The Oxford History of Historical Writing

1945 to the Present

EDITED BY
Axel Schneider and Daniel Woolf
The Oxford History of Historical Writing is a five-volume, multi-authored scholarly survey of the history of historical writing across the globe. It is a chronological history of humanity’s attempts to conserve, recover, and narrate its past with considerable attention paid to different global traditions and their points of comparison with Western historiography. Each volume covers a particular period, with care taken to avoid unduly privileging Western notions of periodization, and the volumes cover progressively shorter chronological spans, reflecting both the greater geographical range of later volumes and the steep increase in historical activity around the world since the nineteenth century. The Oxford History of Historical Writing is the first collective scholarly survey of the history of historical writing to cover the globe across such a substantial breadth of time.

Volume 1: Beginnings to AD 600
Volume 2: 400–1400
Volume 3: 1400–1800
Volume 4: 1800–1945
Volume 5: Historical Writing since 1945
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General Editor’s Acknowledgements

*The Oxford History of Historical Writing* has itself been the product of several years of work and many hands and voices. As general editor, it is my pleasure to acknowledge a number of these here. First and foremost are the volume editors, without whom there would have been no series. I am very grateful for their willingness to sign on, and for their flexibility in pursuing their own vision for their piece of the story while acknowledging the need for some common goals and unity of editorial practices. The Advisory Board, many of whose members were subsequently roped into either editorship or authorship, have given freely of their time and wisdom. At Oxford University Press, former commissioning editor Ruth Parr encouraged the series proposal and marshalled it through the readership and approvals process. After her departure, my colleagues and I enjoyed able help and support from Christopher Wheeler at the managerial level and, editorially, from Rupert Cousens, Seth Cayley, Matthew Cotton, and Stephanie Ireland. I must also thank the OUP production team and Carol Bestley in particular.

The series would not have been possible without the considerable financial support from the two institutions I worked at over the project’s lifespan. At the University of Alberta, where I worked from 2002 to mid-2009, the project was generously funded by the Offices of the Vice-President (Research) and the Provost and Vice-President (Academic). I am especially grateful to Gary Kachanoski and Carl Amrhein, the incumbents in those offices, who saw the project’s potential. The funding they provided enabled the project to hire a series of project assistants, to involve graduate students in the work, and to defray some of the costs of publication such as images and maps. It permitted the acquisition of computer equipment and also of a significant number of books to supplement the fine library resources at Alberta. Perhaps most importantly, it also made the crucial Edmonton conference happen. At Queen’s University in Kingston, Ontario, where I moved into a senior leadership role in 2009, funding was provided to push the project over the ‘finish-line’, to transfer the research library, and in particular to retain the services for two years of an outstanding research associate: Assistant Editor Dr Ian Hesketh. I am profoundly grateful for Ian’s meticulous attention to detail, and his ability ruthlessly to cut through excess prose (including on occasion my own) in order to ensure that volumes maintained editorial uniformity internally and together with other volumes, not least because the volumes are not all being published at once. A series of able graduate students have served as project assistants, including especially Tanya Henderson,
Matthew Neufeld, Carolyn Salomons, Tereasa Maillie, and Sarah Waurechen, the last of whom almost single-handedly organized the complex logistics of the Edmonton conference. Among the others on whom the project has depended I have to thank the Office of the Dean of Arts and Science for providing project space at Queen’s University, and the Department of History and Classics at Alberta. Melanie Marvin at Alberta and Christine Berga at Queen’s have assisted in the management of the research accounts, as has Julie Gordon-Woolf, my spouse (and herself a former research administrator), whose advice on this front is only a small part of the support she has provided.
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Foreword

Daniel Woolf, General Editor

Half a century ago, Oxford University Press published a series of volumes entitled *Historical Writing on the Peoples of Asia*. Consisting of four volumes devoted to East Asia, Southeast Asia, the Middle East, and South Asia, and based on conferences held at the School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London in the late 1950s, that series has aged surprisingly well; many of the individual essays are still being cited in our own day. The books were also remarkably ahead of their time, since the history of historical writing was at that time firmly understood as being the history of a European genre. Indeed, the subject of the history of history was itself barely a subject—typical surveys of the early to mid-twentieth century by the likes of James Westfall Thompson and Harry Elmer Barnes, following Eduard Fueter’s paradigmatic 1911 *Geschichte der Neuren Historiographie*, were written by master historians surveying their discipline and its origins. The Oxford series provided some much needed perspective, though it was not followed up for many years, and more recent surveys in the last two or three decades of the twentieth century have continued to speak of historiography as if it were an entirely Western invention or practice. Since the late 1990s a number of works have been published that challenge the Eurocentrism of the history of history, as well as its inherent teleology. We can now view the European historiographic venture against the larger canvas of many parallel and—a fact often overlooked—interconnected traditions of writing or speaking about the past from Asia, the Americas, and Africa.

*The Oxford History of Historical Writing* is conceived in this spirit. It seeks to provide the first collective scholarly history of historical writing to span the globe. It salutes its great predecessor of half a century ago, but very deliberately seeks neither to imitate nor to replace it. For one thing, the five volumes collectively include Europe, the Americas, and Africa, together with Asia; for another, the division among these volumes is chronological, rather than regional. We decided on the former because the history of non-European historical writing should, no more than that of its European counterpart, be viewed in isolation. We chose the latter in order to provide what amounts to a cumulative narrative (albeit with well over a hundred different voices), and in order to facilitate comparison and contrast between regions within a broad time period.

A few caveats that apply to the entire series are in order. First, while the series as a whole will describe historical writing from earliest times to the present, each
individual volume is also intended to stand on its own as a study of a particular period in the history of historical writing. These periods shrink in duration as they approach the present, both because of the obvious increase in extant materials and known authors, but also because of the expansion of subject matter to a fully global reach (the Americas, for instance, feature not at all in volume 1; non-Muslim Africa appears in neither volume 1 nor volume 2). Second, while the volumes share a common goal and are the product of several years of dialogue both within and between its five editorial teams and the general editor, there has been no attempt to impose a common organizational structure on each volume. In fact, quite the opposite course has been pursued: individual editorial teams have been selected because of complementary expertise, and encouraged to ‘go their own way’ in selecting topics and envisioning the shapes of their volumes—with the sole overriding provision that each volume had to be global in ambition. Third, and perhaps most importantly, this series is emphatically neither an encyclopedia nor a dictionary. A multi-volume work that attempted to deal with every national tradition (much less mention every historian) would easily spread from five to fifty volumes, and in fact not accomplish the ends that the editors seek. We have had to be selective, not comprehensive, and while every effort has been made to balance coverage and provide representation from all regions of the world, there are undeniable gaps. The reader who wishes to find out something about a particular country or topic not included in the OHHW’s more than 150 chapters can search elsewhere, in particular in a number of reference books which have appeared in the past fifteen or so years, some of which have global range. Our volumes are of course indexed, but we have deemed a cumulative index an inefficient and redundant use of space. Similarly, each individual essay offers a highly selective bibliography, intended to point the way to further reading (and where appropriate listing key sources from the period or topic under discussion in that chapter). In order to assist readers with limited knowledge of particular regions’ or nations’ political and social contexts, certain chapters have included a timeline of major events, though this has not been deemed necessary in every case. While there are (with one or two exceptions) no essays devoted to a single ‘great historian’, many historians from Sima Qian and Herodotus to the present are mentioned; rather than eat up space in essays with dates of birth and death, these have been consolidated in each volume’s index.

Despite the independence of each team, some common standards are of course necessary in any series that aims for coherence, if not uniformity. Towards that end, a number of steps were built into the process of producing this series from the very beginning. Maximum advantage was taken of the Internet: not only were scholars encouraged to communicate with one another within and across volumes, but draft essays were posted on the project’s website for commentary and review by other authors. A climactic conference, convened at the University of Alberta in Edmonton, Canada in September 2008, brought most of the editors and just over half the authors together, physically, for an energizing and
exciting two days during which matters of editorial detail and also content and substance were discussed. A major ‘value-added’, we think, of both conference and series, is that it has introduced to one another scholars who normally work in separate national and chronological fields, in order to pursue a common interest in the history of historical writing in unique and unprecedented ways. As the series’ general editor, it is my hope that these connections will survive the end of the project and produce further collaborative work in the future.

Several key decisions came out of the Edmonton conference, among the most important of which was to permit chronological overlap, while avoiding unnecessary repetition of topics. The chronological divisions of the volumes—with calendrical years used instead of typical Western periods like ‘Middle Ages’ and ‘Renaissance’—remain somewhat arbitrary. Thus volume 1, on antiquity, ends about AD 600, prior to the advent of Islam, but overlaps with its successor, volume 2, on what in the West were the late antique and medieval centuries, and in China (the other major tradition of historical writing that features in every volume), the period from the Tang through the early Ming dynasties. Volumes 4 and 5 have a similar overlap in the years around the Second World War. While 1945 is a sensible boundary for some subjects, it is much less useful for others—in China, again, 1949 is the major watershed. Certain topics, such as the Annales School, are not usefully split at 1945. A further change pertained to the denotation of years BC and AD; here, we reversed an early decision to use BCE and CE on the grounds that both are equally Eurocentric forms; BC/AD have at least been adopted by international practice, notwithstanding their Christian European origins.

It became rather apparent in Edmonton that we were in fact dealing with two sets of two volumes each (vols. 1/2 and 4/5), with volume 3 serving in some ways as a bridge between them, straddling the centuries from about 1400 to about 1800—what in the West is usually considered the ‘early modern’ era. A further decision, in order to keep the volumes reasonably affordable, was to use illustrations very selectively, and only where a substantive reason for their inclusion could be advanced, for instance in dealing with Latin American pictographic forms of commemorating the past. There are no decorative portraits of famous historians, and that too is appropriate in a project that eschews the history of historiography conceived of as a parade of stars—whether Western or Eastern, Northern or Southern—from Thucydides to Toynbee.

In volume 5, the second-published of the series but its concluding volume chronologically, my co-editor, Axel Schneider, and I have had to deal with a tiny fraction of the time covered in other volumes, but also a period of unprecedented change—which has not yet abated. We decided at the planning stage that the volume should have two sorts of chapters, one thematic and the other national-regional. This, in essence, meant that many countries and parts of the world would go unrepresented, but the series as a whole, as noted above, has never intended comprehensive coverage. Moreover, while historiography is still in
many ways organized by national fields, in the past sixty years the most interesting changes have crossed and re-crossed spatial lines—at an accelerated pace in the electronic/virtual era of the past ten to fifteen years—such that many important developments would have fallen between geopolitical cracks in a book arranged exclusively along national lines. Thus our volume begins with a series of thematic chapters reflecting on history’s relations with its neighbours as well as with a selection of the differing approaches, methodologies, and sub-disciplines which have emerged in the past sixty-five years. These developments, however, have played out in practice within the institutions and cultures of particular countries and regions, and have been affected by variable political and social circumstances. The second half of the book therefore traces the working-out in practice of some of the themes opened up in the first half within national, and in some cases transnational, contexts.

NOTE ON TRANSLATION AND TRANSLITERATION

Non-Roman alphabets and writing systems have been routinely transliterated using the standard systems for each language (for instance, Chinese using the Pinyin system). Non-English book titles are normally followed (except where meaning is obvious) by a translated title, within square brackets, and in roman rather than italic face, unless a specific, published English translation is listed, in which case the bracketed title will also be in italics.
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Editors’ Introduction

Axel Schneider and Daniel Woolf

This concluding volume in *The Oxford History of Historical Writing* covers a very small period in comparison with some of its companions: barely two-thirds of a century. As with the other volumes, the boundary dates are both fluid and imprecise: 1945 is a watershed date for the world in the sense that it marked the end of the Second World War and the division of Europe into a Western and an Eastern bloc. Elsewhere in the world, other dates are more meaningful: for China, 1949 is the critical year; and in much of Africa the decolonization of the 1950s and 1960s marked a significant rupture with past, colonial historiography. Unlike the earlier volumes, our period is also an unfinished one, for though some obvious sub-periods are broken at points such as the early 1960s, the fall of European communism at the end of the 1980s, and the rapid rise of both globalization and radical Islam during the 1990s, it is difficult to predict, in early 2010 as this introduction is written, just where the story of post-war historiography will end, or how. What is apparent is that the progressive fissuring and refissuring of the historical field along multiple fault lines is likely to continue, as party, race, gender, religion, ethnicity, class, and ideology continue to vie for dominance, all now further complicated by postmodern doubts about the very possibility of historical knowledge beyond the filter of language.

Although our chronological brief is a short one, the period is enormously complicated in ways that make it different from its predecessors. In particular, the highly nationalist orientation of much nineteenth-century historical writing (and the organization of the institutions of history such as universities, archives, professional journals, and major source publication initiatives), which continued through the early twentieth century, began to break down in the West at the end of the war. In other parts of the globe, however, nationalist historiography has continuously remained strong, and it has experienced a recent resurgence in post–Cold War Europe. It is perhaps more accurate to say that nationalist modes of historical writing were challenged after 1945 by other modes of organizing and structuring the study of the past, along thematic, problem-based, or ideological and interest-group lines. Not coincidentally, this is also the period within this global history of historical writing during which history itself became more
seriously and consistently global, beginning with the ‘world history’ initiatives of
the 1960s and 1970s (here treated by Jürgen Osterhammel), and ending, as we go
to press, in a doubling back of this global imperative into historiography itself.
The book and the series are themselves products of a resurgent globalism which
began at the end of the last millennium, and of a desire to treat the history of the
discipline within an international and, where appropriate (it is not always),
comparative framework.
In a volume of some 300,000 words it is of course impossible to include every
aspect of historical writing. Nor would it be in keeping with the series as a whole,
which has aimed to be representative rather than comprehensive, and which
eschews any claim to an encyclopaedic coverage. As suggested in the general
editor’s foreword, we have opted to slice our smallish portion of the series’
chronological cake in two different ways. In the first half of the work, primacy
is given to theoretical and problem-based historiography. Authors have been
couraged to approach chapters in this section with a global reach, but we have
ourselves realized in the course of producing the book that some theoretical issues
are not global, and even when they are, have unfolded in widely different ways.
Postmodernism, for instance, while not exclusively a fixation of the West, is very
vibrant in East Asia, but there it has been utilized less as an epistemological
critique of history or a subversion of its categories than as a tool to emphasize, for
instance, a particularity that sets itself apart from the West/Rest. Postmodernism
has thus become in some parts of the world a tool to fortify boundaries, rather
than to tear them down.
Having ‘set the table’, so to speak, the second half of the volume returns to a
more conventional national—or regional—approach. One might question why
it is still appropriate to use this kind of categorization in an era of ‘postnation-
alism’. The obvious rationale is that there are still in most countries (including
some newly emerging from a Cold War internationalism or, at the other end of
the spectrum, liberated from dictatorships and military juntas, as is the case in
parts of Latin America) strong traces of the nineteenth century’s scholarly
structures, journals, and professional associations, and university history depart-
ments continue to hire academics predominantly by national and chronological
categories. The second reason, however, is more important: it is in the Petri
dish of particular countries that we can watch historical cultures develop, as
the individual cells of national historiographic enterprises come into contact
with differing theoretical approaches and preoccupations. Or, to change the
metaphor, if we are to study the real-life implications of historiographic
trends—feminism and gender, memory studies, environmental history, social-
science-based history, and so on—national and regional case studies offer a series
of windows.
The modern discipline of history has never been a unified field. Ever since the
beginnings of institutionalized academic history-writing in mid-nineteenth-century
Europe (a theme of the forthcoming OHHW vol. 4), divergent understandings of
what history is and different ideas as to how it should be researched and written have competed for dominance. However, the heterogeneity of approaches after the end of the Second World War, especially since the rise of postmodernism (the first signs of which were visible by the late 1960s) is without precedent. Chris Lorenz traces these developments in his chapter on history and theory, disentangling three phases of theoretical changes from analytical to narrative philosophy of history, and then on to ‘history from below’ and the ‘presence’ of history, ultimately leading to the current return of fundamental ontological and normative questions concerning the status of history and history-writing. Kevin Passmore offers a parallel treatment, later in the volume, of history’s somewhat hesitant, hot-and-cold, courtship with various disciplines within the social sciences, from Talcott Parsons’s early post-war sociological theories, through anthropological engagements of the 1970s and 1980s, and ending in the ‘cultural turn’ of the more recent past. These divergent theoretical approaches to history have to be seen in the context of their times. They are related to historical and political changes such as the decolonization process in the 1950s and 1960s, and the more recent processes of economic and political globalization. As a result, we are nowadays facing a more pluralistic and multifaceted situation, challenging core assumptions of the hitherto dominant modernization theory and its approach to the writing of history.

Gyan Prakash, in his chapter on postcolonialism, analyses one of those new approaches, which developed in reaction to nationalist and Marxist views of history that had taken hold in the wake of Western colonial expansion. In order to counter the state-led modernization paradigm, which some elites in the colonies had adopted from the colonizing powers, postcolonialists attacked assumptions of progress, causality, and state-led nation-building, allegedly typical of the modern West. Promoting a bottom-up understanding of history, they emphasized ‘subaltern’ non-elite perspectives and criticized Eurocentric normativity without, however, denying the influence of the modern West (an influence seen by many recent postcolonial writers as both socially and epistemologically oppressive and marginalizing).

Similar developments can be observed in the two related fields of world history and economic history, here studied by Jürgen Osterhammel and Peer Vries respectively. In his chapter, Osterhammel examines different approaches to global history. After the Second World War, he notes, historians paid more attention to the interaction of the nation-state—the local—and the world—the global. The newer global history, while it does not negate the nation-state, strives to understand the reasons for the success of the West, without however reverting to a Eurocentric and essentializing perspective. Aware of the constructedness of history, it nonetheless pays attention to agency in the past, and to the plurality of perspectives and divergent historical paths. It does so by focusing on topics such as the history of migration, the environment, and economic globalization. In the field of economic globalization, the hitherto dominant approaches of Marx and
Smith have recently been challenged. Economic historians, stimulated by the successive economic miracles that have occurred in East Asia, are now more than ever taking non-European historical experience into account, while developing new models that are better contextualized and themselves have the potential to influence the Western economic discourse.

The close connection between theoretical approaches and contemporary circumstances can be observed in other fields too. It is no accident that women’s history and its successor, gender history, emerged as strong new approaches beginning in the 1970s, which is precisely when the wider feminist movement began to have its most profound impact on at least Euro-American societies. The same can be said of the emergence of environmental history, developing in the context of, and stimulated by, the environmental concerns that began in the 1960s with worries about local industrial pollution, but which has since evolved into a full-scale global crisis of climate change. Focusing on material aspects, policy issues, and cultural factors, J. R. McNeill shows how environmental history first began to thrive, especially in the United States, and how it has since spread to Europe and the rest of the world. Theoretical or ‘ideological’ approaches (we specifically do not use the latter term in any negative sense since it is our contention that virtually all history is either explicitly or implicitly ideological) are themselves cross-cut and modulated by others from elsewhere: the gender studies of the past decade have been increasingly influenced, owing to the work of scholars such as Joan Wallach Scott, by postmodern theory, and by the redefinition of such concepts as subjectivity and identity. And it hardly needs to be stated that these approaches, too, are often conflicting and orthogonal—the classic example being the tension between class and gender which brought old-line Marxist historians into a sometimes adversarial, sometimes more symbiotic, relation with historians of gender and of race. Julie Des Jardins traces the beginnings of, and recent developments in, both women’s and gender history, using the North American experience as her base, but drawing in comparisons from elsewhere in the world. Gender history and women’s history are not the same. The former, larger category overlaps with the latter, and also with areas such as masculinity history, critical race theory, and queer studies—women’s history clearly provided the root, as Des Jardin comments. ‘The rise of gender history cannot be extricated from the story of women’s history or the woman historian.’

Another field of recent prominence, introduced by Alon Confino, has shaped the academic discipline of history at least as profoundly as gender and environmental history. ‘Memory’ as a category to analyze and understand the relation of human beings to their past has become in the past two decades or so a nearly ubiquitous concept. Triggered jointly by the general crisis of representationalism and by a specific historical experience, the Holocaust, ‘memory’ has replaced for some scholars a rather linear and monodimensional concept of ‘society’. Whereas in the past memory was considered to be subjective and unreliable,
and hence contrasted negatively with ‘objective’ history as an inferior form of engaging with the past, it has now moved to centre-stage: it is in individual and collective memory that the past remains present in the contemporary agent. Memory (captured in methodological approaches such as oral history) also foregrounds the historical experience of ordinary people—including their engagement with public monuments, museums, and galleries—and thus carries the potential to counterbalance official, state-focused, and politically legitimate historical narratives, as well as those more broadly sanctioned by the academic enterprise.

The past six or seven decades have seen that the work of historians can also come into conflict with state or party authority. Censorship of historians’ writings is no new phenomenon; it has existed virtually as long as there have been historians to write about the past. Nor does it always involve the most egregious forms, wherein an offending historian can be imprisoned, exiled, or even murdered, either for raising uncomfortable and politically incorrect ‘truths’ from a dead past and giving them currency, or for taking a perspective on that past in contradiction to that of a ruling authority. Several of our essays explore the place of censorship and political intervention in varying national contexts (for instance Joel Horowitz’s discussion of Argentinean historiography, and Patricia Pelley’s of Vietnamese). Antoon De Baets, who has made the study of censorship the main focus of his research, offers in his chapter an innovative attempt at a nomenclature or classification of types of censorship as they have developed since 1945, including some specific examples. As he puts it, censorship (which can be professionally sanctioned or self-imposed as much as state-inflicted), is ‘the knot that ties power, freedom, and history together’.

As our world has advanced technologically and scientifically in ways that even the optimistic futurists of the early twentieth century could not have imagined, the growth in the study of the past of science and technology has also been profound. Indeed, in many countries the history of science has become less a sub-discipline than a parallel discipline, sometimes even housed in a separate department. In their jointly authored chapter, Alex Roland and Seymour Mauskopf link the history of science with the related but less well-studied history of technology. Apart from yoking these two approaches together, their chapter provides further evidence of transdisciplinary influence, as they trace the impact, for instance, of gender and labour history on their own subject.

Our geographically organized chapters, in the second half of the book, have necessarily needed to be even more selective than the themes covered in the first half. The ‘usual suspects’ have a place—in particular the Western trio of Britain, the United States, and France, each influential in differing ways on the development of historiography. Michael Bentley’s study of British historical writing traces its vicissitudes from the end of the war—when, arguably, much of the late nineteenth-century empiricist agenda was still intact, and political history continued to dominate—through signal events such as the founding of
Past and Present (and that influential journal’s gradual movement from the left to the centre of the discipline), to the advent of neoconservatism in the 1980s, the puffing up and eventual bursting of the bubble of Franco-American-style quantification, and the advent, in this most untheoretically inclined of national historical professions, of the cultural turn. Ian Tyrrell offers an outsider’s view of American historiography from the vantage point of Australia, and with a focus on the extra-academic life of American historians, including the development of ‘public history’, and one of its consequences: the emergence in the 1990s of bitter conflicts over the public representation of the past in such episodes as the Smithsonian Institute’s Enola Gay exhibit, here crossing the agendas of three earlier essays, Roland and Mauskopf on the history of science and technology, Confino on the ‘memory’ industry within historical studies, and De Baets on censorship. Matthias Middell traces French historiography, which has sustained the double impact of the Annales School and much postmodern and structuralist theory après Foucault, Derrida, and Lyotard.

The post-war fate of Germany, the great ‘lawgiver’ of nineteenth-century historical writing throughout most of the world, offers a further study of academic and political life intersecting on both sides of the Berlin Wall. Discussing the East prior to 1989, Stefan Berger demonstrates the overwhelming dominance of a Marxist, Soviet-inspired agenda, and the supremacy of social and especially economic history. In the Federal Republic, historiography followed a course not unlike that in the other Western democracies, but with one major exception: the shadow of German war guilt. The Holocaust provided an ‘elephant in the room’ of German historiography—one that stirred from time to time in the corners of its chamber; for instance in the ‘Fischer controversy’ of the early 1960s regarding German intent in the First World War. But the elephant roared to life in the late 1980s, on the eve of reunification with the East, during the Historikerstreit, which played out in the public press in heated exchanges between such luminaries as Jürgen Habermas on the left, and neoconservative historians such as Ernst Nolte on the right, reopening barely scabbed wounds. The Sonderweg or German ‘special path’—a variant of the exceptionalism also found in other parts of the world (including the United States and, as observed above, East Asia)—provided the axle around which the wheels of these debates turned.

Nowhere in Europe were the interconnections between state authority and historiography so strong, and ultimately constricting, as in the Soviet Union. Denis Kozlov’s chapter, reaching back before the ‘Great Patriotic War’ (as Soviets termed their 1941–5 struggle with Germany), traces the early emergence of official Marxist historiography in the USSR under the leadership of M. N. Pokrovskii, and its 1930s’ Stalinization. He then examines the further development of history-writing in the post-war era, before the Soviet experiment came to an abrupt end in the early 1990s. Kozlov’s study of party and history is complemented by another chapter that examines the relations between party and
history, this time in that most polarized of Western democracies, post-Fascist Italy, as related by Stuart Woolf, who also foregrounds Italy’s most distinctive contribution to post-war historical method, microstoria, the popularity of which peaked in the 1980s and early 1990s. ‘Microhistory’, to give it its English name, while itself having antecedents in the Annales School (for instance in Emmanuel Le Roy Ladurie’s *Montaillou* [1975]) blossomed in such works as Carlo Ginzburg’s well-known *Il formaggio e i vermi* [*The Cheese and the Worms*] (1976) and quickly found adherents in other parts of the world.

As the flow of historiographical fashions and methods indicates, even before the Internet truly made the world a smaller place, national boundaries were highly porous. The nation provided context and often subject, but it rarely delimited the range of topics or approaches. In some instances a regional approach is useful, not merely as a way of being more synoptic, but also because contiguous countries find themselves in similar historiographic places, though with varying outcomes. This is demonstrated in a number of essays which take regions rather than nations as their topics. Ulf Brunnbauer analyzes historiography in several Balkan countries on either side of the Iron Curtain before and after the fall of the Soviet Union (with Greece, never socialist and briefly under a military junta, offering a counterexample to those of Bulgaria, Albania, Romania, and Yugoslavia). Maciej Górný offers a companion study of three central European states—Poland, Hungary, and Czechoslovakia (subsequently separate Czech and Slovak republics)—across the same temporal divide. In a part of Europe that has not featured prominently in previous histories of historical writing—Scandinavia—Rolf Torstendahl demonstrates that Norway, Sweden, and Denmark, despite some national variations, followed remarkably similar post-war trajectories, from an initial period when pre-war agendas continued to be pursued, through the advent of social history, Marxist and sociological scholarship in the 1960s, then cultural history and the impact of anthropology, ending up with so dispersed a sense of the field that efforts at comprehensive national histories have been largely abandoned.

Something of the same pattern demonstrated in the various European regions also appears in the Middle East and Africa. Youssef M. Choueiri, extending his forthcoming chapter in *OHHW* vol. 4 on Arabic historiography, shows how in the various states of the Arabic world, some but not all of which have become fundamentalist Islamic regimes, Western models continued to be followed, though often with a more explicitly socialist approach than would be the case in America or Western Europe. Relatively new states such as the Saudi Arabian monarchy were somewhat slower than other parts of the Arab world (Lebanon, Iraq, and Syria for instance) to establish a national agenda for historiography, but by the 1970s, well before the shake-up of radical Islamicization that has dominated the past quarter-century, the entire Arabic world began to push hard against the dominance of residual Western colonial history, with key academic texts such as Edward Said’s *Orientalism* (1978) simultaneously providing both
encouragement and a destabilization of the West’s own academic presuppositions from within.

A somewhat similar story is to be told in the various countries of Africa, whose modern historical institutions are of relatively recent (and typically colonial) origins, and which have been progressively establishing African history as a field outside ‘old’ imperial history. Toyin Falola, also continuing an analysis he has presented in *OHHW* vol. 4, traces the development of distinctive national historiographies from the pieces of the British, French, and Belgian empires, while also exploring a key methodological innovation that emerged in African studies first but has had application in other fields—namely the work by Jan Vansina and others on oral tradition as a pathway into pasts either largely devoid of written records or dominated by the written records of colonial occupiers. Oral tradition has figured in other parts of the world, too, and nowhere with greater effect than in the relatively young field of indigenous historiography. In his chapter on Australia and New Zealand, Bain Attwood offers an example of this by focusing his lens on a specific issue; the historiography of aboriginal–settler relations—a dialogue that has produced in that country public controversies between right and left even more widespread than those seen in the United States.

The situation in South America offers another variant, as after decolonization—which in much of the continent began in the nineteenth century—the social structures and concomitant elites established under colonial rule continued to exert a considerable influence. As Joel Horowitz shows, in Argentina the tight political control to which historians were subjected during much of the twentieth century went hand in hand with a rather positivist orientation in methodology—a situation comparable to that of Mexico, where a Rankean notion of history dominated the field after the Mexican Revolution in the 1930s. As analyzed by Guillermo Zermeño Padilla, during the 1940s Mexican historiography entered a process of professionalization and institutionalization, leading after the 1960s to a pluralization of the fields of historical research under the influence of new Western trends such as social history. The same phenomenon can be observed in Argentina since the 1980s. In Brazil, the writing of history was for some time in the hands of gentlemen historians, mainly non-academic, who focused on issues of national identity. Here, too, according to Marshall C. Eakin, starting in the 1940s historical writing was gradually professionalized and then pluralized under the impact of Western historiographical trends such as Marxism, the Annales School, and Dependency Theory. The Brazilian government had made deliberate overtures to European academics, several of whom, such as Fernand Braudel and Claude Lévi-Strauss, were involved in establishing the Universidade de São Paulo in the 1930s and 1940s.

The situation in Southeast Asia was more complex as different patterns of colonization and independence coincided with the varying trajectories of developing modern institutions and practices of writing history. In Thailand
(here studied by Patrick Jory), which never really experienced a process of colonization and decolonization, the writing of history went back to the tradition of royal annals and was, for large parts of the twentieth century, under the direct influence, if not control, of the royal family. (The architect of the modern Thai education system, including historiography, during the early decades of the century was none other than King Chulalongkorn’s half-brother, Prince Damrong Rajanubhab.) The main themes of the court as guarantor of national independence and modernization were challenged at times by, for instance, a militarist nationalism focusing on the Thai nation rather than the court, and by a Marxist critique of absolute monarchy. Only in the 1980s, however, did the writing of history begin to change again under Western influence.

Indonesia, analyzed by Ann Kumar, found itself in a different, a colonial, situation. Indonesian elites then faced the postcolonial predicament of having to adopt Western nationalistic approaches to history in order to oppose the Dutch version of the archipelago’s history that had legitimized colonial domination. Soon after independence the military took over and dominated the writing of history in Indonesia for several decades. Challenges to the military’s view of history came from artistic representations of history, and from historians, trained in the social sciences, who emphasized a multidimensional approach balancing central and local perspectives. However, it was only after 2002 that historians could openly criticize the role of the military.

Yet another pattern can be observed in Vietnam, where, as Patricia Pelley demonstrates, the process of decolonization and the ensuing separation of Vietnam into a northern and southern state as part of the Cold War in Asia led to different types of history-writing. In both Vietnamese regimes, the writing of history had to serve the state, and in both countries historians emphasized its political function. Whereas North Vietnam located itself in an East Asian and Marxist context, historians of South Vietnam positioned it within a Southeast Asian setting and took a staunchly anti-communist position. After 1986 (over a decade after reunification), with past tensions now relaxed, the past could be reevaluated more openly under a reformist Vietnamese government that now also permitted much greater interaction with foreign historians.

In all three areas of East Asia—China, Korea, and Japan—historians could look back and derive inspiration from a tradition of writing history reaching back nearly 3,000 years. However, all three underwent very different political developments in the context of the Cold War. In colonial Korea, historians oscillated between collaboration with the Japanese colonial power and a critique of Japanese colonialism from a nationalist perspective. Henry Em describes how after 1945 those who had criticized colonial rule achieved influence, started to build modern academic institutions, and, in the southern state, excluded Marxists from the profession. A positivist style of history, modelled along the lines of modernization theory, dominated the discipline in South Korea for a long time, especially after the suppression of the student revolts in the 1960s. It
was only after 1980 that the situation changed. In the wake of rapid economic modernization and concomitant political changes, long-dominant modernization theories were increasingly challenged, and notions of multiple modernities, assuming divergent paths to different manifestations of modernity, were fruitfully applied to research on Korean history. In this context, postcolonial theories and the Korean historical experience of suzerainty under Chinese and Japanese colonialism started to play an important role in conceptualizing multiple modernities, and have recently influenced the writing of history in Korea.

In Japan, here discussed by Sebastian Conrad, the year 1945 represented a change of a very different kind. Japanese historians now repudiated the ultranationalist historiography of the 1930s and early 1940s, and turned in significant numbers towards Marxism (or returned to positions of influence), which rapidly achieved a kind of hegemony. They criticized the master narrative of the post-Meiji past, centred on the Tennō (emperor), and identified it with Fascism as a failed experiment in modernity. In the 1960s, however, this Marxist historiographical dominance was gradually supplanted by a pluralism of competing approaches. Modernization theory, social science methodologies, and 'history from below' coexisted, and historians, inspired by the Japanese economic miracle, tried to come to terms with the fact that Japan’s traditions, long perceived as an obstacle to modernization, actually seemed to foster it.

In China, divided by civil war into mainland China and Taiwan, two opposing political camps instrumentalized the writing of history for political purposes. However, Susanne Weigelin-Schwiedrzik argues that, contrary to common expectations, both camps actually shared a lot. On both sides historians struggled with the particularity of Chinese history and its relationship to universal world history. The question of whether or not European models could be applied to Chinese history—be they Marxist models as on the mainland, or theories drawn from the social sciences as in Taiwan—shaped discussions for a long time. With the beginning of the end of the Cold War in East Asia around 1975–6 the writing of history on both sides of the Taiwan Straits underwent major changes. In Taiwan, questions of national identity became increasingly important, and it is no surprise that Taiwanese history grew in popularity. On the mainland, academic history-writing became gradually marginalized in the wake of a thorough commercialization of the historical field. The dominant discourse now turned anti-revolutionary, leaving the Communist Party in a difficult position as it faced the paradox that its legitimacy depended on the very revolutionary discourse now being attacked by a reformist paradigm that it needed to adopt in order to modernize the country.

In his epilogue to the volume—a bookend to G. E. R. Lloyd’s comparable epilogue in *OHHW* vol. 1—Allan Megill offers some thoughtful comments on the entire enterprise which resonate with our perspective as editors. We suggested at the outset of this introduction that post-war historiography is a story without an ending, and one without an obvious central figure, much less a ‘hero’. It is
difficult to say what a similar project such as this, a hundred years from now, will say about our own time, or the decades preceding. The history of historical writing may well be stalled, as Hayden White suggested many years ago, in an ironic perspective (and the passage of nearly forty years since White’s seminal book *Metahistory* [1973] provides little evidence to the contrary). We may similarly be at point where, to quote Peter Novick’s *That Noble Dream* (1988), wherein Novick in turn paraphrased Carl Becker, ‘every group is its own historian’. But if the story of historical writing in the past seventy years offers any indication, the next, unpredictable ‘turn’ in the road may lie just ahead.
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In a 2006 article entitled ‘The History of Theory’ the historian Ian Hunter began his diagnosis of the present predicament of theory with the following opening line: ‘One of the most striking features of recent discussions of the moment of theory in the humanities is the lack of even proximate agreement about what the object of such theory might be and about the language in which it has been or should be conducted.’ Alluding to a diversity of ‘rivalrous theoretical vernaculars’ ranging from Jameson and Eagleton to Chomsky, Habermas, Althusser, and Derrida, he argues that ‘it is fruitless to begin a history of theory by trying to identify its common object or shared language’ because there is none.¹ Fredric Jameson, one of the theorists under attack, responded to Hunter’s critique. In his polemically entitled ‘How Not to Historicize Theory’, he blamed Hunter for being ‘anti-theoretical’, and for clinging to ‘empiricism’ and to a low-level version of ‘positivist censorship’.²

Although this exchange between Hunter and Jameson probably will not be seen as an ‘historical’ debate, the kind of debate and the theoretical positions which both represent is also representative for theory in history. The discussion in the early 1980s between Perry Anderson and E. P. Thompson is just one example.³ On closer analysis, the debate about the role of theory in history has been accompanying history as an academic discipline since its beginning. But before going further I first need to clarify the notions of theory and history.

ABOUT HISTORY

As is well known, history as a discipline has traditionally developed into specializations, the standard subdivision of which has been blocs of time and space. The spatial frames have ranged from the local to the global—with regional, national,
imperial, and continental frames in between. And the temporal frames have ranged from one day (one hour?) in the past back to the Big Bang—with the year, the decade, the century, the period, and so on, in between. Historiography—as the history of history-writing—has developed in the same way.

When specializations have developed in history which appear not to be based on explicit differentiations of space and time—as they in fact did, as in the case of ecclesiastical, legal, economic, gender, and environmental history—these specializations are still defined by implicit temporal and spatial characteristics. All subject-specific histories are also histories of specific chunks of space and time. For instance, the social history of the 1960s and 1970s usually remained within a national framework. In other words, history as a discipline defines its object, explicitly or implicitly, as being located in space and in time.

ABOUT THEORY IN HISTORY (1)

Now what about theory and history? What about Hunter’s rather hopeless conclusion about the impossibility of a history of theory?

On ‘the question of theory’ Hunter is both wrong and right, and I will limit myself to theory of history from now on. Hunter is right in his observation that there is no unified ‘common object’ of theory, and he is also right in his observation that there is no unified ‘shared language’ of theory. However, he is wrong in his conclusion that this lack of a unified object and of a shared language of theory is a problem, because theory of history consists exactly of the philosophical or reflexive discussions about what the object(s) and language(s) of history is (are) or should be. Theory of history consists of ‘the philosophical examination of all the aspects of our descriptions, beliefs, and knowledge of the past’ and is both descriptive and normative.4 Theory of history poses (epistemological) questions concerning the characteristics of our knowledge of the past, (methodological) questions concerning how this knowledge is achieved and what counts as ‘quality’ and as ‘progress’ of historical knowledge, (ontological or metaphysical) questions concerning the mode of being of ‘the past’, and (ethical, legal, and political) questions concerning the uses of the past. Many historians touch on, or pose, ‘theoretical’ questions without being aware of it.

The descriptive/normative double character of theory can only be expected given the sheer variety of ideas concerning the identifying characteristics of ‘the’ discipline and given the variety of historical practices. Both this variety and the normative character of epistemological ideals also pertains to other disciplines, as Lorraine Daston and Peter Galison have recently argued in their Foucauldian

history of the sciences: ‘As long as knowledge posits a knower, and the knower is seen as a potential help or hindrance to the acquisition of knowledge, the self of the knower will be an epistemological issue. The self, in turn, can be modified only with ethical warrant.’\(^5\) This had been the case since Kant had defined epistemology as the ‘battlefield’ between the will of the scientist against itself and ‘objectivity’ as what Schopenhauer had called ‘the will to willessness’\(^6\). Subjectivity had since turned into ‘the enemy from within’, which had to be ‘tamed’ by ‘objective’ procedures and rules.\(^7\)

Striving after ‘objectivity’ is thus simultaneously an epistemic and an ethical ideal.\(^8\) In this light it is not accidental that many great minds in the natural sciences became reflexive (philosophical) in periods when a former consensus broke down under the influence of new ideas, new languages, or new ‘paradigms’, as Thomas Kuhn famously labelled them. Therefore Jameson was right in criticizing Hunter for his ‘empiricism’ and for his lack of understanding of what theory is about.

Theoretical reflection about the ‘true nature’ of history fulfils three interrelated practical functions. First, theory legitimizes a specific historical practice—a specific way of ‘doing history’—as the best one from an epistemological and a methodological point of view. For instance, Fernand Braudel’s reflections on la longue durée aimed to legitimize Annales history in the 1960s as ‘best practice’. Similarly Eric Hobsbawm’s reflections on ‘history of society’ in the 1960s and 1970s aimed to legitimize his kind of Marxist history in the same way.\(^9\)

Second, theory usually sketches a specific programme of doing history. Again Braudel and Hobsbawm can serve as examples, because both argued how ‘doing history’ would become more ‘scientific’ when more historians take the notions of model and structure more seriously and become more aware of the three time-layers of history and of their hierarchy.

Next to its legitimizing and to its programmatic functions, theory has a third function: demarcation. Theoretical reflections usually demarcate a specific way of ‘doing history’ from other ways of ‘doing history’, which are excluded or degraded. So the third function of theory is the drawing of borders to determine who is included within and who is excluded from the community of ‘real’ historians. Again Braudel furnishes a simple example in his exclusion of the histoire événementielle from the domain of ‘scientific’ history, and in his embrace of the social sciences as a necessary precondition of ‘scientific’, ‘structural’ history.

\(^6\) Ibid., 210.
\(^7\) Ibid., 198, 234–46.
\(^8\) Ibid., 174, 210.
ABOUT THE PLACE OF THEORY IN HISTORY

The institutional place of theory in history has always been marginal at best, and many practising historians with empiricist leanings (like Hunter) have had mixed feelings about theory. This resistance to theory is historically rooted in the opposition that Ranke himself constructed between the methods of history and of philosophy. In this view, theory is something like an uninvited visitor who is always asking the wrong questions at the wrong time at the wrong place and, perhaps worse in the eyes of empiricist historians, too often offering bad answers.

There are historical reasons for this ‘bad news’ view of theory, because since history turned into an academic discipline in the nineteenth century and since it claimed a privileged epistemological status vis-à-vis non-professional approaches to history, debates about the role of theory in history have followed a clear pattern. In periods of relative uncertainty about the disciplinary status of history, debates about theory tended to be heated and widespread. In those periods, Theoriedebatten and Methodenstreit were visible even in the centre of the disciplinary stage, while in periods of relative certainty and of academic recognition, this type of debate usually receded to the margins of the discipline (or beyond).

Seen from an historical point of view, widespread discussion on the role of theory in history is in a sense a symptom of challenge, of epistemological uncertainty, or even of ‘crisis’. Since Kuhn has suggested a direct connection between ‘crises’ and ‘scientific revolutions’—and since challengers of dominant paradigms have been paraded as Kuhnian revolutionaries—there has been an extra sensitivity of historians to diagnoses of ‘crisis’.

This direct connection between theoretical discussions and (un)certainty within the discipline makes sense because discussions of this sort concern the discipline’s epistemological foundations and—based on its epistemological claims—its societal functions. Therefore, debates about theory in history always involve history’s disciplinary credentials. Because the discipline’s status is dependent on its claims to epistemological superiority, claims and challenges to history’s ‘objectivity’—as the fundamental concept underpinning all scientific disciplines since the mid-nineteenth century—have usually been central, directly or indirectly, to the theoretical debates.

Seen from the point of view of the sociology of science, debates about the role of theory have usually been directly linked to battles waged by the proponents of different conceptions of history for scientific legitimacy and supremacy, that is, for academic recognition and reputation. In periods of serious competition for ‘intellectual capital’ between several competing factions in the same ‘disciplinary field’, debates about theory have been intense. This not only holds true for history, but also for the (other?) social sciences such as sociology, economics, and psychology. Therefore, this type of debate is especially a characteristic of pluralistic or polyparadigmatic disciplines.15

Typical for the periods of increased interest in theory is usually also an increased interest in the history of the discipline in question. This interest in disciplinary history is usually motivated by a desire to locate the preferred conception in the origins—preferably in its ‘founding fathers’—of the discipline in order to increase its academic credentials. Therefore, in history an increased interest in historiography can usually be observed alongside an increased interest in theory. The remarkable growth of interest in historiography of the last decade is thus not unrelated to the uncertainty following the flowering of postmodern theory within the confines of disciplinary history.16

Seen from a philosophical point of view, debates about theory in history also have been marginal at best. Although there have been quite a few philosophers—from Kant and Hegel over Nietzsche and Heidegger to Foucault and Habermas—who have philosophized about the nature of history, in most parts of the world the philosophy of history did not develop into one of the recognized philosophical specializations, and remained a reserve of the happy (and hardly institutionalized) few. Theory in history has therefore largely remained a specialization of a small number of philosophers and of ‘reflexive practitioners’ of history.

THEORY IN PRACTICE: HISTORIANS DEFINING HISTORY

Because theory of history consists of the reflexive discussions about what the object(s) and language(s) of history—including its method—is and should be, we can expect theory in action when historians define their discipline. As the question ‘What is history?’ usually pops up more frequently in times of disciplinary uncertainty, we can expect the definitions to pop up in the same periods. In the post–Second World War era, the 1960s and 1970s were such a period,


producing a rich harvest of definitions which tried to establish history’s *genus proximum* and its *differentia specifica*.

In Germany, Karl-Georg Faber did his best to find solid ground in the definitional swamps. The conclusion of his broad stocktaking of definitions was, however, that the object of history comprises ‘human activities and suffering in the past’. Faber thus remained ambivalent on the relationship between history and the social sciences. Although he claimed to be able to see ‘qualitative differences’ between them, based on the focus on particularity—on the *Einmaligkeit*—of history and on generality of the social sciences, elsewhere he described this difference as ‘relative’. This relationship remained, in his words, ‘a difficult problem’ because the social sciences were also interested in human comings and goings, which did not help a great deal in establishing history’s identity.

The English historian G. R. Elton fundamentally disagreed with all such ambivalent designations. While he accepted that history and social sciences such as sociology share the same object, namely ‘everything that men have said, thought, done or suffered’, he argued that they differ in the way they approach this object. History, according to Elton, is characterized by its concern with events, its concern with change, and its concern with the particular.

