commissioners to revise them. The bureau’s remit was to find and report any text by or about censored authors, and if an examination of such text so required, to destroy it and order the re-carving of the blocks for the books. The officers published details of prohibited

52 Chung-kuo ti-i li-shih tang-an-kuan, Tiuan-hsiu Sue-hu ch'i-an-shu tang-an, pp. 1119, 1129.
54 See Wu Che-fu, Ch'ing-tai chin-hui shu-mu yen-chiu, p. 92.
sections and pages with orders that such pages should be removed from existing copies and sent to the bureau for destruction.\textsuperscript{55}

Another phase of the censorship movement came with the move to examine drama and opera scripts. As Ch'hien-lung wrote, such materials could contain sentences referring to the early period of the Ch'ing dynasty, so they also needed to be examined. As for lyrics that concerned the Southern Sung (1127–79) and Chin (1115–1234) dynasties, “there are passages that are inappropriate or contain inaccuracies. When they circulate for a long time, ignorant people start believing that the play is true, and thus all plays must also be investigated.”\textsuperscript{56} Next came investigations of the blank spaces in texts (k'ung-ko) because Ch'hien-lung felt that these lacunae often implicitly broke taboos and that readers could figure out what had been in the blank space. This meant the readers could reconstruct the dangerous connotations of the passages.\textsuperscript{57} Later even music scores were checked to see if their instructions contained errors.\textsuperscript{58} By this stage, the censorship work had moved beyond evaluation of unacceptable expressions, and begun to deal with the accuracy of knowledge.\textsuperscript{59} Painting and calligraphy also came within the scope of investigations, in case they had inappropriate subject matter or suggested undesirable messages.\textsuperscript{60}

Material objects such as tablets with inscriptions and plaques on household doors were targeted after a garrison commander (tsung-ping) of Ma-lan, a key military base northeast of Peking, discovered steles with texts that were negative about “northerners.” The steles had been erected 200 years earlier during the Chia-ching (1522–66) and Wan-li (1573–1620) reigns by a military officer in charge of the imperial palace sacrifices to the Han dynasty


\textsuperscript{56} Chung-kuo ti-i li-shih tang-an-kuan, \textit{Tsinan-hsiu Ssu-k'u ch'üan-ibu tang-an}, p. 1228.

\textsuperscript{57} After he read Shen Lien's \textit{Ch'ing hsia chi}, Ch'hien-lung wrote, “as there are many taboo uses of blank spaces, they have been sent to A-kuei and Ho-shen for investigation.” After this he ordered, “All books that contain blank spaces in text must be reported for checking.” Chung-kuo ti-i li-shih tang-an-kuan, \textit{Tsinan-hsiu Ssu-k'u ch'üan-ibu tang-an}, pp. 1231, 1296.

\textsuperscript{58} The governor-general of Hu-kuang, Cheng Ta-chin, memorialized, “There are unscrupulous people who hold onto the carved blocks for printing forbidden books in hope of collecting payments for them from the government; it is difficult to prevent this from happening ... In some cases it may be that the person reporting the book does not possess the carved blocks, but the books are sold by merchants who are not completely unaware of the location of the blocks ... Officials and degree holders are ordered to hunt vigorously, and in addition, take utmost care to find the carved blocks.” Chung-kuo ti-i li-shih tang-an-kuan, \textit{Tsinan-hsiu Ssu-k'u ch'üan-ibu tang-an}, pp. 1032.

\textsuperscript{59} For example, some music scores used “customary forms that are very different from those in imperial court music. Although there may be no mistakes in their directions, it is still appropriate for them to be translated. The originals should be reported.” Chung-kuo ti-i li-shih tang-an-kuan, \textit{Tsinan-hsiu Ssu-k'u ch'üan-ibu tang-an}, p. 1984.

\textsuperscript{60} For example, “Cheng Jui, the director of the salt administration of Liang-huai, sent the painting and book collections of Luo Yü from Yangchow to Peking for inspection.” Chung-kuo ti-i li-shih tang-an-kuan, \textit{Tsinan-hsiu Ssu-k'u ch'üan-ibu tang-an}, p. 1971.
The garrison commander of Ma-lan promptly had the steles buried. Later, fearing that they would someday be unearthed, he had them dug up, the inscriptions effaced, and a new inscription carved. After reading the report on this, Ch’ien-lung ordered all inscriptions on steles at the gates of temples, city walls, and highways checked. “Those that should be effaced must be ground down immediately. Those that should be revised must be re-carved immediately.” Upon receipt of the order, officers set about grinding down stele inscriptions throughout the realm, particularly in peripheral places that had been the sites of battles. The commander-in-chief at Mukden, Fu-k’ang-an (1754–96), memorialized to report that he had dispatched his deputy to every district and county within Chin-chou. He wrote, “There are an inordinate number of inscriptions that need to be ground down or contain words that need to be removed; this cleansing work is being implemented with the assistance of the local officials.”

The last phases of the censorship came when the governor of Kiangsi, Ho Yü-ch’eng (1726–90), developed a new method. Ho dispatched education officials throughout his jurisdiction to replace all copies of offensive works with reprinted versions that had had offending passages removed. Several books that Ch’ien-lung had approved early in his reign were recalled for revision. By this stage there was such an atmosphere of mistrust that the on-the-spot destruction of banned books was prohibited. Such works had to be sent to the capital, and inspection and necessary revision work also had to take place there.

Categories of offense and the impact on scholastic culture

The large-scale censorship movement in conjunction with the book collecting project did not begin with a fully formed set of standards or a list of books to be banned. The nature of the censorship emerged gradually and in an ad hoc manner as the investigations proceeded. Even though many provincial officials

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62 Ho Yü-ch’eng memorialized to report that he had “ordered the correction of the carved blocks, and reprinted many books. Education officials distributed them throughout each county in the province, at the same time instructing people to exchange any older copies, whether they were complete or not.” Chung-kuo ti-i li-shih tang-an-kuan, Ts’ien-hsiau Ssu-k’u ch’üan-shu tang-an, p. 1932.
63 For example, Ch’iu Chen-k’uei of Ch’ung-shan county reported to the county magistrate a book that his ancestor Ch’iu Chün had written during the Ming dynasty, the Ta hsüeh yen i pu. A reissue of this book had once been graced with a preface written by Ch’ien-lung, and at that time no major problems had been seen. Furthermore, Ch’ien-lung wrote of his own compilation, the Yü-p’i t’ung-chien käng-mu hsü-pien, “there are many slanderous passages in the sections on the Liao, Chin, and Yüan dynasties.” Chung-kuo ti-i li-shih tang-an-kuan, Ts’ien-hsiau Ssu-k’u ch’üan-shu tang-an, pp. 829, 1054–5, 1676–8, 1873.
and military departments concerned with the *Ssu-k'u ch'üan-shu* project compiled lists of prohibited books as they conducted investigations, investigators did not necessarily carry copies of such lists with them, so much depended on spot decisions as well as hearsay. The governor-general of Shensi and Kansu, Le-erh-chin, reported,

> After I arrived at my present appointment, I conducted rigorous investigations and produced a list of all the banned books that had been uncovered. This was sent to each county and prefecture, and to all the schools in these two provinces with orders for officials to check for books on the list.

The result was that “since the beginning of this policy, everyone in all corners, fields, and villages of these provinces has clearly understood [which books are forbidden]”.\(^{64}\) Fear caused officials to err on the side of caution. However, as the literary inquisition grew case by case, a series of precedents emerged. These served as indicators that let the literati know that certain subjects were either discouraged or prohibited, which resulted in the avoidance of those fields.

Provincial lists of proscribed books contained abstracts that provided the literati with a guide as to what they had to avoid and what was safe to write about. However, these abstracts were often ambiguous, and it was not easy to determine which passages in the prohibited books were actually offensive.\(^{65}\) Besides passages that touched on ethnicity and Manchu–Han relations, a number of other kinds of writing constituted offenses, including violation of imperially endorsed Confucian thought, expressions of disgruntlement or anger toward the present conditions, inappropriate historical argument, careless ridicule of past sovereigns and sages, and even writing that reflected too fondly on the idea of becoming a recluse. Such a broad array of offenses produced a tense atmosphere, as is demonstrated in an anecdote that the envoy from Korea, Liu Te-kung (Yu Deuk-gong) (1748–1807), recorded in his 1790 book *Luan-yang lu* (*A record of Luan-yang*), an account of his time in Peking. A scholar gave him a painting with the title “Lake with rocks and reclusive fishermen.” Weng Fang-kang (1733–1818), a 1752 *chin-shih* who later would become an editor of the *Ssu-k'u ch'üan-shu*, watching from the side, waved his hand dismissively and said, “in the age of a sage ruler [such as the present emperor] there should be no hermits.”\(^{66}\)

As described above, Ch'ien-lung’s main aim was the establishment of a regime of truth, and his method mixed prohibition with promotion. The prohibition part was achieved through direct instructions transmitted through

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65 For example, see “Ch'ing-tai chin-shu chieh-t'i,” in Wang Pin, comp., *Ch'ing-tai chin-shu tsung-shu* (Peking, 1999), pp. 71–564.
66 Liu Te-kung, *Luan-yang lu* (Shen-yang, 1934) 2, p. 11a.
officials and also by the signaling system created by the censorship cases, which transmitted information on what was banned and what was tolerated or encouraged. Several key points can be derived from various lists of prohibited books. First, annotated classics and historical works were handled with extreme sensitivity. One of the most frequent categories of offense was “distortion of classics and histories, violating the proper standards of such subjects.” Scholars could get into serious trouble for careless editing of classics and histories. In terms of histories, works that related to events in Liao-tung, and events of the Southern Sung, late Yuan, and early Ming were dangerous and could be forbidden. Historical treatises and general works on history, calendars, and horoscopes were all very sensitive. Lax discussion of the great sages was also dangerous. Chou Huang, from Yen-ch’eng in Kiangsu, was executed after his privately annotated Kang-chien i chih lu (An easy introduction to the outline and lessons of history) was accused of “belittling the ancient sages and writing presumptuously about the fortunes of former dynasties.” Judgments of historical figures were also only safe if they corresponded to those in the imperially sponsored histories. Kuo Yen-po was punished because the standard of evaluation used in his T’ung-chien Ming chi (Record of the Ming in the comprehensive mirror style) was different from that in the imperially approved Ming shih kang-mu (Outline of Ming history).

Beyond these there was a host of other things that could get writing banned. Rash fortune-telling and discussion of military strategy could be offenses, as could poetic works with “excessive anger” or “excessive hate,” or even expressions of “sorrow” regarding specific episodes in history. It was a crime to call oneself a non-collaborator (i-min), an expression used to refer to adherents of the former dynasty living under a new one without serving it. Use of taboo words and phrases, or even nonsensical expressions like “a dog’s wild bark” were offenses. Inappropriate word choice also led to the banning of books. For example, the unauthorized use of “to pardon” (she), or referring to the army that conquered the Ming empire as “Ch’ing troops” (Ch’ing shih), instead of “imperial soldiers” (ta-ping) or “the sovereign’s troops” (weng-shih), were banned. Carelessly using such words as “Han,” “Great enterprise” (ta-yeb, i.e. dynastic conquest), “Ch’ing,” “sun and moon” (the components of the character for “Ming”), “barbarian,” “Ming,” and similar words also could be

67 These cases are detailed in Lei Meng-ch’en, Ch’ing-tai ko-sheng chin-shu bai-k’ao (Peking, 1989), pp. 26, 29–30; Kuo Ch’eng-k’ang and Lin T’ieh-ch’un, Ch’ing ch’ao wen-tzu-yü, p. 335; Chung-kuo ti-i li-shih tang-an-kuan, T’uan-hsiu Su-k’u ch’üan-shu tang-an, p. 777.

68 For these cases, see Lei Meng-ch’en, Ch’ing-tai ko-sheng chin-shu bai-k’ao, pp. 12, 19, 28, 30, 32, 34, 37, 61, 83; Chung-kuo ti-i li-shih tang-an-kuan, T’uan-hsiu Su-k’u ch’üan-shu tang-an, pp. 1522–8.
punishable. So were lying or bragging, and disordered or irregular citations. Writings deemed to be excessively vulgar, particularly if they involved sex and lust, were forbidden as well. Any text or account that touched on the outlandish or misrepresented Confucian canonical texts also was banned. Leaving lacunae (wa ch’ü tzü yang) in the text was another reason for prohibition. Finally, writings that transmitted rumors or made guesses about the emperor’s personal life were forbidden.

Many of the offenses were discussed in an ambiguous and vague manner that avoided quoting offending passages. This was a characteristic of most official writing in the Ch’ing period. One cause for prohibition, however, was extremely clear, and that was reference to persons and writings from late Ming and events and individuals associated with the Ming–Ch’ing transition. These were consistently censored. In this category were writings by and about Ch’ien Ch’ien-i, Kung Ting-tzu (1615–73), Ku Yen-wu (1613–82) and others. Works by or relating to such famous late Ming writers as Li Chih (1527–1602), Ch’en Chi-ju (1558–1639), Li Jih-hua (1565–1635), Chung Hsing (1574–1624), T’an Yüan-ch’un (1586–1637), Chin Pao (1614–80), Ch’ü Ta-chün (1630–96), and Ch’en Kung-yin (1631–1700), among others, were banned or censored. Some of these writers had died before Ch’ing troops were in Peking. Writings by late Ming literati were so frequently censored that some officials began to ban anything produced in that era. Also banned were the writings of Lü Liu-liang and writings that referred to him. Because there was a large volume of writing associated with Lü, such works often appeared in catalogues of banned books.

Ch’ien-lung’s attitude toward Ming literati and culture had a great influence on the censorship policies. In his own writing, Ch’ien-lung was highly critical of aspects of the behavior of the Ming literati that strike some present-day observers as foreshadowing “modern” thought. Even the Tung-lin Academy movement and the activities of Buddhists aroused his ire. Curious about the work of unconventional late Ming literati such as Li Chih and Li Yü (1610–80), he had officials send Li Chih’s books to Peking so that he could inspect them personally, and then he objected to them strongly. He wrote that “the propositions are ridiculous, and there are mistakes and absurdities on crucial

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\[70\] Lei Meng-ch’ên, Ch’ing-tai ko-sheng chin-shu hui-k’ao, pp. 28, 32, 34, 36, 40, 61, 82, 83; Chung-kuo ti-i li-shih tang-an-kuan, Tsuan-hsiu Ssu-k’u ch’üan-shu tang-an, p. 1224; Kuo Ch’eng-k’ang and Lin T’ieh-chün, Ch’ing ch’ao wen-tzu-yü, pp. 335, 349.
\[71\] Lei Meng-ch’ên, Ch’ing-tai ko-sheng chin-shu hui-k’ao, pp. 1, 30, 54, 68–9, 91.
issues.”

He was also critical of Yüan Huang (1533–1606) and Hou Fang-yü (1618–54), late Ming writers who in the emperor’s judgment went beyond Confucian norms.

There were many facets to the prohibition of books that accompanied the Ssu-k’u ch’üan-shu project. Sometimes the officials in charge acted like those in charge of the imperial examinations, in that they were concerned not only with offensive thought, but also with incorrect knowledge. For example, drama scripts that were deemed to contain historical inaccuracies were revised for the benefit of “ignorant crowds” who did not know the truth. Compilations of exemplary examination policy essays by top-ranked candidates (chuang-yüan) in which the text of the printed essays differed from the originals also ended up being destroyed.

Prosecution of offenses outside the book-collecting project

Prosecutions for literary expressions were not all related to the book-collecting projects and the associated literary inquisitions. There were many other cases during the Ch’ien-lung reign. Some were rooted in misunderstandings, others in officials’ hopes to curry imperial favor. Some were responses to criticism of local officials, and many more were related to local social and political conflicts that led to accusations of literary crimes. At the local level, this method was often used to deal with members of fractious groups in attempts to maintain social order.

Some cases began as conflicts between individuals and developed into literary inquisition cases. For example, Chiao Lu from T’ai-p’ing county in Anhwei was ostracized from his clan because of adultery. Chiao fabricated charges that those who complained about him were “disloyal to the Ch’ing,” which had to be investigated. Some indictments arose because of an individual’s ignorance. One case involved a monk, Hsin-kuang, who wrote, “Because the surname

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72 Chung-kuo ti-i li-shih tang-an-kuan, Tsuan-hsü Ssu-k’u ch’üan-shu tang-an, p. 809. Although they were not unofficial histories (yeh-shih) and had no “traitorous or slanderous” passages, Chang Sui’s Ch’ien-pai nien yen and Li Chih’s Ts’ang shu and Fen shu were still regarded as outlandish and unfaithful to the sages, and therefore proper targets for censorship. According to Honan governor Hsü Chi, one list of forbidden books included Li Chih’s Fen shu. The Ch’ien-lung emperor also ordered searches for Li Liu-liang’s Ssu shu yü lu and Li Chih’s Fen shu. Some forbidden books were at first only ordered by Ch’ien-lung to be revised, but were later banned. Ch’ien-lung believed that Hou Fang-yü’s Chuang-hui-t’ang chi inappropriately followed some of the degenerate customs of the late Ming, and that the T’ien yüan yü li had wild soothsaying and many other outlandish passages, and therefore they should be prohibited. In addition, editions of the Kan-ying p’ien and ledgers of merit and demerit (kung-kuo ko) were also forbidden. See Chung-kuo ti-i li-shih tang-an-kuan, Tsuan-hsü Ssu-k’u ch’üan-shu tang-an, pp. 405–6, 500, 510, 516–17, 775, 782, 796, 809.

73 Chung-kuo ti-i li-shih tang-an-kuan, Tsuan-hsü Ssu-k’u ch’üan-shu tang-an, p. 1228; Lei Meng-ch’en, Ch’ing-tai ko-sheng chin-shu hui-k’ao, p. 76.
Chao is at the front of the book of family names, it must be the surname of our emperor,” and wrote Ch’ien-lung’s name with the surname Chao. Many more cases resulted from attempts to gain revenge for grudges. For example, when her husband was browbeaten by an imperial academy student named Li Ta-pen, a woman from Lin-hsiang in Hunan to gain revenge accused Li Ta-pen of printing a private copy of *Tzu hsiao chi* (*Toward being filial*). This was a collection of complimentary essays written by Li Ta-pen’s relatives and friends for his mother’s celebration of her eightieth birthday. Some authors praised Li’s mother by comparing her to the mother of a sage king in antiquity (which was excessive), but the major problem was that some of the essays did not avoid using the characters in the emperor’s name; there also were many instances of lewd and improper language in the collection. Individuals’ accusations led to literary inquisition cases. Ts’ai Chia-shu of Kan-yü county accused his neighbor who had refused to allow him to buy back his field. A man in Yunnan fabricated charges after a business deal turned sour. In Fukien, a man made allegations against his associate after they fell out over a matter involving a prostitute. Accusations about offensive writings were often used as weapons against personal enemies.

After reading through Ch’ing cases of literary inquisition, Lu Hsün (1881–1936) wrote that he had initially believed that the people involved had wanted, as the late Ch’ing revolutionaries had said, to overthrow the Ch’ing and restore the Ming. But after reading them, he found that many accused individuals had only wanted to praise the emperor, but, not knowing how to do so appropriately, had breached taboos. For example, Jung Ying of Shansi, whose literary style was mediocre, wrote *Wan-nien p’ei t’ien ts’e* (*Essays on the eternal Son of Heaven*) and *T’ien jen p’ing hsi ts’e* (*Son of Heaven’s pacification of the west*) and presented them to the book collection office, only to be accused of writing offenses. Some people made allegations in order to seek positions in the bureaucracy, or to get back at others. Some got into trouble because

74 Kuo Ch’eng-k’ang and Lin T’ieh-chün, *Ch’ing ch’ao wen-tzu-yü*, pp. 369–70.
75 For these cases, see Kuo Ch’eng-k’ang and Lin T’ieh-chün, *Ch’ing ch’ao wen-tzu-yü*, pp. 329–30, 344, 353; Chung-kuo ti-i li-shih tang-an-kuan, *Tsuan-hsiu Ssu-k’u ch’uan-shu tang-an*, pp. 938, 940. Fan Ming-feng, on the magistrate’s staff in Pao-shan county, Kiangsu, was reported for having a copy of *Ka T’ing-lin chi*; see Kuo Ch’eng-k’ang and Lin T’ieh-chün, *Ch’ing ch’ao wen-tzu-yü*, p. 356.
77 Lin Chih-kung of Ch’ang-shan, Chekiang, was arrested after he sent fabricated inscriptions to a government office in an endeavor to get a job. See Kuo Ch’eng-k’ang and Lin T’ieh-chün, *Ch’ing ch’ao wen-tzu-yü*, pp. 326, 344.
78 Shen Ta-chang of Kuei-an county had a grudge against T’ang Yu-lung and accused him of possessing books with lyrics cursing the Ch’ing and calling for the restoration of the Sung. However, after an official investigation Shen was sentenced to death by slow slicing. See Kuo Ch’eng-k’ang and Lin T’ieh-chün, *Ch’ing ch’ao wen-tzu-yü*, pp. 325, 334.
of women or wealth. There were aspiring scholars who rashly sent their work to officials in hopes of getting into the top ranks of the examination candidates, but they were found to have committed offenses in their writing. A successful candidate in the local examinations in Honan sent his work to the provincial education commissioner. Although in this case there were no problems with the content, Ch’ien-lung found that sending manuscripts to education officials in the hope of being recommended was a sign of a man who is not content with his position. Because of this, he was stripped of his position and imprisoned until a verdict was reached. Kuo Wen-liang, a candidate for the lowest examinations in Fukien, came up with a story that he had seen the Yung-cheng emperor in a dream, who “commanded that I secretly investigate the traitor Ma Ch’ao-chu.” Kuo sent this to the official in charge of the examinations, hoping that it would be appreciated and aid his advancement. But the examiner found it treasonous and wrote to Peking that “Fukien is a coastal region, so a sentence of suspended execution pending review is not enough to warn people and demonstrate the law of the realm. Request permission to execute immediately.” Some people were charged after retaliating against local ruffians. Accusations befell others who wrote accounts of local administration. In Wu-yüan county in Anhwei, Wang Ta-fan detailed alleged corruption in the conduct of local examinations and in the handling of customs taxes and grain taxes paid to the capital. In many similar cases thoughtless or facile criticisms of local officials were magnified into charges of capital offenses by the accused.

There were significant implications to any discussion of administrative matters. They could become literary inquisition cases. Sometimes charges would be brought if someone wrote an exposé of local government and sent it up higher in the bureaucracy. In other cases, the accused had argued for land redistribution, reform of the salt administration, or offered other advice to the emperor. Local officials, either through fear for their positions or caution, often charged such authors with literary offenses in order to escape criticism of themselves. This restricted the mechanisms for dealing with local corruption,

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79 Yü Pao-ming of Kiangsi quarreled with Yü T’eng-chiao over a field and accused him of writing slanderous poetry. See Kuo Ch’eng-k’ang and Lin T’ieh-chün, Ch’ing ch’ao wen-tzu-yü, p. 327.
80 Kuo Ch’eng-k’ang and Lin T’ieh-chün, Ch’ing ch’ao wen-tzu-yü, pp. 330–3.
81 Pao T’i-ch’uan of Kui-an county, in an attempt to get revenge on a local troublemaker called Tu Yung-jo, took advantage of a local case relating to a treasonous book and wrote poems designed to implicate Tu. Pao was found out, however, and sentenced to immediate execution. Kuo Ch’eng-k’ang and Lin T’ieh-chün, Ch’ing ch’ao wen-tzu-yü, p. 325.
82 Ai Chia-chien, a successful candidate in the local examinations in I-chang, Hupei, complained in his examination paper about the severity of local taxation, and a fellow examination candidate in Nan-p’ing, Kwangsi, wrote to the court to request lower taxes in his district. Both were subjected to harsh punishments. Kuo Ch’eng-k’ang and Lin T’ieh-chün, Ch’ing ch’ao wen-tzu-yü, pp. 362, 366.
which was something that Ch’ien-lung had not expected at the beginning of the campaign. Some cases in which the author discussed local or central administration were dealt with as cases of treason. This signaled to literati that any discussion of government was a perilous undertaking. An atmosphere of unarticulated fear settled on the literati and provoked a system in which members of the bureaucracy deceived each other in order to protect themselves.

The literary inquisition put a weapon into the hands of the population that could be used whenever someone was disgruntled. Although Ch’ien-lung repeatedly said that false accusations would result in severe punishment, there were few instances of accusers being punished. In the majority of cases of literary inquisition, the accused were sentenced, either to hard labor on the frontier, to delayed or summary decapitation, or even to death by slow slicing. Moreover, in many cases associates and family members of the accused also suffered punishments. This created a pervasive environment of taboos and suspicion that affected everyone from ordinary people to high officials.

In the Ch’ien-lung period the most frequent victims of literary inquisition cases were at the lowest level of the literate population. Fortune tellers and itinerant doctors turned up often in the lists of targets. Such people moved often from place to place and interacted with many different elements of society, and it was relatively easy for them to cause offense with their writing. Fortune tellers, if their predictions were considered inappropriate, were particularly likely to be accused of breaking taboos. Accusations tended to surface when they were away from their native place, on the road or in inns. In addition, those who wrote legal complaints on behalf of others, students in imperial academies, or those who had failed the examinations or been dismissed from academies, were also common victims of charges. Finally, semiliterate people who gave the impression of being mentally unstable were often in the ranks of the accused.83

Punishments in cases involving offensive expression were always severe in the K’ang-hsi and Yung-cheng reigns, and for the majority of the more

83 Intriguingly, Yung-cheng’s way of dealing with cases in which mentally unstable people broke taboos was very different from Ch’ien-lung’s. Yung-cheng once wrote on a case that if an offender was clearly insane there was no need to bother with him. Ch’ien-lung, however, gave orders that even insane people had to be dealt with the full force of the law. Households should assist local governments in the prohibition work, and prevent mentally disturbed relatives from having access to paper and ink. Many of the Ch’ien-lung era cases were related to such people. In the twenty-eighth year of his reign, a delusional man in Nan-an, Fukien, wrote “Confucius, Head Priest Chang of the Taoist Sect, the Yang household, Yang Ling-kung, the Lin household, and that criminal are the top military adviser sage official and the Dragon father dragon mother.” The governor of Fukien had the man arrested, and Ch’ien-lung ordered that he be punished. The same year Ch’en Hung-mou memorialized suggesting that the insane be forbidden from writing. Kuo Ch’eng-k’ang and Lin T’ieh-chün, Ch’ing ch’ao wen-tzu-yü, pp. 329, 332–3.
than 130 cases in the Ch'ien-lung reign as well. Even trivial charges often resulted in the death penalty. The literary inquisition cases created a culture of prohibitions that was quite different from regular Ch'ing law, in which every offense was clearly specified. The range of accusations that could lead to a literary inquisition was virtually unlimited. Although some things slipped through, the net cast by the prohibition campaigns grew larger over time. Ch'ien-lung often accused investigators of not being alert enough, and he regarded what he saw as negligence as a sign of disloyalty. Because of this, officials preferred to be overly zealous rather than lenient. This created an atmosphere in which everyone constantly checked himself, and a ubiquitous self-censorship was on the rise.

**Self-Censorship in the Production, Publication, and Consumption of Texts**

According to one estimate, 151,000 copies of books were destroyed while the *Ssu-k'u ch'üan-shu* project was under way. More than 3,000 titles were banned. The number of titles banned almost equals the number of titles included. 84 Under the threat of literary inquisition, many manuscripts from the late Ming and early Ch'ing periods remained unpublished until the late Ch'ing. The disruption of the cultural world was immense.

Besides the official prohibitions of titles and destruction of copies of books and manuscripts, there was a pervasive self-censorship. Most past research on the impact of political pressure on culture in the Ch'ing dynasty concentrated on cases in which individuals were imprisoned for objectionable writing and certain books were destroyed. Scholars have not been attentive to the way that people silently altered, destroyed, or hid books, and used all manner of distorted ways of expressing themselves not only in response to restrictions laid down by the government but also in response to rumors and guesses. As a response to political pressures that originated at the top of the government hierarchy, authors, publishers, readers, and collectors decided for their own safety to suppress what they surmised was disapproved by the state. Despite the lack of attention that the phenomenon of censoring oneself has received, it had a great impact on Ch'ing culture and scholarship.

As the imposition of government-instigated censorship spread concern, fear, and even paranoia, censoring oneself was a response. Private deletion of possibly offensive passages from books is hard to trace, but evidence suggests that authors, book carvers, editors, publishers, descendants of the original

84 Hsü Wei, “Ch'ing Ch'ien-lung nien chien Chiang-hsi sheng chin-hui shu ch'a-chiao shih-mo yen-chiu,” in *Ssu-k'u ch'i-hui shu yen-chiu*, ed. Ho Ling-hsiu et al. (Peking, 1999), p. 105.
author, or even readers themselves all could be involved. Writers not only censored their own works, but sometimes enlisted others to help. For example, Chou I-ning wrote to Wang Ying-kuei, beseeching him to “help delete several characters, out of fear of transgressing literary laws.” In order to save the woodblock carver from further consequences, Chou warned Wang to expunge passages. This is a rare document, because most self-censorship was privately administered.

A writer's self-censorship could take the form of completely avoiding certain subjects, creating a silence in his writing. Not all silence was calculated, just as not all mistakes were intentional, but many of the silences found in these sources are significant. The Ch'ien-lung emperor himself can be inferred to have been influenced by this atmosphere of avoidance while he was still a prince. The historical commentaries that he composed then focused primarily on the Han, T'ang, and Sung dynasties, rarely touching upon events of the Ming and early Ch'ing periods. Even as the potential crown prince he may have been cautious about discussing sensitive topics. It was not until thirty years into his reign that he began to study Ming and Ch'ing history in depth.

Writing about Ming historical events was an especially precarious topic during the early Ch'ing period. The authoritative Ming shih was not printed and circulated until 1739. Before that, the correct interpretation of events in the Ming period was left uncertain, and writers had little idea of what the limitations on their writings were. Ku Ying-t'ai, who received a chin-shih degree in 1647 and served several years as a Ch'ing official, compiled his Ming shih chi-shih pen-mo (Detailed account of recorded events in Ming history) in the 1650s. But in 1661 a case was brought against Chuang T'ing-lung, who had died before completion of the printing of the book compiled under his sponsorship with the title Ming shih chi-lüeh (Summaries of Ming history). Because some of the contents were accused of being pro-Ming, there was a legal proceeding. The case led in 1663 to the severe punishment of Chuang's household and seventy other households of those who were judged to have been complicit in writing, editing, printing, or even condoning an offensive work. After this case, the two characters Ming and shih (“Ming” and “history”) were highly sensitive. When the Chuang case exploded, Ku Ying-t'ai already had completed the manuscript and carved the blocks for his book. Upon

86 For example, many mistakes in the veritable records are purely careless errors and not intentional. See Ch'ien Shih-fu, “Tu Ch'ing shih sui-pi: Ch'ing-tai li-ch'ao shih-lu ti ts'o-tzu,” Chung-hua wen-shih lan-t'ung 1 (1962), p. 340.
87 Tai, Ch'ien-lung ti chi chi shih-tai, p. 91.
hearing news of the Chuang case, somebody immediately deleted the two characters “Ming shih” from the title. Later the manuscript appeared, with supplementary materials written by P'eng Sun-i (1615–73), who did not serve the Ch'ing government, with the title changed to Ming-ch'ao chi-shih pen-mo pu-pien (Supplements to the detailed accounts of recorded events of the Ming dynasty). The two words, Ming ch'ao (“Ming dynasty”) were used because at this time an official Ming history had not been published. In the text of Ku’s book, he avoided accounts of massacres by the Ch'ing army in the north. This gave the impression that the demise of the Ming dynasty had little to do with the presence of Ch'ing soldiers. Later, the official Ming shih did not recognize that three rulers of the Southern Ming continued the Ming imperial family line, and they were also not mentioned in the Ming shih chi-shih pen-mo. Any mention of the Chien-chou Jurchens was also omitted in the Ming shih. There are a number of books that sparsely narrate the transitional period of history, such as the book entitled Ming chien i-chih lu (An easily understood record of the Ming as mirror).

Once the authorized Ming shih was printed and official historical memory established, any sort of criticism of the official account or suggestion that there was an alternative account of Ming history was liable to prosecution. This became a focus of self-censorship. There are many instances in which poems and essays that implied criticism of the Ming shih were destroyed or hidden. Numerous examples are found in Ch'ing texts where massacres by Ch'ing troops were blamed on roaming bandits. This manipulation is found in the 1699 drama by K'ung Shang-jen, Tao hua shan (Peach blossom fan), in which bandits, not Ch'ing soldiers, are described as massacring people. Despite these self-restrictions, the drama came under intense scrutiny from the imperial inquisitors, although the K'ang-hsi emperor personally met with
K'ung Shang-jen. In his anthologies, the poet Chu Chih-chün failed to mention the massacres that he must have witnessed in his hometown of Ta-t'ung in Shansi.\footnote{Teng Chih-ch'eng, Ch'ing shih chi-shih ch'u pien, pp. 722–3.}

Missing from the collection of poems and essays by Ch'en Kung-yin (1631–1700) are his memorials to the emperor, public notices, and annotations. A note from the author stated that only the catalogue of these missing works remained.\footnote{See the new edition of Ch'en Kung-yin, Tu lu t'ang chi, ed. Kuo P'ei-chung (1718; Kuang-chou, 1988), p. 773.} Ch'en explained that the manuscripts of the missing parts were destroyed in a fire. Teng Chih-ch'eng (1887–1960) speculated that, in actuality, “He was afraid of violating imperial regulations, and thus did not dare publish the writings.”\footnote{Teng Chih-ch'eng, Ch'ing shih chi-shih ch'u pien, p. 303.} If writings were destroyed in a fire, why were only memorials, notices, and annotations incinerated? It can be inferred that the author fabricated a reason to avoid scrutiny. Many others who knew that their writings would incur official suspicion simply “refused to publish” their works\footnote{For example, Ch'ien Ping-teng's Sheng-huan chi and Hsing-chiao shih. See Teng Chih-ch'eng, Ch'ing shih chi-shih ch'u pien, p. 123.} or “hid their manuscripts at home.”\footnote{Shen Ch'üan, I-yen-chai shih-chi, in Teng Chih-ch'eng, Ch'ing shih chi-shih ch'u pien, pp. 466–7.} Some writers, after censoring their own writings, would furtively leave coded messages for interested researchers. For example, Ch'en Tzu (1683–1759), a native of Chekiang, lived during the prosperous times of K'ang-hsi and Yung-cheng as well as the early part of the Ch'ien-lung reign, but he was extremely critical of the Ch'ing government. His writing is forceful and passionate. His attacks on the Ch'ing government and his strong opinion on ethnic differences between the Han and the Manchu resemble those of earlier Ming remnant officials. In his preface to his anthology of poems, \textit{Shan-hou shih ts'un} (Poems remaining after the effacement), Ch'en wrote,

After deciding to incinerate some of my poems due to their content, I decided that the ones in this anthology did not deserve to be destroyed. Yet I altered all of the poems slightly, to show that I follow the imperial regulations loyally, thus eradicating the best parts of my work, leaving the scraps and remains for posterity. What a pitiful sight my poems have become.\footnote{See Wang Chung-min, Leng-lu wen-sou (Shanghai, 1998), pp. 31–2. Not only did Ch'en censor his own poems, he subtly directed future researchers to his true feelings with his irony. This is a unique case. In his research on Ch'en's poems, the scholar Wang Chung-min was only able to understand what Ch'en meant by “eradicating the best parts of my poems” after comparing Ch'en's other anthology, \textit{Ching hsìn chi}. When the Tseng Ching case erupted during Ch'en's lifetime, Ch'en had secretly entrusted the complete edition of his own poems and essays to Hsieh Hsiu-lan, an intimate friend, and Hsieh's descendants passed them down to future generations. It is reported that copies are kept in the Library of Congress and other libraries. See Liang Shao-chieh, “Ch'en Tzu nien-p'u,” Ming-Ch'ing shih chi-k'uan 10 (2012), pp. 211–386.}
Silence and suppression in book publishing

In the Ch'ing period certain books on sensitive topics went a long time without being reprinted or even printed. Publishers also used various means to mislead inspectors. For example, they would leave out the date of publishing or the printer’s and publisher’s name. They would sometimes use aliases, or odd symbols and signs, in lieu of publishing their names. Sometimes publishers would even fabricate symbols and marks that indicated that these books were stamped with official approval, or originated from official collections and block carvings.

Under the pressure of the literary inquisitions, editors were forced to practice self-restraint. Their selection of the content, the ordering of words and sections, and the handling of narrative all revealed the editors’ assessments and the thoroughness of inspection. The book Hsiao-shan shih ch’u kao (First collection of Hsiao-shan poetry) was probably printed as each part was edited, and the complete edition took many years to finish. While the blocks for the poetry collection were being carved, the Yung-cheng emperor’s book Ta-i chüeb-mi lu was ordered by the emperor in 1729 to be read by literati throughout the country. Before the carving of the woodblocks for the subsequent parts of the poetry collection was finished, the Ch’ien-lung emperor ascended the throne, and his father’s Ta-i chüeb-mi lu was banned. Thus a poem that was flattering to the Yung-cheng emperor for his handling of the defamation case in the Ta-i chüeb-mi lu had become unacceptable. Editors quickly deleted the poem from the book, but the list of contents had long before been printed and could not be altered. The effects of the literary inquisition were still felt in the Tao-kuang era. For example, when excerpts were taken from Ku Yen-wu’s Jib chih lu (Record of knowledge gained day by day) to be included in the Huang Ch’ing ching-chieh (Explanations of the classics from the Ch’ing period), the massive compilation published in 1829 under the editorship of Juan Yüan (1764–1849), the criterion was to include all material related to interpretation of classics through history, and history through the classics; materials related to revolutionary ideas and ethnic tensions between the Han and non-Han peoples were not selected. Missing words in Ch’ing personal essay collections are

100 During the Chuang T'ing-lung case of 1662, even book carvers were executed. Up until the end of the Ch'ien-lung period, many book carvers were afraid to leave their names in books. After the Chia-ch'ing and Tao-kuang periods, when the inquisition was loosened, more carvers left their names on book blocks. Ch'eng Ch'ien-fan et al., Chiao-chou kuang-i: Tien-tsang pien (Chi-nan, 1998), pp. 304–5.
especially common in biography and history sections because the content in these two sections was the most restricted under literary regulations. Later editors would often alter content. In some instances, content mentioned in the original preface would be missing in the printed body of the text. In some books the list of contents has mentions of materials that were later deleted, while other books have some items not recorded in the list of contents.

When the newly enthroned Ch’ien-lung emperor reopened the treason case against Tseng Ching and ordered his execution, he extended his vengeance to those who had inspired Tseng. The body of Lü Liu-liang was exhumed and violated. As a result, any mention of Lü Liu-liang’s name in any sort of article was an extremely sensitive matter and created tension among intellectuals. The descendants of Lu Lung-ch’i (1630–92) were victims because Lü Liu-liang and Lu Lung-ch’i had been intimate friends. Lü Liu-liang was an important figure in promoting the transition from the Wang Yang-ming school to the Chu Hsi school in the Chiang-nan area. Lu Lung-ch’i wrote that after he met Lü Liu-liang he decided to dedicate his life to promoting the Chu school, so it is apparent that Lü had a great impact on Lu’s intellectual development. Yet one would not be able to discern this relationship when reading the biographical chronology included in the *Lu P’ing-hu wen-chi* (*Collected writings of Lu Lung-ch’i*), his posthumous collection. In certain places the prose is unclear, or blank spaces replace Lü Liu-liang’s name. Those who did not know about Lu’s intellectual development could not infer their relationship. The *Kuo ch’u jen chuan* (*Biographies of men early in our dynasty*) records that a son-in-law of Lü wrote a chronicle of his life that “described the relationship between Lu and Lü Liu-liang,” but after Lü Liu-liang was persecuted, the nephew deleted parts of it. Another effect of this case was that of the many pieces that were originally collected in Lu Lung-ch’i’s *San-yü t’ang wen-chi* (*Collected writings from San-yü Hall*), any that contained dialogue with Lü were deleted. All persons connected with the Tseng Ching case, even those at some remove, were aware of their precarious position and acted upon it.

There are numerous examples of woodblocks being altered or effaced because of pressures on editors and publishers, with sensitive words being covered or made indecipherable. Another common method of evasion was to change book titles or to remove cover pages. A reader could read a book without knowing

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104 The *Kuo ch’u jen chuan* does not record the name of the editor. Here I quote from Li Tz’u-ming, *Yüeh-man-t’ang tu-shu chi*, ed. Yang Chia-lo (Taipei, 1975), p. 429. A large amount of time elapsed between when the chronicle was finished and the persecution of Lü Liu-liang’s descendants. This shows that the chronicle was circulated for a considerable amount of time before it had to be rewritten. Researchers verifying the chronicle have discovered numerous instances where words have been altered and deleted. Fu Chen-lun, "Teng Chih-ch’eng hsien-sheng hsing-i," in *Teng Chih-ch’eng hüe-shu chi-nien wen-chi*, ed. Teng K’e (Peking, 1991), p. 37.
the original title or author of what he was reading. Places where the words are illegible or there are missing words might appear to be misprints, yet in Ch'ing books they were often intentional obliterations of prohibited words and names, and other taboo content.

There are numerous cases of published books being withdrawn when the publishers discovered that the political atmosphere had put them in jeopardy. In 1777, at the height of the literary inquisition, Lu Shih-hua (1714–79) of T'ai-ts'ang remembered that his book Wu Yi’e shu hua lu (Record of books and paintings seen in Wu and Yi’e) included derogatory remarks about Manchus. He destroyed the existing woodblocks and he recovered and burned as many as possible of the already distributed copies. Why did Lu suddenly remember the problems in his book in 1777? The Ssu-k’u ch’üan-shu project had begun five years prior to that, and in 1774 Ch’ien-lung issued an edict ordering the collection of all offensive books from late Ming and early Ch’ing. As prominent inquisition cases entered the public consciousness, the increased political tension became palpable and authors took measures to protect themselves.