Finally, turning to France, it is—again—difficult to avoid Fernand Braudel, but we will seek in vain for a clear definition of the object and method of history from him. That is so because, in his view, all the social sciences cover the same ground, which is ‘the actions of human beings in the past, present and future’. Braudel expresses regret that this terrain had, in the past, been parcelled out among the different social sciences, as a consequence of which, each of these disciplines had felt the need to defend its boundaries if necessary by annexing the neighbouring territory: ‘Every social science is imperialist, even if they deny it: they are in the habit of presenting their insights as a global vision of humanity’, observed Braudel. To restore the unity of the social sciences and put an end to pointless border disputes, it was in his view necessary to reintegrate all the social sciences. Braudel argued that evidence for the possibility of this can be found in the common language used by all the social sciences, at the heart of which are the concepts of structure and model. The idea that history can be distinguished from the social sciences because historians focus on events and social scientists on structures (as Elton argued) was, therefore, according to Braudel, absolutely wrong. The same could be said of the questioning of the use of models by historians. The main difference between history and the (other) social sciences is not that history addresses particular aspects of phenomena, while the (other) social sciences are said only to be concerned with general aspects. Both branches

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18 On the social sciences, see Ch. 10 by Kevin Passmore in this volume.
20 Braudel, *Écrits sur l’histoire*, 86.
of the social-scientific family are interested in both aspects, according to him. The
difference is that they have concerned themselves with different time frames.
That, however, is an historical difference rather than one of principle. When
history and, for instance, sociology are working with the same time frame, not
only do they meet, they converge.21 Braudel’s definition of history is, for this
reason, particularly broad: ‘the sum of all possible histories—a collection of
specialisms and viewpoints, from the past, present and future’.22

A fellow French historian, Paul Veyne, offered a fine illustration of the
academic imperialism that Braudel warned against. Veyne argued that history
has neither a clearly defined object nor a specific historical method. Historians
study not only people, but everything that happened in the past, and they are
concerned with both particular and general aspects. The only restriction histor-
ians impose upon themselves is that they do not search for laws, as they leave that
to the social scientists. If they are doing anything other than searching for laws,
then according to Veyne they are directly entering the terrain belonging to
history. Veyne, in other words, lays claim to almost the whole field of the social
sciences for history.23

Surveying the battleground of definitions of history outlined above can lead to
only one conclusion, and this is that there is not even the slightest appearance of
an agreement among historians about the object of their research, about its
method, or about its ‘scientific’ credentials vis-à-vis the social sciences. Nor is
there much clarity about what is supposedly the ‘core business’ of history: specificity as to the dimensions of time and place. The spatial dimension of
history even appears to be pretty absent from all definitions. There is not even a
consensus about the most minimal definition of history as a discipline concerned
with ‘mankind in the past’, so this surely looks like a battlefield of theory in the
disciplinary field of history, even to the most staunch empiricist. This is so
because Veyne considers humanity to be too narrow an object—the climate
also has a history and so do the forests—while Braudel cannot see any way to
separate the present from the past fairly. While Elton regards change—that is,
event—as the characteristic of history, Braudel regards the ‘un-eventful’ alias
‘structures’ as history’s object par excellence.

That definitions of history elevate a particular way of ‘doing history’ to ‘the
real’ or the ‘best thing’—like Coca-Cola—becomes abundantly clear when one
runs through any list of definitions. All definitions are descriptive and normative
at the same time. In the Netherlands, Frank R. Ankersmit made no bones about
this normative character of definitions when arguing in favour of a privileged
position for cultural history. In his view, no other historical specialization beats

21 Ibid., 107–8, 114.
22 Ibid., 55, 97.
cultural history in terms of ‘methodological soundness’. As all definitions of history rest, in the final analysis, on these kinds of normative judgement—based on the mix of the legitimizing, programmatic, and demarcating functions of theory—controversy about definitions is inextricably bound up with the competition between different schools or paradigms. As Daston and Galison have also argued, notions of ‘objectivity’ in the natural sciences are based on a mix of epistemological ideals and of normative ideals about the ‘scientific self’. It is not only the theoretical claims as to the nature of the discipline that are at stake here, but also the associated reputations, and financial and institutional resources. This entanglement of ideal and material investments in theoretical positions in a discipline—theorized by Bourdieu in his sociology of ‘disciplinary fields’ and by Foucault in his theory of ‘power/knowledge’—may explain why theoretical struggles never concern only theory.

ABOUT THEORY IN HISTORY (2)

Before discussing the role of theory in history since 1945 it is necessary to present some further conceptual clarification. Due to the double meaning of history as res gestae and as historia rerum gestarum, theory in history can refer both to history as an object and to the knowledge of that object. Therefore the first basic distinction to make is the distinction between (a) theories that deal with characteristics of history as an object (such as, for instance, Marx’s theory of history as a process of class struggles, or Herder’s theory of history as a process of nation-formation), and (b) theories that deal with the characteristics of knowledge of history (such as, for instance, that knowledge of history is empirical and has the form of law-like knowledge, or that knowledge of history is based on hermeneutical understanding and has the form of narrative). Theories of type a can be called material or ontological theories of history because they posit some mode of being of history, while theories of type b can be called epistemological in a broad sense because they posit characteristics of historical knowledge. Ontological and epistemological theories are interrelated, because presuppositions about what history consists of (ontology or metaphysics) are linked to presuppositions of what historical knowledge is (historical epistemology) and to how historical knowledge can be achieved (historical methodology).
Ontological theories, for instance, that present history as determined or conditioned by underlying mechanisms (for example, of nation-formation or of class struggle or of some other evolutionary principle, producing developmental stages in history) have been interrelated with epistemological theories that posit that knowledge of history implies empirical knowledge of the general (generalizations, theories, or even of law-like statements), and with methodological theories that elucidate how this type of (law-like) explanatory knowledge can be achieved. In the practice of history this kind of theory can be recognized in a strong explanatory emphasis on causal ‘factors’.

In contrast with these ‘mechanistic’ theories, there also are ontological theories of history that posit intentionality, contingency, and meaningful human action (instead of causal mechanisms), which have been interrelated with theories about knowledge of meaning of (intentional) actions and of linguistic expressions, and also with methodological theories that elucidate how this type of (hermeneutic) understanding of meaningful action and of linguistic expression can be achieved. In the practice of history this kind of theory can be recognized in a strong explanatory emphasis on intentional action. It has not been unusual to see the competition between the ‘social scientific history’ dominating the 1960s and 1970s, and the ‘new cultural history’ dominating from the 1980s in terms of a change from explanation on basis of causal factors to interpretation on basis of meaningful actors.

Now, since 1945 all explicit ontological questions of history have been put under serious suspicion (beginning with Karl Popper) and have no longer been taken seriously. Holistic ‘metaphysics’ of history, presupposing supraindividual social entities such as ‘races’ and ‘classes’, were criticized as the conceptual foundation of totalitarian (Nazi and communist) politics. ‘Substantial’ philosophy of history was proclaimed dead academically both by logical positivism and by Popper’s falsificationism. During the Cold War, historians and philosophers who made their holistic presuppositions explicit, like Marxists and the non-Marxist Arnold Toynbee, were criticized as ‘ideologues’ or worse, and ontological individualism was dominant.28 Since the 1980s the anti-essentialist critique of ‘grand narratives’ in history by postmodernism (starting with Lyotard) renewed this line of critique. The connection between ontological or metaphysical and epistemological problems of history subsequently disappeared from the agenda of theory of history—until, very recently, the ontology of history made its return under the influence of the surge of ‘memory’,29 leading to a renewal of interest in ontological questions related to the ‘presence’ of the past and to the ontology of social objects.

29 See Ch. 2 by Alon Confino in this volume.
Although there is little consensus in the domain of theory of history there at least appears to be considerable agreement as to its history since 1945. Most recent overviews agree on a threefold periodization.  

Between approximately 1945 and 1970 analytical philosophy of history was dominant, to be superseded by narrative philosophy of history from the 1970s to approximately 1990. This latter shift is often seen as a consequence of the ‘linguistic turn’ in history and is also called ‘representationalism’. Since somewhere in the late 1980s a third period has begun in which the themes of ‘memory’, ‘trauma’, ‘the sublime’, and ‘the presence of the past’ are the most salient topics. There is no agreed-upon philosophical label as yet for this tendency, although recently the label of ‘presence’ has been suggested.

ANALYTICAL PHILOSOPHY OF HISTORY  
FROM 1945 TO 1970

In the period between 1945 and 1970 the agenda of theory of history was heavily dominated by analytical philosophy of science with its focus on the epistemological problem of verification and the methodological problem of scientific explanation. Carl Hempel’s 1942 article arguing that all ‘scientific’ explanations are based on ‘covering laws’ was without doubt the most important point of reference of most reflections on the disciplinary status of history for some three decades (at least in the English-speaking world). This held both for Hempel’s positivist allies and for his hermeneutic or historicist opponents—such as W. H. Walsh, William H. Dray, Louis O. Mink, and Michael Scriven. Given its origin in (philosophy of) science, this debate in theory of history had strong prescriptive overtones, while its descriptive contents as to the practice of history were weak. The whole discussion centred on epistemological and methodological questions derived from the analytical agenda. How could explanatory claims by historians be justified if not by referring to general laws or law-like general statements? If they could not, did they have a logical form of their own? If historians did not comply with the positivist ‘unity of scientific method’, how and in what sense could history then claim to be ‘objective’?

This debate had already run out of steam in the late 1950s, although it also developed into a new edition of the ‘explanation versus understanding’ debate in the 1960s and 1970s. Analytical philosophy was now put to use in order to explicate the logic of ‘understanding’ human action. ‘Colligatory’, ‘rational’, and

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32 The fundamental contributions are collected in Patrick Gardiner (ed.), Theories of History: Readings from Classic and Contemporary Sources (New York, 1959).
‘teleological’ explanations were presented by Mink, Walsh, Dray, F. A. Olafson, and G. H. von Wright as the alternative explanatory models for Hempel’s covering law model in history. Thus their focus was still on epistemology and on methodology.

Characteristic for this period is that the debates among philosophers and those among historians were hardly connected. Those historians who championed the ideal of ‘history as a social science’ in the 1970s—such as Charles Tilly and David Landes—hardly ever referred to the debate on the role of general laws in historical explanation, and the philosophers hardly ever referred to debates among historians about history and social science.33

On the European continent the situation was different because neo-Kantian, phenomenological, and hermeneutical philosophy of history did not give way to analytical philosophy. In both Germany and France, Max Weber’s (neo-Kantian) theory of history was defended and elaborated upon by philosophers such as Raymond Aron, Henri Marrou, and, partly, by Paul Ricoeur. Following the neo-Kantian philosopher Heinrich Rickert, Weber had made a distinction between ‘individualizing’ and ‘generalizing’ methods and had characterized history as an ‘individualizing’ discipline.

When from the 1960s onwards the dominance of logical positivism came to an end in philosophy of science and when Karl Popper and, shortly thereafter, Thomas Kuhn took centre stage, the philosophical contours of the central notions of this whole period, ‘science’, ‘explanation’, and ‘objectivity’ became blurred. Since Kuhn, the (philosophical) idea that science can be characterized in terms of one (global) ‘method’ and of one (global) rationality has been undermined.34 It was replaced by the (historical) presupposition of history of science that science consists of a variety of (local) disciplinary practices with their own (local) logics. From that ‘post-positivistic’ time onwards ‘science’ and ‘objectivity’ turned from ‘givens’ into new historical and conceptual problems. In this contextualizing and historicizing spirit, disciplinary practices—again the plural—were turned into an object of anthropological study by social studies in science, so it was also about time for theory of history to change. And change did come to theory in history in the early 1970s.

NARRATIVE PHILOSOPHY OF HISTORY IN THE 1970S AND 1980S

In hindsight, Arthur C. Danto’s Analytical Philosophy of History (1965) can be seen as the transition between the ‘analytical’ and the narrative period. Starting

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33 David S. Landes and Charles Tilly (eds.), History as Social Science (Englewood Cliffs, 1971).
34 See Ch. 9 by Seymour Mauskopf and Alex Roland in this volume.
from the analytical agenda, Danto nevertheless developed a position in which ‘narrative explanation’ was analyzed as an autonomous and legitimate way to explain phenomena in history. He was the first analytical philosopher who took the dimension of time seriously because he emphasized that historical explanation is retrospective by definition. Nevertheless, ‘narrative explanation’ in Danto’s view was still a variety of causal explanations, and narrative still a composite of singular statements—and this connection to causal explanation still tied him to positivism and its methodological agenda.

This direct connection to positivism was finally cut by Hayden White in his *Metahistory* (1973). With the benefit of hindsight this book is regarded as the beginning of a new phase in theory of history and of a new agenda. Although White claimed—just as Danto had—that narrative is an autonomous mode of explaining phenomena, he did not defend this claim *vis-à-vis* positivism, nor did he develop any kind of formal ‘proof’ (or deduction) for it. And no longer did White subscribe to the (analytical) idea of narrative as a composite of singular statements. The idea of narrative as a textual whole apart from the singular statements it contains—as a linguistic entity generating a specific viewpoint—first acquired a philosophical foundation in Frank R. Ankersmit’s fundamental *Narrative Logic* in 1981. While in the phase dominated by analytical philosophy the idea of ‘objectivity’ and ‘getting closer to the truth’ had been the leading epistemological virtues, in the phase of narrative philosophy these virtues receded into the background (or were completely given up).

When most theoreticians of history lost their faith in the possibility of ‘objectively’ reconstructing The Past, their interest shifted to the *modes of representation* of the past—to the ‘clothing of Clio’, to use Stephen Bann’s phrase. Characteristic of ‘representationalism’ was that the traditional trust in the ‘transparency’ of narrative had vanished, including the ‘uncritical faith of historians in the neutrality of historical narrative, a faith whose bedrock was fact’.

White suggested that historians, just like novelists, have the freedom to choose between different kinds of narrative ordering or ‘emplotment’ (he discussed four: romance, tragedy, comedy, and satire), and thus between different kinds of explanation. Moreover, he claimed that the facts of history do not limit the historian’s freedom to ‘narrativize’ them. Therefore White argues that in history we are facing ‘the fictions of factual representation’. Historians do not choose a narrative ordering of the facts that they report on *epistemological* grounds,

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according to White, but rather on aesthetic and political grounds. So as far as there is methodology in *Metahistory*, it is Paul Feyerabend’s anarchistic methodology of ‘anything goes’. Feyerabend’s arguments ‘against method’ turned into a starting point of the postmodern critique of the methodical ‘disciplinization’ of both science (including the humanities) and society. Thus, although it appears at first sight that White’s ideas about narrative have simply bypassed positivism as being irrelevant to history, it can be argued that many of his central arguments are actually directed squarely against positivism and even represent its inversion.

However this may be, there can be little doubt that White cleared the ground for a new type of theory of history while setting its new agenda, centred around ‘the question of narrative’ and spreading into new and intensive discussions about the old question of how the object and the method of history and the humanities could be defined. Discussions about interpretation, hermeneutics (Hans-Georg Gadamer), deconstruction (Jacques Derrida), ‘thick description’ (Clifford Geertz), New Historicism (Stephen Greenblatt), and Critical Theory (Jürgen Habermas) dominated the agenda of philosophy of the human sciences for some time to come, although usually outside the walls of history departments.

After White, other philosophers of narrative picked up his lead but used other sources of philosophical inspiration. Ankersmit used Leibniz to turn analytical philosophy against itself in order to arrive at an holistic view of narrative in his ‘narrative logic’. Ricoeur combined phenomenology and analytical philosophy to arrive at a narrative philosophy in which temporality is presented as the hallmark not only of narratives, but of social life as such—which Ricoeur viewed as itself narratively structured. Along this path, ontology (of time) also made its way back into theory of history. Jörn Rüsen followed a similar phenomenological philosophical trail, although his narrative philosophy also incorporated the basic Enlightenment ideas of Jürgen Habermas.

Although in the period of narrative philosophy there was much more communication between the historians’ and the philosophers’ discourses than before—most discussants at this time were also trained as historians—the rich proliferation of narrative positions and their focus on the notion of representation in the course of the 1980s came at a price. The staunch linguistic predilections, especially of White and Ankersmit—both of whom argued that narratives

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39 I have argued for this view in ‘Narrativism, Positivism and the “Metaphorical Turn”’, *History and Theory*, 37 (1998), 309–29.
are just linguistic constructs without controllable referential strings attached to ‘the real’—collided with the realistic presuppositions of most practising historians who clung to the presupposition that history aims to reconstruct the past, not merely to ‘tell a story’ about it. Although the ideals of ‘resurrecting’ the past and ‘reenactment’ in past persons ‘objectively’ have been given up for good epistemological reasons this does not imply that the idea of reconstructing the past is dubious or unsound. In defence of this idea, historians like Allan Megill and Anthony Grafton have argued that ‘doing history’ consists not only of constructing narratives, but also of doing research and of constructing a bridge between the two which anchors narratives in the evidence of the past. Both ingredients of ‘doing history’ belong inextricably together. The epistemological questions of narrativism, thrown out by White and Ankersmit through the front door, thus have reappeared at the back.42

This point of view experienced a considerable tailwind by an unexpected ‘return of the past’ itself in the guise of ‘memory’ after the political earthquake of 1989/1990.43 This leads me to the third and last phase of the history of theory, in which new approaches in history have tended to become explicitly self-reflexive and theoretically self-conscious.

THE ‘PRESENCE’ OF HISTORY SINCE 1990

Broadly speaking, one can observe around 1990 a new agenda emerging in theory of history, primarily connected to the rise of memory studies. Next to the central issues of the former two periods—that is the issue of historical explanation and the issue of historical representation—(1) the issue of ‘The Other’, (2) the issue of the traumatic past, and (3) the issue of the use of language as a form of action, made it on to the agenda of theory.

First, attention has been directed to the subjects—in the plural—of representation and their different representational codes. Under the influence of multiculturalism and postmodernism, the unitary Self of epistemology was ‘de-centred’ and fell apart into a variety of contesting Collective SELfs—such as gender, race, ethnicity, colonial, and class (‘who are representing the past and why are they doing it the way they do?’). Even the ‘Scientific Self’ is no longer seen as unitary: it has a history of its own. Since the idea of a subjectless ‘objectivity’ was given up, and the problem of ‘subjectivity’ entered the discipline of history through the front door, the problem of perspectivity had to be faced (as several earlier theorists since Nietzsche had argued). As a consequence, historical narratives can no longer be written without reflecting on the problem of the

perspectivity of both the actors in the text and of the author(s) of the text. Narratives can only be written in an ‘up–to-date’ manner by integrating this plurality of perspectives somehow.\textsuperscript{44}

Second, under the influence of memory studies, the focus has changed to traumatic experiences in the past, otherwise known as the presence of the traumatic past. On the trail of Holocaust studies, memory studies have been overwhelmingly devoted to traumatic memories and thus to victim perspectives.\textsuperscript{45} This emphasis on the victims of history was also an extension of the ‘history from below’ approaches which were developed predominantly in social, gender, subaltern, and microhistory from the 1970s onwards, and which focused on the repressed and silenced voices in the past.

The third change of focus is exemplified, first, in the interest in Foucauldian discourse analysis and, second, in the interest in the performative character of language (the so-called performative turn, based on J. L. Austin and John Searle). Both lines of analysis are based on the insight that the use of language is not just a medium of representation, but also a form of social action alias of practice—an insight that Charles Taylor traces back to Wilhelm von Humboldt.\textsuperscript{46}

I shall elaborate on these three changes in the reverse order because I want to conclude my analysis by returning to the ‘objectivity question’.

The third change. Foucault’s approach to the past can best be understood on the basis of his use of Clausewitz because he turned the statement of the latter that ‘war is an extension of politics by other means’ into the insight that ‘all politics is an extension of war by other means’. Warfare by linguistic means is crucial because language is not only a carrier of meaning, but also ‘goes out to do battle’. Combined with the view that all history is past politics and all politics is present history, Foucault started a critical ‘history of the present’ into the ways in which ‘language does battle’, and into the ‘microphysics of power’ (‘how and under which power relations were the subjects and objects of history constructed in practices?’). According to Foucault’s social constructivist theory of ‘power/knowledge’, a discipline imposes its own set of rules for the distinction of ‘the normal’ and ‘the abnormal’ and for the distinction of the truth and falsity of statements. He coined those sets of rules ‘truth regimes’ which regulate the mechanisms of inclusion and exclusion (of legitimate statements and forms of acceptable behaviour) in specific societal domains. This holds not only for the disciplines and disciplinary practices Foucault himself has analyzed—like

\textsuperscript{44} See Robert F. Berkhofer, Jr., Beyond The Great Story: History as Text and Discourse (Cambridge, Mass., 1995).


psychiatry, criminology, and sexology—but for all disciplines in the human sciences.  

Edward Said famously applied Foucault’s theory of ‘power/knowledge’ to the discourse of ‘orientalism’, thereby contributing to the spectacular rise of postcolonial theory. Said argued that orientalism was a product of Western imperialism, which it was intended to further from the very start. As a geographical and as a cultural notion ‘the Orient’ was little else than a product of ‘Othering’ by ‘the Occident’. The characteristics projected on ‘the Orient’—its mysteriousness, irrationality, and sexuality, for instance—resulted from the inversion of the characteristics which were used for the description of the West. Said argued that in this manner there is a ‘politics of space’ at work in the humanities—already present in the geographical labels (like ‘Lebensraum’, ‘unreclaimed land’, and ‘buffer state’). In *Imagining the Balkans* (1997) Nancy Todorova argued that the same mechanisms are at work in the description of Europe’s own marginal zones.

A similar interest in the constructive and performative function of language can be found in Anglo-Saxon speech act theory and the so-called Cambridge School of the History of Political Thought, of which J. G. A. Pocock and Quentin Skinner are the best-known representatives. Building on Ludwig Wittgenstein’s *Philosophical Investigations* (1953), Austin and Searle have analyzed the so-called performative function of language, meaning forms of speech that are at the same time forms of action. The point of a performative utterance is that the utterance itself constitutes *doing* something in the world. When US President George W. Bush said to his generals in 2003, ‘I order you to conquer [or: liberate] Iraq’, Bush was not merely speaking, he was also performing or acting: he was giving an order. The same applies to summoning, greeting, warning, making promises and contracts, marrying, signing peace treaties, and so on. To understand the performative meaning of utterances, therefore, we need to know their context of action, or the ‘language game’ of which they form a part and within which they are being used (just as we can only understand chess moves in the context of a game of chess).

Skinner went on from this view of the use of language as a form of social action to attach to it the consequence that the meaning of a text is formed by what the author ‘intended in doing’ in the context: ‘To understand any serious utterance, we need to grasp not merely the meaning of what is said, but at the same time the intended force with which the utterance is issued. We need, that is, to grasp not merely what people are saying but also what they are doing in saying it’. To understand the meaning of an historical utterance or text, therefore, it is

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not sufficient to read the utterance or text itself. The context of the text must also be studied. Skinner argues that this means that the distinction between text and context becomes relative.\(^{50}\)

In a similar vein, Judith Butler in *Gender Trouble* (1999) analyzed the distinction between (gender-)identity and action in performative terms, arguing that (gender-)identities are the *result* of specific performances—of specific ways of social action—and not individually ‘pregiven’ and then *expressed* in social action. As a consequence of this new ‘social’ line of argument, the ontology of social objects—like groups, discourses, and the *Zeitgeist*—has resurfaced on theory’s agenda again, challenging the former hegemony of ontological and of methodological individualism.\(^{51}\)

The second change. While discourse analysis, historical semantics, or conceptual history in the fashions of Foucault, Said, and Skinner, could be interpreted as subspecies of the ‘new cultural history’, trauma as a new topic is posing a more fundamental challenge to history as a discipline because it questions the very distinction between the present and the past.\(^{52}\) In trauma the past refuses to become history—‘to go away’—because it remains somehow present. Therefore this phenomenon does not fit into the irreversible, linear time conception of the discipline of history, according to which the present transforms into the past automatically just by the passage of time. Traumatic experience unsettles history’s basic temporal distinction between the present and the past by denying the presupposition of ‘the pastness of the past’ and its underlying conception of linear and irreversible time. It also unsettles the fundamental presupposition of representationalism *à la* White and Ankersmit that the past is *only* present in the form of representations. If it makes sense to discuss ‘the return of the repressed’ in, for instance, German or Holocaust history, then surely the repressed past must exist in some form in the present. In this vein, Eelco Runia has argued that in contrast to what representationalism posits, the past is exactly present in what is *not* represented: it is, for instance, present in our mémoire involontaire. Therefore it is possible to be ‘overwhelmed’ by the past and to remember things later on we did not know before.\(^{53}\)

It is no accident that the Holocaust, especially, has stimulated philosophical reflection on the time conception of history because irreversible time cannot account for the presence of the traumatic past as exemplified in Holocaust survivors like Yizhak (Ante) Zuckerman, who told his interviewer Claude Lanzmann in ‘Shoah’ in 1985: ‘If you could lick my heart, it would poison you’. In order to account for this sort of experience, Lawrence Langer has

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\(^{50}\) Ibid., 117.


\(^{52}\) For the pitfalls of trauma, see Wulf Kansteiner, ‘Genealogy of a Category Mistake: A Critical Intellectual History of the Cultural Trauma Metaphor’, *Rethinking History*, 8 (2004), 193–221.

proposed the distinction between *chronological time* and *durational time*. ‘Chronological time is the “normal” flowing, passing time of “normal” history’ while ‘durational time resists precisely the closure—the putting an end to the past—that chronological time necessarily effects; durational time persists as a past that will not pass, hence as a past always present’, as Gabrielle Spiegel phrased it.⁵⁴

Following the ontological trail, Berber Bevernage recently called for a renewed reflection on the relation between history and *justice*, and their implicit notions of irreversible and of reversible time respectively.⁵⁵ He argues that history’s conception of irreversible time is in a sense *amoral*, because it does not account for the experience of trauma—of continuing suffering—of those who have been victims of historical injustices in the past. He seeks to overcome this problem by adopting Derrida’s notion of spectral time, which goes beyond the dichotomy of absence and presence (of the past), and which is still used by Runia. At the same time he interprets the difference between the past and the present not as a ‘given’, but as a *performative* distinction: that is, as the result of speech acts. The past does not somehow automatically ‘break off’ the present, as Ankersmit posits, but only results from the *performative act* of ‘breaking up’.⁵⁶ Bevernage’s analysis of the political struggles and debates of the truth commissions in Argentina, South Africa, and Sierra Leone in demarcating the past from the present offers telling insights into the contested, political aspects of ‘breaking up’. At the same time his case studies show what fundamental insights the ‘performative turn’ in history may yield.⁵⁷ This renewed interest in the *philosophy* of historical time is also inspired by the renewed interest in the *history* of historical time, as exemplified in the publications of Reinhart Koselleck, François Hartog, Peter Fritsche, Lynn Hunt, and Lucian Hölscher in particular.⁵⁸

In the context of postcolonial theory Dipesh Chakrabarty has proposed the concept of *historical wounds* in order to make sense of traumatic experience due to injustices in the past. ‘Historical wounds’ are the result of historical injustices caused by past actions of states which have not been recognized as injustices. The genocidal treatment of the ‘First Nations’ by the colonial states in the former white settler colonies represents a clear historical example of this category. Using Charles Taylor’s analysis of ‘the politics of recognition’, Chakrabarty argues that ‘misrecognition shows not just a lack of due respect. It can inflict a grievous

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⁵⁷ See Frank van Vree, Karin Tilmans, and Jay Winter (eds.), *Performing the Past: History, Memory, and Identity* (Amsterdam, 2010).
wound, saddling its victims with a crippling self-hatred’. Here it makes good sense to speak with Chakrabarty of a ‘particular mix of history and memory’:

Historical wounds are not the same as historical truths but the latter constitute a condition of possibility of the former. Historical truths are broad, synthetic generalizations based on researched collections of individual historical facts. They could be wrong but they are always amenable to verification by methods of historical research. Historical wounds, on the other hand, are a mix of history and memory and hence their truth is not verifiable by historians. Historical wounds cannot come into being, however, without the prior existence of historical truths.59

Because ‘historical wounds’ are dependent on the (political) recognition of the perpetrator groups—usually at the level of ‘their’ state—they are ‘dialogically formed’ and not ‘permanent formations’. Since this recognition of ‘historical injustices’ also depends on the recognition of universal human rights, the phenomenon of ‘historical wounds’ illustrates the interdependency of history, politics, law, and ethics.

The first change. With the problem of ‘historical wounds’ and of ‘durational time’ the very notion of ‘objectivity’ of history as a discipline is turning into an urgent problem—not only in practice but also in theory—because since Ranke distance in time has been regarded as a necessary condition of ‘objectivity’ in history.60 Temporal distance and ‘objectivity’ were actually identified with each other because interested ‘partisanship’ (and interested actors)—religious, political, or otherwise—needed time in order to disappear and to give way to ‘suprapartisan’ perspectives alias ‘objectivity’. As Mark Phillips argued, in historicism (Historismus) the notions of distance and of history were practically indistinguishable.61

Temporal distance between the past and the present was also seen as necessary because in historicism the consequences of events and developments—their future-dimension or Nachgeschichte, so to speak—must be known before historians can judge and explain them ‘objectively’. This is another ground why the idea of irreversible ‘flowing’ linear time formed and forms the very basis of history as a discipline.

This view on the relation between time and ‘objectivity’ explains the very late birth of contemporary history as a specialization within academic history. Only in the 1960s in the aftermath of the Second World War and the Holocaust did contemporary history slowly gain recognition as a specialization of academic history, manifesting itself in chairs, journals, and so on. From Ranke’s days

60 See Reinhart Koselleck, Wolfgang Justin Mommsen, and Jörn Rüsen (eds.), Objektivität und Parteilichkeit (Munich, 1977).
contemporary history was primarily seen as an impossible mix of ‘the past’ and ‘the present’—as a *contradictio in adiecto*—signalling the unreflected and un-theorized status of time within history as a discipline.

For space and spatial differentiations in history a basically similar story can be told as for time, including its direct and fundamental connection to the discipline’s idea of ‘objectivity’. Although history from its beginning claimed to be a discipline specific to both time and space, its conception of space was not reflected upon and taken for granted. Karl Schlo ¨gl’s recent analysis of the ‘spatial atrophy’ of history and of ‘the disappearance’ of space in history certainly comes timely.62

The explanation of this ‘disappearance’ is that in much history the spatial framework of the nation-state was implicitly taken for granted and larger spatial units, like empires, were conceived as composites of nations and nation-states. This ‘special connection’ between academic history and the nation/state has recently been emphasized by a number of experts in historiography.63

For most academic historians of the nineteenth century, identification with their state and nation (or ‘people’, ‘race’, ‘tribe’, which terms were used as synonyms of ‘nation’) came naturally, because they identified the historical process *itself* with the genesis and development of nations and ‘their’ states.64 On the basis of this (Herderian) ontology of history, *national* history appeared as *the* adequate representation of the historical process—as its ‘natural mode of being’ in Daniel Woolf’s phrasing.65 As far as world or universal history was concerned, it was primarily conceived of as a ‘sum’ of national histories and therefore typically as a project for the *future*.

This ontology of history also explains why historians of the nation regarded their nationalistic narratives as ‘true’ and/or as ‘objective’. ‘Objectivity’ was basically conceived as leaving partisanship behind—in terms of religious and political affiliations—*within* the space of the nation. This connection explains why historians well into the twentieth century regarded ‘the’ point of view of ‘the’ nation as the ‘objective’ point of view, and why they did not experience a tension between their striving after ‘objectivity’ and their role as ‘half-priests and half-soldiers’ of their nation. Telling for the continuing hold of the national

framework on history is that many of its fundamental critics since the 1970s—in the name of class, ethnicity, or gender—have also remained within this spatial framework. Only with the recent debates about postcolonial, transnational, comparative, global, world, and big history has the spatial framing of history been turned into an explicit problem and object of discussion. The same holds true for the ‘spatialization of time’ and for the ‘waiting hall’ idea of history: that is, for the identification of the ‘Western’ parts of the world as being ‘ahead’ in time and of the ‘non-Western’ parts as ‘not yet there’.66

All in all, at the beginning of the twenty-first century in theory of history we can observe, first, a remarkable return to the problems of historical ontology—especially concerning the discipline’s presuppositions with respect to time and space and with respect to the ontology of social objects. Remarkable, too, is the return of the problem of the relationship of history to politics, law, and ethics—and thereby the distinction between what Michael Oakeshott called the ‘historical’ and the ‘practical’ past.67 Both problems of ontology and of politics, justice, and ethics in relation to history had been rigorously ‘skipped’ in the agenda of theory of history as ‘pseudo problems’ during the reign of empiricism, so it makes good sense to interpret this fact as ‘the return of the repressed’.

Simultaneously the problems of historical epistemology and of historical methodology have not disappeared from theory’s agenda since the rise of the memory boom after the mid-1980s. The methodological discussions about how to compare in a transnational and a transfer context are heated.68 And although the problems of historical ‘objectivity’, of historical method, and of historical explanation/interpretation have also been historicized and contextualized, they are also still being discussed in epistemic and in logical terms.69 This looks like the lasting legacy of the period 1945–70 and of analytical philosophy in theory of history, although the former idea of both the ‘unity’ of ‘scientific’ and of ‘historical method’ has usually been replaced by the idea of a fundamental variety.70 Even the classical question whether there is an explanatory role for ‘laws’ and ‘mechanisms’ in history—reflecting the conditioning influences of, for instance, ecological, social, and political structures—has recently returned, especially through global and ‘big’ history.71 A similar return can be observed

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70 Christian Meier and Jörn Rüsen (eds.), *Historische Methode* (Munich, 1988).
concerning the classical question of what ‘understanding the past’ means and how this is possible.\footnote{72}{Hans H. Kögler and Karsten R. Stueber (eds.), \textit{Empathy and Agency: The Problem of Understanding in the Human Sciences} (Boulder, 2000).}

The lasting legacy of the period 1970–90 and of narrativism appears to be the awareness of the theoretical impossibility of a ‘God’s eye point of view’ and thus of the circumstance that all our knowledge of the past is mediated by representations and perspectives. Traditionally these are textual representations, but there is a growing awareness that audio and visual representations are becoming increasingly important at the expense of the textual type. The latter change is often indicated as the ‘iconical’ or the ‘visual turn’. Connected with this ‘turn’ is the recognition that each medium of representation—text, interview, photograph, documentary, film, and interactive videogame—follows its own rules and own logic. The same goes for the digitalization of information and the use of the Internet, which are now beginning to become objects of theoretical reflection in history.\footnote{73}{Wulf Kansteiner, ‘Alternate Worlds and Invented Communities: History and Historical Consciousness in the Age of Interactive Media’, in Jenkins, Morgan, and Munslow (eds.), \textit{Manifestos for History}, 131–49.}

Given our inescapable representational predicament in history, the historicization of, and the reflection on, the competing representational forms of history are often mentioned as the best rational way of dealing with this predicament.\footnote{74}{Werner and Zimmermann, ‘Beyond Comparison’; Arif Dirlik, ‘Performing the World: Reality and Representation in the Making of World History(ies)’, \textit{Bulletin of the German Historical Institute, Washington D.C.}, 37 (2005), 9–27; and Chris Lorenz, ‘Towards a Theoretical Framework for Comparing Historiographies: Some Preliminary Considerations’, in Seixas (ed.) \textit{Theorizing Historical Consciousness}, 25–49.}

Where the period beginning around 1990 is leading theory of history is impossible to foretell. One thing, however, may be clear already: given the increasing theoretical awareness of the ‘new approaches’ to history, and given the increasing self-reflexivity of its practitioners, we can safely conclude that, in the debate over ‘theory’ in history, Jameson was right and Hunter was definitely wrong.

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Chapter 2

History and Memory

Alon Confino

The notion of historical memory has become a totem of sort: a revered notion for public identity and professional investigation. For scholars, it now governs questions of interpretation, narration, and explanation, perhaps like no other term in the historical discipline. But no one could have quite predicted thirty or forty years ago that a volume about historical writing since 1945 would have to include a chapter on history and memory.

In itself, the scholarly interest in memory is not new. Cumulative intellectual influences at the end of the nineteenth century and the early decades of the twentieth made memory a central notion to understanding human behaviour. Among those who were interested in the topic we find psychoanalysts (such as Sigmund Freud), philosophers (such as Henri Bergson), and writers (such as Marcel Proust), who, unlike historians, regarded memory as a faculty of the individual mind; Aby Warburg, the exceptional art historian who used the notion of social memory (soziales Gedächtnis) to explain how ancient symbols migrated among different art works, periods, and countries; and sociologists, notably Emile Durkheim and Maurice Halbwachs.1

The first to have used the concept systematically was Halbwachs, whose contribution in his seminal work Les cadres sociaux de la mémoire published in 1925 was to establish the connection between a social group and collective memory. Halbwachs, a student of Durkheim, argued in a Durkheimian fashion that even the most individual memory is determined by images and categories coming from society and related to a social formation. In a series of studies he argued that every memory is carried by a specific social group limited in space and time.2

1 Henry Bergson, Matière et mémoire (Paris, 1896); trans. as Matter and Memory (1908); Marcel Proust, À la recherche du temps perdu (Paris, 1913–27); and Aby Warburg, Gesammelte Schriften (Leipzig/Berlin, 1932).
The affiliations between history and memory originated within a milieu of French scholars, notably Halbwachs and Marc Bloch, that initiated at the first half of the twentieth century the modern study of memory and of mentalities (histoire des mentalités). Lucien Febvre and Bloch, the fathers of the Annales School founded in the 1920s, called for a new kind of history that explored, beyond the usual political history of states and kings, the social and economic structures of a society as well as its ‘mental tools’ (outillage mental): namely, the system of beliefs and collective representations, myths, and images with which people in the past understood and gave meaning to their world. The history of collective memory—of how societies represent their past—was viewed as one important part of this endeavour. Bloch started to use the term ‘collective memory’ in the mid-1920s; and in 1925 he wrote a favourable review of Halbwachs’s Les cadres sociaux de la mémoire.3

But in the following decades the notion of memory did not play an important role in the historical discipline, even while the latter became more diverse by giving central place to social and economic history. Halbwachs’s ideas went unnoticed in the wider intellectual world. This dramatically changed in the late 1970s and during the 1980s. It was Pierre Nora, a member of a later generation of Annales, conscious of the school’s traditions and also of its new directions, who again linked history and memory. In 1978 he outlined ideas for a new kind of history in the volume La nouvelle histoire.4 Then came his magisterial project Les lieux de mémoire—seven volumes dedicated to the exploration of French national memory, published between 1984 and 1992, which became the starting point of present-day memory studies.5 His text ‘Between History and Memory’ became a manifesto of sorts for the emerging field of study.6

What originated within a specific milieu of French scholars in the 1920s became in the 1980s a larger phenomenon. Nora’s project reflected wider professional interest, and the range, number, and sophistication of memory studies became phenomenal. Jacques Le Goff’s History and Memory was published in Italian in 1986, in French in 1988, and in English in 1992. Le Goff was a great Annaaliste of the Middle Ages, and it is again worth noting the link

between the Annales and the topic of memory and history. In Heidelberg at the same time, Jan and Aleida Assmann, working with a group of scholars in the Institute of Egyptology, suggested the terms ‘cultural’ and ‘communicative’ memory, which gained currency first in the German-speaking world and then beyond.\(^7\)

But memory took on a life of its own, with contemporary professional and cultural characteristics. In 1978 the historian Saul Friedländer published *Quand vient le souvenir*, his memoir about the Holocaust. It was one of the first, influential such memoirs, reflecting what would become fundamental relations between Holocaust and memory studies. In 1989 Friedländer founded in Tel Aviv University the journal *History and Memory*, which became the flagship of the emerging field. Memory studies covered in the following years any imaginable historical topic, from the tragic to the mundane, from genocide and war to Mickey Mouse and landscape.\(^8\) In 1997 it was reasonable to argue that ‘the notion of “memory” has taken its place now as a leading term, recently perhaps *the* leading term, in cultural history’ and history overall.\(^9\) In recent years, memory studies have become institutionalized as a new field. Engagement on issues of method and approach takes place in a new journal *Memory Studies* published from 2008, and an H-Memory online discussion group founded in 2007. Both provide transdisciplinary venues for new research and critical thinking. New publications, such as a reader and a handbook, have begun to take stock of the field as a whole and to chart its history, problems, and future.\(^10\)

What are some of the reasons for the transformation of the notion of memory into a leading historical concept? The answer lies in a combination of trends within the historical discipline as well as in the surrounding culture. Developments within the historical profession come into sharp focus when we consider the recent history of the notion of memory. When Nora conceived his memory project in the late 1970s and early 1980s it reflected a wider disciplinary transformation. Broadly speaking, we can talk of an interpretative shift from ‘society’ to ‘culture’ and ‘memory’: this began in the early 1980s, at first gradually rather than briskly. By the 1990s, however, the notion of ‘society’—as it had been practised by social historians in the twentieth century and particularly after 1945—was swept away by the interpretative onslaught of memory and cultural

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studies. The notion of society, broadly speaking again, was based on a linear concept of history developing forward along one temporal timeline, and privileging social and economic topics interpreted in terms of their function and structure. The notion of ‘culture’, in contrast, is based on a multi-temporal concept of history where past and present commingle and coalesce, capturing simultaneously different and opposing narratives, and privileging topics of representation and memory interpreted in terms of experience, negotiation, agency, and shifting relationships. This shift put at its centre the historicity of history-writing. It became crucial to the project of historical understanding to emphasize the historian’s act of construction and interpretation of the past. And under these circumstances it became necessary to explore how people (including historians) construct their collective representations of the past.

The emergence of the notion of memory in the 1980s has been linked to the influence of related historical approaches and subject matters. Cultural history became a dominant approach among historians, while a diffuse body of work called ‘cultural studies’, which often focused on issues of identity (including, among others, postcolonialism and gender studies), also gained influence. Especially important were new approaches to the study of nationhood that regarded the nation as a cultural artefact, as a product of invention, social engineering, and construction of the past. Benedict Anderson’s influential *Imagined Communities* was published in 1982, and for a long while the link between memory and nationhood defined the field.

But broader cultural trends, related to, yet not dependent on, professional interest in memory, were also at play. First among these was the growing importance of the Holocaust from the 1980s as a signifying event, perhaps the signifying event, of modern European history. Public and scholarly debates flared up regularly about the history and memory of the Third Reich and the extermination of the Jews (for example, the Bitburg controversy in 1985 over the visit of President Ronald Reagan to a cemetery that included graves of SS soldiers; the Kurt Waldheim controversy in the mid-1980s about the role of the former Secretary General of the United Nations as a Wehrmacht soldier; and the *Historikerstreit* or Historians’ Debate about the uniqueness of the Third Reich and the Holocaust). The study of the representation of the Holocaust propelled and inspired the scholarship on memory as a whole in terms of approaches,

11 The two historiographical moments, the social and the cultural, were blended, not clearly separated. Accentuating their differences serves only to identify changes and articulate the transformation. Thus, for example, much of this transformation had already been evident in the work of François Furet from the 1970s, who left behind the rigid rendition of social history in favour of history of discourse and power.


13 Geoffrey Hartman (ed.), *Bitburg in Moral and Political Perspective* (Bloomington, 1986); and Peter Baldwin (ed.), *Reworking the Past: Hitler, the Holocaust, and the Historians’ Debate* (Boston, 1990).
topics, and public attention. Influenced by extensive Holocaust scholarship, notions such as the witness, victim, and survivor became important to the way scholars understand modern history overall.

There is another, more profound link between the rise of memory studies and of Holocaust remembrance. The exploration of memory, I would argue, has been a response of the historical discipline to the rupture of the Holocaust. The scholarly fascination with, and concern about, representation of the past (what we call, in short, ‘memory’) has been determined by the growing awareness of the crisis of representation caused by the extermination of the Jews. The linguistic turn and post-structuralism were in large part intellectual and philosophical responses to the Holocaust, seeking to explain a historical rupture and presenting themselves as also a rupture of sorts in Western philosophy and tradition. In the historical discipline, one response to the Holocaust was the exploration of how societies represent their pasts. And this exploration accentuated problems of historical representations overall.  

It is important to underline that by focusing on memory, historians reflected, more than they shaped, contemporary engagement with the past that is evident in all levels of society, in popular culture, government initiatives, heritage and tourist industry, family and genealogical history, reparation claims, and repentance declarations. Doing memory work is not simply a scholarly fashion, but a sign of our times, because representations of the past habitually lead to public discussions and debates. One can think, for example, of the controversies about the five-hundredth anniversary of Columbus’s expedition, about the Smithsonian’s exhibition commemorating the fiftieth anniversary of the dropping of the atomic bombs, or of the recent challenge posed by Israeli-Palestinians who commemorate the Nakba (the dispossession of Palestinians during the 1948 war) on Israel’s Independence Day.

Much of this interest in memory has been linked to repentance. The great convulsion that was the Second World War is often at the centre of such memories, although it is not the only historical focus. Apologies for the persecution of the Jews were heard from the Evangelical Lutheran Church in America (1994), the Vatican’s ‘We Remember’ (1994), and the French bishops’ ‘Declaration of Repentance’ (1997). ‘Truth commissions’ were established to investigate past regimes and crimes in democratizing Latin America, Eastern Europe, and South Africa. And the notion of memory has been also a nexus of morality, legal proceedings, and international relations in the creation of the United Nations’ International Criminal Tribunal that made genocide a punishable offence for rulers and their helpers, and which constituted the International Criminal Tribunals for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) established in May 1993, and for Rwanda (ICTR) established in November 1994. The point is that historians are

not alone in assigning meaning to memory. Everybody does: national truth commissions, governments, the Pope, financial and industrial companies and the list can go on.

There are other, different reasons why at the start of the twenty-first century memory has become a fundamental creed of group and individual identity. We are interested in memory because, as a result of the capitalist economy, history moves forward at such a speed that the past of even twenty years ago seems distant and alien—because the commercialization and commodification of every aspect of our lives produce, with the help of the mass media, an ever-growing number of memories, ‘old’, new, and instant. None of these elements in itself, however, is sufficient to explain the current interest in memory. The year 1990 is probably not any more distant and alien from us than 1935 was in 1955, or than 1905 was in 1925. It is the combination of elements—the experience of the Second World War and the acknowledgment of the Holocaust, the development of human rights, the commercialization of the past, and the transformation of historical methods and theories, among others—that brought about the shift toward memory. Historians have been at one and the same time spectators, chroniclers, and creators of this shift.

The recent upsurge in the study of memory is reflected in scholars’ search for its definition. One scholar proposed the term ‘historical remembrance’ over memory because it emphasizes agency, while another suggested the term ‘mnemonic practices and products’ because it emphasizes a dynamic process. These and other definitions are not wrong, but they are only partially helpful. They single out one element that should at any event always be part of historical investigation. Using notions of agency, process, contingency, shifting relations, or negotiations is simply a good way to explore every history, including that of memory. Ultimately, it is not the precise working of the definition that matters, but how the historian uses it to illuminate the past. One of the benefits of memory studies has been its resolute transdisciplinarity, combining history, anthropology, sociology, and other fields. For the historian, a simplicity that allows for diversity seems the best strategy. The study of memory explores how a social group, be it a family, a class, or a nation, constructs a past through a process of invention and appropriation, and what it means to the relationship of power within society. Differently expressed, the historian of memory considers who wants whom to remember what and why, and how memory is produced, received, and rejected.

Of course, social groups cannot remember, for this is only a faculty of the individual. And certainly, people cannot remember events in which they did not

take part. Yet you do not need to have stormed the Bastille in order to celebrate 14 July as a symbol of national identity. One’s memory, like one’s most intimate dreams, originates from the symbols, landscape, and past that are shared by a given society. Since the making and the reception of memories, personal and collective, are embedded in a specific cultural, social, and political context, we can explore how people construct a past in which they did not take part individually, but which they share with other members of their group as a formative sense of cultural knowledge, tradition, and singularity.

Scholars explore vehicles of memory that represent the past such as commemorations, textbooks, holidays, literature, museums, or architecture. Les lieux de mémoire explored ‘sites of memory’ as diverse as state funerals and the Tour de France. The role of different media in making and transmitting memories has been emphasized: in memorials, literature, photography, film, journalism, and the Internet. In this sense, the Assmanns’ concept of kulturelles und kommunikatives Gedächtnis—cultural and communicative memory—differentiated as it was from Halbwachs’s ‘collective’ memory, enlarged and refined the concept of memory. It viewed communicative memory as interactions of individuals and groups on the everyday level, while it saw cultural memory as knowledge that shapes behaviour and experience through generations in repeated practice that is distanced from the everyday. It made the notion of memory more flexible and thus more suitable for interpreting the diversity of human affairs.