Publishers seem to have been the most sensitive self-censors. When a certain book on their list was forbidden, they had to make arrangements to forestall disaster. Once the Ssu-k’u ch’üan-shu collection was completed, the content was fixed for each title and the editors’ appraisal was given for each title listed. Thereafter many publishers reviewed each of their texts before printing it. For example, Yao Chi-heng (b. 1647) around 1700 had finished a short manuscript with the title Ku-chin wei-shu k’ao (Examination of ancient and modern books with spurious attributions). It was a supplement to his earlier book of jottings, the Yung-yen lu (Record of useful sayings). Yao’s manuscript almost a century later was selected for inclusion in the project organized by Pao T’ing-po (1728–1814) to print rare books and manuscripts from his collection under the running title Chih-pu-tsu-chai ts’ung-shu (Collectanea from the Hall of knowing one’s deficiencies), a series begun in 1776 and continued with supplements for forty years. As a renowned book collector, Pao contributed hundreds of books and manuscripts to the Ssu-k’u ch’üan-shu project in the 1770s, and he received a commendation from the Ch’ien-lung emperor. Yao’s manuscript of the Ku-chin wei shu k’ao was included in an early set of the Chih-pu-tsu series, but then the editors’ evaluations (t’i-yao) of books included and noted for the Ssu-k’u ch’üan-shu collection denounced Yao’s Yung yen lu as derivative, with an inclination to be “other” (i). The editors’ comments said he had taken ideas and conclusions about spurious attributions from Huang Tsung-hsi (1610–95), Yen Jo-ch’ü (1636–1704), and Wan Ssu-t’ung (1638–1702), among others, and that he

had included too many offensive, speculative claims, such as that the teachings of the Sung masters were derived from Ch'an Buddhism. However, the book was not banned. Nevertheless, because of the *Ssu-k'u ch'iian-shu* editors’ harsh criticisms of Yao’s *Yung yen lu*, his related book, the *Ku-chin wei-shu k’ao*, was removed from the revised, reprinted *Chih-pu-tsu-chai ts’ung-shu*. There are numerous other examples of publishers omitting selected works from their various printed collections.

*Readers’ self-censorship*

Some readers used self-censorship as a means to protect themselves by covering offensive passages and words in books in their possession. For example, Wei I-chieh, a noted literatus who received a *chin-shih* degree in 1646, owned a copy of the *Chao Kao-i chi* (*Collected writings of Chao Nan-hsing*) on which he entered his own notes and comments. This copy eventually passed into the hands of the late Ch'ing dynasty revolutionary Chang Chi. Chang showed it to Chang T'ai-yen (1869–1936). According to Chang T'ai-yen, Wei had recorded his notes in blue ink, and all his words mentioning differences between Han and other ethnicities were marked over or simply erased by later readers. Censorship by a reader implied an intent to make his collection an innocent endeavor during the time of suppression. Wei’s leaving his name on this book could have only happened in the early Ch'ing, not after the middle of the Ch'ien-lung era. From this example we can see that not only Ch'ing officials made alterations in their books, but the general populace also would covertly make changes.

Most editors of Ch'ing dynasty book catalogues intentionally omitted mention of any forbidden book. Often collectors had two versions of their catalogue. The one for public use was purged of references to forbidden titles; the other for private consultation included all the titles. For example, in the 1930s the historian Hung Yeh discovered the personal notebooks of Wang Shih-sun (1804–43) in the Peking Tsinghua University Library. In Wang’s notebooks there are many listings of forbidden books, including those by Ch’ien Ch’ien-i and Lü Liu-liang, that were not in Wang’s published *Chen-ch’i t’ang shu-mu* (*Book list of Chen-ch’i Hall*). It is possible that these forbidden books were Wang’s personal belongings, and thus were not entered into the public record of the collection, but it is more likely that Wang was afraid of violating literary restrictions and thus kept the titles secret as a precaution.

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Catalogues contained a general summary of information in the books that were listed, so it was a sensitive area of scholarship. Many catalogues were re-edited numerous times, and the successive versions reveal the pressures felt by book collectors and catalogue compilers. The most famous private book collection, dating back to the mid-sixteenth century, was still housed in the T’ien-i Tower (T’ien-i ko) in Ningpo when the Ssu-k’u ch’üan-shu project was under way, and the collection provided hundreds of mostly rare books and manuscripts. In 1803–4, a new catalogue in ten chüan was prepared. “The compilation process was carried out after the Ch’ien-lung era of inquisition. Therefore many forbidden books, like Wang Shih-chen’s (1526–90) book on history, Kang-chien hui tsuan (A compilation on the outline and lessons of history), and Ch’ien Su-yüeh’s (1607–48) Keng-ch’en ch’un ou yin (Accidental chants in the spring of 1640), were not entered into the catalogue.”108 As times changed and enforcement of the suppression of prohibited books was loosened in the nineteenth century, additions were made in the later editions of the catalogue. In 1847, in the Tao-kuang reign, the Chekiang commissioner Liu Hsi-hai (1794–1853) entered the T’ien-i Tower to read and copy books stored there. He compiled a new edition of the catalogue in which 463 more books were recorded compared to the 1804 version.109 Many forbidden books were listed in the new catalogue. This suggests that these prohibited books had been kept all along in the library. There were strict controls on entry into the tower, so these books could have been kept hidden. As the literary inquisitions waned, many collectors added supplemental lists of forbidden books to the earlier edition of their catalogues.

If statistics existed about book burning among the general population from the beginning to the middle of the Ch’ing dynasty, one would find that an enormous number of books were set aflame. The scope of this book burning reached proportions that surpassed any imperial regulation. Those who did not destroy suspect books they owned would change the titles or the names of authors to avoid detection of books they wanted to hide.110 The possession of historical materials on Ch’ing dynasty interpretations of Ming history posed great difficulties for scholars.111 The imperial government initially issued edicts ordering citizens to turn in their books,112 but not everyone co-operated

110 For example, the seventeenth-century text Ku-chin shih-i. See Yü Ying-shih, Fang 1-chih wan chib k’ao (1972; Taipei, 1986), pp. 137–63.
111 Regarding the difficulties scholars faced, see Wu Han, “T’an Ch’ien ho Kuo ch’üeh,” in Teng hsia chi (Peking, 1960), pp. 169–85.
willingly with the government. After the Chuang T'ing-lung case, however, even those involved in imperially sanctioned projects such as compiling the *Ming shih* were cautious about collecting books of these types.

Wu Ming-tao, the grandson of Wu Ying-chi (1594–1648), wrote in a postscript to the *Liu-tu chien-uen lu* (*Seen and heard in Nanking*), “After this year’s case, the literary restrictions have grown and orders have become more strict. There are many accusers and denouncers. Thus if one suspects that there is anything suspicious, he should incinerate his books indiscriminately to avoid harm.” The “case” that Wu mentioned in this passage is the Chuang case in 1663. Wu described the situation as so tense that people would check and alter their books out of fear of the government’s regulations, even without being accused of violating any laws. This was because the restrictions were so strict and the punishments were so severe that scholars were unable to act otherwise. Furthermore, book burning had to be done covertly, out of fear that neighbors would discover it and report to the officials. The family of an author could decide to destroy his books without the author’s knowledge or permission. For example, when Ho Cho (1661–1722) was convicted during the K'ang-hsi era, his family destroyed his printed books and woodblocks.

Many writings containing prohibited materials never achieved wide circulation, and therefore never made it onto the lists of proscribed books. Some books that existed only in the form of manuscripts and were hardly known escaped suspicion. Most important, ordinary people were largely unaware of the existence of lists of forbidden books, and officials never published a comprehensive version of the lists. Therefore the ordinary individual had no certainty about which books were forbidden and restricted, but people surmised about the consequences of imperial or local decrees and feared the whims of the government. This often led to an indiscriminate burning of books, regardless of whether these books were officially forbidden or not.

Self-censorship was not universal. Newly available books had been approved for printing, and there was no purpose in editing or deleting contents. Some book collectors seldom read their books or had no knowledge of what they

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113 Quoted from Teng Shih, in Yao Chin-yüan, *Ch'ing-tai chin-hui shu-mu*, p. 341.
114 There are examples of people being accused by neighbors of burning their own books. See Pei-p'ing ku-kung po-wu-yüan, *Ch'ing-tai wen-tzu-yü tang*, pp. 367–72.
116 Teng Chih-ch'eng, *Sang-yüan tu-shu chi*, p. 38, records that Hsü Ch'ung-hsi's compilation *Li-tai ta-cheng chi-yao* "is presently not circulating, nor seen in forbidden book catalogues. It seems to not be carved yet."
117 For example, Li Yü's *Lien ch'eng pi* was not widely circulated. Thus, in the forbidden catalogues of Chekiang and Kiangsu during the Tao-kuang and T'ung-chih eras, one only finds his Shih-erh lau banned, and not his *Lien ch'eng pi*. See An P'ing-ch'iu and Chang P'ei-heng, eds., *Chung-kuo chin-shu ta-kuan* (Shanghai, 1990), p. 296.
had. Other readers who were insensitive to the political climate failed to take any active part in censoring material. These numerous instances cannot be ignored.\footnote{Teng Chih-ch’eng, Ch'ing shih chi-shih ch’u pien, pp. 12, 19–20.} Due to lineage ties, commercial interests, ignorance, neglect, or bravery, many books and documents, both printed and hand-copied, survived the imperial government’s efforts to eradicate them.\footnote{Lynn A. Struve pointed out that only ten books from a catalog of works banned in the eighteenth century could not be found anywhere in the first half of the twentieth century. Lynn A. Struve, The Ming–Qing conflict, 1619–83: A historiography and source guide (Ann Arbor, 1998), p. 68.} Some were reprinted after the late Chia-ch’ing reign, although the reprinted versions were not necessarily the same as the originals. The availability of previously suppressed books and manuscripts constituted a new political and cultural presence in the last decades of the Ch’ing period.

**Effects of Political Pressures and Self-Censorship**

After early Ch’ing the tendency to self-regulate was most obvious with regard to politics. One effect was that writers were hesitant to discuss national affairs. In 1779 the Ch’ien-lung emperor exclaimed in an imperial decree, “It is not that I forbid my subjects to speak directly, but it is the subjects themselves; they have nothing to complain about and no grievances to report.”\footnote{See the decree of February 22nd in Chung-kuo ti-i li-shih tang-an-kuán, ed., Ch’ien-lung ch’ao shang-yü tang (Peking, 1991), p. 586.} Ch’ien-lung and the policies associated with the book-collection project were the culmination in this atmosphere of “nothing to complain about.” The imperial court had implemented unprecedented measures to strip the people of their freedom to criticize public affairs. Since the emperor expressed discontent about this situation, we can infer that his officials regulated themselves. In tacit recognition of these conditions, scholars like Wang Hui-tsu (1731–1807) wrote essays suggesting that others should refrain from writing diaries, notes, and discussions of current affairs in order to “avoid violating imperial decrees and incurring disasters to their family.”\footnote{See “Shuang-chieh-t’ang yung hsün,” in Wang Hui-tsu, Wang Lung-chuang i shu (1889; Taipei, 1970) 5, pp. 898–9.}

The Ch’ien-lung emperor had three core goals: to promote the Confucian tradition of correct learning (cheng-hstiêh), to protect the legitimacy and continuation of Manchu rule, and to establish Confucian ethics, particularly the cardinal virtues, as universal and not just Han principles. Regarding the promotion of correct learning, some people in the Ch’ing period believed that the Ssu-k’u ch’üan-shu project had a positive influence on scholarship. Juan Yüan, a 1789 chin-shib, wrote, “After the founding of the Ssu-k’u office, the style and
spirit of scholarship changed direction.” Ch'ien-lung was deeply engaged with Confucian culture and imbued with the sense of mission to propagate the tradition. After seven complete copies of the entire Ssu-k'u ch'üan-shu collection of more than 3,000 books were made and stored in different locations, the Ch'ing court allowed scholars to use the three collections that were sent to the south. Wang Chung (1745–94) wrote the Wen-tsung ko ts'a-chi (Miscellaneous notes from the Wen-tsung Hall) as a record of his experiences reading and making copies from one of them. After this, many editions based on manuscript copies from the Ssu-k'u ch'üan-shu appeared as scholars and book merchants printed reproductions, particularly of rare or “secret” books. Some of these editions were revised by those who reproduced them; editing did not have to wait for the appearance of an official version, and could be completed well enough with some guesswork. This meant there were often different versions of a given title. The “hand-copied editions” (ch'ao ko pen) of Ssu-k'u books were therefore important in their own right. In addition there were orders for each province to produce printed editions of various books from the Ssu-k'u ch'üan-shu collection. Ch'ien-lung agreed with Tung Kao’s (1740–1818) suggestion that selected books be printed and distributed in Chiang-nan and five other provinces. These printed editions were a positive indication to the literati of the kind of knowledge that the state recognized and encouraged.

Ch'ien-lung saw the censorship movement as an important link in an overarching endeavor to foster “correct learning.” His edicts typically associated censorship with “aligning customs with reason and rectifying people's minds.” His struggles to eliminate heterodoxies and his attacks on late Ming dynasty “recluses” (shan-jen) and other authors whom he considered irresponsible were aspects of his efforts to advance “correct learning.” One obvious example is the care Ch'ien-lung took to ensure that Li Chih’s works were rooted out, and the severity of his criticism of them. In spite of the Ming government's efforts to suppress his books, Li Chih's writings had continued to be regarded as attractive for many scholars. In a record of a conversation between an early Ch'ing

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125 Many of the books listed in Hsieh Kuo-chen's Ming Ch'Ieng pi-chi ti'ung-t'an are versions copied from the Ssu-k'u collection; see Hsieh Kuo-chen, ed., Ming Ch'Ieng pi-chi ti'ung-t'an (1960; Shanghai, 1981), pp. 214–15.
126 Chung-kuo ti-i li-shih tang-an-kuan, Tsuan-hsiu Ssu-k'u ch'üan-shu tang-an, p. 768. In addition, as the Fukien governor Fu-k'ang-an wrote, "Scholars in remote places rarely have a chance to see the printed copies of the Ssu-k'u books; since the emperor allowed them to be reproduced ... I have ordered that copies be loaned to all the distant counties, so that local elites can more easily arrange to purchase copies." Chung-kuo ti-i li-shih tang-an-kuan, Tsuan-hsiu Ssu-k'u ch'üan-shu tang-an, p. 1130.
non-collaborator and a Vietnamese envoy about must-read texts, both Li’s *Fen shu* (A book to be burned) and *Ts’ang shu* (A book to be concealed) were mentioned.\(^{127}\) For contemporary defenders of tradition, Ch’ien-lung’s ideological movement implemented the ideal of “unification of all customs with the Way” (*tao i feng t’ung*), and the harmonization of the moral Way, learning, and government. Furthermore, because it suppressed heterodox and antitraditional thought as well as ideas that were considered capricious or ridiculous, the collection of approved books and suppression of disapproved books solidified the Confucian cultural order, as understood by the emperor and his officials doing the editorial work.

Most studies have viewed the censorship movement only as destructive. However, it contributed to the Ch’ing government’s ability to move away from the old “Han-versus-barbarian” view (*Hua i kuan*) and to deal more successfully with peoples on the periphery of the empire.\(^{128}\) As the Ch’ien-lung emperor repeatedly stressed, his actions were intended to “promote the cardinal virtues, now and in the future.”\(^{129}\) In works such as the *Erh-ch’en chuan* (Biographies of twice-serving ministers), Ch’ien-lung explicitly condemned the Ming officials who had taken office in the early Ch’ing government. In *Sheng-ch’ao hsin-chieh chu ch’en chuan* (Records of martyrs for the previous dynasty), he reconfirmed that loyalty to one’s own dynasty overrode all other values. The *Yii-p’i li-tai t’ung-chien chi-lan* (Imperially approved selections from mirrors for aiding government over several dynasties) selected a large number of comments on memorials, most of which had been written by ministers who anticipated the moral and political views that would be approved by the emperor. Ch’ien-lung accentuated the cardinal virtues more than any previous monarch of China had ever done. Moreover, the loyalty that he promoted was more strict and


\(^{128}\) In his study of the development of Ch’ing rule in Sinkiang, James Millward uses the different conceptions that the Ch’ing emperors had of equivalent vocabulary items in different languages to discuss the Ch’ing court and ethnic relations. His view of the Ch’ing rulers’ conceptualization of their realm is subtly different from that of traditional historians of the Ch’ing. As Millward points out with reference to Ch’ien-lung’s account of the words for “heaven” in different languages in the preface to *Hsi-yü t’ung-wen chib*, in Ch’ien-lung’s mind every ethnic group (even including groups such as the Miao and the Yao) was theoretically of equal status. This theoretical equality meant that the Han cultural tradition did not have any claim to authority in the Inner Asian parts of the Ch’ing empire. Furthermore, in Ch’ien-lung’s ideology, the realm was divided both culturally and territorially into five primary component regions: Manchu, Mongol, Han, Tibetan, and Muslim lands. Millward argues that this vision of ethnic equality (even if it was only theoretical and abstract) meant that the Manchu emperors dealt with the other ethnic groups in their empire in a different manner than did the Han emperors of previous dynasties. See James A. Millward, *Beyond the pass: Economy, ethnicity, and empire in Qing Central Asia, 1759–1864* (Stanford, 1998), pp. 200–49.

political pressures on the cultural sphere

Ch'ien-lung feared that his officials were hiding negative information from him, but he also sought to cover up problems in the empire and was unwilling for his officials to discuss them, preferring to promote an impression of peace and prosperity. The emperor's attitudes seemed to have had a pervasive effect on society in the eighteenth century. The expansive cultural repression involved the entire population and led to the formation of a social environment characterized by mutual deception by promoting a vision of great peace. Fear maintained a kind of harmony in local communities and in the government. The central government itself was particularly invested in a system of mutual deception.

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The Ch'ien-lung emperor's government was not in complete control. While feigning acceptance or perfunctorily observing certain taboos, people were able to enjoy the fruits of a commercialized culture in fields that did not concern politics. Many offensive books were saved through a variety of means. The documents produced by the Ssu-k'u ch'üan-shu project show that, although the movement's scope was wide and penetrated into lower levels of society, token participation and the use of tricks to meet the requirements of the project were also common. Nobody knew exactly how many offensive books there were, and because of this it was impossible to implement numerical targets, which opened up numerous strategies to counter the censorship effort. Some officials submitted their own books or those of other officials for inspection; others, however, just sent a few books to make up the quotas. Education officials constituted the backbone of the investigation efforts, and some of them employed idlers to go back to their villages to check for forbidden books. But many tried to bide their time until the impetus behind the book-collection efforts declined. The Kiangsi provincial governor, Hai-ch'eng, wrote that as soon as official investigation work slackened, people stopped sending books. Hai-ch'eng recommended that the investigation work should continue.

Because of the arbitrary ways in which authority was exercised, many works slipped through the net. In addition, the whole endeavor was hampered at the

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131 Some books about the late Ming, like Ming-mo chu ch'en tsou-shu and T'ung-shih shang lun lu, were generally considered acceptable because they were critical of the late Ming government; see Chung-kuo ti-i li-shih tang-an-kuan, Tsuan-hsiu Ssu-k'u ch'üan-shu tang-an, p. 558.

132 For example, the Hupei governor, Ch'en Hui-tsu, sent in his own manuscript copy of Ku Yen-wu's T'ien-hsia chün kuo li ping shu; see Chung-kuo ti-i li-shih tang-an-kuan, Tsuan-hsiu Ssu-k'u ch'üan-shu tang-an, p. 162.

lower levels by illiterate or only semiliterate people who did not understand the orders and muddled the processes.

Apart from this, commercial interests and the profit motive cannot be discounted. At one stage in the investigations, officials solicited forbidden books by offering money for them, which proved more effective than other search methods.\footnote{Kao Chin, the governor-general of Liang-chiang, that is, the provinces of Kiangsu, Kiangsi, and Anhwei, mentioned that he had demanded investigators be prepared to pay high prices to solicit the reporting of copies or carved printing blocks of books that contain passages that break taboos. Chung-kuo ti-i li-shih tang-an-kuan, Tsuan-hsiu Ssu-k’u ch’iu-an-shu tang-an, pp. 594–5.} The possibility of commercial profit also led some book merchants to brave the dangers and print forbidden books. For example, all of Li Chih’s works were in the lists of banned works, but because his writings were innovative and exciting, they attracted readers, and some book merchants were still willing to risk printing them. An envoy from Annan (Vietnam) during the Ch’ien-lung reign made a record of all titles for sale in Canton bookshops to take back for his monarch. Among the many works listed were banned books by Li Chih.\footnote{See “Yün ch’ing hang shu-mu,” in Ch’en, Yüeh-nan Han chi wen-hsien shu-lun, pp. 17–35.} Ku Yen-wu’s books were also forbidden, but the Korean envoy Li Te-mao (K. Yi Tŏng-mu) (1741–93) saw copies of them at booksellers in Peking.\footnote{Li Te-mao arrived in 1778 and wrote that he had “bought the forbidden books of Ku Yen-wu at a place called Wu-liu chú.” Li Te-mao [Yi Tŏng-mu], Ch’ongjanggwan chŏnso (1793; Seoul, 2001) 67, p. 231.} Huang Tsung-hsi’s Ming-i tai-fang lu (Records awaiting a new dawning), written in 1662, never appeared on a list of forbidden books, yet because of the prohibition of some of his other works and the sensitivity of its contents, the book remained out of sight and was only printed in 1839. These examples demonstrate that the power of state censorship had limits. However, the prohibitions succeeded in pushing many books out of mainstream discourse and into restricted private circulation, and there was a real difference between the two conditions.

Although the influence of political pressures on the cultural sphere lasted throughout the Ch’ing dynasty, the severity diminished steadily after the Chia-ch’ing reign. The coercive force and the number of literary inquisitions also decreased from the Chia-ch’ing period on, and almost disappeared in the late Ch’ing, as the government faced more pressing problems.
CHAPTER 15

CHANGING ROLES OF LOCAL ELITES FROM THE 1720S TO THE 1830S

Seunghyun Han

In the early nineteenth century, local elites expanded their roles in the public realm and pursued their interests in various cultural practices. Three aspects of local elites’ activities reveal the relative rise of elites’ power during the Chia-ch’ing (1796–1820) and Tao-kuang (1821–1850) periods: local elites’ contributions of money and goods for local public causes, local elites’ promotion of enshrinement of local worthies, and local elites’ writing and printing of literature of local relevance. Concomitant with these changes came a gradual decrease of centralized control of the cultural order from the end of the eighteenth century, an order that had featured the emperors and the central government as the ultimate arbiters of cultural values and historical evaluations.¹ The relaxation of central control over the cultural order allowed for the reassertion of diverse local voices and local interests.

The term “local elites” refers to the leaders in local society who generally possessed examination degrees and wealth. They included retired officials, officials home on leave, officials waiting for appointment, holders of degrees who never held an official appointment, purchasers of official ranks and titles, and commoners who participated in the elite group because of their wealth, literary talent, or kinship ties. “Local elites” is used here as distinguishable from literati (shih), although there is considerable overlap; “local elites” were men defined more by their roles as leaders in their local communities and less by their individual achievements in the literary traditions as exemplified particularly in composing examination essays and in eligibility for serving as a government official. “Local” refers not to small, agricultural villages, but to market towns (chen), county (hsien) towns, and prefectural (fu) or higher cities. The rise of local elite activism in the Chia-ch’ing and Tao-kuang periods was the beginning of the historical significance of local elites’ activism later in

¹ See Wang Fan-sen’s chapter in this volume. An expanded version of this chapter is in Han Seunghyun, *After the prosperous age: State and elites in early nineteenth-century Suzhou* (Cambridge, MA, 2016).
the nineteenth century, when the Ch'ing state was adapting to new political circumstances and sought to create more flexible relations with local elites.

Elites’ activism in the nineteenth century is usually considered a defining characteristic of post-Taiping Chinese society. Since the pioneering study by Philip Kuhn on militarization of local society in the mid-nineteenth century and Mary Rankin’s research on the expansion of public functions performed by elites as part of the restoration efforts, the second half of the nineteenth century has been understood as a different era in state–society relations. William Rowe’s study of Hankow demonstrated local elites’ and merchants’ involvement in the management of urban public affairs primarily in the latter half of the nineteenth century.

The characterization of post-Taiping local society as dominated by local elites’ activism and leadership is in contrast to the state activism of the eighteenth century. The Ch'ing government under the Yung-cheng (r. 1723–35) and Ch'ien-lung (r. 1736–95) emperors expanded and strengthened its hold over local institutions such as lineages, private academies, benevolent societies, and famine relief activities. State intervention was exercised then in the management of local public affairs to a greater extent than in earlier or later centuries. However, Ch'ing provincial officials at the peak of state activism enlisted the help of local elites and relied on market mechanisms to better local social conditions. It can be argued that by the middle of the eighteenth century, the assumptions about interventionist state grain storage policies were shifting toward a market model for solving economic problems.

The term “state activism” is used here to describe the tendency for the central government to intervene directly in social, economic, and cultural matters in the local communities. Such activism did not flourish during the


5 On Ch'en Hung-mou and his interventionist policies as a provincial official, see William T. Rowe, *Saving the world: Chen Hongmou and elite consciousness in eighteenth-century China* (Stanford, 2001).

6 Helen Dunstan, *State or merchant? Political economy and political process in 1740s China* (Cambridge, MA, 2006).
Chia-ch'ing and Tao-kuang periods. The central government in these periods took some of the public roles previously given to ranked officials or sub-bureaucratic personnel and parceled them out to local elites. These local elites, called managers (tung-shih), recruited funds and managed public water and famine relief projects while still under the supervision of local officials. During the early nineteenth century, many of the public works previously funded by regular state funds (kuan-t'ang) came to be financed by donations from local elites or surcharges levied on local people's lands. Accompanying these new social developments were changes in local elites' cultural activities. Literary genres of sorts once criticized or placed under control of the central government were revived and increasingly became autonomous, free from government intervention. Members of local elites placed their ancestors’ names in local public shrines with greater success, indicating the modification of previously rigorous, centralized selection standards and the growing assertiveness of local elite families in enhancing their family prestige.

In the early nineteenth century, most of these changes existed across many regions of the Ch'ing empire, but the discussion here privileges the greater Chiang-nan area; that is, the lower Yangtze region, one of the most important cultural and economic macro-regions in late imperial China. Local elites in Soochow and Chiang-nan had been regarded by the early Ch'ing rulers as most resistant to the Manchu conquest and needed to be controlled with restrictive measures. The wealth and the cultural heritage of these elites enabled them to take advantage of changes in state policies in the early nineteenth century. The shifting balance of power between Chiang-nan elites and the Ch'ing central government indicates a larger trend.

An important element in the changing relation was the decline in the state’s fiscal resources. Reserves of silver bullion in the state treasury had increased through most of the eighteenth century. By the end of the 1770s they reached a peak of about 80 million taels. This sense of wealth found expression in the extravagant southern tours of the Ch'ien-lung emperor. By the 1790s silver reserves had begun to decline. In 1795, the last year of the Ch'ien-lung reign, when the emperor “retired,” the treasury controlled by the Ministry of Revenue reported holding 69.3 million taels. With the outbreak of a major rebellion by the White Lotus movement the next year, military expenditures increased and silver reserves went down to about 56.5 million taels. In 1797

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9 The explanation of the silver reserves in the Ministry of Revenue treasury is based on Shih Chih-hung, Ch’ing-tai hu-pu yin-k'u shou-chih bo k'u-t'ien t'ung-chi (Fu-chou, 2008), pp. 103–11.
there were 27.9 million taels, 16.9 million in 1801, and 21.6 million in 1804. In the last year of the Chia-ch'ing reign (1820), the amount was up to 31.2 million taels, and the reserves stayed in the range of 20–30 million taels until the outbreak of the Opium War in spite of the weakening balance of payments in foreign trade during the Tao-kuang reign.¹⁰

The expansion of financial and managerial participation by local elites in the public realm in the early nineteenth century and its promotion by the state through regulatory means were not simply a function of the declining fiscal condition of the Ch'ing government. A changing imperial vision came to prefer certain forms of public-works management. This vision encompassed an imperial response to bureaucratic corruption and inefficiency, an imperial consideration of the proper roles of local elites, and an altered self-definition of the imperial role.

Early nineteenth-century emperors often barred local officials and clerks from intervening in locally funded public works.¹¹ During this period, the role of central government in water management or famine relief programs declined. Local officials, while still acting as general supervisors, often devolved practical management to local elites who contributed significant portions of required funds. The managers (tung-shih) had quasi-bureaucratic positions and took charge of soliciting, receiving, and dispensing funds while working closely with local officials. These managers were generally considered by local bureaucrats to be morally superior to clerks or runners, who would often siphon off funds.

The relationship between state activism and elite expansion underwent many changes throughout the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. For most of the eighteenth century, the local elites’ roles were constrained by state controls set in place by the Yung-cheng and Ch'ien-lung emperors. By the nineteenth century, in contrast, state regulations encouraged local elites’ participation and donations. This nurtured an expanding local elite activism that developed outside state controls.

IMPOSITION OF CONTROLS OVER LOCAL ELITES’ CONTRIBUTIONS IN THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY

The Ming and Ch'ing governments both had programs to reward those who donated grain for public causes. Both governments designated them

“righteous commoners” (i-min),\(^\text{12}\) and awarded official hats and belts or memorial arches to those who made donations for famine relief. According to the Ta Ming hui-tien (Collected statutes of the Great Ming), individuals whose actions exemplified the Confucian virtues should be recommended by local officials to be rewarded by the government with memorial arches.\(^\text{13}\) The four categories under which such people could be recommended were filial sons (hsiao-tzu), obedient descendants (shun-sun), righteous men (i-fu), and chaste women (chiu-fu). State recognition of donations in the Ming seems to have been limited to famine relief. There is no evidence that the Ming government had a comprehensive reward system that covered various public works such as building roads, bridges, and examination halls. If someone made contributions for public works, that person would have been recommended under the category of “righteous men.” This reward system was broad in scope, and donations constituted only a part of the wide array of activities recognized under this system. Until the end of Ming, contributions for public causes other than famine relief did not form a separate category. Moreover, local gazetteers seldom contain cases in which a person was rewarded by the state for making donations for any public cause, unlike the Ch'ing gazetteers, especially beginning in the Chia-ch'ing period.

The early Ch'ing government accepted without significant changes the Ming system of rewarding contributions, and continued to promote elite contributions during times of famine by offering various preferential treatments. Under the Yung-cheng emperor, however, the Ch'ing government began to create a program of rewarding donations for a number of different causes, not just famine relief. The program sought to bring elite contributions under stricter state control. There are no memorials reporting contributions during the first four years of the Yung-cheng reign in the Li-k'o shih-shu (Summaries of routine memorials related to the Office of Scrutiny for Personnel)\(^\text{14}\) or the Li-k'o shih-shu (Summaries of routine memorials related to the Office of Scrutiny for Rites). Beginning in 1727, provincial officials began submitting memorials with the names of people who had made donations for public causes to ask for state rewards in the form of either memorial arches or ranks and titles. In the last few years of the Yung-cheng reign provincial officials memorialized


\(^{13}\) Shen Shih-hsing et al., comps., Ta Ming hui-tien (1587; Peking, 1989) 79 Li-pu 37, p. 457.

\(^{14}\) Here I examined the Yung-cheng portion of the Li-k'o shih-shu (Personnel) published recently. See Chung-kuo ti-i li-shih tang-an-kuan, comp., Yung-cheng chao tai-k'o liu k'o shih-shu, Volume 1: Li-k'o (Kuei-lin, 2002). The Li-k'o shih-shu has an identical romanization with another work discussed here and I shall disambiguate the two by appending either (Personnel) or (Rites) to the title.
on more cases to recommend rewards. In response the central government developed a system. In 1735, when a man from Fukien was recommended for a memorial arch, the Yung-cheng emperor ordered deliberations on what the text to be engraved should be, and after discussion by the grand secretaries it was decided that the four characters lo-shan bao-shih (Delighting in charity and enjoying giving) should be used for such occasions. The Yung-cheng emperor emphatically encouraged regional officials to recommend for state rewards local contributors under their jurisdiction. Imperial encouragement and systematization of elite contributions in the Ch'ing appeared when the state was building an unprecedented, large-scale granary system across the empire, and was also launching a well-developed famine relief program executed with state funds and official initiatives. At this time the state actively promoted the establishment of charitable institutions, often initiated by local officials and aided by government funds. Elites’ donations were intended to be a supplement to, not a substitute for, state relief and charitable efforts.

This policy of systematizing elite contributions had social and political ramifications. Donations were a way for donors to make their names known and raise their standing among local elite groups, even when donating was similar to paying a tax. As donations came to be monitored by state officials and rewards were made by the central or provincial government, the government was better able to associate locally influential people with the governmental hierarchy, similar to the way the early Ming state integrated locally powerful gods into a state-controlled hierarchy. Imperial rewards for contributions were a way to show the emperor's magnanimity and to promote loyalty to him by men who were not officials. Rewarding donations also was a way to counteract any favors owed by local officials to elite contributors. This allowed the central government to achieve more impartial local control because local elites' aid for local administration benefited local officials, and these favors, if not repaid through a route endorsed by the central state, tended to be reciprocated by extralegal or corrupt means. Officials who took the initiative to report contributions and secure state rewards for contributors enhanced their own independence from the powerful local families by dealing with the contributor

15 Nei-ko ta-k'u tang-an, (#A072–024), Chung-yang yen-chiu-yüan li-shih yü-yen yen-chiu-so, Taipei; Li-k'o shih-shu (Rites), 216, YC 10/11/9 (YC denotes Yung-cheng, and the numbers that follow are the reign year, the lunar month, and the day); Ch'in-ting Ta Ch'ing hui-tien tse-li (1748; Taipei, 1983) 71, p. 356; Hsiao Shih, Yung-hsien lu (c. 1752; Peking, 1957) 3, p. 237.
16 Ta Ch'ing Shih-tsung Hsien huang-ti shih-lu (1937; Peking, 1985) 151, p. 867. Hereafter CSL-YC.
17 Will and Wong, Nourish the people; Will, Bureaucracy and famine in eighteenth-century China.
18 Joanna F. Handlin Smith, "Social hierarchy and merchant philanthropy as perceived in several late-Ming and early-Qing texts," Journal of Economic and Social History of the Orient 41 No. 3 (1998), pp. 444–5. Also see her The art of doing good: Charity in late Ming China (Berkeley, 2009).
in a legitimate way. The central government’s control over accounting when
donations were brought into the system also helped prevent collusion between
local elites and local officials. No longer could officials exaggerate the amounts
of contributions in return for taking bribes from the elites.

In the process of systematization, the Yung-cheng emperor attempted to
define and limit the kinds of contribution that were acceptable to the state. In
an edict issued shortly before his death in 1735, he determined that the
memorial arch with the inscription lo-shan hao-shih would be awarded only
to activities supporting famine relief, charitable granaries, bridges and roads,
charitable lineage estates, and institutions such as foundling homes and old
people’s homes. In addition to creating specific categories of contributions,
Yung-cheng attempted to draw a clear line between acceptable and unaccept-
able kinds of contribution. In the same edict, he criticized a provincial official
who reported that he had received donations from local elites and commoners
and would consult with local officials on how to use the funds. The emperor,
outraged by this report, declared that the memorial revealed that there was
no urgent public need that required contributions, and that any such contri-
butions made for an unstated purpose were nothing less than covertly selling
offices. Managed by incapable officials, such contributions would only foster
corruption among clerks and local bullies without actually benefiting local
people. The emperor made clear that a contribution, even when made in the
name of public good, was subject to restrictions.

Imperial efforts to channel elites’ contributions into desired purposes and
to impose controls over them continued under the Ch’ien-lung emperor. Soon
after his enthronement, Ch’ien-lung affirmed that his father’s decision
to prohibit undesignated contributions was an act of “encouraging virtue
while preventing abuse.” Like his father, Ch’ien-lung also emphasized that
contributions should only be allowed when there was a particular local need.
Otherwise contributions could be a way to routinize the sale of offices. If the
local rich and powerful men could purchase offices under the guise of making
“contributions,” then this would lead to the empowerment of men not based
upon qualifications through achievement in the competitive examinations, as
the regular degree-holding bureaucrats were, but on their wealth. Though
making contributions might be commendable, it needed to be constrained so
that its negative aspects did not overshadow the positive ones.

Ch’ien-lung also criticized other aspects of contributions, such as provincial
officials coercing contributions from local elites in order to enhance their own
reputation for transforming local customs. An increase in “virtuous acts” by

19 CSL-YC 156, pp. 910–1.
20 Ta Ch’ing Kao-tung Ch’un huang-ti shih-lu (1937; Peking, 1986) 5, p. 240. Hereafter CSL-CL.
local elites would serve as a manifestation of an official’s administrative skill and goodness. Below the provincial level, local officials might also compel contributions in order to impress their superiors. To prevent such forced donations, Ch‘ien-lung declared that if there were rich people who wanted to donate money for famine relief, rebuilding a city wall, and water conservancy, they should visit the office of the provincial administrative commissioner to report their intention directly, and bypass local officials. The provincial commissioner was then required to report this case to the governor-general or governor, who in turn had to submit a memorial asking for imperial permission to accept the contribution. Since the public activities mentioned in the edict were large-scale, needing large sums of money, the emperor believed that proper management of these contributions would more likely be achieved by relying on provincial and central government officials, rather than on local officials. For lesser projects, such as establishing charitable estates, granaries, schools, and cemeteries, Ch‘ien-lung allowed contributors to report their plans to local officials first, but the local officials still had to submit a report to their superiors and keep a copy on record.

Ch‘ien-lung’s policy was intended to suppress corruption among local officials, clerks, and strongmen while encouraging local contributions. This could be achieved by giving higher-level officials control over contributions. Ch‘ien-lung’s systematization efforts were directed at enabling the central government to monitor local public projects not originating from Peking.

Debates over the system to reward contributions

Before the Yung-cheng reign, local officials needed local elites’ help to finance public works projects, and the forms of reward, whether official or not, seem to have largely remained at the discretion of local officials. After the central government decided to establish a system of controls and rewards, officials at court debated on how to reward contributors.

There were two main debates at court in the early Ch‘ien-lung period. The first took place in 1737 between Kuo Shih-ch‘ü (chin-shih 1727), a censor, and Chang T‘ing-yü (1672–1755), a grand secretary who was also in charge of the Ministry of Personnel. Kuo argued that rich families might use the system of contributions (chüan-chu) as a replacement for the direct purchase of offices (chüan-na), which had been canceled by Ch‘ien-lung after his enthronement. Instead of being awarded substantive posts, Kuo insisted that donors only be granted brevet ranks, official hat buttons, or advancement in rank of official
degrees, rewards that would not undermine the current system of official recruitment.

Chang T'ing-yü rebutted this criticism point by point. First, he invoked the Yung-cheng emperor's frequent practice during the last three years of his reign of offering rewards to local elites who had made donations for famine relief. Chang claimed that such donations, unlike the sale of offices, were morally commendable. Elites' donations were fundamentally different from the sale of offices in that making a donation was a virtuous act that benefited local society and from which the state did not gain any material profit, while the sale of offices was a means for the state to raise more revenues. Chang did not accept Kuo's assertion that wealthy men might use contributions as an alternative to the purchase of offices. He believed instead in the sincerity of the donors and the precautions that Yung-cheng and Ch'ien-lung emperors had already set up against the possible misuse of the system as a route to the de facto sale of offices. In Chang's mind such a concern was not crucial. As for Kuo's suggestion that the state should not reward donors with substantive posts, Chang responded that if the motives behind contributions were so questionable, why should the state even grant brevet ranks and official hat buttons? If donors could be encouraged, then why should the state not award substantive posts? The only argument by Kuo that Chang evaluated positively was that the state should try to prevent collusion between contributors and local officials, as when contributors bribed officials to exaggerate the contribution in order to obtain greater rewards. Chang suggested measures to prevent this kind of collusion:

From now on, when there is [a need for] public projects such as [relieving] a poor harvest, city-wall rebuilding, constructing dikes, founding charitable schools and community granaries, and there are people among the literati and commoners who are rich and willing to donate, let the local officials investigate fairly and concretely, prepare a register [of the donations], and report it to the governors-general and governors. The governors-general and governors should again investigate the report, and if there is no exaggeration, they should submit a routine memorial to ask for an imperial decree [about the rewards]... If there are local officials who do not investigate concretely, or are bribed or solicited to exaggerate the amount in the hope of a donor's obtaining the rank-and-title reward, and if they are impeached by censors or accused by others, the governors-general, governors, and local officials should be punished severely, in addition to the contributors themselves not being rewarded.22

Chang's suggestions aimed to implement a system of reports of donations that held officials accountable and could punish corruption by officials and contributors. The implementation of this new system during the early

22 Li-k'o t'i-pen 12, 3419–18.
Ch’ien-lung years ignited further debate among officials over how to define the nature of donations, how to reward donors, and how to prevent corruption in the system. In the early stage of developing this system, some confusion was inevitable, and the system was amended through a process of court debates. As the result of these reassessment efforts, contributions were no longer left to the discretion of local officials and elites. The central government, as in many other areas of governance during the Yung-cheng and Ch’ien-lung reigns, sought to impose control over elite participation in local public affairs.

In 1739, two years after the exchange between Chang and Kuo concerning the impact of contributions and the appropriate forms of reward, there was another debate among officials, this time over the acceptable forms of contribution. The debate started when Li Yüan (1684–?), a censor, submitted a memorial stating that contributions should not be limited to occasions of need. Li argued that, as long as contributions were made out of genuine concern for public good, the donations, either grain or money, could be stored in the granary or treasury and expended whenever needs arose. Contributions for local public projects should be allowed at any time, rather than being allowed only on specific occasions. Aware of the corruption this practice might engender if the contributions were not spent immediately, Li proposed that the contribution amounts be recorded in the local official records and monitored by provincial officials. Li’s suggestion was an extension of Chang T’ing-yü’s position. Like Chang, Li valued the virtuous motives behind the donations, which prompted him to request the expansion, while ignoring the negative effects such measures might produce. As in the debate between Chang and Kuo, some officials felt that an expansion of the contribution system would enhance the unwanted practice of the sale of offices, in addition to the possibility that the expansion would promote corruption among officials and clerks. The Yung-cheng and the Ch’ien-lung emperors were well informed of these risks, and they were cautious in promoting local elites’ contributions. Although Li’s suggestions may have gone further than the original encouragement of contributions envisioned by the emperor, Ch’ien-lung did not dismiss it outright. He ordered the Ministry of Personnel to deliberate. Before the ministry submitted its recommendations, however, Li was criticized by Chu Feng-ying (chin-shih 1730), a Ministry of Works official, who raised basically the same concerns as Kuo Shih-ch’ü about corruption and contributions becoming de facto purchases of office.

Apart from criticizing Li’s position, Chu submitted his own plans to strengthen the central government’s supervision over rewards and to restrict

23 Li-k’o t’i-pen 35, 3677–8; CSL-CL 98, pp. 487–8.
the scope of rewards for contributions. Chu suggested that when provincial officials reported contributions for famine relief or other local public projects to the Ministry of Personnel, they should limit the recommendations for official appointment to people who made particularly prominent contributions. The recommended donor then would go through an evaluation process administered by the Ministry of Personnel, after which he would be given an imperial audience. Only after the audience would a donor then be considered for the special reward of appointment to an office. Chu’s suggestions were primarily aimed at preventing contributions from becoming a de facto sale of office. Concurrently, Chu submitted a plan to strengthen official monitoring of the reward process to prevent fraudulent practices. When local officials requested ranks and titles as a reward for contributions, Chu suggested, they should also attach a document that guaranteed that there were no exaggerated or false reports, nor any corruption by the clerks involved. Moreover, when the requests reached the central government, they were to be placed under the close scrutiny of the Ministry of Revenue when the contributions were related to disaster relief, and of the Ministry of Works when related to local public works. When the ministries confirmed that there was no error or deception in the report, officials of those ministries were to meet with Ministry of Personnel officials to determine the appropriate ranks and titles to be awarded. After deliberations, recommendations by the Ministry of Personnel primarily supported Chu’s suggestions, not Li’s. Li’s proposal to lift restrictions on the timing of contributions was rejected by the ministry, and this was endorsed by the emperor. On the other hand, Chu’s suggestion to involve the relevant ministries in scrutinizing recommendation reports was adopted by the Ministry of Personnel and eventually authorized by the emperor.

The results of this systematization during the late Yung-cheng and early Ch’ien-lung periods were reflected in the Ch’ien-lung edition of the Ta Ch’ing hui-tien compiled from 1747 to 1764. While the K’ang-hsi and the Yung-cheng editions of the Ta Ch’ing hui-tien only included reward regulations for conduct exemplifying Confucian virtues such as filial piety, chastity, and righteousness, the Ch’ien-lung edition contains specific regulations for rewarding donations made for famine relief and for the maintenance of roads and bridges. As a result of these changes, the Ch’ing government was able to bring local elite participation in local public affairs under the closer scrutiny of provincial and central officials. Contributions made by local elites for local public purposes were indispensable for the success of local administration, but a contributor was only promoted after provincial and central official review.

24 Li-k’o t’i-pen 35, 3677–8; and 162, 4903–22.
The impact of state activism on local elites’ participation in public affairs

The Yung-cheng and Ch’ien-lung emperors exercised more control over local and regional activities than did previous emperors.25 By providing direct economic support during this period, the Ch’ing state intervened in the operations of many local educational and philanthropic institutions such as private academies and benevolent halls, and of public works such as water conservancy and famine relief projects. The increasingly stable fiscal condition of the government supported this policy. In 1726, for example, after the Chiang-nan region was hit by a severe flood, the Yung-cheng emperor decided to launch a water control project in the Soochow and Sungkiang areas and ordered that the project should be completed with state funds. A provincial official had originally proposed that the project should be executed with the money and labor extracted from the local landlords and tenants, a proposal adamantly rejected by Yung-cheng.26 Yung-cheng’s confidence in the relatively healthy state of government finances and his determination to impose more centralized controls were manifested again in 1733, when he told officials in charge of assessing sea dike work in Chekiang that they should not hesitate to spend ten million taels of silver from the state treasury as long as they completed the work and saved people’s lives.27

In 1736, the Ch’ien-lung emperor proclaimed that civilian “contributions” for Grand Canal projects would be replaced by state funds because these “contributions” increased the people’s hardship with little benefit to state finances.28 In the same year, the emperor discontinued the practice in five Chekiang counties that assigned surcharges on local land in order to finance water projects. Such collection methods, he maintained, only led to the harassment of local residents by yamen runners and local bullies.29 Instead, Ch’ien-lung mandated that provincial officials should draw the required expenses from provincial revenues and send their own subordinate officials to take charge of the works. The emperor also discontinued the current practice that held local people responsible for the costs of registering households that had suffered damage from drought or flood. He ordered local authorities to pay the necessary expenses instead.30 In 1736 the emperor forbade foisting the financial

25 See, for example, Helen Dunstan, Conflicting counsels to confuse the age: A documentary study of political economy in Qing China, 1644–1840 (Ann Arbor, 1996), pp. 19–20.
28 CSL-CL 9, p. 318.
cost of a dredging project on merchants and others in the Yangchow area. He obliged salt administration officials to provide the necessary funds from the treasury of the salt controller and to dispatch government personnel to manage the work.\textsuperscript{31} The regulation made in 1739 that encouraged provincial officials to request state funds for various water conservancy works if local people could not afford them can be considered a continuation of such imperial efforts to promote centralized control over local affairs.\textsuperscript{32}

During his early years, the Ch'ien-lung emperor tried to replace some of the public works previously funded and managed by local elites with projects funded and managed by government officials. Corrections of inefficiencies in this policy later allowed the participation of local elites.\textsuperscript{33} Nonetheless, the emperor did not entirely relinquish his centralizing approach toward local public works. Even when he compromised by allowing a greater degree of participation by local elites, the hybrid system still mandated a degree of state control in the areas of providing funds and management.\textsuperscript{34}

The following example illustrates how the emperor envisioned the proper balance of the state and civilians in large-scale local projects. In 1750, the governor of Kiangsi submitted a memorial proposing that local people carry out repairs of city walls and embankments in Kiangsi, and that the state should recognize their donations and efforts with rewards.\textsuperscript{35} The emperor dismissed this suggestion. He explained that large-scale works that required sizeable expenditures were beyond the capacity of local residents. Therefore, even though the state had devised the system of encouraging, accepting, and rewarding local elites' contributions, they were appropriately used for small-scale public works or other projects originally the responsibility of the local population only. This case shows that elite contributions for local public works, as envisioned by the emperor, were expected to play a secondary role, supplementing but never replacing the role of regular state funds.

The policy of the Ch'ien-lung emperor was that the state should have the main responsibility for funding and managing public works. When this norm was breached, it could lead to the punishment of the officials in charge. In 1752, the governor of Shansi reported that local elites had made contributions in areas of Shansi that had been struck by drought. He stored the contributions in the government treasury for future relief,\textsuperscript{36} and as a result suffered the emperor's censure. According to Ch'ien-lung, if a locality suffered a natural disaster, it was permissible for its wealthy families to donate money and

\textsuperscript{31} CSL-CL 25, p. 559. \textsuperscript{32} Ta Ch'ing hui-tien shih-li, Kung-fu 927, p. 655.
\textsuperscript{33} For example, see CSL-CL 239, pp. 75–6; 437, p. 698.
\textsuperscript{34} Ta Ch'ing hui-tien shih-li 927, p. 657; 867, p. 71; CSL-CL 236, p. 41; 258, p. 355; 673, p. 531.
\textsuperscript{35} CSL-CL 377, p. 1178. \textsuperscript{36} CSL-CL 424, p. 558.
Storing civilian contributions in the government treasury for future purposes, however, was an entirely different matter. Ch’ien-lung declared that his government had never been parsimonious in relieving the sufferings of the people, whether by remitting taxes or through direct state relief projects. For these, the state could spend hundreds of thousands or even millions of taels of silver. The donations made by local rich people were insignificant compared to such massive use of state funds. Ch’ien-lung concluded that the governor’s actions were detrimental to the people already suffering from the disaster, and were therefore inappropriate. Based on this evaluation, the emperor ordered the governor to be placed under deliberation by the Ministry of Personnel for punishment.

When the immediate mobilization of state funding was difficult, the emperor sometimes allowed civilians to finance works that ordinarily officials were responsible for maintaining, but more often than not he maintained his policy of central government control by censuring provincial officials who had allowed this. In a 1764 edict, the emperor reprimanded Chuang Yu-kung (1713–67), the governor of Kiangsu, for his proposal to complete major water projects in Soochow and Sungkiang prefectures by enlisting local elites for funding and service. These projects were financed by more than 180,000 silver taels drawn from the provincial treasury, but more was needed, and the governor wanted to allow local elites to manage as well as contribute to the projects. Ch’ien-lung said that the proper way to manage was to use regularly appointed officials, not local elites. Ch’ien-lung also urged Chuang to find a way to avoid using elites’ donations since they were marginal compared to state funding and might be an opening for corruption. As the edict above illustrates, Ch’ien-lung insisted that the state provide not only most of the funding but also the management of public works.

Ch’ien-lung similarly rebuffed Wang Hsien-hsiü (1717–85), a censor who suggested in 1748 that the state let rich local elites take charge of famine relief in Shantung and later compensate them with rewards. Famine relief led by the local rich would be chaotic, Ch’ien-lung explained, since the elites, unlike officials, did not have the authority to control the starving people and impose order. Furthermore, they were entangled in local kinship networks. The resulting disorder would require law enforcement, the consequence of which would only exacerbate the famine victims’ misery. Moreover, officials were required to keep more accurate accounts of the famine relief amounts in silver and grain than local elites would be. Ch’ien-lung was convinced that if left in the hands of local elites, accounts would be corrupted with exaggerated amounts of contributions. Local elites and officials in collusion could then
seek more favorable rewards from the government. In 1742, the Minister of Works reported to the emperor that officials in charge of famine relief projects often delegated the assessment of damages to local degree holders, and this practice frequently led to deceptive or unfair handling of the charitable distributions. As a remedy, the minister proposed that provincial officials issue strict orders to those in charge of the relief to keep a close watch over fraudulent practices. If degree holders attempted to obstruct official activities, they should be indicted. Moreover, officials in charge of assessing damages should do it personally, and not delegate this duty to degree holders. These suggestions made by the minister were endorsed by the emperor.

In a water project in a Hupei county in 1767, provincial officials memorialized to propose temporarily putting the project, originally under civilian charge, under officials’ control because the county recently had suffered a series of natural disasters. They asked that several reliable local elites be selected to assume managerial roles under the supervision of officials. They also proposed that the necessary funds could come from the state, but also that the local population would be required to repay the debt over several years. Ch’ien-lung rejected this proposal. He noted that it shifted the officials’ responsibility to local people, and he ruled that the work be carried out with government funds. The emperor, citing a previous incident in which a provincial degree holder (chü-jen) of the area had embezzled money collected for a local water conservancy project, ordered that local officials, instead of local elites, receive the funds and take charge of the work.

An edict issued in 1788 discussed a water conservancy project in Hupei that previously had been carried out by locals. Because of severe floods, the government was to take temporary control of the management and finances of the project, with responsibility for the work later reverting to the local residents. Ch’ien-lung added that the project, even after its return, still required official supervision. He doubted that local donations would be forthcoming unless officials intervened, and proclaimed that the ancient agrarian ideal of the well-field (ching-t’ien) system in which local farmers shared for the public good was no longer attainable. He ordered that future water projects in the region, though funded by local residents, were to be managed by officials.

An edict the emperor issued in 1789 illustrates his conviction that a degree of official intervention was imperative. A water project in Hupei originally under the control of locals was temporarily funded using state money, and was scheduled to return to local control. The governor-general of Hupei and Hunan provinces requested that the emperor permit reliable local elites to take

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40 CSL-CL 176, p. 262.  
41 CSL-CL 796, pp. 752–3.  
42 Ta Ch’ing hai-tien shih-li 931, pp. 693–4.  
43 CSL-CL 1342, p. 1202.
charge of the management of the funds allotted for the work. In response, the emperor reminded the governor-general that an official mandate to supervise and review the work was inevitable, and warned him that fraudulent practices by either officials or local elites would be difficult to cover up.

If supervision by local officials could end local elites’ corruption, how could the problem of corrupt local officials be solved? The emperor tried to solve this problem by placing local officials under closer supervision by higher officials. In 1793, the governor-general of Liang-chiang (that is, the provinces of Kiangsu, Kiangsi, and Anhwei) reported on a water conservancy project in Anhwei managed and funded by local elites. Ch’ien-lung commented that as state funds for local projects were often embezzled by officials, local funding was even more prone to abuse.\(^{44}\) He wanted local officials to have a role in public works, but to prevent corruption he urged higher officials to tighten control over their subordinates. For this project he ordered the prefect (chih-fu) and the department magistrate (chih-chou) to visit the work site and supervise construction, but simultaneously required their superior, the governor of Anhwei, to also visit the site and monitor them.\(^{45}\)

Ch’ien-lung’s centralized approach toward local public works, especially in the early years of his rule, was possible because state finances were relatively secure. The emperor also trusted his higher officials to uphold the public good as perceived by the emperor. As finances worsened in the early nineteenth century, emperors could no longer sustain this way of managing public works.

**Changing attitudes under the Chia-ch’ing and Tao-kuang emperors**

The number of large-scale famine relief and water conservancy works managed with regular state funds diminished in the early nineteenth century. Instead, smaller-scale projects financed through direct elite donations or surcharges on local lands became widespread. Local elites more commonly became managers supervising these activities in cities and rural areas. These phenomena were especially prominent in the Chiang-nan region.

Local elite managers worked in quasi-bureaucratic capacities, frequently communicating with local officials. Not completely autonomous from the influence of local officials, these elites were empowered to undertake roles previously reserved for officials or sub-bureaucratic underlings. The spread of the elite management of local public works can be considered a bureaucratic

\(^{44}\) CSL-CL 1424, p. 52.

\(^{45}\) This emphasis on oversight and official supervisory roles characterized eighteenth century-public-works management and is also discussed by Lillian Li in relation to famine relief projects in Chihli. Lillian M. Li, *Fighting famine in north China: State, market, and environmental decline, 1690s–1990s* (Stanford, 2007), p. 224.
retreat. A similar trend of bureaucratic retreat was apparent in the experiment with transporting tribute grain north in commercial ships in the 1820s\textsuperscript{46} and in monetary policy.\textsuperscript{47} During this period local elites assumed more formal roles in public works large enough to involve officials, and on a lower level were also creating an increasing number of their own private institutions, such as benevolent halls and charitable estates, to help their relatives and neighbors in need.

Paralleling these changes in local society were the changes in imperial attitude toward public works management. Both the Chia-ch'ing and the Tao-kuang emperors departed from Ch'ien-lung's policies by relaxing the requirements for control and supervision by high officials. These emperors accepted the growing incidence of public works funded and managed by non-officials (nin-ch'ian min-pan) while often emphasizing the need to guard against undue influence by officials and their underlings. This meant that the emperors became more aware of financial shortfalls, deficiencies in overreaching bureaucratic intervention, and breakdowns of official discipline.\textsuperscript{48} These two emperors relied less on central government control and whenever possible sought financial and managerial involvement by local elites.

The keen imperial awareness of the declining fiscal condition of the state is epitomized in the sentence “state revenues are limited” (kuo-chia ching-fei yu ch'ang), which the early nineteenth-century emperors repeatedly mentioned in their edicts responding to the reports for public works in and out of Peking. The Ch'ien-lung emperor had noted the deteriorating condition of state finances in the last years of his rule,\textsuperscript{49} but the severity of the problem was more keenly felt by Chia-ch'ing and particularly by Tao-kuang. In 1803, Chia-ch'ing urged his officials to postpone less significant construction or repair works in provinces. He declared that annual routine repair works, which by definition were not urgent, could not be executed with state funds. He also temporarily banned requests for public works around Peking if there was no urgent need, because “state revenues are limited.”\textsuperscript{50}


\textsuperscript{47} Lin, China upside down, pp. 262-5.


\textsuperscript{49} CSL-CL 1331, p. 1018; 1335, p. 1099; 1356, p. 174; 1361, p. 241; 1392, p. 704; 1395, p. 738. In 1788, Ch'ien-lung ordered that nonurgent works of provincial public works managed on state funds should be postponed in order to reduce state expenditure. See Ta Ch'ing hui-tien shib-li 887, p. 254.

\textsuperscript{50} Ta Ch'ing hui-tien shib-li 887, p. 255. For the emperor's agony in 1809 over how to provide appropriate funds for a water project see also Ta Ch'ing Jen-tsung fuj huang-ti shib-lu (1937; Peking, 1986) 204, p. 727; 206, p. 747. Hereafter CSL-CC.
By the time of the enthronement of Tao-kuang in 1820, the gravity of the financial situation was firmly incorporated in his worldview. Throughout his reign, Tao-kuang in his responses to reports of public works reminded officials that state revenues were limited and urged them to save state funds. Officials shared the emperor's concerns and tried to shift financial responsibility for some public works onto local elites. It became increasingly common for provincial officials to plead insufficient funding for public works in order to postpone the works or to mobilize nongovernmental resources. From around 1827 the Ministry of Works prohibited officials from requesting authorization for public works that would require state funding. Provincial officials often had to qualify their requests by declaring that the work would be funded by the mobilization of elites' donations or the levying of surcharges on local lands, and not by the state. In 1833, a censor requested in a memorial that the responsibility for water projects in Chihli be handed over to the local people because current financial conditions did not allow official management of those works. In the same year, the governor-general of Hu-kuang (that is, Hunan and Hupei) blamed local officials and residents of Hupei for deliberately sabotaging a water project in the hope of borrowing the needed funds from the state instead of mobilizing their own local resources.

The Tao-kuang emperor's response in 1827 to a request to dredge three rivers in Soochow and Sungkiang in Kiangsu is symptomatic of the changed emphasis in public works management. The Tao-kuang emperor commented that the dredging work had been approved several years earlier, but due to the enormous costs, only part of the originally proposed work had been completed. Deliberating on a request for further repairs in 1827, Tao-kuang decided to reauthorize the dredging, but he ordered provincial officials to investigate how they could secure funding, including mobilizing financial

51 See, for example, Ta Ch'ing Hsiian-tsung Ch'eng huang-ti shih-lu (1937; Peking, 1986) 47, pp. 832 and 839; 49, p. 870; 75, pp. 204–5; 80, pp. 299–300; 85, p. 337; 145, pp. 226–7; 159, p. 455; 170, pp. 644–5; 209, pp. 76–7; 210, p. 93; 220, p. 279; 221, p. 297; 228, p. 419; 230, p. 450; 240, pp. 588–9; 244, pp. 662–3; 244, pp. 678–9; 253, pp. 846–7; 268, p. 118; 269, pp. 131–2; 304, p. 747; 315, p. 908; 325, pp. 1108–9; 329, p. 1184. Hereafter CSL-TK.

52 See, for example, T'ao Chu's memorials submitted on waterworks and city-wall building in 1825, 1829, and 1836. T'ao Chu [Tao Shu], T'ao Chu chi, Volume 1 (Ch'ang-sha, 1998), pp. 442, 452, 487.

53 All works related to the construction and repair of administrative buildings in and out of Peking, except some important ones, were temporarily banned by the emperor in 1840. Ta Ch'ing hui-tien shih-li 887, p. 256.


55 Ta Ch'ing hui-tien shih-li 925, p. 652. 

56 CSL-TK 230, p. 438.
and managerial help from local elites for small-scale water projects in the area.\textsuperscript{57} The example of a sea dike repair in Chekiang in 1833 also reveals the emperor’s concern with the shortage of state funds. As the Tao-kuang emperor acknowledged, the work was of crucial importance to the safety of the people and the economy of seven prefectures in Kiangsu and Chekiang, the empire’s most economically advanced areas. Recognizing that the required funds were difficult to secure at the time, the emperor ordered the governor of Chekiang to report on possible ways of financing the work as well as on the possibility of securing contributions from local elites and merchants in the area.\textsuperscript{58}

For a city water project in Soochow in 1796, the work was initiated by provincial and local officials using donations they personally made from their government salary supplements, “money for nourishing honesty” (yang lien yin).\textsuperscript{59} Following their lead, literati, merchants, and rich commoners in Soochow also donated money. On this event, Fei Ch’un (1739–1811), the governor of Kiangsu province, recorded, “Money came from voluntary donations and government money was not expended. Labor came from those hired for money, and corvée labor was not recruited. Literati in the prefecture managed the work, and it was kept out of the hands of clerks and runners.”\textsuperscript{60} Funding for this project came from officials, local elites, and merchants, without the use of government resources. The total amount donated was more than enough to pay for the project, and with the remaining money the Soochow prefect launched another set of projects the following year to repair dikes and bridges.\textsuperscript{61} He discussed his plans with local elites, who “willingly” accepted managerial roles.

In 1830, in order to dredge a creek in Wu county in Kiangsu province, local elites donated money in response to the lead of the assistant prefect in charge of water communications. He made an initial donation with his “money for nourishing honesty.”\textsuperscript{62} A memorial from the Kiangsu governor, T’ao Chu (1779–1839), reported the expense of the project as 15,110 taels of silver, and that this amount “was donated by literati managers and others, and no

\textsuperscript{57} CSL-TK 122, p. 1052. The interruption of this river works project in 1825 because of the fiscal shortage and its resumption in 1827 is detailed in Polachek, “Literati groups and literati politics in early nineteenth-century China,” pp. 269–85, 344–6. Lillian Li’s study of the river management in Chihli province illustrates that the Chia-ch’ing emperor and especially the Tao-kuang emperor had to mobilize more private resources to finance the works due to lack of funding. Li, Fighting famine in north China, pp. 56–66.

\textsuperscript{58} CSL-TK 233, p. 491.

\textsuperscript{59} Ch’ien Ssu-yüan, Wu-men pu-ch’eng, 1822, [compiled 1803, supplemented by Ch’ien Shih-ch’i and published in 1822], Shanghai T'u-shu-kuan, Shanghai, 1, p. 10a.

\textsuperscript{60} Ch’ien Ssu-yüan, Wu-men pu-ch’eng 1, p. 10a.

\textsuperscript{61} Ch’ien Ssu-yüan, Wu-men pu-ch’eng 1, pp. 12a–b.

\textsuperscript{62} Ch’ien Ssu-yüan, Wu-men pu-ch’eng 1, pp. 12a–b.
money from the government treasury was expended.”\textsuperscript{65} Based on the report submitted by the provincial administrator, governor T’ao recommended to the emperor that the local elites who donated significant amounts or exercised managerial roles and the local officials in charge of this project should both be rewarded.

Apart from fiscal constraints, in the early nineteenth century the central government’s growing awareness of the problems in letting officials and their underlings have too much control over public works projects played a role in the loosening of centralized control. Bin Wong, in his study of the Ch’ing management of the state granary system, noted that the active official control of grain storage and restocking that characterized the prosperous period during the eighteenth century was not evident after 1799, and grain storage policies after that shifted to prioritizing small-scale granaries managed by local elites.\textsuperscript{64} The motive behind this shift was the recognition that proactive efforts by the central government during the eighteenth century had not been effective. In a 1799 edict the Chia-ch’ing emperor remarked on the mismanagement of community granaries, corruption, and misuse of funds. To fix this problem, the emperor suggested returning managerial roles to local wealthy men and promoting more autonomous local management free from intervention by officials.\textsuperscript{65}

The granary system was not the only area of public works where there was promotion of local elites’ leadership in lieu of official intervention. Imperial references promoting elite-led management are frequently found in the Chia-ch’ing and Tao-kuang portions of the veritable records. With regard to famine relief projects in and around Peking in 1801, the Chia-ch’ing emperor ordered contributors not to wait for official directives, but to take the initiative in relief activities. Moreover, the emperor freed private donors from cumbersome official supervision by stating that contributors need not report their intention of contributing, and assured donors that their virtuous actions would be rewarded by the state.\textsuperscript{66} In 1810, when the governor-general of Fukien and Chekiang reported the intention of degree holders and commoners in a Fukien county to contribute to repairs to the city wall, Chia-ch’ing reminded him that the management of donations and expenses should be entirely handled by local elites, and that government clerks should not be allowed to interfere.\textsuperscript{67} Likewise, in the case of a water project in Kiangsu in

\textsuperscript{65} Ch’ien Ssu-yüan, Wu-men pu-ch’eng \textsuperscript{1}, pp. 12a–b. On T’ao’s reform policies in Chiang-nan, see Wei Hsiu-mei, T’ao Chu tsai Chiang-nan (Taipei, 1985).

\textsuperscript{66} Roy Bin Wong, China transformed: Historical change and the limits of European experience (Ithaca, 1997), pp. 113–14.

\textsuperscript{67} CSL-CC 84, pp. 109–10.  \textsuperscript{67} CSL-CC 229, pp. 86–7.
1816 funded by local landowners, Chia-ch'ing issued an order stating that managers should be selected from local people and that they should assume full control. He prohibited official intervention and exempted the local people from making burdensome financial reports of the project to the central government.68

In 1817, a censor memorialized the Chia-ch'ing emperor that the literati of Ch'ang-chou prefecture, Kiangsu, had forged an agreement among themselves on how to manage future relief activities in the area. According to the agreement, local degree holders, merchants, and rich commoners were expected to save a fixed amount of money every day, and the accumulated sums were to be deposited monthly at a local pawnshop to gain interest. At the year's end, the local leaders would submit a financial report to the magistrate. If a famine struck the locality, the local leaders would obtain the permission of the magistrate to withdraw money from the pawnshop and use the funds for relief. The censor also reported that this agreement was popular in adjoining areas such as Soochow and T'ai-ts'ang.69 The creation of a standardized relief agreement at the initiative of local elites was an attempt to regularize elite-led relief projects. The rapid spread of this agreement to neighboring areas showed the popularity in the early nineteenth century of relief activities not closely controlled by officials. The Chia-ch'ing emperor's response to this report was positive. He commented that helping those in need by using money from the local rich was the correct way to provide famine relief, similar in nature to a community granary. He praised the measures taken by local elites as virtuous. This was a case in which elites' donations, collected while there was no imminent need, garnered imperial praise rather than imperial rebuttal and the reassertion of imperial control as under Ch'ien-lung's reign.

The changes made during the Chia-ch'ing era continued under his successor. In 1820, when the Tao-kuang emperor received reports of a natural disaster in Chekiang, he commented that a relief program organized by rich degree holders and commoners would be more effective than one run by officials.70 This is a reversal in public works management from the Ch'ien-lung reign period, when official relief programs were thought to be superior to those led by local elites. Like Chia-ch'ing, Tao-kuang tried to safeguard the donations made by local people from appropriation by local officials. With the increase in public works projects funded by local elites, Tao-kuang, just as his father had, encouraged the establishment of local agreements that regularized elite participation in public works and prohibited official intervention, as the following example shows. Local degree holders and rich men in Honan funded the establishment of charitable schools with money they had deposited in

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pawnshops to earn interest. In 1829 a censor brought imperial attention to
the practice of officials’ controlling the deposited funds and suggested that the
funds should be controlled by the donors instead. In response to this request,
Tao-kuang declared that local people should create appropriate regulations
preventing expropriation of such funds by local officials.  

The expansion of public works funded and managed by local elites could
produce clashes between them and local government underlings. To clerks and
runners, expanded roles for local elites in the public realm meant the reduction
of their opportunities for income, as administrative fees previously collected
by clerks and runners increasingly went instead to local elites as managers. In
the early nineteenth century, there were cases in which tensions between these
two groups escalated into violent clashes that were reported to the emperor.
According to a memorial submitted by a censor to the emperor in 1830, in
Kiangsu province there had been two types of convoy soldier (pang-ting) in
charge of the transportation of tribute grain. One type transported the grain,
while the other navigated the boats. The payment of fees was constantly the
object of extortion by clerks and runners. To facilitate grain transport, degree
holders and other local leaders of Chiang-ning and Shang-yüan counties created
a public fund in 1822 and deposited it at a pawnshop. The interest on the
deposit funds was used to pay the transportation fee for the convoy soldiers.
The local leaders, unlike convoy soldiers, were not the kind of people that
clers and runners could prey upon. Having lost a source of extra income, the
clers and runners from the local yamens later coerced the pawnshop manager
into refusing the deposit on the pretext that the interest was more than he
could pay. The censor requested that the emperor intervene to thwart the
clers’ plot and return the control of the project to local elites.

A similar case involving a clash between clerks and local degree holders
occurred in 1836. An official reported to the emperor that the management
of a water project in Chien-li county in Hupei had been carried out jointly
by officials who collected the necessary funds and by local people who did the
repair work. After the annual funds were collected, the magistrate selected
local managers and made the funds from the local government available to
them. During this process, however, clerks frequently embezzled portions of
the donations they had collected for the project. This fraud caused a shortage
of funds, preventing completion of work. To fix this problem, the governor-
general of Hu-kuang sent officials who, together with local elites, created
a bureau that would collect the money. At the same time, the local people
selected eight reliable managers and dozens of subordinate managers who
would receive the funds needed for the work and supervise it. The entire

process, from the collection of fees and receipt of funds to the management of the work, was carried out by local people, not clerks. Tax collection, a regular part of local administration, also came to be performed by local elites, who had been largely excluded from such a role during the eighteenth century. In response, the clerks pressed the local people to not make payments at the bureau sponsored by the local elites. The managers protested to the local officials, but the clerks’ malpractices continued, and the funds collected by the bureau regularly fell short of the required amounts. In 1836, the antipathy between the clerks and the literati escalated into a physical clash at the bureau. When the emperor heard this report later in 1836, he praised the local elites’ efforts to establish the bureau, and he reproached local officials for not supporting this initiative. He blamed the clerks for obstructing the bureau and attacking the literati, and he warned the county magistrate not to protect the clerks. His support of the literati implicitly legitimized the elite management of a public project.  

The central government did not devolve the entire responsibility of managing public works to local elites. During the Chia-ch'ing and Tao-kuang periods, the government still organized public projects such as famine relief and water projects whenever there were available funds and elite donations were not an option. However, it is unquestionable that local elites’ managerial and financial roles expanded in the early nineteenth century, particularly in the Chiang-nan area, and that the Chia-ch'ing and Tao-kuang emperors, compared to Ch'ien-lung, were more supportive of elite initiatives in these roles.

** Changing Incidence of State Recognition of Contributions by Local Elites **

In building and maintaining local infrastructure such as water conservancy projects, bridges, roads, schools, and examination halls, and in aiding poverty-stricken people in times of famine or flood, contributions of money by local elites were crucial to the success of local officials’ administrations at least since late Ming times. Even during the eighteenth century, when the reach of the Ch'ing imperial administration was built on sufficient state revenues, “voluntary” elite contributions were still indispensable to financing various local public works. In return, the Ch'ing state recognized donors if the amounts were significant. These were reported to the central government, and the contributor was rewarded with permission and money to build a memorial arch (ching-piao) or with an honorific award of rank and title (i-hsü). If the

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73 CSL-TK 290, p. 486.
donations were not deemed significant, then provincial and lesser officials were responsible for rewarding the donors, usually in the form of plaques for public display. Examining the frequency of bureaucrats’ reports on, and the state’s dispensation of rewards for, donors’ contributions is a way to gauge changes in local elites’ roles in local affairs.

Different types of recognition for contributions were managed by different parts of the bureaucracy, and the sources of relevant data differ. If the donor was to have a memorial arch, then the case was handled by the Ministry of Rites. If the reward was rank and title, the case was handled by the Ministry of Personnel. References regarding state recognition of contributions can be found in three main sources, the Shib-lu (Veritable records), the Li-k’o shib-shu (Summaries of routine memorials related to the Office of Scrutiny for Rites) and the Li-k’o t’i-pen (Routine memorials of the Office of Scrutiny for Personnel). Though scattered among different sources, the data can be used together for a more complete picture.

With regard to the system of recognition for donations, the veritable records for the Ch’ien-lung, Chia-ch’ing, and Tao-kuang reigns scarcely mention cases of memorial arches for contributions, but they contain information about contributions involving awards of honorific rank and title. The disparity between the number of cases recorded during the Ch’ien-lung reign compared to the Chia-ch’ing and Tao-kuang reigns is significant. During the sixty years of the Ch’ien-lung reign, its Shib-lu mentions only six incidents of contributions. Numbers of reported local contributions, however, increased in the Chia-ch’ing and Tao-kuang periods. Figure 15.1 gives the number of contribution incidents recorded in the veritable records for the Chia-ch’ing and Tao-kuang years.

The range of public projects for which contributions were made included a gruel house, famine relief, city walls, Confucian temples, examination halls, private academies, charitable schools, bridges, and water conservancy. The relevant information in the Shib-lu sometimes lists both the names of local officials and of local elites as contributors, but more frequently mentions only the local officials while collectively referring to the others under the vague word “others.” By collating the usually brief accounts in the Shib-lu with the corresponding and more detailed accounts of the same case in the Li-k’o t’i-pen, we can infer that most of the contributors were local elites. Even for

74 The six recorded incidents of contribution are in CSL-CL 85, pp. 337–8; 97, p. 470; 240, p. 97; 787, p. 682; 1154, p. 154; and 1319, p. 854.
75 For example, compare the report of the incidents of contributions in Anhwei described in CSL-TK 157, p. 411; and Li-k’o t’i-pen 55, 9790–10; and also in Chekiang in CSL-TK 263, p. 30; and Li-k’o t’i-pen 101, 10146–26.
cases where the list of contributors is abbreviated, the major contributors are presumed to be wealthy local elites, not local officials because local officials usually took the lead by donating some amounts out of their “money for nourishing honesty,” and local wealthy leaders followed their lead by shouldering most of the necessary financial burden.

Although references to contributions recorded in the Shih-lu only numbered six during the sixty years of the Ch’ien-lung reign, Figure 15.1 shows twenty-seven cases within the much shorter span of the twenty-five years of the Chia-ch’ing period. The number increased to 200 during the thirty years of the Tao-kuang reign. This expansion of state recognition of contributions, as evidenced in the Shih-lu, supports the inference that local elites’ donations became more important in the maintenance of local public works in the Chia-ch’ing period and even more so during the Tao-kuang period.

Almost all the cases recorded in the Shih-lu involved the state rewarding donors with honorific ranks and titles. The cases in which contributors were compensated with memorial arches were processed by the Ministry of Rites, for which data can be found in the Li-k’o shih-shu [Rites]. The number of cases of memorial arches for selected years between 1736 and 1850 are congruent with the pattern observed in the Shih-lu. Some caveats need to be noticed. The materials relating to the cases of memorial arches in the Li-k’o shih-shu [Rites] usually consist of memorials of two types. The first are memorials by provincial officials reporting the contributions and requesting state rewards for the donors. The second type are memorials submitted to the emperor from

Figure 15.1. Number of contributions recorded in the Shih-lu for the Chia-ch’ing and Tao-kuang reigns
the Ministry of Rites soliciting imperial endorsement of its decisions. While most cases of memorial arches involve memorials of both of these types, there exist some cases, especially in the early nineteenth century, that contain only one type of memorial, either the requests by provincial officials or from the Ministry of Rites, but not both. Such incompleteness is perhaps due in part to the expanded use of secret memorials by officials in the early nineteenth century. These caveats, however, do not undermine the usefulness of the source, since the requests for a reward of a memorial arch presented through secret memorials were very few under Ch'ien-lung. Figure 15.2 shows the pattern of reported contribution incidents found in the Li-k'o sbib-shu [Rites], incorporating cases that have memorials of either one or both types.

The number of cases of memorial arches increased in the Chia-ch'ing period, and intensified under the Tao-kuang emperor. As sample years, I have selected nineteen years out of the sixty-year span of the Ch'ien-lung reign. I examined all twenty-five years of the Chia-ch'ing reign except 1819, for which the data was unavailable. For the samples in the Tao-kuang reign, I examined twelve years, 1821–6, 1831–2, 1835–6, and 1843–4. Among the nineteen Ch'ien-lung years, twelve years had no cases of memorial arches, there was only one case recorded for each of three other years, and another three years recorded

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Figure 15.2. Cases of memorial arches for selected years between 1736 and 1850

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77 I have examined related portions of the archival holdings of the Kung-chung-tang tsou-che and Chü-chi-ch'u tang-che published by or held at the National Palace Museum, Taipei, and the Chü-p'i tsou-che held at the First Historical Archives, Peking, as well as the Ch'ien-lung to Tao-kuang portion of the Kung-chung chu-p'i tsou-che t'ai-ch'eng lei chiian-shu hsiang.
Changing roles of local elites

The annual average of the number of memorial-arch cases roughly doubles during the Tao-kuang reign. This evidence from the Li-k’o shih-shu [Rites] also shows that the financial role of local elites in their communities became more important during the Chia-ch’ing and Tao-kuang reigns.

Another source containing information about cases of honorific rank and title is a section of the Li-k’o t’i-pen. Documents were grouped together by the First Historical Archives, Peking, under the category of “evaluation of achievements and encouragement and appointment” (k’ao-chi chiang-hsu). The Li-k’o t’i-pen only contains the cases processed through routine memorials, and it encompasses many cases of honorific rank and title that were not recorded in the Shib-lu. Because of the vast amount of material in the Li-k’o t’i-pen, I chose thirty-eight sample years from the Ch’ien-lung reign, fifteen from the Chia-ch’ing, and nine from the Tao-kuang reign. Figure 15.3 shows the number of cases of honorific rank and title collected for sample years.

The Li-k’o t’i-pen corroborates the inferences drawn from the other two sources. They identify the Chia-ch’ing period as the incipient stage of expanding public roles for local elites in organizing monetary contributions and management. The numbers are much higher during the Tao-kuang reign as the trend intensified. The recorded contributions for the early nineteenth century in the Li-k’o t’i-pen differ from those in the earlier period not only
Table 15.1. Provincial distribution of recorded instances of contributions during the Chia-ch'ing and Tao-kuang reigns

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Province</th>
<th>Number</th>
<th>Province</th>
<th>Number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Chihli</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>Kiangsi</td>
<td>80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kiangsu</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>Kiangsu</td>
<td>53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shensi</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>Chekiang</td>
<td>28</td>
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<tr>
<td>Anhwei</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>Anhwei</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chekiang</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>Hunan</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Szechwan</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>Szechwan</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hupei</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>Hupei</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shansi</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>Shansi</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shantung</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>Fukien</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fukien</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>Honan</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Honan</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>Yunnan</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kwangtung</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>Shensi</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sinkiang</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>Kwangtung</td>
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<tr>
<td>Hunan</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>Kansu</td>
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<td>Kweichow</td>
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<td>Kwangsi</td>
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<tr>
<td>Kiangsi</td>
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<tr>
<td>Kansu</td>
<td>4</td>
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<tr>
<td>Hsi-tsang</td>
<td>2</td>
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<tr>
<td>Hainan</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Feng-t'ien</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Totals</strong></td>
<td><strong>227</strong></td>
<td><strong>242</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

in their frequency, but also in the inclusion of public works that involved large numbers of participants and extraordinary amounts of contributions. The relief project launched in 1823 in response to floods in Kiangsu is a good example. The total amount contributed by local degree holders, merchants, and rich commoners reached 1.95 million taels of silver. More than 1,000 men under the jurisdiction of the Soochow provincial administrative commissioner were rewarded for their donations, and this number did not include those under the jurisdiction of another commissioner stationed in Nanking who also contributed.⁷⁸

The expansion of elite contributions took place not only in one or two confined areas but over a wide range of regions (see Table 15.1). The number

⁷⁸ Li-k’u t’i-pan 44, 9701–3.
of reported contributions differed, with some regions figuring more prominently. For Kiangsu, Chekiang, and Anhwei in the Chiang-nan area, this is understandable in terms of the wealth concentrated there. In contrast, the numbers of contributions in provinces such as Kansu were lower, which is indicative of less wealth among local elites in the peripheral provinces. There also was variation in preferences of reward. Kiangsi, for instance, ranked at the top for memorial arches, and near the bottom of the list of provinces for honorific ranks and titles. Elites in the northern provinces of Chihli, Shensi, and Shansi seem to have preferred the honorific ranks and titles as a reward.

Using different sources, recent scholarship corroborates the rise of local elite roles in various public areas and in different parts of the Ch'ing realm. Pierre-Étienne Will pointed out the disappearance of large-scale state relief projects by the early nineteenth century and the concurrent emergence of officials arguing for the superiority of gentry-led, small-scale relief programs over state-run programs. A charitable granary established by local elites in Fo-shan, Kwangtung, in 1795 shows a change in the power relationship between state and society during the first decades of the nineteenth century.

Evidence showing the diffusion of elite-managed public works in the early nineteenth century also is presented in studies on charitable estates, water conservancy works, local organizations such as benevolent halls and public bureaus, and the emergence of the market-town and water project managers. The construction of benevolence halls (shan-t'ang) accelerated during the Chia-ch'ing and Tao-kuang years. Benevolence halls built in the early nineteenth century were largely funded and managed by local people, but during the Ch'ien-lung period local officials had been the active players in funding, and sometimes even managing, the halls. A study of charitable estates in Soochow largely established by local elites reveals that, although eleven estates were created during the sixty-year span of Ch'ien-lung's reign, the


81 See chapters 4 and 6 in Liang Ch'i-tzu [Angela Ki Chi Leung], *Shib-shan yü chiao-hua: Ming Ch'ing ti tz'u-shan tsu-chib* (Taipei, 1997).
number of newly created estates increased to thirty-eight over the next fifty-five years. In water conservancy work, the studies by Morita Akira have shown that the mobilization of local elite resources and managerial roles became more prevalent in early nineteenth-century Chiang-nan. Large-scale water conservancy works, in which local elites had managerial roles, existed during the eighteenth century, but became even more common in the early nineteenth century. Among water projects significant enough to be recorded in a county or prefectoral gazetteer, those funded or managed by local elites in Soochow increased during the early nineteenth century, as did those in other parts of Chiang-nan. The Chia-ch'ing and Tao-kuan periods marked a turning point in the history of water management. Water projects increasingly came under the relatively autonomous control of local managers in this period. In previous centuries such works had been part of the routine duties of local officials. Also during this period, the new term “market-town manager” (chen-tung) emerged in Chiang-nan, while terms such as degree-holding manager (shen-tung) and manager (tung-shih) appear more frequently in the nineteenth-century sources on famine relief and water projects. The administrative roles of local elites in the area became more recognized in official sources.