The relation between history and memory has been fundamental to the field. This relation has been discussed by Halbwachs and Nora as forms of historically situated social practice. Their basic argument has been that memory belonged to a premodern society where tradition was strong and memory was a social practice, whereas the discipline of history, emerging in the nineteenth century, belonged to modern society, where tradition declined and relations to the past were cut off. Halbwachs sharply distinguished between history as a scientific rendition of the past and memory as a malleable one. For Nora, history and memory were united before the development of scientific history in the nineteenth century, and have since been split. Consequently, he distinguished between a premodern memory as a social practice, a milieu of memory, and a modern memory as voluntary and deliberate.

This is a neat distinction—too neat. It derives from Halbwachs’s nineteenth-century belief in history as a science, and from Nora’s nostalgic view of the past. Scholars now view history and memory differently: they are not sharply divided but related; they converge and commingle, although they are not identical.

Collective memory both differs from, and converges with, history. Memory is a malleable understanding of the past that is different from history because its construction is not bounded by a set of limiting disciplinary rules. Invented pasts are characterized by features that historians attempt to avoid in their studies: anachronism, topocentricity, presentism. Of course, history is also a malleable understanding of the past, but it is governed, with varying degrees of success and problems, by rules of evidence and verification. Historians create narratives about the past with the intention of telling truthful stories. The truth of their stories is never stable, for it is socially and culturally constructed, and their stories can never tell the whole truth about the past. But the foundation of all serious historical work is the intent for truth and fairness in the representation of the past. Makers of historical memory are free from this obligation. Yet memory and history also converge, because historians conceive of their stories within the general image of the past shared by society, within a collective historical mentality, and because historians have been the great priests of the nation-state, as well as other groups and identities, thus shaping their memory via history. The historian’s task is to reveal the connections between memory and history without obscuring their differences.

The quick and unexpected surge of the notion of memory to interpretative centrality raised doubts about its explanatory value. Some have argued that memory studies are a fad, and that the concern with memory in recent years reflects a facile mode of history that panders to public trends. But the question is not whether memory is fashionable: something can be fashionable, and still be useful. It is, rather, has memory contributed to our historical knowledge? And here the answer is no doubt ‘yes’. Memory studies brought to the fore topics and uncovered knowledge that were simply unknown a generation ago.

Several examples will make this clear. For a long time, the study of how Germans and Europeans remembered the Holocaust was informed by a laudable moral urgency that asked, nonetheless, the wrong historical questions. According to this common interpretation, National Socialism was treated after the war with collective silence and widespread amnesia. This view had important consequences for the way historians interpreted the post-war period. We know today that it was an historian’s invention, as memory studies demolished this venerated interpretation by changing the central research question from whether Germans have come to terms with the past to what Germans remembered of the Nazi past, how, and by whom. The result was a re-evaluation of post-war German society where, it turned out, a lively debate on National Socialism in the local and private sphere, as well as in public and political life, took place. Studies of memory unearthed traces of the past in films, novels, political debates, academic circles, and even in practices such as travelling and tourism. It is difficult to
underestimate the significance of these findings to the way we now understand post-war German and European societies.  

Research on memory provided new insights about the experience of people in the past. A generation ago historians did not regard the notion of victimhood as fundamental to understanding the history of the twentieth century. We now know that national memory of self-victimhood is a common feature around the globe. It was common after the First and Second World Wars, for example, and crucial to the cultural recovery of many a nation, whether victorious or defeated. That the Germans, too, viewed themselves as victims after 1945 recast the post-war memory in a complex light.

Several main areas of research have dominated the field. Research on the construction of national memory (and of distinct groups within, and in relation to, the nation) was central, as has been the exploration of the memory of wars (the First World War received quite a lot of attention). Research on the memory of the Second World War, the Third Reich, and the Holocaust is a huge topic unto itself. Distinct national historiographies focus on the memory of seminal events, such as the Civil War for American history, and the 1947–8 partition in India and Pakistan. Overall, the best historians of memory are like the ogre who looks for human voices and emotions. They capture the haunted images of the past that hover in a given society, the obsession with certain events, periods, or beliefs, and they attempt to understand how and why they made sense to people in the past.

But the importance of memory studies to the historical profession in the last generation cannot begin and end with new topics and knowledge. These are fundamental, but cannot quite account for the resonance of the notion of memory among historians. For the notion of memory, I would argue, changed the way historians understand the presence of the past in the life of people in the past by making it into an essential empirical, analytical, and theoretical tool with which to understand social, political, cultural, even economic phenomena that regularly had been seen as determined by a very different set of factors. This argument demands explanation, and may even seem baffling or outright objectionable, for historians obviously always considered perceptions of the past as important for understanding the past. This is true, but it is only half the truth.

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We begin by observing that, in itself, there is nothing new in the interest of historians in historical representations of the past. Historians of historical thinking regularly explored how previous intellectuals, theologians, philosophers, writers, and historians understood the past: for example, R. G. Collingwood in his classic collection of essays *The Idea of History* (1946). And historians whose main field of research was not the history of history but of politics, society, economy, and ideas also investigated, decades ago, topics of historical representation. This was often called myth. We can think, for example, of the important work in Southern history by Paul Gaston, *The New South Creed: A Study in Southern Mythmaking* (1970) that explored the writing of several thinkers, during the three decades following 1865, who called for an economic development while adopting the invented cult of the Lost Cause about the moral ethos of the Old South.

The significant differences between these kind of studies forty years ago and present-day studies of memory reflect the changing character of the historical profession. Older studies of historical representation usually focused on the writings of a selected group of (mostly male) thinkers and intellectuals. Present-day studies of memory—influenced by anthropology, sociology, cultural history, cultural studies, history of everyday life, and others—explore representations of the past among all members and organizations of society, from official memory of the state to popular memory.21 There is a difference in the explanatory importance assigned to the representation of the past. Older studies tended to see it as a development in intellectual history. Its meaning often derived from, and was a reflection of, bigger, more substantial social, political, and economic processes. In line with the dominant social history paradigm of the period, perceptions of the past (that is, culture) were viewed as a ‘natural’ corollary of social and political development and interests. Present-day memory studies, in contrast, view representations of the past (that is, culture), in theory if not always in practice, as shapers of political and social developments. And perceptions of the past are not confined to strictly intellectual milieus, but exist and act everywhere in society.

As a result, in their most innovative rendition, memory studies wish to explore whether, and in what way, the presence of memory is not so much a manifestation of the society around it, but a shaper of politics, society, and culture, and of beliefs and values, as well as of everyday life, institutional settings, and the processes of decision-making. They ask how influential the category of memory was in making social, political, economic, and everyday-life decisions. New directions in memory studies investigate a whole range of topics such as families, consumption, economics, death, nostalgia, and the state as a site of memory.22 They show the influence of memory on topics that forty years ago were considered

21 Alice Fahs and Joan Waugh (eds.), *The Memory of the Civil War in American Culture* (Chapel Hill, NC, 2004).
wholly unrelated: for example, the influence of memory on claims for military pensions after 1918, and on public policy concerning war widows after 1945.

In a sense, an historian who best reflects this transition is the maverick Marxist Eric Hobsbawm. A leading figure of the social history of the 1960s, Hobsbawm accurately perceived that a more analytical approach to the study of the past was needed. In 1972 he published an essay in *Past and Present* that provided the basis for his influential *The Invention of Tradition* published in 1983 with Terence Ranger. The splendid title alone set a whole new agenda in perfect agreement with memory studies (even if Hobsbawm set the relations between tradition, on the one hand, and politics and society, on the other, somewhat mechanistically): how modern societies invent new pasts, which are believed to be immemorial, and the roles of these pasts. The cumulative impact in the 1980s of *The Invention of Tradition, Imagined Communities, Les lieux de mémoire, kulturelles Gedächtnis*, and the Holocaust’s new awareness was to place the presence of the past as the defining topic of the historical profession. The ‘memory turn’ was fully under way.

What emerges from this discussion is the importance of the topic of the presence of the past in present-day historical analysis. Until the ‘memory turn’ the presence of the past was not considered in the historical discipline to be a topic essential for understanding problems in social, political, and economic history. This, to my mind, is the significance of memory to historical thinking and method. By thinking with memory, phenomena previously considered to be sufficiently described and understood, received completely new meanings. Research on memory accorded with the principle of all research that claims to be innovative: it revealed factors previously unobserved. It is probable that, because of trends in contemporary culture, historians assign to memory an inflated role in explaining the past; still, the enduring contribution of memory studies has been to document in wholly new ways the fundamental importance of the presence of the past in human society.

And yet, the benefit of richness cannot hide a sense that the term ‘memory’ is depreciated by surplus use, while memory studies lack a clear focus and, perhaps, have become predictable. A number of important texts explore memory and historical method, but there has been little in the way of a systematic evaluation of the field’s problems, approaches, and objects of study. Studies often follow a

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familiar and routine formula, as yet another event, its memory, and appropriation is investigated. The details of the plot are different in each case, but the formula is the same. Memories are described, following the interpretative Zeitgeist of the humanities, as ‘contested’, ‘multiple’, and ‘negotiated’. There are frequent calls for an integrated history of remembrance, for considering its multimedial character, or for analyzing the ‘dynamic interplay’ between cultural and social processes. All these are valid, of course, but they also sound trite now. For in itself memory does not offer any true additional explanatory power. Only when linked to historical questions and problems, via methods and theories, can memory be illuminating.

Some problems of method thus seem central to memory studies. These are problems that define the field; they cannot be expected to be answered definitively, but should be discussed, refined, and articulated anew. Three such problems can be identified here: the problem of sifting meaning from a memory source, of treating memory as a foundation of historical reality, and of the various levels of memory.

How can meaning be shifted from a memory case: say a film, a novel, or a museum? The crucial issue in the history of memory is not how a past is represented, but why it was received or rejected, for every society sets up images of the past. Yet to make a difference in a society it is not enough for a certain past to be selected. It must stir emotions, motivate people to act, be received; in short, it must become a sociocultural mode of action. Why is it that some pasts triumph while others fail? Why do people prefer one image of the past over another? To ascertain meaning, a systematic study of reception is required, as well as of different representations that opposed, contradicted, or rejected the given memory.

If for the historian it is always important to ask how to sift meaning from a given source, it seems especially pertinent in memory studies because everything is a memory case. Memory is everywhere: we construct a sense of the past from the most trivial, everyday-life object (a souvenir of the Sphinx) to the most holy one (the Dome of the Rock). Here lies an interpretative danger: the temptation to construct memory by linking everything to everything else, by interpreting a memory case as circulated in a seamless web of representations, where the agency of historical actors disappear, memory takes a life of its own, and it is not possible any more to write the history of who wants whom to remember what, and why, and whether it was at all received or rejected. When all is connected and memory is everywhere, the result is that no real history of memory can be written. In this historical reconstruction it is not clear what memory is not. In memory studies there is the danger of treating memory as a real foundation of historical reality, similar to the danger of treating culture in the same way in cultural studies.

Differently put, the social embeddedness of memory is lost in many memory studies that focus on representation. When social relations are reduced to ‘identities’ and ‘memories’, then the understanding of society risks being reduced to the presumed intentions of ideas and representations. Instead, a meticulous
analysis of the production and social foundation of memory allows an explana-
tion of the commonalities and differences in the memory of different groups. A model of the genre is Pieter Lagrou’s *The Legacy of Nazi Occupation* (2000) that explores three social groups (resistance veterans, displaced populations, and forced labourers) in post-war Belgium, France, and the Netherlands, and how they shared a memory less as members of different nations and more by common war experience.

A way of avoiding the trap of primordial reality is to be conscious of the different levels of memory experienced by individuals and groups. A given memory is better viewed as made of the collective negotiation and exchange between the many memories that exist in society. An individual and a social group is a vessel of many memories, often opposing and frequently contradictory. If we isolate one memory and attempt to understand it unto itself, we explain little. We need to take into account the game of memories at various levels; the juggling of memories by individuals and groups.

Take the case of the commingling of local and national memories. For a long time localness and nationhood were viewed in the historiography as opposing identities, and the question was posed: how did the local become national? A new approach has asked instead how localness and nationhood influenced and shaped each other, as in the case of the Heimat (homeland) idea in Germany after the unification in 1871.25 Rather than taking nationhood as the hard and set context within which memory and localness operate, this approach knocked off balance the boundaries among these categories and elucidated their hybrid relations. The aim was to call attention to the way localness and memory have been emplotted in stories of nationalism, and to the danger of reducing the local to the national, and a culture of remembrance to the hegemony of the nation. Common understanding of the relations between the local and the national has viewed the local as, not so much a shaper of nationalism, but a repository of national belonging created elsewhere. But the Heimat idea made local identity a constituent of national identity, and localness the symbolic representation of the nation. It became an interchangeable representation of the locality, region, and nation. This game of memories fits much better the messy ways people think of themselves in the world.

An overview of the notion of memory in post-war historical writing cannot limit itself to problems of method, for memory confers in our culture legitimacy, roots, authenticity, and a sense of identity like perhaps no other concept. Historians could not avoid this cultural baggage. How could they? It was only expected that they would also find memory an apt metaphor to describe the ills or redeeming qualities of their discipline. Nora viewed memory as ‘life... in permanent evolution... affective and magical’. There existed once a

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'real memory—social and unviolated, exemplified in but also retained as the secret of so-called primitive or archaic societies'. But his distinction between premodern real memory and modern voluntary memory is wrong, for all memory is voluntary, and all is carried by a social practice. But his essay ‘Between History and Memory’ should be read as a poetic elegy by a historian who embraces the past nostalgically.26 Others look at memory as a notion that can either reaffirm or regenerate the discipline in new directions. Joyce Appleby, Lynn Hunt, and Margaret Jacob (the first two former presidents of the American Historical Association) approach memory as a form of knowledge that can rescue history from the postmodernist critics of historical objectivity, while others find in memory a diametrically opposed meaning: namely, as a vehicle for understanding the discipline of history as a personal pursuit, like autobiography.27

The notion of memory has been used as a medium to raise concerns about history, politics, and morality. Nora saw the memory explosion as a reflection of the unravelling of the nation-state. This did not happen. It is more accurate to say that what he had witnessed was the transformation of his particular idea of France into a different nation-state characterized by the ending of the Revolutionary legacy, postcolonialism, Muslim emigration, and the decline of France in the world. Charles Maier astutely asked ‘whether an addiction to [historical] memory can become disabling’ and whether the preoccupation with memory was not a sign of a regrettable escape from transformative politics. Kerwin Klein observed correctly that exploring memory had become a ‘therapeutic alternative to historical discourse’.28 These concerns are important, and they should be emphasized and discussed in a culture that tends to venerate memory, at times thoughtlessly. But they are not inherent in the historical study of, or public engagement with, memory. Thus, for example, some preoccupations with memory lead to political activism and heightened social awareness, such as the Memorial group in Russia (and other former republics of the Soviet Union) dedicated to the history of political persecution and human rights. Ultimately, it all depends on what historians and non-historians do with memory, what their intentions are (political, methodological, and others), and how they use memory to understand their world and the past. The larger point that emerges from this discussion is the capacity of memory to serve as a metaphor to articulate fundamental moral, political, and historical concerns.

Why is it that memory has become such a powerful metaphor among historians to think about their discipline? Because, I believe, it calls for interpretation.

27 Joyce Appleby, Lynn Hunt, and Margaret Jacob, Telling the Truth about History (New York, 1994), 238; and Susan Crane, ‘(Not) Writing History: Rethinking the Intersections of Personal History and Collective Memory with Hans von Außess’, History and Memory, 8 (1996), 5–29.
Of course, every historical topic is interpretable. But economic trends in the nineteenth-century British coal industry do not call for interpretation in the same way that Holocaust memory does, or the memory of the American Civil War, or of the Palestinian Nakba. Sources and analysis of memory lay bare the process of construction of the past and therefore the practice of the historian. That is one important reason that the notion of memory expanded the investigation of the past. And here lies the risk of memory as method of inquiry, and also its promise. It calls for interpretation, which can be facile and superficial. To find a meaningful trend in the serial data of coal production in nineteenth-century Britain is much more time-consuming, and involves an extended period of research, collection, and analysis of evidence. But a representation of memory is different. It is as if it does not require an interpretative effort from the historian, and the sources seem to speak for themselves. Of course, no such thing exists. The challenge of the historian is to resist this unbearable lightness of interpretation, and instead to sift meaning from memory via methods and theories, via interrogations of the use of evidence, of narrative, and of sources. Here lies today the potential of memory to set our historical imagination free.

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Chapter 3
Censorship and History since 1945

Antoon De Baets

Shall the Dictator...be less harsh with facts and records than with men?
Should he be more tender with the traditions and men of other lands and other times than he is with the men of his own land and time?

Bertram D. Wolfe, ‘Totalitarianism and History’ (1954)

This chapter examines the knot that ties power, freedom, and history together. It is not about the history of censorship, but about the censorship of history and, incidentally, about the history of the censorship of history. It concentrates on the theoretical problems generated by the censorship of history, and its justification and effects in different contemporary political settings (dictatorships, post-conflict societies, and democracies). In order to define the censorship of history, borderline areas and demarcations with closely related concepts are scrutinized in detail. The presence of censorship in different modes, genres, fields, categories, eras, and countries is briefly discussed. This chapter also attempts to offer some coherent sets of illustrations of the phenomenon rather than simply aducing examples randomly (from a universe of thousands of possible cases). The final analysis deals with the relationships between censorship and epistemology, truth and ethics.

THE SCENE

Let us, however, first gain an impression of the scene by comparing an American, a Czechoslovakian, and a Chinese case.¹ During the height of McCarthyism, Moses I. Finley, an historian of antiquity at Rutgers University, New Jersey, was accused of having run a communist study group while a graduate student at Columbia University during the 1930s. The accusation came from William Canning, an historian, and Karl Wittfogel, a former German communist who after his exile in 1934 became an historian of China at the University of

Washington. Both were testifying before the Senate Internal Security Subcommittee and had previously accused Finley. In March 1952, Finley declared before the subcommittee that he was not a Communist Party member, but invoked the Fifth Amendment (a constitutional privilege against self-repression) when asked if he had ever been one, thus avoiding a possible indictment for perjury. Initially, Rutgers supported Finley but later its board of trustees unanimously declared that pleading the Fifth was sufficient reason for immediate dismissal, thus overruling the conclusions of two special advisory committees. Finley was dismissed from his assistant professorship and blacklisted at American universities. He founded the American Committee for the Defense of International Freedom in response to the rise of McCarthyism. From 1954 until his death, he pursued his career at Cambridge University. In 1958, Finley’s appointment to the Cornell University history department was rejected by the university president; and the history department’s appeal to the faculty Committee on Academic Freedom and Tenure was to no avail.

If democracies such as the United States took questionable steps as in the Finley case, all the more so did dictatorships. During the Czechoslovak ‘normalization’, in 1973, the prize-winning book *Z ilegality do povstania: Kapitoly z občianskeho odboja* [From Illegality into the Rising: Chapters from the History of Democratic Resistance] (1969) was removed from libraries and bookshops. Its author, Jozef Jablonický, a member of the Slovak Academy of Sciences History Institute, was accused of having underestimated the communist resistance and overrated the non-communist resistance during the 1944 Slovak National Uprising. The book had also criticized the 1964 memoirs of Communist Party Secretary Gustáv Husák, who had participated in the uprising. In 1974, Jablonický was dismissed from the history institute and moved to the Slovak Institute of Conservation of Monuments and Protection of Nature. This was the start of sixteen years of harassment during which he was called a ‘perpetrator of antisocial activities’ and his writings were labelled ‘harmful to the interests of the state’ and ‘in conflict with official historical findings’. His new study on the communist resistance could not be published. The State Security Police investigated his case and his house was searched eleven times. At least three manuscripts were confiscated and not returned. He was interrogated by the police, demoted, and expelled from the Slovak Communist Party. In 1978 his permit for research into historical archives was withdrawn. Meanwhile, Jablonický completed a new text of *Bratislava a vznik Slovenskeho národného povstania* [Bratislava and the Origins of the Slovak National Rising], the original manuscript of which had been seized by the police. In 1979 he wrote two polemical articles against the gaps in official historiography (eventually published in 1994). His study *Zlohanie Malárovej armády v Karpatoch* [The Failure of Malář’s Army in the Carpathians] circulated in the Padlock Editions *samizdat* series: the first two versions of this study had been seized by the police; the third version was written while the author simultaneously hid away remnants of his own archival collection and every
completed page of his manuscript. He was regularly harassed and detained. In 1984 his most recent papers on history, as well as reference documents, were confiscated because they were considered particularly dangerous in the fortieth anniversary year of the Slovak Uprising. His works were banned until the 1989 Velvet Revolution. In 1990 he was finally able to resume his work at the Political Science Institute of the Academy of Sciences.

In China, Jian Bozan, head of the history department and vice-president of Beijing University, and also a member of the Chinese Academy of Sciences, was one of the founders of Marxist historiography. In 1957 he criticized the leading Communist Party cadres for not going far enough with the liberalizing Hundred Flowers Movement, and in 1958–61 he rejected the Great Leap Forward policies. Central to his criticism of the extreme leftist ideological trend of the late 1950s were his ‘historicism’ and his ‘concession theory’. The first meant respect for the context and the complexity of historical fact and primacy of the empirical methodology. The second explained that when confronted with peasant rebellion in history, the ruling class had had to make concessions to restore the established order. In a 1962 speech he attacked the official slogan ‘Lead History with Theory’ directly. This became the basis for the charge that he had rejected the class-struggle view of history. In December 1965, at the dawn of the Cultural Revolution, Mao Zedong personally attacked Jian’s concession theory. In 1966 Jian was subjected to more than forty attacks in a dozen different newspapers and journals. He was denounced as an antisocialist, anti-Party bourgeois academic who sought to lay the ideological foundation for the restoration of capitalism, and was brutally persecuted. In late 1967, Nie Yuanzi, leader of the Red Guard rebel faction at Beijing University, compiled a blacklist of the names of thirty teachers from the history department whom she regarded as reactionary. Jian was one of five who were hounded to their deaths: in December 1968 he committed suicide together with his wife, only to be officially rehabilitated a decade later.

When we compare these cases, we see that Finley was persecuted for being too communist, and Jian and Jablonický for not being sufficiently communist. The Finley case was about political rather than historical views, but the outcome deeply affected his further career as a professional historian. In the remaining cases, historical matters belonged to the heart of the affair. In two of the three affairs, the political leaders of the country were directly involved (Husák and Mao). The cases demonstrate several features of what can be called the censorship universe: the diversity of context (McCarthyism, ‘normalization’, Cultural Revolution), the diversity of circumstances (blacklisting, interrogation, dismissal, samizdat, resistance), and the diversity of outcomes (exile, marginalization, suicide). All three historians refused to bow, and developed theoretical and
practical perspectives on the epistemological or moral aspects of scholarship. Lamentably, in all three cases, attempts at rehabilitation came far too late. Let us now look systematically into the types of society behind these and numerous other cases.

### TYPOLOGY

The importance of the censorship of history clearly varies according to whether a given political regime is dictatorial, democratic, or transitory between both. In dictatorial regimes, which can be subdivided into authoritarian and totalitarian types, a small group illegitimately holds power over the state, with backing from the military. By their nature, these regimes cannot draw sufficient legitimation for its absolute power from elections and laws. Therefore, to root and consolidate that power, it must seek legitimation elsewhere, often in an ideology that instrumentalizes the past as it has survived in memories, traditions, documents, and cultural heritage. History thus becomes an instrument of the official ideology that in its turn serves dictatorial political power.

To that end, dictators use propaganda and censorship as twin tools—the former to promote the official vision, the latter to eradicate the rest. Historical propaganda is the systematic manipulation of historical facts or opinions by, or with the connivance of, the government or other powers, whereas the censorship of history is the systematic control over historical facts or opinions and their exchange—often by deliberate suppression—imposed by, or with the connivance of, the government or other powers. The union of propaganda and censorship creates an official historiography with monopolistic pretensions and absolute truths. It discourages or blocks inquiry challenging it. Governmental and other institutions are established to implement the official guidelines. Ideally, these institutions do not blatantly falsify the historical record, but leave intact as much of the past as possible, only altering key passages. They attempt to distort history gently so as to arouse unanimity, not suspicion and dissent. Reality, however, does not always match the ideal: history, then, is often cruelly falsified. This propagation of the regime’s own version of history can be accompanied by tremendous pressure upon historians, resulting in self-censorship, self-criticism, and broken careers. In such a climate of fear and suspicion, professional repression may transform into physical repression. Mail control, telephone tapping, intimidation in all its forms, purges, trials, and detention are part of its panoply.

The best topics for propaganda are those that illustrate the official ideology: cherished antecedents and historical parallels favourable to the dictator in power will be praised, enemies and heresies diabolized. Topics viewed as controversial and liable to be censored are those that call into question the official ideology: allusions to the illegitimate origins and violent maintenance of power, crimes committed by the regime and its interest in covering them up, rivalry among its
leaders, discord among the population, sensitive information about dominated minorities and classes, crises (periods of martial law, revolts, and civil war), frictions with other countries, military defeat, periods of humiliation and weakness, the history of successful rivals, and, finally, historical parallels with all these areas. To that end, key episodes of history need reassessment or recovery.

The dynamics of making historiography subservient typically pass through three stages: a stage of equalization, a stage of ‘normality’, and eventually, if at all, a stage of renewed openness. The length and intensity of these stages is dependent on many factors: history’s place in society; the predictatorial traditions of integrity among historians and their standing as public figures; the degree of consistency, elaboration, and monopolization of the dictatorial ideology; the importance accorded to history therein; and the strength of the repressive apparatus. The manipulated historical facts and opinions are adapted to the needs of the moment; firm and lenient control alternate. Censorship fluctuates with it—at one moment, it is a legal activity, at another an illegal one; at one moment it is fragmented at the sub-national level, at another it may apply to a set of countries that share a common ideology.

When dictators are eventually toppled, the windows of the past are thrown open. The transition to democracy and the abolition of systematic censorship go hand in hand and can enable—though there are no firm guarantees of this—the development of an independent historiography. This includes the partial replacement of compromised historians, the rehabilitation and re-employment, if still feasible, of persecuted historians, and the training of a new generation of history students. Current and archival records require new policies of openness; official secrecy needs democratic legislation and control. In terms of personnel and infrastructure, the solution in most countries leaves room only for a certain degree of generational continuity. If that continuity reflects the dictatorial legacy too closely, historians will not always launch investigations into the problematic past as energetically as they should. Emerging democracies alternate hope for the future and fear of relapse. The past plays a key role in this process, for the exposure of historical falsifications, the rehabilitation of political adversaries formerly fallen in disgrace, the predilection for new historical symbols, all contribute to the delegitimation of the ancien régime.

Two dangers related to the censorship of history emerge in these post-conflict societies. The first is obstruction to the protohistorical work of post-dictatorial tribunals and truth commissions. Efforts to punish perpetrators of past human rights abuses and to provide reparations for their victims are often hampered. The second related danger consists in the concealment or destruction of evidence of the violent past. The main targets here are the secret dictatorial archives documenting the past repression, and the clandestine cemeteries that contain forensic evidence of their victims. Archives collected by national human rights groups under the dictatorship or those that are the product of post-dictatorial
criminal justice and truth-seeking efforts are not safe either. In short, tyranny haunts the lands of history long after its own burial.

When these emerging, insecure democracies survive, they gradually transform into stable democracies that protect the human rights of their citizens and that keep the military under firm civilian command. The United Nations Development Programme calculated that the share of the world’s countries with multiparty electoral systems that met the wider criteria for democracy rose from 39 per cent in 1990 to 55 per cent in 2003. The more democratic the regime, the more alternative evidence-based historical facts and opinions circulate or are freely allowed to do so in a public debate about history. Some of these democracies, however, may be characterized by a mixture of democratic and authoritarian elements, with the first tipping the scales. Traces of censorship are clearly recognizable in restrictions put upon historians living in those democracies, especially in three domains. As was the case for emerging democracies, the area of public information and secrecy needs regulation. When secrecy rules for current and archival records are excessive, illegal, or both, they lead to censorship; intelligence services in particular are often keen to hide their ‘family jewels’. Furthermore, histories commissioned by governments or others are sometimes subtly adapted to avoid unwelcome messages. In these histories, the precarious subjects are mostly tied to the international wars and internal conflicts of the past—frequently (but not always) in combination with imperial or colonial expansion—that in the long run come to be seen as adversely affecting the democratic legitimation of power and the construction of a collective identity: in short, as sources of shame. Finally, groups denying certified research findings, especially about grave historical wrongs, may be penalized for their denial. The historical profession is adamant about condemning the aberrant theses of deniers of genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes as products of pseudo-history, but it is divided as to whether the propagation of such views should be criminalized.

JUSTIFICATION

The justification for censorship and propaganda is rooted in ideology. Indeed, every form of power, dictatorial as well as democratic, is embodied in an official ideology, which must clarify convincingly two major questions: which historical path did the community follow hitherto, and why is the ruling elite particularly suited to guide it with a firm hand into the future? The first question, about collective identity, is related to the need of each community (and segment thereof) for roots and feelings of continuity with its ancestors, and to its yearning

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for pride in a unique destiny. The second, about legitimacy, is linked to the fact that no elite and no ruler whose task it is to give the community that desired background can do without an acceptable biography and a venerable genealogy. In the ideology developed by the elite to satisfy and lend authority to both demands, the past constitutes an important storehouse of usable examples. The problem, however, is that the selection of fitting historical examples can be challenged at any given moment. Therefore, elites and rulers are forced not only to make selective use of the past, but also to optimize that use creatively and permanently. In dictatorial systems, the present commands the past, but it is highly doubtful whether the tyrant who loses the keys to history is still able to rule. Democracies, emerging and stable, also draw some of their legitimacy from the past by presenting themselves as a continuation of earlier democracies, or as a rupture with earlier dictatorial periods.

DEMARCATION

The term ‘censorship’, the leading specialist in media law Eric Barendt wrote, is emptied of real meaning if it is applied to any social convention or practice which makes communication for some individuals more difficult. Therefore, the focus here lies on the coercive and the tutelary practices of the state. Even with this fundamental caveat, and whatever the regime, it is often difficult to distinguish censorship from similar restrictions on the activities of historians.

First, a general historical context of war, colonization and occupation, poverty and violence may deeply affect the working conditions of historians.

Second, in all regime types, the main censors are governments. In dictatorships, they are supported by the complete state machinery. In other regime types, censorship is more indirect and fragmented. On a more fundamental level, every government imposes constraints on historical research, especially if its official information and archival policies are characterized by excessive secrecy used to conceal sensitive information and reduce accountability. The risks of control appear also in the area of public libraries, governmental quasi-monopolies on historical museums, or on certain large source editions. Of a different order is the official prevention, or disturbance, of controversial commemorations and anniversaries. Not only does the executive branch of government impose regulations; parliaments also do so. For example, they may adopt laws making mandatory the teaching of history in the language of the majority. Judges may check too eagerly whether the historians carried out their research honestly and prudently and, in the process, attempt to determine historical truth themselves.

Third, educational policies govern the capabilities of universities in terms of funding of research and teaching, allocation of scarce resources, grants, employment, and infrastructure management. In the specific field of history, censorship may be further disguised as pressure from the historical establishment, corporatism, political correctness on the campus, and the rejection of theses and manuscripts. It often takes the form of career restrictions. Loss of salary, refusal of promotion, demotion, revocation of academic degrees and responsibilities, restrictions on travel abroad and on contacts with foreign scholars, wholesale boycott, and, finally, dismissal, are sometimes insidious forms of censorship. Dismissal is perhaps the most common sanction against historians around the globe, as the three examples given at the outset clearly demonstrate.4

Fourth, individuals and unofficial groups, either allied with, or opposed to, the government, may threaten unwelcome manifestations of the past. They loot archives or museums, destroy or desecrate historical monuments, and boycott books and journals. Elsewhere, radical pressure groups attack historians on religious, political, or ethnic grounds. In many countries they are involved in censorship activity. Hidden censorship is also at work when historians advise publishers or editorial boards to refuse manuscripts of colleagues because the latter’s contents do not conform to the peer reviewer’s viewpoint, or when they compete with the peer reviewer’s own work. Market mechanisms, publishing strategies, and private enterprise subsidies deciding which genres are popular enough to be published may lead to whimsical or structural exclusion of valuable strands of historical writing.

Fifth, large-scale sexism, nationalism, and ethnocentrism lead to the misrepresentation, negligence, or denial of the history of victim groups. In addition, entire categories of personnel may be excluded from, or discriminated against, during the recruitment for academic vacancies. Some of these practices amount to direct censorship, such as the destruction of historical traces as the result of nationalism, or the rejection of an historical work because of the sexual or racial origin of its author.

Sixth, autobiographical factors may induce in historians excessive bias and myopia. On balance, it can be concluded that certain restrictive factors may either result in de facto censorship or be disguised forms of censorship themselves.

PRACTICE

Censorship of history has been practised in all modes, genres, fields, categories, and periods of history, and in all countries. To begin with, it ranges over all modes of the historiographical operation. Pre-censorship, often invisible to the

4 Conversely, there is a risk of arbitrary censorship charges: legitimate dismissal for incompetence or abuse is sometimes presented as a censorship case by its victim.
Censors also pay attention to all potentially dangerous historical facts and opinions, whatever their category. As the censors’ aim is to control the past, they do not necessarily distinguish between professional historians and others dealing with the past. They perceive a danger, irrespective of the qualifications of those behind it. Therefore, anyone expressing historical facts or opinions can be targeted. Popular history, whether written, spoken, or visual, is as much a target of censorship as academic history, and probably even more so. It uses multiple media, and many of these media (such as songs, commemorations, films, television, and all forms of cultural heritage) partly feed or reflect collective memory. The reach of popular history, therefore, is wider than that of academic history. Depending on the censor’s need, all periods of history can be targeted. Archaeology, for example, covers the sensitive problem of the origin of the nation, and is often closely watched. In many countries, contemporary history is certainly the most dangerous period of study. This is mainly because the witnesses are still alive.

CONTROVERSIAL SUBJECTS IN HISTORY TEXTBOOKS WORLDWIDE (1945–2010)

The methodological problem of how to provide, in a short and worldwide overview such as the present one, examples drawn from a universe of thousands of cases illustrating the manifold manifestations of the censorship of history is vexing. Given the infinite variety in amount and degree of censorship, an example of variant 1 inevitably elicits the question why no examples are given for variants 2, 3, . . . n. I have chosen a particular strategy here to solve this problem. The universe of all cases of censorship of history since 1945 can be divided in sub-universes, some of which reliably reflect the larger one in terms of
diversity of historical content affected by censorship. One such sub-universe is presented here. On the positive side, the presentation of a sub-universe avoids the distorting selectivity flowing from space restrictions, or the eternal repetition of examples decreed ‘classic’ by those who ignore the rest of the universe; on the negative side, its size reduces the individual items (the examples) to a list.

The sub-universe chosen here—the censorship of history textbooks for primary and secondary education—is, I argue, a good barometer for the censorship of history in general. The textbook genre is watched very closely all over the globe, and because of its reach and potential impact on young minds it is often the subject of controversy and, consequently, not seldom of censorship.

Despite its ambition to represent a sub-universe of the censorship of history, the following worldwide survey of subjects in history textbooks for primary and secondary education is not exhaustive. For each of the controversies, however important, well-known, or typical many of them may be, there are lesser-known ones. However, each subject on the list is based on evidence, the details of which (protagonists, textbook titles, regimes, reasons for the controversies, and so on) are not reproduced here. Where possible, subjects are tied to chronology (which is sometimes tentative). The absence of particular periods or countries does not imply that no history textbook censorship occurred in those periods or countries. Nor does the absence of controversy mean that no censorship took place: countries with the worst censorship records repress controversies.

Three types of textbook controversy were excluded from the survey: (1) those taking place in the form of a legitimate (no matter how heated) debate about national standards, curricula, and textbooks without inappropriate interventions—as was often the case in democracies (indeed, many controversies listed in the survey took place without a debate); (2) those relating to the subject of history in general but not to specific historical textbooks (except for attempts to abolish or reduce the subject inspired by the less malleable nature of history compared to subjects such as social studies); (3) those concerning structural omissions in history textbooks as a result of gender, ethnic, or other bias.

The annotation is as follows: **Country, year(s) of controversy** 1 (if applicable: **part of country**: subject 1, subject 2, and so on). 5

**Afghanistan, 1978–89**: Sovietization of textbooks.
**Albania.** See **Macedonia, Serbia**.
**Argentina, 1979–80**: Marxist views.
**Armenia.** See **USSR**.
**Australia, 1994–6** (Queensland, New South Wales, Victoria): ‘invasion’ versus ‘settlement’ as accurate description of establishment of Australian colonies.

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5 Sources: for most of the pre-2000 subjects see De Baets, *Censorship of Historical Thought*; for many of the post-1995 subjects see the website of the Network of Concerned Historians (http://www.concernedhistorians.org).
Azerbaijan. See USSR.
Bangladesh. See Pakistan.
Belize, 1984–9: nationalist views.
Brazil, 1964–[85]: Marxist views.
Brunei, 2004: history of religion.
Bulgaria, 1944–[89]: former monarchs.
Colombia, 1985–9: independence heroes, Marxist views, conservative versus progressive views, contemporary history.
Cuba, 1961–: school libraries ordered to replace old textbooks with Marxist guidelines.
Cyprus, 1974–2001 (Turkish): Greek Cypriot historical views; 2004 (Greek):
textbook illustration deemed ‘too Turkish’ retouched; 2008–9 (Greek):
Czechoslovakia, 1945–: odsun (expulsion of Sudeten Germans in 1945–7).
Ethiopia, 2002: Oromo history.
Germany, 1945: history lessons temporarily abolished; 1945–9: ban on Nazi textbooks; 1989–92: ban on East German textbooks; 2005 (Brandenburg):
Armenian genocide.
Greece, 1965: ancient emperors; 1984: Turkish invasion of northern Cyprus in 1974;
Haiti, 1947–1990s: history teachers required to be Haitian citizens.


**Iraq, 2005–**: de-Ba’athification of textbooks; omission of post-2003 history.


**Italy, 2000, 2002**: anti-fascist, communist views.


**Libya, 1973**: former monarchy; 2006: Berber history.

**Lithuania, 2004**: anti-Jewish stereotypes.

**Macedonia, 2000–6**: armed conflict of 2001 between Albanians and Macedonians.

**Mexico, 1992–93**: nationalist heroes, Porfiriatio (dictatorship of 1876–1911), revolution of 1910–17, Tlatelolco massacre of 1968, contemporary history;

Moldova, 2001–4: de-Romanization and re-Sovietization of textbooks.


Peru, 1970s: traditional heroes versus socioeconomic factors as determinants of history.


Romania, 1980–97: Transylvanian history teachers required to be Romanian (not Hungarian) and teach in Romanian; 1999: Dacian roots of Romania, tenth-century Transylvanian rulers, Michael the Brave, Vlad the Impaler, revolution of December 1989; 2003–4: Holocaust.


Sri Lanka, 1956–; Sinhalization of textbooks.


Thailand, 1946–: overthrow of absolute monarchy in 1932.


USSR, 1938–53: dominance of Stalin’s *History of the All-Russian Communist Party (Bolsheviks)—Short Course*; 1940–91: annexation of Baltic countries; 1945–[88] (*Nagorno Karabakh enclave [Azerbaijan]*): history of Armenia not taught; 1964–[84]: former Communist Party leader Nikita Khrushchev; 1981 (Georgia): period of Georgian independence (1918–21), Georgian anti-Soviet revolt (1924) and other obliterated episodes of Georgian history; 1988–9: historical examinations cancelled because textbooks were ‘full of lies’.

Uzbekistan, 2000: de-Sovietization through order to destroy all Soviet-era textbooks, leading to textbook shortage.


Zimbabwe, 1980–2: racist views.
Some conclusions spring to mind in reviewing this survey. The first is that most controversies arose in relation to recent, twentieth-century content. The next is that the controversies about this explosive content are not a matter of the past alone: they are still prominent in the twenty-first century. A further conclusion is that censorship is geographically universal and that it occurs in widely diverging political and historiographical contexts, though distributed very unevenly across continents. The survey refutes a simplistic assignment of freedom of enquiry to the West and censorship to the Rest. Nevertheless, the basic rule of thumb (the more democratic a country, the less censorship) stands.

Last, and without asserting, as some do, that history textbooks faithfully reflect public opinion, collective memory, or collective identity (if this were so, no controversies would exist), it is still possible to argue that history textbook controversies always reflect divergent opinions on historical questions to some degree and, therefore, different conceptions of a collective—often a national—identity. It appears that many, if not most, of the textbook controversies were part of larger debates that, if regime circumstances permitted, raged also in academia, political and legal arenas, the media, the streets, and, sometimes, in neighbouring countries. It is telling, however, that professional historians did not always participate in the controversy because they found the historical issues at stake already solidly settled by research.

EFFECTS

Returning from the textbook scene to the overall situation, the effects of the censorship of history are best assessed in its natural habitat: dictatorship. Under a repressive regime, the peer community of historians ceases to act as an honest check on the scholarly character of historical works. Scores of historians are obliged to destroy their own writings. The whole environment is infected, and the border between truth and lies almost irreparably blurred. The censorship of history affects and poisons the entire professional climate: qualifications become unimportant and judgements twisted. Historians are terrorized, the once-stuffed drawers often stand empty. All this leaves its imprint on the present and future generations of historians as a social and professional group. The overall effect of censorship on the profession is not the death of history, but the illusion that it is still alive. In short, the main effect is sterility.

Despite all control, however, professionals are seldom a willing tool of some prescribed line; they always retain bargaining power, represented by their training and knowledge, because they must apply the general ideological guidelines to many different historical problems and contexts, or translate them into detailed curricula and textbooks. In doing so, they are able to create margins that increase as one moves further from the kernel of ideology. For this reason, purely instrumental theories of historiography are usually rather rudimentary.
Although at the broadest societal level the dictator’s aim is a unanimously obedient people, the next effect of censorship may be doubt about dogma and room for dissidence. The implausible tenets of censorship and propaganda engender a credibility gap between the official history taught at school and the versions whispered at home, often followed by a feeling of disillusion, especially among the younger generation, in the face of a culture of lies. For a long time to come, persistent distrust of the historical profession may be the legacy. Thus, even in the darkest hours of tyranny, the distorted past may be challenged by alternative versions. These alternative versions may be equally biased, but they are alternative and, through them, the flame of plurality continues to burn. Under non-dictatorial regimes, the effects of censorship, however serious, are less substantial. Even here, increasing frequencies of censorship may adversely affect the work climate, make the environment more condoning, and the work habits sloppier.

However, under all regime types, censorship can have unintended positive effects. Sometimes, if it is not all-pervading, it provides an indirect incentive for creativity and criticism. More importantly, it has a remarkable ability to highlight that which it suppresses. Taboos always attract curiosity. Repression may discourage that curiosity for decades. But when history as a classical vehicle of the past is silenced and compromised, every utterance—graffiti, literature, theatre, film—becomes its potential vehicle and substitute. Thus, censorship generates the emergence of substitutes: whenever the silenced and silent historians are not able to refute the heralded truths of official historical propaganda, philosophers, poets, novelists, playwrights, film-makers, journalists, storytellers, and singers take care of the historical truth and keep it alive. Paradoxically, the ostensible vulnerability of many of these substitutes is their power: writing, for example, is a solitary act requiring little institutional support. Sometimes, fictional genres are not taken seriously by the authorities and hence escape their attention. Thus, censorship may not suppress alternative views but rather generate them, and, by doing so, become counterproductive. Censorship backfires.

**EPISTEMOLOGY**

The question of how we know that censorship occurred has several sides. Problems of evidence of censorship do not only arise from its practical operation (the large variety of modes, genres, fields, and categories), but also from its very nature as a phenomenon related to knowledge. Three epistemological paradoxes are worth mentioning.

First, many forms of censorship are invisible and difficult to trace, since censorship normally takes place in an atmosphere of secrecy. Omission is less
easily studied than commission. The less visible, the more effective censorship is. Censors’ motives are better masked and borderline cases confusingly ambiguous.

Second, in a repressive society there is less information about more censorship, whereas in a democratic society there is more information about less censorship. Under dictatorial regimes, insiders (or outsiders allowed to visit the country) who are aware of the censorship of history or the persecution of historians, mostly do not report them because they fear research or career troubles or backlash effects on themselves or their wider circle. The result is wide under-reporting. Authors who do mention the subject typically do so in passing. Sometimes they treat it more extensively as they write under the vivid impression of a recent famous case. If they systematically research and report it, and become whistleblowers, they may encounter disbelief. Data from the censors themselves is generally lacking, at least until the moment when a post-conflict transition arrives. Several exceptional but most important moments of repression, and moments of large operations in particular, are ill suited for recording. Active recording of repression of historians typically requires stability and routine. In more democratic regimes, censorship is not absent, but it is usually less unobserved and uncriticized.

These twin paradoxes entail a third one (close to the unintended positive effects discussed above) that comes to light when censorship is felt as problematic: studying censorship is the beginning of its suspension. However, although censorship of history is a well-known and obvious area of interest, it has also been, until recently, a relatively underestimated and neglected field of systematic historical research. Scarcity and abundance of information about the censorship of history may be determined by the extent of the censors’ success, but also by very uneven research efforts, which make it difficult to distinguish important and typical information from other data and, hence, to identify patterns and trends in the relationships between history, power, and freedom.

HISTORICAL TRUTH

The epistemology of the censorship of history provides evidence for the thesis that the search for historical truth carried out with as much objectivity as possible—and however provisional, conjectural, and perspectival that truth as a result may be—is the central problem in historical scholarship. There are many truths about the past, because there are many different perspectives with which to look at the past, and many different ways to make sense of that past. But these tentative truths—the only ones to which we can ever aspire—are intrinsically better than error and lie. It is clear that the existence and centrality of historical truth is corroborated by the history of the censorship of history.

A superficial count of the heads of state and government between 1945 and 2010 who had either a degree in history, wrote an historical work, held important speeches with historical contents, or showed their active interest in history in
other demonstrable ways, totalled 117 leaders in 68 countries. Many of them attacked historians directly and publicly. From time immemorial, the eagerness of rulers to censor history has been proof a contrario of their historical awareness, and hence of the existence and importance of historical truth. Why, indeed, would they have bothered to censor certain versions of history if the notion of historical truth was not important?

At the other side of the spectrum, some historians living in a dictatorship refuted historical myths at the cost of irreparable career damage. This can only be plausibly explained by their belief in the value of historical truth. In 1963, for example, Soviet historian Aleksandr Zimin attempted to prove that Slovo o polku Igoreve [The Song of Igor’s Campaign] was not written in 1187 as most believed, but fabricated as late as the 1770s. During a conference at the Institute of Russian Literature in Leningrad, he outlined his conclusions, questioning the tale’s authenticity, destroying it as a source of Russian and Soviet pride in the process. His conclusions aroused much controversy and hostility. In 1964 they were discussed at a three-day symposium of the USSR Academy of Sciences History Institute on the basis of copies of the first draft of his book. Although his work could not appear, Zimin succeeded in publishing his argument in a dozen journal articles. Until the 1990s almost nothing from what Zimin wrote was published, though his manuscripts totalled many thousands of typed pages. The controversy reportedly contributed to his early death at age 60.