83 Chapters 1 through 3 of Morita Akira, Shindai no suiri to chiiki shakai (Fukuoka, 2002).
84 It is generally assumed that the water projects in the eighteenth century were monitored more closely by the state in Ch’ing than in Ming times, and more so in the Chiang-nan area than in a more remote area such as Hunan. See Peter C. Perdue, Exhausting the earth: State and peasant in Hunan, 1500–1850 (Cambridge, MA, 1987), p. 184.
87 Morita, Shindai no suiri to chiiki shakai, p. 356.
While these studies primarily focused on the Chiang-nan region where local elites’ influence was the strongest and their economic resources abundant, Yamamoto Susumu and Yamada Masaru have pointed out that in Szechwan public bureaus (kung-ch¨u) led by local elites began to appear in the early Tao-kuang period as well. However, these two scholars disagree over the nature of these public bureaus. Yamada argues that the public bureaus were established to fill the administrative shortfall caused by the massive migration into Szechwan, where the increase in the number of regular government officials did not keep pace with growth of population. The population increase necessitated more administrative fees and services, and this encouraged co-operation between local officials and local elites. Yamada emphasizes the supplementary nature of the bureaus to local administration by officials. Yamamoto explains the spread of local elites’ organizations in the early nineteenth century from a different perspective. He emphasizes the local elites’ protection of their shared interest. He claims that the early nineteenth-century growth of public bureaus in Szechwan and benevolent halls in Chiang-nan were part of the local elites’ endeavor to protect their interests and resist the rampant extortion by clerks and runners, sub-official personnel in county offices, who themselves were forced to generate their own incomes because of the government’s worsening fiscal condition. Despite their differences, Yamada and Yamamoto both acknowledge the vigor of elite activism, whether propelled by the desire for self-protection or for public-minded purposes. They also share the view that the imperial government’s fiscal crisis at this time was a direct stimulus of local elites’ activism.

The number of reported contributions and awards of memorial arches clearly jumped in the 1820s and 1830s. Reporting of rewards of honorific ranks and titles for such contributions also showed an upward trend, slower at first in the first quarter of the nineteenth century and picking up in the second quarter. The contributions also increased across provinces, and expanded in terms of the kinds of public works that were supported.

The increase in the number of contributions in the early nineteenth century led to the government establishing more specific regulations on how to recognize and reward contributions. The relevant regulations in the Ch’ien-lung and


the Chia-ch'ing editions of the *Ta Ch'ing hui-tien* (*Collected statutes of the Great Ch'ing*) show that the categories of public activity for which contributions could be made had become both more detailed and expansive.\(^\text{90}\) The Ch'ien-lung edition of the *Ta Ch'ing hui-tien* does not mention the specific amount for which contributions were to be rewarded by the central government. The Chia-ch'ing edition explicitly fixes it at 1,000 tael of silver. Although the more specific regulations in the Chia-ch'ing edition had functioned as guiding principles in the Ministries of Rites and Personnel in the earlier reign, their inclusion in the statutes in the Chia-ch'ing period suggests the growing importance of contributions.

As financial contributions became more critical for local governments, and as the increase of such cases made the reward process more complicated, the state was confronted with the need to devise regulations that would both render the task of making rewards more efficient and encourage more contributions. The regulations created in 1827 for the Ministry of Personnel were aimed at these purposes. In the early Ch'ien-lung years, when elite donors preferred to be compensated by official ranks and titles instead of memorial arches, the central government not infrequently rewarded them with substantive appointment of office (*shih-chih*) and not merely an honorific official rank. With the increased numbers of expectant officials awaiting appointment by the late eighteenth century, the government found it increasingly difficult to honor the contributors in this way. By the late Ch'ien-lung years, contributors were generally not compensated with substantive appointments, but instead awarded with brevet ranks, official hat buttons, or promotions in degrees or merits, when they wanted the ranks and titles.\(^\text{91}\) These policies were inherited by the Chia-ch'ing and later by the Tao-kuang administrations, and continued to guide the reward process until the implementation of a new reward program in 1827.

Before the establishment of the 1827 regulations, officials at the Ministry of Personnel had to consult precedents they regarded as applicable to current cases to assess the social status of the contributor and the amount of the contribution in order to recommend a reward. This became inconvenient as the number of cases rose. With the new regulations in 1827, officials were no longer obliged to locate and cite a precedent, but could decide the appropriate reward by referring to the prescribed regulations that matched various ranges of contribution to the corresponding reward form.\(^\text{92}\)


\(^{91}\) Chüan-shu hsüan [in T'ai-cheng lei of Kang-chung chu-p'i hsüa-chu, paper copy], Kuo T'ing-i T'u-shu-kuan, Chung-yang yen-chiu-yüan li-shih yü-yen yen-chiu-so, Taipei, 6, pp. 48–53; Li-k'ao t'i-pen 218, 7920–8.

\(^{92}\) The specifics of the 1827 regulation were constructed on the basis of the following documents: Li-k'ao t'i-pen 44, 9704–15; 45, 9705–1; 55, 9787–15; 55, 9790–5; 55, 9790–14; 55, 9791–7; 101, 10146–1;
One of the major features of the 1827 regulations was that the Ministry of Personnel decided to adjust the practice of differential treatment according to the status of contributors. In the earlier system, lower-degree holders and commoners were rewarded differently for the same contribution. Lower-degree holders referred specifically to holders of sheng-yüan and chien-sheng degrees, as well as holders of official hat buttons of ranks eight and nine and official titles of rank nine. Commoners consisted of men, however wealthy, who did not possess any degree, rank, or title. Under this old system, even though commoners made large-scale contributions, the state normally did not reward them with official titles, but only with official hat buttons, which were considered one level lower than the reward given to degree holders, who could be rewarded with an official title for the same amount of contribution. The 1827 regulation abolished this distinction, and extended the bestowal of official titles to commoners if the amount of their contribution met certain criteria. The purpose of this new measure was to encourage larger contributions by commoners by promising them a more attractive reward possibility. Contributors who held degrees benefited from the new program as well, as the Ministry of Personnel bestowed higher-rank official titles than the previous regulation for the same donation. This was an attempt by the state to channel more civilian monetary resources into local public works.

Another important addition in the 1827 regulations was the special treatment offered to managers (tung-shih) of projects who showed initiative in promoting contributions or managing the activity. These managers, apart from the regular rewards bestowed on them according to the amount of their contribution, received additional rewards in the form of having their merits recorded twice in normal cases, and three times if there had been an imperial decree that ordered a special reward. The managerial roles were sometimes performed by local officials, but more often they were undertaken by local elites. Elite managers who made contributions were given not only an official title or hat button but also promotion in their merits, which could be used to offset any demotion in their quasi-official career. Even when the elite managers did not donate money, they could still be rewarded in recognition of their services in the managerial role.

Special treatment for managers in charge of public works began earlier than 1827. Already in 1814, local elite managers involved in a public project who donated less than the minimum amount to qualify for a state reward were nonetheless honored for their service.93 A similar policy was used in

93 Li-k'uo t'i'-pen 44, 9701–3.
1827, before the new regulation came into existence, in a famine relief case in Kiangsu.\footnote{682} In the early nineteenth century, the Ch’ing state officially recognized and actively promoted managerial roles for local elites in public works.

The new regulations of 1827 provided more incentives to lower-degree holders and to commoners. Five years later, in 1832, the Ministry of Personnel added another set of reward regulations, this time targeting officials awaiting appointment (hou-hsiian jen-yiiian). The 1832 regulation was designed to offer a faster track to appointment to those who contributed to public works projects certain amounts prescribed by the Ministry of Personnel.\footnote{1827} Previously, officials awaiting appointment, if they made donations, had been granted advancement in degrees and merits. The new regulations in 1832 allowed them to move one step closer to receiving substantive posts. If the 1827 measure was intended to appeal to both lower-degree holders and commoners, the 1832 regulation was intended to appeal to expectant officials residing in their home districts waiting for an appointment to a post. With the 1832 regulation, the state broadened the pool of contributors in an attempt to mobilize more private wealth for public projects. These reward regulations went through some minor changes in 1838.\footnote{1832} A comprehensive reward program was announced in 1843 that reflected a series of changes that had been made since the Ch’ien-lung period.\footnote{1832} The primary reason behind such frequent emendations of reward measures was to process the increasing number of contributions more efficiently and systematically, and to provide more attractive incentives to encourage further contributions.\footnote{1832}

Also during the Tao-kuang reign in 1841, an additional donation category was created to mobilize more civilian resources. This new category was primarily set up to reward contributions for military costs. The outbreak of the Opium War forced the state to spend more on the military, and this further added to the state’s reliance on “voluntary” contributions.\footnote{1841} These policies targeting wealthy elite donors suggest how strenuously the Ch’ing state in the

\footnotesize{\begin{itemize}
\item[94] Li-k’o t’i-pen 44, 9701–3.
\item[95] The details of this 1832 regulation were reconstructed on the basis of Li-k’o t’i-pen 102, 10154–4; 101, 10147–18.
\item[96] Ta Ch’ing hui-tien shih-li 77, p. 994; Ch’iin-ting Li-pu tse-li (1843; Taipei, 1966) 8, pp. 997–8.
\item[97] Ta Ch’ing hui-tien shih-li 77, pp. 995–6.
\item[98] In 1832, the Tao-kuang emperor even bestowed chui-jen degrees on those who made donations to aid people struck by a serious drought in Chihli. When officials later asked for similar treatment for other contributors, the emperor stated that it had been a temporary action and prohibited officials from making similar requests. See CSL-TK 239, pp. 571–2; Ta Ch’ing hui-tien shih-li 403, p. 499. In 1831, an official suggested to the emperor that men whose ancestors were of a lesser social status would be allowed to take the civil service examinations or to purchase office if they donated a large sum of silver or grain and then have their surnames removed from the register of lesser citizens. The emperor declined the suggestion. The purpose of the official’s suggestion, however, is self-evident: to expand the pool of contributors in order to try to draw more private resources into public projects. CSL-TK 193, p. 1052.
\item[99] CSL-TK 358, p. 469.
\end{itemize}}
early to mid-nineteenth century endeavored to deal with crises by mobilizing resources from local elites who were supplying funds through the contribution system.

**POLICIES ON ENSHRINING LOCAL WORTHIES**

From the mid-Ming period, two types of shrine, one for eminent officials (ming-huan tz'u) and the other for local worthies (hsiang-bsien tz'u), spread across the empire. The shrines for eminent officials were built to commemorate former local officials who had made distinguished contributions to the well-being of the local population. The shrines for local worthies were built to honor deceased local residents, most of them members of influential families, whose virtuous deeds or accomplishments deserved recognition. The shrines to eminent officials marked them as paragons for subsequent local officials, and the shrines to local worthies similarly marked persons who served as models for their community. Enshrinement of local worthies was important since their relatives and descendants, unlike the descendants of eminent officials, usually continued to live in the same locality and worship their ancestors. Enshrinement of an ancestor by a consensus of local elites confirmed public recognition of the elite status of his family. The importance of enshrinement of local worthies meant that there was fierce competition among elite clans for this honor that enhanced their standing. Local families seeking official endorsement for enshrining an ancestor gave rise to the problem of “excessive enshrinement.” Confronted with this problem, the central government during the Ming and Ch'ing periods several times enacted various policies to restrict enshrinement, but they were not effective. Only during the Yung-cheng and Ch'ien-lung periods was the number of enshrinements controlled. Enshrinements began to increase again during the Chia-ch'ing period. The policies during the Yung-cheng and Ch'ien-lung reigns and the later changes in administering enshrinements offer another set of evidence about the changing relations between the state and local elites in the Ch'ing period.

At the beginning of the Ming dynasty, eminent officials and local worthies were usually worshipped in the same shrine, often called a shrine for former worthies (bsien-bsien tz'u). Starting in the fifteenth century, eminent officials and local worthies were venerated separately in pairs of shrines. These shrines were established by active local officials or local elites who were motivated to promote a Confucian agenda. Because the central government recognized the local importance of these shrines, imperial orders encouraged but did not always mandate the building of these shrines. In addition to promoting

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100 For example, Sarah Schneewind stated that these shrines were built without government orders in Ming. See Sarah Schneewind, *Community schools and the state in Ming China* (Stanford, 2006), pp. 136, 237. Also see Romeyn Taylor, “Official religion in the Ming,” in *The Cambridge history of China,*
Confucian values, the Ming government used these shrines as one type of reward it could bestow on deserving men and their families. The decision to enshrine someone in a local-worthy shrine was often in addition to other rewards, such as granting a posthumous title or a posthumous rank.\textsuperscript{101} In Ming it was normally local or regional officials rather than the central government who approved the enshrinement of a local worthy. The 1642 gazetteer for Wu county in Soochow prefecture states that in 1525 the county magistrate made the enshrinement decision concerning eminent officials.\textsuperscript{102} The same gazetteer states that in 1538 the regional inspector (hsü-an yü-shih) decided which names could be entered in the shrine of local worthies. The gazetteer continues that beginning sometime after 1525, authority to decide for both categories of enshrinement was, by an imperial statute, under the control of the education intendant censor (t‘i-hsüeh yü-shih), a provincial official.\textsuperscript{103} This was the practice until the Yung-cheng reform in 1725. Within the Ming enshrinement system, the qualifications of a recommended candidate first had to be guaranteed by local government school officials and students, and then the recommendation was submitted to the education intendant censor through the local magistrate or prefect. Reflecting this change that was introduced after 1525, many local gazetteers in the late sixteenth and the seventeenth centuries, and into the early eighteenth, note that the name of the person was entered into the shrine with the endorsement of the education intendant censors or commissioners. This reform, however, failed to meet expectations, as already by 1534 complaints were submitted by local residents about the enshrinement of unqualified men with dubious morals or qualifications,\textsuperscript{104} and the problem became more severe by the late sixteenth century. In 1574, the central government ordered provincial officials to examine the shrine lists for eminent officials and local worthies and remove the tablets of those whom they considered undeserving.\textsuperscript{105} Shen Li (1531–1615), a minister of rites

\textsuperscript{101} Ming shih-lu (facsimile of Kuo-li Pei-p'ing t'u-shu-kuan t'sung hsiang-ko ch'ao-pan, ed.) (14th–17th c.; Taipei, 1983) 104, p. 163. On another occasion, an official at the Hung-chih court proposed to the emperor in 1488 that the worthies whose merits did not deserve worship in the Confucian Temple (wen-miao) should be expelled and enshrined in a hsiang-hsien tz'u instead. Here the official used the terminology "hsiang-hsien tz'u chih chih," which implies that the worship had been already established by the state by 1488. Ming shih-lu (facsimile of Kuo-li Pei-p'ing t'u-shu-kuan t'sung hsiang-ko ch'ao-pan, ed.) (14th–17th c.; Taipei, 1983) 17, pp. 413–14. There were at least two similar orders during the Chia-ching period (1522–66). Lin Yao-yü, comp., Li-pu chih-kao (Taipei, 1983) hsia, 85, pp. 535–6; Yang Shen, Sheng-an chi (Taipei, 1983) 4, p. 55.

\textsuperscript{102} Ch'ung-chen Wu hsien-chih (1733; Taipei, 1983) 104, p. 163.

\textsuperscript{103} Ch'ung-chen Wu hsien-chih 13, p. 235.

\textsuperscript{104} Lin Yao-yü, Li-pu chih-kao hsia, 85, p. 535.

\textsuperscript{105} Lin Yao-yü, Li-pu chih-kao 30, p. 563.
during the Wan-li period, submitted a memorial that accused local elites of abusing their influence in the enshrinement process. He also suggested that, at the end of each year, education intendant censors should submit reports to the central government on enshrinements and the evidence of each person’s qualifications.  

The repeated appearance during the late Ming dynasty of similar requests and orders indicates that these measures were not effective in dealing with excessive enshrinements.

In the early Ch’ing period, the provincial education commissioner, the Ch’ing equivalent of the Ming education intendant censor, was in charge of enshrinements, and the abuse of the system by powerful local families continued undisrupted. Without the intervention of central government in the enshrinement process, provincial education officials seem to have been unable to apply rigorous enshrinement standards that might conflict with the interest of local elites.

During the K’ang-hsi years, there seems to have been an increase in the number of enshrinements, but there are no totals because there was no centralized supervision. In 1686, T’ang Pin (1627–87), the governor of Kiangsu, chose to enshrine thirty-one eminent officials, from antiquity to the Ming, for veneration at the Soochow prefectural school, and later he added twelve more names. Among the thirty eminent Ch’ing officials enshrined at the same school before 1745, as many as twenty-eight entered the shrine during the K’ang-hsi reign. The measures taken by the Kiangsu provincial administration commissioner, Yang Chao-lin, in 1717 were quite similar to T’ang Pin’s. Yang chose forty-six local worthies from T’ang to Ming and placed their tablets in the shrine for local worthies of K’un-shan county.

In these two cases from Soochow prefecture, the contrast between the high numbers of enshrinements during the K’ang-hsi reign and the low numbers under the following two reigns was distinct. A similar pattern occurred in some counties in Chekiang. In T’ang-hsi county of Chin-hua prefecture, six out of eight eminent Ch’ing officials whose time of enshrinement is known entered the shrine during the K’ang-hsi reign. Likewise, in neighboring P’u-chiang county, out of the seven eminent Ch’ing officials enshrined before the late nineteenth century, at least six entered the shrine during the K’ang-hsi period. As for the local worthies of the same county, five out of seven entered the

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111 *P’u-chiang hsien-chib* (1896; Shanghai, 1993), 13, p. 498.
local-worthy shrine under the K'ang-hsi emperor. During K'ang-hsi’s reign, one official endorsed no fewer than 658 local worthies during the span of only three years, and bestowed official hat buttons on more than 1,100 descendants of the worthies.\textsuperscript{112}

The lax enshrinement policy was reversed in 1724, when the Yung-cheng emperor endorsed a memorial requesting an empire-wide reappraisal of the qualifications of the already enshrined and removal of undeserving names.\textsuperscript{113} In order to establish who was a qualified worthy, their names and merits had to be submitted to the Ministry of Rites for review.\textsuperscript{114} A similar action was applied to new candidates for enshrinement. Unlike previous practice initiated sometime after 1525 in which the enshrinement decision was made at the provincial level, after 1724 provincial officials had to submit enshrinement requests to the Ministry of Rites along with evidence of the candidates’ qualifications so that the ministry could examine and endorse their enshrinement.\textsuperscript{115} The role of provincial officials was reduced from decision-maker to recommender.

In 1725 the Shantung education commissioner suggested to the throne that provincial officials should directly submit names in memorials to the emperor for his endorsement of their enshrinement, in addition to the substantiating evidence they were required to submit to the Ministry of Rites.\textsuperscript{116} The request suggests that examination by the Ministry of Rites could not prevent abuses. By involving the emperor, provincial and local officials were expected to be more cautious in recommending candidates. This suggestion formed the basis of a new policy on enshrinement proposed by the Ministry of Rites, to which the Yung-cheng emperor gave his consent.\textsuperscript{117} The centralization of the decision-making process that occurred in 1724 and 1725 placed the emperor himself at the apex of the enshrinement process in an attempt to rescue veneration of local officials and worthies from appropriation by powerful local families and allied officials.

After 1725, provincial officials began to memorialize the emperor with lists of worthy candidates.\textsuperscript{118} To further guarantee the merit of the candidates, in 1728 the minister of rites suggested that ministry officials who came from the same province as the candidates should meet with the Nine

\textsuperscript{113} Li-k'o shih-shu (Rites) 113, YC 2/5/8; Ta Ch'ing hui-tien shih-li 402, p. 494.
\textsuperscript{114} Ta Ch'ing hui-tien shih-li 402, p. 494.
\textsuperscript{115} Li-k'o shih-shu (Rites) 113, YC 2/5/8.
\textsuperscript{116} Li-k'o shih-shu (Rites) 130, YC 3/0/24.
\textsuperscript{117} Li-k'o shih-shu (Rites) 131, YC 3/11/6; Ch'in-ting hsüeh-cheng ch'üan-shu (Taipei, 1968) 76, pp. 1591–2; Ta Ch'ing hui-tien shih-li 402, p. 494.
\textsuperscript{118} Li-k'o shih-shu (Rites) 166, YC 6/8/28.
Chief Ministers (chiu-ch'ing) to discuss the qualifications of the recommended worthies. The Yung-cheng emperor rejected this proposal, primarily on the grounds that provincial ties shared by the candidates and the central officials would prevent impartial evaluations. Instead, Yung-cheng ordered a reappraisal of the suitability of the candidates recommended since 1726. He received the report in 1731. After the reassessment, as many as ten out of forty-three candidates were disqualified. This follow-up measure, together with Yung-cheng's earlier efforts, shows he was determined to bring enshrinement under tighter central government control, and should be understood as a part of the larger imperial program to curb what the emperor regarded as the excessive power of local elites.

In the first decade of the Ch'ien-lung reign, the number of enshrined worthies increased compared to those during his father's reign. This brief increase, however, was soon reversed and the numbers remained at a low level through the rest of the Ch'ien-lung reign. Early on the emperor expressed his concern about enshrinements by criticizing provincial officials who recommended too many worthies. He said that their actions were no more than "reputation seeking," by which he meant gaining popularity among the local elites by fulfilling their desire to enshrine their ancestors. He was irritated when a governor recommended his own uncle as an eminent official. The emperor declined this request by denouncing it as working for a private motive rather than the public interest. The decisive turn came in the thirteenth year of his reign (1748). The emperor took issue with a recommended candidate whom he considered average at best. He declared that the candidate was being recommended only because he had been a high minister at court. In an edict issued the next year, the emperor placed blame on provincial officials and local elites who, misjudging the qualifications of the candidate, had recommended him. Ch'ien-lung added sarcastically that the recommendation of someone with such a weak evaluation only served to facilitate officials and local elites having their own tablets eventually entered into shrines. Reflecting the emperor's increasing suspicion on this matter, a 1748 regulation stipulated that the Ministry of Rites should reject enshrinement requests if

119 Li-k'o shih-shu (Rites) 166, YC 6/8/28.
120 Li-k'o shih-shu (Rites) 166, YC 6/8/28; CSL-YC 73, p. 1084; Ta Ch'ing hui-tien shih-li 402, p. 494; anon., Ch'in-ting hsiüeh-cheng ch'üan-shu 76, pp. 1592–3.
121 Li-k'o shih-shu (Rites) 199, YC 8/12/16.
the qualifications of the candidate were fabricated, and that officials who made such requests should be punished.\textsuperscript{127}

Enshrinement numbers remained low after the stern measures taken by the emperor in 1748. The emperor remained vigilant. In 1755, he discovered that two candidates who had obtained enshrinement endorsements from the Ministry of Rites had sons serving as high ministers, while another candidate who had no such son had been denied. This provoked the ire of the emperor. Ch'ien-lung suspected that the high ministers at his court and provincial officials were in collusion based on shared membership in the highest echelons of the bureaucracy. Bureaucratic favoritism was supersed ing official duty. The emperor said that if the shrines were filled with the ancestors of high ministers, then how could the system fulfill its purpose of evaluating genuinely worthy men hidden away from politics and power.\textsuperscript{128} The emperor's analysis touched on one of the fundamental problems of the enshrinement process. Even if the ancestors of high ministers were recommended under the guise of public consensus, the men who expressed the consensus were local elites who were affines of high ministers. Therefore, the emperor concluded, this was far from representing a broad spectrum of the public. Ch'ien-lung was aware of the discrepancy between the lofty ideals of enshrinement and the manipulation of the system by ministers and local elites for their own interests. Ch'ien-lung was wary not only of collusion between ministers and local elites. Ancestors of powerful ministers easily passing through the screening process administered by provincial officials and the Ministry of Rites was evidence of a bureaucratic alliance camouflaged under the rubric of enshrinement of worthies. The emperor ordered the expulsion of the two unqualified worthies from the shrines, and he meted out punishments to the governors-general, governors, and Ministry of Rites officials involved in this event. Soon a regulation was enacted prohibiting the recommendation of grandfathers or fathers of sitting Nine Chief Ministers.\textsuperscript{129} The total number of enshrinements after 1750 remained low throughout the Ch'ien-lung period.

The data for enshrinements are drawn from the Shib-lu and the Li-k'o shih-shu [Rites], except for the three years (1750, 1751, 1786) for which I rely upon the routine memorials of the Ministry of Rites. From 1726 to 1795, except the six years for which the data is missing, ninety-eight eminent officials and 231 local worthies were enshrined. In Kiangsu province, forty-nine names were enshrined during this long period under Yung-cheng and Ch'ien-lung. Compared to the number of enshrined eminent officials and local worthies

\textsuperscript{127} CSL-CL 344, p. 765; Ta Ch'ing hui-tien shih-li 402, p. 495.
\textsuperscript{128} CSL-CL 481, pp. 28–9. \textsuperscript{129} Ta Ch'ing hui-tien shih-li 402, p. 495.
just in the Soochow prefectural school to the end of the K'ang-hsi reign, which reached as high as eighty-two, the rate of enshrinement experienced a remarkable decrease.

During the Yung-cheng reign, the total number of enshrined men was about forty-five. Owing to the strengthening of enshrinement criteria, the average number of enshrinements per year remained in the single digits. The number increased slightly in the first twelve years of the Ch'ien-lung reign, which led to a series of interventions and imperial initiatives from 1748 to 1755. In the last thirty years of Ch'ien-lung’s reign, only about twenty-six names were approved for either of the two shrines. In Soochow prefecture, as few as ten names of local worthies were entered in the shrine between 1726 and 1795. Moreover, of these ten, nine were enshrined in the first thirty-four years of the Ch'ien-lung reign. Soochow, a center of local elites’ influence and sophisticated elite culture under the Ming, could not escape from the new imperial disposition after the mid-1720s.

During the Chia-ch'ing period, especially after the emperor assumed direct political control following the death of his father in 1799, changes occurred in enshrinement policies. Unlike for the Ch'ien-lung period, the Li-k'o shih-shu [Rites], one of the two primary sources of information for this analysis of enshrinement patterns, shows frequent missing sections from the Chia-ch'ing period. The reason for these gaps is perhaps the occasional practice of ministers of rites submitting secret memorials instead of routine ones for the end-of-year enshrinement requests. If we solely rely on the Li-k'o shih-shu [Rites], then we are able only to know which provincial officials recommended whom, but not whether those men’s names received imperial endorsement. The veritable records from this period contain thorough information about enshrinement results for every year until the end of the T'ung-chih period in 1874, except for two years in the Hsien-feng reign (1851–61). For those two years, the absence of data is likely due to lack of recommendations rather than mistakes by compilers.

The total number of enshrined eminent officials and local worthies between 1726 and 1795 was about 329, an annual average of about five persons per year. Over the last thirty years of the Ch'ien-lung reign (from 1766 to 1795), the average was about one per year. During the Chia-ch'ing reign, the total of enshrinements was about 169, an annual average of about seven. The increase during the Chia-ch'ing period was higher for local worthies. The efforts by local elites in this period to honor relatives are related to the relaxation of enshrinement criteria applied by the government. The families of men recommended for enshrinement, the local and regional officials making the recommendations, and the central officials deciding on the recommendations all seem to have shared an optimism that the enshrinement requests would
be approved by the emperor and that recommending officials would not be punished.

Besides the overall increase of enshrinements, changes also occurred in the regional distribution of enshrined worthies. During the eighteenth century, provinces in the north were second, third, and fourth on the list of provinces that produced the most worthies. However, between 1796 and 1820, Kiangsu, Chekiang, and Kiangsi, provinces in the lower Yangtze region, claimed the top three spots. The combined percentage of these three provinces in the total number of enshrinements rose from 25 percent in the eighteenth century to 48 percent in the Chia-ch'ing period. In the same periods, the combined percentage of the top three provinces in the north producing enshrined local worthies dropped from 32 percent to 15 percent. The sudden reversal of the north–south ratio is not explained by changes in the populations of local elites or regional cultural achievements. The implication is that the government in the eighteenth century sought to promote the local elites' cultural heritage in the north while restricting the total number of enshrinements; this reversed in the Chia-ch'ing period.

The increase in the number of enshrinements during the Chia-ch'ing period seems to have been a function of the government's greater reliance on the financial and managerial roles of local elites for the maintenance of local order and infrastructure. State policies could no longer curb the power of local elites generally and that of Chiang-nan elites in particular. The changes in enshrinements that occurred in Soochow are quite revealing. Soochow produced only ten local worthies from 1726 to 1795, nine of whom entered the shrine in the first thirty-four years of the Ch'ien-lung reign. In the early years of Chia-ch'ing, Soochow elites made strenuous efforts to place the tablets of their ancestors in shrines for local worthies. In the twenty-five years of the Chia-ch'ing reign, eleven Soochow men were enshrined. Ten of these eleven names entered the shrine between 1798 and 1808. The desire that accumulated during the eighteenth century to enshrine ancestors only found its outlet in the early Chia-ch'ing years. Not only did enshrinement numbers in Soochow increase, but so did those for all of Kiangsu province during the Chia-ch'ing period. During the seventy years between 1726 and 1795, the total number of enshrinements in Kiangsu province was about forty-seven, but after 1795 it took only twenty-five years to almost match that number. The proportion of Kiangsu in the overall enshrinement numbers almost doubled from 14 percent under Ch'ien-lung to 27 percent in the Chia-ch'ing period. Efforts to maintain more balanced numbers between northern and southern provinces in the eighteenth century were abandoned in the Chia-ch'ing reign.

The total number of enshrinements from 1821 to 1850 under the Tao-kuang emperor reached as high as 345. This is an annual average of over
eleven, higher than in the previous reign. In terms of the balance between northern and southern provinces, the Tao-kuang enshrinement pattern was dissimilar to that of the previous reign. The number of enshrinements for the four Lower Yangtze provinces, Kiangsu, Chekiang, Anhwei, and Kiangsi, was eighty-one, which was about a quarter of the total. The number of enshrinements from Honan, Shensi, Chihli, and Shantung, the four northern provinces that produced the most worthies during this period, was 103, about 30 percent of the total. The pattern of eighteenth-century enshrinement had two features that resulted from the central government’s curbing the entrenched power of Chiang-nan local elites: low annual numbers of enshrinements and the relative dominance of candidates from northern provinces. In the early nineteenth century, when the state relaxed this policy, these two features of the government’s enshrinement policy were compromised.

**STATE CONTROL OF PUBLICATION OF LOCAL GAZETTEERS**

The central government under the Ch’ien-lung emperor extended control to another area of local cultural practice closely intertwined with local elites’ interests: the compilation and publication of local gazetteers. Writings on local history, customs, and residents were a medium through which powerful local families could enhance their prestige by having their members’ names, virtues, and achievements recorded. At the same time, they were vehicles through which local people could celebrate the cultural traditions of their community. The change in the production of these materials from the Ch’ien-lung to the Chia-ch’ing and Tao-kuang reigns reflected another aspect of changing relations between the Ch’ing state and local elites.

Private local literature, together with local gazetteers, clashed with state interests on two fronts during the eighteenth century. First, the production of local gazetteers and private local literature by local elites was incompatible with the state agenda of removing public media from the private control of powerful families. Through personal, kinship, and local ties, and sometimes pressure or bribery, those families could have compilers of local gazetteers include the names of unworthy ancestors or give undeserved praise to them in the biographical section. In this respect, controlling local writings paralleled the government’s actions taken on the enshrinement of local worthies. Both were limiting the influence of local elites’ families. Second, during the Ch’ien-lung period Ch‘ing officials came to the realization that local writings were unreliable because they exaggerated and omitted in order to enhance the

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130 Following the classifications of the Ssu-k’u ch’iu-shu, this local literature belongs to the categories of history, biographies, miscellaneous history, geography, literary collections, and individual collections.
reputation of certain families and localities. This prompted continuous state
efforts to expose deviant local ideas and to replace them with ones prescribed
by the state. Ch‘ien-lung and his officials tried to construct a cultural order
in which ultimate authority rested with the emperor. Under this centralized
order, local claims of being autonomous cultural centers were viewed suspi-
ciously by the state and local voices were suppressed. In the early nineteenth
century, when it became apparent that the central state was no longer willing
to intervene in the local cultural arena with the same degree of intensity,
production of writings about local topics rapidly began to enjoy a new vogue.

In 1766, Hsiung Hsüeh-p’eng (d. 1779), the governor of Chekiang
province, submitted a memorial to the Ch‘ien-lung emperor asking for
the implementation of more rigorous controls over compilation of local
gazetteers. Unlike provincial gazetteers presented to the central govern-
ment for inspection, Hsiung argued, prefectural and county gazetteers were
often compiled at the discretion of local officials working with local elites.
Hsiung called this practice “private” (ssu-tzu). Produced at the behest of pre-
fects and magistrates, these gazetteers could have been considered “official”
(kuan). However, to Hsiung the fact that these gazetteers were not presented
for review by the provincial officials or the central government was enough to
call them “private.” Hsiung complained that local officials often called upon
the local elites to finance compilation of the gazetteer, and the elites in return
wanted their personal interests and preferences represented in the gazetteer.
As a consequence, Hsiung charged, local gazetteers had become unreliable
repositories of local information that heaped praise on undeserving men and
hid faults that should have been recorded.

Drawing on a report submitted by Ch‘ien Wei-ch‘eng (d. 1772), a former
educational commissioner of Chekiang, Hsiung gave three specific examples
to substantiate his accusations. The first example concerned a late Ming fig-
ure named Mao I-lu (chin-shih 1604) from Sui-an county in Chekiang, who
was associated with the infamous eunuch faction under Wei Chung-hsien
(1568–1627). Mao was in part responsible for the death of Chou Shun-ch‘ang
(1584–1626), a Tung-lin faction member whose arrest by order of the noto-
rious eunuch leader triggered a mass protest in Soochow. Despite this disreput-
able association, Hsiung reported, the county gazetteer of Mao’s hometown
contained a biography full of embellished descriptions of his political career
and achievements. The second example Hsiung quoted was about a man
from Chia-hsing, also a member of the eunuch faction in late Ming who had
launched attacks on righteous men. Nevertheless, the prefectural gazetteer of

131 Hsiung Hsüeh-p’eng, “Ch‘ing yen ssu-hsiu chih-shu chih li,” in Huang Ch‘ing tsou-i, comp. Ch‘in-
ch‘uan chü-shih (Shanghai, 1995–9) 57, pp. 1a–4a.
Chia-hsing included his biography, which not only erased his alignment with the eunuchs but also claimed that he had resisted the eunuch faction. The third example came from the Hsiao-shan county gazetteer. The gazetteer took a hostile attitude toward a Ming official, Ch'en Ta-shou (chin-shih 1595), who was portrayed as avaricious and cruel. The gazetteer stated that Ch'en was antagonistic toward literati, and always blamed and humiliated literati whenever they were involved in lawsuits with commoners. The gazetteer alleged that Ch'en was not able to swallow food if he had not cashiered several licentiates in that month. In his report to governor Hsiung, Ch'ien Wei-ch'eng pointed to the misinformation in the gazetteer. Ch'en Ta-shou was an education intendant censor of Chekiang during the Wan-li reign, and he had been well known for his fidelity and benevolence, in contrast to his portrayal in the gazetteer. The description of Ch'en in the gazetteer was not only inaccurate, but had inverted right and wrong. On these grounds, Ch'ien had requested that governor Hsiung order the elimination of these parts from the local gazetteers.

Hsiung Hsüeh-p'eng in his memorial presented his own opinion about Ch'en's report. He emphasized that the first two officials were listed in the imperially endorsed Ming shih (Ming history) as members of the "treacherous faction," followers of Wei Chung-hsien. The gazetteers' praise of them was undoubtedly inverting right and wrong. Hsiung reported to the emperor that he had already ordered local officials to delete the offensive passages from the gazetteers. On the issue of Ch'en Ta-shou, governor Hsiung took a more cautious stance as he confessed he did not have enough information about Ch'en, and asked for permission to investigate this matter further.

Hsiung, convinced that there were numerous similar cases in other gazetteers, proposed specific remedies to fix these problems. When a provincial official first came to his post, Hsiung explained, local gazetteers were customarily presented to him to aid in his governing, but they were too voluminous to be checked for accuracy. To resolve this problem, Hsiung suggested that the provincial education commissioners, who bore fewer administrative burdens, should be responsible for reviewing gazetteers. When the education commissioners found offensive sections in the gazetteers, they should eliminate them and annually report the list of deleted sections to the governor-general and the governor, who in turn would submit these reports to the emperor. While these suggestions were directed toward published gazetteers, Hsiung also targeted future gazetteers. Hsiung proposed that whenever local officials planned to recompile an existing gazetteer or to compile a new one, they should first report their plan to their superiors. When the draft gazetteer was compiled, it should be sent to the provincial education commissioner, who would report the result of his review to the emperor. Only after imperial permission was
granted was the local gazetteer to be printed. Hsiung’s proposal also attempted to ban local officials from collecting money from local elites for the expenses of the compilation of a gazetteer. He wanted the officials to bear the expenses themselves. By making gazetteers financially independent from local elites and subject to review by local officials appointed from other provinces, Hsiung believed that the compilers would be free from local pressures, and that then the accuracy of the information would increase.

Hsiung’s memorial was discussed by the Manchu grand secretary Fu-heng (d. 1770) and others, who reported the result to the emperor later in 1766. Fu-heng confirmed Hsiung’s accusation that the gazetteers in question gave unreliable evaluations of two of the late Ming figures. Just as Hsiung had done, Fu-heng cited the Ming shih’s inclusion of these two in the category of the “eunuch faction.” To both Hsiung and Fu-heng, this judgment overrode any assessment expressed in the gazetteers. Fu-heng also reported on his investigation of Ch’en Ta-shou, on whose case Hsiung did not pass judgment. After examining the stele listing of the metropolitan graduates erected at the Directorate of Education, Fu-heng confirmed that Ch’en had become a chin-shih in the Wan-li period, not in the Chia-ching period, as the county gazetteer claimed. This research corroborated a criticism raised by Hsiung. Fu-heng endorsed the governor’s action of removing these inaccurate sections from the gazetteers.

As for the general suggestions made by Hsiung, Fu-heng accepted them in somewhat revised form. For example, Fu-heng had reservations about Hsiung’s claim that provincial education commissioners could verify local gazetteers while they were making regular tours of prefectures, since local conditions would not always permit them the time to review gazetteers. Instead, he tried to make the job more flexible by not restricting officials with a fixed deadline. If problematic parts were found, then the provincial education commissioners were to order local officials to delete or revise them, while the local officials were to report the results to the provincial officials. As for local gazetteers currently being compiled, he agreed with the governor that the drafts should be submitted to the provincial education commissioners for review, and only with their approval could the gazetteers be printed.

Fu-heng, however, did not accept Hsiung’s more radical proposal that the drafts of all future gazetteers be reviewed and endorsed by the emperor before publication, because the sheer number and volume of the gazetteers would overburden the already tired emperor. Another reason that prompted Fu-heng to decline this extensive censorship plan was that a new Ta Ch’ing i-t’ung-chib (Gazetteer of the Great Ch’ing integrated domain) was being compiled, and in

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132 Li-k’o shih-shu (Rites) 617, CL 51/2/18. Hummel, Eminent Chinese of the Ch’ing period, pp. 252–3.
changing roles of local elites

Fu-heng did not see a need to set up a system for extensive pre-publication censorship of all future gazetteers. Fu-heng also rejected Hsiung’s other request, to ban private donations for gazetteer compilation and to oblige local officials to manage the project with their own financial resources. Unlike Hsiung, who worried about interference from local elites, Fu-heng argued that compiling gazetteers originally belonged to the realm of local public affairs, which led him to conclude that the state should not ban voluntary donations by local people.

Although the Ch’ien-lung emperor in his response supported Fu-heng’s report, later developments indicate that the emperor moved in the direction of Hsiung’s more restrictive request that mandated prepublication review of all new gazetteers. The *Ch’in-ting Hsiüeh-cheng ch’üan-shu* (*Imperially authorized compendium of records of education commissioners*), published sometime after 1773, incorporated Fu-heng’s memorial submitted in 1766. Although this entry lists all the important points made by Fu-heng in his original memorial, Fu-heng’s rejection of Hsiung’s demand of prepublication censorship is missing. In the original memorial, Fu-heng divided gazetteers into three types, namely published gazetteers, gazetteers currently being compiled, and future gazetteers. He supported review of the first two types but dismissed the need for review of the third type. Omission of the phrases related to “future gazetteers” in the *Ch’in-ting Hsiüeh-cheng ch’üan-shu* made the term “currently compiled gazetteers” refer to all new gazetteers that would be compiled.

Evidence of the policy of prepublication censorship can be gleaned from local gazetteers compiled after 1766. After this year, local gazetteers having the names of education commissioners as authors of a preface or an “appraisal” are common, almost without exception, until the end of the eighteenth century. The 1768 gazeteer of Wang-chiang county, Anhwei, contains a preface written by the Anhwei education commissioner. It states that a recent imperial decree mandated that education commissioners review past and new gazetteers to correct mistakes. He explained that in compliance with this order, local officials had submitted the draft of the gazeteer to him for review. The 1770 prefectural gazeteer of Lu-an, Shansi, lists the names of the governor and the education commissioner under the heading “appraisal” (*chien-ting*), and the names of administrative and judicial commissioners under a similar category. The 1779 gazetteer *Ch’i-hou fu-chih*, from Anhwei, has a preface.

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133 On the compilation process of the *Ta Ch’ing I-t’ung-chih*, see Ch’iao Chih-chung, “*Ta Ch’ing i-t’ung-chih ti ch’u-hsiu yü fang-chih hsüeh ti hsing-ch’i*,” *Ch’i Lu hsiüeh-k’an* No. 1 (1997), pp. 116–23.
Table 15.2. The number of county and prefectural gazetteers in Chiang-nan and north China produced between 1644 and 1850, by reign

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Chiang-nan province</th>
<th>North China province</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Kiangsu</td>
<td>Chekiang</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shun-chih</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>K’ang-hsi</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>107</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yung-cheng</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ch’ien-lung</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1–30</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>28</td>
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<tr>
<td>31–60</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chia-ch’ing</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tao-kuang</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


by the provincial education commissioner, and also a statement by the prefect that the gazetteer was first submitted to the provincial education commissioner and published only after his review, following the “already established regulations.” In the 1792 Shao-hsing (Chekiang) prefectural gazetteer, the names of the governor-general and the education commissioner are listed under the heading of “appraisal.” The Ch’ang-Chao ho-chih (Combined gazetteer of Ch’ang-shu and Chao-wen counties) of Soochow prefecture, originally published in 1805, is noteworthy as it contains a document submitted to the Kiangsu education commissioner by Ch’ang-shu and Chao-wen county officials in 1793. The document was submitted to report the completion of the draft of the Ch’ang-Chao ho-chih and to request the commissioner’s permission to publish it, which they stated was following the established regulations. These citations make clear that prepublication review of local gazetteers by provincial officials was in effect after Hsiung Hsüeh-p’eng’s memorial.

The effect of prepublication review by provincial authorities after 1766 is indicated in Table 15.2, which provides the numbers of local gazetteers compiled in four provinces in the Chiang-nan region and four provinces in

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137 A few more similar examples from Shantung are the preface by the provincial educational commissioner in Ch‘ien-lung Ch‘i-li fu hsiien-chih (1774; Nanking, 2004), p. 2a; the preface by the provincial educational commissioner in Ch‘ien-lung Tsu-ch‘uan hsiien-chih (1776; Nanking, 2004), p. 3a; the preface by the provincial educational commissioner in Ch‘ien-lung Hsin-lai hsiien-chih (1785; Nanking, 2004), p. 6a.
138 Ch‘ang-Chao ho-chih, 1898 (ed. Ting Tsu-yin), Harvard-Yenching Library, Harvard University, p. 4a.
139 Ch‘ang-Chao ho-chih, p. 4a.
the north from the beginning of the Ch'ing period through the Tao-kuang reign.

During the early Ch'ing period, some provincial officials in the north actively organized the compilation of provincial gazetteers, and many county and prefectural gazetteers were published in order to provide information for the provincial gazetteers. In 1661, the governor of Honan, Chia Han-fu (1606–77), compiled the Honan t'ung-chib (Gazetteer of Honan province), and promoted the compilation of local gazetteers under his jurisdiction.\(^{140}\) Encouraged by the favorable reception of this effort, Chia compiled the provincial gazetteer of Shensi in 1662 when he was transferred to be the governor there.

In 1672, the Ch'ing court decided to compile the Ta Ch'ing i-t'ung chib. An order was issued to compile provincial gazetteers first. The Ta Ch'ing i-t'ung chib was completed in 1743,\(^ {141}\) and during the process, many local gazetteers were compiled all across the empire. Imperial edicts were issued in 1672, 1683, and 1728 to encourage the compilation of local gazetteers.\(^ {142}\) Different regions in the Ch'ing empire responded to these government initiatives differently. More local gazetteers were compiled in the provinces in the north than in the Lower Yangtze region from the beginning of the Ch'ing until the end of the Ch'ien-lung period (see Table 15.2). This discrepancy was due to some extent to the initiatives taken by northern provincial officials in the early Ch'ing, but it also may be an indication that officials in north China responded more actively to imperial initiatives about gazetteer compilation in preparation for publication of the Ta Ch'ing i-t'ung chib.

The number of local gazetteers in the north and in Chiang-nan rapidly declined during the second half of the Ch'ien-lung reign, coinciding with the period when the prepublication scrutiny was in effect. The scrutiny seems to have discouraged local officials and elites from compiling gazetteers for fear of making mistakes. Kiangsu recorded a drop from forty-four gazetteers in the first half of the Ch'ien-lung reign to only nine in the second half. One reason for the decline in Kiangsu is that in addition to more stringent compilation

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\(^{141}\) The Ta Ch'ing i-t'ung chib was revised in later Ch'ien-lung years to reflect the expansion of Ch'ing territory. It was presented to the emperor in 1784 and printed in 1790. See Ch'iao, “Ta Ch'ing i-t'ung-chib ti ch'u-hsiu yü fang-chih-hsüeh ti hsing-ch'i,” p. 117. The third version was completed in 1820 and printed in 1842.

\(^{142}\) Ch'iao, “Ta Ch'ing i-t'ung-chib ti ch'u-hsiu yü fang-chih-hsüeh ti hsing-ch'i,” p. 117. According to Ch'iao's study, 1,560 local gazetteers were compiled during the span of sixty-eight years from 1672 to 1740, the period when the first comprehensive gazetteer was in the making. Then during the span of eighty years from 1741 to 1820, the number dropped to 1,384 despite the longer time span covered. See p. 118 in his article. He does not explain why this happened or how different regions experienced this drop in different ways.
regulations, the fallout from the Ch’ien Ch’ien-i case might have inhibited local compilation projects in the province.

Ch’ien Ch’ien-i (1582–1664) was a late Ming high official from Soochow prefecture who in 1645 led the surrender of Nanking to the invading Ch’ing army and briefly served the Ch’ing dynasty as an official. He was a renowned and widely respected literary leader within the Chiang-nan elite community. The Ch’ien-lung emperor held him in contempt for his disloyalty to the Ming. Moreover, after reading Ch’ien’s poetry collections in 1769 and finding a number of seditious phrases, the emperor immediately ordered a search in Chiang-nan for Ch’ien’s books and their printing blocks.¹⁴³ A decade later, in 1779, Min O-yüan (1720–97), the governor of Anhwei, memorialized the throne to request the removal of the titles of prohibited books and any prose or poetry by the forbidden authors from all the county and prefectural gazetteers in the empire.¹⁴⁴ To this, the Ch’ien-lung emperor replied,

This memorial is correct. For a long time the poems and prose of Ch’ien Ch’ien-i, Ch’ü Ta-chün (1630–96), Chin Pao (1614–80), and others have been prohibited in order to help in teaching the people and to rectify the people’s minds. Current county and prefectural gazetteers of the provinces frequently include their poems and prose under the heading of famous scenic sites and historic remains. They also include their lives, stories, and the titles of their books under the headings of persons and literature. These should be eliminated one by one.¹⁴⁵

With this edict, a campaign began to investigate local gazetteers and search for the titles of proscribed literature and the names of forbidden authors. The rigor with which this measure was executed is evidenced in the text in the Ch’ang-Chao ko-chih, discussed earlier, that includes the 1779 order that mandated the removal from gazetteers of any writings composed by, or facts relating to, Ch’ien Ch’ien-i and others like him.¹⁴⁶ Subsequently, gazetteers of Ch’ang-shu and Chao-wen counties were sent to the local government school for investigation, and offending passages were found and deleted.¹⁴⁷

Table 15.2 shows that important changes were taking place in the early nineteenth century in the production of gazetteers in the north and in Chiang-nan. While the number of gazetteers produced in the four northern provinces dropped from ninety-eight in the second half of the Ch’ien-lung reign to fifty-two under Chia-ch’ing, the number in the four Chiang-nan provinces increased from seventy-one to eighty. In the following Tao-kuang reign, the southern provinces continued to exceed the northern ones in producing gazetteers. In the

¹⁴³ CSL-CL 836, p. 155; 841, p. 239. ¹⁴⁴ CSL-CL 1095, p. 689.
¹⁴⁵ CSL-CL 1095, p. 689.
¹⁴⁶ Ch’ien was classified as a “twice-serving official” by an edict of 1776 that elevated loyal Ming martyrs and condemned officials who served the Ch’ing after serving the Ming dynasty. Hummel, Eminent Chinese of the Ch’ing period, pp. 148–50.
¹⁴⁷ Ch’ang-Chao ko-chih, p. 5b.
early nineteenth century, gazetteer production in Chiang-nan outnumbered that of the north for the first time in the Ch'ing period.

Prepublication official review of local gazetteers continued into the Chia-ch'ing and Tao-kuang periods, but the policy was pursued with less rigor, particularly in the Tao-kuang period, as can be inferred by the growing number of gazetteers that had neither prefaces written by provincial education commissioners nor names of provincial officials as reviewers. The centralized cultural order in which the emperor, and by extension the central government, had the utmost authority to impose certain historical views and cultural judgments was gradually dissolving, and this dissolution brought important changes in publication patterns and scholarly discussions. It also allowed the expression of diverse local voices and brought a renewed interest in local themes. The genre of private local literature also experienced a dramatic efflorescence in early nineteenth-century Chiang-nan, having largely disappeared during the Yung-cheng and Ch'ien-lung periods. Local elites once again began praising their local people, customs, and traditions. In the case of Soochow, elite endeavor to assert local pride also found its expression in shrine-building activity and collective discourse on local heroes. Soochow elites in the early Tao-kuang years built a shrine that commemorated more than 500 former worthies of the city, again vigorously invoking the proud local past and asserting local identity. The selection of these local worthies, unlike those in the regular local-worthy shrine in the government school complex, did not require the endorsement of central government.

Soochow elites at this time also presented a strong localist interpretation of the late Yüan figure Chang Shih-ch'eng (1321–67), a rival of the future Ming founder, Chu Yüan-chang. Their discussions reflected favorable local

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149 For discussions on the process of establishing a centralized order in early Ch'ing, see Huang Chin-hsing, The price of having a sage-emperor: The unity of politics and culture (Singapore, 1987); and Kishimoto Mio, Min Shin kōtai to Kōnan shakai: 17–seiki Chūgoku no chitsujo mondai (Tokyo, 1999), pp. 1–25.

150 Han, “Re-inventing local tradition,” pp. 94–154.


152 In 1765, a similar shrine was built in Soochow at private initiative for the worship of local worthies. The shrine was small in scale as it contained only seven worthies. Sources indicate that it was neglected in the eighteenth century and eventually repaired in 1817, and then again in 1837. See Su-chou fu-chih 1824, 25, p. 33b.
sentiment toward Chang and thus challenged the established evaluations of Chang’s reputation by the Ming and Ch'ing courts.\textsuperscript{153} Literati efforts to emphasize the tradition of their localities and elevate the cultural importance of their hometowns emerged across the Ch'ing empire in the early nineteenth century in areas such as Yangchow, Canton, and Hunan, a phenomenon that was largely missing during the eighteenth century.\textsuperscript{154}

CONCLUSION

The expansion of local elites’ public roles in the first half of the nineteenth century was accompanied by a decline in state control over various local elite practices, such as the enshrinement of local worthies and the compilation of local gazetteers. As the state relied more on elites’ financial and managerial roles in local projects, the bureaucracy at both central and local levels moved in the direction of being more accommodating to local interests. The expansion of their roles in the nineteenth century was a gradual process and not simply a response to the Taiping Rebellion and the postbellum restoration efforts. Local elites’ efforts during and after the Taiping Rebellion deepened rather than initiated the trend of elite activism. Elite activism in the early nineteenth century differed from its later, more fully fledged form in a number of aspects. In the early nineteenth century, local elites’ managerial roles were largely restricted to local public projects for social welfare and infrastructure management, and were not involved in military activities for community defense, as occurred in mid-century.\textsuperscript{155} The public actions of local elites as managers in the early nineteenth century were largely carried out in their local areas and lacked the extra-regional dimension of networks and activities of elite managers in the late nineteenth century.\textsuperscript{156}

Local elites’ political activism intensified over the course of the nineteenth century. The origins of literati political activism in the nineteenth century

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\textsuperscript{155} Kuhn, *Rebellion and its enemies in late imperial China*.

\textsuperscript{156} Rankin, *Elite activism and political transformation in China*, pp. 136–69.
\end{flushleft}
are traceable to the 1820s, but the Chiang-nan literati had already begun to organize themselves more tightly, as shown in the increasingly frequent boycotts of examinations in the Chia-ch’ing period. Confronting signs of escalating social crises, officials such as T’ao Chu, Ho Ch’ang-ling (1785–1848), Liang Chang-chü (1775–1849), and Lin Tse-hsü (1785–1850) organized relief and water projects, and attempted reforms in tribute grain transport and salt administration in the 1820s and 1830s in Kiangsu province. Their reforms were aimed at solving problems in the Chiang-nan area, particularly the extortionate surtax in the tribute grain system that had been plaguing landowners there for generations. The officials involved in the statecraft movement mobilized the support of Chiang-nan literati in pursuing these reforms, and activist Chiang-nan literati in turn pressed those officials to accommodate their demands. The ascendant literati political activism in the early nineteenth century was reminiscent of the vibrant political actions in late Ming and was almost unknown among literati in the eighteenth century, when government measures to suppress such activism under the first four Ch’ing emperors were largely effective. Around 1801 a young Chiang-nan scholar, Pao Shih-ch’en (1775–1855), wrote an essay that ambitiously proposed the establishment of a government organization that could guarantee the political participation of diverse social groups including literati and commoners. Pao’s concern for seeking political opinions from a broader spectrum of social groups was echoed a few decades later by the statecraft scholar Wei Yüan (1794–1858). The proposal by Wei to expand the boundary of political participation to include provincial degree holders reflected an ascendant literati political activism in the first half of the nineteenth century. Pao’s and Wei’s ideas of broadened political participation marked a starting point in a similar line of political persuasions that unfolded in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. The early nineteenth-century local elites’ political activism foreshadowed the more extensive and vigorous political activism in the later period.

157 The discussion about literati political activism in the 1820s and 1830s is based on Polachek’s “Literati groups and literati politics in early nineteenth-century China” and his The inner Opium War.
158 Seunghyun Han, “The punishment of examination riots in the early to mid-Qing period,” Late Imperial China 32 No. 2 (2011), pp. 133–65.
159 William T. Rowe, “Rewriting the Qing constitution: Bao Shichen’s ‘On wealth’ (Shuochu),” T’oung Pao 98 Nos. 1–3 (2012), pp. 210–11.


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730


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GLOSSARY–INDEX

Note: Page references followed by 'n' denote footnotes. Figures are indicated by 'fig'; tables by 'tab' and maps by 'map'.

Abagha Mongols, 140
aborigines (Taiwan), competition between settlers and, 94–9; and corvée labor service, 84, 91–3; education, 94; plains aborigine militia, 99; revolts by, 91–3; taxation of, 82–4, 94; and tribal land ownership, 95–9
Abunai, 122
administration, province–prefecture–county system, 8. See also governors of provinces; Grand Council; Li-fan yüan; provincial administration administration commissioners, 23–4, 31–5
Ai 契, Han emperor (r. 6–1 BCE), 333
Ai Yüan-cheng 艾元徵, 37–8
aisilakobar fan (Man., assistant director in Li-fan yüan), 136
Aisin Gioro 愛新覺羅 clan, 111–14, 117, 140–1
Alchemy, see female alchemy; inner alchemy
Aleni, Giulio, 353–4
all under heaven, see t’ien-hsia
Almeida, Sebastián d’, 340–1
Altai Mountains, 142
Altan Khan, 117
Altar of Heaven (T’ien-t'an), 418
Altyshahr, 134–5
Amaterasu 天照, 237
amban (Man. Ch’ing resident officials), 118, 122, 130, 139
Amin, 151
Amiot, Jean-Joseph, 362
Amoy 嘉興, 79, 80, 88, 102, 269, 274–6, 280–1
Amur River 黑龍江 (Hei-lung chiang), 166
Amursana, 132–3
an 案 (dossier), 482, 483
An Lu-shan 安祿山, 17n
an-ch’a shib 按察使 (provincial judge, surveillance commissioner), 31
An-ch’ing 安慶, 18
An-nan tu-t’ung shih 安南都統使
(Commissioner of Annan), 201
An-p’ing 安平, 88
ancestral tablets, 352, 359, 365. See also Chinese rites controversy
Anhwei 安徽 province, 20, 34–5, 578, 676tab, 691
Annan 安南, 10–11, 198, 201. See also Dai Viet
annual payments, see sui-pi (K. sep’ye)

Anqua, 282

Anson, George, 299

Aokhan Mongols, 120

Arai Hakuseki 新井白石, 234, 249

art and artists, see Castiglione, Giuseppe; painting

Aru Khorchin Mongols, 120

Asada Sōhaku 浅田宗伯, 251–2

Asami Keisai 浅見綱斎, 237–8, 241

Ashikaga 足利 era (1338–1573), 234, 236

Ashikaga Academy (J. Ashikaga gakkō 足利學校), 251, 255–6, 257–61

astrology and astromancy, 184–6, 386, 387

Astronomia Europaea, 340

astronomy, ban on private practice of, 184–6, 386, 387; compatibility of Chinese and Western traditions, 384–91, 392; Copernican system, 394–5, 522; K’ang-hsi emperor and, 386, 387; sky’s unfathomable nature, 504. See also Bureau of Astronomy; calendars and calendrical learning;

Royal Bureau of Astronomy

Augustinians, 345, 350

ayimagb (Mon. a grouping of Mongol khoshun), 128–30

Ayudhaya, 210–11

Bach Viet (Hundred Yüeh, Ch. Pai Yüeh 百越), 225

Bangkok, 223, 225, 227

banners (ch’i 旗), see banner system; Eight Banner system; Han-ch’in bannermen; Inner Mongolia; Leagues of Mongol Banners; Manchu bannermen; Mongol bannermen; Red Banner

banner system, (Mon. khoshun), Mongol, 119–23, 129; Sinkiang, 134–5

barbarian, (i, i-ti, yeb-jeon), 112–17, 146, 237, 616, 628, 646

Barin Mongols, 120

Barkul, 132

Batavia (Jakarta), 205, 211–12, 267, 268, 273, 275, 276, 277, 299, 300–7

Batur Hongtayiji (r. 1635–53), 124, 125–6

Baykov, F. I., 270

Beale, Daniel, 317

beg [Ar. local Muslim official], 134–5

beile [Man. Jurchen aristocrat], 115–16

beise [Man. Jurchen aristocrat], 115–16

benevolence halls, 677

Bengal, 273, 291–3, 295–6, 309, 327

Benoist, Michel, 394

Bien-Hoa, 212

Big Dipper, 420

Binh-Duong, 228

Birthday of emperor, 147, 157

bka’-blon [Tib. local ministers], 131

Bohea (Wu-i 武夷) tea, 286–9

book burning, 642–3

book censorship, see censorship; literary inquisitions

book collectors and booksellers, 183–4, 642, 648

book exports and imports, 183–4, 240

Book of change (I 易, Chou i 周易, or I ching 易經), 347, 355–6, 393, 502–3, 537, 560, 561, 599, 603

Book of documents (Shu, or Shu ching 書經), 502–3, 537, 551, 577, 603–4

Book of odes (Shih, or Shih ching 詩經), 502–3, 537

Book of rites (Li chi 禮記), 352, 464, 557

Bort, Balthasar, 269

Boshoghtu Khan, see Galdan

Bouvet, Joachim, 342, 346–7, 353–4, 355–6

Boym, Michael, 330

Brah, Tycho, 375

broad learning (po bsüeb), criticism of, 468, 496–7; and Ku Yen-wu, 530, 531n, 545, 556–8; as term, 528n; and Wang Fu-chih, 567–9
brotherhoods, 105, 106, 109
Buddhism, Central Buddhist Registry, 424–5; Japan, 235–7, 241; Mongolia, 126, 127–8, 137; status of clerics, 422, 426–7; Tibet, 125; Vietnam, 213–14, 218–19. See also Ch’an Buddhism; Mahayana Buddhism
Buddhist–Taoist clerics (seng-tao), 422
Buglio, Ludovico, 334
burn 文 (J. classical literacy), 244
burnjin 文人 (J. men of letters), 241–6
bunka 文化 (J. literary culture), 244
burnri 文理 (J. composition), 242
Bureau for Cherishing Those Who Come from Distant Places (jou-yüan ssu 柔遠司), 137
Bureau for Reception of Guests (Pin-k’o ssu 賓客司), 136–7
Bureau for Rewards for Meritorious Service (Lu-hsiün ssu 錫勳司), 136
Bureau of Astronomy, 154, 329–30, 335, 397. See also Ch’iu-t’ien chien
Bureau of Mongol Affairs (Meng-ku ya-men 蒙古衙門), 135
Bureau of Punishments (Li-hsiün ssu 理刑司), 137
bureaucracy, see governors of provinces; provincial administration
Burni, 122
Caballero, Antonio de Santa Maria, 336, 337
calendars and calendrical learning, calendar controversy (1664), 154, 157, 372, 378–84; calendrical system, 184–6; compatibility of Chinese and Western traditions, 384–91, 392; insertion of intercalary months, 376–7; Jesuits’ role in calendar reform, 335, 374–9, 382; Korea, 176, 184–6, 190–1; Mei Wen-ting on, 384–6; reform of Ming calendar, 373–8; role of Ch’ing emperors (summary), 397–8; Schall’s calendar-making, 335; symbolic importance of calendar; use of “Western methods,” 378, 379, 381, 382–3
calligraphy, 168
canonization, 417, 433, 435–6
cannons, 329, 338
Canton 廣州 (Kuang-chou), 281–3, 287–8, 292, 303–11, 358–9, 700
Canton Conference, 336–7
Canton system, 274, 327
Cao-Bang, 201
cardinal virtues (san-kang), 616, 618, 644–7
cartels, see hong (bang) merchant firms
Casteel Zeelandia, 266
Castiglione, Giuseppe (Lang Shih-ning 郎世寧), 302, 363
Catholic Church, see Roman Catholic Church
causality, and coherence (li), 508–9, 537; and cosmic forces (tao), 561, 564–6; and epidemics, 405–7; and seminal force (chi), 517–21; so-i-jiang as, 396, 507, 519, 564
Censorate (Tu-ch’a yüan 都察院), 139
censorship, categories of offense, 626–7, 626–30; of drama and opera scripts, 625, 636; effect on publishing, 623; of gazetteers, 623–5, 691–9; limitations to, 647–8; of painting and calligraphy, 625; of plaques, tablets, and steles, 625–6; prominence in Ch’ing era, 12–14, 67, 572, 603–7; and revision of offensive works, 626–30; seizing of suspect books as, 620–3; self-censorship, 634
Central Buddhist Registry (Seng-lu ssu), 424–5
Central Taoist Registry (Tao-lu ssu), 424
cha-men 梗門, 180, 182
Ch’a Ssu-t’ing 查嗣庭, 613
c’i-a-chuang 茶莊 (tea processors), 288
Chang Chi

Chakri dynasty (1782–)

Chang Heavenly Master, 416

Chang P’eng-ko 343

Chang San-feng 46, 598

Ch’ang-chou 343

Chang T’ing-lu 張廷璐, 54

Chang T’ing-yü 張廷玉, 54, 67, 587–8, 656–9

Chang Tsai 張載, 519, 547–8, 560–2, 563–4, 568

Chang Ts’un-i 張存義, 431

Chang Ying 張英, 352–3

Chang Yü-lung 張應京, 431

Chang Yü-shu 張玉書, 600

Chang-chou 漳州, 103, 105

Chang-hua 彰化, 80, 90, 91, 92, 97, 100, 106–7

Chang-i ssu 掌儀司 (Office of Palace Ceremonial), 418, 419

Ch’ang-chao ho-chih 常昭合志

(Combined gazetteer of Ch’ang-shu and Chao-wen counties), 669, 698

Ch’ang-chou 常州, 85, 669

Ch’ang-lo 長樂, 51

Ch’ang-lu 長蘆, 51

Ch’ang-pai shan 長白山 (Long White Mountain), 161

Ch’ang-sha 長沙, 66

Ch’ang-shu 常熟, 696, 698

Chao Chih-huan 趙之桓, 48–51

Chao Hung-hsieh 趙宏燮, 44, 48

Chao Hsüeh-min 趙學敏, 399

Chao 趙 imperial family of the Sung dynasty, 4–5

Chao Kao-i chi 趙高邑集 (Collected writings of Chao Nan-hsien), 641

Chao T’o 趙佗, 197

Chao Yü-shih 趙與時, 521

Chao-wen 昭文, 696

Chao-fu Chiang-nan 招撫江南 (pacificator of Chiang-nan), 608

Chao-wen counties, 645

Chao-wen (hand-copied edition), 645
Ch'en Chi-ju
Ch'en Ch'ueh
Ch'en Hao
Ch'en Chung-yuan
Chen-ch'i t'ang shu-mu
Ch'en Wen-shu
Chen Tzu
Chen T'uan
Chen T'ing-ching
Chen Ta-shou
Chen-wu
Chen-ch'i 賑紀 (Record of relief efforts), 68
Ch'en-jen 真人 (true man), 430
Chen-tung 鎮董 (market town managers), 678
Ch'eng 城 (New Year's Day) K.
Ch'eng-te 正德 (perfect learning), 499, 644
Ch'eng-hsiao 正心 (rectifying the heart), 467
Ch'eng-hsien 正史 (standard history), 574
Ch'eng-hsiao 正朔 (the first day of the new year and first day of each month), 389
Ch'eng-t'ung 正統 (correct transmission), 472
Ch'eng-hsiao pu-cheng shih 承宣布政使 (provincial administration commissioner), 17–18
Ch'eng-huang 城隍 (city god), 415, 435
Ch'eng-huang miao 城隍廟 (city god temples), 421, 422
Ch'eng-te 承德, 319, 349, 350
Ch'eng-t'ien 承天, 18
Ch'eng-tu 成都, 367–8, 442
Chi Tseng-yün 彼曾筠, 52
Chi Yuan 纪昀, 188
Chi-an 吉安, 516
Chi-chi-p’u 集集埔, 108
Chi-ch’ing 吉慶, 73
Chi-ho yu-an-pen 幾何原本 (Elements of geometry), 192–3
chi-hsi 極西 (far West), 387
chi-k’ao 積考 (cumulative examinations), 516
chi-ku yu-wen 稽古右文 (study antiquity to aid our culture), 620
Chi-kung 濟公, 451
Chi-yin khang-mu 濟陰經目 (To benefit yin: A comprehensive guide), 404
cb’i 氣 (particles, the stuff of which everything in heaven-and-earth is constituted), 405, 483–6, 487, 489–90, 518–21
cb’i 器 (physical artifacts; particular things), 516–17
Ch’i-feng-o 奇豐額, 75tab
Chia Han-fu 賈漢符, 697
Chia K’uei 賈逵, 546
Chia-ching 嘉靖 era (1522–66), enshriment during, 548; policy on name tablets and steles, 352, 625–6
Chia-ch’ing 嘉慶 (r. 1796–1820) emperor, anti-Christian stance, 367–8, 370; and naming of Vietnam, 197; policy on local project management, 668–9
Chia-ch’ing 嘉慶 era (1796–1820), 366–8
Chia-hsing 嘉興, 693
cbia-tszu 甲子 (first in the sequence of sixty counting terms), 333
Chiang Ch’en-ying 姜宸英, 584
Chiang Yu-p’u 蔣與蒲, 449
Chiang Yung 江永, 392–4
Chiang, three brothers 蔣 [immortals], 435
cbianhsieh 講學 (discourses on learning), 462, 483, 496
Chiang-nan 江南, 20, 33, 608, 639, 651, 660, 678
Chiang-nan t’ung-chih 江南通志 (Comprehensive gazetteer of Chiang-nan), 624
Chiang-ning 江寧, 33
Chiang-yin 江陰, 624
cbiao 酋 (a grand communal ritual), 421, 422
Chiao Lu 焦祿, 630
cbiao-chu 教主 (cultural-religious authority), 616
Chiao-yao hsi lun 教要序論 (An introduction of doctrinal essentials), 370
cbieb 戒 (precepts), 438
cbieb-ch’i 節氣 (fortnightly periods), 376–7
cbieb-fu 節婦 (chaste women), 653
cbieb-tu shih 節度使 (military commissioner, in T’ang), 16
chien hsiaok tsai wai chih ch’ueh 简選在外之第 (posts for which selection was made outside the capital), 57
Chien-chou Jurchens 建州女真, 112–17, 118, 147–50, 636. See also Jurchens
Chien-chou tso wei 建州左衛 (Chien-chou Left Guard), 149
Chien-chou wei 建州衛 (Chien-chou Guard), 112–14, 149
Chien-ning 建寧, 301
chien-sheng 監生 (lower examination degree, and degree holder), 21
cbien-ting 鑑定 (appraisal), 695
Chien-wen 建文 reign (1398–1402), 583
Ch’ien Ch’eng-chih 錢澄之, 624
Ch’ien Ch’ien-i 錢謙益, 623–5, 629, 698
Ch’ien Su-yüeh 錢肅樂, 642
Ch’ien Ta-hsin 錢大昕, 392–4, 396
Ch’ien Wei-ch’eng 錢維城, 692
Ch’ien-ch’ing Gate 乾清門, 302
cb’ien-ch’iu 千秋 (birthday for the heir apparent) K. cb’ôngch’u, 147
Ch‘ien-lung 乾隆 emperor, attitude towards Christianity, 362–4; campaign against Dzungars by, 132–3, 134; central control over public works, 660–4; and Confucian ideas, 615–16, 644–6; core goals, 644–6; enshrinement policy, 687, 689; and Lin Shuang-wen rebellion, 107–8, 110; on loyalty and imperial power, 616–18, 646–7; motives for literary inquisitions, 615–18; recognizing and rewarding local elite contributions, 655–9, 674, 680; and self-censorship, 635; sixtieth jubilee, 324; and taxation reform in Taiwan, 94; and tribute ceremonials, 320–4; trust in Manchu officials by, 70–2

Ch‘ien-lung 乾隆 era (1736–95), activist governors, 63–8; appointment of Manchus as governors, 70–2; centralization of power, 68, 76; control over local public works, 660–4; defeat by Tay-son forces, 225; influence of Ho-shen, 72–3; literary inquisitions, 607, 609, 612, 615–18, 634, 639, 640; reaction to the Yung-chen order, 59–62; regulating and rewarding local contributions, 656–9; system of salary fines, 74–5

chib 知 (knowing), 460, 464, 488
chib 質 (material), 519, 520–1, 524
chib 志 (purpose), 562
chib 志 (gazetteer), 6. See also gazetteers
chib 止 (to stop, rest), 613
chib chib 致知 (extending knowledge), 493, 568–9
chib liang chib 致良知 (extending one’s innate knowledge of the good), 463, 465, 466, 494
chib tao 知道 (knowing a way), 546
chib ts’i 質測 (material investigations), 518, 569
chib-ch’ing 至情 (perfect expression of sentiment), 481
chib-chou 知州 (department magistrate), 664
chib-fu 知府 (prefect), 664
chib-bui shib 指揮使 (commander), 114
chib-li 至理 (ultimate patterns; perfected order), 524, 562–3
chib-li 直隸 (directly administered administrative units, as independent departments or sub-prefectures), 55
Chib-pu-tsu-chai ts‘ung-shu 知足齊叢書 (Collectanea from the Hall of knowing one’s deficiencies), 260, 261, 640–1
chib-shan 至善 (highest good), 465
chib-tao 治道 (ways of governing), 546, 551, 565
chib-t‘ung 治統 (tradition of good governance), 597
Chihli 直隸 province, 20, 33, 44, 370, 505, 624, 666, 676tab, 677, 691
Ch‘ih Shao 鄭紹, 543
Ch‘ib-chou fu-chih 池州府志 (Gazetteer of Ch‘ib-chou prefecture), 695
chin 今 (the present), 528
chin 斤 [unit of weight, approx. 1.3 lbs], 179
Chin 金 dynasty (1115–1234), 116, 625
Chin 金 dynasty (1616–35) [Man. amaga aisin gurun], 111
Chin chung-hsing shu 晉中興書 (On the Chin restoration), 543
Chin Fu 靖輔, 41, 42–3, 44
Chin Nung 金農, 608n
Chin Pao 金堡, 623–5, 629
Chin ssu lu 近思錄 (Reflections on things at hand), 598
chin ying hsing 進鷹行 (embassy for presenting falcons) K. chin‘ying baeng, 160
Chin-chou 錦州, 626
chin-bo 進賀 (presenting congratulations), 272
Chin-hua 金華, 625–6
Chin-k'ai hsiih-shih 金蓋心燈 (Lamp for the heart from Chin-k'ai Mountain), 438
Chin-k'ai, Mount 金蓋山, 448, 453
Chin-k'e'i yao-lüeh 金匾要略 (Essentials of the golden casket), 252, 253–4
Chin-kung 進貢 (presenting tribute), 272
Chin-shih 進士 (presented scholar, metropolitan graduate); named instances, 48, 60, 63, 64, 70, 345, 357, 397, 404, 475, 515, 530, 554, 574–7, 578, 580, 587, 627, 635, 641–4, 658, 693, 694
Chin-wen 今文 (“modern” style of script), 261
Ch'iin 勤 (diligence), 49
Ch'ing 秦 dynasty (221–206 BCE), 3, 7, 552
Ch'ing Ch'eng-en 秦承恩, 615
Ch'ing min 親民 (having a kin feeling for the commoners), 510
Ch'ing-t'ien chien 欽天監 (Bureau of Astronomy), 154
Ch'ing-t'ien chien tsou-chun yin-tao 欽天監奏准印造時憲曆日 (Ch'ing-t'ien chien calendar published by the Bureau of Astronomy with imperial authorization), 382–3
Ch'ing-t'ien chieh 由進 (by imperial order), 600
Ch'ing-t'ien shueh-cheng ch'üan-shu 欽定學政全書 (Imperially authorized compendium of records of education commissioners), 695
Ch'ing-t'ien Ming shih 欽定明史 (Imperially ordered Ming history), 588

Chinatown (J. Tókan 於讓), 235
Chinese origins of Western learning (hsiih-hsiu chung-yuan), 192–3, 388–91, 392
Chinese classical learning (Tokugawa Japan), 240–9; interest in “ancient learning,” 254; and medical knowledge, 242, 243, 251–4; reception in China of Japanese scholarship, 258, 260; reinterpretation of Confucian texts, 254–63; role of teachers, 242, 244–6; and sinophobia, 247–9; teaching methods, 246, 247; and upward mobility, 241–6, 252; use of kanbun, 251–4. See also Ashikaga Academy
Chinese medical treatises, 252–4
Ching 經 (classics, scriptures), 394, 448
Ching 敬 (respect), 495
Ching T'ien 敬天 (Honor Heaven), 338
Ching i k'ao 經義考 (Examination of interpretations of the classics), 602
Ching River 漯河, 615
Ching shu 經術 (scholarship on the classics), 546
Ching ts'ui 精粹 (pure essences), 564
Ching-ming 淨明 (Pure Brightness), 447
Ching-mo 經脈 (meridians and channels), 404
Ching-piao 胜表 (memorial arch), 671–2
Ching-t'ai 景泰 reign (1450–1456), 583
Ching-te-ch' en 景德鎮, 289
Ching-t'ien 井田 (well-field), 663
Ch'ing 情 (sentiments; emotions), 458, 481, 562
Ch'ing 情 (honesty), 49
Ch'ing 清 dynasty (1644–1911), as categorically distinctive, 9–10; as an integrated domain, 6–15; interpretations of, 154; and Mongol imperial legacy, 125; proclamation of, 152
Ch'ing code (Ta-Ch'ing lü-lí), 140, 230, 249, 302, 315
Ch'ing jen 清人 (men of Ch'ing), 459
Ch'ing shih 清史 (History of the Ch'ing), 34
Ch'ing shih 清師 (Ch'ing troops), 628
Ch'ing-chiang 清江, 66
Ch'ing-kui 清規 (rules for Taoist clergy), 422
Ch'ing-tai wen-tzu-yü tang 清代文字獄 檔 (Archives of literary inquisition cases in the Ch'ing period) 609–10
Ch'ing-wei ling-pao 清微靈寶 [a category of Taoist priests], 416, 423, 429
Ch'ing-yüan 青原 mountain, 516
Ch'inggis Khan, 5, 117, 118–19, 125
Ch'inggisid legitimacy, 117, 122, 125

Chingünjav Rebellion, 132–3
Chishiwu 濟世武, 45
Chiu ch'ing 九州 (Nine Chief Ministers), 687
Chiu chou chib wai wei chib fan kuo 九州 之外謂之藩國 (“What is outside the nine divisions are called outer countries’), 124
Chiu pen 舊本 (old books), 551
Chiu tsang 九賁 (nine visceral systems), 410
Chiu Ch'ang-ch'un 丘長春, 437
Chiu Ch'u-chि 丘處機, a.k.a Ch'i'u Ch'ang-ch'un, 437
Ch'iung li 究理 (fathoming coherence), 404, 489, 493, 494, 495, 496, 500, 503–4, 518, 558–69, 570
Cho Ch'ang-ling 卓長齡, 610
Cho-shui River 濟水 River, 108
Choe M'yǒng-gil 崔鳴吉, 152
Choe Sŏk-ch'oéng 崔錫鼎, 191
Ch'oku 章句 (J. phrases and sentences), 242
Ch'onggwun (official envoys), 174
Chönin 町人 (J. merchants, townspeople), 341
Choroo Mongols, 132
Chosŏn 朝鮮 dynasty (1392–1910), 10–11, 146. See also Korea
Chou 州 (sub-prefecture), 7–8
Chou 縣, last ruler of the Shang dynasty, 549
Chou 周 era (1045–256 BCE), 2

Chou Hsüeh-chien 周學健, 364, 544
Chou Huang 周煌, 364
Chou i 周易, see Book of change
Chou i che chung 周易折中 (Balanced annotations on the Book of change), 599
Chou i wai chuan 周易外傳 (An outsider commentary on the Book of change), 561
Chou I-ning 周以寧, 635
Chou li 周禮 (Chou rituals), 124
Chou Shun-ch'ang 周順昌, 692
Chou Tun-i 周敦頤, 470, 547–8
Chou-pi 周髀 (The gnomon of Chou), 389
Chou-shan 周山 (Chusan), 280
Ch'ou-hui 抽燬 (expurgated), 609
Ch'ou-jen 僕人 (astronomers and mathematicians), 391
Ch'ou-jen chuan 僕人傳 (Biographies of astronomers and mathematicians), 391, 392
Chu Ch'ang-tso 朱昌祚, 29
Chu Chen-heng 朱震亨, 253
Chu Chih-chün 朱之俊, 637
Chu Ch'uit 楊家, in Hopei, 498
Chu Fang-tan 朱方旦, 612
Chu Feng-ying 朱鳳英, 658
Chu Hsi 朱熹, Chang Lü-hsiang on, 490–2; Ch'en Ch'üeh on, 464–8; on coherence (li), 386, 393, 396, 464; on coherence–matter relationship, 483–6, 596–7, 615; on human nature, 487–90; influence in Japan, 236, 238, 249, 253, 254, 260; influence in Korea, 167; Ku Yen-wu on, 534–8; Li Kuang-ti on, 596–9; Li Kung on, 508–9; Li Yung on, 495–7; Lu Shih-i on, 492–4; on moral awareness, 487–90, 491–3; official endorsement of, 497, 511, 502–9; on status of numbers (shu), 386, 535; Sun Ch'i-feng on, 473–4; Yen Yuan on, 498–505
Chu I-kuei 朱一貴 rebellion, 86–8, 104–5
Chu I-tsun 朱彝尊, 581–2, 602
Chu 朱 imperial family of the Ming dynasty, 4–5, 554, 559
Chu Kuo-chen 朱國楨, 608–9
Chu Kuo-chih 朱國治, 34
Chu Shun-shui 朱舜水, 238–9
Chu zu ch‘üan shu 朱子全書
(Comprehensive compendium of Master Chu’s sayings and writings), 597
Chu Yüan 祝澐, 462
Chu Yüan-chang 朱元璋 (Ming emperor, r. 1368–98), 17
chu-ch‘iḥ 住持 (temple manager), 446
chu-ch‘ing 主敬 (primacy of showing respect), 466
chu-ju 諸儒 (the “various Confucians”), 483, 537
chu-ts‘at 主宰 (directing power), 486
Ch‘ü Shih-ssu 翟式耜, 330
Ch‘ü Ta-ch‘ün 楚大宗, 613, 623–5, 629
Ch‘u tz‘u 楚辭 (Songs of Ch‘u), 525
chü-jen 舉人 (provincial degree, and degree holders), 472, 559, 663
chü-ju 拘儒 (obstinate Confucians), 537
ch‘ua (lord), 202
chuan-bang 専行 (exclusive guild), 283
chuan-yen 專言 (specialized modes of speaking), 523–4
ch‘ian 卷 (chapters, slim volumes), 183
ch‘uan-chu 捐助 (contributions), 653
ch‘uan-na 捐納 (direct purchase of offices), 653
ch‘uan hsi lu 傳習錄 (records of traditions about practices), 503
Ch‘üan-chen 全真, 416–17, 436–43
Ch‘üan-chou 泉州, 85, 103, 105
ch‘üan-b‘u 全燬 (completely destroy), 609
Chuang Ta-t‘ien 莊大田, 107–8
Chuang T‘ing-lung 莊廷鑾, 608–9, 612, 614, 635
Chuang Yu-kung 莊有恭, 662
Chuang tzu 莊子, 497, 537, 539
Chuang-mu 壯繆 (Strong and Respectful), see Kuan Yü
Chuang-tzu 莊子 (The Chuang-tzu), 497, 543
chuang-yüan 状元 (top-ranked degree holder in each metropolitan examination), 630
Chu–lo 覺羅 branch of the imperial lineage, 71
Chüeh-lo lang-kan 覺羅琅玕, 618
Chügoku ben 中國辨 (J. “Disputations on the Central Realm”), 237–8
Chügoku ronshū 中國論集 (J. “Collected arguments about the Central Realm”), 237–8
Chun Hae-jong 全海宗, 153
Chün-chi-ch‘u 軍機處, see Grand Council
Chün-chi ta-ch‘en 軍機處大臣, see grand councilor
Chün-chi chang-ch‘ing 軍機章京, see Grand Council clerk
ch‘ün-tzu 君子 (noble man, honored men, gentlemen), 500, 537, 589
Ch‘un-ch‘i 春秋 (Spring and autumn annals), 502–3, 537
Ch‘un-shu chih-yao 羣書治要 (Selections on the essentials of rulership, J. Gunsho chiyō), 261
Ch‘un-yang kung 純陽宮 (Palace of Purified Yang), 452, 453
chung 中 (Chinese; central), 393
chung 忠 (loyalty to one’s dynasty), 617–18
Chung Hsing 鍾惺, 629
chung i 忠義 (loyalty and righteousness), 578, 617
Chung-i 忠義 (Loyal and Righteous), see Kuan Yü
chung kuo 中國 (the central country), 387, 468, 548, 560, 568
chung tao 中道 (The Middle Way), 612
chung t‘u 中土 (middle land), 389
Chung-kuo 中國 (Middle Kingdom) K.
Chungguk, 147
Chung-ni 仲尼 (Confucius), 473, 547
Chung-yin 鐘音, 620
Chung-yung 中庸, see Doctrine of the mean ch’ung 衡 (thoroughfare), 57
Ch’ung-chen 崇禎 era (1628–44), 608–9
Ch’ung-chen 崇禎 emperor, 168, 329, 375, 378
Ch’ung-chen li-shu 崇禎曆書 (Calendrical treatises of the Ch’ung-chen reign), 382–3
Ch’ung-hsiu An-hui t’ung chih Ch’ung-hsiu An-hui t’ung chih 重修安徽通覲 (Revised comprehensive gazetteer of Anhwei), 35
Ch’ung-te 崇德 era (1637–43), 138, 159
Chunggang River 中江 [Ch.
Chung-chiang], 178
circuit intendant (tiao-t’ai 道臺), 55
city god, see ch’ieng-huang
civil service, see governors of provinces;
Grand Council; Li-fan-yüan;
provincial administration
Classic on being filial (Hsiao ching 孝經), 259–61
clergy, see Jesuits; missionaries; Roman Catholic Church; tao-shih; Taoism
cohong (kung-hang 公行, publicly controlled merchant firms), 307
coins and currency, 217, 221, 224
commerce, see trade
commoners, 652–3, 681. See also chin-min, heimin, juuën
companies (niru, Ch. tso-ling 佐領)
[Manchu and Mongol military units], 118
Confucianism, 1680s debate on, 592–9;
Buddhist and Taoist accretions, 455–6, 499; and Ch’ien-lung emperor, 615–16, 644–6;
compatibility with Christian principles, 332–3; in Sung era,
547–8; in Tokugawa Japan, 254–63;
See also Analects; Ch’eng-Chu learning;
Chu Hsi; Lu Hsiang-shan; Sung learning; Wang Yang-ming
Confucians (ju 菽), 463, 468, 471, 493–4, 495, 500, 510, 595
Confucius 孔夫子, on “broad learning”, 528n, 557, 567; Catholics on ritual veneration of, 344, 348; on learning and practicing, 460, 501, 502–3, 568–9; on music, 557; and transmission of classical texts, 547; on “unity threading”, 536. See also Analects; Great Learning
Confucius Sinarum philosophus, 346
congou (kung-fu 工夫) tea, 289
Congregatio de Propaganda Fide, see Propaganda
conquest elites, 9–10
Consoo (kung-so 公所) Fund, or “guild hall” fund, 310
consular relations, see diplomatic and consular relations
Copernicus, Nicolaus, 394–5, 522
copper, as coinage and cash, 217, 224, 298, 545; mining of, 221; trade in, 214–15, 234–6, 277
corréé labor, 84, 91, 216, 423
Council of Ministers (Tib. bka-shags), 131
“country trade”, 293, 295, 310, 311–12, 327
county (hsien 縣), 56, 552, 649
Couplet, Philippe, 342, 346
Court of Colonial Affairs, see Li-fan yüan
Court of Imperial Sacrifices (T’ai-ch’ang ssu), 418
Court of Judicial Review (Ta-li ssu), 139
Cruz, Gaspar da, 201
Crystal rosary, 125
cults, 205, 213, 218, 421, 422, 444–7, 449–50, 452–3
Cult of the Holy Mothers, 218

cultural practice (wen 文), 557

Daghur Mongols, 134

Dai Mei ritsurei yakugi 大明律例訳義
(J. Translation of the Great Ming code),
249–50

Dai Nam (Great South), 197

Dai Viet, Chinese immigrants, 212;

debasement of currency, 221, 224; as
divided realm, 201–2, 204–5; early
history, 198–201; Nguyen regime,
210–19, 222–5; Nguyen–Trinh
rivalry, 200–10; religion, 218–19;
role of literati, 221–2; socioeconomic
strains, 219, 226; Tay-son revolt,
224–6; trade and commerce, 207–8,
209, 211, 214–15, 217; tributary
status, 10–11, 217; Trinh regime,
215, 217–22. See also Dong-Khin;
Thuan-Quang