Other courageous historians living in dictatorial contexts sometimes criticized the official rewriting of history with its blank spots by publicly and directly claiming a right to historical truth. In the Soviet Union, Novy mir’s chief editor Aleksandr Tvardovsky once wrote in a 1965 editorial that omission of facts was a lie. His article was promptly attacked by Evgenii Vuchetich who advanced the notion of ‘two truths’: the ‘truth of the event and the fact’, and the ‘truth of the life and struggle of the people’. Vuchetich attempted to introduce this novel notion with the aim of adapting epistemology to ideology. A group of prominent Soviet historians wrote an open letter to the newspaper Izvestia, in which the notion of ‘two truths’ was called an ‘attempt to distinguish between suitable and inconvenient facts’, and in which the duty to search for the historical truth was emphasized. Submitted in May 1965, the letter was rejected for publication. It was instead published a month later in the samizdat journal Political Diary, edited by historian Roy Medvedev.

In Czechoslovakia a large debate about the nature of history took place among samizdat historians in 1984–5. It started in May 1984 with the publication of

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6 For a partial overview, see De Baets, Responsible History (New York, 2009), 100–7.
7 From a 1982 book in his honour, the official Festschrift designation was removed prior to publication. Three articles in the book that treated Zimin explicitly had all notice of that fact removed from their titles. De Baets, Censorship of Historical Thought, 495.
8 Ibid., 497–8, 183, 401, 117; and id., Responsible History, 153–4.
a Charta 77 document, Právo na dějiny [The Right to History]. This document included a negative assessment of official historiography, a defence of the Catholic view of history, and a reappraisal of several episodes and persons in Czechoslovak history. It also criticized the severely restricted access to archives, especially for post-1918 sources. Some fifteen historians reacted to this Charta 77 document. Many of the texts from this debate appeared in Milan Hůbl’s 1985 samizdat publication, Hlasy k českým dějinám [Voices on Czech History]. There had been predecessors: medievalist František Graus and contemporary historian Jan Křen had launched appeals for more autonomy in historiography in 1956 and 1963 respectively; and, as we saw, in 1979 Jozef Jablonický attacked the gaps in official historical writing. In Poland, an article entitled ‘The Right to Historical Truth’ was accepted for publication in Res Publica—an independent but legally published monthly from the 1980s—and then banned in 1987. The article, written by historian Adolf Juszewenko, described the problematic state of post-war Polish historiography. It eventually appeared in Index on Censorship in 1988.

In a very different context, that of the transition in China after Mao Zedong’s death in 1976, a circle of writers around Hu Yaobang (the Chinese Communist Party’s future Secretary-General) initiated a major epistemological shift. These writers contended that practice, rather than ideology, was the criterion for truth. A major role in this shift was played by Sun Changjiang—a professor, journalist, and editor with a degree in Chinese history from the China People’s University. He was the main author of ‘Shijian shi jianyan zhenli de weiyi biaozhun’ (‘Practice is the Sole Criterion of Truth’)—the article of May 1978 that sparked what became known as the ‘truth criterion controversy’. Later, in the summer of 1987, Sun would nearly lose his Party membership for allegedly advocating ‘bourgeois liberalization’ and criticizing leftist dogmatism. He was dismissed as an editor.

Were the actions of Tvardovsky and Medvedev, Charta 77 and Hůbl, Juszewenko and Index on Censorship, and Hu and Sun futile? They were not. Although for a large part these authors wrote under pressure and with high risks, they kept burning the flame of truth. They did what may be expected of historians, but they did it under very unfavourable circumstances. Therefore, their actions were important and courageous. Many similarly important efforts by similarly courageous historians have been forgotten. But these historians managed to leave traces of their actions. Therefore, their struggle for a right to history can be remembered here.

ETHICS

Finally, the problem of the censorship of history possesses an ethical dimension, at least to the extent that the political regime allows historians the oxygen to act as
responsible agents at all. Censorship is a violation of the historians’ two core rights which are high on the list of human rights: freedom of expression (for teaching and publishing) and freedom of information (for conducting research). Given these rights, it is the historians’ professional duty to apply standards of accuracy and sincerity—in particular to search honestly and methodically for the historical truth. Whereas the responsible use of history—including many forms of responsible selection and omission—is protected by academic freedom, censorship is not. And if restrictions imposed by censorship are not prescribed by law or necessary in a democratic society, they are not even covered by the right to free expression. Censorship of history, through its almost exclusive dependence on non-scholarly interests, is a form of abuse of history. Like all such abuse, it undermines the trust placed by society in scholarship and teaching. Therefore, historians should always oppose it. For this reason, the activities of censoring historians should be condemned, with the aggravating qualification that censorship of history committed by professional historians is worse than the same conduct by non-professionals. Detailed study of their cases, however, often reveals that censors are sometimes subjected to heavy pressure themselves. Hence, moral judgements from outsiders on the freedom to act of censoring historians (and on the position of historians who did not oppose censorship) are not always relevant in the more complex cases.

A final basic ethical principle is this: the universal rights of freedom of thought and expression ineluctably include the right to write and teach history and the right to remember the past. Mapping the history of the censorship of history and remembering both those opposing it and suffering from it, are vital avenues for keeping alive these rights to history and to memory.

Obviously, even if the history of the censorship of history has unusually wide ramifications, it does not cover the totality of historical writing. But just as societies are well studied at the atypical moments of their deepest crises, so has the study of historical writing its privileged but surprising vantage points. And, as the dark side of scholarship, the censorship of history is one of them.

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Chapter 4
Postcolonial Criticism and History: Subaltern Studies

Gyan Prakash¹

Beginning in 1982 as an intervention in South Asian historiography, Subaltern Studies came to enjoy a widespread influence in the historiographies of regions beyond South Asia and disciplines other than history. This influence rests on the postcolonial perspective charted out in its twelve volumes of deeply researched articles and discussion pieces, and books by the members of the Editorial Collective. The term ‘subaltern’ now appears with growing frequency in studies on Africa, Latin America, and Europe, and subalternist analysis has become a recognizable mode of critical scholarship in history, literature, and anthropology. Scholars across disciplines have used this approach as a way to question Eurocentric knowledge and to advance critical, minority viewpoints. With the Editorial Collective’s recent decision to disband after over twenty-five years of forthright intervention in debates across disciplines on postcolonial readings of colonialism and nationalism, it is an appropriate time to assess its contributions.

Subaltern Studies did not begin self-consciously as a postcolonial project. Its wider aim was, and remains, to rescue subaltern histories and forms of knowledge from elitist representations. But given that the project emerged as an intervention in modern South Asian historiography, the critique of colonial knowledge, including the practices of history-writing authored and authorized by colonialism and Western domination, was present since its very inception. Of course, colonialism and its legacies had faced challenges before. One has only to think of nationalist rebellions against imperialist domination, and Marxism’s critiques of capitalism and colonialism. But neither nationalism nor Marxism broke free from Eurocentric discourses.² As nationalism reversed orientalist thought, and attributed agency and history to the subjected nation, it staked a claim to the

¹ This essay draws heavily on my ‘Subaltern Studies as Postcolonial Criticism’, American Historical Review, 99:5 (1994), 1475–90.
² In calling these accounts ‘Eurocentric’, I do not mean that they followed the lead of Western authors and thinkers. Eurocentricity here refers to the historicism that projected the West as History.
order of Reason and Progress instituted by colonialism. When Marxists turned
the spotlight on colonial exploitation, their criticism was framed by an historicist
scheme that universalized Europe’s historical experience. The project to write
subaltern history required undoing the Eurocentrism produced by the institution
of the West’s trajectory, its appropriation of the Other, as History. Thus,
Subaltern Studies challenged and sought to break free from Eurocentric history.
But critiquing Eurocentrism was never its only aim. The goal was to challenge
elitist knowledge, of which Eurocentrism was a part but not its entirety. For this
reason, the project has always included multiple and changing approaches.
Tackling a range of topics and deploying different methods of reading and
writing history, it established the subaltern perspective so broadly in the field
that the unity of purpose prominent in its early volumes no longer exists, or even
seems necessary. In a sense, this is a sign of the project’s success.

THE EMERGENCE OF SUBALTERN STUDIES

Subaltern Studies emerged as an intervention in South Asian historiography in
the wake of the growing crisis of the Indian state in the 1970s. The dominance
of the nation-state, cobbled together through compromises and coercion during
the nationalist struggle against British rule, became precarious as its programme
of capitalist modernity sharpened social and political inequalities and conflicts.
Faced with the outbreak of powerful movements of different ideological hues
that challenged its claim to represent the people, the state resorted increasingly
to repression to preserve its dominance. But repression was not the only means
adopted. The state combined coercive measures with the powers of patronage
and money, on the one hand, and the appeal of populist slogans and pro-
grammes, on the other, to make a fresh bid for its legitimacy. These measures,
pioneered by the Indira Gandhi government, secured the dominance of the
state but corroded the authority of its institutions. The key components of the
modern nation-state—political parties, the electoral process, parliamentary
bodies, the bureaucracy, law, and the ideology of development—survived, but
their claim to represent the culture and politics of the masses suffered crippling
blows.

In the field of historical scholarship, the perilous position of the nation-state in
the 1970s became evident in the increasingly embattled nationalist historiogra-
phy. It was attacked relentlessly by the ‘Cambridge School’, according to which a
collaboration between Indian elites and the East India Company not only
enabled the colonial conquest but also constituted the very substance of British
rule in India. Underneath the outward face of colonial power was the inner
reality of mutually beneficial relations between the British rulers and Indian
elites. This interpretation underplayed the colonizer versus colonized divide, and
represented India’s nationalist struggle as nothing but a chronicle of competition
among its elites for power. This school exposed the nationalist hagiography by highlighting the involvement of local and regional magnates in the struggles for power and influence, but its elite-based analysis turned the masses into dupes of their superiors. Marxists contested both nationalist historiography and the ‘Cambridge School’ interpretation, but their mode-of-production narratives merged imperceptibly with the nation-state’s ideology of modernity and progress. This meant that, while championing the history of the oppressed classes and their emancipation through modern progress, the Marxists found it difficult to deal with the hold of ‘backward’ ideologies of caste and religion. Unable to take into account the oppressed’s lived experience of religion and social customs, Marxist accounts of peasant rebellions either overlooked the religious idiom of the rebels or viewed it as a mere form, and a stage in the development of revolutionary consciousness. Thus, although Marxist historians produced impressive and pioneering studies, their claim to represent the history of the masses remained debatable.

Subaltern Studies plunged into this historiographical contest over the representation of the culture and politics of the people. Accusing colonialist, nationalist, and Marxist interpretations of robbing the masses of their agency, it announced a new approach to restore history to the subordinated. Started by an editorial collective consisting of six scholars of South Asia spread across Britain, India, and Australia, Subaltern Studies was inspired by Ranajit Guha. A distinguished historian, then known for his *A Rule of Property for Bengal* (1963), a brilliant intellectual history of the British colonial land settlement, Guha edited the first six Subaltern Studies volumes. After he relinquished the editorship, the group expanded to include new members. Members drawn from the expanded and reconstituted Editorial Collective, with occasional collaboration with scholars outside it, took on the responsibility of publishing the volumes. Guha, however, continued to publish in Subaltern Studies and remained a member of the group until its recent disbandment.

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3 The classic statement of the ‘Cambridge School’ is to be found in Anil Seal’s *The Emergence of Indian Nationalism: Competition and Collaboration in the Later Nineteenth Century* (Cambridge, 1968), which contended that Indian nationalism was produced by the educated elites in their competition for the ‘loaves and fishes’ of office. This was modified in J. Gallagher, G. Johnson, and Anil Seal (eds.), *Locality, Province and Nation: Essays on Indian Politics, 1870–1940* (Cambridge, 1973). This volume advanced the view that nationalism emerged from the involvement of local and regional elites in colonial institutions. As the official institutions reached downwards to the locality and the province, the elites reached upwards to the central level to secure their local and regional dominance, finding nationalism a useful instrument for the articulation of their interests.

RETRIEVING THE SUBALTERN

Subaltern Studies aimed to promote, as Guha declared in the preface to the first volume, the study and discussion of subalternist themes in South Asian studies. The term ‘subaltern’, drawn from Antonio Gramsci’s writings, refers to subordination in terms of class, caste, gender, race, language, and culture, and was used to signify the centrality of power relations in history. Guha suggested that while Subaltern Studies would not ignore the dominant because the subalterns are always subject to their activity, its aim was to ‘rectify the elitist bias characteristic of much research and academic work’ in South Asian studies. The act of rectification sprang from the conviction that the elites had exercised dominance, but not hegemony, in Gramsci’s sense, over the subalterns. A reflection of this belief was Guha’s argument that the subalterns had acted in history ‘on their own, that is, independently of the elite’; their politics constituted ‘an autonomous domain, for it neither originated from elite politics nor did its existence depend on the latter’.

While the focus on subordination has remained central to Subaltern Studies, the conception of subalternity has witnessed shifts and varied uses. Individual contributors to the volumes have also differed, not surprisingly, in their orientation. A shift in interests, focus, and theoretical grounds is also evident through twelve volumes of essays, and several monographs by individual subalternists. Yet, what has remained consistent is the effort to rethink history from the perspective of the subaltern.

How the adoption of the subaltern’s perspective aimed to undo the ‘spurious primacy assigned to them [the elites]’ is not entirely clear in the first volume. The essays, ranging from agrarian history to the analysis of the relationship between peasants and nationalists, represent excellent, though not exceptional, scholarship. Although all the contributions attempt to highlight the lives and the historical presence of subaltern classes, neither the thorough and insightful research in social and economic history, nor the critique of the Indian nationalist appropriation of peasant movements was new; Marxist historians, in particular, had done both. It was with the second volume that the novelty and insurgency of the Subaltern Studies became clear.

The second volume makes forthright claims about the subaltern subject, and sets about demonstrating how elite perspectives anchored in colonialist, nationalist, and Marxist narratives had denied subaltern agency in history. Arguing that

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7 See, for example, Majid Siddiqi, Agrarian Unrest in North India (Delhi, 1978); and Jairus Banaji, ‘Capitalist Domination and Small Peasantry: Deccan Districts in the Late Nineteenth Century’, Economic and Political Weekly, 12:33 (1977), 1375–44.
these narratives had sought to represent the subaltern’s consciousness and activity according to schemes that encoded elite dominance, Guha asserts that historiography had dealt with ‘the peasant rebel merely as an empirical person or member of a class, but not as an entity whose will and reason constituted the praxis called rebellion’. Historians were apt to depict peasant rebellions as spontaneous eruptions that ‘break out like thunder storms, heave like earthquakes, spread like wildfires’; alternatively, they attributed rebellions to a reflex action to economic and political oppression. ‘Either way insurgency is regarded as external to the peasant’s consciousness and Cause is made to stand in as a phantom surrogate for Reason, the logic of consciousness.’

How did historiography develop this blind spot? In answering this question, Guha’s ‘The Prose of Counter-Insurgency’ offers a methodological tour de force, providing a stunning reading of the historical writings on peasant insurgency in colonial India. Describing these writings as counter-insurgent texts, he begins by distinguishing three types of discourse—primary, secondary, and tertiary. These differ from one another in terms of the order of their appearance in time, and the degree of their acknowledged or unacknowledged identification with the official point of view. Analyzing each in turn, Guha shows the presence, transformation, and redistribution of a ‘counter-insurgent code’. This code, present in the immediate accounts of insurgency produced by officials (primary discourse), is processed into another time and narrative by official reports and memoirs (secondary discourse), and is finally incorporated and redistributed by historians with no official affiliation and farthest removed from the time of the event (tertiary discourse). The ‘code of pacification’, written into the ‘raw’ data of primary texts and the narratives of secondary discourses, survives and shapes the tertiary discourse of historians when they fail to read in it the presence of the excluded other, the insurgent. Consequently, while historians produce accounts that differ from secondary discourses, their tertiary discourse also ends up appropriating the insurgent. Consider, for example, the treatment of peasant rebellions. When colonial officials, using on-the-spot accounts containing ‘the code of pacification’, blamed wicked landlords and wily moneylenders for the occurrence of these events, they used causality as a counter-insurgent instrument: to identify the cause of the revolt was a step in the direction of control over it, and constituted a denial of the insurgent’s agency. In nationalist historiography, this denial took a different form as British rule, rather than local oppression, became the cause of revolts, turning peasant rebellions into nationalist struggles. Radical historians, too, ended up incorporating the counter-insurgent code of the secondary discourse as they explained peasant revolts in relation to a revolutionary continuum leading to socialism. Each tertiary account failed to step outside the

9 Ibid., 26–33.
counter-insurgent paradigm, Guha argues, by refusing to acknowledge the subjectivity and agency of the insurgent.

Quite clearly, the project to restore the insurgent’s agency involved, as Rosalind O’Hanlon pointed out in her thoughtful review essay, the notion of the ‘recovery of the subject’. Thus, by reading records against their grain, these scholars aimed to uncover the subaltern’s myths, cults, ideologies, and revolts that colonial and nationalist elites sought to appropriate and conventional historiography has lain to waste by the deadly weapon of cause and effect. Ranajit Guha’s *Elementary Aspects of Peasant Insurgency in Colonial India* (1983) is a powerful example of this scholarship, which seeks to recover the peasant from elite projects and positivist historiography. In this wide-ranging study, full of brilliant insights and methodological innovation, Guha returns to nineteenth-century peasant insurrections in colonial India. Reading colonial records and historiographical representations with an uncanny eye, he offers a fascinating account of the peasant’s insurgent consciousness, rumours, mythic visions, religiosity, and bonds of community. From Guha’s account, the subaltern emerges with forms of sociality and political community at odds with nation and class, defying the models of rationality and social action that conventional historiography uses. Guha argues persuasively that such models are elitist insofar as they deny the subaltern’s autonomous practices, and are drawn from colonial and liberal-nationalist projects of appropriating the subaltern.

It is true that the effort to retrieve the autonomy of the subaltern subject resembled the ‘history from below’ approach developed by social history in the West. But this resemblance was complicated by the fact that the subalternist search for a humanist subject-agent ended up frequently with the discovery of the failure of subaltern agency: the moment of rebellion always contained within it the moment of failure. The desire to recover the subaltern’s autonomy was repeatedly frustrated because subalternity, by definition, signified the impossibility of autonomy. As Veena Das remarked, subaltern rebellions only offered ‘the night-time of love’. Moreover, as Dipesh Chakrabarty points out, Guha’s notion of peasants as autonomous agents did not suggest that they were conscious of their subaltern subjectivity, but that insurgency could be read in their practices.

While these scholars failed to fully recognize that the subalterns’ resistance did not simply oppose power but was also constituted by it, their own work showed this to be the case. Further complicating the urge to recover the subject was the fact that, unlike British and US social history, Subaltern Studies drew on the

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11 Veena Das, ‘Subaltern as Perspective’, in Ranajit Guha (ed.), *Subaltern Studies*, vol. 6 (Delhi, 1989), 315.

antihumanist structuralist and post-structuralist writings. Guha’s deft readings of colonial records, in particular, drew explicitly from Ferdinand de Saussure, Claude Lévi-Strauss, Roman Jakobson, Roland Barthes, and Michel Foucault. Partly, the reliance on such theorists, and the emphasis on ‘textual’ readings, arose from the absence of workers’ diaries and other such sources available to English historians. Indian peasants had left no sources, no facts from which their own ‘voice’ could be retrieved. But the emphasis on ‘readings’ of texts and the recourse to theorists like Foucault, whose writings cast a shroud of doubt on the idea of the autonomous subject, contained an awareness that the colonial subaltern was not just a form of ‘general’ subalternity. While the operation of power relations in colonial and metropolitan theatres had parallels, the conditions of subalternity in the colony were also irreducibly different. Subaltern Studies, therefore, could not just be the Indian version of the general ‘history from below’ approach; it had to conceive the subaltern differently and write different histories.

**SUBALTERNITY AND DISCOURSE**

This difference has grown in subsequent Subaltern Studies volumes as the desire to recover the subaltern subject became increasingly entangled in the analysis of how subalternity was constituted by dominant discourses. Of course, the tension between the recovery of the subaltern as a subject outside the elite discourse, and the analysis of subalternity as an effect of discursive systems was present from the very beginning. Later volumes, however, pay greater attention to developing the emergence of subalternity as a discursive effect, without abandoning the notion of the subaltern as a subject and agent. This perspective, amplified since volume three of *Subaltern Studies*, identifies subalternity as a position of critique, as a recalcitrant difference that arises not outside, but inside elite discourses, to exercise pressure over forces and forms that subordinate it.

The attention paid to discourse in locating the process and effects of subordination can be seen in Partha Chatterjee’s influential *Nationalist Thought and the Colonial World* (1986). A study of how Indian nationalism achieved dominance, this book traces critical shifts in nationalist thought, leading to a ‘passive revolution’—a concept that he draws from Gramsci to interpret the achievement of Indian independence in 1947 as a mass revolution that appropriated the agency of the masses. In interpreting the shifts in nationalist thought, Chatterjee stresses

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14 Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak has drawn attention to precisely this tension in her ‘Subaltern Studies: Deconstructing Historiography’, in Ranajit Guha (ed.), *Subaltern Studies*, vol. 4 (Dehli, 1985), 337–8.
the pressure exerted on the dominant discourse by the problem of representing the masses. The nationalists dealt with this problem by marginalizing certain forms of mass action and thought that ran counter to the modernity-driven goals that they derived from the colonial discourse. Such a strategy secures elite dominance but not hegemony over subaltern culture and politics. His *The Nation and Its Fragments* (1993) returns once again to this theme of appropriation of subalternity, sketching how the nation was first imagined in the cultural domain, and then readied for political contest by an elite that ‘normalized’ various subaltern aspirations for community and agency in the drive to create a modern nation-state. The role of the elite discourse in appropriating subaltern practices also appears in David Hardiman’s study of peasant religion and resistance. A turn towards discourse also animates David Arnold’s study of colonial medicine, showing that the ‘normalization’ of Western medicine in British India entailed the colonization of the body.

Investigating the process of ‘normalization’ entails a complex and deep engagement with elite and canonical texts. This, of course, is not new to Subaltern Studies. Earlier essays, most notably Guha’s ‘The Prose of Counter-Insurgency’, engaged and interrogated elite writings with enviable skill and imagination. But these analyses of elite texts were aimed at establishing the presence of the subalterns as subjects of their own history. The growing engagement with elite themes and writings in later volumes, on the other hand, emphasizes the analysis of the operation of dominance as it confronted, constituted, and subordinated certain forms of culture and politics. This is visible in the treatment of the writings of authoritative political figures such as Mahatma Gandhi and Jawaharlal Nehru, and in the analyses of the activities of the Indian National Congress—the dominant nationalist party. The readings of elite nationalism strove to show how the nationalist leadership rewrote history, and how its rewriting was directed at both contesting colonial rule and protecting its flanks from the subalterns. Another theme explored with a similar aim is the intertwined functioning of colonialism, nationalism, and ‘communalism’ in the partition of British India into India and Pakistan—a theme that has taken on added importance due to the recent resurgence of Hindu supremacists and outbreaks of Hindu–Muslim riots.

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15 David Hardiman, *The Coming of the Devi: Adivasi Assertion in Western India* (Delhi, 1987).


17 Fine examples in this respect are Shahid Amin’s ‘Gandhi as Mahatma: Gorakhpur District, Eastern UP, 1921–2’, in Ranajit Guha (ed.), *Subaltern Studies*, vol. 3 (Delhi, 1984), 1–61; and Amin’s, ‘Approver’s Testimony, Judicial Discourse: The Case of Chauri Chaura’, in Guha (ed.), *Subaltern Studies*, vol. 5 (Delhi, 1987), 166–202.

The importance of such topics is self-evident, but the turn to the analysis of discourses meant a diminishing importance of economic and agrarian history. Also, the peasant did not remain the only focus of attention. Critics saw this move as an abandonment of the search for subaltern groups in favour of a fashionable obsession with discourses and texts. But this criticism overlooked the fact that although these scholars turned away from positivistic retrieval of the subaltern subject, they continued to press the notion that the subalternity represented a radical heterogeneity with, though not autonomy from, the dominant. It is true, however, that they locate this heterogeneity in discourses, woven into the fabric of dominant structures, and manifesting itself in the very operation of power. In other words, subalterns and subalternity do not disappear into discourse but appear in its historical articulation in practices, subordinated by structures on which they exert pressure.

Thus, Shahid Amin shows that Indian nationalists in 1921–2, confronted with the millennial and deeply subversive language of peasant politics, were quick to claim peasant actions as their own and Gandhian. Unable to acknowledge the peasants’ insurgent appropriation of Gandhi, they represented it in the stereotypical saint–devotee relationship. Amin develops this point further in his innovative monograph on peasant violence in 1922. That violence resulted in the death of several policemen and led Gandhi to suspend the non-cooperation campaign against British rule. Returning to this emotive date in Indian nationalist history, Amin shows that this violent event, ‘criminalized’ in the colonial juridical discourse, was ‘nationalized’ by the elite nationalists, first by an ‘obligatory amnesia’, and then by selective remembrance and reappropriation. To take another example, Gyanendra Pandey suggests that the discourse of the Indian nation-state, which had to imagine India as a national community, could not recognize community (religious, cultural, social, and local) as a political form; thus, it pitted nationalism (termed good because it ‘stood above’ difference) against communalism (termed evil because it did not ‘rise above’ difference).

Such reexaminations of South Asian history do not invoke ‘real’ subalterns, prior to discourse, in framing their critique. Placing subalterns in the labyrinth of discourse, they cannot claim an unmediated access to their reality. The actual subalterns and subalternity emerge between the folds of the discourse, in its silences and blindness, and in its overdetermined pronouncements. Thus,
interpreting the 1922 peasant violence, Amin identifies the subaltern presence as an effect in the discourse. This effect manifests itself in a telling dilemma that the nationalists faced. On the one hand, they could not endorse peasant violence as nationalist activity but, on the other hand, they had to acknowledge the peasant ‘criminals’ as part of the nation. They sought to resolve this dilemma by admitting the event in the narrative of the nation while denying it agency: the peasants were shown to act the way they did because they were provoked, or because they were insufficiently trained in the methods of non-violence.

Subalternity thus emerges in the paradoxes of the functioning of power, in the functioning of the dominant discourse as it represents and domesticates peasant agency as a spontaneous and ‘prepolitical’ response to colonial violence. No longer does it appear outside the elite discourse as a separate domain, embodied in a figure endowed with a will that the dominant suppress and overpower, but do not constitute. Instead, it refers to that impossible thought, figure, or action without which the dominant discourse cannot exist, and acknowledges them in its subterfuges and stereotypes.

This portrait of subalternity is notably different from the image of the autonomous subject. Instead of the full-blooded agent recovered from historical evidence by the ‘history from below approach’, this subaltern appears fragmentary. Denied presence and integrity by history itself, the historian cannot make a complete subject-agent after the fact. Historical records register both the necessary failure of subalterns to come unto their own, and the pressure they exert on discursive systems that, in turn, provoke their suppression and fragmentation. The representation of this discontinuous mode of subalternity demanded a strategy that recognized at once the emergence and displacement of subaltern agency in dominant discourses. Thus, like Amin, Pandey turns to fragments in his study of communal violence, arguing that state and majoritarian practices leave the historian with no recourse but to defend the scraps that express the subaltern experience.23

‘PROVINCIALIZING EUROPE’

The Subaltern Studies’ relocation of subalternity in the operation of dominant discourses leads it necessarily to the critique of the modern West. For if the marginalization of ‘other’ sources of knowledge and agency occurred in the functioning of colonialism and its derivative—nationalism—then the weapon of critique must turn against Europe and the modes of knowledge it instituted. It is in this context that there emerges a certain convergence between Subaltern Studies and postcolonial critiques originating in literary and cultural studies. To

23 Id., ‘In Defense of the Fragment’.
cite only one example, not only did Edward Said’s *Orientalism* (1978) provide the grounds for Partha Chatterjee’s critique of Indian nationalism, Said also wrote an appreciative foreword to a collection of Subaltern Studies essays. It is important to recognize that the critique of the West is not confined to the colonial record of exploitation and profiteering but extends to the disciplinary knowledge and procedures it authorized—above all, the discipline of history.

In a widely read essay, later included in his book, *Provincializing Europe* (2000), Chakrabarty offers a forceful critique of the academic discipline of history as a theoretical category laden with power. Finding premature the celebration of Subaltern Studies as a case of successful decolonization of knowledge, Chakrabarty argues that

insofar as the academic discourse of history—that is, ‘history’ as a discourse produced at the institutional site of the university—is concerned, ‘Europe’ remains the sovereign, theoretical subject of all histories, including the ones we call ‘Indian’, ‘Chinese’, ‘Kenyan’, and so on. There is a peculiar way in which all these other histories tend to become variations on a master narrative that could be called ‘the history of Europe’. In this sense, ‘Indian’ history itself is in a position of subalternity; one can only articulate subaltern subject positions in the name of this history.

The place of Europe as a silent referent works in many ways. First, there is the matter of ‘asymmetric ignorance’: non-Westerners must read ‘great’ Western historians (E. P. Thompson or Le Roy Ladurie or Carlo Ginzburg) to produce good histories, while the latter are not expected to know non-Western works. Indeed, non-Western scholars are recognized for their innovation and imagination when they put into practice genres of inquiries developed for European history; a ‘total history’ of China, the history of *mentalité* in Mexico, the making of the working class in India, and so on, are likely to be applauded as fine studies.

Even more consequential, Chakrabarty suggests, is the installation of Europe as the theoretical subject of all histories. This universalization of Europe works through the representation of histories as History; even ‘Marx’s methodological/epistemological statements have not always successfully resisted historicist readings’. Chakrabarty’s study of jute workers in Bengal runs up precisely against the Eurocentrism that undergirds Marx’s analysis of capital and class struggle. In his study, he finds that deeply hierarchical notions of caste and religion, drawn from India’s traditions, animated the working-class organization and politics in Bengal. This posed a problem for Marxist historiography. If India’s traditions lacked the ‘Liberty Tree’ that had nourished, according to E. P. Thompson, the

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26 Ibid., 4.
consciousness of the English working class, were Indian workers condemned to ‘low classness’? The alternative was to envision that, sooner or later, the Indian working class would reach the desired state of emancipatory consciousness. This, of course, assumes the universality of such notions as the rights of ‘free-born Englishmen’, and ‘equality before law’, and posits that ‘workers all over the world, irrespective of their specific cultural pasts, experience “capitalist production” in the same way’.\(^{27}\) This possibility can only arise if it is assumed that there is a universal subject endowed with an emancipatory narrative. Such an assumption, Chakrabarty suggests, is present in Marx’s analysis, which, while carefully contrasting the proletariat with the citizen, falls back nonetheless on the Enlightenment notions of freedom and democracy to define the emancipatory narrative. As a result, the jute workers, who resisted the bourgeois ideals of equality before law with their hierarchical vision of a pre-capitalist community, are condemned to ‘backwardness’ in Marxist accounts. Furthermore, it allows the nation-state to step on to the stage as the instrument of liberal transformation of the hierarchy-ridden masses.

It is not surprising, therefore, that themes of historical transition occupy a prominent place in the writing of non-Western histories. When historians ask if these societies achieved a successful transition to development, modernization, and capitalism, the answer is frequently in the negative. A sense of failure overwhelms the representation of the history of these societies. So much so that even contestatory projects, including the Subaltern Studies, Chakrabarty acknowledges, write of non-Western histories in terms of failed transitions. Such images of aborted transitions reinforce the subalternity of non-Western histories and the dominance of Europe as History.\(^{28}\)

Against the historicist schemes that universalize Europe’s experience as History, Chakrabarty calls for ‘provincializing Europe’. To build his case, he revisits Marx. This is because Marx’s critique of capital includes in the category two key elements of European thought: ‘the abstract human of the European Enlightenment and the idea of history’.\(^{29}\) The global dissemination of these concepts has been central to the history of capitalism and colonialism, and they have played a large role in the espousal of rationalism, humanism, secularism, and justice by anti-imperialist thought in India and elsewhere. A re-examination of Marx is therefore necessary, he argues, to rework the relationship of postcolonial thought with the legacies of post-Enlightenment ideas. According to Chakrabarty, Marx’s analysis of capital identified two kinds of history in its historical existence. One was the past that capital presupposed—a presumption governed by the logic of capital, for example, the severance of peasants from land so that they could become free labourers. Another history was capital’s encounter with

\(^{27}\) Id., *Rethinking Working-Class History: Bengal, 1890–1940* (Princeton, 1989), 223.


\(^{29}\) Id., *Provincializing Europe* (Princeton, 2000), 47.
social forms that were not part of capital’s life-process. Capital had to subjugate these social forms and turn them into its presupposed past, but there was nothing to guarantee this process. Historicism assumes that the relationship between capitalism and difference is a matter of time, that the logic of capital absorbs and assimilates different social forms over a period. But Marx, Chakrabarty suggests, also identifies another possible relationship between the two—one that views difference not as external but internal to its existence. In opposition to the historicist thought that views the relationship of capital and difference as one between capitalist and pre-capitalist relations, modernity, and tradition, Chakrabarty offers a philosophical reading that treats capital’s becoming as part of its being. He suggests that capital’s existence includes the ‘pre-capitalist’ difference, that ‘tradition’ is not alien to, but part of, ‘modernity’. In other words, capital’s life does not imply a transition from one stage to another stage of history but includes that which it deems alien to itself.

The purpose of Chakrabarty’s sustained reading of Marx is to read transition as translation, to analyze the global dissemination of post-Enlightenment ideals from its margins. A similar inspiration was also at work in my own scholarship and my own involvement with Subaltern Studies. My study of bonded labour in British India was an examination of the history of the discourse of freedom as an aspect of colonialism, showing that the language of free labour as natural was deeply instituted in the historical archive, suppressing other histories. After joining Subaltern Studies in 1992, my work on the history of science’s cultural authority was an effort to examine Western knowledge from the margins. Arguing that the universalization of Western science under colonial condition brought to light its particular history, I showed that the process of science’s translation proved key to the establishment of the modern nation-state. The inescapable conclusion from such analyses was that ‘history’, authorized by European imperialism and the Indian nation-state, functions as a discipline, empowering certain forms of knowledge while disempowering others.

RETHINKING HISTORY-WRITING

For some Marxist critics of Subaltern Studies, a deconstructive understanding of the post-Enlightenment legacy was tantamount to a rejection of rationality, a dismissal of Marxism, a dangerous flirtation with postmodernism on a global scale, and with indigenism and Hindu fundamentalism in India. But neither

nativism nor cultural relativism animated the project of ‘provincializing Europe’. There were no calls for reversing the Europe/India hierarchy, and no attempts to represent India through an ‘Indian’, not Western, perspective. Instead, the recognition that the ‘Third World’ historian is condemned to knowing ‘Europe’ as the original home of the ‘modern’, whereas the ‘European’ historian does not share a comparable predicament with regard to the pasts of the majority of ‘humankind’, serves as the condition for a deconstructive rethinking of history.33 Such a strategy seeks to find in the functioning of history as a discipline (in Foucault’s sense) the source for another history—one that resists and revises its functioning as a mode of Eurocentric power.

This move is a familiar one for postcolonial criticism, and should not be confused with approaches that insist simply on the social construction of knowledge and identities. It delves into the history of colonialism, not only to document its record of domination, but also to identify its failures, silences, and impasses; not just to chronicle the career of dominant discourses, but to track those (subaltern) positions that cannot be properly recognized and named, only ‘normalized’. The aim of such a strategy is not to unmask dominant discourses but to explore their fault-lines, in order to provide different accounts, to describe histories revealed in the cracks of the colonial archaeology of knowledge.34

This perspective draws on the critiques of binary oppositions that scholars look upon with suspicion. It is true that binary oppositions conceal intertwined histories and engagements across dichotomies, but the critique must go further. Oppositions such as East/West and colonizer/colonized are suspect, not only because they distort the history of engagements, but also because they edit, suppress, and marginalize everything that upsets founding values. For example, the Orient/Occident opposition, as Edward Said pointed out so forcefully, is designed to assert the positive and superior values of the West, attributing magic and superstition that are part of its own history to the East. It is in this respect that Jacques Derrida’s strategy to undo the implacable oppositions of Western dominance is of some relevance.

Metaphysics—the white mythology which reassembles and reflects the culture of the West: the white man takes his own mythology, Indo-European mythology, his own logos, that is, the mythos of his idiom, for the universal form that he must still wish to call Reason… White mythology—metaphysics has erased within itself the fabulous scene

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that has produced it, the scene that nevertheless remains active and stirring, inscribed in white ink, an invisible design covered over in the palimpsest.\textsuperscript{35}

If the production of ‘white mythology’ has nevertheless left ‘an invisible design covered over in the palimpsest’, Derrida suggests that the structure of signification, of \textit{diifference}, can be rearticulated differently from that which produced the West as Reason. Further, the source of the rearticulation of structures that produce foundational myths (History as the march of Man, of Reason, of Progress) lies inside, not outside, its ambivalent functioning. From this point of view, critical work seeks its basis, not without, but within the fissures of dominant structures. Or, as Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak puts it, the deconstructive philosophical position (or postcolonial criticism) consists in saying an ‘impossible “no” to a structure, which one critiques, yet inhabits intimately’.\textsuperscript{36}

The potential of this deconstructive position has been explored effectively in the recent readings of the archival documents on the abolition of \textit{sati}, or Hindu widow sacrifice in the early nineteenth century. The historian encounters these records, as I have suggested elsewhere, as evidence of the contests between the British ‘civilizing mission’ and Hindu heathenism, between modernity and tradition, and as a story of the beginning of the emancipation of Hindu women and about the birth of modern India.\textsuperscript{37} This is so because, Lata Mani shows, the very existence of these documents has a history that entails the use of women as the site for the colonial and the indigenous male elite’s constructions of authoritative Hindu traditions.\textsuperscript{38} The questions asked of accumulated sources on \textit{sati}—whether or not the burning of widows was sanctioned by Hindu codes, whether women went willingly or not to the funeral pyre, on what grounds the immolation of women could be abolished—come to us marked by their early nineteenth-century history. The historian’s confrontation today with sources on \textit{sati}, therefore, cannot escape the echo of that previous rendezvous. In repeating that encounter, how does the historian today \textit{not replicate} the early nineteenth-century staging of the issue as a contest between tradition and modernity, between the slavery of women and efforts towards their emancipation, between barbaric Hindu practices and the British ‘civilizing mission’? Lata Mani tackles this dilemma by examining how such questions were asked and with what consequences. She shows that the opposing arguments assumed the authority of the law-giving scriptural tradition as the origin of Hindu customs: both those who supported and those who opposed \textit{sati} sought the authority of textual origins for


\textsuperscript{37} The discussion on \textit{sati} draws heavily on my ‘Postcolonial Criticism and Indian Historiography’, \textit{Social Text}, 31/32 (1992), 11.

\textsuperscript{38} Lata Mani, ‘Contentious Traditions: The Debate on Sati in Colonial India’, \textit{Cultural Critique}, 7 (Fall 1987), 119–56.
their beliefs. In other words, the nineteenth-century debate fabricated the authority of texts as Hinduism, without acknowledging its work of authorization; indigenous patriarchy and colonial power colluded in constructing the origins for and against sati while concealing their collusion. Consequently, as Spivak states starkly, the debate left no room for the widow’s enunciatory position. Caught in the contest over whether traditions did or did not sanction sati and over whether or not the widow self-immolated willingly, the colonized subaltern woman disappeared: she was literally extinguished for her dead husband in the indigenous patriarchal discourse, or offered the choice to speak in the voice of a sovereign individual authenticated by colonialism. The problem here is not one of sources (the absence of woman’s testimony), but that the very staging of the debate left no position from which the widow could speak.

The silencing of subaltern women, Spivak argues, marks the limit of historical knowledge. It is impossible to retrieve the woman’s voice when she was not given a subject-position from which to speak. This argument appears to run counter to the historiographical convention of retrieval to recover the histories of the traditionally ignored—women, workers, peasants, and minorities. Spivak’s point, however, is not that such retrievals should not be undertaken, but that the very project of recovery depends on the historical erasure of the subaltern ‘voice’. The very possibility of retrieval, therefore, is also a sign of its impossibility. The recognition of the aporetic condition of the subaltern’s silence is necessary in order to subject the intervention of the historian-critic to persistent interrogation, to prevent the refraction of ‘what might have been the absolutely Other into a domesticated Other’.

These directions of postcolonial criticism make it an ambivalent practice, perched between traditional historiography and its failures, within the folds of dominant discourses, while seeking to rearticulate their pregnant silence—sketching ‘an invisible design covered over in the palimpsest’. This should not be mistaken for the postmodern pastiche, though the present currency of such concepts as decentred subjects and parodic texts may provide a receptive and appropriative frame for postcolonial criticism. Postcolonial criticism seizes on discourse’s silences and aporetic moments neither to celebrate the polyphony of native voices nor to privilege multiplicity. Rather, its point is that the functioning of colonial power was heterogenous with its founding oppositions. The ‘native’ was at once an Other and entirely knowable, while the Hindu widow was a

40 For a similar argument about the colonized woman caught between indigenous patriarchy and the politics of archival production, see also ead., ‘The Rani of Sirmur: An Essay in Reading the Archives’, History and Theory, 24:3 (1985), 247–72.
silenced subaltern who was nonetheless sought as a sovereign subject asked to declare whether or not her immolation was voluntary. Clearly, colonial discourses operated as the structure of writing, with the structure of their enunciation remaining heterogenous with the binary oppositions they instituted.

This perspective on history and the position within it that the postcolonial critic occupies keeps an eye on both the conditions of historical knowledge and the possibility of its reinscription. It is precisely this double vision that allows Amin to use the limits of historical knowledge for its reinscription. His study of peasant violence in Chauri Chaura is at once scrupulously ‘local’ and ‘general’. It offers a ‘thick description’ of a local event set on a larger stage by nationalism and historiographical practice. Amin seizes on precisely this general (national) staging of the local not only to show that the Indian nation emerged in its narration but also to mark the tension between the two as the point where the subaltern memory of 1922 can enter history. This memory, recalled for the author during his fieldwork, is not invoked either to present a more ‘complete’ account of the event or to recover the subaltern. In fact, regarding gaps, contradictions, and ambivalences as constitutive, necessary components of the nationalist narrative, he inserts memory as a device that both dislocates and reinscribes the historical record. The result is not an exposé of nationalism that yields lifeless layers of suppressed evidence and episodes. Instead, we get a stage on which several different but interrelated dramas are performed, jostling for attention and prominence; curtains are abruptly drawn on some, and often the voices of the peasant actors can only be heard in the din of the other, more powerful, voices. Amin’s account is not animated by the urge to recover the subaltern as an autonomous subject. He places his inquiry in the tension between nationalism’s claim to know the peasant and its representation of the subalterns as the ‘criminals’ of Chauri Chaura. The subaltern remains a recalcitrant presence in discourse, at once part of the nation and outside it. Amin traffics between these two positions, demonstrating that subaltern insurgency left its mark, however disfigured, on the discourse—‘an invisible design covered over in the palimpsest’.

Neither Amin’s retelling of the 1922 event nor Chakrabarty’s project of ‘provincializing Europe’ can be separated from postcolonial critiques of disciplines, including the discipline of history. Thus, even as Subaltern Studies has shifted from its original goal of recovering the subaltern autonomy, the subaltern has emerged as a position from which the discipline of history can be rethought. This rethinking does not entail the rejection of the discipline and its procedures of research. Far from it. As Chakrabarty says, ‘it is not possible to simply walk out of the deep collusion between “history” and the modernizing narrative(s)’.42

42 Chakrabarty, ‘Postcoloniality and the Artifice of History’, 19. Frederick Cooper’s influential Colonialism in Question (Berkeley, 2005) takes the postcolonial rewriting of history to task for allegedly folding a heterogenous and varied history of colonialism into a flat and unvaried critique of modernity and the post-Enlightenment discourse. In my view, his criticism completely misses the
SUBALTERN STUDIES TODAY

The critique of colonialism and nationalism from the subaltern perspective has radically transformed South Asian historiography. The picture today looks very different than it did two decades ago. Not all of it is due to Subaltern Studies. Undoubtedly, the changing political and intellectual climate has played a part. But the influence of Subaltern Studies’ complex engagement with Marxism and post-structuralism in the study of modern South Asian historical experience is palpable in the published scholarship. Nationalist historiography, though by no means dormant, no longer stalks the field as it did two decades ago. The subaltern perspective circulates widely and is deployed in a whole range of scholarly inquiries. The group itself has grown over time to include new members who have taken the project into fresh topics. Susie Tharu, who had already done pioneering work in retrieving women’s writings, developed the group’s work on gender. Ajay Skaria’s work on orality and history, Shail Mayaram’s study of intercommunal history, and M. S. S. Pandian’s study of non-Brahman politics in South India expanded and added depth to the project. The essays in recent volumes register the project’s exploration of the question of subalternity beyond the historical experiences of colonialism and nationalism.43

With the 1988 publication of the anthology, Selected Subaltern Studies, edited by Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak and Ranajit Guha, and with a foreword by Edward Said, Subaltern Studies began to circulate globally. Scholars of East Asia, the Middle East, Africa, and Latin America read Subaltern Studies as postcolonial criticism, and the term ‘subaltern’ entered the lexicon in literary criticism. As Subaltern Studies was included in the postcolonial studies literature, the project also engaged with the works of scholars such as Homi Bhabha, Said, and Spivak, who joined the group in the mid-1990s. This engagement has also moved Subaltern Studies into a broader interdisciplinary conversation about colonial legacies and globalization.

Looking at Subaltern Studies today, it is clear that the project has achieved and gone beyond its original objective of rectifying the ‘elitist bias’ in South Asian historiography. This is reflected in the groups’ decision to disband after two decades of intense scholarly questioning of colonialist and nationalist interpretations of history.

point that the postcolonial critique is, in fact, directed at the ‘flat’ interpretation and the binaries of the colonizer/colonized and modern/premodern that were imposed by colonial history, and that it seeks to deconstruct and revise this colonial view of history.

43 See, for examples, Partha Chatterjee and Pradeep Jagannathan (eds.), Subaltern Studies, vol. 11 (Delhi, 2000), which includes several articles dealing with contemporary South Asia; Shail Mayaram, M. S. S. Pandian, and Ajay Skaria (eds.), Subaltern Studies, vol. 12 (Delhi, 2005), which is thematically focused on Muslims, Dalits, and History.
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World history, understood as transcultural history in temporal depth in the horizon of the known world, is beset by several paradoxes. First, it is an ancient mode of historical writing practised in several of the great traditions, and yet, from the vantage point of the early twenty-first century, one of the youngest and most innovative fields of historiography. National history—its main rival in contemporary debates—seems to be on the wane, enveloped by pre- and post-national visions of historiography. Second, world history encompasses some of the best and some of the worst of historical writing. Its spectrum of variety ranges from the works of master historians such as Ibn Khaldun and Edward Gibbon, Fernand Braudel and William H. McNeill, to shallow compilations for popular consumption. Third, it is a highly theoretical enterprise requiring reflections on, and decisions about, totality and individuality, timescales and spatial orders, similarity and difference, determination and contingency. At the same time, it has been struggling for simplicity, for easy access to its readers, and for tidy storylines. It thus faces the potential dilemma of being caught between an excess of methodological and philosophical sophistication, and a condition marked by triviality, naivety, and lack of intellectual restraint.