Daigaku wakumon 大學或問 (J. Questions
on the Great learning), 236

daimyo (regional ruler, J. daimyo 大名),
249

Dalai Lama, 117, 125, 126–7, 130

Dang Ngoai (The Outer Realm), 206

Dang Trong (The Inner Realm), 206

Danish East India Company, 284

Dao Noi (Inner Religion), 218

Dartsedo, 46

Dawachi (r. 1753–5), 132–3

Dayan Khan (r. 1480–1517?), 117

Dazai Shundai 太宰春台, 246, 247,
256, 259–61

De bello Tartarico in Sinis historia,
346

Dge-lugs-pa sect, 117

dike maintenance, 52–4, 56, 65, 66,
660, 667

dinh (military garrison), 212, 213

diplomatic and consular relations,
316–18, 349. See also tribute
embassies

Directorate of Education (Kuo-tzu chien
國子監), 694
disaster relief, 669
discourses on learning (chiang hsüeh 講
學), 462, 483, 496
“dispatching heavenly taxes”, 445
doctors, lack of certification and
regulation, 398–9; medical learning,
400–1; patient–physician relations,
407–11; practitioner hierarchy,
401–3

Doctrine of the mean (Chung-yung 中庸),
501, 504, 538

Dolom Nor Convention, 128

Dominicans, 300, 332, 334, 336–7,
340–1, 364

Dong-Kinh 東京 (Tonkin, Ch.
Tung-ching), 197

Dong-Kinh scholars, 200, 205, 229,
230, 232

Dörbet (Dörbed) Mongols, 132

Dorgon 多爾袞 (To-erh-kun), 26,
27–47, 329–30
drought, see famine relief
drugs, see opium

Duke of Chou (Chou kung 周公), 499,
502

Dutch East India Company, 267–73,
284, 291–3, 311

Dutch learning, 240
dynastic histories, Ch’ing dynasty, 34;
Ming dynasty, 172, 574, 579–89,
635–7; Sung dynasty, 595
dynasty, as concept, 1–2

Dzunghar Mongols, 117, 118, 124,
126–7, 130–4. See also Galdan

earth god (t’u-ti kung), 435
earthquakes, 334, 381

East India Company (British), 275, 290,
291–3, 294, 296, 303, 309, 312, 315

East India Company (Danish), 284

East India Company (Dutch), see Dutch
East India Company
East India Company (Swedish), 284
East India Company (British), see English East India Company
Edict of Toleration, 343, 358
Edo 江戸, 239, 245–6
education commissioners, 632, 685, 686, 693–4, 695
eight-legged essays (pa-ku wen), 119
Eight Banner system, 119–20
eight-bundle trade, 179–80
eight-legged essays (pa-ku wen), 540
elites, contest elites, 9–10; elite and non-elite Taoists, 425–9; examination elites, 9–10. See also local elites
embassies, see tribute embassies
empire, as concept, 2–6
enshrinement of local worthies, 683–91;
Ch‘ien-lung reign, 687, 689;
K‘ang-hsi reign, 685–6; Ming period, 683; nineteenth century, 689–91;
numbers and regional distribution, 688–91; Yung-cheng reign, 686–7
English East India Company, see East India Company (British)
Enryakuji Temple 延曆寺, 235–6
envoys, Jesuits as, 349, 350. See also diplomatic and consular relations;
embassies Erdeni-yin Tobˇci (Man. Precious summary), 125
Erh-ch‘en chuan 貴臣傳 (Biographies of twice-serving ministers), 646–7
Erh-hsien an 二仙菴 (Abbey of the Two Immortals), 449
Erke Khonggor Eje, 122
Esen Khan (r. 1438–54), 11, 117
L’estat présent de la Chine en figures, 346–7
Eternal Mother, 456
ethnicity, anti-Manchu sentiment, 169, 646; censorship of references to, 606, 612, 614, 627, 641, 646
eunuchs, 231, 329, 419, 475, 615, 692–3, 694
European learning, see calendars and calendrical learning; Western learning evidential learning (k‘ao ching hsieh), applied to calendrical matters, 385, 390, 391–7; applied to classical texts, 258, 262, 532–3, 591; defined, 513–14; Fang I-chih on, 516; Japan, 258; in Korea, 194; and use of history as evidence, 553, 556; Vietnam, examinations, 222
fa 法 (methods, [Taoist] exorcistic ritual), 383–4, 429–30
fa-kuan 法官 (ritual official), 419, 431
fa-p’ai 法派 (Taoist clergy lineage), 416
fa-shih 法師 (ritual master, vernacular priest), 429–30
Fabre-Bonjour, Guillaume, 354–5
Fairbank, John K., 153–4
famines and famine relief, 68, 651, 652, 653, 657, 659, 662–3, 668, 677, 677n
fan 滅 (outer or foreign territories), 123–4
fan 繁 (troublesome), 57
Fan Shao-tso 樊紹祚, 357–8
Fan Wen-ch‘eng 范文程, 26
fan-t‘un 番屯 (aborigine military colony), 99
Fang Chung-t‘ung 方中通, 522
Fang I-chih 方以智, biographical and overview, 478, 489, 515–29, 572; on broad learning, 526–8; on evidenced-based knowledge, 516–27; influence, 528–9; on things (wu), 516–24; on words (yen), 523–7
Fang Kuang-ch‘eng 方觀承, 67–8
Fang Pao 方苞, 46
fang-wu 方物 (local products), 154
fang-yin 方音 (local pronunciation), 544
“fathoming the coherence” (ch‘iung li), 464, 495, 496
Fei Ch‘un 費淳, 667
fei-i 廢醫 (eradicating physicians), 409
female alchemy (nii-tan 女丹), 455–6
fen 憤 (resentment, indignation), 569
Fen 汾 River, 52
Fen-shu 蘭書 (A book to be burned), 646
fen-t'an 分壇 (branch altars), 453
Feng Ch'üan 馮鉉, 574
Feng Fang 豐坊, 259–61
feng-chien 封建 (enfeoffment, feudal), 614
Feng-shan county 鳳山, 82, 83, 86–8, 92, 104–5, 107–8
Feng-t'ien 奉天, 676tab
Feng-yang 奉陽, 20–1
feudal, see feng-chien
fief, see feng-chien
figurism, 355
filial behavior (bsiao), 249, 352, 574, 631
fines (of officials), 74–5
fire, 520
fire god temples (huo-shen miao), 421, 422
fiscal resources, decline in, 651–2
Five Classics (Wu ching 五經), 232
Five Dynasties 五代 (907–60), 259, 261
Five Elements (Fire, Water, Metal, Wood, Earth) (wu shing 五行), 520
Fiyanggū, 130
Flint, James, 305–6
Fo-shan (Fou-shan) 佛山, 677
Fontaney, Jean de, 342
Foochow 福州 (Fu-chou), 20–1
Fouquet, Jean-François, 355
Four Books (Ssu shu 四書), 232, 260, 346, 464, 497, 503, 506, 513, 560, 592
France, see French Jesuit mission
Franciscans, 314, 332, 334, 336–7, 340–1, 344–5, 365
French Jesuit mission, 342, 345, 346–7
fu 府 (prefecture), 7–8, 649
fu 賦 (poetic exposition), 577
Fu Chi'n-ch'üan 傅金鈞, 454–5
Fu Shan 傅山, 575–6
Fu-an 福安, 300, 351, 364
fu-chi 扶騷 (spirit-writing), 451–5
Fu-de 富德, 61
Fu-heng 富恒, 69, 694
Fu-k'ang-an 福康安, 108, 626
Fu-k'o chung-sheng 婦科準繩 (Guidelines of gynecology), 404
fu-t'un 扶 (spirit-writing), 451–5
Fu-p'eng 福彭, 67
Fu-shun 撫順, 150
Fu-sung 福松, 73, 75tab
Fukien 福建 province, 18, 668, 676tab
Galdan, 118, 124, 125, 126–8, 130
Galdantsering (r. 1727–45), 132
Gali 喝禮, 46
Galilei, Galileo, 375
Gama, Luis da, 337
garrison commanders (tsung ping), 19–21, 625–6
garrisons, Manchuria, 112–15;
provincial, 31–2, 39; Taiwan, 79–80, 109; Vietnam, 206–7, 212, 213
Gaubil, Antoine, 362
gazetteers (chib), censorship of local gazetteers, 623–5, 691–9; chib as genre, 6; inclusion of tributary states in, 11, 111; Ta Ch'ing i-tung chib, 6, 590–1
George III, 322–3
Gerbillon, Jean-François, 342, 353–4
Ghorlos Mongols, 120
ghosts, 421, 422, 524
Gia-Dinh, 197–8, 212–13, 222–3, 227–32
Gia-long (r. 1802–19), 197–8, 226–7.
See also Gia-long era (1802–19);
Nguyen Anh
Gia-long code, 230
Gia-long era (1802–19), adoption of Ch'ing styles and forms, 229–30, 232–3; adoption of reign name, 197–8; and Confucianism, 232;
Go-Hōjo 俊北条 family, 257–9
gold exports, 293
Golovkin, Russian ambassador, 325
Gouveya, Alexandre de, 317
governor-general (tsung-tu 總督), 18, 19n, 19–21, 29, 36
governors of provinces (hsün-fu 巡撫),
acccusations of malfeasance against, 45–7; as activists, 51–4, 63–8;
appointment of Grand Council clerks as, 68–70; appointment of local officials by, 54–8; appointment of Manchus as, 70–2; appointments by Yung-cheng emperor, 47–58; early appointments and locations, 19–25; fines paid by, 74–5; growing power of, 18, 42; location; roles of, 16; stages of development, Ch’ing period, 18–19
Goyer, Pieter de, 268
Gozandera 五山寺 (J. Five Mountains temples), 236
granary system, 66–7, 668, 670
Grand Canal (Yün ho 運河), 41, 42, 660
grand co-ordinator (hsün-fu 巡撫), in Ming era, 17–18
Grand Council (Chüen-ch’i’u 軍機處), 19, 63, 68–70, 364
Grand Council clerks (Chüen-ch’i’u chang-ching 軍機章京), 68–70, 76
grand councilors (Chüen-ch’i’u ta-ch’en 軍機大臣), 19, 62
Grand Secretariat (Nei-ko 內閣), 36, 52, 68
grand secretary (ta-hsüeb-shib 大學士), 302, 574, 586, 590, 592, 597, 656

Great Hall of Light (Ta-kuang-ming tien), 419
Great learning 大學 (Ta-hsüeb), 254,
259–61, 464, 470, 510, 568–9, 613
Great Wall 長城, 354–5
Green Standard soldiers, 80, 107, 134
Grimaldi, Claudio Filippo, 340
gucu (Man. Jurchen companions-in-arms), 115
guilds, see merchant guilds
gunpowder, 78, 184, 274
Güüshi Khan (r. 1636–56), 130–4

Ha-Tien, 223
hai nei 海内 (within the seas), 7
Hai-ch’ang 海昌, 469
Hai-ch’eng 海成, 614, 621, 647
Hai-ch’eng 海澄 city, 266–7, 275
Hai-hsü 海西 Jurchens, 112–17
Hai-nan 海南 island, 676tab
Hai-ning 海寧 (d. 1790), 70
Hai-ning 海寧 city, 462
Hakata 博多, 236
Hakka 客家 (Ch. K’o-chia), 88, 92, 104–5, 434–5
Hallerstein, August, 191
Hami, 132, 134–5
Han 漢 dynasty (206 BCE–220), 4–5
Han Chinese in Taiwan, expanding settlement, 95–105; inter-community conflict, 102–5, 109; Lin Shuang-wen rebellion, 105–8; relations with plains aborigines, 95–105
Han jen chib tao 漢人之道 (ways of Han people), 8
Han learning (Han hsüeb 漢學), 262
Han Nhan (civilized people, Ch. Han-jen 漢人), 227–8
Han River 漢江 (Korea), 146
Han Shih-ch’i 韓世琦, 35
Han shu 漢書 (Han History), 552
Han T’an 韓菼, 349
Han Yü 韓愈, 548
Han-chün 漢軍 bannermen, 9–10, 19–21, 26, 27, 33, 34–5, 39–40, 41, 48, 51, 574
Han-chung 漢中, 39
Han-k'o 汉可, 608
Han-san kung 汾三宮 (Palace Encompassing the Three), 453
Hangchow 杭州 (Hang-chou), 343, 352, 427–8, 431–2, 435, 456
Hankow 漢口, 456, 650
Hanlin 翰林 Academy, 60, 515, 574, 577, 581, 587, 592–4
Hanoi, see Thang-Long
bao bsiib 好學 (fond of learning), 541
Hao Yü-lin 郝玉麟, 92, 93, 98, 99
Hayashi Gahō 林鶴鳴, 255
Hayashi Nobuatsu 林信燥, 236–7
Hayashi Razan 林羅山, 236–7, 241
heart, see hsin; originating heart
Heaven (T'ien 天), 2, 494
Heaven and Earth Society (T'ien-ti hui 天地會), 106–7, 109
Heian 平安 period (794–1185), 257–9
Heilungkiang, see Amur River
beimín 平民 (J. commoners), 237
Heng-ch'ün 恆春, 108
Heng-wen 恆文, 72–3
Heng-yang 衡陽, 559
Hetu Ala, 150
Hickey, William, 308
Hiei, Mount 比叡山, 235–6
Histoire générale de la Chine, 362–4
Hmong (Miao), 202
Ho Ch'ang-ling 賀長齡, 701
Ho Cho 何焯, 643
Ho Chün-hsi 何君錫, 190–1
Ho Fa-sheng 何法盛, 543
Ho Kuo-tsung 何國宗, 397
Ho Quy Ly (r. 1400–6), 199, 202
“Ho t'u” 河圖 (“Array from the Yellow River”), 535, 603
Hó Won 諸遼, 190
Ho Yü-ch'eng 何裕城, 626
Ho-lan 荷蘭 (Holland), 268. See also Dutch East India Company
bo-ping 河兵 (river troops), 54
Ho-shen 和珅, 72–3, 106, 296, 309, 313
Ho-tung bo-tao tsung-tu 河東河道總督 (governor-general for the Yellow River and Grand Canal), 61
Hoeryǒng 會寧, 178
Hoi-An (Faifo), 205, 207–8, 211, 222, 224, 231
Holland (Ho-lan), 268. See also Dutch East India Company
Holy See, and Chinese rites controversy, 337, 340, 344, 347, 359–60, 365; establishes ecclesiastical hierarchy for China, 344; Jesuits as K'ang-hsi-C envoys to, 349, 350; papal legations from, 285. 2, 349–50, 359–60. See also Jesuits; missionaries; popes; Propaganda; Roman Catholic Church
Honan 河南 province, 20, 676tab, 691, 697
Honan t'ung-chib 河南通志 (Gazetteer of Honan province), 697
boncho 本朝 (J. our ruling dynasty), 237
hong (bang 行) merchant firms, 288, 290, 292, 296, 306–7, 308–10, 313, 327. See also chuan-bang
Hong Kong 香港, 457
Hong Tae-yong 洪大容, 188–9, 191, 192–3
Hong-duc era (1470–97), 200, 201, 204, 216
Hongtayiji [Mon. title of supreme Oirat leader], 132–3
Hoorn, Pieter van, 270
Hopei 河北 province, 370, 505
hoppo, maritime customs superintendent, 274
hordes (Kaz. jüz), 130
Horikawa 堀川 River, 241–2
horse markets, 114
Hsin T'ang shu 新唐書 (New T'ang history), 551
hsin-fa 新法 (new methods), 378, 379, 381, 382–3
Hsin-fa li-shu 新法曆書 (Calendrical treatises in accordance with the new methods), 382–3
Hsin-kuang 心光, 630
hsin-p'ai 信牌 (trading credentials, J. shinpai), 234
hsin-t'i 心體 (the mind-in-itself), 601
hsing 行 (acting; actions), 464
hsing 性 (human nature), 467, 473, 485, 487–8, 652–9
hsing chung-shu sheng 行中書省 (branch secretariat, in Yüan), 17–18
hsing erh shang 形而上 (the realm “above forms”), 563
Hsing li ta-ch’üan 性理大全
(Compendium of teachings on human nature and coherence), 599
Hsing-pu 刑部, see Ministry of Justice
Hsiung Hsieh-p’eng 熊學鵬, 692
hsü 虚 (empty; emptiness), 535
hsü chi 虚氣 (vacuous particles), 522
Hsü Ch’ao 徐翱, 45
Hsü Chen-chüan 許真君 (The Perfected Lord Hsiü), 417, 447
Hsü Chi 徐績, 621
Hsü Ch’ien-hsüeh 徐乾學, 587, 589–91
Hsü Hsün 徐巡, 447
Hsü Hsün 許遜, 417, 447
Hsü Kuang-ch’i 徐光啟, 375, 377
Hsü Shen 許慎 (Shu-chung 叔重), 546
Hsü Ta-ch’un 徐大椿, 407, 409
Hsü Tsuan-tseng 徐繼曾 (Basil), 345–6
Hsü Yüan-wen 徐元文, 574–7, 582, 585
Hsü, Candida, 345–6
hsü-ling 虚靈 (immaterial intelligence), 486
hsü-ming 虛名 (abstract term), 508
hsü-pan 序班 (attendant officials), 180
hsü-tzu 虚字 (abstract word), 509
hsüan 玄 (dark, mysterious), 535
hsüan chi yü heng 煤礦玉衡 (topic for 1679 examination), 577
Hsüan-fu 宣府, 18, 21, 24
Hsüan-miao kuan 玄妙觀 (Hsüan-miao Monastery), 439, 445
Hsüan-t’ien shang-ti 玄天上帝
(Supreme Emperor of the Dark Heaven), 417
Hsüan-tsung 玄宗, or Emperor Ming 明皇 (r. 713–755), 544
hsüeh 學 (learn, learning), 460, 467, 475, 496, 501–3, 569
Hsüeh Chi 薛已, 615
Hsüeh Hsüan 薛瑄, 404, 491
“Hsüeh she lu” 學射錄 (“Record of learning archery”), 508
hsüeh-an 學案 (source book), 470
Hsün Tzu 荀子, 548
hsüan-yü-shib 巡按御史 (regional inspector), 32, 46, 684
hsün-fu 巡撫 (in Ming era, grand co-ordinator, 17–18, 21, 31–2, 36.
See also governors of provinces
Hu An-kuo 胡安國, 232
Hu Chü-jen 胡居仁, 491
Hu Wei 胡渭, 591, 603
Hu-chou 湖州, 453
Hu-kuang 湖廣 province, in Ming era, 18
Hu-pu 戶部, see Ministry of Revenue
hua 華 (civilized, Chinese), 616
Hua i kuan 華夷觀 (“Han versus barbarian”), 646
Hua-an-shan 化安山, 478
Hua-Hsia 華夏 [an ancient term for the inner states], 124
Hua-shan 華山 (Shensi), 52
Hua-yin 華陰, 52
Huang Ch'ing chih-kung t'u 皇清職貢圖
(Explanations of the classics from our imperial Ch'ing), 163

Huang Ch'ing chih-kung t'u 皇清職貢圖
(Explanations of the classics from our imperial Ch'ing), 163

Huang Ch'ing-ch'ou 恤過自新 (“repenting transgressions, renew oneself”), 495

Hui-hou 回回 (Muslim), 388

Hui-t'ung kuan 會同館 (College of Interpreters), 180, 188

Hung-chi 弘治 reign (1488–1505), 684

Hung-kuang 弘光 era (1644–5), 608–9

Hung-p'iao 紅票, see Red manifesto

Hung-wen yüan 宏文院 (Office for the Advancement of Literature), 330, 331–2

Hung-yang chiao 弘揚教 (Vast Yang Teaching), 456

Hung-yang Chen 1488–59, 616

Huo 華 (fire), 520

Huo-chi 火居, see Huo-chi tao-shih 火居道士 [monks who were married and lived at home], 421, 422

Huo-chi tao-shih 火居道士 [monks who were married and lived at home], 421, 422

Huo-shen miao 火神廟 (fire god temples), 608, 640

Huan 湖南 province, 559, 669, 676 tab, 700

Hundred Yüeh, see Bach Viet

Hung Ch'eng-ch'ou 洪承疇, 608

Hung Taiji 皇太極 (r. 1627–36; Mon. Sechen Khan, Man. Sure Han), 111, 117, 118–19, 125, 146, 151–3, 156

Hung Yeh 洪業, 641

Hung-yang chiao 弘揚教 (Vast Yang Teaching), 456

Hung-yang Chen 1488–59, 616

Hupei 湖北 province, 663–4, 670, 676 tab

Huang Ch'ing-ch'ou 恤過自新 (“repenting transgressions, renew oneself”), 495

Hui-chou 惠州, 85

Hui-hui 回回 (Muslim), 388

Hui-t'ung kuan 會同館 (College of Interpreters), 180, 188

Hui-ya 會雅 (collective recommendation), 36

Hunan 湖南 province, 559, 669, 676 tab, 700

Hung Ch'ing-ch'ou 皇清職貢圖
(Explanations of the classics from our imperial Ch'ing), 163

Hung-ts'ai-chi, see Hung Taiji

Hung Tsung-hsi 黃宗羲, avoids scholars’ recruitment examination, 575, 577; biographical overview, 332–3, 469–90, 572, 590, 640; and Book of documents, 604; censorship of, 648; on coherence–matter relationship, 483–6; as compiler of Ming texts, 480–2; criticism of Sun Ch'i-feng by, 474; on human nature–moral action relationship, 487–90; involvement in Ming restoration, 476–8; on Ming Confucian learning, 481–90; on moral knowing, 487–90; as protector of Liu’s legacy, 469–90; publication of Ming ju hsüeh an, 600–1; role in Ming history project, 585; support for Wang Yang-ming’s teaching, 594–5; views on rule and political power, 478–80

Hung T’u-an 黃圖安, 26

Hung yü Chunglan lan t'u 皇輿全覽圖
(Comprehensive maps of the imperial realm), 162, 354–5

Hung Yüan-yü 黃元御, 406–7

Hung-ch’ao ching-chib wen-pien 皇朝經世文編 (Writings on ordering the world in our dynasty), 64

Huang-chu-p’u 黃竹浦, 477

Huang-ti 黃帝 (emperor), 2–3, 4, 5, 7

Huang-ti nei-ching 黃帝內經 (Yellow Emperor’s inner canon), 252–4

Hue, 214, 229

Hui kuo tzu hsin 悔過自新 (“repenting transgressions, renew oneself”), 495

Hui-chou 惠州, 85

Hui-hui 回回 (Muslim), 388

Hui-t'ung kuan 會同館 (College of Interpreters), 180, 188

Hui-ya 會雅 (collective recommendation), 36

Hung Ch’ing-ch’ou 皇清職貢圖
(Explanations of the classics from our imperial Ch’ing), 163

Hung-t'ung kuan 會同館 (College of Interpreters), 180, 188

Hung-yang chiao 弘揚教 (Vast Yang Teaching), 456

Hung-yang Chen 1488–59, 616

Hung-yang Chen 1488–59, 616

Hupei 湖北 province, 663–4, 670, 676 tab

Bach Viet 白文 (painters), 174

Hyojong 孝宗 (r. 1649–59), 165–7

i 異 (other), 640

i 意 (intention, moral intention), 471, 488, 562

i 夷 (J. i, barbarian, outsider, non-Chinese), 237, 616

i 疫 (epidemics), 406

i 役 (corvée), 406. See also corvée labor
I an ruigo 醫案類語 (J. Words classified for medical cases), 245
I ching 易經, see Book of change
i bsi-yang bsin-fa 以西洋新法 (according to new Western methods), 379, 381, 382–3
I bsiieb bsiang shu 易學象數 (Figures and numbers in studies on the Change), 478
i kōbō gaku 醫考證學 (J. medical philology), 253–4
i kuan 一貫 (unity threading [through the teachings of Confucius]), 536
i li 一理 (unitary coherence), 536
I pen i 易本義 (Basic meanings of the Book of change), 599
I sbi 醫史 (A history of physicians), 251–2
I t'ung chih 易圖明辯 (Clarification of the arrays in the Book of change), 603
i-an 醫案 (case history), 403
I-chou 異州 (Chihli), 51
i-fu 義夫 (righteous men), 653
i-hsi 議敘 (honorable award of rank and title), 671–2. See also rank and title rewards
i-hua 醫話 (medical discourses), 403
i-li 義理 (meanings and principles), 51
i-lun 醫論 (medical discussions), 403
i-min 遺民 (non-collaborator), individual cases, 461, 462, 472, 478, 511, 528, 578, 628; as term, 459–60
i-min 義民 (righteous commoners), 653
i-ti 夷狄 (barbarians), 606
i-ting chib li 一定之理 (certain, regular pattern), 566
i-tsun-yin 議罪銀 (money payments in righteousness of guilt), 74
i-t'ung 一統 (integrated domain), 6
I-t'ung chib 一統志 (Gazetteer of the integrated domain), 542
i-wen chib 藝文志 (comprehensive bibliographical chapters), 582
igakkan 醫學館 (J. official medical school), 242
Ikai Keisho 猪饲敬所, 249
ilgwan 日官 (astronomers), 174
Ili, 134, 367, 369
imperial family, employment in government, 552–5
Imperial Household Department (Nei-wu fu內務府), 51, 418, 419
imperial residents, see amban
inculturation, as a missionary strategy, 336–7, 340–1, 349, 360
India, see Bengal
Injo 仁祖 (r. 1595–1649), 146, 151, 152–3, 170–2
innate knowing of moral good, 461, 463, 466, 487, 493, 495, 512, 529, 539, 541, 560, 593–4, 595. See also chib liang chib
inner alchemy, see nei-tan
Inner Asia, Ch’ing expansion and tutelage, 117–30, 142–3; submission of Khalkhas and Oirats, 124–30. See also Mongolia; Sinkiang; Tibet
Inner Mongol leagues (meng 盟), 128–30
Inner Mongolia 内蒙古, leagues and banners in, 119–23. See also Mongolia
inquissions, see literary inquisitions
intercalary months, 376–7
interpreters, 175–6, 179–83, 184, 185
Intorcetta, Prospero, 343–4
Itō Jinsai 伊藤仁斎, 241–2, 248, 251–2, 254
Itō Tōgai 伊藤東涯, 241–2, 254
Jade Emperor, 435, 445, 452
Jalayit Mongols, 120
Jao Modo, 130
Japan 日本, adoption of Ming–Ch’ing law, 249–51; assessments of Manchu conquest, 236–9; Chinese classical learning, 240–9; and Chosón Korea, 239; classical scholars, 237; and European astronomy, 339; medical learning and practice, 251–4; relations with Ming dynasty, 234;
jitsuji 寶字 (J. “connectives”), 242
Josutu League, 120
Jou-yüan ssu (Bureau for Cherishing
Those Who Come from Distant
Places), 137
ju 儒 (Confucians; classical scholars),
463, 468, 471, 493–4, 495, 500,
510, 595
ju lin 儒林 (Confucians, as a group;
biographies of Confucians), 595,
602
ju-i 儒醫 (Confucian physician),
401
Ju-tsang 儒藏 (Confucian collection),
620
Juan Yüan 阮元, 188, 258, 391, 396,
638, 644
Jung Ying 戎英, 631
Jurchens 女真, and Chosŏn collection;
classes among, 112–17; Nurhaci’s
polity, 116–17, 147, 149–51; trade
permits, 114, 142–3. See also Later
Chin dynasty
jurisprudence, 249. See also legal codes
juōn (Man. commoners, Jurchen people),
116
jusha 儒者 (J. classical scholars,
Confucians), 237
Juu Uda League, 120
ka 華 (J. civilized), 237
Ka i bentai 華夷変態 (J. Reversal of
civilized and barbarian), 237
Kado 椧島, 151
Kaesŏng 開城, 180
k’ai-liêb 開列(-ranked list), 37–8
Kaifeng 開封, 26
Kaitokudô 懷德堂, 250
Kalgan (Chang-chia-k’ou 張家口),
122
Kalmyks (Qalmaqs), 125–6
kalpa, 452
Kamakura 鎌倉時代 period
(1185–1333), 236, 245, 254
Kang-hsi\textsuperscript{1} Kang-shan Kang-yü county\textsuperscript{2}
\(k'an-bo\) 剃合 (tally trade, J. kangō), 234–5
\(kanbun\) 漢文 (J. Han writing), 240, 242, 243, 244, 245–6, 250
\(kangaku\) 漢學 (J. Han learning, “sinology”), 245, 253
Kang Hong-nip 姜弘立, 150
\(kang-ch'ang\) 綱常 (Confucian moral values), 607
Kang-chien hui tsuan 綱鑑會纂 (A compilation on the outline and lessons of history), 642
Kang-chien i chib lu 綱鑑易知錄 (An easy introduction to the outline and lessons of history), 628
Kang-shan 岡山, 87
K'ang Sheng I-lang 康勝一郎, 434–5
K'ang-hsi 康熙 emperor (r. 1662–1722), administrative style, 47; attitude towards Christianity, 334–6, 338, 343–4, 345, 358, 359–60; campaign against Dzungars, 132–4; Chinese rites controversy and, 348, 349–50; expeditions against Galdan, 128, 130; intellectual interests, 12, 353–4, 355–6, 386–9, 592–4; interest in Manchu homeland by, 161–2; post-rebellion administration, 40–5; relations with Verbiest, 338–41, 386–9; rewarding local elites, 659; sponsorship of Ming history, 574–7; sponsorship of scholarly projects, 573, 574–7, 587, 597, 599–600; summons scholars to recruitment examination, 573, 577; support for Chu His’s teaching, 497, 511, 592–9; Three Feudatories rebellion and, 38–40; treatment of Korea by, 162–3
K'ang-hsi 康熙 era (1662–1722), compilation of Ming dynasty history, 574, 579–89; early administrative reforms, 19–25, 29–35; enshrinements during, 685–6; literary acquisitions, 607, 608–9, 612, 614; model governors, 43–4: officially sponsored scholarship, 573–9; post-rebellion administration, 40–5; procedure for appointing governors, 36–8; relations with Korea, 162–4; role of regents, 29–35, 37; special examination for scholars, 573, 576–9; succession dispute, 44, 360, 612, 613; Wu San-kuei rebellion, 38–40, 573, 619
K'ang-hsi tsu tien 康熙字典 (K'ang-hsi canon of characters), 599–600
K'ang-hsi yung-nien li-fa 康熙永年曆法 (Perpetual calendrical methods of the K'ang-hsi era), 338–9
Kanghwa 江華, 152–3
kampō 漢方 (J. Han prescriptions or medicine), 239–40, 242, 251–2
Kansei 寛政 era (1789–1801), 262
Kansu 甘肅 province, 20, 31–2, 56, 134–5, 624, 627, 676tab, 677
Kao Shih-shih 高世栻, 400
Kao Tou-kuang 高斗光, 26
Kao-chin 高晉, 621
kao-kung 高功 (ritual master), 429–30
fa-shib
K'ao ling yao 考靈曜 (“On the divine celestial luminaries”), 521
k'ao-chêng 考證 (evidential studies), 385, 556, 589, 591
k'ao chêng hsîieb 考證 / 鉴 學, or k'ao chü hsîieb 考據學 (evidential or evidenced learning), 513–14, 516. See also evidential learning
k'ao-chi ch'iang-hsiu 考績獎敘 (evaluation of achievements and encouragement and appointment), 675
Karachin Mongols, 120
karun (Man. military post), 142
Kashgharia, 134–5
Kashi honya 貨本屋 (J. lending libraries), 245
Katsuda Tomosato 勝田野友里, 250
Kazakhs, 130, 135–7
Ke’ Ch’ in 柯琴, 406–7
Ke-Ch’o, 209, 218
Keng Chi-mao 耿鎖茂, 267
Keng Ch’ing-chung 耿精忠, 43–4
Keng-ch’en ch’un ou yin 庚辰春偶吟
( Accidental chants in the spring of 1640), 642
Kepler, Johannes, 375, 394–5
Kerulen River, 130
Kesigten Mongols, 120
Keyser, Jacob de, 268
Khalkha Jirum, 268
Keyser, Jacob de, 268
Khalkha Mongols, 120
Khoqand, 134–5
Khalkha Mongols, 120
Khakhut Mongols, 117, 131, 132
Khoyd Mongols, 132–3
Khubilai, 5
Khotkhotu, see Jebsundamba Khutukhu
Kiangsi 江西 province, 20, 39–40, 447, 621, 626, 647, 661, 664, 667, 676tab, 677, 690, 691, 696tab
Kiangsu 江蘇 province, 33, 46, 664, 676tab, 690, 691, 696tab
Kibi no Makibi 吉備真備, 257–9
Kim Ch’ang-ôp 金昌業, 169–70, 187
Kim Cha-jom 金自點, 166
Kim Chi-nam 金指南, 175
Kim Ch’ong-hùi 金正喜, 258
Kim Kyong-mun 金慶門, 186
Kimon 昌門 school, 237–8
Kimura Kenkado 木村兼載全, 260
Kinh, 227
Kırghız, 5
Kongyong ˇun 金-sharing family, 254
Kiyohara 清原 family, 254
Ko 格 (investigate), 496
Ko wu 格物 (investigating things; for Chu Hsi, investigating or going out to experience things; for Wang Yang-ming, rectifying or keeping external phenomena from impinging), 464, 467, 473, 501, 568–9
Ko-wu chi’ang-li 格物窮理 (the investigation of things so as to fathom the Principle), 385
K’o-i 科儀 (liturgy), 429–30
Kobdo, 142
Kobun kókyo Kóbi den 古文孝經孔氏傳
( J. K’ung’s commentary to the ancient script version of the Classic on being filial), 259
Kobunji gaku 古文解學 (J. learning based on ancient texts), 256
Kóchó ishi 皇朝醫史 (J. History of physicians in our era), 251–2
Koebi 古注 (J. ancient commentaries), 256
Kókoku meii den 皇國名醫傳 (J. Biographies of famous physicians of our august country), 251–2
Koffler, Andreas, 330
Kogaku 古學 (J. ancient learning), 254
Kogido 古義道 (J. Way of ancient meanings [Academy]), 241–2
Kögler, Ignatius, 191
Koibó 古醫方 (J. ancient medical prescriptions), 251–2, 253
Kojiki den 古事記傳 (J. Commentary on the Record of ancient matters), 247, 248
Kokonor (Tsinghai), 111–12, 130
Kokonor Mongols, 125–6
Kokutai 国體 (J. sacred polity), 238
Kongyong ˇun 公用銀 (silver for official use), 179
Korea, anti-Ch’ing sentiment, 165–7, 169, 177, 190; border demarcation, 161–2; calendars and calendrical learning, 176, 184–6, 190–1;
Ch’eng–Chu learning in, 167, 194; Chin invasion, 151–3; Chost’s divided loyalty, 164–73; evidential learning in, 194; exchange of embassies, 157–8, 159, 160, 164; as heir to Middle Kingdom, 167–70, 191; Japanese invasion of, 148; and Jurchens, 146, 148–52, 153; and Kang-hsi emperor, 162–3; legitimacy of Chosing in, 194; exchange of embassies, 64.3, 167–70, 191; Northern Campaign, 165–7; Northern learning, 193–5; rectification of false records, 170–2; trade, 177–84; as tributary state, 10–11, 146, 151–60, 164; Western learning in, 189–93

Koryŏ 高麗 dynasty (918–1392), 171 koseiha 後世派 (J. advocates of latter-day [medicine]), 252

kowtow (k’o-t’ou 諂頭), 146, 153, 319–21, 324, 325

Koxinga, see Cheng Ch’eng-kung

ku 古 (the past), 551

Ku Hsien-ch’eng 顧憲成, 472

Ku Shao-fei 顧紹芾, 530, 530n

Ku Ying-t’ai 谷應泰, 635

Ku-chin t’u-shu chi-ch’eng 古今圖書集成 (Synthesis of past and present arrays and writings), 425

Ku-chin wei-shu k’ao 古今偽書考 (Examination of ancient and modern books with spurious attributions), 640–1