World history has difficulty in finding its focus and in demarcating its boundaries. Its open edges shade into the philosophy of history, macrosociology, and various general diagnoses of the human condition. Whenever and wherever a distinction has been drawn between amateurs and professionals, world history has been seen as a playground for dilettantes. The higher the standards set for source-based research, the greater the discipline’s difficulty in conforming to them. The early nineteenth century’s research imperative inevitably resulted in a delegitimation and deprofessionalization of world history—a tendency that only began to be reversed in the late twentieth century. This leads to a fourth and final paradox: when meant as more than a collection of anecdotes from the past, world

1 Work on this chapter was generously supported by the Carl Friedrich von Siemens Foundation (Munich).
history has for a long time claimed to produce insights of particular profundity, but at the same time it has had enormous difficulties describing the methodological position from which such insights might be gained. At least in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, the intellectual authority of world history was never as unchallenged as world historians themselves were apt to believe.

Unlike the research and writing of national history since its beginnings in the eighteenth century, the development of world history has not been cumulative, steady, and incremental. It has gone through phases of boom and neglect, and has been highly dependent on the rhetoric and scholarship of individual protagonists. Until very recently, world historical writing, at least in the public eye, was a string of outstanding solo performances. For sceptics it remained a literary genre preying parasitically on the fruits of patient and inconspicuous scholarship. An organized field of growing knowledge built by a community of scholars, themselves training cohorts of younger researchers and supported by academic institutions and publishing media, has been slow to emerge. World history has thus rarely occupied centre-stage in the organized historical profession. In most countries its position in school curricula has remained marginal, and much of its most durable and influential literature has originated outside the university. World history used to be an occupation for mavericks, gentleman scholars, and littérateurs. A major exception was the official support given to world history in socialist countries that enshrined Marxist historical materialism as a binding guideline. In the Soviet Union and the German Democratic Republic, the academies of science had departments of world history, which was considered of extraordinary political usefulness. This remains the case with the People's Republic of China today.

LEGACIES OF THE PAST

Modern world history differs from older universal-historical constructions in that it presupposes an empirical idea of geography and of both the unity and plurality of humanity’s historical experience. Such a vision of the world could only be formed in Europe, and not earlier than the eighteenth century. European voyages during the ‘second age of discovery’ revealed, according to Edmund Burke, the ‘great map of mankind’. Manuscripts in non-European languages were collected, studied, and translated. For the first time ever, it became possible to establish basic chronologies for several Asian civilizations. Starting in the early 1800s, European archaeologists began to retrieve traces of ancient civilizations. The decipherment of cuneiform writing and hieroglyphics opened access to the

Riches of ancient Mesopotamia and Egypt. The English *Universal History* (23 vols., 1736–45) soon expanded into an even larger German edition,\(^4\) represents the first major document of this new empirical approach, and is the ancestor of countless multi-volume compilations of regional and national histories. The period from about 1770 to 1830 was the first golden age of world history. William Robertson wrote on the history of America, and Edward Gibbon, basing himself on the great Joseph de Guignes,\(^5\) covered Eurasia from the second century AD to the Mongol world empire and the Turkish conquest of Constantinople. Jesuit knowledge of China and its history was synthesized in several works that depended very much on Chinese historiography. Travellers brought glimpses into the Japanese past home to Europe, and the histories of Persia and India, especially under Muslim rulers, were reconstructed from documents. At the University of Göttingen, August Ludwig Schlözer and Johann Christoph Gatterer sketched the outlines of an empirical history of the world, and discussed some of the methodological problems connected with that project.\(^6\) Johann Gottfried Herder used the same materials for a broad panorama of individual cultures across the world, embedded in an elaborate anthropology.\(^7\) And G. W. F. Hegel, in his *Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Weltgeschichte* [Lectures on the Philosophy of World History](posthumously, 1837), drew on a thorough knowledge of the evidence available at the time—although he used it to support an argument about political progress and spiritual enhancement, leaving no agency or creativity to peoples outside the Occident.\(^8\)

Present-day world historians look back in different ways at this period when a number of the fundamental choices facing world history were being contemplated. Some of these historians doubt the enduring relevance of Enlightenment origins for contemporary world history. Others look for a genealogy validating their own efforts. Such a genealogy is usually based on strong value judgements. The cosmopolitan outlook and anti-racist stance that culminated in the Göttingen school, and perhaps even more so in the last survivor of the German Enlightenment, Alexander von Humboldt, is held up as a model for the present day, whereas the Eurocentric closure beginning with Hegel, and in Hegel’s day, James Mill, the author of the influential *History of British India* (3 vols.,

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6 August Ludwig Schlözer, *Vorstellung einer Universalhistorie*, 2 vols. (Göttingen, 1772–3); and Johann Christoph Gatterer, *Versuch einer allgemeinen Weltgeschichte bis zur Entdeckung Amerikens* (Göttingen, 1792).
1817)—another source of objectionable quotations—meets with vehement disapproval. From the 1820s until at least the end of the century, European historiography was indeed characterized by cultural, political, and often racial hierarchization, and the mental exclusion of the various Asian great traditions, not to speak of those peoples that came to be labelled ‘primitive’. Once the doctrine took hold that the inhabitants of the non-occidental world were ‘peoples without history’, there was no need to incorporate them into narratives of material and spiritual progress.

A few features, however, lighten up this gloomy picture of the nineteenth century. A limited interest in histories of peoples outside Europe was retained in historical geography (in the work of Carl Ritter and others) and in the German historical school of economics. This was also the age of a rising philological scholarship that, although often coloured by ‘orientalist’ arrogance, still unlocked the treasures of many literate traditions from Mesoamerica to Malaya, making them available as sources for historical comment. Early ethnology was dominated by evolutionist approaches that assumed a sequence of universally valid stages of social organization.9 Both in this form and in Franz Boas’s alternative concept of the specificity and incommensurability of discreet ethnic communities, it preserved, through an age of racism, the Enlightenment idea of a basic unity of mankind. Finally, Marxism, in spite of its strong modernist bias and lack of sympathy for anything preceding bourgeois society in Europe and elsewhere, provided novel tools for an analysis of ‘modes of production’ and social dynamics in different cultural contexts. Bulky ‘world histories’ were mainly published in the German-speaking lands, where the term simply changed its meaning from a conjectural (Isaak Iselin) or empirical (August Ludwig von Schlözer) history of the human species to a moralizing and didactic discourse for an emerging civil society. This was the case, for instance, with Friedrich Christoph Schlosser’s immensely successful Weltgeschichte für das deutsche Volk [World History for the German People] (final edition, with Georg Ludwig Kriegk, 19 vols., 1844–57).10 These works, which include Leopold von Ranke’s swansong, Weltgeschichte (9 vols., 1881–8) and, at the end of this particular tradition, Hans Delbrück’s Weltgeschichte (5 vols., 1923–8), were histories of civilization and state-building in Europe, usually with some introductory remarks on Babylon and Egypt, and with occasional side glances at the Byzantine Empire and its Ottoman successors. They were never meant to include every continent, and should not be judged by an abstract ideal of what world history ought to be.11

11 Hartmut Bergenthum, Weltgeschichten im Zeitalter der Weltpolitik: Zur populären Geschichtsschreibung im wilhelminischen Deutschland (Munich, 2004).
By the turn of the century—at the zenith of Europe’s imperial and colonial supremacy—an upswing of economic and migratory globalization and a proliferating rhetoric of ‘world power’ and ‘world politics’ had contributed to a new awareness of global interaction. The artefacts collected by ethnologists and exhibited in museums or *expositions universelles*, and the rise of new disciplines like *Religionswissenschaft* (comparative religion), vastly augmented the available knowledge about civilizations on every continent. However, new perceptions and additional information were slow to translate into new historiographical sensibilities. Multi-volume publishing projects, above all in Germany, assembled the expertise of regional specialists, but only the one edited by an academic outsider, the geographer Hans Ferdinand Helmolt, offered a minimum of conceptual originality.12 A small number of imaginative historians saw the need to think about new ways of doing world history: for example Karl Lamprecht, who laid the foundations for an Institute for Cultural and World History at the University of Leipzig, and Kurt Breysig, the most theoretically minded among German historians of the early twentieth century.13 Neither Breysig nor Lamprecht attempted to write a broadly synthetic work of transcultural history. Such a work was Eduard Meyer’s *Geschichte des Altertums* [History of Antiquity] (5 vols., 1884–9, much revised in later editions)—a comprehensive (though unfinished) history of Near Eastern and Mediterranean antiquity, unrivalled in any language. Meyer combined a theoretical mindset with extraordinary linguistic skills and a supreme mastery of the sources. His work, the creation not of an outsider but of one of the great academic mandarins at the University of Berlin, demonstrated for the first time that a history, if not of the entire world then at least of a vast multicultural space, could be written without sacrificing the most demanding professional standards.

No counterpart to Meyer emerged in any other European country. The most important collaborative project of the early twentieth century was organized by the French philosopher Henri Berr, again an outsider in academia. Around 1900, Berr, who kept his own evolutionist philosophy of history unobtrusively in the background, began to advocate his ideal of a new ‘historical synthesis’, and in conjunction with this he created several publishing platforms for bringing together historians and scholars of neighbouring disciplines. Between 1920 and Berr’s death in 1954, fifty-two volumes of his series *L’évolution de l’humanité* appeared. They were of varying quality and did not always follow the original


A final legacy of the *fin de siècle* was the massive work of Max Weber. It did not achieve worldwide fame before the 1960s. Weber had no patience with the idea of world history. He sharply distanced himself from any kind of evolutionism or holism, and from the belief in ‘laws of history’ common among his contemporaries, including Karl Lamprecht and Max’s own brother Alfred Weber. And yet he formulated his categories and ideal types, such as ‘charisma’, ‘patrimonialism’, and ‘the city’, in view of their universal applicability; and he took his examples and illustrations from all over the world. Weber’s voluminous studies of belief systems and social structures in various major civilizations, collected in *Gesammelte Aufsätze zur Religionssoziologie* [Collected Essays on the Sociology of Religion] (3 vols., 1920–1), have been among the most influential examples of comparative sociology ever written.\footnote{From among the vast literature on Weber see, in particular, Stephen Kalberg, *Max Weber’s Comparative-Historical Sociology* (Cambridge, 1994); Wolfgang J. Mommsen, *Max Weber: Gesellschaft, Politik und Geschichte* (Frankfurt, 1974); and Joachim Radkau, *Max Weber: A Biography*, trans. Patrick Camiller (Cambridge, 2008), orig. pub as *Max Weber: Die Leidenschaft des Denkens* (Munich, 2005).} They and even more so the analyses in his fragmentary treasure trove, *Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft* [Economy and Society] (1921–2), continue to impress world historians, even if he never proposed a detailed narrative of world history that went beyond his general concept of the rationalization of the world.

As was the case with Weber in his time, the authors identified with world history in the aftermath of the First World War were solitary figures. Oswald Spengler’s best-selling *Der Untergang des Abendlandes* [The Decline of the West] (2 vols., 1918–22), carrying the word ‘Weltgeschichte’ in its subtitle, was a vastly extended contemplation of the fate of (some) civilizations. Hovering idiosyncratically between the narrative confidence of an earlier epic age, perhaps Rankean in nature, and the urge to coin a very peculiar terminology, the work attracted its audience mainly through a conservative and pessimistic message. Spengler cultivated the posture of a visionary amateur and treated professional historians with (heartily reciprocated) disdain. Although, in his *Outline of History* (1920), H. G. Wells offered an expression of a progressist outlook entirely different from that of the brooding Spengler, he also addressed the general public—in his case the schoolboy and common man, rather than the *Bildungsbürger* and the cultivated philistine. Though Wells relied more on the *Encyclopaedia Britannica* than on specialized scholarship,\footnote{Paul Costello, *World Historians and Their Goals: Twentieth-Century Answers to Modernism* (DeKalb, Ill., 1993), 36–45.} one of the greatest of professional historians,
Marc Bloch, treated him with a surprising amount of respect while taking issue with the novelist’s penchant for hasty and ill-considered judgements. But all this being said, the influence of both Spengler and Wells on more contemporary world historical writing has turned out to be negligible.

The most famous world historian of his time was Arnold J. Toynbee, a professor of history with a background in ancient and modern Greek studies who spent much of his life in the comfortable combination of research director at the Royal Institute of International Affairs and independent gentleman scholar. In 1947 he turned down an offer to become Regius Professor of History at Cambridge—the most prestigious historical position in the United Kingdom. His twelve-volume *A Study of History* (1934–61) is a work of more than 5,500 pages, with volumes one to six, published in 1934 and 1939, generally believed to comprise its best part. Though it has attracted vehement criticism on empirical grounds (this was especially the case from 1947 onwards, when, at the same time, Toynbee’s fame began to surpass that of any previous historian), its standing as a feat of industry and sustained reasoning has rarely been doubted. Eventually, a skilful abridgement to a little over 900 pages put the work within the range of the average educated reader. A few basic themes could now enter the public mind, such as Toynbee’s ‘challenge and response’ model—one of several guaranteeing the coherence of his huge venture. Nevertheless, despite its impressive nature, Toynbee’s achievement appears to have had little lasting influence. It is still acclaimed as the first truly non-Eurocentric construction of world history, but few world (and other) historians today study Toynbee and consider themselves in his debt. Toynbee can hardly be read for pleasure (as Gibbon still can be), while his categories and propositions have failed to convince many, and his message that mankind needs a new spirituality—a message propagated in his later volumes—has stood at some remove from a secular age. Toynbee’s concept of ‘civilization’ is less refined than the same concept as developed by historical sociologists such as S. N. Eisenstadt. Since he was not interested in connections between individual civilizations, he cannot really qualify as a patron saint of current global history. At the time of his death in 1975 he was more a symbol of infinite intellectual aspiration: something like the historical profession’s response to Einstein, rather than an active inspiration.

By the end of the Second World War, the international situation had changed fundamentally. To a new generation of professional historians, the extant historiographical tradition seemed to offer no trustworthy guidance. Among a vast number of intellectual responses to the post-war age, world history was not at first a privileged one, remaining at the margins of historians’ concerns from 1945 into the 1980s. Decisive intellectual advances over Toynbee’s work in the 1930s and that of some of his broader-minded contemporaries were very rare. The victory of the democracies over their German and Japanese enemies seemed to confirm the superiority of ‘Western’ societies and their value systems—an impression in turn encouraging neo-Hegelian interpretations of world history, seen as having been fulfilled in the North Atlantic West. The Soviet Union’s military successes and the communist revolution in China supported a different reading of ‘world historical’ tendencies. It was thus no surprise that teleological narratives of progress flourished among both Cold War antagonists. The ten volumes of the *Vsemirnaia Istoriia* [World History] (1955–65), authored by an elite of Soviet historians under the general editorship of the Japonologist Evgenii M. Zhukov, were held together by the dogma that all nations—and the nation or nation-state remained the basic unit in this work—would sooner or later run through a fixed sequence of stages ending in socialism and communism. But this simplistic idea did not prevent complex analyses of the coexistence and transformation of ‘societal formations’. Hence the underlying approach within this historical schema was not totally deterministic, Soviet historians having decided to give revolutionary class struggle preference over the development of ‘productive forces’ as the main mover of progress. Still, categorization of nations in terms of a higher or lower maturity remained at the heart of official Soviet world history.20

In a sense, the modernization theory reaching its peak of influence in American social science during the early 1960s was a mirror image of the Soviet theory. It too was a story of the ‘rise of the West’, this time not with the socialist bloc but with the United States as the model of perfection—a realized utopia of liberty and enterprise.21 In its scholarship and analytical refinement, William H. McNeill’s *The Rise of the West* (1963), by far the most influential English-language text on world history during the three subsequent decades, surpasses

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anything produced by the modernization school in American sociology. But the book does share the general spirit of the period around 1960, presenting a kind of moderate occident-centrism that has retreated a few steps from Toynbee’s Olympian relativism: an influence both acknowledged and partly repudiated by the University of Chicago historian. McNeill’s virtues were twofold: he was the first major historian to root world history firmly in the most advanced research on the various regions of the world, and who recast it as just one perspective on the past among many others—and not a superior perspective. In this manner, McNeill downsized world history from metahistory and prophecy to a research programme. At the same time, he proved a master of proportion, finding elegant balances between the innumerable time–space patterns and historical factors that needed to be handled in a synthesis of universal scope. In the end, his book’s main innovation is, perhaps, its demonstration that world history can be written without mystification, clumsiness, or triviality. In many subsequent works, McNeill developed his views in close touch with changing themes and concerns, and he eventually turned a critical eye on his own early masterpiece.22

While teleologies offering meaning for the present and confidence for the future were in great demand, some historians had begun to understand that triumphalist accounts culminating in the modern West were no longer sustainable. The English medievalist Geoffrey Barraclough, who in 1956 succeeded Toynbee as Stevenson research professor at the Royal Institute of International Affairs, was foremost among these historians. He suggested a wide-ranging interpretation of the twentieth century in An Introduction to Contemporary History (1966) that has not been entirely superseded by Eric Hobsbawm’s more detailed and better-known Age of Extremes (1995), edited the best world-historical atlas published up to then, The Times Atlas of World History (1978), and wrote a survey for UNESCO on Main Trends in History (1978) that covered all major areas of the world. Barraclough and others doubted whether continuing to write history Spenglerian style, as an account of ‘major’ civilizations, could any longer be justified: a question to be repeated by the anthropologist Eric R. Wolf in his empirically flawed but seminal Europe and the People without History (1982).

Despite McNeill’s prominence and influence, it would be inaccurate to claim that the locus of world history writing had definitively moved in a Hegelian way to the Western hemisphere. Historians in the new nation-states created by decolonization were mostly preoccupied with establishing an academic infrastructure and providing students and the reading public at home with versions of their own national pasts before and during colonialism. But reflections on global hierarchies and on the colonial experience of dehistoricization were never far

from their minds. The great Jawaharlal Nehru had set a precedent by spending his time in prison reading H. G. Wells and pondering lessons of the past.\textsuperscript{23} At the same time, multi-volume compilations of chapters on every part of the world were being produced in Europe (rather than the United States)—one example among several being the German Propyläen Weltgeschichte [Propyläen World History] edited by Golo Mann (11 vols., 1960–5), which combined a high standard of scholarship with a low level of thematic integration.\textsuperscript{24} Several journals were now specializing in world history—above all, the Cahiers de l’histoire mondiale [Journal of World History] (1953–72), a forum of exchange for historians from virtually all over the world that served as a testing ground for the History of Mankind (6 vols., 1963–9) published under the auspices of UNESCO. This work reveals some of the weaknesses of history-writing by committee. It gives surprisingly much weight to Europe, especially in its ancient and medieval volumes. The volume on the twentieth century, however, written by Caroline F. Ware from the United States, K. M. Panikkar from India, and Jan Romein from the Netherlands, implemented a highly innovative approach and structure, relegating conventional political and military history to an inferior position. A few years earlier, Romein had published a substantial book on the rise of Asia in the first half of the twentieth century entitled De eeuw van Azië [The Asian Century] (1956), an almost visionary account at a time when decolonization was far from completed.

France had a long tradition of histories of civilization, beginning with Voltaire and Condorcet. With its competence in sinology and Arabic studies, the country was in a strong position to contribute to world history of a new type. A few authors reached a large audience: for example, René Grousset, a learned and industrious semi-popularizing historian and member of the Académie Française who focused on Eurasia in its entirety. The considerable French expertise in non-European civilizations was effectively deployed in several handbooks within the Clio (1934–52) and Nouvelle Clio series (1963–). Yet the most innovative branch of French historical scholarship, the group centred around the famous journal Annales d’histoire économique et sociale, showed little genuine interest in world history. Marc Bloch’s plea of 1928 for large-scale comparisons within Europe was not read as a call to transgress the Occident’s boundaries, despite Bloch’s own brief remarks comparing European and Japanese feudalism. The great exception to the rule was Fernand Braudel, whose Grammaire des civilisations [Grammar of Civilizations] (1963) offered a first inkling of his global interests.


\textsuperscript{24} An earlier work by the same title had been edited by Lamprecht’s successor, Walter Goetz: Propyläen-Weltgeschichte: Der Werdegang der Menschheit in Gesellschaft und Staat, Wirtschaft und Geistesleben, 10 vols. (Berlin, 1929–33).
This work was followed by the more original *Civilisation matérielle et capitalisme* (1967), and then by a full development of the approach outlined in that earlier book in his trilogy, *Civilisation matérielle, économie et capitalisme* [*Civilization and Capitalism*] (1979). The trilogy’s worldwide influence was assured through Braudel’s dialogue and cooperative relationship with the sociologist Immanuel Wallerstein, whose world-system theory replaced modernization theory as one of the leading paradigms in American social science. But Braudel goes beyond the considerable theoretical sophistication of his American disciple, his spatial and temporal models allowing him to create a history of a global early modern epoch (*c.*1400–*c.*1700) that combined coherence with theoretical stringency and a narrativity typical of the Annales School. Writing at the threshold of a new boom in world and global history, Braudel offered a masterful historical view of ‘early modernism’ that rivalled McNeill’s in astuteness—without, however, making a similar impact on Anglophone historiographical culture. Together with the Swiss economic historian Paul Bairoch, he is the most seminal figure in twentieth-century Francophone world history.

During the three or four decades after 1945, that form of history continued to be practised mainly within national contexts. The growing ecumenical orientation of many historians had not yet erased traces of national traditions. German contributions, other than Marxism in the German Democratic Republic, shunted aside economic history, so dear to Braudel, instead emphasizing the unity of humankind in a rather idealistic way. The old German preoccupation with consciousness and ideas (including religious ideas) was now transformed into an ‘historical anthropology’ that investigated manifestations of basic human desires and life forms across as many civilizations as possible (since 1950, this was especially apparent in the journal *Saeculum: Jahrbuch für Universalgeschichte*). In Britain a small number of solitary scholars insisted on the need to widen history’s horizon. Barraclough was one of the first prominent historians with a background in the occidental tradition to acknowledge and welcome the enormous quantity and innovative power of recent research on the history of what was then called the Third World. By 1978, several fields had been created virtually from scratch. African history, Caribbean history, and Southeast Asian history, until then domains explored by a few outsiders, had become well-established research fields. These were mainly located in the United States, where ‘area studies’ had injected resources into regional histories, but also in Britain, France, the Netherlands, and several countries outside Europe. The results of this research formed the basis for a new kind of empirically grounded world history. By 1975, achievements emerging from a few decades of international historiographical

effort had made it possible to launch the *Cambridge History of Africa*—the first of many multi-volume series on non-European areas of the world, together representing the most important publishing venture to date in the effort to promote a pluralistic view of global history. At this research juncture, the ever-attentive Barraclough warned against any world-historical illusions of detached omni-science: ‘There is, after all, no reason to assume that the view of world history from the Tarim basin and the view of world history from the Thames valley will ever be broadly identical.’

While Barraclough kept a distance from the speculative constructions of universal history, he recommended comparative history in Weber’s tradition as an honest and practicable way to move beyond Eurocentric or other ‘centrist’ approaches. Comparison was indeed perhaps the most important American contribution to post-war world history before the 1980s. It was epitomized in the journal *Comparative Studies in Society and History*, launched in 1958, and achieved prominence through tightly argued studies, mainly written by historical sociologists such as Barrington Moore, Theda Skocpol, and Charles Tilly. Of course, this raised the issue of disciplinary identities: why get historians to take world history seriously when comparative sociologists appeared to be just as good at ‘macro’ history? But the retreat of American sociology during the 1990s away from comparison and causal explanation, empirical history, and Weberian grandeur, opened up a space that the new global history was quick to capture. In any case, the reputation of both universal history and the philosophy—as opposed to the methodology—of history has generally been higher in Europe than in the United States, where it has not been regarded as an intellectual enterprise of the first order. Francis Fukuyama’s *The End of History and the Last Man* (1992) did not change this assessment. The best works of ‘philosophical history’ have been written by European authors—none of them an historian by training and vocation: Karl Jaspers, Ernest Gellner, and Jean Baechler. Only ‘big bang’ history, with its proximity to the natural sciences (especially cosmology), qualifies as an American contribution to speculations about the past that defy the ordinary historian’s sense of professional responsibility.

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The picture furnished by simply opposing world history and national history would be distorted. Below the level of the nation-state, histories of sub-national regions, landscapes, cities, towns, and rural communities have flourished in many countries. Between the nation-state and the world, numerous layers of spatial structuring have attracted the attention of historians. Apart from the highly theoretical construction of the Wallersteinian world-system, three such strata deserve to be mentioned. First, we have the history of international relations, which ever since Arnold Hermann Ludwig Heeren has been more than a mere account of foreign-policy decisions and events. Heeren, and after him Ranke, founded a tradition based on examining Europe as a state-system with overseas extensions. After the Second World War, diplomatic history, following the ‘realist’ paradigm of ‘great powers’ driven by particular reasons of state and the logic of state interests, yielded a few masterpieces such as A. J. P. Taylor’s *Struggle for Mastery in Europe* (1954), without ever entering the historiographical avant-garde. More than forty years later, Paul Kennedy returned to the same themes as Taylor, but now on a broader canvas (including the United States and Japan) and over a longer period, with the addition of economic and military dynamics to the overall picture, and effectively using a Gibbonian language of cyclical boom and bust. Kennedy’s *The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers* (1988) made international history palatable to critics of diplomatic history and to a wider reading public. Already since the 1920s, the French school of international history, founded by Pierre Renouvin and continued by his pupil Jean-Baptiste Duroselle and others, had enriched the complexity of international analysis far beyond the dogmas of realism, paying attention to geopolitical and demographic factors, financial flows, norms, values, mentalities, and public opinion. From the mid-1960s onwards, scholars such as Akira Iriye in the United States and Christopher Thorne in Britain would pioneer the multilateral study of power and culture. Then, in the mid-1990s, Paul W. Schroeder discovered the European state system’s normative and peace-preserving undercurrents in his influential *Transformation of European Politics, 1763–1848* (1994). Interestingly, while international history found it difficult to respond to the challenge of social history, it was more successful in appropriating stimuli emanating from the new cultural history emerging in this period. The culture of the Cold War became a particularly fruitful research area, one of its most salient conclusions being that the nuclear

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confrontation between two highly militarized and ideologically antagonistic blocs strongly stamped the sense of reality of a broad range of societies affected by the confrontation to a greater and lesser degree. Correspondingly, opening up a new phase of research after the Soviet Union’s collapse, Odd Arne Westad portrayed the Cold War as a conflict played out in many different arenas all over the world in *The Global Cold War* (2005). In this way, international history caught up with developments in the new global history that was then reaching maturation.

A second historiographical stratum involves the history of empires. At times, this has taken the form of a history of colonialism and colonies and, by extension, of the postcolonial nations. At the same time, comprehensive accounts of the larger modern empires have been compiled, including the five-volume *Oxford History of the British Empire* (1998–9), under the editorship of William Roger Louis, and with contributions by historians from every continent. Imperial history is a field with high theoretical standards and where an inter-imperial comparative methodology has been used to great effect: for example, in John H. Elliott’s *Empires of the Atlantic World: Britain and Spain in America, 1492–1830* (2006). Working out from studies of the British Empire, it has not been difficult to extend imperial history into global history, as suggested and exemplified by C. A. Bayly and A. G. Hopkins. 35 Among the other empires, the Tsarist empire with its considerable ethnic diversity has become a focal point for particularly innovative research. A new early twenty-first-century development has been an amalgamation of scholarship on maritime and continental empires. 36 In this manner, imperial history has turned out a useful link between the national and global perspectives.

The third stratum is occupied by the history of large regions and entire continents. Perspectives and conceptual tools used for writing integrated histories of multicultural, politically heterogeneous, and ecologically diversified regions are more similar to those of world history than to the common frameworks of national history. They usually lack a political centre, have to deal with plural identities, ‘hybridity’, shifting cultural boundaries, long-distance trade, and so on. Braudel’s work on the Mediterranean already referred to earlier, established a model for regional panoramas of this kind. An ambitious project on Asia was K. N. Chaudhuri’s *Asia before Europe: Economy and Civilization of the Indian Ocean from the Rise of Islam to 1750* (1990). Chaudhuri started his career as an historian of the East India Company, gradually extending his reach, first to the Indian Ocean as an area of trade and dominion, and then to a history of all the major adjacent civilizations. His idea of integrating continental and maritime Asia into

one vast framework has proved difficult to follow. But the history of the Indian Ocean as an area of multilayered interaction has stimulated a lot of imaginative research. Historical commonalities in Eurasia, especially in pre-modern times, make it possible to surmount the orientalist divide between East and West. Central Asia gains in importance as a source for the medieval unification of large parts of the continent through the Mongol Empire, and also as a region of Chinese, Russian, and British empire-building in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. It also emerges as a framework for cross-cultural comparison. Jack Goldstone, an historical sociologist, was the first to explore this approach’s potential in *Revolution and Rebellion in the Early Modern World* (1991). A Eurasian perspective on the history of the Old World had already been suggested by several eighteenth-century European writers; it had some relevance for nineteenth-century debates on Russia’s position between Western Europe and China, and it became popular with geopolitical strategists before 1914. The new ‘Eurasianism’ is free from such ideological baggage and mainly takes its cue from the recent rise of China.

The concept of ‘Atlantic history’ achieved some prominence during the Cold War when it tended to be a history of liberty in opposition to communist dictatorship. But reminders that no comprehensive history of the Atlantic can ignore slavery, and the slave trade spoiled this simplified picture. A ‘black Atlantic’ characterized both by coercion and cultural creativity was suggested as a counter-model to the ‘white’ or even Anglo-Saxon Atlantic. Three guiding concepts for an Atlantic history have proved viable: first, the concept of a common origin of modernity, spanning both sides of the Atlantic, in an age of revolution between the 1760s and the 1820s—a concept first suggested by the French historian Jacques Godechot and the US historian R. R. Palmer; second, the concept of colonial identities in the Atlantic world; and third, a broad concept of migrations including the coerced transportation of slaves to both South and North America, and the mass exodus of Europeans to the Western Hemisphere, starting in the mid-nineteenth century, that is itself just one of several migratory systems operating simultaneously in several parts of the world.38

Serious world history rarely covers the entire planet. Many of the most fruitful hypotheses have been developed and tested in the study of supranational regions, and much of the best research originated from the study of international systems, empires, or large spaces. Networks and communities of scholars have more easily formed around such extensive but delimited entities than on the level

of an abstract history of the world in its totality. Some of the most dynamic fields of historical scholarship since 1945 have followed such a ‘transnational’ agenda. Perhaps the most impressive of them is the history of slavery and the slave trade. In addition to the core topic of the Atlantic ‘plantation complex’, with its repercussions in the history of European consumption of colonial products, it includes the ‘production’ of slaves in Africa, the oriental slave trade in East Africa and the Indian Ocean—a trade independent of that in the Atlantic but comparable in its effects—and both the various paths towards emancipation and the trajectories of post-emancipation societies.39

THE NEW GLOBAL HISTORY
AT THE TURN OF THE MILLENNIUM

The rise of world history and global history in the 1980s was a new phenomenon; it would begin to unfold spectacularly starting around 1990.40 Professional associations were formed, journals were created such as the Journal of World History (1990–) and the Journal of Global History (2006–), and Internet platforms were established. World history topics found their way onto the agendas of national and international historical congresses. Graduate training was established at a growing number of universities. Teaching requirements created a new demand for printed and electronic materials. Experts on particular non-Western regions of the world discovered that the new label ‘global history’ added to the respectability of their own work and helped move them towards the centre of the profession. For the first time ever, world history crystallized as a movement aimed at procuring a place as one of the dominant historiographical paradigms. Broadening the attitude pioneered by William H. McNeill, the intuitions of earlier world historians were transformed into research programmes. Conventional topics were reframed in a global perspective. A new type of book appeared on the market and began to displace the large synthesis as the representative embodiment of global history: the ‘lateral’ analysis of a problem, cross-cutting established political and cultural boundaries and based on primary sources in several languages.

This revival, extension, and professionalization of world history was a development mainly taking place in the United States. Even international networks usually had their centre of gravity there. By 2010, a few other countries were catching up. The largest communities of world historians outside the United States appear to be located in Japan and China. In Europe there has rarely been anything like the ‘Western civilization’ courses typical of American colleges and

40 For institutional developments, especially in the United States, see Patrick Manning, Navigating World History: Historians Create a Global Past (New York, 2003), 79–85.
universities, and world history thus has to struggle much harder for acceptance into curricula and syllabi. Everywhere in Europe, universities have remained reluctant to create professorships in this domain, with a few exceptions confirming the rule. World history’s American centre of gravity has been reflected in English being the unchallenged idiom of publication and communication between scholars—a growing communicative uniformity accompanied, nevertheless, by increasing thematic diversity.

It is too early to suggest definitive explanations for world history’s resurgence at the turn of the millennium. To define it as a new paradigm assuming the place of the cultural history that was internationally dominant in the 1980s would give too coarse a picture. Global history was not simply a macrobacklash against the microconcerns of cultural history. Global historians were careful to incorporate the perspectives and findings of cultural history. The catchphrase ‘glocalization’ suggests a superficial rapprochement, but cannot serve as a substitute for a methodological discussion about levels of analysis. The upsurge of world history responded to an experience of ‘globalization’ that had become overpowering by the 1990s. After the end of the Cold War, international harmony seemed to be closer than ever before. At the same time, intercultural conflict and worldwide material inequality appeared to be increasing rather than diminishing. Other problems, mainly ecological ones, were of a truly planetary nature, demanding solutions transcending the cleavages between nation-states and civilizations. The past century’s closing years also saw a revolution in academic communication, with the Internet accelerating the circulation of information and ideas, thus both facilitating the growth of international scholarly networks and improving access to sources and literature. Likewise, the life-world of students was more and more shaped by experiences of globality. A conventional concentration on national history, important as it remained for many reasons, came to contradict both cultural sensibilities and the demands of the academic labour market.

In 2011, many theoretical issues pertaining to globality and history remain unresolved. Debates tend to centre around the difference between ‘world’ and ‘global’ history, with discussions continuing between adherents of one or the other label regarding temporal coverage and topical preferences. Many historians favour the less demanding term ‘transnational’ history, but this is a term even more difficult to define than ‘global history’ since it remains unsupported by theoretical help from the social sciences. In such a fluid situation the historian of historiography can merely point to a few features seen by the movement’s protagonists as embodying its peculiar strengths.41

In the first place, looking back on the tendency of cultural history to privilege the small, the local, and the marginal, global historians have rediscovered some of the major problems of an historiography that uses the past to throw light on the

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41 For a wide-ranging survey of the basic issues, see Eric Vanhoute, Wereldgeschiedenis: Een inleiding (Gent, 2008).
present. None of these problems has been more prominent than the question of a ‘Western special path’ in history and the reasons for the West’s comparative material success.42

Second, the question of the ‘European miracle’ overlaps, but is not identical with, the history of economic globalization. The time frame of the latter is usually shorter, beginning after the middle of the nineteenth century, and the guiding question is that of long-term tendencies of integration and disintegration in the international economy. Global historians usually take a broader view of ‘globalization’. To the economic dimension they add the study of political internationalism and of cultural transfers.

Third, a particular strength of global history has been the history of migration. The Atlantic slave trade was a foundational topic for the discipline, with Philip D. Curtin’s brilliant *The Atlantic Slave Trade* (1969) as one of its most seminal texts. The novelty of a global approach involves the interlinkage of various migratory systems—the approach taken, for instance, in Dirk Hoerder’s *Cultures in Contact: World Migration in the Second Millennium* (2002).

Fourth, another classical testing ground for global history has been medical and environmental history. Here, Alfred W. Crosby has been a much-admired pioneer, while William H. McNeill already discovered the topic in the mid-1970s. More recently, J. R. McNeill has greatly added to the topic’s substance.43

In spite of a persistent fragmentation of the field, in the early twenty-first century global historians appear to agree on a number of general attitudes (rather than theoretical propositions). They do not deny the significance of the nation and the nation-state as elements of historical interpretation, but they are unwilling to accept them as ‘natural’ units. They insist on the constructed and variable nature of all spatial framings employed by historians to organize their work. Global historians share a ‘metageographical’ attentiveness.44 They are also strongly opposed to Eurocentrism, although many of them warn against moralizing the issue and taking the project of ‘provincializing’ Europe too far. Only a minority believe that the heavy weight of Eurocentric historiography should be compensated for by a radical reshifting of historical emphasis. The question of how and to what extent a ‘methodological Eurocentrism’ should, and can, be avoided still awaits discussion.45 A further feature of global history is its thinking in terms of relations. On a philosophical level, this is linked to a postmodern

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42 See Ch. 6 by Peer Vries in this volume.
45 For a good discussion of Eurocentrism, see Dominic Sachsenmaier, ‘World History as Ecumenical History?’ *Journal of World History*, 18 (2007), 465–89.
critique of essentialism. Culture and society are seen as constituted through action, practice, and cognitive construction. Therefore, both the ‘laws of history’ popular with earlier world historians and any kind of diffusionism find little favour with present-day global historians. The concept of ‘agency’, nothing entirely new for those familiar with the tradition of Historismus, has assumed an enormous importance, especially in conjunction with the idea of what the Germans term Handlungsspielräume—spaces for manoeuvre or action.\footnote{See Sebastian Conrad and Andreas Eckert, ‘Globalgeschichte, Globalisierung, multiple Modernen: Zur Geschichtsschreibung der modernen Welt’, in Sebastian Conrad, Andreas Eckert, and Ulrike Freitag (eds.), Globalgeschichte: Theorien, Ansätze, Themen (Frankfurt/New York, 2007), 7–49, at 32–3.}

Unlike other tendencies in contemporary historiography, world and global history are projects whose basic viability, and ability to meet technical and professional standards, face fundamental objections. But whatever world history’s future, it has already succeeded in creating a ‘transnational’ space for the encounter of historians from the most variegated backgrounds. As a result of this normalization process, one no longer has to be a solitary genius to attach the label of world history to one’s own work.

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Chapter 6
Global Economic History: A Survey

Peer Vries

PRELIMINARY COMMENTS

This survey covers the historiography of global economic development since 1945. It focuses on comparisons of, and connections between, the main civilizations on the globe. Eurasia, where between 70 to almost 90 per cent of global population has been living during the last millennium, receives most of the attention. The Americas and Africa—continents whose economies relatively speaking were often more integrated into global networks than those of Eurasia—are not ignored.

It does not present a chronological story but rather a cursory exposition of the main views on global economic development, with emphasis on the early modern and modern eras, indicating the main changes in those views. The focus is on two debates that have dominated the research agenda of scholars in the field. The first one concerns the question of why some countries have become rich whereas so many others have continued to be poor, or to express it in Kenneth Pomeranz’s terms, the question of the Great Divergence. The second debate concerns the history of intercontinental economic connections. It is usually referred to as the debate on (economic) globalization. Although analytically separate, in practice these debates are often interconnected. To a large extent this is also the case in this text. In these debates one invariably comes across certain views on how economies are supposed to develop. These are introduced before we start our actual review.

PERSPECTIVES ON ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT

Until quite recently, two perspectives have almost monopolized thinking about economic development. They functioned as explanatory framework and
theoretical scaffolding for almost all master narratives in global economic history. For the sake of convenience they will be called ‘Smithian’ and ‘Marxian’. They originated in the West, but have been taken up by many people elsewhere. In so-called underdeveloped or developing countries most ‘modernizers’, for example, were also Smithians or Marxians.

The first perspective is called after Adam Smith and covers the views of all those who regard the market mechanism as the necessary and sufficient condition for economic development. This mechanism is supposed to function optimally in what is nowadays called a ‘market economy’, but in more ideological times was known as ‘capitalism’. It is characterized by the juridical protection of private property and private enterprise, the possibility to acquire goods and services on a market, and free and fair competition. For Smithians, capitalism is characterized first and foremost by economic freedom and formal equality of those participating in market exchange. In a capitalist system, individuals can pursue their interests while, if they act rationally, at the same time maximizing societal wealth. Amongst Smithians, internal developments hold pride of place in explaining the Great Divergence. The contribution of the rest of the world to Western primacy is presented as rather marginal. The label ‘Smithian’ is a broad one. The institutionalist approach, that has recently become quite influential, is also here regarded as Smithian, as it refines but never rejects the basic premises of Smith’s thinking.

The second perspective is called ‘Marxian’, because it has been inspired by Karl Marx’s ideas on economic development. This perspective too is not monolithic and static. It has a certain ‘core’, though that justifies using one overarching concept. The Marxian answer to the question of what is distinctive for the economies of the West and of what caused them to grow also is ‘capitalism’. But for Marxians there is more to capitalism than markets and rational individuals making choices. They regard it first and foremost as a mode of production with an unequal distribution of power and the means of production over classes. They are serious about practising political economy, and unwilling to ignore the role of collusion, coercion, and monopoly in capitalist development. They agree that in capitalism, total production will increase, but at the price of growing inequality.

In explaining the emergence of capitalism, classical Marxism too emphasizes internal developments in certain Western societies without, however, entirely ignoring the importance of the rest of the world. Its rather dispersed comments on that importance have been systematized and elaborated upon by proponents of what has become known as ‘dependency theory’ and ‘world-systems analysis’.

Both Smithians and Marxians think of industrialization as a major shift in Western economic history. In the end, however, they see it as ‘just’ an acceleration in a continuing process. For modern Smithians, industrialization is the result of intensified competition ‘provoking’ technological invention. How exactly the transition from feudalism to capitalism and then industrial capitalism
was made continues to divide Marxians. While recognizing that mercantile capitalism is fundamentally different from industrial capitalism, they as a rule claim that the former somehow produced the latter.

In the last decades, ideas about economic growth and development have become much more complex. Developmental economics has entered a phase of confusion. Historians studying economic development in the West have come up with so much new data and so many interpretations that the standard narratives have become highly problematic. In the emerging discipline of ‘global economic history’, traditional beliefs with regard to the economic history of ‘the Rest’ as well as ‘the West’ are put to the test. These recent developments will be addressed. The chapter will conclude with some separate comments on economic globalization.

THE SMITHIAN PARADIGM

The Smithian view of economic development has become part and parcel of ‘neoclassical economics’, which was mainstream in economics for most of the twentieth century. As such, it could not fail to influence the discipline of economic history. For neoclassical economists, explaining the ‘rise of the West’ is quite simple: it coincides with ‘the rise of the market’. Explaining the ‘failure’ of ‘the Rest’ is not complicated either. There, apparently, well-functioning markets did not emerge. From Adam Smith onwards (neo)classical economists spent most of their time specifying and refining their claims without changing their basic message: economic theory proves that nothing can beat the market in generating economic growth, and economic history shows that countries with a market economy were the most successful. Britain was the first, and for quite some time the only, industrial nation, and it was the place where Adam Smith wrote his works and found staunch support. The United States was Britain’s successor as a global economic superpower, and it also emphatically claimed to be a market economy. What better proof could one wish for?

Scholars departing from a Smithian perspective as a rule realized that there were substantial differences between various Western countries and the ways in which they industrialized. They nevertheless tended to write along the lines of a ‘model’ in which in the end developing and industrializing economies could only be market economies. Nobel Prize winner John Hicks proposed a theory of economic history. W. W. Rostow—probably the most influential writer on economic development in the twentieth century—postulated the existence of stages of economic growth. They both did this on largely Smithian premises. Two of the most influential books written on the Great Divergence in the last

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decades—E. L. Jones’s *The European Miracle* (1981) and David Landes’s *The Wealth and Poverty of Nations* (1998)—both claim that what made ‘the West’ rise, and was lacking in ‘the Rest’, was ‘markets’.

Of course, differences of emphasis, often substantial, exist between scholars that have here been lumped together under the label ‘Smithian’. An approach that has become very important for the field of economic history from the 1970s onwards is institutional economics. What differentiates institutionalists from ‘ordinary’ neoclassical economists is that they are keen on determining the institutions: that is, the formal and informal rules of economic life that ensure that markets function as efficiently as possible. Historical research inspired by them tends to focus on the evolution of property rights and the ways in which they are defined and guaranteed. The role of the state in this respect is paramount. So institutionalists have written numerous studies of ‘good governance’ and how that emerges—or more often does not emerge! Douglass North, the most famous institutionalist, has published extensively on the history of Britain—the first major country, he claims, with the ‘right’ institutions. He has also explicitly, with Robert Thomas, tackled the problem of the rise of the Western world. Although they only discuss the situation in parts of Western Europe in the early modern era, they conclude that the explanation of that rise consists in the way in which property rights became defined and protected, in particular in Britain after the Glorious Revolution. This has continued to be a very popular view.

**PRECONDITIONS FOR CAPITALISM**

If capitalism is the solution, then finding out what kind of society gives birth to it becomes the question. What we call ‘the economy’ as a rule is embedded in social relationships. To think of all consumer goods, but especially land, labour, and money, as commodities, or to try and completely separate household from firm, as would be ‘rational’ in a capitalist society, implies a revolutionary break with tradition.

In the neoclassical interpretation of economic development, the rise of the market boils down to ‘simply’ removing all obstacles that ‘prevent’ people from acting as *hominis oeconomici*. That removal is considered both necessary and positive. If actors are rational and can take care of their own business, growth will be normal. The number of possible impediments to the autonomous functioning of an economy, however, is huge. The most important one is what economists call ‘rent-seeking’. The Australian economic historian E. L. Jones (mentioned

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above) proposed to regard the economic history of the world as a struggle between a propensity for growth and one for rent-seeking.\(^5\)

This quest for the specific set of social arrangements in which economic life can become less embedded in social arrangements has resulted in a wide-ranging catalogue of characteristics that are supposed to differentiate the modern, capitalist West from its premodern past, and even more from all non-Western societies that would have continued to be ‘traditional’. Most of the characteristics that one finds in the vast literature can already be found in Max Weber’s work. In briefly summarizing his ideas on the ‘peculiarity of the West’, one can still provide a synthesis of almost all the themes discussed in the bulk of non-Marxian literature published until as late as the 1990s.

For Weber, the Western world had several distinctive characteristics. In the last instance they are all emanations of the fundamental and long process of rationalization or ‘disenchantment’ that he thought characterized Western society. Capitalism as a system in which private entrepreneurs seek profit via peaceful exchange on a market requires a lot of rational acting. Rationality is a broad and not exactly unequivocal concept. But it is obvious that without, for example, methodical and systematic measurement and calculation, one cannot be an efficient, let alone a successful, entrepreneur in a capitalist environment. To turn capitalism into a successful system, such rationalization has to pervade the entire political, social, and cultural life of a society.

The kind of state that evolved in the West and that is supposed to be the ideal counterpart of a capitalist economy is normally described, in Weberian terms, as ‘rational-legal’ and ‘bureaucratic’. It is predictable, bound by its own rules, and trustworthy. There are clear limits to its arbitrariness, but it is very powerful as it can get things done, especially when people look at government as their own.

The emergence of capitalism has also often been connected to certain ‘rational’ characteristics of social life in the West: individualism, a central role for the nuclear family, a tendency to separate household and firm, and certain demographic behaviour such as a marriage pattern in which people marry late and many never marry at all. References to a uniquely high level of social and geographical mobility also have always been very popular, as was pointing at the fact that in Western Europe the bourgeoisie acquired substantial political leverage. With regard to their geographical mobility, it is claimed that Europeans were explorers *par excellence*, which resulted in the acquisition of new markets, new institutions, and new knowledge.

Rationality was also supposed to increasingly dominate Western culture. Here references abounded to the fact that the Western mind would be inquisitive and interested in tinkering with nature and society. This did not mean that the West had always been number one in theoretical knowledge, let alone technology.

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It did, however, so it was claimed, become the place where invention and inventors were supported or at least protected, and where inquiry became autonomous and methodical. So in the end, its science and technology could and would flourish.

Western Europe has been a Christian civilization for many centuries, so it is almost inevitable that scholars would try and connect the Christian faith, or a specific variety of it, to Europe’s particular history. When it comes to economic history, the first ‘connection’ that springs to mind is the one made by Weber between the Protestant ethic and the spirit of capitalism. Linking Catholicism, a much less disenchanted religion, to economic modernity proved more of a challenge. It nevertheless has been tried, by pointing at the fact that in Catholicism God is supposed to have created an orderly world that is subject to laws and that man is allowed to dominate. Much more straightforward connections would be that the organization of its cloisters was an adumbration of later factories: that it had supported and legitimized what is nowadays regarded as modern marriage, or that it had functioned as a provider of trust between Westerners.

Underlying all these characteristics, and therefore in many publications presented as the ultimate cause of European dynamism, is the fact that the sources of social power, to put it in Michael Mann’s terms—to wit, political, ideological, economic, and military power—were never monopolized by one central instance. Most people in Western Europe enjoyed a relatively high level of freedom and protection. On the other hand they were subject to a fairly intense level of competition. This competition also characterized the interstate level. Western Europe never again became (part of) an empire. It continued to be a system of competing states. This, so it is claimed, prevented the region from entering a phase of stasis that is often regarded as the final fate of all empires.

**THE ‘FAILURE OF THE REST’, ACCORDING TO SMITHIANS**

Smithian explanations of the economic predicament of the non-West boil down to the claim that there, impediments to growth had not been removed. Explanations in terms of geography and contingency have not been lacking, but most authors have emphasized that rulers and systems of rule outside the West were, almost without exception, not exactly helpful in generating economic growth. Governments of the big empires in ‘the East’ tend to be described as ‘plunder machines’ or ‘revenue pumps’, their rulers as inefficient, living in luxury, and wasting resources. Their realms are characterized by exploitation, insecure property, and, as a consequence, a tendency of many subjects to hoard. So read the

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general Smithian view. When research showed that a number of emperors in the eighteenth century ruled China very lightly instead of despotically, it read that their empire suffered from ‘under-government’ and ‘lethargic’ rule.

Outside Asia the situation was no better. The rulers of the Maya, Aztecs, or Incas were also depicted as brute exploiters. The press of African rulers was not good either. It is claimed that in precolonial times, Africa, overall, did not really have states. With colonialism, Western state-models were introduced, with fairly unfortunate results, particularly after the colonialists disappeared. The continent in any case never became known for good governance. The completely different developments in North America as compared to South America looked ideally suited to illustrate the importance of having the right institutions. North America inherited its institutions from the British and became rich. Most of South and Central America inherited the wrong institutions from Spain and Portugal, and became poor. Whatever rulers outside the West may have, or have not, done their rule was arbitrary and they could not be held accountable. That was widely regarded as bad for development.

Comments with regard to what was wrong in ‘the Rest’ were not confined to politics. It would be hard to find a description of, for example, China that did not mention overpopulation. Claims that many societies across the globe were better at reproducing than at producing have always abounded in the literature—as a rule with quite unclear references with regard to time and place. Again, the contrasts with the Western world were usually emphasized, such as the tendency to marry (too) young and to have (too) many children. With regard to Africa, one finds comments that it would be too empty, as well as comments that it would be too full. When discussing demography of ‘the Rest’, commentators also liked to refer to the fact that the structure of families ‘there’ was not as conducive to economic growth as the Western ‘individualistic’ nuclear family. Most people across the globe were considered too tightly encapsulated in extended families, clans, lineages, or tribes, to have the possibility—and to feel the need and see the use—of personal initiative. The separation of household and firm, so dear to Smithians and Marxians alike, had not progressed very far, if at all, especially in areas of intensive agriculture that could mean that the household mode of production, quite common in traditional societies, perpetuated a system of self-exploitation, and continued to be a serious obstacle to modern economic growth.

When it comes to culture, again, various quite different factors were and often still are mentioned to explain why regions outside the West did not take off. References to a defective work ethic have always been very popular—next to comments about self-exploitation!—as have comments on the negative role of various religions. Until Confucianism was regarded as one of the underlying causes of the ‘Asian miracle’ in the last decades of the twentieth century, its economic impact had been regarded as negative: it inspired people to adapt to the world instead of changing it. Hinduism and Buddhism were basically regarded as
too ‘other-worldly’, and Islam as a religion that over the centuries developed into a conservative if not fundamentalist force. In many publications, moreover, civilizations in other parts of the world appear as less ‘open’ than Western societies. In East Asia in countries like China, Korea, and Japan, for a long time it was all but impossible for foreigners to get in, or for their own population to get out. Just like the big ‘Islamic’ empires of the Mughals, the Safavids, and the Ottomans, they had no overseas empires. Not only, so it reads, did these countries often close their frontiers: they also closed their minds. This would in particular apply to China and many Islamic regions. Again, these comments were not just ‘Western prejudices’: by and large they were endorsed by ‘non-Western’ modernizers, whether they were liberal, socialist, or nationalist.

THE MARXIAN PARADIGM

The historiography of economic development has never been monolithic. Scholars writing in a Smithian vein stood opposite those who derive inspiration from Marx. Those taking care of Marx’s legacy have always been a contentious lot. But they have enough in common to be regarded as a group. As indicated, the rise of the West in terms of economic primacy for Marxists, too, basically, boils down to the rise of capitalism. In a certain way and to a certain extent, Marx was quite positive about that. He regarded capitalism as a necessary, progressive phase on the way to socialism that had to destroy the fetters of feudalism. The development of capitalism to him basically is the outcome of processes that take place inside certain Western societies to then spread over the globe. That spread occurred so fast that already in his days capitalism had become a global phenomenon that could only be dealt with on a global scale. With regard to the question whether there would be a model of development—a march-route for all countries in the world—Marx and Marxians are ambivalent. Marx did make the claim that underdeveloped countries only have to look at developed ones to see their future; but elsewhere in his work he fiercely denies having a philosophical theory that stands above history.

For Marxians a market economy, and the behaviour it implies, is anything but natural. It arose at a certain moment and a certain place. Most people would rather not be subjected to the permanent and fierce disciplining by the market. Those who became the actual labour force of the capitalist entrepreneurs, simply had to; they had no other option than to sell their labour as they had no or insufficient means of subsistence. There resides the importance of expropriation—a concept that is central in the work of Marx and his followers. This expropriation did not occur without violence. Support of the state was paramount in wielding that violence.

In traditional economies, small owner-producers, who normally work as and in a household, play a predominant role. Capitalism and socialism can only
emerge when that is no longer the case. By far the largest group of those producers are peasants in such economies. That means that, overall, in Marxist analysis and practice, creating a modern society involves getting rid of them and their household mode of production. Barrington Moore, Jr., in his extremely influential *Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy* (1966) elaborated on how this elimination, or its failure, worked out in various societies, and showed that there has been more than one route to modern industrial society, not just the ‘classical’ capitalist one of England. There also exists a fascist road to modern industrial society, exemplified by Germany and Japan, where initially peasants are not eliminated as a group, but even courted, and government is a major driving force of industrialization. Finally there is the communist route, exemplified by Russia and China, still pre-capitalist societies, where peasants in large masses support the revolution against the ancien régime, only to be later on deprived of their property as government attempts to create a collectivized agricultural sector to feed a rapidly increasing urban population.

Marx and his followers are clearly under the spell of the enormous dynamism and power of the capitalist West. When it comes to their perception of the rest of the world, they differ surprisingly little from Smithians. Just like them, and for similar reasons, they think that ‘the Rest’ lacked dynamism. Marx’s original comments are not based on systematic comparative analysis, and constitute only a tiny part of his oeuvre. Most of them are rather imprecise and refer to ‘the Orient’ or ‘Asia’. On various occasions he calls them ‘unchanging’ and ‘unchangeable’, and claims that the key to understanding their stasis is the absence of private property.

Much of what Marx said about Asia in general was simply held to also apply to China. Karl Wittfogel, in his book on oriental despotism, would later elaborate extensively on the Chinese case, in particular its totalitarian ‘hydraulic state’. In China itself that concept never became really popular. The official interpretation of history, as a rule, preferred to describe the situation before the opening by the West as ‘feudalism’, allowing for ‘sprouts of capitalism’. Those, however, could never fully bloom because of intervention by the state and foreign imperialists, and because of the behaviour of local power-holders. As always in Marxian thinking, there is a certain ambivalence about the role of imperialists in the process of modernization. Whatever their wrongdoings, they did trigger the development of a kind of capitalism. Obviously, Chinese historians, living in a country run by a communist party, cannot be expected to be very enthusiastic about China’s history before communist rule. In India, the influential Marxist interpretation of precolonial history propagated by the Aligarh School continued


8 See Ch. 30 by Susanne Weigelin-Schwiedrzik in this volume.
to regard the village community, and in particular the extractive and oppressive Mughal state, as major obstacles to the emergence of autonomous capitalism. With the coming of the colonizers, major changes did take place, but they of course were implemented in a colonial setting. The situation in Latin America and Africa is never explicitly addressed in Marx’s work. As we will see, it does receive lots of attention in the work of many neo-Marxist scholars. Systematic analysis along traditional Marxian lines of the Ottoman Empire, the other big Islamic empire in the East, is as yet lacking.

PRIMITIVE ACCUMULATION, DEPENDENCY THEORY, AND WORLD-SYSTEMS ANALYSIS

In the work of Marx and his followers, one can also discern an interpretation of the emergence of capitalism and the rise of the West in which pride of place is given to the way in which capitalist societies profit from their contacts with other societies. Basically there are two varieties of this approach. In the first one, the emphasis is on the role of non-European regions in ‘primitive accumulation’. Their exploitation here is part of the prehistory of real capitalism: it helps in explaining how it all began. This interpretation differs from the one that originates with Lenin, J. A. Hobson, and Rudolf Hilferding, who write about imperialism as capitalism’s ‘highest stage’, in which the competitive, liberal capitalism is succeeded by organized, ‘monopoly’ capitalism. In this view it is only at that stage that other parts of the world become quintessential for capitalist economies, with capitalists desperately looking around for markets, resources, and possibilities to invest.

The thesis that the contribution of the Rest to the riches of the West, and the role of the West in the underdevelopment of the Rest, was anything but marginal has never lacked defenders, especially outside the West. Eric Williams wrote a very influential book on slavery in the Caribbean and the rise of capitalism. 9 Walter Rodney set out to explain how Europe underdeveloped Africa. 10 Indian historians with a nationalist background would always point at the ways in which the British plundered their country. In a recent publication by Jim Blaut, the thesis that plunder and windfall profits were at the basis of Western dominance is still prominent. 11

Latin American scholars such as Raúl Prebisch, Fernando Henrique Cardoso, and Theotonio Dos Santos have tried to turn the firm intuition that there is a connection between the wealth of the West and the poverty of the Rest into a theory called ‘dependency theory’. This ‘theory’ was formulated to explain the

9 Eric Williams, *Capitalism and Slavery* (Chapel Hill, 1944).
specific predicament of their continent. It was taken over by Andre Gunder Frank—very probably its best-known defender in the West.  

An important incentive for its proponents was the fact that in many of the countries they studied, the impoverishment that began in colonial times did not disappear after independence, notwithstanding the fact that those countries had become more integrated into international markets. Apparently, so they claim, there exist mechanisms that prevent worldwide economic convergence and rather create divergence. Rich nations, or as they now were often called, ‘the North’, in their role as ‘metropolis’, continued to be rich and became even richer, whereas poor nations, or ‘the South’, in their role as ‘satellites’, continued to be poor, if they did not actually become poorer.

Direct exploitation of course continued to play a role, for example, in the manipulation of trade by the North and collaborating elites in the South, or in the repression of the labour force in poor countries. Even in formally independent countries, the use of brute force by local power-holders and ‘Westerners’ never ceased to be a real threat. What dependency theorists were particularly interested in, however, was more indirect, ‘structural’ exploitation. They liked to point at a division of labour between rich and poor countries that lay at the basis of what they call ‘unequal exchange’, with positive effects for the North and negative effects for the South. Poor countries, so they claimed, mainly exported primary commodities with terms of trade that structurally deteriorated. They were transformed into ‘dual economies’, with export sectors that had hardly any linkages with the rest of the economy, and whose profits were either transferred to the West or ended up in the hands of a tiny domestic elite. Instead of providing a solution, integration in wider markets became the problem. It implied ‘the development of underdevelopment’.

Thinking in terms of dependency became quite popular in various Third World countries. Its impact in the West was minor. The ideas of Immanuel Wallerstein, that are very similar in principle but supported by broader and systematic historical research, in contrast, had an enormous impact in the West as well as in the rest of the world. His three volumes about *The Modern World-System*, the first of which appeared in 1974, are amongst the most quoted in the social sciences. In his historical analysis he was strongly influenced by the French historian Fernand Braudel. For both Braudel and Wallerstein, again, ‘capitalism’ is at the root of Western wealth and predominance. For Braudel it is not, as such, a uniquely European phenomenon. He only claims that it nowhere developed as far as in Europe.  

For Wallerstein it is something uniquely European that emerged in the sixteenth century and then spread over the entire globe.

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Both scholars explicitly define capitalism in terms that are very different from, and in many respects even opposed to, those used by Smith and Marx. For them it is not a system based on the working of free markets. Although it can only flourish in societies that have markets, it is not a market economy itself. In those markets in which capitalists operate, competition is neither free nor fair, nor transparent. Protection, monopoly, and manipulation rule supreme in a context of collusion between political power-holders and capitalists. Losses are absorbed by political hands while gains are distributed to private hands. The state provides shelter for capitalists, often against the market!

The capitalists we are talking about now, feel at home in finance and long-distance trade. With the rise of the modern state and European overseas expansion, opportunities in those sectors increased. As a rule they do not invest heavily in production, least of all in agriculture. They prefer freedom of manoeuvre and the spreading of risks. All this hardly changed with industrialization, which for Braudel and Wallerstein is therefore not regarded as a real break in the history of capitalism.

Of fundamental importance in a survey like this is the fact that for both of them capitalism is a ‘world-system’ that implies a geographical hierarchy; in other words, a specific division of labour between what Wallerstein calls ‘the core’ region of the system and its ‘peripheries’ and ‘semi-peripheries’. It is a system because life in it is largely self-contained and the dynamics of its development are largely internal. It is a ‘world-system’, not because it encompasses the whole world, but because its economic logic operates within an area larger than that which any political entity can totally control. By referring to that economic logic we have already pointed at a third characteristic: it is an economic system.

In the core or centre one finds free, highly paid, and specialized labour, working in sectors where value-adding is high. The periphery of a world economy consists of that geographical sector of it that produces primarily lower-ranking goods, and whose labour is less well rewarded. It is an integral part of the overall system, because the commodities involved are essential for daily use. Peripheral labour is not just badly rewarded: it also is unfree. Then there are semiperipheral areas which are in between the core and the periphery on a series of dimensions, such as the complexity of economic activities, strength of the state machinery, or cultural integrity.

Quintessential for our analysis is that the core of this system lay in (shifting) parts of Western Europe, and from the nineteenth century onwards in Western Europe plus North America. There were peripheral regions in Europe, for example Ireland, that was a periphery of Britain, or the rye-producing regions in Eastern Europe that fed large parts of the Dutch Republic. But the real contrast is that between a Western core and peripheral regions in other continents. In the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, the Americas and (small) parts of Africa and of Asia formed Europe’s periphery. In the eighteenth century we see further extensions; in particular, the parts of India that became British.
At the end of that century the United States was no longer part of the British Empire and started shifting position in the global economy. Some decades later, Central and South America, almost in their entirety, became independent regions, without, however, getting rid of their peripheral status. In the nineteenth century, with the ‘opening’ of the Ottoman Empire and China and, be it with other results, Japan, and with the further exploration and partition of Africa, the entire world became one economic system.

The hierarchical structure of this world-system implies that capitalism for Braudel and Wallerstein is not a *phase* in history but a *layer* of economic life. ‘Underdeveloped’ regions are not in an earlier stage than ‘developed’ ones. They presuppose each other. The free labour one finds doing skilled work in core areas cannot exist without the coerced labour used for less skilled work in the periphery. Their combination is the essence of capitalism.

In this perspective, the West not only became rich over the back of its (semi) peripheries; it also actively thwarted their further development. India, to mention a notorious example, would have been ‘deindustrialized’ by the British. The ‘sprouts of capitalism’ that may have existed in China were either destroyed or distorted by foreign imperialists and their Chinese accomplices. The ‘scramble for Africa’ in the nineteenth century only added to the damage already done by the enslavement of so many Africans. Latin and Central America may have become formally independent quite early, but they soon became parts of an informal empire run by Britain and the United States. The Ottoman Empire was slowly dismantled and carved up into Western zones of protection. The case of Japan was something of an ‘exception that proves the rule’. It had never been a colony; it began to colonize other regions soon after it was ‘opened’, and it industrialized.

In world-systems analysis, capitalism is the dynamic force that creates a global economy. The ultimate motor behind this dynamism, not unlike in many Smithian explanations, is supposed to be the existence from the late Middle Ages onwards of a Western European state-system that never turned into an empire. Fierce interstate competition encouraged most states to look for expansion overseas.

The ideas of, especially, Braudel and Wallerstein are more subtle than those of dependency theorists. In the last instance, however, they start from similar premises and have incurred similar critiques. Let us combine the critiques. There is the critique that the meaning of various central concepts is unclear. What exactly, for example, is meant by ‘unequal exchange’, and how can one measure its ‘inequality’? What is meant by ‘a dependent economy’, and how can one measure ‘dependency’? What does it take to become a centre or a periphery? Wallerstein’s concept of ‘externality’ has also come in for critique. During the early modern era, China, the biggest economy in the world, clearly was not a periphery of Europe. Wallerstein therefore simply places it outside Europe’s world-system. Critics think that this is Eurocentric and misleading. Not only was trade between China and the West, and other parts of the world, substantial,
but they also point to the fact that China exchanged manufactured goods like silken fabrics and porcelain, and a fairly basic product like tea, for Western silver. Does not that make Europe look like a Chinese periphery?

The existence of a long-term deterioration of the terms of trade for the exports of underdeveloped countries—a fundamental ingredient in ‘the development of underdevelopment’—has been disputed if not actually refuted. Since the third quarter of the twentieth century onwards, various underdeveloped non-Western countries have known substantial economic growth. Critics regard this as a refutation of dependency theory. The same goes for the fact that the ‘catching-up strategies’ that dependency theorists suggested to underdeveloped countries—in essence always some kind of detachment from the global market—very often failed.

Various economic historians, looking at the matter from a European angle, think that in claiming that the West developed over the back of the rest, one wildly overestimates the importance of contacts between the West and its peripheries for most of their histories. In a rather paradoxical way, these critics have found support amongst historians studying Asia’s history who emphasize that the impact of the West on most parts of that continent has been quite marginal and brief. Here again one is confronted with the big difference in intensity, duration, and impact of Western influence in various parts of the world. It would not be by accident that dependency theory originated in Latin America and was always very popular there and in Africa. What, finally, has increasingly become a point of critique is that the modern world-systems approach is Eurocentric in depicting a dynamic West that incorporates ever larger parts of a fairly passive, victimized ‘Rest’.

Nevertheless, dependency theory and modern world-system analysis have pointed at some really major problems for neoclassical economic thinking. First and foremost, there is the fact that the incorporation of ever more politically independent regions in a global economic network has not (yet?), as neoclassical economics predicts, been accompanied by economic convergence. One cannot ignore the question as to what extent the structure of international economic relations and exchange might be to blame. That question continues to hold centre stage in global economic history, and has led to increasingly sophisticated analyses of, for example, slave trade and slave labour, formal and informal colonialism, commodity chains, and the functioning of dual economies.

CHALLENGES FOR CLASSIC EUROCENTRIC EXPLANATIONS

The Smithian and Marxian master narratives about development and underdevelopment have their defenders until this very day. But changes in the real world and in the historical discipline have severely subverted their credibility.
Economic transformations in the Western world since the beginning of industrialization have been tremendous. Scale, scope, and structure of business changed. Many night-watchman states turned into social welfare states. Classical Smithian theories could no longer even provide a ‘stylized’ description of the situation in the West. For economic historians who believed in the Smithian perspective, this presented serious challenges. Seeking comfort in further refining neoclassical models, as many economists did, was not a viable option. The Marxian alternative, as analysis of developments in the West and as theoretical foundation of real-existing socialism, in the end fared even worse. The addition in the end is cardinal here: at the beginning of the twenty-first century one easily forgets how long ‘socialist alternatives’ to economic liberalism looked and, to a certain extent, were successful in modernizing countries and increasing their GDP. Whatever their merits and potential in the longer run, socialist experiments showed that substantial economic growth is possible in a non-capitalist setting. The fact that capitalism and communism not only had their problems at home, but were no striking successes in the Third World either, only added to the unease about these old paradigms.

And then there was the challenge presented, in particular from the last decades of the twentieth century onwards, by various cases of sensational, non-Smithian and non-Marxian growth in the former ‘Third World’. Of course, there had been a major precedent of modern economic growth outside the West. Japan already took off in the Meiji Era (1868–1912). A popular strategy to deal with that ‘anomaly’ had always been made to ‘Westernize’ it, for example, by pointing at its feudalism, at the competition between various fiefs during Tokugawa rule (1601–1867) that counted as equivalent of competition between states in Europe, or at its strong work ethic. The claim that industrializing Meiji Japan was a Western capitalist country that happened to lie in Asia nevertheless continued to be suspect. If one really wants to insist on seeing parallels, Germany’s industrialization would be a case to think of, rather than Britain’s.

Then came Japan’s phenomenal rise after the Second World War. Again, systematic efforts to prove the opposite notwithstanding, it was clear that the country was not implementing Smithian, let alone Marxian models. There was something peculiar and quite successful to its ‘strategy’ that was analyzed in numerous studies. When Japan’s growth figures and pace of development slackened, many scholars simply forgot how enthusiastic they had been about the ‘Japanese model’. New challenges to mainstream economics, however, would not be lacking, in particular with the appearance of the Asian tigers—Hong Kong, Singapore, South Korea, and Taiwan—and from the last decades of the twentieth century onwards, the impressive growth of China and India.

Most ‘catching up’ occurred in Asia. It would be an exaggeration to talk about the emergence of a distinct ‘Asian’ alternative to traditional models of growth. But some characteristics stand out. First, there is the interventionist and steering stance of governments. Chalmers Johnson, an expert in Japan’s history, in this
respect has coined the term ‘developmental state’. In particular during the first
phases of economic take-off, those governments tended to behave in a quite
authoritarian way. What is also notable is the extent to which the economies of
those new industrializing countries were export-oriented and their production
labour-intensive.

Life did not become easier for developmental economists. Their quest for
growth proved quite elusive. Studies by economic historians—studies which
became increasingly sophisticated and numerous—were also more helpful in
deconstructing than in reconstructing. The idea that there would be one model
of industrialization, valid for the entire Western world, is no longer taken
seriously. The Smithian ‘rise of the market narrative’ encountered serious pro-
blems, without being replaced by a Marxian counterpart. There is the fact, for
example, that industrializing Britain actually was a fiscal-military state, with high
taxes and a huge government debt. Its central government massively intervened,
directly and indirectly, in the economy—in particular in foreign trade. The
United States, until well into the twentieth century, actually was a bastion of
protectionism. Western countries that successfully caught up never did so by
simply copying Britain. The role of the state in their industrialization was
substantial and proactive.

Moreover, changes occurred in the way in which industrialization was inter-
preted. In terms of an increase of GDP, the first Industrial Revolution in Britain
was anything but impressive. It apparently was a fairly regional affair in which the
role of big factories had been overestimated. Family firms continued to be
important in industrializing and industrialized economies. The connection be-
tween capitalism and industrialization proved to be casual rather than causal. The
growth of markets need not, and very often did not, lead to industrialization, not
even in the case of proto-industry (sic!) that often catered for foreign markets and
implied a rapid increase of the number of (semi-)proletarians.

GLOBAL ECONOMIC HISTORY AND REVISIONISM

The emergence of a branch of economic history that purports to be truly global
and that seriously studies the entire globe only added to the confusion. Much
more is becoming known about the economic history of non-Western countries.
All this has led to big changes of perspective, in particular when it comes to the
early modern period and the history of parts of Asia.

Many scholars tend to ‘reorient’ as Frank puts it. Studies in which the
economy of parts of Asia before the Great Divergence was presented in a positive

14 See for example, Chalmers Johnson, Japan: Who Governs? The Rise of the Developmental State
15 Andre Gunder Frank, ReOrient: Global Economy in the Asian Age (Berkeley, 1998).
light had never been lacking. In the last decades of the twentieth century, however, their number increased sharply. Their message, as a rule, was twofold: Europe had only a marginal impact on Asia, and Europe was not more developed. Europeans did not dominate Asia’s trade, let alone its production. Overall they were not more advanced traders or producers. Revisionist scholars like Frank, Pomeranz, R. Bin Wong, and Jack Goldstone, sometimes referred to as the ‘California School’, started claiming in the 1990s that the most developed parts of Qing China, Tokugawa Japan, and Mughal India were ‘advanced organic economies’ like Western Europe, with quite similar levels of wealth, development, and growth.

More positive descriptions of the economy of Tokugawa Japan had already begun to appear in the 1970s. The most striking re-evaluation, however, is presented by the case of early modern China. No expert will call it a case of ‘oriental despotism’ any longer. Its society under the Qing is now described as relatively ‘open’, with a fair amount of social mobility, and its domestic economy as a well-functioning market economy. The claim that its population would have grown unchecked is now rejected, as is the claim that its technology would be less developed than that of Western Europe, at least overall.

But even so, in the end, a huge economic gap between the West and the entire rest did emerge. Modern global historians claim that it happened with industrialization in the nineteenth century. For them the Industrial Revolution is still a watershed in the history of the world—not so much because it brought immediate and massive changes, but because it set industrializing economies on a trajectory with unheard-off possibilities. They see industrialization as it occurred in the West, first and foremost as a fundamental breakthrough in technology and especially energy use. They do not regard it, as such, as a ‘logical outcome’ of the specific ‘capitalist’ institutional setting in which it first emerged.

The challenge of explaining the Great Divergence in fact consists in answering three different questions. In terms of the economist Moses Abramovitz they would be: Why did some countries forge ahead? Why and how could some countries (begin to) catch up? And finally, why did many countries fall behind?16

Most scholars would agree that candidates to forge ahead via industrialization could only be found in Eurasia. Various highly developed societies had existed in South and Central America. The ‘discovery’ of these regions by the Europeans, however, brought total disaster. During the colonial era some recovery occurred, but being colonized was not exactly a stimulus to domestic economic growth, and it left a legacy in the form of extractive states, landlordism, and a gap between rich and poor that was not helpful either. The economies of North America never became as extractive as those in the southern half of the continent and, in connection to that, a set of institutions emerged that was more supportive of

growth. Many parts of Africa were not blessed by geography and did not attract settlers. Slavery and the slave trade had negative effects on demography and institution-building in terms of property rights in particular. Then came colonization, and after that a decolonization that often caused more problems than it solved.

The main problem, therefore, becomes to explain why the West with industrialization entered a phase of sustained and substantial economic growth, whereas large parts of Asia did not or did so much later. Next to the traditional stories about the rise of the West in which it does not really matter what happened elsewhere, various new explanations have been offered. Pomeranz suggests that, in a nutshell, Britain happened to have coal and colonies, whereas China, the Asian country on which he focuses, did not. Frank basically sticks to the explanation that Mark Elvin had already presented in the 1970s when he referred to China’s ‘high-level equilibrium trap’: a situation in which the combination of cheap labour because of high population, expensive resources, and scarce capital, plus very efficient markets, renders investment in labour-saving technology neither rational nor economical. He adds that in the big empires in the East, decline had already started before Western Europe began to industrialize. This made it easier for Europeans to overhaul their competitors. Frank does not discuss institutional factors. Scholars who do, now look at the political and military problems those empires faced. Whether they had domestic origins or were caused and increased by foreign interference, they could lead to political crises or even (semi-)colonial situations.

The theses of the revisionists have led to fierce new debates over the causes of the first diverging. The study of strategies of catching up has received a new boost by the emergence of many successful new examples of it, especially, but not only, in Asia. This makes the fate of those who continue to fall behind or even become poorer more unacceptable, and in a sense more incomprehensible, as many would claim that in a globalizing economy it should not be hard to eradicate poverty. Abramovitz’s third question clearly has not yet been answered.

ECONOMIC GLOBALIZATION?

Most global historians focus either on comparing situations in various parts of the world or on connecting them. Although the bulk of this text so far has been dedicated to comparative analyses, comments on the importance of global connections have not been lacking. A survey of the history of global economic history would not be complete, however, without a couple of paragraphs that explicitly deal with economic globalization, here defined as the increase in extensity, intensity, speed, and impact of worldwide economic contacts.

All developed societies in history have known long-distance trade. It has always received ample attention—in particular, the trade that occurred in the wake of Europe’s expansion. Amongst scholars, the question of the wider relevance of such trade contacts is bound to be raised. When did intercontinental economic contacts become really important? Or, as it is normally asked, when did globalization actually begin? Answers have varied enormously. Frank and Barry K. Gills claim it has already existed for 5,000 years. Other scholars think that even in the beginning of the twenty-first century globalization is more hype than reality because the so-called global economy is essentially nothing but a new ‘triangular trade’, in this case between North America, parts of Europe, and parts of Asia, with most of the produce of these macroregions not being exported to other continents at all.

Amongst historians probably the most popular answer has been to point at the beginning of the early modern era when Europeans discovered America and began to sail to Asia via the Cape of Good Hope. Earlier periods have been suggested, though, like that offered by Frank and Gills above. Others refer to the Islamic oecumene of the Middle Ages or to the Eurasian connections in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries when, according to Janet Abu-Lughod, one can already discern a world system before European hegemony. Critics have commented that a frail network of which the Americas are not part, and in which the goods traded are almost entirely luxuries, can hardly deserve that name.

There in any case are good reasons for choosing the early modern era. With the ‘discovery’ of the Americas, all the big continents had become known and connected. American bullion became the most important global ‘commodity’ and found its way into Europe, Asia, and Africa. The triangular trade that connected Europe, Africa, and the New World over the Atlantic grew faster than any other intercontinental trade. Asian spices, textiles, porcelain, and tea, to mention but a few goods, now began to reach Europe over seas. Intercontinental contacts had their impact on consumption patterns. Products such as sugar, coffee, tea, cocoa, and tobacco became popular in many parts of the world. Production was also affected worldwide. Textiles and porcelain from Asia, for example, presented a challenge to European producers. The plantations in Brazil and the Caribbean provided Western Europe with sugar produced by slaves from Africa.

Even bigger than that of trade was the impact of what Alfred W. Crosby called the ‘Columbian Exchange’—the transfer of flora, fauna, and diseases, between the Old and the New Worlds. Then, finally, there was intercontinental

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movement of people—part ‘trade’ and part migration. Trade in this context refers to slave trade. By far most of the attention by scholars has been paid to slave trade and slavery in the Atlantic region. Considering the numbers involved, a basic consensus with regard to orders of magnitude appears to have emerged. Their impact continues to be a bone of contention. Only fairly recently have other slave trade circuits, such as that of the trans-Saharan trade eastward and that of white Christian slaves in Northern Africa, become the subject of serious analysis. That also applies to other unfree labour like that of convicts, and the semi-free labour of indentured labourers. Intercontinental free migration was still relatively insignificant in the early modern era. From Europe—by far the biggest exporter of people to other continents—over the entire era not more than some five million people migrated overseas.

Europe was the only continent with direct contacts to all other continents. That does not mean it would have been the only region with substantial long-distance trade. There were other big trading areas, at times encompassing parts of various continents, and sometimes of a scale like that of the Indian Ocean or the Chinese seas dwarfing what was going on in Europe. As a rule, these areas were located around a sea. Studying such ‘seascapes’ and their hinterlands, like the Mediterranean, the Indian Ocean, the Arabian Seas, and increasingly the Pacific Ocean, whose importance as a trade route tends to be reinterpreted, and of course the Atlantic Ocean, has become very popular.

From a West European perspective the early modern era was an era of increasing (intercontinental) trade. One must, however, not forget that during that period certain kinds of trade and the trade activities of certain regions decreased rather than increased. Overland trade between Europe and Asia tended to decline over time, as did African caravan trade. Large parts of the Mediterranean and of Central Europe did not share in the new dynamism of the Atlantic region. China at times closed itself off from foreign trade, especially against Europeans. Japan and Korea did so too, and much more radically. Intercontinental trade had its booms and busts—the most famous bust in the early modern period being the crisis of the seventeenth century that, according to various scholars, was a truly global economic crisis. Not everyone agreed, which only further fuelled the debate on how to prove the existence of worldwide economic cycles, and on how to explain them.

Most experts would agree that from the nineteenth century onwards one can indeed discern worldwide economic fluctuations of various lengths and intensity, and worldwide interconnections in the movement of basic economic variables. Agreement on their exact nature and causes is still lacking. What is clear is that not only the timing but also the impact of globalization differed widely: global trends that hardly touched some regions might have an enormous impact in others. Nor can it be doubted that for colonized regions globalization already became an unmistakable fact of life quite some time ago.
The thesis that economic globalization took off with Columbus has been fiercely contested, especially by Jeffrey Williamson and Kevin O’Rourke. According to them it only started in the 1820s, when markets integrated worldwide and global convergence of prices set in. Until then, intercontinental trade, predominantly in (semi-)luxurious goods, would not have entailed fundamental shifts in sites and modes of production. They claim that better means of transport and communication, rising incomes, and the disappearance of many of the barriers to free trade were the heralds of an unprecedented economic integration over the nineteenth century. What they actually describe is the emergence of an integrated Atlantic economy with intense movement of commodities, capital, and people, while the rest of the world was connected to that system but not yet fully incorporated in it. The story of the huge increase in transatlantic migration of free people during the long nineteenth century till the First World War has been told many times. It is only thanks to the further growth of the discipline of global history that the huge migration from, but especially inside Asia now also receives the attention it deserves.

Economic globalization in modern times has not been a unilinear process either. In the period between the two world wars, the level of intercontinental and even international economic exchange lessened. That tide turned again after 1945, with a clear acceleration after 1973 when exchange rates became free. In the 1980s, according to probably the biggest best-seller ever on globalization, a book by Thomas Friedman, the world became flat, and with the fall of ‘communism’ and the appearance of various new industrializing counties, also one. Economic globalization then not only made a quantitative leap forward, but also changed character. The importance of international financial transactions increased phenomenally, to which the revolution in information and communication technology will not have been innocent. The same applies to the role of services in international trade. Foreign direct investments reached unprecedented levels and multinational firms became powerful global players. As indicated, not all experts would agree with the one-flat-world thesis, pointing at the fact that in the beginning of the twenty-first century most countries still tend to trade predominantly with their neighbours, and that only a certain number of trade blocs really go global. They do have a point, but even so two conclusions stand out. There definitely is an increase in scale of trade networks, with trade blocs increasingly functioning like states did in the past, and between the majority of these trade blocs intercontinental connections do increase and become tidier. In that process, transcontinental migration is also on the rise, although as compared to commodities and capital, let alone information, people are still rather immobile.

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One needs no practical reason to globalize economic history. On the contrary: what good intellectual reasons could there be to not try and compare economic developments in various parts of the world or to not study the connections that may have existed between them? The fact that the world, as the cliché has it, is becoming a small place, only gives extra practical urgency to those endeavours. The importance of knowing about other economic systems and their histories, and about the potentialities and pitfalls of economic globalization, will only increase. Historians as a rule are weary of making predictions, and are probably right not to do so. I would, however, be surprised if the discipline of global economic history did not have a bright future.

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Women’s and Gender History

Julie Des Jardins

Concern with gender as an analytic category has emerged only in the late twentieth century. It is absent from the major bodies of social theory articulated from the eighteenth century to the early twentieth century. To be sure, some of those theories built their logic on analogies to the opposition of male and female, others acknowledged a ‘woman question’, still others addressed the formation of subjective sexual identity, but gender as a way of talking about systems of social or sexual relations did not appear... The term ‘gender’ is part of the attempt by contemporary feminists to stake claim to a certain definitional ground, to insist on the inadequacy of existing bodies of theory for explaining persistent inequalities between women and men.


It has really only been since the 1980s that historians have considered ‘gender’ an historical subject, a lens, or, as Joan Wallach Scott has phrased it, ‘a useful category of historical analysis’.1 Several factors conspired to make gender history an academic subfield at the end of the twentieth century: second-wave feminism provided its political impetus; social constructivism and post-structuralism its theoretical means. Nevertheless, various radical, Marxist, and progressive historians had planted the seeds of gender history as early as the 1920s and 1930s, even as they privileged neither women nor gender as subjects. Their questioning of power structures and engagement of politics and relativist concepts were integral to the development of the field later in the twentieth century.

‘Women’s’ and ‘gender’ history are not one and the same, though at certain junctures they have been treated as synonymous. For this reason, and because the latter grew out of the former, we must treat the historiography as intertwined. Gender analysis has been both complementary and corrective to the history of women’s liberation, but its applications have since expanded beyond original intentions. An engagement of gender has aided in plucking the female experience from the depths of historical obscurity, but gender has also become a lens.

through which topics other than women—men, sexuality, race, citizenship, and nationhood among others—have been seen anew. Gender can serve as a lens on power—not just between men and women, but also through them and their symbolic representation.

The rise of gender history cannot be extricated from the story of women’s history or the woman historian in the twentieth century. Although there are men who write the history of gender, the original impetus for gender history came from an international feminist movement spearheaded by women for women. It is essential to understand the conditions in which women historians felt compelled, and ultimately empowered, to explore topics that professional mentors told them were unscholarly, unhistorical, and off limits to legitimate scholars. Women’s and gender history grew out of their politicization and willingness to forge new areas of historical expertise.

MAKING A PLACE FOR WOMEN HISTORIANS AND WOMEN’S HISTORY IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY

In the late nineteenth century, history-writing in the West started to be perceived as a ‘profession’—a ‘scientific’ endeavour requiring academic credentials. Before then and outside the West, women had been deemed appropriate subjects and writers of history. Mughal emperor Akbar commissioned his aunt, Gulbadan Begum, to write the history of her father and brother’s reigns in the sixteenth century; and the resultant text, the *Humayun-nama*, was a Persian account of her own experiences, recollected with the aid of relics from the domestic sphere. Indeed it was not uncommon for women to write about noteworthy people and events they observed intimately. In colonial America, Mayflower descendant Mercy Otis Warren insisted that the men around her were too busy making history to be bothered with its recording, and thus she singlehandedly chronicled the American Revolution and published the manuscript in 1805.² Before the professional turn, her peers considered it ladylike to teach local, familial, and national history in the home. As custodians of culture and tradition, women used historical lessons to make good citizens of their children. Some women went on to write nationalistic textbooks; others raised funds to erect commemorative structures honouring the heroes of the past.³


However, the process of professionalization in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries has since obscured women’s longstanding relationship to the historical enterprise—not just as historians but also as subjects of history. Rigorous research, as defined by the new breed of historical scholar, required the use of official, written documents; but few of these sources provided insight into the agency of women, since most women, as yet, had no legal status as property holders or political beings. As history increasingly came to be understood as the progressive story of nationhood, credentialed men focused on the political, military, constitutional, and public realms. Invariably, when people appeared in their accounts they were exceptional—and male. By virtue of their associations with domestic and reproductive work, women were unremarkable and hence impossible subjects of history.\(^4\)

The emergence of women’s or gender history as a field of inquiry seemed beyond the reaches of possibility in this professional milieu, and yet women wrote about women anyway—typically outside the academy. Those involved in first-wave feminist movements—Jenny P. d’Héricourt in France and Susan B. Anthony and Elizabeth Cady Stanton in America, for example—wrote historically about women and their political movements to legitimate women’s claims to citizens’ rights.\(^5\) In 1889 Greek activist Callirhoe Parren ambitiously set out to write a *History of Woman from the Beginning of the World to Today*, which, if taken to completion, would have covered women in China, India, Persia, ancient Greece and Rome, Assyria, Egypt, and the North. Anglophones Alice Clark, Edith Abbott, Eileen Power, and Ivy Pinchbeck followed suit later in the twentieth century with histories of women’s economic roles in capitalist systems from the Middle Ages to the present day.\(^6\) Although university men balked at women as topics, these historians recognized that women’s social and economic status in the present was determined by the past.

Like her predecessors, American Mary Beard brought a feminist agenda to historical practice. It became increasingly obvious to her that scholarship of the university privileged moments, places, and realms of activity in which men asserted primacy over women. She believed that a ‘long view’ of history—retrieved through women’s sources and seen through women’s eyes—would show that men had been denying the reality of women’s agency and accomplishment in the modern age. Aided by Hungarian pacifist Rosika Schwimmer, she


launched the World Center for Women’s Archives (1935–40)—a collection of material evidence of women’s contributions to ‘civilization’ all over the world, from antiquity to the present. Unfortunately, her hopes for a woman-centred history, like Parren’s, were not fully realized in her lifetime.7 When she died in 1955, few men or women were interested in recovering women’s past, let alone theorizing their oppression. Ironically, Western women were entering colleges in greater numbers than ever before, but they left the academy before pursuing scholarly or historical careers. Many women who had been mobilized into industrial work during the Second World War were encouraged to return home to assume roles as wives and mothers, and they were similarly retrenched in post-war histories. The consensus among academics was to focus on political regimes and the great individual men who led them. Once again, narratives of the nation-state excluded women as actors who had bearing on national affairs.8

It should not be surprising that the women’s histories to come out of the post–Second World War period were not written by academic historians. Amateurs of radical groups like the Jewish women’s Emma Lazarus Federation wrote the sort of socially conscious histories of the poor, oppressed, and female that academic social historians eventually embraced in the 1960s. Gerda Lerner, Eleanor Flexner, and other radicals wrote histories that exposed the exploitative workings of masculine institutions, even if not yet defined explicitly in patriarchal terms.9 French philosopher Simone de Beauvoir helped to theorize women’s oppression by providing an historical model in The Second Sex (1949). Covering the state of women from agrarianism through classical antiquity, the Middle Ages, the Enlightenment, the French Revolution, and the fight for suffrage, her analysis of French women resonated all over the world and inspired liberation movements in Europe and North America two decades later. She believed that biology was not to blame for women’s secondary status as ‘Other’: man-made culture inhibited women’s self-realization. Beauvoir’s nascent form of social constructivism was yet another crucial anticipation of gender theory to come.10

Political tumult in the 1960s created conditions both inside and outside the academy conducive to the study of women and eventually gender in the past.

7 Des Jardins, Women and the Historical Enterprise, 225–40.
10 Simone de Beauvoir, The Second Sex (New York, 1953).
Student protests sprang up on college campuses in Italy, France, England, West Germany, and the United States. As historians became swept up in anti-war, civil rights, black power, New Left, Maoist, and countercultural movements, they were inspired to reorient their research both in content and perspective. The influx of scholars who were non-white, ethnic, and working class into the university prompted challenges to elitist history of previous decades. In Australia, Latin America, and North America, historians of indigenous groups turned celebratory tales of discovery and settlement into cautionary tales of invasion and dispossession. Rather than privilege the rise of the nation-state, they turned to radical movements, slavery, class formation, and the social and cultural histories of ordinary people.

New social history—the Annales scholarship in France, Alltagsgeschichte in Germany, Microstoria in Italy, and ‘bottom up’ history in North America—required an altogether different set of sources and suppositions about what constituted the historically noteworthy. Diaries, journals, oral accounts, folklore, and census data were no longer trivia but enlightening pieces of cultural evidence. For many social historians, men of minority religious, racial, and ethnic groups were of greater priority than women. E. P. Thompson’s *Making of the English Working Class* (1963) and similar texts were, in hindsight, aggressively masculine coming-of-age narratives, and indeed several histories of slavery in these years reinstated the black man as empowered historical agent at the slave woman’s expense. And yet the highlighting of social experience through the details of daily life gave feminists the means to reveal women like they had not revealed them before. Rather than focus on sweeping political events, the new breed of social historian looked at phenomena in microcosm and made groundbreaking discoveries in the once unremarkable private sphere, where women would eventually be found in their greatest numbers.¹¹

Most female historians who earned academic credentials to this point had written on the same political, military, constitutional, and diplomatic topics that shored up professional advancement for their male peers. Now with shifting identity politics within the university they felt emboldened to study themselves. Many future historians of women were products of the democratizing university, while others were faculty members who had turned increasingly radical in the post-war years. Leftist politics informed Austrian refugee Gerda Lerner’s writing of women’s history in America. Likewise, Renaissance historian Joan Kelly demonstrated against racial discrimination and war in Indochina before participating in civil rights and anti-war movements of the 1960s and agitation for reproductive rights in the early 1970s. Her political convictions shaped her

transformation as a women’s historian—one increasingly sensitive to issues of race, class, and the construction of gender.\textsuperscript{12}

Politicized academicians began carving out niches for women’s history within the modern university. The Canadian Committee on women’s History in the Canadian Historical Association provided an organizational base from which to develop the field, much like the Berkshire Conference of Women Historians in America. New research filled the pages of newly established feminist periodicals, while professors developed innovative women’s history curricula. In 1971 Natalie Zemon Davis and Jill Ker Conway co-taught the first women’s history course in a Canadian university (Toronto). Two years later Michelle Perrott, Fabienne Bock, and Pauline Schmitt Pantel taught the first women’s history course at the Sorbonne. The first British women’s history courses emerged through History Workshop—a vehicle of new social history growing steadily feminist in its aims.\textsuperscript{13}

The greatest impetus for women’s history internationally was the rise of the feminist movement in the last third of the twentieth century. Liberal, radical, cultural, social, and lesbian feminists made a case for revisiting the pasts of women all over the world. And yet the International Federation for Research in Women’s History (IFRWH) charted both similar and divergent national traditions in these years. Historians of Western countries, and the United States in particular, have spearheaded many of the developments in the emerging field, and thus much of the story that follows is theirs. American historians of women have enjoyed relative acceptance and autonomy in the university, but in Australia and elsewhere the impetus for women’s history had to derive from elsewhere. In Greece, for example, the women’s movement catalyzed popular interest in women’s history after 1974, but academic institutions remained hostile to feminist-minded projects.\textsuperscript{14} In England, feminist history has grown largely out of leftist journals and polytechnics, rather than major universities. In Brazil, women’s history has developed without much influence from women’s or feminist studies. The same can be said for Japan, though scholars have applied feminist perspectives to the family—a topic of consistent academic interest. Historians of women in Canada, Spain, Austria, Sweden, and elsewhere have, by contrast, worked closely with the women’s studies programmes that also came out of second-wave feminism. For them, women’s history has been consciously employed to combat sexism in the university as well as in present-day society.