Ku-liang 毂梁 commentary tradition on the Spring and autumn annals, 546

ku-pen 古本 (ancient text), 466

Ku-shu yin-lou 古書隱樓, 454

Ku-shu yin-lou tsang-shu 古書隱樓藏書 (Books held at the Ku-shu yin-lou), 454

ku-wen 古文 (ancient script, J. kobun), 259

ku-wen 古文 (ancient-style prose), 589, 603

kuan 官 (official, governmental, not private), 692

Kuan county 灌縣, 442

Kuan Fu 灌夫, 567

Kuan Yü 關羽, 617

kuan-t'ang 官帑 (regular state funds), 651

Kuan-t'ih 關帝, 451

k’uan 寬 (lenient), 47

Kuang-Chao-Lo 廣肇羅 circuit (Kwangtung), 65

Kuang-ch’eng i-chib 廣成儀制 (The Kuang-ch’eng ritual system), 442

k’u’ang 猛 (wild), 458

Kui-hsi 貴溪, 430

Kumazawa Banzan 熊沢蕃山, 236, 241

kun’gwan 軍官 (military attendant), 174

K’un-shan 崑山, 427–8, 531, 534, 685–6

K’un-yü ch’u’an-t’u 坤輿全圖 (Complete map of the terrestrial globe), 338–9

kundoku 訓讀 (J. guides to reading), 242, 246, 247

Kündülen Khan, 118

Kung Ting-tzu 龜鼎孳, 629
kung-chü 公局 (public bureaus), 679
Kung-pu 工部, see Ministry of Works
kung-kuo 功過格 (ledgers of merit and demerit), 492
kung-sheng 貢生 (tribute students)
 [students recommended for the Imperial Academy], 621
Kung-yang 公羊 commentary tradition on the Spring and autumn annals, 546
K'ung An-kuo 孔安國, 261, 546, 549
K'ung Shang-jen 孔尚任, 611, 636
K'ung Yu-te 孔有德, 23
K'ung Yü-hsün 孔毓珣, 279
k'ung-ko 空格 (lacuna, blank space), 625
kunten 訓点 (J. punctuation marks), 249–50
kuo 国 (kingdom, state, dynasty), 2
Kuo ch'ü jen chuan 國初人傳 (Biographies of men early in our dynasty), 639
Kuo Chin-ch'eng 郭金城, 506–7
Kuo Hsiang 郭象, 543
Kuo Hsien 郭獻, 42–3, 44
Kuo Shih-ch'ü 郭石渠, 656–9
Kuo Shih-hsün 郭世勛, 75tab
Kuo Wen-liang 郭文亮, 632
Kuo Yan-po 郭彥博, 628
kuo-chia ching-feu yu ch'ang 國家經費嬗 ("State revenues are limited"), 665
kuo-feng 国封 (government canonization), 435
Kuo-t'ai 國泰, 73
Kwanghae 光海 (r. 1608–23), 150
Kwangsi 廣西 province, 18, 20–1
Kwangtung 廣東 province, 18, 20–1, 676tab
Kwansanggam 観象監 (Royal Bureau of Astronomy), 185
Kweichow 貴州 province, 18, 20–1, 676tab
Kyōngwon 慶源, 178
kyoji 虚字 (J. "insubstantial" graphs), 242
Kyōto 京都, 237, 241–2, 245–6, 248
Kyujanggak 奎章閣 (Korean royal library), 183
Lady Hughes case, 315–16
Lama Office (La-ma yin-wu ch'üi 喇嘛印務誌), 424–5
Lan Ting-yüan 藍鼎元, 88–90, 92–3, 96–7, 98
Lang Shih-ning 郎世寧, see Castiglione, Giuseppe
Lao-tzu 老子 (The Lao-tzu, Tao-te-ching), 497, 537, 539, 564
Later Chin 金 dynasty, founded 1616, 111, 116, 150–3
law, see legal codes
Lazartists, 366
Lhazang Khan (r. 1703–17), 130, 131
Le dynasty (1428–; restored 1592–1788), 200–1, 203, 204,
209–10, 221, 225, 231
Le Comte, Louis, 347, 348
Le Duy Luong, 231
Le Duy Mat, 221
Le Hien Tong (r. 1498–1504), 200–1
Le Loi (r. 1428–33), 199
Le Quy Don, 221–2
Le Than Tong (r. 1619–43, 1649–62), 209
Le Thanh Tong (r. 1460–97), 200–1, 215, 226
Le Van Duyet, 230, 231
Le Van Khoi, 231
Le-erh-chin 勒爾謹, 627
Leagues of Mongol banners, 119–23
Leanqua, 282
Learning of the Way (Tao hsueh 學道), 513, 593
legal codes, Ch’ing code, 140, 230, 249, 302, 315; Japan, 249; Ming code,
249–50; Mongolia, 138–40; and treatment of Europeans, 314–16
Leibniz, Gottfried Wilhelm, 347
Lettres édifiantes et curieuses, 347
Lhazang Khan (r. 1703–17), 130–4
Li 理 (coherence; principles; Principle; pattern; orderliness), and calendrical learning, 383–4, 385, 393, 396, 513; as causal entity, 508–9, 520–1, 534, 537, 566; Chu Hsi’s emphasis on, 458, 473, 493, 508–9, 514, 534, 615; Wang Fu-chih’s revaluation, 560–9; fathoming coherence, 464, 493, 495, 496; and human nature (hsing), 467, 487–8; learning based on, 458, 464, 466; Li Kung’s critique, 508–9; and numerical relationships (shu), 385, 393, 535; relation between particles (ch’i) and, 483–6, 518

li 里 (distance, about 1/3 of a mile), 332, 477, 521, 533, 552

li 隷 writing form, 546

li 禮 (ritual), 557

Li cbī 礼記, see Book of rites

Li Ch’eng-tung 李成棟, 30

Li Chih 李賢, 539, 567, 629, 645, 648

Li Chih-tsaì 李之藻, 375

Li Chih-ying 李質穎, 75tab

Li Fu 李敘, 613

Li Hsi-yüeh 李西月, 454

Li hsia̤ng k’ao ch’eng 曆象考成 (Thorough investigations of astronomical phenomena), 191

li hsüeh 理學 (tradition of learning based on coherence), 464, 534, 538

Li hsüeh tsung chuan 理學宗傳

(Transmission by the masters of learning involving coherence), 472, 474, 593

Li 李 imperial family of the T’ang dynasty, 4–5

Li Jih-hua 李日華, 629

Li Jui 李鍾, 391

Li Kuang-t’i 李光地, 591–2, 596–9

Li Kung 李燾, 369, 505–11

Li Lien 李濂, 251–2

Li Shih-ch’eng 李時珍, 525

Li Shih-yao 李侍堯, 72–3, 620

Li Ssu 李斯, 7, 9, 12–14

Li Ta-pen 黎大本, 631

Li Te-mao 李德懋 [Yī Tōng-mu], 648

Li Tsu-po 利祖白, 333, 334

Li T’ung 李侗, 536

Li Tzu-ch’eng 李自成, 26, 329, 330, 531

Li Wei 李衛, 49

Li Wei-ch’un 李維鉅, 48–51

Li Yin-tu 李因篤, 578

Li Yü 李漁, 629

Li Yüan 李願, 658–9

Li Yung 李順, 495–7, 576, 577

li-fa 曆法 (calendar methods), 387

Li-fan yüan 理藩院 [board for governing outer territories], legal powers, 138–40; main bureaus, 136, 137; in Mongolia, 123–4, 135–43; overview 8–9; in Sinkiang, 134–5; in Tibet, 131

Li-fan yüan ts’e-li 理藩院則例

(Regulations of the Li-fan yüan), 138–9

li-hsing 曆行 (the calendar mission) K. yôkhaeng, 157

Li-hsing ssa 理刑司 (Bureau of Punishments), 137

li-i 禮義 (ritual and righteousness), 163, 171

Li-k’o shib-shu 吏科史書 (Summaries of routine memorials related to the Office of Scrutiny for Personnel), 653, 672

Li-k’o shib-shu 吏科史書 (Summaries of routine memorials related to the Office of Scrutiny for Rites), 653, 672, 673–5, 689

Li-k’o t’i-pen 吏科題本 (Routine memorials of the Office of Scrutiny for Personnel), 635, 672

Li-pu 吏部, see Ministry of Personnel

Li-pu 禮部, see Ministry of Rites

Li-tsung 理宗 (r. 1225–64), 547–8

liang 兩 [a unit of weight, about 37.5 grams; a unit of value of silver, called a tael], 160–1.

liang 淋 (innate good), 493

Liáng Chang-chùi 梁章鉅, 701
literati, Korean, anti-Ch’ing sentiments, 169, 177, 190; and Chinese literati, 187; as envoys, 187; and Northern learning, 189, 193–5; travel writings, 186–7; and Western learning, 189–93; yanghan literati, 174–7, 191, 196

literati, Vietnamese, 221–2

Liu Chao-kuo 劉肇國, 330, 331–2

Liu Hsi-hai 劉喜海, 642

Liu Hsing 劉歆, 546

Liu Hua-yang 柳華陽, 451

liu i 六藝 (six disciplines; Six Classics), 499. See also six disciplines

Liu I-ming 劉一明, 450

Liu 劉 imperial family of the two Han dynasties, 4–5

Liu K’un 劉琨, 569

Liu Te-kung 柳得恭 [Yu Deuk-gong], 627

Liu Tsung-chou 劉宗周, 460–1, 466, 468, 469–77, 482, 483, 490

Liu T’ung-hsün 劉統勳, 72–3

Liu tzu chieh-yao, 劉子節要 (Essentials of Master Liu), 471–2

Liu Wan-su 劉完素, 253

Liu Wen-te 劉蕘德, 341

Liu Wu-yüan 劉武元, 30

Liu yü yen-i 六語演義 (Amplifications of the Six Admonitions, J. Rikuyu engi), 249–50

Liu-tu chien-wen la 留都見聞錄 (Seen and heard in NanKing), 643

liu-yin 六淫 (six excesses), 404

“Lo sbu” 洛書 (“Writing from the Lo River”), 535, 603

Lo Shih-lin 羅士琳, 392–4

Lo Wen-tsaio 羅文藻, also known as Gregory Lopez, 365–6

Lo Yü 羅煬, 392–4

Lo-fu Mountain 羅浮山, 454–5

lo-shan hao-shib 樂善好施 (Delighting in charity and enjoying giving), 654

Lobzang Tayiji (r. 1652–67), 126
local elites: contributions to public realm, expansion in nineteenth century, 664–71, 673f, 672–7, 679; fiscal crisis as stimulus, 665–8; for contributions to military costs, 682; honorific plaques, 672; local officials’ reactions to, 669; memorial arches, 671–2, 674f, 673–5, 679; in Ming period, 652–3; provincial distribution, 676tab; rank and title awards, 671–2, 673, 675, 675f, 679; recognition and rewards, appointments to office, 680; rewards for local managers, 681–2; systematizing the reward process, 652–9, 679–82; treatment of commoners, 681; types of contributions, 672
local gazetteers, 691–9
local products (fang-wu), 154
Long White Mountain, see Ch’ang-pai shan lord (V. chua), 202
Lou Chin-yuan 姜近垣, 419
Louis XIV (r. 1643–1715), 342, 346
Louis XV (r. 1715–74), 362
lower Yangtze region, 63, 531, 651, 690–1. See also Grand Canal loyalists, see Ming resistance to Ch’ing conquest
loyalty (chung 忠) to the state, 43–4, 45, 617–18
lu 錄 (records), 541
Lu 魯 [an ancient state], 168
Lu Hsiang-shan 陸象山 (Chiu-yuan 九淵), 472, 491, 538, 548
Lu Hsüin 魯迅, 631
Lu Lung-ch’i 陸麟其, 639
Lu P’ing-hu wen-chi 陸平湖文通
(Collected writings of Lu Lung-ch’i), 639
Lu, Prince 魯王, 477
Lu Sheng-nan 陸生楠, 613
Lu Shih-hua 陸時化, 640
Lu Shih-i 陸世儀, 492–4, 499
Lu Wen-chao 盧文弨, 260
Lu-an 潘安, 695
Lu-hsüan su 鈞動司 (Bureau for Rewards for Meritorious Service), 136
Lu-kang 鹿港, 106–8
Lü li yüan yüan 律曆淵源 (Origins of pitchpipes and the calendar), 192–3, 390
Lü Liu-liang 陸留良, 613, 629, 639
Lü Tung-pin 陸洞賓, 417, 445, 452–3, 499
Lü-shan 開山 [category of Taoist], 433–5
Lü-tsu ch’iu-an-shu 呂祖全書 (The complete works of Patriarch Lü), 453
Lü-tsu miao 呂祖廟 (The temple of Patriarch Lü), 452
Luan-yang lu 潼陽錄 (Record of Luan-yang), 627
Lun yü 論語, see Analects
Lun-yü i-shu 論語義疏 (Sub commentary for the meaning of the Analects, J. Ronggiao), 255, 257
lung 羅 (amused), 567
Lung K’o-to 隆科多, 612, 613
Lung-hu shan 龍虎山 (Dragon-Tiger Mountain), 417, 430
Lung-men 龍門, 416, 437–8, 440
Lung-men hsin-fa 龍門心法 (Heart method of the Lung-men lineage), 438
Lung-wu 龍武 era (1645–6), 608–9
Ly Than Tong (r. 1128–37), 209
Ma Ch’a’o-chu 马朝柱, 632
Ma Jung 马融, 546
ma shih 马市 (horse market), 114
Ma Tuan-lin 马端临, 542
Ma-lan 马兰, 625
Mac clan, 200–4, 216
Mac Dang Dung (r. 1528–41), 200–1
Macao 澳門, 266–7, 271–3, 278, 296, 301–2, 314, 316, 335–6
Macartney, George Lord, 318–23, 325–6
Magalhães, Antonio de, 360
Magalhães, Gabriel de, 334, 346
magistrates, 81–2
Mahākāla temple, 125
Mahayana Buddhism 大乘, 204, 209, 213, 218
Maigrot, Charles, 344, 347–50
Maila, Joseph de Moyriac de, 362–4
Malacca, 277
Man-pao 滿保, 96
Manchu bannermen, 370, 472
Manchu Christians, 369–70
Manchu language, 338
Manchu officials, 70–2
Manchuria, Chin dynasty’s achievements, 111–17; economy and society, 112–17; Ming intervention in, 112–17; Taoism in, 439. See also Jurchens, Nurhaci
Manchus, appointment as governors, 31–2, 70–2; intermarriage with Mongols, 135, 140–1; Jurchen society, 112–17; and Mongol imperial legacy, 125; pacification of Southern Mongols by, 118–23
Mandate of Heaven, 372
Manila, 210–11, 276–7
Mao Ch’ang 毛苌, 546
Mao Ch’i-ling 毛奇齡, 510
Mao Ch’ung-cho 毛重倬, 608
Mao I-lu 毛一鶚, 692
Mao Wen-lung 毛文龍, 151, 152
Mao-lien 毛憐, 112–14
Maominggan, 120
map-making, 354–5
maritime customs superintendent (hoppo), 274, 275, 279–80, 284, 304
market-town managers, 678
marriage between Manchus and Mongols, 135, 140–1
Martino Martini, 337
mathematics, 391, 397
medicine, Chinese medical treatises, 252–4; debates and disputes, China, 404–7; debates and disputes, Japan, 251–2, 253; K’ang-hsi emperor and, 353–4; medical philology, 253–4; medical writing, 403–4; in Tokugawa Japan, 242, 244, 251–4. See also doctors
Mei Chüeh-ch’eng 梅揆成, 390, 397
Mei Wen-ting 梅文鼎, 192–3, 384–6, 392–4, 396, 397, 592
Mei-hua kuan 梅花觀 (Plum Blossom Temple), 448, 453
mei-mei 味味 (dim or hazy), 525
Meiji 明治 period (1868–1912), 238
Mekong delta, 213, 223
 Mémoires concernant l’histoire, les sciences, les arts, les mœurs, les usage, etc. des Chinois; Par les missionnaires de Pékin, 363
memorial arches, 654, 655, 671–2, 674 fig, 673–5, 679
memorial rites, 351
memorials (petitions and imperial correspondence), seeking rewards for local elites, 653, 658; secret palace memorials, 50; urging local public works, 661
Mencius, 547
Mencius (Meng tsu 孟子), 537, 539, 547
Meng 盟 (Inner Mongol leagues), 128–30
Meng-ku lü-li 蒙古律例 (Mongol statutes and regulations), 138–9
Meng-ku lu-shu 蒙古律書 (Mongol statutes), 122–3
Meng-ku pa ch’i 蒙古八旗 (Mongol Eight Banners), 119–20
merchant guilds, 274, 443, 452
mercury (quicksilver), 138–9, 140, 317
Metello de Sousa e Menezes, Alexandre, 285–6, 361
Mezzabarba, Carlo Ambrogio, 359–60, 365
Mi-yün 密雲, 18, 20–1
Miao 苗 people (Hmong), 202
Miao chiang 苗疆 (Miao frontier areas), 56
Middle Kingdom, see Chung-kuo
migration, to Southeast Asia, 227, 276, 277, 312–13; to Taiwan, 79, 84–6, 92–3, 95; to Vietnam, 212
military garrisons, Manchuria, 112–15; provincial, 39; Taiwan, 80, 109; Vietnam, 206–7, 212
min 民 (commoners), see commoners
Min I-te 闵一得, 454, 553
Min O-yuan 闵鹗元, 623
Min 閱 River, 51
min-chi'an min-pan 民捐民辦 (funded and managed by non-officials), 665
Minagawa Kien 皆川洪園, 245–6
mind, see反省
ming 名 (name; term, nomenclature), 525, 549
ming 喝 (cock’s crow), 559
Ming 明 dynasty (1368–1644), calendar reform, 373–8; Chosǒn’s loyalty to, 164–70, 173, 191; and Christianity, 330; enshrinement system, 683; intellectual endeavors, late Ming, 458; intervention in Manchuria, 112–15; invasion of Vietnam, 199; maritime trade, 266; military campaigns, 202; as 明承ao, 636; official history of, 574, 579–89, 635–7; provincial administration, 17–18, 29–30, 36–8; rewards for “righteous commoners,” 652–3; Taoism, 416–17, 437; tribute system, 266
Ming chien i-chib lu 明鑑易知錄 (An easily understood record of the Ming as mirror), 635
Ming code 大明律 (Ta Ming liù), 249–50
ming i 明意 (clarifying the moral intentions), 489
Ming i-min lu 明遺民錄 (Records of non-collaborators from the Ming), 607
Ming ju hsüeh an 明儒學案 (Source book of Ming Confucians' learning), 470, 474, 481–90, 594
ming li 明理 (clear understanding of coherence), 509
Ming officials serving in the Ch’ing government, 26–7, 156, 646–7
Ming princes in the south, 559
Ming resistance to Ch’ing conquest, in southern China, 38, 210, 238–9, 372, 380, 477–8, 531, 559, 573, 575, 578; in Taiwan, 214–15, 380. See also Southern Ming
Ming shib 明史 (Ming history), 380, 595, 694
Ming shib an 明史案 (Dossiers on Ming history), 480
Ming shib chi-liüeh 明史輯略 (Summaries of Ming history), 635
Ming shib chi-shib pen-mo 明史紀事本末 (Detailed account of recorded events in Ming history), 635
Ming shib kang-mu 明史綱目 (Outline of Ming history), 628
Ming shib kao 明史稿 (Draft Ming history), 172, 587
Ming T’ai-tsu 明太祖 (r. 1368–98), 249–50, 595
Ming wen an 明文案 (Dossiers on Ming prose), 481
Ming-ch’ao chi-shib pen-mo pu-pien 明朝紀事本末補編 (Supplements to the detailed accounts of recorded events of the Ming dynasty), 636
Ming-hsing 明興, 75tab
ming-huan tz’u 名宦祠 (shrine for eminent officials), 683
Ming-i tai-fang lu 明夷待訪錄 (Records awaiting a new dawning), 478–80
Ming-shan 明山, 70
ming-te 明德 (“lighting one’s inner moral force”), 510
ming-tzu 名字 (invented term, or name), 520–1
Mingju 明珠, 42–3, 44
Minh Huong (Chinese who settled in Vietnam and married locally, Ch. ming-hsiang 明香 or 鄉), 212
Minh Vyong (Enlightened Prince, Ch. ming wung 明王), 214
Minh-mang (r. 1820–40), 227, 231
minister (shang-shu 尚書; Man. aliba amban), lead official in ministries and Li-fan y’un, 62, 136
Ministry of Justice (Hsing-pu 刑部), 139, 368
Ministry of Personnel (Li-pu 吏部), 659, 671–2, 680, 681, 682
Ministry of Revenue (Hu-pu 戶部), 21, 23, 36, 651–2, 659
Ministry of Rites (Li-pu 礼部), 164, 172, 334, 357–8, 671–2, 673–5, 686, 687, 688
Ministry of Works (Kung-pu 工部), 659, 666
missionaries, adaptation to Chinese culture, 12, 341; banishment, 334, 336–7; ethnocentrism towards, 351; growth in numbers, 344–5; Nanking Decree, 350; padrado system, 340–1, 344; publications on China, 346. See also Jesuits; Roman Catholic Church
Missions étrangeres de Paris, 344, 345, 348
Mito school 水戸学, 238
mo-’yuan 膜原 (internal membrane), 405
moji 文字 (J. written characters), 242
Mok clan (V. Mak, Ch. Mo 莫), 213, 223, 227, 228
money, see coins and currency
"money for nourishing incorruptibility" (yang-lien 養廉) system, 63, 667, 673
Mongke Temür (r. 1405–33), 114
Mongol bannermen, 119–23, 129
Mongol Eight Banners (Meng-ku (pa ch’i), 119–20
Mongols 蒙古人, Chakhar, 122–3; Dzungar, 131, 132–4; early Manchu–Mongol relations, 118; intermarriage with Manchus, 135, 140–1; Khalkhas, 125–6, 128–30, 132–3, 140; as “nations”, 120;
Oirat, 124, 125–6, 132–3, 134
Morois, Juan Bautista de, 336
morals, see innate knowing of moral good
Motoori Norinaga 本居宣長, 239–40, 243, 244, 247, 248
Mount Hiei 毘陀山, 235–6
Mourão, João, 361
mourning, 66
mu 牧 (regional commissioner, in Han era), 16
Mu 穆, see Smogulecki, Nicolas
Mu 沐 family, 40
Mu-k’e-teng 穆克登, 175
mujilen bahabukū (Man. supervisor in Li-fan y’un), 136
Mukden (Sheng-ching 盛京), 125, 439, 626. See also Shen-yang
Muro Kyūsō 室鳩巣, 249, 250
Muromachi 室町 period (1336–1573), 245, 253, 254
music, censorship of, 625; Confucius on, 557; and court rituals, 418; Li Kung’s treatise on, 510; as one of the six
disciplines, 499, 502, 507; Taoist
418; Western music and the
K'ang-hsi emperor, 340
Muslim (huí-huí), 388
Muslim titles, 134
Muslim law, 135
Muslims, 134–5, 365, 388
My-Tho, 212
Nagasaki 長崎, 235, 276–7
Nagoya 名古, 261
Nagoya Gen'i 名古屋玄匡, 241
Naiman Mongols, 120
Nakai Chikuzan 中井竹山, 251, 255–7
Nakai Riken 中井履軒, 250
Nakai Töju 藤樹中江, 241
Nam-giao sacrifice, Ch. Nan-chiao 南郊, 200
Namhan san 南漢山, 146, 152–3
nan 難 (difficult), 57
Nan Viet (Ch. Nan Yüeh 南越), 197
Nan Yang 南洋 (Southern Sea), 210–11, 212, 277
Nan-ch'ang 南昌, 332
Nan-hai 南海, 283
Nan-kan 南贛, 18
Nan-shan chi 南山集 (Nan-shan collection), 608–9
Nan-yang 南陽, 439
Nan-yang 南洋 (southern ocean, Southeast Asia), 277
Nanking 南京, 20, 345, 367, 531, 608
Nanking Decree, 350, 356
Naobi no mitama 直毘靈 (J. “Rectifying spirit”), 247, 248
Napier, John, 375
Nara 奈良 period (710–94), 257–9
Nasön chöngbol 羅祿征伐 (Military Campaign to Nasön), 166
Navarrete, Domingo, 337
Needham, Joseph, 376
Nei-bšin 內修 (inner moral cultivation)
K. naesu, 167
Nei-san-yüan 内三院 (Three Inner Courts), 36
nei-tan 内丹 (inner alchemy), 437, 437n, 449, 450, 451, 455–6
nei-ti 内地 (inner provinces), 7–8
Nei-wu fu 内務府 (Imperial Household Department), 418, 419
Nemoto Sonshi 根本達志, 255
Netherlands, 268. See also Dutch East India Company
New Year Greetings (chêng-ch'ao), 147
New Year (Tet), 225
Ngo Thi Si, 221–2
Nguyen Anh, 197, 223, 225, 226–7, 228–9. See also Gia-long
Nguyen Hoang, 202, 204, 205
Nguyen Hue, 320
Nguyen Phuc Chu (r. 1691–1725), 214
Nguyen Phuc Khoat (r. 1738–65), 214, 223
Nguyen regime, see Dai Viet
Nguyen Van Thanh, 230
nien 念 (conscious thinking), 488
Nien Keng-yao 年羹堯, 48, 612, 613
nien-kung 年貢 (annual tribute) K.
yön'gong, 157
Nihon koku 日本国 (country of Japan), 235–6
Nine Chief Ministers (chiu ch'ing), 687
Ning Wan-wo 當完我, 574
Ning-yüan 寧遠, 134
Ningguta 寧古塔, 162
Ninghsia 寧夏 province, 18, 21, 24, 134
Ningpo 寧波, 304–5
Noailles, Louis, 348
non-collaborators, leading scholars as,
332–3; names of, 459–60, 462, 472, 478, 511, 528, 559, 578, 581–2, 628
North Church (Pei i'ang 北堂), 345
Northern Campaign (pukból), 165–7
Northern learning (pukbak), 189, 193–5
Northern Sung 宋朝 dynasty
(960–1127), 252, 472, 547–8
“nourishing incorruptibility” (yang-lien
養廉) system, 63, 667, 673
Nouveaux mémoires sur l’état présent de la
Chine, 347, 348
Nouvelle relation de la Chine, 346
Novissima Sinica, 347
Novus atlas Sinensis, 346
Nu-erh-kan 奴兒干, 112–14
Numata 沼田, 259
Nurhaci 努爾哈赤 (Nu-erh-ha-ch’ih r.
1616–26), 111, 116–17, 118–19,
147, 149–51
nui-i 女醫 (female physician), 403
nui-tan 女丹 (female alchemy), 455–6
O-erh-t’ai 鄂爾泰, 49, 50, 68, 70, 92
O-jung-an 鄫容安, 70
O-pao 鄫寶, 70
Oboi 門拜, 29–35, 272, 334. See also
regents
Ochiru Khan, 126–7
Office of Palace Ceremonial (Chang-i
ssu), 418, 419, 424
Ogyu Hokkei 萩生北溟, 249–50, 258
Ogyu Sorai 萩生徂徕, 241, 244, 246,
247, 248, 250, 251–2, 255–7
Oirat Mongols, 124, 125–6, 132–3, 134
Okada Shinsen 岡田新川, 261
Omid 鄫彌達, 92–3
Ongniut Mongols, 120
Ônin War 応仁の乱, 237
Ono no Takamura 小野篁, 257–9
opera, 415, 625
opium imports, 295–8, 367
Opium War, 682
ordination (Taoist), 416–17, 430, 433,
437, 437n
ordination certificates (tiu-tieh), 21, 422,
426, 434–5
Ordoros, 120
originating heart (pen hsin), 463, 466,
467, 468, 471, 487, 493, 494, 513,
529, 563, 601
Osaka 大阪, 248
Ostend Company, 282, 284
Ôta Kinjö 大田錦城, 247
Ou-yang Hsiu 歐陽修, 548
Outer Mongolia, 124, 129, map, 140.
See also Khalkha Mongols
outer territories (Ch. wai-fan 外藩,
Man. tulergi golo), 6–9, 13, 118, 124
overseas Chinese, 198–210, 213, 227,
235, 264–5, 276, 277, 299, 300–7,
312–13
Pa kua chiao 八卦教 (Eight Trigrams
Teachings), 456
Pa-chou 霸州, 357–9
pa-ku wen 八股文 (eight-legged essays),
540
Pa-shan 巴山, 608
Paats, Vincent, 275
Pacheco de Sampaio, Francisco de Assis,
302
padraudo, 340–1, 344
Paektu san 白頭山, 161
Pai-yün kuan 白雲觀 (White Cloud
Temple), 448, 457
painters and painting, 302, 363, 625
Pak Che-ga 朴齊家, 188, 194–5
Pak Chi-won 朴趾源, 188, 193
Pak Se-dang 朴世堂, 176
palace memorials, 50
p’alp’o 八包 (eight bundles), 179–80
Pan Ku 班固, 551
“P’an Keng” 盤庚, 549
Pan Lei 潘耒, 545, 578, 582–3, 601,
602
Panchen Lama, 126–7
pang-ting 帮丁 (convoy soldiers), 670
panjông 反正 (restoring righteousness)
[Ch. jan-cheng], 151
P’ang T’ien-shou 麗天壽, 330
p’ang-cheng 旁徵 (collaborating
evidence), 516
pao 包 (bundle) [unit of trade], 160–1
Pao Shih-ch’en 包世臣, 700
Pao T’ing-po 鮑廷博, 260, 640
pao-chia 保甲 (mutual security, community defense system), 65, 422
pao-chuán 寶卷 (precious volume [of Taoist texts]), 448, 456
Pao-ho tien 保和殿, 324
Pao-ting 保定, 18
papal legations, 285, 349–50, 359–60
Parennin, Dominique, 353–4, 362
Pedrini, Theodoric, 356
Peking 北京, 18
pen hsin 本心 (originating heart; originating mind), 463, 466, 467, 468, 471, 487, 493, 494, 513, 529, 563, 601
pen hsin chib liang 本心之良 (the goodness of one’s originating heart), 468
pen t’i 本體 (fundamental permanence), 489
Pen ts’ao kang-mu 本草綱目 (Complete materia medica), 525
P’eng Chia-p’ing 彭家屏, 619–20
P’eng P’eng 彭培, 43–4
P’eng Sun-i 彭孫贻, 636
P’eng-lai 蓬萊, 21–3
pepper, 208, 295
Pereira, Tomas, 272–3
Pereira de Faria, Bento, 272–3, 340
Pescadores Islands 澎湖群島, 77, 79, 82, 87, 88
petitions, see memorials (petitions and imperial correspondence)
Phan Huy Chu, 229
Phan Thanh Giau, 228
philology, 194, 240, 253–4, 262
Phnom Penh, 210–11
Pho-Hien 218
Pho-Xuan (Hue), 214
Phu-Yen (Cap Varella), 206
Pi Yuan 毕沅, 623
pi-shib 避世 (avoiding the contemporary world), 611
p’iao 票 (certificate), 350, 358–9
Piccolomini, Francesco, 330
picul (tan 擔, weight of about 140 pounds), 288n
Pien chi 辯記 (Records of the recent changes), 608
Pien-men 邊門, 181–2
P’ien-yüan 偏沅, 181–2
Pin-k’o ssu 賓客司 (Bureau for Reception of Guests), 136–7
Pin t’u i lu 賓退錄 (Records after the guests retire), 521
ping t’ien-hsia 並天下 (bring together all under Heaven), 3, 7
p’ing 評 (critiques), 500
p’ing-chieh-ch’i 平節氣 (averaged fortnightly period), 376–7
pirates and piracy, 226
Pitt, Thomas, 276
Pitt, William, 311
plaques, 625–6, 672
Plaskowitz, Gotthard, 285
po 伯 (earl), 436
Po Nagar, 205
po hsüeh 博學, see broad learning
po hsüeh bung ju 博學鴻儒 (men with broad learning and outstanding scholarship), 533
po hsüeh bung ju examination (1679), 533, 545, 576–9, 603
po wen 博文 (broad mastery of the cultural heritage), 546, 556–8
p’o 婆 (granny), 402–3
Poankeequa (P’an Ch’i-kuan 潘啟官), 288, 1, 292, 305, 307, 308
popes, Benedict XIII, 360; Clement XI, 356, 359–60; Innocent X, 337; Innocent XII, 345; Innocent XIII, 360; Pius XI, 365–6
porcelain exports, 289–91
Portrait historique de l’empereur de la Chine, 346–7
postal stations, 141–2
prefects (chib-fu 知府), 664
prefecture (fu 府), 7–8, 649
Prémare, Joseph Henri de,
355
Prince of Kuei 桂, 30, 330
Prince of Lu 魯王, 477–8
principle, see li (coherence, principles, Principle, patterns, orderliness)
Propaganda (Congregatio de Propaganda Fide), 337, 340, 342, 344, 347, 360, 366
Provana, Antonio, 350
provinces (sheng 省), under Yuán dynasty, 17
provincial administration, Ch’ien-lung era, 59–62; evaluation of officials, 49–51; K’ang-hsi era, 27–47; map, 22 map; Ming period, 17–18;
overseeing of outer territories, 8–9;
province–prefecture–county hierarchy, 7–8; reaction to the Yung-cheng order, 59–62; Shun-chih era, 19–27; summary, 17n, 18–19, 76; Yuán dynasty, 17; Yung-cheng era, 59. See also governors of provinces (hsien-fu)
provincial administration commissioners (ch’eng-hsüan pu-cheng shib 丞宣布政使), 17–18. See also pu-cheng shib
provincial education commissioners (t’i-tu hsüeh-cheng 提督學政), 632, 685, 686, 693–4, 695
provincial governors, see governors of provinces
provincial judges (an-ch’a shib 按察使); also known as provincial surveillance commissioner), 31, 35
Prussia, 317
public bureaus, 679
pu-cheng shib 布政使 (lieutenant governor; in Ming era, provincial
finance commissioner), 16, 31–2.
See also lieutenant governors
pu-i 布衣 (unranked literatus, without higher degree), 578, 582
Pu-te-i 不得已 (I could not do otherwise), 334
Pu-te-i pien 不得已謬 (I could not do otherwise, refuted), 334
P’u-chiang 浦江, 685–6
pukbak 北學 (Northern learning), 189
pukpˇol 北伐 (Northern Campaign), 165–7
purchase of office (chı̂an-na 交納), 656–9
Pusan 釜山, 179
pyˇolpˇo 別包 (extra-bundle) trade, 180
Pyˇong’an 平安, 180
pyˇonmu 辨謬 (rectify false records), 170–2
qādi (Ar. local judge), 170–2
Queen of Heaven, 205
Queen of Heaven Temple, 427–8
Quemoy 金門 (Chin-men), 261
queues, 27, 169
quicksilver, 317
Quy-Nhon, 206
rank and title (i-hsii) rewards, 671–2, 673, 675, 675fig, 679
Rashipungsu, 125
rebellions and revolts, Chien-ning, 301;
Chingünjav, 132–3; Chu I-kuei rebellion, 86–8, 92, 104–5; Lin Shuan-wen rebellion, 105–8; Muslim uprising (1781), 365; Ta-chia-hsi revolt, 91–3, 104–5; Three Feudatories rebellion, 38–40, 167;
White Lotus rebellion, 651; Wu Fu-sheng revolt, 104–5; Wu San-kuei rebellion, 573, 619
recluse (shan-jen), 645
Red Banner, 574
“Red manifesto” (hung-p’iao 紅黑), 356
Red River 紅河, 225
Red River delta, 198–210, 215, 218–19, 226, 230
Red-seal ships (J. shuinsen 朱印船), 208
regents, 29–35, 37, 64, 380
regional inspectors (bsü-an 追安), 30, 32, 46, 684
regional military commission (tu-chib-hui 都指揮司), 29
Régis, Jean-Baptiste, 354–5
Republican period 中華民國 (1912–49), 413, 414, 423
revenues, see fiscal resources
revolts, see rebellions and revolts
Rho, Giacomo 羅雅谷 (Lo Ya-ku), 375
Ricci, Matteo 利瑪竇 (Li Ma-tou), 191, 334, 336, 348, 349, 353–4
rice production, Taiwan, 101–2
Ripa, Matteo, 371
rites and rituals, Analects on, 557, 567;
Rites Controversy, see rites and rituals ritsuryō no gaku 律呂之學 (J. jurisprudence), 249
ritual, see rites and rituals
ritual official (fa-kuan), 419, 431
rivers and irrigation, 52–4, 64, 66, 68, 357, 666, 667, 668. See also dike maintenance; water conservancy projects
Rodrigues, Simão, 351
Roman Catholic Church, Chinese clergy and catechists, 341, 365–6, 370–1; Chinese converts, 332, 345–6, 366–8, 369–70; in Ming era, 330; padroado system, 340–1, 344; repression of, 279, 299, 300–7, 314, 343, 357–9, 362–4, 365, 366, 367–8, 381. See also Jesuits; papal legations
Royal Bureau of Astronomy (Kuansanggam), 185
Royal Translation Bureau (Sa-yōgwon), 175
Russia, advance into Ch’ing territory, 166; diplomatic relations with Ch’ing regime, 155, 275, 342–3; Galdan’s relations with, 126–7; Treaty of Nerchinsk, 128, 342–3; tributary status, 11, 155, 270, 275, 325
Ryukyu 琉球 (J. Ryūkyū) Islands, 164, 239, 250, 275
Sa-tsai 薩載, 621
“Sacred edict” (Sheng yú 聖語), 250–1, 344
sacrifice to Heaven, 216
Sagang Sechen, 125
sai-hui 賽會 (ritual–theatrical festival), 420
Saigon (Ho Chi Minh City), 212, 223, 231
saints, see canonization
sajagwan 寫字官 (transcribers), 174
Sakubun ritsu 作文率 (J. Rules for writing), 245
Saldanha, Manoel de, 272, 335–6
salt administration, 51, 73, 661, 701
salt peter, 175, 184
San fan 三藩 (Three Feudatories), 38–40, 167
San Kuan 三官 (the Three Officials), 445
San-chib 三節 (the three major junctures of ritual importance) (K. samjôl), 157
San-chib nien-kung hsing 三節年貢行
(embassy for the three junctures of ritual importance and the yearly tribute) (K. samjôl yon’gong haeng), 157, 160
san-kang 三綱 (the three cardinal virtues), 616
San-pao 三寶, 621, 622

San-bibib 三事 (three types of activity), 502

San-ssu 三司 (Three Offices), 29–30

San-wu 三物 (three types of affairs), 502.

See also six disciplines (liu i); six types of moral power; six types of moral relationships

San-yü t'ang wen-chi 三魚堂文集
(Collected writings from San-yü Hall), 639

Sanz, Pedro, 364

Sarhu, 150

Satō Issai 佐藤一斎, 250

Satō Naokata 佐藤直方, 237–8

Satsuma 薩摩, 239, 250

Sayogwon 司譯院 (Royal Translation Bureau), 175

Sayin Noyan Khan, 129

Schall von Bell, Johann Adam 湯若望 (T’ang Jo-wang), 191, 329–33, 348, 375, 378–9, 380–2, 383

Scholarly projects, emperors’ sponsorship of, 573, 574–7, 587, 597, 616; high officials’ initiatives in, 589–600; independent projects, 600–5

Scenen Khan [also known as Setsen or Chechen Khan], 125, 126, 128, 129

Secret Accounts Bureau, 75tab security merchants, 283, 303–4, 305

Seijuukan 躋壽館, 242

Seito 西土 (J. western land), 254

Sejong 世宗 (r. 1418–50), 185

censorship, prevalence of, 634; by publishers, 638–41; by readers and book collectors, 641–4

self-cultivation, 449, 450–1, 452–3

Semedo, Álvaro de, 408

Seminario de Nossa Senhora do Amparo, 301–2

Seng-ssu 僧錄司 (Central Buddhist Registry), 424–5

Seng-tao 僧道 (category of Taoist and Buddhist clerics), 422

Sengge, 125–6

Sengoku 戰國 era (1482–1558), 252

Senseiden 先聖殿 (Hall of Earlier Sages), 236–7

Shan-hai ku 沙海 [Shanhaikuan], 139

Shan-hou shib t'ou 甕後詩存 (Poems remaining after the effacement), 637

Shan-ju 山人 (recluse), 645

Shan-shu 善書 (morality book), 451

Shan-yin 山陰, 461, 462

Shang 商 dynasty (to 1046 BCE), 544, 549

Shang Chih-hsin 尚之信, 266–7

Shang K'o-hsi 尚可喜, 266–7

Shang shu 尚書 (Venerated writings), see Book of documents

Shang shu ku wen shu cheng 尚書古文疏證 (Evidence for a commentary on the ancient style sections of the Book of documents), 603

Shang-an 尚安, 75tab

Shang-ban 傷寒 (cold-damage disorder), 404, 405

Shang-ban lun 傷寒論 (Treatise on cold-damage disorders), 252–4, 404–7

Shang-ban tsu-ping lun 傷寒雜病論
(Treatise on cold-damage and miscellaneous disorders), 252

Shang-shu 尚書 (Man. aliba amban, lead official in ministries and Li-fan yüan, 62, 136