\textsuperscript{13} Des Jardins, \textit{Women and the Historical Enterprise}, 219–225; and Spongberg, \textit{Writing Women’s History}, 182.

But even where women’s history has developed for feminist ends, historians have turned to differing sets of historical questions and actors. American and English historians were compelled early on to tell the story of women’s access to political rights, and they left few stones unturned as they wrote of their respective suffrage movements and the major players involved. In Italy, France, and Germany, academics gravitated towards the study of gendered divisions of labour in the early capitalist era. By contrast, much of the history of women in Scandinavia was initially located in the Middle Ages, while much of the early history written about Indian women focused on the ancient period. In the Eastern bloc, women’s history generally came out of a larger body of Marxist scholarship. In France it was heavily informed by that nation’s philosophical tradition. In Brazil the ready availability of ecclesiastical sources led scholars to write histories of eighteenth- and nineteenth-century women informed heavily by demographic data. Unfortunately this also made it difficult for women’s history to be seen autonomously from social and family history in Brazilian universities.15

Government, academic, and private funding of archives has also shaped national traditions of women’s history. Collections such as the Fawcett Library in London, the women’s history archive at the University of Gothenburg, the Bibliothe`que Marguerite Durand in Paris, and the Sophia Smith Collection (Smith College) and Schlesinger Library (Radcliffe College) near Boston have attracted thousands of researchers and yielded groundbreaking studies in areas for which source materials have been rich. But from place to place, the ability to study women’s pasts has not been uniform: researchers have enjoyed varied amounts of source materials, funding, and institutional support for their projects.

EARLY FEMINIST HISTORY: THE PROJECT OF HERSTORY

With few exceptions the primary project of early women’s liberation (1960s–70s) inside and outside the academy was ‘Herstory’—a term that acquired multiple connotations. In 1975, Gerda Lerner would be one of the first to criticize its compensatory tone, calling it ‘contribution history’ that in no way challenged male conceptual frameworks for viewing the past.16 Still, most agree this history was a necessary precursor to the new conceptions of women’s history to come.

In the most obvious sense, herstory was a reclaiming of a masculinist enterprise: history was and always had been his story, feminists insisted—written by man

about man, ultimately in the service of man over woman. The operative term associated with herstory, as in new social history, was _agency_. Objectives of herstory were to relate traditionally male-centred history from the female point of view, and to privilege the experiences of women so that they finally featured as historical actors. At this stage, historians did not make too many distinctions between retrieving women from male spheres of influence or from uniquely feminine realms; the prerogative was to discover them, reveal them, and leave any evaluation of where they were found for later. Still, inherent in these objectives was the revelation (though by no means diagnosis) of women’s exclusion from exceptional and noteworthy events in the public and political spheres, for it was in the details of the everyday, domestic, and private that women’s experiences came to light.

Feminists hoped that ‘herstories’ would perform the consciousness-raising that characterized women’s liberation. As woman-present became better acquainted with woman-past, she would identify with her plight (note the singularity), leading to a sense of connection across time, space, and cultural context. Women-present would come to feel as if they made up their own oppressed but awakened social class. Because identification was the goal, historians revealed their historical women in recognizable terms. It was too soon to alter accepted historical categories, though some did begin to challenge notions of periodicity and progress. Was the Renaissance really a Renaissance? Was the Age of the Common Man also about the Common Woman? Could traditional ways of characterizing eras, impulses, and movements stand when women were brought into the fold?17

Much of the initial work of herstory was necessarily the retrieval of historical sources. In 1970 a women’s collective headed by Florence Howe founded the Feminist Press (now in City University of New York), which reprinted the forgotten works of women from eras past. Virago, the Woman’s Press, and other small radical houses published works that revived ‘women worthies’ as well as everyday women. Feminist libraries, archives, and reading rooms—the Fawcett Library in London, the Jessie Street Library in Sydney, and the National Archive of Black Women’s History in Washington, among others—eventually housed original documents and newly published scholarship in the burgeoning field. The titles of compiled and edited academic works that appeared in these years—*Becoming Visible* (1977), *Hidden from History* (1973), *Clio’s Consciousness Raised* (1974)—told of intentions to discover, recover, and keep women visible as historical agents.18 The number and size of them suggest that historians hoped to make up for the decades of neglect.

But the retrieval of written texts by or about women proved easier for some than for others. Literate women of the middle and upper classes had long written diaries, journals, and personal correspondence and maintained family relics and keepsakes. Monarchs, professionals, and social reformers revealed themselves readily, while illiterate and labouring women proved to have little time or inclination to save papers. Historians of African-American women discovered that their subjects often dissembled rather than put thoughts and feelings to paper.19 Brazilian historians, too, complained that written sources were not abundant in their field: ‘We cannot directly recover women’s thoughts and sensibilities during three and a half centuries of Brazilian history. Female desires, decisions and complaints can only be guessed at through the bureaucratic language of petitions written by men.’20

The scarcity of sources has been a problem elsewhere in Latin America, and it has proven challenging to give voice to African, ‘Third World’, and ‘subaltern’ women who have not authored written texts themselves. Historians of Confucian-influenced Imperial China discovered short poems by women, but found that their authors did not have the time, training, nor mastery to leave wenji (prose) or writings in essay form. Like women in most pre-modern societies, they appeared only as nonentities in government documents and canonical texts. Historians studying women in non-literate societies have had to rely more heavily on oral traditions and techniques borrowed from anthropology and sociology. Nigerian historian Bolanle Awe insists that though her methods may be imperfect, she has enlisted mythology, proverbs, praise poems, and folk tales, in addition to asking new questions of conventional texts. Historians of women under imperial regimes would eventually concede that the subaltern articulated in ways they could not engage—but not yet. Few worried about the problem of perspective or the ability to articulate experience until the rise of multicultural criticism and the ‘cultural turn’ of the 1980s.21

Pioneering feminist historians wrote about both the exceptional and the typical woman, but the former remained an enigma to present-day women, and the latter an oddity to history. Women were hardly the perfect substitutes into narratives of professional historians, who, with the exception of some social


Historians, continued to designate politics, business, and battlefields as the theatres of significant activity. Only a few women worthies occupied these spaces, and they appeared to do so at the expense of normalcy or femininity. Rigorous history, as traditional historians defined it, required written sources and official and legal records that women did not author and in which they did not appear. Moreover, herstory highlighted historical women by pulling them from their contexts—both gendered and historical—and placing them under spotlights that isolated and peculiarized, rather than made them understandable, in relation to men and other women.

So long as no one challenged the masculinist prescriptions of historical practice, the tactic of ‘add women and stir’ simply could not suffice. A more sustaining history would require an altogether new recipe, the ingredients of which would combine to make new historical lenses and metanarratives through which women appeared collectively as empowered agents rather than individual tokens. Until then, women would collect at the historical fringes or separate from the rest. As subjects, they would never be integrated into the histories written by scholars who did not call themselves ‘women’s’ or ‘feminist’ historians.

Although the project of herstory was a consciousness-raising first step, its limitations grew clear. It lacked not only a means for seeing women in new terms, but also for explaining the patterns of oppression that increasingly came into view. It provided no theoretical accounting for why more women appeared in some realms of activity than others, and why those realms continued to relegate women to secondary status. How were gender hierarchies constructed in the first place, and how did they change over time? It was not enough to trace women’s subjection in the past. Historians like Natalie Zemon Davis and Joan Kelly called for deeper understandings of the construction of sex roles and their meanings. Feminists needed a history that went beyond descriptive, compensatory, and restorative functions.

In search of explanatory historical models, historians began borrowing concepts of ‘patriarchy’ from women’s studies and other social science disciplines, hoping to account for women’s collective oppression over time. Some scholars chose to locate the impetus for patriarchy in men’s alienation from women’s reproductive role, others in women’s sexual objectification. Both theories of origin privileged a focus on sexual exploitation in the family, where a differential of power between the sexes first materialized before reverberating into other contexts—politics, the workplace, the market, legal systems, and so on. Indeed, if there was a facet of women’s lived experience that seemed universal, it was their circumscribed domestic ambit compared with men’s broader public sphere. Patriarchy seemed to explain women’s pervasive domesticity as more than mere coincidence.

The presumption that men and women occupied dichotomous spheres was helpful for organizing women’s experience and explaining their perpetually lower status. But the model was rigid, leaving little room to imagine women as anything but victims of patriarchal forces. Some historians viewed these ‘vic-timologies’ as no more effective tools of liberation than were unproblematized celebrations of women, and hence changed tack to evaluate the culture of women’s domestic sphere on its own terms. Barbara Welter, Carol Smith Rosenberg, and others came to regard it as something women consciously shaped and utilized for heightened stature and autonomy. Their historical subjects were not exceptional women who avoided the drudgery of the home, but those who acquired informal modes of power and moral authority from their domestic roles.23 Women’s domestic culture was, as they viewed it, a consciously constructed base of operations from which women enjoyed their own sense of status, love, and fulfillment—and subversively influenced the public sphere. They suggested that the paradigm of separate spheres could explain women’s absence in the historical record (which had privileged the public realm), while also revealing women as empowered agents.

Such projects lent nuance to the overly bleak or celebratory tone of histories of women, but they did not identify patriarchal forces with much precision, nor did they account for women experiencing them differently across class and context. Historians grew anxious to account for change in relations between men and women and between themselves. But they also grew tired of fixating solely on biological sex; they wondered how they could account for constructed sex—masculinity and femininity—and its change over time. Patriarchal models were fine as far as they went, but could they shed light on women without particularizing them, both to their advantage and detriment? The separate-spheres paradigm worked well to frame the experiences of well-to-do Western women, casting them as empowered agents of a newly valued realm of influence, but it grew apparent that it also prescribed a brand of womanhood inflected by race, class, sexuality, and ethnicity. Though feminist historians would become some of the greatest critics of oppositional theories of private and public spheres (many recognizing them as problematic constructs of liberal and republican political thought), they left the framework largely unchallenged through the 1970s.24

As the base of the feminist movement diversified, historians wrote on women as well as varied issues shaping their lives—birth control, radicalism, homosexuality, prostitution, immigration, slavery, and imperialism, among others. Coverage of non-white, poor, Third World, and homosexual women increasingly

24 See Kathleen Canning, Gender History in Practice: Historical Perspectives on Bodies, Class, and Citizenship (Ithaca, 2006), 18.
revealed an ideal of separate spheres that empowered some women at the expense of others, or that failed to characterize the ways in which men and women understood sexual roles in their societies. On the surface, women of Imperial China, for example, appeared the quintessential victims of separate-spheres ideology. Western historians pointed to arranged marriage, patrilocality, son preference, foot binding, concubinage, sex segregation, and any number of patriarchal practices to make the case for their victimization. But was it proper to impose this model of sexual organization on a society that viewed sex roles in different terms? Indeed the Chinese conceived of ‘inner’ (nei) and ‘outer’ (wai) spheres of influence that belonged to women and men respectively, but they were not analogous to Western notions of the private and public since the dynamics between them were more fluid, complementary, overlapping, symbiotic, and, arguably, bolstering of women’s relative status.25

Other historical women show the limitations of separate spheres—both as explanatory and prescriptive models. Various Jewish and indigenous women have lived in societies in which members defined spheres of influence differently, as women assumed responsibilities ‘outside’ the home as breadwinners, house builders, skilled artisans, spiritual leaders, and heads of state. Women of North American Indian tribes found the imposition of separate spheres, as defined by white, Christian missionaries, more stifling than natural. In their conversion to Western notions of ‘civility’, they relinquished their influence over diplomacy and agricultural production—duties that afforded them great political and economic power.26

Debates over the paradigm of separate spheres made it increasingly clear to Western historians that they could no longer ignore the glaring fact of difference between historical women. The rise of transnational and multicultural consciousness within the feminist movement also brought questions of historical difference to the surface. The radical feminist journal Quest asked readers whether it was possible to ‘talk about the global oppression of women…in any universal terms’. Sociologist Chandra Mohanty believed that Western feminists could only view the commonality of the category of women with scepticism. Increasingly, critics demanded more sensitivity to the ‘politics of location’. Estelle Freedman explains that ‘neither oppression nor liberation looked the same from the perspective of women in Asia, Africa, Latin America, and the Middle


East’, but this idea of location also had socioeconomic, cultural, and psychic dimensions. In short, there was no such thing as a singular ‘woman’s history’; women had ‘histories’, and they had to be told through a range of perspectives.  

Inevitably, scholars of women from ethnic minorities, lesbians, and the working class challenged paradigms originally conceived to create a sense of unity and collective consciousness during the early years of women’s liberation. Radical elements of the feminist movement asserted in the early 1970s that ‘sisterhood is powerful’, but later cautioned against narratives that reified women’s collective consciousness at the expense of historical accuracy. African-American scholar bell hooks determined that Western feminism itself had a racist, nationalist legacy that had to be acknowledged. To that end Nancy Hewitt described the ways by which class interests, religious doctrine, racism, nationalist sentiment, and cultural difference divided American feminists and in fact often caused women to identify more readily with men. White suffragists had lobbied against the political rights of black women to shore up their own rights, she insisted, while privileged women exploited working women to enhance their social status and material comfort. Wittingly or not, Western women had been agents of imperial conquest, decimating cultures of indigenous women and colonized subjects. White expansionists justified their hunger for land by claiming to bring ‘civilization’ in their wake—a concept defined in no small part through delineations of sexually defined separate spheres. They decided that traditional practices such as foot-binding, sati, polygamy, female circumcision, and veil-wearing were hallmarks of barbarism, as if they did not have patriarchal practices of their own. In fact their patriarchal systems utilized categories of difference between women—a sort of divide and conquer technique—to maintain the primacy of men overall.

Historians engaged in other debates endemic to second-wave feminism. Radical and working-class elements within the movement wondered if liberal feminists’ goal of equality in politics, the professions, and higher education was desirable when women took no part in shaping the masculinist culture of these institutions. Likewise radical and liberal historians debated about whether their histories should make the case for women’s and men’s inherent sameness or difference, as well as sex-integrated or separatist politics. In 1986 such

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28 Robyn Morgan (ed.), *Sisterhood is Powerful: An Anthology of Writings from the Women’s Liberation Movement* (New York, 1970); and bell hooks, *A’int I a Woman* (Boston, 1982).


questions came to a head in the United States when two historians of women, Rosalind Rosenberg and Alice Kessler-Harris, served as expert witnesses in a trial over discrimination in the workplace. Harris used her knowledge of women’s labour history to determine that the Sears Corporation had in fact created discriminatory glass ceilings for women managers in the present day. Rosenberg, however, insisted that the history of women’s different intentions in the workplace be taken into account, for women have not always acted like men nor desired the same concept of professional promotion.\textsuperscript{31} The tensions that ensued over the court case revealed how seriously historians of women took the business of revisiting the past for feminist ends. Regardless of where one fell on the issue, a larger message was clear: if women’s history was supposed to espouse a feminist politics, there was not a singular politics to espouse.

GENDER HISTORY AS COMPLEMENT AND CORRECTIVE

By the mid-1980s, historians of women felt hamstrung by the theoretical limitations of their field. They lacked explanatory models, but also ways for making women relevant to historians of other subjects. ‘[W]hile rediscovering the worlds that women have inhabited is important’, an historian editorialized in History Workshop in 1985, ‘it can lead to ghettoisation of women’s history and to its presentation in forms which historians working in different fields find easy to ignore’.\textsuperscript{32}

Kathleen Canning recalled this crossroads and the eventual transformation that resulted. A gradual breakdown of the category \textit{woman} as subject, object, and monolithic political identity had begun to propel the turn to \textit{gender}:

The intellectual forces driving the shift from women to gender were multiple. The achievements of nearly two decades of scholarship in women’s history were significant, but had left the chronological and conceptual framings of history unshaken. Feminist historians delivered powerful critiques of the dualism of public-private and worked to dissolve or transcend the sex/gender distinction as well. Yet the binary pairings of home/factory, production/reproduction, and production/consumption remained tenaciously in place. As feminist historians sought, empirically and theoretically, to overcome or dissolve these dualisms, they began to pose more fundamental challenges to established chronologies, categories, and theories of historical transformation. In the natural and social sciences feminists critiqued biological essentialism as an explanation for sexual inequality, emphasizing instead the power of languages and discourses to define hierarchies of sex and gender and to anchor them in social practices and institutions.\textsuperscript{33}

\textsuperscript{32} The 1985 editorial is quoted in Rendall, “Uneven Developments”, 49.
\textsuperscript{33} Kathleen Canning, ‘Gender History: Meanings, Methods, and Metanarratives’, in ead., \textit{Gender History in Practice}, 7–8.
Of course there was not a single moment when historians decided ‘gender’ history should replace ‘women’s’ history, and indeed they continue to exist both separately and in concert. But there was an urgent sense that women’s experience had to be theorized rather than described, that it had to be seen in relation to the experiences of men and other women, and that its symbolic representations had to be analyzed and understood. If there were a single essay ushering in the ‘age of gender’ among English-speaking historians, it would be Joan Wallach Scott’s ‘Gender: A Useful Category of Historical Analysis’ (1986), later included in her *Gender and the Politics of History* (1988). Scott grappled with theoretical approaches to gender and the totality of historical questions that gender answered and raised. She wanted not only to equip feminist historians with new tools, but also to urge all historians to contend with gender and explore its uses.

What separated ‘gender’ from ‘woman’ as an historical category was its enabling of relational analysis and its applicability to discourses, institutions, and abstractions, regardless of the existence of biological sex. Joan Kelly was aware of the ramifications of this relational history well before she died in 1982. She saw that it would do more than bring women out of obscurity, and it would also redefine chronologies and master narratives that historians accepted as absolute. Scott agreed, and called for scholars in all historical fields to employ gender to challenge accepted modes, paradigms, and epistemologies of historical practice. Though ‘gender’ initially signified most simply the social or cultural relations between the sexes, her call for interdisciplinary perspectives helped to expand its meaning to include the symbolic system in which men and women operated. By the end of the decade, scholars dedicated to gender as subject, lens, and analytic tool founded the journal *Gender and History* (1989), figuring that the fodder for its pages would be endless.

Scott encouraged the postmodernist turn to meanings in language, but not before assessing the strengths and limitations of other existing feminist approaches. We’ve already seen that patriarchy was a concept too universalizing to aid in understanding change in gender relations over time and context. Though a helpful point of departure, it largely limited analysis to that of fixed biological sex. Marxist theory, in contrast, had been derived from historical conditions too circumscribed to be applied broadly to women. How could one attribute women’s oppression to capitalist forces when women had been subordinate to men before capitalism and continued to be under socialist regimes? Marxist feminists ultimately viewed class as the primary category of oppression, discounting the oppression that women experienced in other forms. A few deviated slightly from orthodox theory to conclude that economic and gender systems were ultimately autonomous, but interacted to create historical

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34 Joan Kelly, ‘Did Women Have a Renaissance?’
experience. While this modified approach provided a sense of historical time and place to oppression, and accommodated factors of race and class in differentiating women’s experience, it still made gender apparent almost exclusively as a manifestation of the material world. Psychoanalytic theory, in stark contrast, delved into the representational and subconscious. Both Anglo-American object-relations theorists and French structuralist and post-structuralist interpreters of Freudian psychoanalysis turned to early stages of child development for clues into the origins of gender identity, but the latter also explored these origins through language—an avenue of promise for gender historians. Still, in its pure form, psychoanalytic theory left something to be desired, since penis envy, the Oedipal complex, or any number of masculinist concepts supposed that identity formation and gendered meanings were predicated on inherent and unchanging sexual antagonism.

When Scott stripped each approach of its limitations, she found the postmodernists’ facilitation of seeing and contesting meaning through language the most compelling; their techniques would allow feminist historians to conceive of gender as fluid, even fictional, and ultimately to contest universal categories of man. They made apparent the ‘human-madness’ and hence mutability of the norms and practices of gender, and they rendered relative the status of man-made knowledge itself. Although sociology, anthropology, philosophy, and psychoanalysis provided useful tools for analyzing history and gender, the crossover into literary criticism—the study of textuality—turned especially fruitful. Michel Foucault, Roland Barthes, and Jacques Derrida had exploded notions of the transparent text, and allowed for the sort of representational analysis that Scott had in mind. One could account for the meanings attached to gender—the ‘variability’, ‘volatility’, and ‘political nature of its construction’.

Some historians proved reluctant converts to this new form of cultural history. It seemed sacrilege to treat historical sources like literary texts in which ambiguous forces of gender signification clashed and revealed themselves in unobvious ways. Historians trained in the positivist tradition were leery of the symbolic realm when they had long been taught that meaning was transparent and knowable through unchanging material evidence. And yet Scott challenged
them to wonder at the extent to which meaning was obtainable at all. Man was not a fixed historical fact, nor was woman. Not only were the human beings who featured in histories gendered, but so were the institutions through which they operated and the conventions by which they were made known to present-day observers. Increasingly historians were forced to contemplate the extent to which their own genderedness had bearing on the histories they wrote. History itself is not exclusively ‘the record of change in the social organization of the sexes’, Scott explained, but also ‘a participant in the production of knowledge about sexual difference’. If this is true, said detractors, then the historian has lost his raison d’être altogether.40

Scott struck a nerve, particularly among scholars for whom omniscience and objectivity were reinforcing claims. But, over time, more historians, if not completely engaging postmodern ideas, have become reflective of the cultural biases they bring to their histories. For historians of gender the turn to cultural theory has added to their analytic arsenal and allowed them to view the gendering of meaning in multiple ways—including in the practice of history itself. Several have traced masculinist notions about what constitutes the ‘historical’—wars, laws, and statesmanship—all the way back to Classical times. Nina Baym has shown that in the antebellum United States various forms of historical writing and commemoration were once the preserve of women, while Bonnie Smith has revealed how only decades later history’s academization became a masculinizing process. Well into the twentieth century, professional and amateur history (and historians) acquired identity by becoming associated with concepts defined discursively as masculine and feminine: scienticity, disinterestedness, empiricism, individualism, and exceptionalism versus anecdote, subjectivity, collectivity, dailyness, triviality, and impressionism.41 In uncovering the gender of history, we can move beyond the compensatory functions of herstory to recommend alternatives to the masculinist content and procedures of historical practice. Finally, we see women collectively as historians and historical actors: for centuries they had been operating under some other name.

GENDER: THE FEMINIST PROJECT AND BEYOND

In the 1980s gender serviced feminism but also shed light on other categories of identity formation. Scholars revisited race and class anew through the lens of gender, and they finally explored sexuality with added levels of nuance. Now that gender could be teased out from all intertwined in it, historians of

40 Appleby, Hunt, and Jacob, Telling the Truth about History, 223–31; and Scott, Gender and the Politics of History, 2.
41 Spongberg, Writing Women’s History; Baym, American Women Writers and the Work of History; Smith, The Gender of History; and Des Jardins, Women and the Historical Enterprise.
homosexuality, queerness, and transsexuality could better reveal its constructed conflation with sexuality over time. Sex and gender are not part and parcel, they came to insist, though deviant and normalized conceptions of both have shaped each other before, and especially since, the rise of sexology in the twentieth century.

Much of the work in the history of sexuality has followed on the heels of Foucault’s explication of power and its dissemination through sexual repression. He and others since have revealed sexuality—as well as male and female bodies—as historical constructs. By 1990, British philosopher Denise Riley had suggested that the category ‘woman’ had a ‘peculiar temporality’, while Thomas Laqueur and Cynthia Eagle Russett concluded that agents of ‘Science’—from sexologists to phrenologists, physiologists to Freud—shaped categories as seemingly natural as anatomic male and female. While Jeffrey Weeks posited the idea of ‘playing sexual roles’, Judith Butler wondered if being female constituted a ‘natural fact’ or ‘cultural performance’. ‘Naturalness’ itself, she concluded, was ‘constituted through discursively constrained performative acts that produce the body through and within the categories of sex’. The ramifications of this understanding were immense, for phallogocentrism and compulsory heterosexuality were, as a result, challenged as default modes of operation.

‘Woman’—her representations, her sexuality, and her body—had been destabilized, as had heterosexuality generally, and yet by the early 1990s historians still had not explored normative masculinity in any systematic way. The fear of turning to men had been no doubt connected to the origins of gender history in a feminist movement preoccupied with the historically invisible female. Critics warned that masculinity studies merely posited male-centred history in fashionable ways. It was not a coincidence, they noted, that a disproportionate number of scholars interested in such topics were white men who had no perceptible stake in changing the status quo. Others disagreed, insisting that the very act of laying bare dynamics and mechanisms of power operated in the service of feminism. ‘That men remain unaware of the centrality of gender in their lives perpetuates the inequalities based on gender in our society’, Michael Kimmel explains. In showing the constructedness of what appears as natural as manhood, making visible what lurks imperceptibly, historians invite masculinity to be scrutinized and reworked. Constructs of manhood selectively empower, but they also

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pressure and constrain men who, like women, fall prey to social prescriptions to which they cannot measure up. Since the mid-1990s, studies on the formation of manhood from Canada to Africa, antiquity to the present, have revealed it as a patriarchal and historical process. Assessing ‘men’s history’ in the twenty-first century, Konstantin Dierks contends that gender has become ‘part of the standard analytical apparatus of any monograph’—a claim that is less often true in women’s history itself.46

In probing the cultural and discursive construction of sexual difference, historians have been able to centre the masculine subject, to question what appears transparent about masculine institutions, and find hidden meanings that empower those who, in the previous silences about them, have been passed down to us as historical victims. Yet these new possibilities for interpretation have also turned history into a daunting enterprise. With one hand, postmodernists unlocked theoretical shackles that prevented historians from seeing women and patriarchy in the past. With the other, they cautioned historians not to impose meaning on what they discovered. While new paths of exploration have been opened by the cultural turn, historians are now in the uncomfortable position of having to problematize what they thought was transparent about experience, identity, and agency in the past. Many historians of women’s liberation are disenchanted, for they, like the social historians who inspired them in the 1960s, based their brand of herstory on a concept of experience that was empirically knowable. In 1991 Joan Wallach Scott, too, challenged the authority of the category of ‘experience’, deciding it was not lived reality but a linguistic event that could not occur outside established meanings. Can we really understand the experience of a black gay man, she posited, when he does not necessarily make sense of himself or his world through gayness or blackness or otherness?47

Since the cultural turn, historians of gender have been forced to confront questions that are not easily answered. Can one really understand how aboriginal, or subaltern, or preliterate, or non-Western women made sense of their gendered pasts when they had not shared Western categories for organizing experience? Experience is already difficult to capture when represented in a subject’s own words; but when retrieved from the words of others, it comes to us as filtered and more distorted yet. Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak pondered whether the Third World subject—in her case the widow who engaged in the act of sati—could or should be represented in Western discourse at all. Chroniclers, historians, and agents of the state have made meanings of practices that could never be those of the widows themselves. The colonial subject will always become constituted in

Western narratives as ‘Other’, she concluded, despite the historian’s earnest attempt at identification with her subject. Here Spivak points to the very procedures of Western history as the insurmountable problem: is a ‘feminist’ history even possible when one cannot make meaningful connections between people past and present? Having embraced postmodern perspectives more readily, the historian of gender finds that these questions weigh heavily on her conscience.

The rise of multiculturalism and post-structural critique has done much to particularize and problematize the experiences of historical women, yet older popularizers of women’s history have wondered if this trend would undermine their original intent to unite women by historicizing their collective struggle. The first writers of herstory relied on the idea that women shared a consciousness, and that ultimately that commonality could be summoned for political purposes. But greater awareness of difference has led to women’s history that feels fragmented and coreless. Some have feared that the unifying function has been excised from it, and that the increased deployment of gender theory, too, has stripped women’s history of its feminist force. Where it once highlighted female agency and lived experience, more often women’s plight is no longer the ends but the means for understanding nationhood, imperialism, and abstractions constituted through gendered discourse. The writing of women’s history was once a political act; but after the linguistic turn, some feared it had been reduced to intellectual exercise.

Kathleen Canning agrees that gender has facilitated broader interrogations of identity, but not at the expense of the feminist aims of women’s history. ‘Gender history has not so much left women behind as it has redefined the terms of inquiry,’ she clarifies. And yet political, ideological, and generational rifts abound over decisions to call university departments ‘Women’s’ or ‘Gender’ Studies. Many historians of women’s liberation believe that the efforts they initiated in the 1970s to make women visible have not concluded; they continue to defend a brand of history that brings real, not symbolic, women out of the shadows to remind women of the human struggles they share. And yet while younger historians appreciate the goal of recovering experience, they increasingly look to uncover new truths that sometimes seem to be little about women themselves.

Joan Wallach Scott anticipated this inevitable confrontation between scholarship and activism, insisting that politics and gender history (as opposed to ‘women’s history’) are ‘antithetical neither to one another nor to the recovery of the female subject’. She hoped that gender history would never shed its radical politics and that postmodernist theory would in fact reradicalize it for future generations. And yet the most revolutionizing effects of gender analysis

49 Canning, Gender History in Practice, 61.
50 Scott, ‘Women’s History’, in ead., Gender and the Politics of History, 27.
may have been on the practice of history as a whole. It has appeared in this chapter as epiphenomenal, but other observers have seen gender analysis as a generative force of new cultural history. Indeed, early on, French feminists and women’s historians made suppositions about the social construction of gender that may have opened up the questioning of fixed identity that epitomized the cultural turn.  

In some ways debates over theory, method, and praxis bring us back to Mary Beard, the historian who once tried to fit it all into an inclusive tradition of women’s history. Although she borrowed theoretical concepts from academic historians, ultimately she believed her nascent form of gender history could only be practised outside the academy and put in the hands of women themselves. Certainly the analytic category of gender has become a tool of academics more often than Beard’s preferred historian at large, but we cannot forget that the origins of gender analysis are connected to a larger feminist movement that reverberated well outside the walls of the ivory tower. For now and for the foreseeable future, histories of women and gender will share a tension between the goals of recovering experience and explaining the mechanisms that shape it and give it meaning.

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Chapter 8
The Historiography of Environmental History

J. R. McNeill

Among professional historians most of the influential innovations of the twentieth century originated in Europe. Italians launched microhistory. Britons developed an anthropological social history. Most influential of all, French historians invented the famous Annales approach, drawing on all the social sciences to create what they sometimes called a total history. Environmental history, however, first took shape in the United States. This chapter will chart the evolution of environmental history in general, exploring its origins and growth, its flaws and eccentricities, and conclude with an assessment of its most active arenas.¹

While scholarship is not an Olympiad, it has from time to time national communities that somehow achieve greater international influence than others. That prominence rarely lasts for more than a few decades. In the sphere of environmental history, US scholars in the 1970s and 1980s, writing about US environmental history, especially the American West, achieved such influence and prominence. In the early twenty-first century they appear to have lost it. This is a sign of the robust health and maturity of the field: environmental history since 1980 has come to flourish in many corners of the world, and scholars everywhere have found models, approaches, and perspectives rather different from those developed for the US context.

WHAT IS ENVIRONMENTAL HISTORY?

Like every other subset of history, environmental history is different things to different people. My preferred definition is ‘the history of the relationship

¹ A longer but now somewhat dated deliberation on these and related themes is J. R. McNeill, ‘Observations on the Nature and Culture of Environmental History’, History and Theory, 42 (2003), 5–43.
between human societies and the rest of nature’. This includes three chief areas of inquiry, which of course overlap and have no firm boundaries.

First is the study of material environmental history—the human involvement with forests and frogs, with coal and cholera. This entails study of the evolution of both human impact on the rest of nature and nature’s influence upon human affairs, each of which is always in flux and always affecting the other. This form of environmental history puts human history in a fuller context—that of earth and life on earth—and recognizes that human events are part of a larger story in which humans are not the only actors. In practice, most of the historical work in this vein concerns the last two hundred years, when industrialization among other forces greatly enhanced the human power to alter environments.

Second is political and policy-related environmental history. This concerns the history of self-conscious human efforts to regulate the relationship between society and nature, and between social groups in matters concerning nature. Thus efforts at soil conservation or pollution control qualify, as perhaps do social struggles over land and resource use. Political struggle over resources is as old as human societies and close to ubiquitous. I would not use the term ‘environmental history’ to refer to contests between one group of herders and another over pastures, but I would use the term to refer to struggles over whether a certain patch of land should be pasture or farmland. The difference lies in the fact that the outcome of the struggle carries major implications for the land itself, as well as for the people involved. In practice, policy-related environmental history extends back only to the late nineteenth century, with a few exceptions for early examples of soil conservation, air pollution restrictions, or monarchical efforts to protect charismatic species for royal hunting pleasure. This is because only in the late nineteenth century did states and societies mount systematic efforts to regulate their interaction with the environment generally. Because these efforts were spasmodic and often modest in their effects, most of this sort of environmental history deals with the decades since 1965, when both states and explicitly environmental organizations grew more active in their efforts.

The third main form of environmental history is a subset of cultural and intellectual history. It concerns what humans have thought, believed, written, and more rarely, painted, sculpted, sung, or danced that deals with the relationship between society and nature. Evidence of a sort exists from tens of thousands of years ago in Australian aboriginal rock shelter paintings, or in the cave art of south-western Europe. But the great majority of this sort of work is drawn from published texts, as with intellectual history, and treats the environmental thought contained either in major religious traditions or, more commonly, in the works of influential (and sometimes not so influential) writers from Mohandas K. Gandhi to Arne Naess. This sort of environmental history tends to focus on

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2 A further extension of this principle is the ‘Big History’ of David Christian and Fred Spier. See Christian, Maps of Time (Berkeley, 2004); and Spier, Big History (Amsterdam, 1996).
individual thinkers, but it extends to the study of popular environmentalism as a cultural movement.

More than most varieties of history, environmental history is an interdisciplinary project. Many scholars in the field trained as geographers or historical ecologists. In addition to the customary published and archival texts of the standard historian, environmental historians routinely use the findings culled from bio-archives (such as pollen deposits which can tell us about former vegetation patterns) and geo-archives (such as soil profiles that can tell us about past land use practices). The subject matter of environmental history is often just the same as the subject matter in historical geography or historical ecology, although the sorts of sources emphasized normally differ. An illustration is the field of climate history, which is pursued by scholars from at least half a dozen disciplines, including text-based historians. Unlike natural science, most environmental history has to date been done by individual scholars, rather than by teams.

THE ORIGINS AND INSTITUTIONALIZATION OF ENVIRONMENTAL HISTORY (AS A SELF-CONSCIOUS ENTERPRISE)

Like every twist and turn within intellectual life, environmental history has countless and tangled roots. Some of the earliest extant texts, such as the Epic of Gilgamesh, deal with environmental change generated by human action (cutting cedar forests in this case). Many scholars of long ago found in the variations in the natural world—climate especially—a key to human behaviour, notably Ibn Khaldun and Montesquieu. Historical geographers since the 1870s charted landscape change. Among professional historians, awareness of geographical constraints and influences has long been a hallmark, although not a universal one. Fernand Braudel, in what was probably the twentieth century’s most influential book among professional historians, devoted a large chunk of *La méditerranée* (3 vols., 1949) to geography and environment.³

But environmental history as a self-conscious undertaking dates only to about 1970 and, like so much in intellectual life, drew its energy from society at large. Around the world, of course, the 1960s and 1970s witnessed the coalescence of popular environmentalism as a cultural and political force. It was stronger in some places than in others, and took different shapes in different contexts. In the United States it helped a few historians, initially scholars of primarily US history, to come together both intellectually and institutionally to launch environmental

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history. Among them were Roderick Nash, Donald Worster, Susan Flader, and an historian of the ancient Mediterranean, Donald Hughes. By some accounts, Nash, author of *Wilderness and the American Mind* (1967), an intellectual history of an environmental subject, was the first to employ the term ‘environmental history’.

Between Nash’s book and 1985 a small handful of books acquired status as foundational texts in US environmental history. The first was Alfred W. Crosby’s *Columbian Exchange* (1972), one of the few books whose title became part of nearly every historian’s vocabulary. Tellingly, Crosby had great difficulty finding a publisher for a book that revealed the extraordinary ecological consequences of the regular crossing of the Atlantic after 1492. Worster’s *Dust Bowl* (1978) took an iconic subject in US history and gave it a new twist. William Cronon’s *Changes in the Land* (1984), which explored the transformations of the southern New England landscape between 1600 and 1800, enjoyed great success and inspired imitation. Worster and Cronon soon became the most influential figures in US environmental history, joined by Richard White, who like Cronon featured Amerindians prominently in much of his work, and Carolyn Merchant, who put women front and centre. Martin Melosi and Joel Tarr pioneered urban environmental history.4

Primarily through the work of these leading scholars, environmental history won a place on the crowded stage of US history. Of new sub-fields in US history, only women’s history has enjoyed fuller acceptance. Only in India, I believe, have environmental historians attracted the attention of their peers as successfully as in the United States.

These US scholars, who continued to produce influential work, attracted international attention too. Historians around the world contemplating taking an environmental turn often read them, especially Worster and Cronon, while formulating their own projects. Worster’s work on droughts and irrigation, for example, seemed relevant in many settings outside the United States.5 The themes of cultural clash and colonization, developed in Cronon’s, Crosby’s, and White’s work, found interested readers among those writing about colonial encounters in Asia and Africa. White’s concept of a ‘middle ground’ seemed helpful to scholars of medieval Central Europe and Tokugawa Japan.6

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5 In *Rivers of Empire* (New York, 1985) Worster drew on Karl Wittfogel’s (now much discredited) ideas about irrigation management in Chinese history.

Part of the influence of the US authors must be attributed to institutional factors. The first generation formed the American Society for Environmental History (ASEH) in 1976–7 and by the early 1980s held regular conferences. Most importantly, the ASEH began publishing a journal, now called *Environmental History*, in 1976. Moreover, as in all fields of history, the Americans enjoyed advantages in the form of the general vigour and (comparatively) generous funding of US academia, and in the fact that so many historians around the world could read English. In contrast, the institutionalization of environmental history came later elsewhere. In every respect, the Americans enjoyed a firmer institutional footing sooner than environmental historians elsewhere. Numerically, Americanists still loom large in the early twenty-first century, and at a guess account for roughly half of the environmental historians around the world as of 2010.

But the intellectual prominence of the Americanists’ examples waned. Scholars elsewhere quickly found their own voices and confronted the limits of the relevance of American precedents. The American environmental historians’ emphasis on wilderness, for example, had minimal resonance in most of the world. Beyond that, while almost everyone in the field could read the work of the Americanists, they could not (or chose not to) read the work of scholars elsewhere. Over time, the proportion of environmental history written in Spanish, German, Italian, among other tongues, grew, and most Americanists could not read it. A few prominent works, such as Joachim Radkau’s *Natur und Macht* [Nature and Power] (2000), were translated for Anglophone audiences, but only a few. Thus, as the enterprise of environmental history globalized, the intellectual exchange expanded, but not evenly: by and large everyone around the world read the prominent Americanists, but the Americanists, for reasons of language and inclination, read only one another. This is not quite as blinkered as it sounds: Americanists were numerous enough that keeping up with their production alone became a full-time job by the 1990s.

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8 There were exceptions to this generalization such as Karl Jacoby, whose *Crimes against Nature: Squatters, Poachers, Thieves and the Hidden History of American Conservation* (Berkeley, 2001) owed something to Indian, Africanist, and British studies that presented conservation as an elite imposition upon unwilling peasantries.
CRITIQUES OF ENVIRONMENTAL HISTORY

Questions of language, training, and inclination also inform one of the three main weaknesses of environmental history. First is its awkward compatibility with the nation-state as a unit of analysis. Most historians for more than a century have defined themselves in national terms, as historians of Japan, Russia, Canada, or Mexico. The publishing industry and the job markets reinforced this socialization. The investment in linguistic skills made it seem unrewarding for someone who had learned Turkish to study the history of China. Moreover, many archives are kept by national governments and record the behaviour of a single state. Very few historians see themselves as specialists in a given time period (for example, 1600–50) around the world, and indeed most would find this ambition absurd, as they would the idea of specializing in, say, the history of plantations or monasticism or smallpox throughout the ages and around the globe. The main reason these things seem absurd to most historians is the importance of reading texts in original languages—and there is a great deal to be said in favour of this preference. However, this preference fits poorly with most forms of environmental history. The natural phenomena that form part of environmental history’s subject matter pay no heed to political borders. Elephants, manatees, and sulphur dioxide plumes migrate across boundaries with impunity. The cultural and intellectual trends concerning human views of nature migrate internationally with almost equal ease, as the rise of modern environmentalism as a popular movement around the world in the 1960s and 1970s attests. Only in the realm of policy and political environmental history does the historian’s preference for national units of analysis make much sense. The longstanding, although weakening, fetish for national-scale history is problematic for many genres of history, but especially so for environmental history.

The second problem for environmental history is that it consists (allegedly) of a single dreary and repetitive tale of woe. Environmental historians grandiosely call the tendency to write in this vein ‘declensionism’. In the 1970s and 1980s, many scholars found in environmental history an opportunity to critique the environmental record of societies, their own or others, writing ‘degradation narratives’. With varying degrees of plausibility, they located in the past societies which behaved with ecological prudence and restraint, or at least a better time when ecosystems were intact. Since those halcyon days, it seems, all has gone relentlessly downhill.

The weight of this critique has diminished over time. Since the 1980s, environmental historians have lost some of their political commitment and moral certitude, especially in Europe and North America, and are ever more

9 One unhappy reader was Simon Schama, Landscape and Memory (New York, 1995), 13.
apt to write about environmental change rather than ‘loss’ and ‘degradation’. Their stories have grown more complex, in recognition of the likelihood that environmental change is good for some people and species and bad for others.\(^\text{10}\) The beguiling formula of Aldo Leopold’s ‘Land Ethic’ (‘A thing is right when it tends to preserve the integrity, stability, and beauty of the biotic community. It is wrong when it tends otherwise’\(^\text{11}\)) seemed progressively less suitable as a guiding principle as layer after layer of complexity emerged from ever more researches. Moreover, historians found encouraging stories of environmental change that could scarcely be seen as degradation, such as the reduction in urban air pollution in many cities since 1965, or the diplomatic protocols that led to bans of chlorofluorocarbon use (thereby sparing the ozone shield a slow death).

Related to the impatience with declensionism is a critique of degradation narratives as either intentional or unwitting accusations of improper ecological conduct on the part of others, especially Africans. Environmental history that found degradation as a result of African land use was suspect, complicit with colonialism, because it implied that Africans ought not be allowed sovereignty over African ecosystems.\(^\text{12}\) Normally this view carried weight only when applied to European and American authors writing about formerly colonial, or Amerindian, societies.

Third among the chief faults found with environmental history is environmental determinism. Scholars in the social sciences and history have been highly sensitive to environmental determinism for more than half a century, as a result of early twentieth-century over-enthusiasms (for example, the geographer Ellsworth Huntington), and the efforts to justify Nazi racism by recourse to biological determinism. Hence any effort to explain matters with emphasis on environmental or biological factors attracts objections. Alfred W. Crosby’s Ecological Imperialism (1986) is a case in point. It argues that the success of European imperialism in the temperate Americas, in Australia, and in New Zealand owed a lot to the unconscious teamwork of pathogens, plants, and animals that paved the way for the imposition of imperialism, the removal and near-extinction of indigenous peoples, and the creation of settler societies. To some this seemed to go much too far, serving to exculpate Europeans for crimes against humanity (which a proper reading of Crosby rules out). To others, it seemed to locate agency and causation not in human choice and social structures, but in viruses, sheep, and bluegrass (which to a considerable degree Crosby did). Jared Diamond’s enormously popular and much admired Guns, Germs, and Steel (1997), which I do not consider a work of environmental history but which Diamond and others do, aroused sharp

\(^{10}\) Useful comment on these trends among Americanists is found in Peter Coates, ‘Emerging from the Wilderness (or, from Redwoods to Bananas): Recent Environmental History in the United States and the Rest of the Americas’, Environment and History, 10 (2004), 407–38.

\(^{11}\) From Aldo Leopold, The Sand County Almanac (New York, 1949).

\(^{12}\) James Fairhead and Melissa Leach, Misreading the African Landscape (Cambridge, 1996).
criticisms for its efforts to explain the long-term distribution of wealth and power around the world in environmental terms.\textsuperscript{13}

**A QUICK AROUND-THE-WORLD TOUR**

Critiques and complaints about the genre notwithstanding, since the 1970s environmental history has appealed to thousands of scholars around the world. However, the degree to which environmental history has made inroads in professional history varies tremendously from place to place and era to era. About eras I will only say that in general the further from the present, the less interest environmental historians have shown. The chief exceptions to this are the ancient Mediterranean, where comparatively abundant sources and other attractions have invited historians and classicists to take up the theme,\textsuperscript{14} and the 1960s–1970s, where the tumult of popular environmentalism cast a spell over historians’ imaginations.

Regionally, matters are especially uneven. Here I will touch down quickly on several world regions, and dally only in South Asia and Latin America. Historians of Australia and New Zealand have taken to environmental history with gusto since the early 1990s. The theme of ecological change brought by settler colonialism, especially the extinction of native species and the spread of exotics, predominated in both countries. The brevity of the settler period and the pace of ecological change made this theme irresistible, although subjects such as the (politically sensitive) ecological impact of Aborigines and Maori, and the meanings of modern environmentalism, have also found their historians.\textsuperscript{15}

South-East Asia may be well served by writers working in Thai, Malay, or Tagalog; I do not know for sure, but colleagues tell me it is not so. Greg Bankoff and Peter Boomgaard led the way in bringing Southeast Asian environmental history to international audiences, again highlighting colonial themes in the

\textsuperscript{13} See for example, Patricia McAnany and Norman Yoffee (eds.), *Questioning Collapse* (New York, 2009) which contains a dozen critiques of Diamond’s *Collapse* (New York, 2005) and *Guns, Germs and Steel* (New York, 1997).


Philippines and the Dutch East Indies respectively. East Asia presents a contrasting picture. If my informants are correct, Chinese, Japanese, and Korean historians were, as of 2000, little interested in environmental history, but foreigners working on China had made excellent use of the approach. Here the majority of work came from scholars closer to economic history, and themes such as agriculture, irrigation, and state management predominated. Soon after 2000, however, Bao Maohong, originally an Africanist, led the development of environmental history within China.

Leaving South Asia aside for the moment, the rest of Asia remains almost terra incognita for environmental history—in other words, a beckoning opportunity. While historical geographers have done excellent work on South-West Asia, Central Asia, and Russia, environmental historians have scarcely set to work.