Shang-ti 上帝 (Lord on high), 336, 344, 349, 352

Shang-yüan 上元, 670

Shanghai 上海, 345–6, 427–8, 431–2, 454, 456

Shansi 山西 province, 676tab, 677

Shantung 山東 province, 676tab, 691

Shao Yung 邵雍, 535, 569

Shao-hsing 紹興, 461, 471, 490, 696

She 敷 (to pardon), 628
she-shang 社商 (village tax farmers), 83
shen 神 (numinous; non-material phenomena; spirit), 518, 519, 562
shen 慎 (vigilance), 49
Shen I-ping 沈一炳, 455
Shen Kuo-yuan 沈國元, 170
Shen Li 沈鯉, 684
Shen-nung 神農 (the Divine Husbandman), 410
Shen-nung pen-ts'ao ching 神農本草經 (The Divine Husbandman's materia medica), 410
Shen-tsung 神宗 (r. 1068–85), 548
shen-tu 慎獨 (taking care in solitude), 463, 466
shen-tung 神董 (degree-holding manager), 678
Shen-yüeh kuan 神樂殿 (Temple of Spirit Music), 418
sheng 省 (province), 6–13
sheng ch'i 生氣 (produce anger), 562
sheng sbib 生事 (create problems), 44
Sheng yü 聖語 (“Sacred edict”), 250–1, 344
Sheng yü kuang hsün 聖語廣訓 (Amplified instructions for the Sacred edict), 250
Sheng-ch'ao hsün-chieh chu ch'ien chuan 勝朝列簡諸臣傳 (Records of martyrs for the previous dynasty), 646–7
sheng-chieh 聖節 (birthday of the emperor) K. sōngjūl, 147
Sheng-ching 盛京, 180. See also Mukden, Shen-yang
Sheng-ching t'ung-chib 盛京通志 (Comprehensive gazetteer of Sheng-ching), 161
sheng-fan 生番 (“uncivilized” or “raw” aborigines), 83
sheng-hsiüeh 聖學 (learning from the sages), 593
sheng-yüan 生員 (licentiate, lower degree status), 249–50, 619
Shensi 陝西 province, 18, 134, 627, 676tab, 677, 691
Shichikei Mōbi kōban 七經孟子考文 (J. Examined texts for seven classics including the Mencius), 258
Shichikei Mōbi kōban boi 七經孟子考文補遺 (J. Additions to the Examined texts for the seven classics including the Mencius), 258
shib 事 (events), 516–17
shib 士 (literatus, literati), 479, 600
shib 實 (substantive phenomenal realm), 562
shib 識 (understanding), 568–9
shib 史 (history), 635
shib 石 (unit of measurement, approx. 100 liters), 162–3
Shih 施, General, 436
Shib chi 史記 (Records of the historian), 551
shib sbib 實職 (substantive appointment to office), 680
Shib ching 詩經, see Book of odes
shib ching 石經 (stone inscription classic), 466
Shih Jun-chang 施閔章, 527
Shih Lang 施琅, 43–4, 77–9
Shih Shih-lun 施世綸, 43–4
Shih Tao-yüan 施道淵, 428, 440
Shih Wen-cho 石文焯, 53
Shih-ch’uan shan 石船山, 559
shib-fang ti’ung-lin 十方叢林 (group of major public monasteries), 441
Shib-bsien li 時憲曆 (Following the decree of Heaven calendar), 176, 184–6, 190–1
shib-hsüeh 實學 (learning that is practiced), 507
shib-huo chib 食貨志 (essays on economic affairs), 583
shib-kung 師公 (vernacular priest) 429–30. See also fa-shib, tuan-kung
shib-lang 侍郎 (Man. ansban-i amban, vice minister in Li-fan yüan), 136
Shun-chih 順治, 71
Shib-lu 實錄 (veritable records), 475, 581, 583, 586
Shib-lu 實錄 (Veritable records), 672
Shib-san ching chu-shu chiao-k'an chi 十三經注疏校勘記 (Collations of the texts and commentaries of the thirteen classics), 258
Shib-shih ch'iu-shih 實事求是 (search for truth in material things), 392
Shi-motsuke 下野, 255–6
Shina (Ch. Chih-na 支那), 254
Shin-chu 新注 (J. new commentaries), 256
Shintō 神道, 237–8, 247
Shogun (將軍 shōgun), 249–50
Shrines, 443, 447, 547–8. See also enshrinement of local worthies
Shu 數 (numbers, numerical relationships, manipulating numbers), 385, 386, 493–4, 535
Shu 忏 (being empathetic), 536
Shu 書 (writing; documents), 551
Shu 書 (Documents), see Book of documents
Shu kuo 屬國 (attached states), 6–13
Shu wu 劃物 (multitude of affairs and things), 508–9
Shun-su 熟番 ("civilized" aborigines), 83
Shu-yüan 書院 (academy), 386, 504
Shühun roku 習文錄 (J. Record of practicing classical literacy), 245
Shun 舜 [ancient sage king], 237–8
“Shun tien” 舜典 section of the Book of documents, 577
Shun-chih 順治 emperor, endorses new calendar, 379, 382–3; and Jesuits, 267, 272, 330, 331–2
Shun-chih 順治 era (1644–61), appointment of provincial governors during, 19–21, 25–7; literary inquisitions during, 607, 608; location of provincial governors under, 18, 20–5
Shun-sun 順孫 (obedient descendants), 653
Shun-t'ien 順天, 18
Shuo wen chiéh tzu 說文解字 (Explanations and explications of written words), 546–7
Siam, 275, 300
Sibe Mongols, 134
Silinghol League, 120
Silk exports, 291–3, 298, 307
Silver bullion reserves, 651–2
Silver imports, 294, 297
Sinicae historiae decas prima, 346
Sinjōn chabō pang 新傳煮硝方 (Newly transmitted recipe for saltpeter), 184
Sinkiang 新疆 province [lit. "new frontier"], Ch’ing conquest of, 132–4; civilian administration, 134–5
Sinophilism and sinophobia in Japan, 247–9
Sinqua, 297
Six disciplines (ritual and musical performance, archery and carriage driving, writing words and manipulating numbers), 499, 502, 507
Six types of moral power (knowledge, benevolence, sagacity, duty, loyalty and harmony), 502
Six types of moral relationships (being a son, a friend, a neighbor, a married in-law, a government officer, and a compassionate contributor to those in need), 502
Slaves (Man. aba, booi aba, booi niyalma), 115–16
Smogulecki, Nicolas, 522
Smuggling, 172, 184, 287, 312, 367
So 所 (posts), 112–15
Sō Ho-su 徐浩修, 192–3
So-i 所以 (that by which), 406
So-i-jan 所以然 (that by which it is so), 396, 509, 520, 564
so-tang-pan 所當然 (that by which it ought to be so), 485
Soares, José, 191
Society of Jesus, suppression of, 12, 366.
See also Jesuits
sōhak 西學 (Western learning), 189–93
Sohyŏn, Prince 昭顯世子, 158–62
sōin 西人 (Westerners, a faction in Korea), 167
Solon Mongols, 134
solstice, see winter solstice
Son of Heaven (T'ien-tzu 天子), 154, 155, 266, 320, 325
Song Si-yŏl 宋時烈, 167–9
Songgotu, 576
Sŏnjo 宣祖 (r. 1567–1608), 148
Soochow 蘇州 (Su-chou), 34, 427–8, 431–2, 456, 662, 666, 668, 677, 678, 685–6, 690, 699
South China Sea, 214–15, 217
South Church (Nan t'ang 南堂), 330, 331–2, 338
Southeast Asia, 205, 222–5, 295, 299, 300–7, 312–13
southern metropolitan area, in Ming era, 33, 35
Southern Ming 南明, 166, 167, 238–9, 330, 559, 573, 575, 608–9
Southern River Conservancy, see Yellow River
Southern Sung 南宋 dynasty (1127–79), 508, 547–8, 593, 625
Spanish embassy, 317
spirit-money, 445
spirit-writing, 451–5
Spring and autumn annals (Ch'un-ch'iu 春秋), 537, 546, 560, 567
Spring and Autumn period 春秋 (722–481 BCE), 546
ssu 思 (thinking; ratiocination), 568
ssu ku 思古 (“thinking about antiquity”), 499
Ssu pien lu 思辨錄 (Records of my thoughts and analyses), 492
Ssu wen lu 思問錄 (Records of thinking and inquiry), 560
Ssu-chib t'ang wen-chi 四知堂文集
(Collected writings from the Hall of four types of knowing), 66–7
Ssu-k'u ch'üan-shu 四庫全書 (Complete collection of the four treasuries), compilation of, 258, 580–1, 620–1; effect on scholarship of, 609, 644–5; and literary inquisition, 607, 618, 620–1, 627, 634, 640–1, 647
Ssu-ma Ch'ien 司馬遷, 551
Ssu-ma Kuang 司馬光, 542, 551
ssu-t'ien 祀典 (official sacrifices mandated by statute), 421, 422
ssu-tzu 私自 (private), 692
state activism, under Chia-ch'ing and Tao-kung emperors, 664–71; defined, 650–1; impact on local elites’ public involvement, 660–4; under Yung-cheng and Ch'ien-lung emperors, 650–1
Staunton, George Leonard, 318
steles, 625–6
Su Shih 蘇軾, 476
su ju 俗儒 (vulgar Confucian scholars), 601, 602
Su-wen 素問 (“Basic questions”), 252–4
su'an 算 (calculating), 493–4
succession struggles, 44, 360, 612, 613
sugar, 89, 101–2, 211, 293
Sugita Genpakū 杉田玄白, 252
Suharaya Shinbe 須原八兵衛, 246, 247
Sui 隋 dynasty (581–618), 259
Sui-an 遼安, 692
sui-pi 歲幣 (annual payments) [K. sep’ye], 151, 157
sui-shib 歲實 (length of a tropical year), 392
Sukchong 禽宗 (r. 1674–1720), 171, 191
Sukeji 蘇克濟, 44
Suksaha 蘇克薩哈, 29
sulfur, 78, 83, 184
*sumu* (Mon. local area controlled by a *jasagb*), 118
Sun Ch’i-feng 孫奇逢, 472–4, 482, 498, 580, 593
Sun Chia-kan 孫嘉淦, 618
Sunahai, 370–1
Sung 宋 dynasty (960–1279), 4–5, 553, 595
Sung learning, Ch’ing critics of, 498–505, 508–11; Ch’ing era re-examination of, 490–4; enshrinement of Sung masters, 547–8; influence in Japan of, 236, 249; Japanese critics of, 253, 256; and medical practice, 253. See also Ch’eng–Chu learning; Chu Hsi; Lu Hsiang-shan
Sung Ch’i 宋祁, 553
Sung Ch’üan 宋槙, 26
*Sung shib* 宋史 (*History of the Sung*), 595
Sung–Yüan 宋元 period [10th–14th c.], 397, 400, 414
Sunggari River 松花江, 112–17
Sungkiang 松江 (Sung-chiang), 662, 666, 668
Sunu 蘇努, 361, 369
supreme commander (*tsung-tu* 總督), in Ming era, 17–18
Suqua, 282–3
surveillance commissioner (*an-ch’a shib* 按察使), 31
Swedish East India Company, 284
Szechwan 四川 province, 18, 18n, 20–1, 46, 454–5, 676tab, 679
*Ta Ch’ing lü-li* 大清律例, 420. See also Ch’ing code
*Ta hsiêh* 大學, see Great learning
*Ta hsiêh pien* 大學辨 (*Critiques of the Great learning*), 464
tai 大義 (larger meanings), 533
*Ta Ming hui-tien* 大明會典 (*Statutes of the Ming*), 171, 653
*Ta Ming i-t’ung* 大明一統 (the integrated domain of the Great Ming), 191
*Ta Ming lü* 大明律 (*Ming code*), 249–50
Ta-chia River 大甲溪, 80
Ta-chia-hsi 大甲西, 91–3, 104–5
Ta-chia-tung 大甲東, 91
ta-hsiêh-shib 大學士, see grand secretary
*Ta-i chüeh-mi lu* 大義覺迷録 (*Record of great righteousness in resolving confusion*), 609, 613, 638
Ta-kuang-ming tien 大光明殿 (Great Hall of Light), 419
*Ta-li ssu* 大理司 (*Court of Judicial Review*), 139
Ta-li 大里杙, 105–8
ta-ping 大兵 (imperial soldiers), 628
Ta-shan 大汕, 214
Ta-tun 大墩, 106–8
Ta-t’ung 大同, 18, 24, 637
*Ta-t’ung lü* 大統曆, 186
ta-yeh 大業 (Great enterprise, dynastic conquest), 628
*Ta-èbo tan* 大報壇 (*Altar for the Great Repayment*), 169
Tai people, 199
Tai Chen 戴震, 395–6
Tai Ming-shih 戴名世 (H. Nan-shan 南山), 67, 609, 612, 614
T’ai-ch’ang 泰昌 emperor (r. 1620), 533
T’ai-ch’ang 泰昌 era (1620), 170
T’ai-ch’ang ssu 太常寺 (*Court of Imperial Sacrifices*), 418
T’ai-chi 太極 (Supreme Ultimate), 344, 520–1
T’ai-ch’i-ch’üan 太極拳 [a martial art], 443
T’ai-Ch’ing kung 太清宮 (Palace of the Great Ch’ing), 439
T’ai-ho t’ien 太和殿, 321
t’ai-hsi 泰西 (Far West), 388
t’ai-hsiêh-shib 太學士, see grand secretary
T’ai-hu 太湖 (Lake T’ai), 590
T’ai-i chin-hua tsung-chih (The secret of the golden flower) 452–3
T’ai-p’ing 太平 county, 630
T’ai-ts’ang 太倉, 640
T’ai-tsung 太宗, see Hung Taiji
T’ai-yüan 太原, 26, 332, 575–6, 578, 581
Taichung 臺中, 91, 106–7
Tainan 臺南, 80, 81–2, 88, 107
Taiping 太平 rebels, 454
Taiping Rebellion (1850–64), 700
Taiwan 臺灣, civil administration, 80–2; communal conflict among Han settlers, 102–5, 109; establishment of Ch’ing rule, 77–82; garrison forces, 80; growth of Han settlement, 89, 95–105, 276–7; land policies, 95–9; pro-colonization debates, 88–90, 92–3; rebellions and revolts, 86–8, 91–3; restrictions on immigration to, 79, 84–6, 92–3, 95; rice and sugar exports, 101–2; taxation of aborigines, 82–4, 94
Takase Kiboku 高瀨喜朴, 249–50
Taki 多紀 family, 241–2
talent (ts’ai 才), as criterion for Ch’ing officials, 49–51
talismans, 432–3
tally trade (J. kango 勘合), 234–5
Tan-shui 淡水, 83, 90, 91, 97, 100, 107	’an 壇 (altar), 430
T’an Yüan-ch’ün 譚元春, 629
T’an Yün-hsien 談允賢, 403
tang-juan 當然 (the event as it ought to be), 396
T’ang 唐 dynasty (618–907), 4–5
T’ang 唐 (J. Kara), 235–6
T’ang Pin 湯斌, 579–80, 581, 593–4, 685–6
T’ang-hsi 湯谿, 685–6
tao 道 (ways; cosmic forces), 508, 561, 562, 564–6
Tao 道 (the Way), 564, 565
Tao hsiêh 道學 (Learning of the Way; learning of the Way), 513, 595
tao i feng t’ung 道一風同 (unification of all customs with the Way), 646
tao li 道理 (dynamic coherence), 600
tao t’ung 道統 (transmission of the Way), 499, 596
tao tzu 道字 (the word tao), 566
Tao-chiao 道教 (Taoism), 412
Tao-feng 道封 (Taoist canonization), 435
Tao-kuan 道觀 (Taoist temples and monasteries), 412, 439
Tao-kuang 道光 era (1820–50), book censorship during, 642; enshrinements during, 690; recognizing and rewarding local elite contributions, 673ff, 672–5, 681; support for local elite involvement in public projects, 664–71
Tao-lu ssu 道錄司 (Central Taoist Registry), 424
Tao-men shib-kui 道門十規 (Ten rules for the Taoist), 416
tao-shib 道士 (Taoist priest, cleric or clergy), 412, 429–30, 441
tao-shib-t’ang 道士堂 (Taoist priest’s hall for altar), 430
Tao-shu shib-erb chung 道書十二種 (Twelve works on the Tao), 450
tao-t’ai 道齋 (circuits intendant), 32
Tao-tsang 道藏 (Taoist canon), 412
Tao-tsang chi-yao 道藏輯要 (Essentials of the Taoist canon), 449
Tao-tsang hsii-pien 道藏續編 (Continuation of the Taoist canon), 454
T’ao Chu 陶澍 (1779–1839), 667, 701
T’ao hua shan 桃花扇 (Peach blossom fan), 636
Taoist 道家 610
Taoism 道教, 412; books and publications, 448–50; canonization ritual, Cheng-i clergy, 416–17; Ch’ing emperors and, 418–19; Chüan-chen clergy, 416–17, 423, 436–43; as contested concept, 412; elite and non-elite Taoists, 419, 425–9; lay practices and practitioners, 447; local cults and rituals, 421, 422, 443–7; in Ming era, 416–17; ordination, 416–17, 430, 433–5, 437, 437n; role at Ch’ing court, 417–20; self-cultivation, 437, 437n, 449, 450–1, 452–3; spirit-writing, 451–5; state policies towards, 417, 420–5, 435–6; “Taoist decline” thesis, 413, 414; women clergy, 441. See also ordination certificates
Taoists 道家, see Taoism
Taoist canon (Tao-tsang 道藏), 412, 416, 448
Tarim Basin, 111–12, 134–5
taxes, monetized economy and, 556; non-payment of, 33, 63; on Taiwan aborigines, 82–4, 94. See also fiscal system
Tay-son revolt, 224–6
t‘e 德 (virtue), 562–3
Te-hua 德化, 289
Te-p’ei 德沛, 369
T‘e-chien 特擢 (special appointment), 70n
tea trade, 160–1, 264–5, 276–7, 284, 286–9, 297, 305, 309, 312
temple manager (chu-ch‘ih), 446
temple of eminent statesmen, 61
Temple of Spirit Music (Shen-yüeh kuan), 418
Ten Great Campaigns (Ch. shih ch‘uan 十全), 108, 223
Tendai 天台, 235–6
Teng Chih-ch’eng 鄧之誠, 637
Teng Hui 鄧雋, 610
Tet (New Year) offensive, 225
Thailand, see Siam
Thang-Long, 216, 229
Thanh Nhan (Ch’ing people, Ch. ch‘ing-jen 清人), 212
Thanh-Nghe, 199–202, 204–6, 207, 209, 227
Thien Mu (Heavenly Mother), 205
Thien Mu Temple, 205, 213, 229
Thien-Y-A-Na, 205
Three Feudatories (San fan 三藩), 38–40, 167
Three Inner Courts (Nei san yüan 内三院), 36
Three Offices (san ssu 三司), 29–30
Three Teachings (V. Tam Giao, Ch. San-chiao 三教), 232
Thuan-Quang, 200, 205, 210–11, 216, 219, 230
ti pao 郵報 (capital reports), 585
Ti t’ien k‘ao 帝天考 (Investigation of the terms Lord and Heaven), 370
Ti yu ti tung ye 地游地動也 (‘Earth roaming’ is the earth moving’), 521
T‘i 體 (realization), 474
T‘i-hsüeh yü-shib 提學御史 (education intendant censor), 684
T‘i-jen 體仁 hall, 577
T‘i-ts‘u hsüeh-cheng 提督學政 (provincial education commissioner), 632, 685, 686, 693–4, 695
T‘i-yao 提要 (evaluation), 640
tiao-shib 弔時 (mourning the times), 611
T‘iao-li 條理 (pattern or arrangement), 508, 562–3
Tibet, 116, 130–1
Tibetan Buddhism, 125
“Tieh lien hua” 蝶戀花 (Butterflies lingering over flowers), 608
T‘ien 天 (heaven; sky), 2–3
T'ien 天 (Heaven; name of deity), 2–3, 336, 344, 349, 473, 494
T'ien jen p'ing ts'ei 天人平西策 (Son of Heavens pacification of the west), 631
T'ien ti hui 添弟會 (Increase Younger Brothers Society), 106
T'ien Wen-ching 田文鏡, 5, 60–1, 613
T'ien-ch'i 天啓 era (1621–7), 170
T'ien-chu 天主 (Lord of Heaven), 336, 338
T'ien-chu chiao ju-chiao t'ung-i k'ao 天主教儒教同異考 (Similarities and differences between Christianity and Confucianism), 370
T'ien-chu shih-i 天主實義 (True meaning of the Lord of Heaven), 353–4
T'ien-hou kung 天后宮 (T'ien-hou Temple), 427–8
T'ien-hsia 天下 (all under heaven; empire; civilized world), 2–3, 4, 5–6, 7, 10
T'ien-hsüeh ch'üan kai 天學傅概 (A survey on the propagation of the learning from Heaven), 333
T'ien-hsüeh pen-i 天學本義 (Essential meaning of the teaching of Heaven), 349
T'ien-hsien p'ai 天會派 (Lineage of the Celestial Immortals), 449
T'ien-i ko 天一閣 (T'ien-i Tower), 642
T'ien-li 天理 (heavenly principle; heavenly coherence), 167, 470, 473
T'ien-ming 天命 (fate), 473
T'ien-shib 天師 (heavenly master), 430.
See also Chang t'ien-shib
T'ien-shib tao 天師道 (Church of the Heavenly Master), 424
T'ien-shun 天順 era (1457–64), 149
T'ien-t'an 天壇 (Altar of Heaven), 418
T'ien-t'an yü-ko 天壇玉格 (Heavenly Master ordination procedures), 428, 433–5
T'ien-ti hui 天地會 (Heaven and Earth Society), 106–7, 109
T'ien-ti wan wu 天地萬物 (the myriad things in the realm of heaven-and-earth), 529–34
T'ien-tzu 天子 (son of Heaven; ruler; emperor), 2, 154, 155, 479
T'ien-wen 天文 (astronomy), 387. See also astronomy; calendars and calendrical learning
Tientsin 天津, 18, 23, 26, 305–6, 427–8
Tin, 295
T'ing-ch'ieh-ch'i 定節氣 (fixed fortnightly periods), 376–7
T'ing 亭 (hamlet), 552
Titsingh, Isaac, 324
Tochigi 桐生 都 (prefecture), 255
Tokugawa 徳川 era (1600–1868), 11, 234–6. See also Japan
Tokugawa Ieyasu 徳川家康, 257–9
Tokugawa Yoshimine, see Yoshimune
Tong-Son, 206
Tongguk 東國 (Eastern State), 168
Tonkin 東京, see Dong-Kinh
Tou Ying 貞嬰, 567
Tou-liu-men 斗六門, 106–8
Tou-mu 斗母 (Mother of the Dipper), 445
T'ou-nao 頭腦 (brain), 470
Tournon, Charles-Thomas Maillard de, 349–50
Toyotomi Hideyoshi 豐臣 秀吉, 148, 149, 236, 238–9, 257–9
trade, book imports, 183–4, 240;
“country trade,” 293, 295, 310, 311–12, 327; end of tribute-trade linkage, 273–4; extortion by officials, 309, 313; foreigners’ grievances, 303–4, 305–6, 312–13, 314–16, 317; gold exports, 293; growth of European trade, 280–5; Japanese, 207–8, 234–5, 265; Korea, 177–84; maritime customs superintendents, 274, 275, 279–80, 284, 304;
trade, book imports (cont.)
maritime trade guilds and monopolies, 282–3, 305, 307, 309;
Ming with Jurchens, 114; between Oirats and Russians, 126; opium
imports, 295–8; porcelain exports, 289–91; private Chinese, 207–8, 211,
235; restrictions and regulations on, 299, 300–7, 312–13; role of
embassies in, 178–80, 267, 268, 270–1, 273, 275, 325–6;
security-merchant system, 283, 303–4, 305; silk exports, 291–3, 307;
silver imports, 294, 297; with Southeast Asia, 222–5, 277, 295,
299, 300–7, 312–13; Taiwan, 101–2;
taxes and maritime customs, 273–4, 275, 279–80, 283–4; tea exports,
286–9; Vietnamese, 207–8, 209, 211–12, 214–15, 217; woolen
imports, 294
Tran-Ninh (Plain of Jars), 221
Treatise on cold-damage disorders, see
Shang-ban lun
Treatise on warm-factor epidemic disorders, see
Wen-i lun
Treaty of Nerchinsk, 128
tributary relations with Ch’ing court,
Annan, 275; Dai Viet, 217;
Dzunghars, 132; European states,
11–12; Japan, 11, 235–6; Jurchens,
112–17; Khalkhas and Oirats,
124–30; Korea, 146, 151–64;
Mongol jasaghs, Tibetans, and
Turkestanis, 136–7; Ryukyu Islands,
275; Siam, 275
tributary relations with Chein-chou
Jurchens, 148–52
tributary relations with Ming court,
Jurchens, 114; Korea, 146–7, 152
tributary relations with Tokugawa
Japan, Korea, and Ryukyu Islands,
239
tribute embassies, Britain, 275; Ch’ing
to Annan, 164; Ch’ing to Chosôn,
164; Ch’ing to Ryukyu Islands, 164;
Dutch East India Company, 267, 268,
270–1, 273, 275; Japan, 235–6;
Korea, 147, 157–61, 164, 171,
178–80, 185; to Ming court, 147,
266; Ming to Chosôn, 147; papal
legations, 285; Portugal, 266–7,
271–3, 285–6, 302; Russia, 270,
325; Siam, 300. See also diplomatic
and consular relations
tribute system, as ceremonial
institution, 285, 325–6; as “Chinese
world order,” 153–6; Ming, 146–9,
266
Trieu Da, see Chao T’o
Trinh Can (r. 1682–1709), 217
Trinh Cuong (r. 1657), 228
Trinh Giang (r. 1729–40), 219
Trinh Hoai Duc, 228
Trinh Kiem (r. 1539–69), 201
Trinh regime, see Dai Viet
Trinh Tac (r. 1657–82), 215,
217–22
Trinh Trang (r. 1623–57), 215,
217–22
Trinh Tung, 202
Truong Phuc Loan, 224
Truong Son Mountains, 199
tsa ch’i 雜 氣 (heterogeneous ch’i),
405
tsai-li 宰理 (principles of maintaining
social order), 524
Ts’ai Ch’en 蔡沈, 232
Ts’ai Chia-shu 蔡嘉樹, 631
Ts’ai T’ing 蔡廷, 613
Ts’ai Yu-jung 蔡毓娟, 41, 42
Ts’ai Yuan-ting 蔡元定, 569
ts’an-tsan ta-ch’en 參贊大臣 (resident
officials in Sinkiang), 134–5
Ts‘ang shu 藏書 (A book to conceal), 567,
646
Ts'ao 曹 family, usurpers of Han imperial rule and founders of Wei dynasty, 66–7
Ts'ao-tung 曹洞 sect, 213–14
Ts’ao-yüan ch’üan-shu 遊運全書 (Complete account of grain transport), 66–7
Tsar of Russia, 128
Tse (regularities), 519
Tseng Tzu 曾子, 536
Tseng T’ien-chu hsin-t’ang chi 謝震天新堂記 (“In honor of the new Catholic Church”), 330, 331–2
Tsewang Rabdan (r. 1697–1727), 128, 130, 131, 132
Tsinan 濟南 (Chi-nan), 26, 345
Tsinghai 青海 province, 111–12, 130
Tsinghua University 清華大學 [Ch’ing-hua Ta-hsüeh], 641
Tso chuan 調傳 (Tso’s commentary), 546, 549, 567
Tso-fang-i 走方醫 (itinerant healers), 398
Ts’o yung tiao 禪庸調 (a tripartite tax system, V. to-dung-dieu), 220
Ts’u-p’u 族譜 (clan genealogies), 623
Ts’u-shib 祖師 (“patriarch” of local cult), 447
Ts’u Chi 崔紀, 64
Ts’ai-yao ch’üeb 最要缺 (very important posts), 57
Ts’un Chu yao chib 尊朱要旨 (“Fundamental points for venerating Chu Hsi”), 596
“Ts’un hsüeh pien” 存學編 (“Treatise on living learning”), 506
Ts’un-mu 存目 (to receive notice), 609
Tsung-chib 宗旨 (master purpose), 483, 569, 593
Tsung-p’ai 宗派 (lineage of Taoist clergy), 416
Tsung-p’ing 總兵 (garrison commander), 625–6
Tsung-tu 總督 (supreme commander, in Ming era), 18
Tu 蠢 (worm), 604
Tu chib-hui shib 都指揮使 (military commissioner), 16, 114
Tu-chib-hui suu 都指揮司 (regional military commission), 29
Tu Chün-ying 杜君英, 87–8
Tu Fu 杜甫, 553
Tu li t’ung k’ao 讀禮通考 (Comprehensive examinations of readings on rituals), 589
Tu Lin 杜林, 546
Tu Yu 杜預, 549
Tu-shu-t’ang hsi-cheng sui-pi 謝書堂西征隨筆 (Jottings of a western journey from the Hall for Reading), 613–14
Tu-t’ung 都統 (commander), 134–5
t’u-tieh 度牒 (ordination certificate), 422
t’u 圖 (array, sometimes called diagram), 535, 603
Tu Kuo-pao 土國寶, 30
T’u-ssu 土司 (local hereditary chief or officer), 40, 201
T’u-t’ung kung 土地公 (local earth god), 435
Tuan Ch’ang-hsü 段昌緒, 619
Tuan-kung 端公 (vernacular priest), 429–30. See also vernacular priests
Tuan-wu chib 端午節 (Dragon Boat festival), 432–3
Tumen River 圖們江, 161–2
Tümet Mongols (Tumed), 120
Tung Chung-shu 董仲舒, 232
Tung Kao 董謨, 645
tung-chib 冬至 (winter solstice) K. tongji, 157
Tung-lin 東林 faction, 472, 475, 476, 490, 500, 559, 615
Tung-lin Academy (Tung-lin shu-yüan 東林書院), 468, 472
tung-shib 董事 (manager), 651, 652, 681–2
Tung-yang 東洋 (eastern ocean, name for countries to the east), 277
T'ung-yüeh miao 東嶽廟 (Temple to the God of the Eastern Peak), 443
T'ung-yüeh ta-ti 東嶽大帝 (deity of the Eastern Peak), 415
t'ung chi 通幾 (comprehending seminal forces), 518
T'ung chien kung-mu 通鑑綱目 (Summary of the Comprehensive mirror for aid in government), 362–4
t'ung ju 通儒 (“comprehensive Confucian scholar”), 545, 601, 602
t'ung ku chin 通古今 (comprehend past and present), 527
t'ung shan hui 同善會 (society for doing good together), 492
T'ung ya 通雅 (Comprehensive refinement), 516, 524–7
T'ung-ch'eng 桐城, 67, 515
T'ung-chien lun 通鑑論 (Discussion on the comprehensive mirror), 613
T'ung-chien Ming chi 通鑑明紀 (Record of the Ming in the comprehensive mirror style), 628
T'ung-chih 同治 reign (1861–75), 689
T'ung-chou 通州 (Chihi), 18n, 319
T'ung-hsüan chiao-shih 通玄教師
(religious teacher who comprehends the mysterious), 331
T'ung Yang-chia 佟養甲, 267
Turfan, 132, 134–5
Turkestan, 118, 126–7, 132, 134, 136–7
Turkic titles, 134
Tüsìyetü Khan, 126–9, 140
tutelage over “outer territories,” 142–3
Tuva, 132
tzu 字 (written words), 527, 549
Tzu chih t'ung chien 資治通鑑
(Comprehensive mirror for aid in government), 542, 551
Tzu-hsia 子夏, disciple of Confucius, 541
Tzu hsiao chi 資孝集 (Toward being filial), 631
tzu-jan 自然 (what is spontaneously so; so of itself), 519, 520, 561
Tzu-kuan 字貫 (Comprehensive dictionary), 614
Tzu-kung 子貢, disciple of Confucius, 547
Tz’u-hsi t’ai-hou 慈禧太后 Dowager Empress Tz’u-hsi, 418
Uesugi Norizane 上杉憲実, 257–9
ügwan 衣冠 (clothes and hats), 168, 170, 194
Úiju 義州, 180
üwón 醫員 (medical doctors), 174
Újümchin, 120
Ulan Budung, 128
Ulanjab League, 120
Uliasutai, 129, 142
unofficial histories (yeb-shih), 619, 623, 630n
Urat, 120
Urumchi, 134–5
van Braam Houckgeest, André Everard, 323–4
Varo, Francisco, 351
veneration rites, see ancestral tablets;
Chinese rites controversy
Verbiest, Ferdinand (Nan Huai-jen 南懷仁), 333, 338, 348, 354–5, 370, 382, 386, 592
veritable records (shib-lu), 475, 581, 583, 586
vernacular literature, 412
vernacular priests, 428, 429–30, 434
vice minister (shib-lang 侍郎; Ma. ashan-i amban), in Li-fan yüan, 136
Vietnam 越南 (Ch. Yüeh-nan),
Buddhism, 213–14; creation as state, 197, 226–7; naming of, 197;
pre-Ch’ing period, 198–210; reign title, 197–8; tributary status, 10–11.
See also Dai Viet; Gia-long era
Vincentians, see Lazarists
Visdelou, Claude de, 342
Vu Truong Toan, 228

Wan Ch'i-yüan 萬其淵, 629
Wadoku yōrō 和讀要領 (J. Essentials of Japanese readings of Chinese), 246, 247
Waegwan 倭館, 179
Wai fan 外藩 (Man. tulergi golo), 6–9, 13.
See also outer territories

Wai-kan 外感 (externally contracted [diseases]), 405
Wan Ch'i-yüan 萬其淵, 341
Wan Ssu-t'ung 萬斯同, 511, 585–7, 640
Wan-an 萬安, 528
Wan-li 萬曆 emperor (r. 1573–1619), 533
Wan-li 萬曆 era (1573–1619), 202, 549
Wan-nien p'ei-t'ien-ts'e 晚年配天策 (Essays on the eternal Son of Heaven), 631
Wan-shou kung 萬壽宮, 447
Wan-wu ch'en-yüan 萬物真原 (True origin of all things), 353–4
Wan-yen 完顏 [name of a Manchu clan], 449–50

Wang Ch'ing-ch'ü 王清初, 201, 223
Wang Ch'ing-ch'ü 王清初, 613–14
Wang Chün 王郡, 92
Wang Chung 汪中, 645
Wang Fu-chih 王夫之, biographical overview, 558–70, 572; on causality, 563–6; as critic of Chu Hsi, 560–9;
emphasizes on things (wu), 563, 569; on importance of particles (ch'i), 560–6, 569; on learning and understanding, 567–9; writings by, 560–2
Wang Hsi 王熙, 352–3
Wang Hsi-ch'an 王錫蘭 [also Hsi-shan], 388
Wang Hsien-hüi 王顯緒, 662
Wang Hui-tsu 汪輝祖, 644
Wang Hung-hüi 王鴻緒, 587
Wang K'eng-t'ang 王肯堂, 404
Wang Mang 王莽, 554
Wang Pi 王弼, 535
Wang Shih-chen 王世貞, 642
Wang Shih-chün 王士俊, 60–2
Wang Shih-hsiung 王士雄, 406–7
Wang Shih-sun 汪適孫, 641
Wang Shu-ho 王叔和, 407
Wang Su 王肅, 549
Wang Ta-fan 王大蕃, 632
Wang T'ing-hsiang 王廷相, 483
Wang Wan 汪琬, 580–1
Wang Wei 王維, 555
Wang Yang-ming 王陽明, Chang Lü-hsiang on, 491; Ch'en Chüeh on, 464; Huang Tsung-hsi on, 480, 482, 485–6, 487–90, 491, 594–5; on innate knowing of moral good, 463, 466, 473–4, 487, 490, 493, 503–4, 511, 560, 593–4, 595; Ku Yen-wu on, 538–41; and Kumazawa Banzan, 236; Li Kuang on, 509–10; Li Yung on, 495, 496; Liu Tsung-chou’s reinterpretation, 460–1, 511; on role of practice, 503n; Sun Ch'i-feng on, 472–4; Yen Yuán on, 503–4
Wang Yen 王衍, 539
Wang Ying-kuei 王應奎, 635
Wang Yuan 王源, 369
Wang-chiang 望江, 695

wasa (the sovereign’s troops), 628

watan 和算 (Japanese mathematics), 242
water conservancy projects, 662, 663–4, 667, 668, 678
Way, 499, 597. See also Tao
wei [a pre-classical copula verb], 613
wei (guards), 112–14
Wei Chung-hsien 魏忠賢, 475, 692–3
Wei I-ch'ieh 魏裔介, 641–4
Wei River 濰水, 615
“Wei tsu” 微子 (“Prince of Wei”), 549
Wei Wen-k'uei 魏文魁, 377
Wei Yuan 魏源, 701
wen (culture), 556–8, 600
wen (written words, writings, literature), 458
wen (warm), 406
wen (pestilence), 406
Wen Ch'ang ti-chün 文昌帝君, 451
wen-ch'ang 温疫 (febrile epidemics), 405, 406
Wen-ch'ang ti-chüan 温疫論 (Treatise on warm-factor epidemic disorders), 405–7
wen-miao 文廟 (Confucian temple), 684n
wen-ping 溫病 (warm-factor disorders), 404, 406
Wen-tsung ko tsa-ch'i (Miscellaneous notes from the Wen-tsung Hall), 645
wen-ts'iu-yü 文字獄 (literary inquisition), 606. See also literary inquisitions
Weng Fang-kang 翁方綱, 627
Western learning (hsi hsiieh), 12–14, 189–93, 527. See also sibak
“Western methods” (hsi fa), 378, 379, 381, 382–3
Western ocean countries, 322, 507
Whampoa (Huang-p'u 黃浦), 279, 303, 306–7, 308, 313
White Lotus rebellion, 651
Winter solstice, 157, 521
Wolun 倭論, 45
women, female alchemy, 455–6; female healers and physicians, 402–3; and filial obligation, 249; as Taoist clergy, 441
woolen imports, 294
wu (ritual healer), 410
Wu 吳 county, 667, 684. See also Soochow
Wu 武, king of the Chou dynasty, 550
wu hsien chih li 吾心之理 (the coherence in my heart), 510
wu ju 吾儒 (we Confucians), 500
wu li 吾理 (my coherence), 509, 524
wu li 物理 (coherence or patterns of things), 524
Wu li hsiao chih 物理小識 (Notes on the patterns of things), 516–23, 524, 528, 569
Wu Ch'ien 吳禎, 260
Wu Chih-wang 武之望, 404
Wu Fu-sheng 吳福生, 91–3, 104–5
Wu Li 吳歷, 341, 365–6
Wu Ming-hsüan 吳明炫, 380, 382
Wu Ming-tao 吳銘道, 643
Wu San-kuei 吳三桂, 20–1, 28, 32–40, 43–4, 329–30, 559, 573, 619
Wu Shou-yang 伍守陽, 451
Wu T'ang 吳瑭, 406–7
Wu Wei-yeh 吳偉業, 555, 611
Wu Ying-chi 吳應箕, 643
Wu Yu-hsing 吳有性, 405–7
Wu Yuan 吳垣, 75tab
Wu Yüeh so-chien shu hua lu 吳越所見書畫錄 (Record of books and paintings seen in Wu and Yüeh), 640
Wu-ch'ang 武昌, 332, 453
wu-ch'ang 五常 (the five constant virtues), 616
Wu-ch'e 五車 (the star known today as Capella in Aurige, near Gemini), 504
Wu-che 武者, 112–14
Wu-i 武夷, 286–9
Wu-Liu 伍柳, 451
wu-lun 五倫 (five human relations), 389
wu-tang 吾黨 (our group), 507
Wu-tang shan 武當山 (Wu-tang Mountain), 439, 443, 446
wu-tzu li 無字理 (wordless coherence), 474
Wu-yüan county 姬源, 632
Yanusha 譯社 (J. Translation Society), 246, 247
Yalu River 鴨綠江, 161–2
yam (Mon., Yüan imperial post system), 141
Yamaga Sokō 山鹿素行, 237, 241
Yamamoto Hokuzan 山本北山, 245
Yamanoi Konron 山井崑巖, 255, 257–9
Yamazaki Ansai 山崎閑齋, 237–8, 241–2
yamen 衙門 (officials’ compound), 54, 88, 91, 660
Yang Chao-lin 楊朝麟, 685–6
Yang Hsi-fu 楊錫訥, 65–7
Yang Hsiung 楊雄, 548
Yang Kuang-hsien 楊光先, 335, 345, 380–2, 383–4, 388, 393
Yang K’uei 楊魁, 75tab
Yang Wen-ch’ien 楊文乾, 60, 283
yang-lien yin 養廉銀 (money for nourishing incorruptibility), 63, 667, 673
yang-sheng 養生 (cultivation of the body), 437
yangshan 兩班 ([Korean] hereditary elites), 175, 191, 196
Yangchow 楊州 (Yang-chou), 661, 700
Yangtze River 長江, 20. See also lower Yangtze region
Yao Chi-heng 姚際恆, 640
yao-ch’ien 樂籍 (medical divination slips), 452
yao-ch’ieh 要缺 (important post), 57
Yeh Fang-ai 葉方舘, 574–7, 582, 584, 586, 587, 589
Yeh Kuei 葉桂, 406–7
yeh-jen 野人 (wild people, barbarian, savage) K. yain, 112–17, 146
yeh-shib 野史 (unofficial histories), 623, 630n
Yeke Juu League, 120
Yellow Emperor, 52
Yellow River 黃河, 52–4
Yellow Sea 黃海, 23
yen 言 (words), 523–7
Yen Jo-ch’ü (or -chü) 餘若璩, 510, 590–1, 603–4, 640
Yen Mo 嚴謨, 351, 370
Yen Yüan 頓元, disciple of Confucius, 369, 547
Yen Yüan 顏元 (words), 498–505, 514
yen-chang 煙瘴 (malarial and miasmatic), 56
Yen-ch’eng 雲城, 628
Yen-sui 養視, 18, 20, 21, 24
Yi Hu-gang 李後綱, 190
Yi I-myŏng 李頤命, 187
Yi Ka-hwan 李家煥, 192–3
Yi Ki-jı 李器之, 187, 191
Yi Sŏng-gye 李成桂 (r. 1392–8), 171
Yi Tŏk-mu 李得懋, 188
Yi Ù-hyon 李宜顯, 183
yin 音 (pronunciation), 543
Yin 殷, 549
Yin hsüeh wu shu 音學五書 (Five writings on phonetics), 532, 543–5
Yin-ch’en 胤禛 (fourth son of K’ang-hsi), 282. See also Yung-cheng emperor
Yin-chi-shan 尹繼善, 64
Yin-jeng 胤仍 (second son of K’ang-hsi), 282
Yin-ssu 胤禩 (eighth son of K’ang-hsi), 612, 613
Yin-t’ang 胤塘 (ninth son of K’ang-hsi), 361, 612, 613
yin-yang 陰陽, 404, 509, 519, 561, 563, 564
Yin-chen 胤禎 (fourth son of K’ang-hsi), 282. See also Yung-cheng emperor
Yin-chi-shan 尹繼善, 64
Yin-jeng 胤仍 (second son of K’ang-hsi), 282
Yin-ssu 胤禩 (eighth son of K’ang-hsi), 612, 613
Yin-t’ang 胤塘 (ninth son of K’ang-hsi), 361, 612, 613
yin-yang 陰陽, 404, 509, 519, 561, 563, 564
yókkwan 譯官 (interpreters), 174. See also interpreters
yón'gong (annual tribute), 157, 160–1
Yoshimasu Tödō 吉益東洞, 251–2
Yoshimune 吉宗 (r. 1716–45), 249–50, 258
Yu I 尤怡, 406–7
Yu 廉 court, 468
Yu Ch'ang 喻昌, 253, 406–7
Yu Ch'eng-lung 于成龍, 43–4
Yu Huang 玉皇, 445. See also Jade Emperor
Yu Kuo-chu 于國柱, 42–3, 44
Yu Yang-chih 于養志, 46
Yu Yung-ho 郁永河, 83
Yu Yüeh 俞樾, 409–11
yü-lu 語錄 (records of speech), 541
Yu-p'i li-tai t'ung-chien chi-lan 御批歷代通鑑輯覽 (Imperial approved selections from mirrors for aiding government over several dynasties), 617, 646–7
Yu-yao 餘姚, 471, 475, 476
Yu-ying t'ang ch'üan shan wen 育嬰堂全善文” (Descriptions and advice on philanthropy for foundling hospitals), 345
Yüan 元 dynasty (1271–1368), 5
Yüan Chung-huan 袁崇煥, 151
Yüan Huang 袁黃, 492, 630
Yüan-ming yüan 圓明園 (Garden of Perfect Brightness) (Old Summer Palace), 319, 363, 431
Yüan shih 元史 (History of the Yüan), 585
Yüeh Sheng-lung 岳昇龍, 46
Yun Hyu 尹鑾, 171
Yün Chung-sheng 晁仲昇, 471–2
Yün-yang 鄭陽, 18, 21
Yung-cheng 雍正 emperor (r. 1723–35), appointment and evaluation of governors, 47–58; attitude to Christianity, 360–2; enshrinement policy, 686–7; reaction to his legacy, 59–62; regulating and rewarding local elites, 653–5, 659; reputation and legacy, 59, 61–3; Taiwan tribal land decree, 97; and Taoist ritual, 418–19; and T'ien Wen-ching, 51–4; use of palace memorials, 50
Yung-cheng 雍正 era (1723–35), anti-missionary policies, 279; literary inquisitions, 607, 612–14; provincial administration, 47–58
Yung-cheng chu-p'i yü-chih 雍正朱批諭旨 (Imperial rescripts in red from the Yung-cheng reign), 51
Yung-li 永曆 era (1646–62), 560, 608–9
Yung-lo 永樂 emperor (r. 1403–24), 112–14, 599
Yung-yen lu 庚言錄 (Record of useful sayings), 640
Yunnan 雲南 province, 18, 20–1, 40, 41, 332, 346, 676tab
Zen Buddhism 禪, 236–7, 254. See also Ch'án Buddhism
zinc alloy, 285