Europeanists since 1990 have excelled in producing provocative environmental history. A landmark early work, The Silent Countdown, edited by Peter Brimblecombe and Christian Pfister (1990), set a fine example, showing some of the variety of possible subjects and how to make use of a comparatively deep documentary base. Scholars working on Germany, Scandinavia, Scotland, and the Netherlands led the way in the 1980s, originally concentrating on forests and water issues, but the strong traditions of agrarian history in Italy, and especially in Spain, soon led to a fruitful exploration of environmental themes in the rural history of southern Europe. East Europeanists got off to a late start, perhaps because environmental perspectives did not fit easily with the officially approved approach before 1989. Since 1989, Hungary and Czechia have developed small but lively environmental history communities. Perhaps because of the supply of suitable records, Europeanists have done more than others with climate history as it affected human affairs. They also brought environmental history to the subject of fisheries and the sea more systematically than anyone else. European environmental historians are sometimes inclined to lament the state of their field, partly on the grounds that mainstream historians seem uninterested in what they do (an interesting contrast to the fate of US environmental

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16 See, for example, Greg Bankoff and Peter Boomgaard (eds.), A History of Natural Resources in Asia (Basingstoke, 2007); and Boomgaard, Southeast Asia: An Environmental History (Santa Barbara, Calif., 2006).


20 See for example, David Starkey, Poul Holm, and Michaela Barnard (eds.), Oceans Past (London, 2007).
historians), but from an outsider’s perspective the Europeanists have done and continue to do well in almost every sphere of environmental history.\textsuperscript{21}

Africanists showed an early inclination to adopt environmental history perspectives. The famous challenges of African environments—aridity, disease—helped Africanists keep ecological matters in view. More than any other, the theme of colonial alteration to the environment has dominated, partly because of the availability of suitable sources. Of necessity, Africanists have gone further than anyone else in making the techniques of oral history serve the interests of environmental history. This allowed research into the environmental thought and practices of Africans, as opposed to the better-documented subjects of the doings of colonial states, science in the service of empire, and the resource conflicts between Africans and settlers. Lately it seems that work on South Africa pours out faster than that on the rest of the continent put together.\textsuperscript{22} The persuasiveness of Africanist environmental history is reflected in the fact that John Iliffe, one of the leading lights of African history since the late 1960s, chose to put environmental themes at the centre of his conspectus, Africans: The History of Continent (1995).

While historians of one region or another may have made an earlier start in adopting the perspectives of environmental history, by the time of writing, environmental history had travelled almost everywhere, from the polar regions to the equatorial latitudes, from ancient Mesopotamia to the day before yesterday. Almost every world region by 2008 had an environmental history survey.

Before turning to more detailed remarks on South Asia and Latin America, I must make a few remarks about global-scale environmental history. This enterprise has the obvious intellectual merit that many ecological processes are global in scope, and many of the cultural trends concerning the environment have been nearly so. But it has the equally obvious practical problem that mastering the relevant information is out of the question, and bringing coherence to the subject much more difficult than, say, to the history of asbestos regulation in Osaka or Kansas City. For decades the only global syntheses came from authors who were not professional historians, but geographers, and in one case a former mandarin of the British Foreign Office. Sociologists too joined the fray,

\textsuperscript{21} A recent lament is Sverker Sörlin and Paul Warde, ‘The Problem of the Problem in Environmental History’, Environmental History, 12 (2007), 116. The bibliography on the ESEH website serves as an introduction to the now vast literature in European environmental history.

unencumbered by the documentation fetish that historians acquire during their apprenticeship. Eventually, natural scientists attempted global historical treatments of subjects such as nitrogen and soil.

Professional historians began by taking slices of the whole, with books on global fire history by Stephen Pyne, or environmentalism by Ramachandra Guha. Joachim Radkau was perhaps the first to bring the sensibilities of the historian to general global-scale environmental history in his *Natur und Macht*. His was not a survey, but a sprawling series of soundings and reflections on everything from animal domestication to tourism in the Himalaya. A small flurry of world environmental histories appeared almost simultaneously—some written as surveys, some as portraits of an era. While the practical problems of such efforts will always remain, environmental history probably lends itself to global-scale work more readily than does, for example, labour history, women’s history, or intellectual history.

**SOUTH ASIA AND LATIN AMERICA: ACTIVE FRONTIERS**

Two of the most active arenas for environmental history since the 1990s have been South Asia and Latin America. Both appear energized by scholars’ investment in current environmental struggles. Note, however, that my choice to focus on these two regions is arbitrary; Canada, South Africa, and southern Europe have also been lively frontiers for environmental history in the past decade.

Within South Asia, indeed within all of Asia, environmental history-writing began earliest and appears strongest in India. Sri Lanka, Bangladesh, and

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27 Helpful anthologies include Richard Grove, Vinita Damodaran, and Satpal Sangwan (eds.), *Nature and the Orient: The Environmental History of South and Southeast Asia* (Delhi, 1998); David Arnold and Ramachandra Guha (eds.), *Nature, Culture, and Imperialism: Essays on the Environmental History of South Asia* (New Delhi, 1995); and Gunnel Cederlof and Kalyanakrishnan Sivaramakrishnan (eds.), *Ecological Nationalisms* (Delhi, 2006). Note also the
especially Pakistan, have come in for much less scrutiny. If this impression is not an illusion resulting from my English-language bias, it is probably a result of Indian scholars’ engagement with social and environmental struggles since 1980. As in Latin America, environmental history in India seems to carry more political content, a stronger social commitment, than it now does in Europe or North America, where that sort of engagement has waned since the 1970s and 1980s.

The vigour of Indian environmental history also results from the helpfulness of the historical records. The gazetteers of the Raj, for example, proved most useful for understanding land use patterns. Its forestry service left behind mountains of memoranda, allowing very detailed work on Indian forest management history. The lack of comparably meticulous work on the period 1500–1750 suggests that the record base left by the Mughals is not nearly so helpful, but that may be disproven in years to come. The success of Indian environmental historians may also owe something to their having easy access, through English, to work done elsewhere. The Indians too have often read Worster and Cronon.

Environmental historians of India (the great majority of whom are Indians working in India) developed some themes in preference to others. A good deal of early work focused on land use and forests, and issues of access to forests, especially under the Raj when ambitious state forest conservation efforts put officialdom on a collision course with peasants, for whom forests had routinely provided much of their wherewithal. Another important theme was water manipulation, including canal-building, chiefly in the colonial era, and dam-building, mainly since independence (1947). Indeed, one might fairly say that Indian environmental history grew out of the study of forests and irrigation. A third subject, taken up more recently, was the fate of wildlife—especially iconic mammals such as tigers and elephants, and their meanings in different Indian cultural settings. These are rural subjects, appropriate perhaps in India. But the tremendous urbanization of the last century has made Indian cities a most interesting and rewarding topic for environmental history—one that as yet has attracted almost no historians.

Environmental historians of India also tended to focus their work on the role of the state, whether that refers to the Mughal Empire, or more commonly the British Raj, or the post-1947 national state. There is a three-fold logic to this. First, since at least the middle of the nineteenth century, India has been home to environmentally activist states. Rulers chose to try to remake nature in India according to (evolving) ideas about modernity, security, and prosperity. Not content with the nature they inherited from the past, they sought to change and to manage it, in the service of either imperial or nationalist agendas. This is far

pioneering synthesis of Ramachandra Guha and Madhav Gadgil, *This Fissured Land: An Ecological History of India* (Berkeley, 1992), and the recent survey of Christopher Hill, *South Asia: An Environmental History* (Santa Barbara, 2008).

28 Mahesh Rangarajan, *India’s Wildlife History: An Introduction* (Delhi, 2001).
from unique, and never reached the levels of ambition attained by the Soviet state. But it supplies a rationale for historians (who rarely need encouragement) to focus on the role of the state.

Second, just as states indulge in gross simplifications in order to try to understand the complexity of the societies they rule, historians often focus on the state in order to simplify their tasks. In the Indian subcontinent the situation is especially challenging. Its ecological diversity, from Himalaya to deserts to rice paddies to jungle (and much else besides), is daunting enough. Add to that the linguistic, religio-cultural, and ethnic diversities, and then bear in mind that none of this stays still for long. Indian history is a kaleidoscopic swirl that, as much as anywhere in the world, drives historians to take intellectual refuge in emphasizing the role of the state.

Third, a focus on the role of the state makes environmental history in India (perhaps more than most other settings) more interesting and relevant to historians in general and the public at large. The significance of colonial rule has probably been the foremost preoccupation of Indian historians in the last half century, and certainly that issue has dominated Indian environmental historiography. While it may be that the import of colonial rule is exaggerated, it did bring major changes: new plantations, railways (and forest protection to ensure supply of railway sleepers), and far more ambitious irrigation, among other things. The colonial preoccupation, I cautiously predict, will change as the colonial experience recedes in time and memory. Historians of Africa, where admittedly colonial rule came later and lasted less long, have progressively demoted colonialism from its formerly dominant position among historiographical priorities. The same, I suspect, is happening, or will happen, in Indian historiography, both in general and with respect to environmental history. Against this prediction, it must be admitted, is the convenience of record-keeping and archives created and maintained by colonial authorities, which will long make work in this sphere tempting for historians.

Since the pioneering works of two decades ago, Indian environmental history has grown with extraordinary exuberance. Those working in the field freely admit that they can scarcely keep up with the spate of publications.

The same happy situation now exists for Latin American environmental history as well. Scholarship on this region included a rich tradition of historical geography dating back to Alexander von Humboldt. But environmental history, as such, arrived only with Crosby’s *Columbian Exchange*, which included a good deal about Latin America and the Caribbean, and in the 1980s, with the work of

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30 Probably the most influential was Ramachandra Guha, *The Unquiet Woods: Ecological Change and Peasant Resistance in the Western Himalaya* (Delhi, 1989).
31 The bibliography maintained by Lise Sedrez and colleagues included about 1,200 entries as of 2008: http://www.csulb.edu/projects/laeh/.
Luis Vitale and Warren Dean. Leaving aside the question of pre-Columbian Amerindian relations with nature—the preserve of anthropologists, geographers, and archaeologists—the main issues of Latin American environmental history have been connected to colonial conquest (as in South Asia) and settlement (unlike South Asia). More recently, work on industrialization, urbanization, conservation, and environmentalism has emerged, making Latin American environmental history both richer and less distinctive.

As in India, environmental historians have sought to explore the ecological impacts of colonialism and capitalism. Some of the themes are familiar, such as the installation of plantation economies, or the spread of deforestation. Dean took up both these in his final book, *With Broadax and Firebrand: The Destruction of Brazil’s Atlantic Forest* (1995)—a masterpiece of research and a model of politically committed scholarship. These themes also predominate in the as-yet thin environmental history of the Caribbean. Settlement of the pampas by people and herbivores naturally looms large in the environmental history of Argentina, summarized in Elio Brailovsky and Dina Foguelman’s prize-winning book. Within the environmental history of the colonial economy, pastoralism, irrigation, and mining attracted attention, although much opportunity remains, especially as regards mining. Who will write the environmental history of Potosí? Or Chilean copper?

Lately environmental historians of Latin America have struck out in new directions. While not neglecting the study of colonial transformations, they have begun to work on environmental thought and science in both colonial and independence periods. In terms of research, the standard setters were probably José Augusto Pádua and Stuart McCook. State programmes of nature conservation also came in for some treatment, usually on the national scale.

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37 José Drummond, *Devastação e preservação ambiental no Rio de Janeiro* (Niterói, 1997); Sterling Evans, *The Green Republic: A Conservation History of Costa Rica* (Austin, 1999); and
Latin America has for centuries been among the most urbanized parts of the world (today nearly 80 per cent of its people live in metropolitan areas), so the early work on rural and agrarian subjects acquired a complementary literature, albeit still small. The first in-depth work was Exequiel Ezcurra’s study of Mexico City and its surroundings, eventually followed by works on Brazilian cities such as São Paulo, regarded as an environmental blight, and Curitiba, a southern Brazilian city viewed by some as a bright example of enlightened environmental city planning. Bogotá is another giant city now the subject of an environmental history. Latin Americanists have gone further in the direction of urban environmental history than have the South Asianists (after all, their region is twice as urbanized), but plenty of interesting cities still await treatment.

Latin Americanists produced several regional (and national) overviews after Vitale’s early effort, taking into account the avalanches of new research. Guillermo Castro offered a compact survey, and Elio Brailovsky a longer one, both well within the declensionist tradition of environmental history. Shawn Miller’s *An Environmental History of Latin America* (2007) succeeded admirably as an introduction and conspectus of the field.

But there will soon be need for further overviews, as more research pours forth, and as new subjects find their historians. Climate history, for example, including the impacts of El Niño, have only just begun to figure in Latin American environmental history, and the same may be said of energy history—although Georgina Endfield and Myrna Santiago have shown some of the potential these areas hold. The entire Caribbean region, so prominent in one of the great achievements of modern historiography—the illumination of the world of plantation slavery—remains woefully underdeveloped when it comes to environmental history.


38 Exequiel Ezcurra, *De las chinampas a la megalopolis: El medio ambiente en la cuenca de Mexico* (Mexico City, 1990); Paulo Henrique Martinez (ed.), *História ambiental paulista: Temas, fontes, métodos* (São Paulo, 2007); and E Bela Maria de Castro Trindade, *Cidade, homem, natureza: uma história das políticas ambientais de Curitiba* (Curitiba, 1997).


CONCLUSION

Over its thirty to thirty-five year existence, environmental history has emerged from the shadows to become one of the fastest-growing sub-fields within professional history-writing. It has cropped up almost everywhere that historians are at work. In some respects Americanists still predominate, although less so every day. The political commitments of the early days have waned somewhat, especially in North America and Europe, but remain a strong motive for some environmental historians everywhere, and perhaps the majority of those working in India and Latin America.

In the first decade of the twenty-first century, environmental history appeared in robust good health. Nearly 700 scholars proposed papers for the first world congress, held in Denmark in 2009. The Encyclopedia of World Environmental History, published in 2003, quickly seemed out of date. Young scholars in dozens of countries continued to flock to environmental history. Much of this good health, regrettably, was owing to unhappy circumstances, notably the continuing anxieties over environmental problems around the world. As long as global climate change, fresh-water shortages, soil erosion and salinization, urban air quality, tropical deforestation, biodiversity loss, and a dozen other concerns remain with us, environmental history will probably maintain its grip on historians’ imaginations. Since these issues are likely to grow in salience (although one never knows), the future for environmental history looks distressingly good.

Sustaining innovation and intellectual excitement is always an issue for a young sub-field. In environmental history two easy routes remain which it can follow in the years to come: more interdisciplinarity, and more imitation. While many historians trained to work as individual scholars find it uncomfortable, interdisciplinary collaborations of the sort routine among, say, environmental archaeologists, is one way forward. Combining the data and perspectives of environmental historians with those of archaeology, ecology, botany, climatology, and so forth, while not without practical problems, will help push along the frontiers of knowledge.43

Paradoxically, more imitation will also propel environmental history forward. Americanists have as of yet taken virtually no notice of the social metabolism approach used to good effect by many scholars in Europe.44 The Americanists have written environmental histories of at least ten US cities, but no one has

43 A few examples exist: for example, Philip Curtin, Grace Brush, and George Fisher (eds.), Discovering the Chesapeake: The History of an Ecosystem (Baltimore, 2001). At Göttingen University the world’s largest environmental history graduate programme is premised on interdisciplinary approaches. Bao Maohong, ‘Environmental History in China’, reports that interdisciplinary collaboration is the norm in China.

44 For example, Oscar Carpintero, El metabolismo de la economía española: Recursos naturales y huella ecológica (1955–2000) (Madrid, 2005).
published one of an Asian or African city. In this respect at least, environmental history in, and of, the United States still deserves the attention of, and within, the limits implied by local variations, imitation by, scholars elsewhere. In short, to maintain its intellectual vibrancy, environmental history as a field needs more integration, both more integration with other disciplines, and more integration within itself, among scholars at work on different regions and different problems.

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Chapter 9
The Historiography of Science and Technology

Seymour Mauskopf and Alex Roland

Since the Second World War, historians of science and technology have been engaged in a dialectical conversation between past and present. Science and technology have evolved so rapidly in the last sixty years that historians must constantly revise their definitions of these fields and their understanding of their historical dynamics. Of course, as Carl Becker noted years ago, all generations rewrite their history in light of their current experience. ¹ But in few fields of historiography have current developments so thoroughly influenced perceptions of the past. Even the very terms ‘science’ and ‘technology’ are of relatively modern vintage, applicable to premodern history only with a certain risk of anachronistic distortion.

Several recent developments have had especially pronounced impact on history-writing in the field. The notion of scientific and technological progress, a product of the Enlightenment, has given way to a more sophisticated and less judgemental notion of change, stripped of the old progressive assumption that change necessarily entails some universal melioration of the human condition. Similarly, the truth claims of scientists and engineers, and the public perception of them as holding a privileged place in society by dint of their cumulative and unparalleled success, have given way to a perception that they bear considerable responsibility for many of the problems of the modern world—from despoiling the environment to producing weapons of mass destruction. The relationship between science and technology seemed to change, from a linear model of technology as applied science, to a more complex and interactive model often labelled ‘technoscience’. Scholars in some contexts perceived technology to be driving science, not the other way around.

It is not that science and technology are now objects of opprobrium, nor that scientists and engineers are uniformly suspect. Rather, these fields and the professionals who work in them have been problematized in a way that was anticipated only by the likes of Frankenstein or Faust. Einstein was a loveable,

¹ Carl Becker, ‘Everyman His Own Historian’, American Historical Review, 42 (1937), 221–36.
pacifistic genius who made possible the atomic bomb. Wernher von Braun was the visionary of spaceflight who built ‘vengeance’ weapons for the Nazis. Plastics are the cheap, versatile, all-purpose materials that defy biodegradation. Genetic engineering is the miraculous technoscience that holds out the prospect of human cloning. The Internet connects the human community while it carries child pornography with unprecedented speed and anonymity.

As historians of science and technology experienced the transformation of modern technoscience, they had to develop new concepts, methodologies, and theories to explain what they were witnessing. And they had to think about unprecedented topics, such as ‘big science’, particle physics, nanotechnology, genetic engineering, and photonics. Their attempts to understand the rapidly evolving worlds of science and technology going on about them suggested new ways of thinking about previous historical eras. More than in perhaps any other field, the historians reimagined their topics to suit the experience of their generation.

RETRORPESCIVE: HISTORIOGRAPHY BEFORE 1945

In delineating the historiography of science, a distinction enunciated by Arnold Thackray and Robert K. Merton between ‘cognitive identity’ and ‘professional identity’ is useful. The field developed a professional identity in the twentieth century, but history of science as a literary genre is ancient: one can reasonably style Aristotle the first historian of science. In the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, in the wake of unprecedented achievements in science during the previous century, accounts of the development of science became increasingly common. Some were philosophically oriented, whereas others, written by practising scientists, charted the history of emerging scientific disciplines.

Early in the twentieth century, scholarship that would influence the historiography of the next hundred years began to be produced. A number of French scientists pioneered the study of ancient and medieval science; Pierre Duhem’s ten-volume Le système du monde: histoire des doctrines cosmologiques de Platon à Copernic [The System of the World: A History of Cosmological Doctrines from Plato to Copernicus] (1913–59) is a classic example. These scientists were succeeded by philosophically trained scholars of sophisticated idealistic orientation, who focused on diachronic changes in systems of scientific ideas and perspectives. Their work deeply influenced such varied successors as Alexandre Koyré, Thomas Kuhn, and Michel Foucault.


3 Examples include Emile Meyerson, Identité et réalité (Paris, 1908); Hélène Metzger, Les doctrines chimiques en France du début du XVIIe à la fin du XVIIIe siècle (Paris, 1923); and Gaston Bachelard, Le nouvel esprit scientifique (Paris, 1934).
In Germany, the historically oriented sociologist Max Weber influenced scholars of the Scientific Revolution through his association of changes in religious sensibility connected with the Reformation and the emergence of capitalism and science. In England, during the 1930s, a Marxist orientation developed among a number of socially active scientists. The core of their orientation was to situate science in social context, particularly as responding to technological and economic needs. Related to this was the work of contemporary continental refugee scholars who stressed the importance of craft (and craftsmen) for the emergence of science in the seventeenth century.4

Two works of synthesis appeared in the late 1930s: Science, Technology and Society in Seventeenth-Century England (1938) by Robert K. Merton and Études Galiléennes [Galilean Studies] (1939) by Alexandre Koyré. Both were devoted to understanding the deep changes that marked the Scientific Revolution, but from very different perspectives.

Trained in philosophy, Koyré was concerned with delineating the ‘intellectual mutation’ that he saw as the essential feature of the Scientific Revolution, embodied in changes that took place in astronomy and physics. This mutation consisted in the substitution of a Platonic–Archimedean geometrical worldview for the qualitative, teleological Aristotelian one. Koyré allowed for little social and no craft or technological role in this mutation. Merton, by contrast, trained as a sociologist, was interested in social context rather than just the scientific ideas. Focusing on seventeenth-century England, Merton asked why science became socially and culturally important then, and found answers in the context of religion (Puritanism) and the demand-pull of technology. Koyré’s and Merton’s historical approaches were contrasted as ‘internal’ and ‘external’, with the internal approach favoured by historians of science down to the 1970s.

The historiography of technology before 1945 differed greatly from that of science. Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels made the most profound contribution. Marx’s ‘materialist conception of history’, what Engels later called ‘historical materialism’, privileged matter over ideation.5 History, said Marx, was the story of mankind’s struggle to control the ‘forces of production’. Class struggle was nothing more than the organization of society for purposes of controlling production. The Hegelian dialectics that informed Marx’s view of historical change were limited to explaining how class struggle evolved, not how the forces of production changed over time. But always that class struggle was over the forces of production, over control of the material world. This worldview placed

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4 The papers of the most prominent of these scholars have recently been published. Edgar Zilsel, The Social Origins of Modern Science, ed. Diederick Raven, Wolfgang Krohn, and Robert S. Cohen (Dordrecht, 2000).
science and technology at the core of a powerful explanatory synthesis. For Marx, science was the attempt to study matter, and what came to be called technology was the attempt to shape matter for human purposes. While few historians of technology have fully embraced Marx’s materialist fundamentalism, many have accepted his notions of class struggle, and have attempted to protect Marx from accusations of technological determinism.\(^7\)

The modern trajectory of the history of technology began with hagiographic studies of great men of engineering. Samuel Smiles, a Scottish editor, political reformer, and railroad executive, wrote a series of biographies, primarily of civil engineers whose lives embodied Victorian ideals of self-help and civic virtue.\(^8\) This great-man history celebrated the achievements of Britain’s Industrial Revolution and reflected the optimism, materialism, and hubris that historian Michael Adas saw behind the British conceit of ‘machines as the measure of men’.\(^9\) For Smiles and many of his fellow Britons, British technology demonstrated the superiority of Western civilization, and justified its hegemony over the sprawling Anglophone. This triumphalism would continue to shape the history of technology through the first half of the twentieth century.

Writing during the Great Depression, Lewis Mumford adopted a far more critical approach. A public intellectual whose repertoire stretched from literature and architecture to world history and cultural studies, Mumford achieved his greatest impact on the history of technology with *Technics and Civilization* (1934). This synthetic overview of mankind’s attempts to live securely, comfortably, and harmoniously in the material world conceptualized history as passing through three great ages defined by their dominant materials and sources of power. Though Mumford condemned the excesses of the ‘paleotechnic’ age of iron and steam, he looked to the dawning ‘neotechnic’ age of aluminium and electricity to provide a kinder, gentler accommodation with the natural environment. After the Second World War, his optimism for a natural, organic relationship with nature gave way to a dark scepticism about an increasing artificial, mechanical, and unsustainable materialism.\(^10\) Mumford had an especially important influence on social critics such as Jacques Ellul, E. F. Schumacher, and Marshall McLuhan, who shared his distrust of the growing influence of technology on life in the late twentieth century.

Economists also made important contributions to the history of technology in the years before the Second World War. Although Adam Smith may be credited with providing a theoretical foundation for modern capitalism from the vantage


point of Britain’s Industrial Revolution in the late eighteenth century, few economists had as much influence on the modern history of economics and technology as Joseph Schumpeter. Among his many contributions, he identified technology as an independent variable in economic systems, he discerned the difference between invention and innovation, and he challenged conventional notions of progress by noting the ‘creative destruction’ of capitalist enterprise. These concepts not only shed light on the world that evolved following Schumpeter’s death in 1950, but also stimulated fruitful reinterpretation of earlier fields. Additionally, it attributed to the history of technology explanatory power that rivalled Marxist materialism.

PROFESSIONALIZATION OF THE 1950s

The extraordinary developments in the basic sciences of the first half of the twentieth century were matched by those of industrial research and development. The two trends came to dramatic synthesis in the productions associated with the Second World War (antibiotics, radar, atomic weapons), and in the post-war productions climaxing in the opening of the space age with Sputnik (1957). The 1950s, witness to the birth of molecular biology and computer science, also saw continued expansion of industrial research and development and unprecedented government support of science, leading to the age of ‘big science’. The prominence of science and industry fostered historical investigation into the origins of Western hegemony in science and technology, as well as into the nature of scientific and technological change.

By 1938, history of science had begun to develop a professional identity and organization. This was principally the work of one entrepreneurial scholar, George Sarton. Born and educated in Belgium but spending most of his career in the United States (Harvard), Sarton founded the first history of science scholarly journal, *Isis*, in 1912 and in 1924 organized the History of Science Society. In these same years, the field began to receive some academic accommodation: first at University College London (1924) and then at Harvard (1936), where President James Bryan Conant established a ‘Committee on Higher Degrees in the History of Science and Learning’.

By the time the first Ph.D. in the history of science was granted by Harvard in 1947 (I. Bernard Cohen), another programme had already been started at the University of Wisconsin. During the 1950s and early 1960s, the field began to

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12 For Sarton’s influence on the development of the history of science in the United States, see the special ‘focus section’ in the 100th volume of *Isis* ‘100 Volumes of *Isis*: The Vision of George Sarton’, *Isis*, 100 (2009), 58–107.
gain professional strength and coherence in the United States and Great Britain. For much of the 1950s, Harvard was central to the field due to the post–Second World War pedagogical activities promoted there by President Conant to use the history of science to convey to students the dynamic quality of the scientific enterprise as well as its best features. Two publications that resulted were *Harvard Case Histories in Experimental Science* (2 vols., 1957) and *The Copernican Revolution: Planetary Astronomy in the Development of Western Thought* (1957) by Thomas S. Kuhn. At this time, the Wisconsin programme sponsored a conference at which historians of science took stock of the state and directions of research in the field. 13

To the conference organizers, the Scientific Revolution was ‘a central point of focus’ for both teachers and researchers in the history of science. 14 Kuhn’s *Copernican Revolution*, characterized as ‘the single most influential’ of a small group of post–Second World War works in the history of science, 15 testified to this, as did two other pedagogically inspired studies: Herbert Butterfield’s *Origins of Modern Science* (1949) and A. R. Hall’s *Scientific Revolution, 1500–1800: The Formation of the Modern Scientific Attitude* (1954). Both scholars were English. Butterfield was a generalist European historian; Hall was one of the new history of science breed. Responding, like Conant, to the importance of science in war and peace, Butterfield became hyperbolic about the Scientific Revolution, arguing that ‘it outshines everything since the rise of Christianity’. 16 Hall’s study was more subdued, but also more technical and detailed than Butterfield’s. Both works took Koyré’s idealistic vision as a point of departure, but went far beyond Koyré in their scope.

Although all of these scholars were sensitive and scrupulous regarding earlier scientific epochs, they held to a positivist, progressive, as well as idealistic view of historical development. This viewpoint was epitomized in the ambitious essay on the development of the modern sciences by Charles Coulston Gillispie, the founder of the Princeton programme in the history and philosophy of science. Titled *The Edge of Objectivity: An Essay in the History of Scientific Ideas* (1960), the work was intended to help situate the history of science in the historical profession. By ‘objectivity’ Gillispie meant something close to Koyré’s geometrical nature (but also experimental), and Gillispie traced its diffusion from physics to chemistry and biology. By no means a triumphalist paean, the work

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14 Ibid., p. vii.
nevertheless saw science as epistemically progressive. For instance, to Gillispie, Aristotelian physics was simply ‘wrong. . . Nature is not like that.’

No synthesis comparable to Gillispie’s ushered the history of technology into the post-Second World War era. Rather, historians of technology individually found their way across the new terrain largely independently of one another. Only in retrospect do some patterns and highlights appear in this work. The atomic bomb may have tempered some of the triumphalism associated with the history of technology, but it also fed a new current of Cold War self-congratulations that celebrated Western science and technology as a bulwark against the threat of communist totalitarianism. Siegfried Giedion’s *Mechanization Takes Command* (1947) echoed some of Mumford’s concerns about the dehumanizing potential of machines, but most authors who turned their attention to the history of technology in the immediate post-war years simply accepted technology as an important, even defining, reality of modern life. They took it upon themselves to explore its historical roots.

R. J. Forbes of Amsterdam was clearly the most prolific author on the history of technology. Of Dutch-Scottish ancestry, he was a chemical engineer and self-taught ancient historian. He wrote a popular and influential overview of early technology, *Man the Maker: A History of Technology and Engineering* (1950), which argued that mankind’s ability and proclivity to make things distinguished us from the animals. And he wrote, with E. J. Dijkstra, *A History of Science and Technology* (2 vols., 1963), one of the earliest syntheses exploring the historical relationship between the two fields. Forbes’s masterpiece, *Studies in Ancient Technology* (9 vols., 1955), remains a reliable source for scholars at the beginning of the twenty-first century. Perhaps Forbes’s greatest contribution to the field was to illuminate the importance of technology in human life, going back before the dawn of history, and to suggest the centrality of technology from the beginning of civilization to the present. His work also avoided the Eurocentrism and modern focus that flavour so much history of technology, though his concentration on the ancient Near East precluded him from completely escaping the Western orbit in the way that Joseph Needham did in *Science and Civilization in China* (27 vols., 1954–2004).


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18 With apologies to Joseph Needham. Between 1936 and 1968, Forbes authored or co-authored at least twenty volumes of scholarship on the history of technology.
Western Civilization (2 vols., 1967). All three works displayed the nationalistic biases that were to colour most post-war histories of technology, though each made an attempt to cover all of Western—if not world—civilization. Each series drew primarily on authors from their respective countries, sacrificing synthesis and coherence for comprehension and authority. As collections, they displayed a tendency to view the field topically, demonstrating the many facets of technology in world history but paying less attention to the unifying themes that might organize the field conceptually.\(^\text{19}\)

As the histories of science and of technology emerged as recognizable fields of study in the first two decades following the Second World War, historians began to organize professionally in the United States, first under the umbrella of the pre-existing History of Science Society (HSS [1924]), and later divided between that organization and the break-away Society for the History of Technology (SHOT [1957]). Other comparable organizations formed in countries (mostly Western and/or developed) around the world. These institutional arrangements, with their attendant journals and conferences, shaped the ways their historians imagined themselves professionally and connected with the rest of the historical discipline. Taking a cue from George Sarton, the founder of the HSS, historians of science began the second half of the twentieth century viewing their field largely in terms of a positivist, progressive intellectual history. Sarton’s counterpart in the history of technology, Melvin Kranzberg, emphasized the social context of technology—he named the society’s journal *Technology and Culture*—and attempted to carve out for the field an independent identity that would make it something more than the history of applied science. As science and technology loomed ever larger in public life and consciousness in the space age that began with Sputnik in 1957, universities in the United States and around the world began forming departments and programmes to engage in the social and philosophical study of science and technology—a pattern that further isolated these fields from the mainstream of historical scholarship, while also giving them a short-lived but intoxicating cachet.

1962: NEW PARADIGMS

By the 1960s, public attitudes towards science and technology had changed from generally positive to critical. This was associated with other widespread social and cultural criticisms and changes (for example, the civil rights movement, and colonial independence movements). A seminal example of the critical attitude

towards science and technology was Rachel Carson’s *Silent Spring* (1962). The critical attitude was also mirrored in the historiography of science and technology from the 1960s onward, particularly in moves towards problematizing earlier valorizations of science and technology.

The 1960s witnessed both evolution and revolution in the history of science. As the field evolved professionally, the number of large-scale surveys diminished, to be replaced by monographs of more restricted compass; however, many were related through common foci—Lavoisier and the Chemical Revolution, or Darwin, for example. Editions of scientific correspondence and papers were also produced, and a massive collective project in scientific biography was undertaken.  

At a more theoretical level, the hitherto dominant positivist, progressive orientation was challenged, most dramatically by Thomas Kuhn’s *Structure of Scientific Revolutions* (1962). Kuhn replaced the progressive model of scientific development by a much more disjointed model of change. Mature scientific development—what Kuhn called ‘normal science’—was punctuated by episodes of ‘scientific revolution’, in which one set of guiding principles for scientific research (‘paradigms’ or ‘disciplinary matrices’) was rejected by a significant part of a disciplinary scientific community and replaced by another set incommensurable with its predecessor. In time, virtually all members of the community embraced the new paradigm.

Kuhn’s argument against progressive views, such as Gillispie’s, depended on an even more radical feature of paradigm change: it did not necessarily move ‘from some methodologically lower to some higher type’, and the explanatory domain of the successor paradigm did not necessarily encompass that of its predecessor. Consequently, settled questions in the old paradigm could become problematic in the new. Finally, because of paradigm incommensurability, rational debate over paradigm choice became knotty. Kuhn invoked psychological considerations such as *gestalt* switches and conversion experiences, and he suggested that extra-scientific considerations and generational factors played roles in paradigm choice.

Although many philosophers of science were resistant, some were led by Kuhn’s book to bring historical considerations into their analyses. Still, few abandoned their own idealistic and progressive view of scientific change. Kuhn himself held back from the most radical implications of his model but, as we shall see, others embraced them. Kuhn also remained an idealistic historian, citing Koyré and his French idealistic predecessors as his principal inspiration. But other historians started taking seriously extra-scientific factors. The republication in 1970 of Merton’s 1938 monograph brought into focus a debate over what, for a

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time, was styled ‘internal’ versus ‘external’ history of science. Prominent among
the external factors was technology.

Lynn White Jr.’s *Medieval Technology and Social Change* (1962) did not have
the transformative effect of Kuhn’s *Structure of Scientific Revolutions*, but it
offered historians of technology an original narrative style, a new way of con-
necting with mainstream historical scholarship, and a compelling example of the
explanatory power of technology as a category of analysis. White devoted his
career to challenging the conventional view of the Middle Ages as a ‘dark’ period
of backwardness and stagnation in European history, eventually giving way to the
‘Renaissance’ of classical civilization that would finally usher in the modern
world. He emphasized developments in religion, science, and technology that
distinguished the Middle Ages and accelerated what William H. McNeill called
in 1964 ‘the rise of the West’.\(^\text{21}\) *Medieval Technology and Social Change* presented
extended essays on the stirrup, developments in agricultural practices and tools,
and the introduction of machinery for the transmission and conversion of power.
The first innovation, said White, contributed to the development of the feudal
economic system. The second increased food production and spurred the com-
mmercial revolution beginning in the tenth century. The third made possible an
early industrial revolution, which failed to mature because of disease and the lack
of adequate political and financial institutions. Though White was harshly
criticized by some medieval historians, especially Marxists, for technological
determinism and reductionist over-generalization, his erudition and conceptual
elegance insulated his work from such attacks among historians of technology.\(^\text{22}\)
White went on to be President of the Society for the History of Technology, the
Medieval Academy of America, and the American Historical Association, con-
firming *Medieval Technology and Social Change* as one of the few works in which
a history of technology attracted a wide following in mainstream historical
scholarship.

**SOCIAL STUDIES OF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY**

In the 1970s, a new movement in the ‘sociology of scientific knowledge’ (SSK)
developed some of the radical implications of Kuhn. SSK drew on philosophy,
sociology, anthropology, and perhaps Marxist historiography to inquire into the
epistemology of Western scientific knowledge. Was that knowledge derived
‘internally’ from observation, experiment, and cognition, or was it shaped, as
Kuhn had suggested, by social forces? Originally based in Britain, the movement

1963).

\(^{22}\) Alex Roland, ‘Once More into the Stirrups: Lynn White Jr., *Medieval Technology and Social
Change*, *Technology and Culture*, 44 (2003), 574–85.
was often called the Edinburgh School for the university that spawned much of its early work. Its deeply interdisciplinary base led to the creation of the Society for the Social Studies of Science in 1975.

Sociologist David Bloor, a pioneer of the movement, characterized it as having two branches, especially when applied to the history of science. The ‘soft programme’, with which Kuhn was often identified, sought sociological explanations for the scientific communities that took ‘wrong’ paths. The ‘strong programme’, pursued by Bloor and his Edinburgh colleagues, such as Barry Barnes and John Henry, adopted a number of anti-positivist–progressive methodological principles. Their investigation would (1) seek the causes of beliefs or states of knowledge; (2) maintain impartiality about truth or falsity; (3) remain symmetrical in explaining true or false beliefs; and (4) use patterns of explanation that applied reflexively to sociology. In their scheme, paradigm-guided scientific education was similar to craft training, practised at local sites. The craft terminology affected the rhetoric of scientific activity: scientific method became ‘practice’, scientific discovery of natural knowledge ‘production’.

The establishment of scientific practices (and changes thereof) was explained in terms of the social environment and the interests of the individual actors or, more broadly, the structure of the relevant scientific community. Power, authority, and resources exerted a preponderant influence in determining whether crisis and revolution were at hand, and what resultant scientific practices would ensue. Most radical was the upending of the idealistic historical visions: scientific knowledge itself was ‘socially constructed’. A work exemplifying this approach with the widest influence among historians of science—once again set in the period of the Scientific Revolution—was *Leviathan and the Air-Pump: Hobbes, Boyle, and the Experimental Life* by Steven Shapin and Simon Schaffer (1985). The subject of the book was the emergence of ‘experimental practices’ and ‘experimental culture’ in Restoration England under the aegis of Robert Boyle, and focused on the newly invented air-pump. In place of an earlier self-evident inevitability, this emergence was explicitly problematized.

Shapin and Schaffer argued that the emergence of experimental culture and practice was closely tied to the new social-political-religious situation that was ascendant in England after 1660. They asserted, indeed, that Boyle’s experimental set-up constituted a microcosm of the body politic and society, and also something of a model of what the latter should be. Boyle himself, although affecting a modest demeanor, was an exemplar of the man of power, authority, and resources in Restoration England.

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Of equal significance was their treatment of the actual ‘material technology’ of the experimental culture: in this case, the air-pump. The operation (and knowledge production) of this, too, was problematized. Moreover, the transfer of operational technique and knowledge from one experimental site to another faced the same challenges of any craft transfer.

The ‘strong programme’ found its way into the historiography of technology, largely through the influence of Harry Collins and his students at the University of Bath. The ‘Social Construction of Technology’ (SCOT, sometimes ‘hard SCOT’) challenged the conventional narrative of scientists ‘discovering’ new knowledge that could then be ‘applied’ by engineers to bend the natural world to human purposes. The very terms ‘science’ and ‘technology’ were problematized and historicized as modern Western idioms used to bestow social capital on the practitioners of these enterprises and legitimize their truth claims. In fact, according to the constructivists, scientists and engineers were social actors like any other, competing among themselves and within society at large for status and resources.

The foundational text of the SCOT movement, *The Social Construction of Technological Systems* (1987), was co-edited by Wiebe Bijker (a Dutch professor trained in engineering, philosophy, sociology, and history), Trevor Pinch (a former Harry Collins student), and Thomas P. Hughes (arguably the most influential historian of technology in the last third of the twentieth century). While all the essays in the book explored the social construction of technology to greater or lesser degree, some argued the hard-SCOT position that social factors trumped material criteria in determining the course of technological change. Hughes’s contribution, ‘The Evolution of Large Technological Systems’, used his signature topic to review the analytical concepts that he recommended, while also warning against social scientists who ‘raise the level of analysis and abstraction so high that it does not matter what the technical content of a system might be’.26

Hughes’s previous work, and his towering stature among historians of technology, made him something of a bridge figure between the mainstream and the social constructivists. His *Elmer Sperry: Inventor and Engineer* (1971) had been a great-man history in the Smiles tradition, without the hagiography. Hughes’s great work, *Networks of Power: Electrification in Western Society, 1880–1930* (1984), also studied great men—‘system-builders’, Hughes called them—but it compared their systems internationally, contextualizing the political, economic, social, and technological forces that gave Chicago, London, and Berlin such different electrical utility systems at the turn of the twentieth century. While it eschewed the theorizing of the SCOT movement, it nonetheless introduced powerful concepts, such as reverse salients in the advancing front of large-scale

technological systems, that proved useful to historians of technology, whether or not they were studying large-scale systems of the type that Hughes investigated.

In these same years, the problematization of scientific practice was pushed even further by a group of self-styled ethnographers studying ‘laboratory life’ and analyzing it in terms of ‘actor-network theory’ (ANT). Constructing their analysis in the 1980s and 1990s, they focused on contemporary cases, whose activities they styled as ‘technoscientific’. All the components of the site of knowledge production (the laboratory)—instruments and machines, test materials, organization and style of researchers, and the resultant knowledge itself—were parts of an interactive network of technoscientific agents (termed ‘actants’ by Bruno Latour). None had epistemic priority. Moreover, the network extended far beyond a particular laboratory to other laboratory networks, funding agencies, industries, politicians, and publications—in fact to all supporters and consumers of technoscience. The durability of an actor network ensured (for a time) the establishment of the natural knowledge produced. Michel Callon and John Law introduced comparable ANT analysis in the history of technology, though they did not limit themselves to modern practice.

While historians of science and technology struggled through the 1980s and 1990s to reconcile the traditional, internalist history of their fields with the new social constructivism, many scholars settled on what they called ‘contextual history’. By this they meant that the best histories incorporated both a thorough familiarity with the science or technology in play, and a full appreciation for the political, social, economic, and cultural forces that drove the scientists and engineers to behave as they did. Many scholars in both fields noted that good histories had always been written this way.27

**NEW CATEGORIES OF ANALYSIS**

In the 1970s and 1980s, social and scientific issues that sustained the critical attitudes of the previous two decades and extended them in new directions had a major impact on perspectives and interests in the history of science and technology. These included ecology, feminism, multiculturalism, and postmodernism. At the same time that SSK and alternatives like actor-network analysis were being

developed, some historians were extending their purview to include gender, race, colonialism, and the environment. These interests reflected the social prominence of such issues in the previous two decades, and the simultaneous rising social criticism of the scientific and industrial enterprises.

A pioneer in gender and environmental studies of science, Carolyn Merchant, identified three domains for gender studies: ideology, metaphor, and social role. Her own pioneering book, *The Death of Nature: Women, Ecology and the Scientific Revolution* (1980), fits the first domain. Traditional in its substantive account of the Scientific Revolution, her gendered explanation for, and valuation of, this ‘incredible transformation’ was radical. The geometrization and mechanization of nature, core transformative components for Koyré and Gillispie, were associated by Merchant with the rise of exploitative capitalism and the social downgrading of women. A male, mechanistic science, bent on dominating and exploiting ‘mother’ earth has prevailed since the seventeenth century.

Merchant’s other two domains of gender studies also came to be studied: gendered images and metaphors by Thomas Laqueur and Londa Schiebinger among others, and the social roles (and challenges) of women in science by Margaret Rossiter, above all.28 Less sustained attention has been given to science and race, although special mention should be made of Stephen Jay Gould’s *Mismeasure of Man* (1981), a book that problematized scientific ‘facts’ regarding intelligence and its measurement as being conditioned by often unconscious social attitudes and racial prejudices.

No doubt the context for the uptake of the history of colonial and imperialist science was the post–Second World War emergence of colonial independence. But a proximate factor for the first attempt at a general overview and model of the unfolding of colonial science was modernization theory, which informed the influential diffusionist model proposed in *The Rise of Modern Science: External or Internal Factors?* (1968), edited by George Basalla. But when this field began to develop in the 1980s, Basalla’s basically linear and positively viewed outflow of European science to the colonies was challenged on both counts. The colonial and imperial scientific enterprises came to be seen as more complexly interactive, and to have been used as much as a means of reinforcing control as of enlightenment.

Basalla, a philosopher whose contributions spanned multiple fields and disciplines, influenced the history of technology as well. Though this field was slower to take up postcolonial studies, it nonetheless generated a number of new currents, while the great struggle between traditionalism and constructivism

played itself out. Lewis Mumford’s early ruminations on the evolutionary nature of technological development was vastly expanded and refined by Basalla and others, including Joel Mokyr, an economic historian. Business history joined economic history as a parallel field, sparked in large measure by the great popularity and powerful insights of Alfred D. Chandler’s Visible Hand: The Managerial Revolution in American Business (1977). Labour history fed a comparable interest among historians of technology in the nature of shop-floor practice and the deskilling of labour. Ruth Schwartz Cowan revealed the explanatory power of gender as a category of analysis in More Work for Mother: The Ironies of Household Technology from the Open Hearth to the Microwave (1983). Technological determinism remained a potent concept, in spite of repeated protestations that it was passé. And historians of technology continued to self-select themselves into boutique subfields, studying the technologies of war, computers, women, aerospace, electricity, communication, labour, chemistry, museums, and so on.

THE SCIENCE–TECHNOLOGY RELATIONSHIP

The relationship between science and technology has engaged historians of technology more so than historians of science. When John Staudenmaier reviewed the first twenty-one volumes of Technology and Culture in 1985, he found the science–technology relationship to be the single most popular issue in the journal. Most historians of science, at least before the constructivist turn, viewed technology as applied science and saw technology’s greatest impact on science in instrumentation. Historians of technology found this view demeaning and inaccurate. Edwin Layton’s ‘Mirror-Image Twins’ (1971), for example, challenged this linear or ‘traditional model’ of the science–technology relationship. Layton portrayed the two fields in the nineteenth century as increasingly symmetrical in their educational patterns, professional societies, and embrace of ‘engineering science’, but opposite in their value hierarchies: scientists privileged theory over empiricism, while engineers distrusted theory and valued practice.

29 Merritt Roe Smith and Leo Marx (eds.), Does Technology Drive History? The Dilemma of Technological Determinism (Cambridge, Mass., 1994).
of science and technology had fuelled the creation of the Society for the History of Technology. But these differences also sparked various attempts by scholars in both camps to find common ground, without, however, much success. The constructivist turn contributed to a lessening of tensions, because it moved scholars in both communities to pay more attention to contextual forces such as politics, economics, social patterns, and even culture in explaining scientific and technological change. Laboratory practice and shop-floor practice had more in common than was previously understood. The attempt by Bruno Latour and other European scholars to focus on technoscience similarly lessened the polarity between the two fields.

Furthermore, many fields of science and most fields of high technology were becoming increasingly intertwined as the twentieth century reached its last decades. Scientists in fields as diverse as particle physics, astrophysics, nuclear physics, solid-state physics, chemistry, nanotechnology, and even the biological sciences, were becoming more dependent on accelerators, telescopes, spacecraft, and laboratory equipment to do even the most basic research. And high technology and advanced engineering continued to be increasingly science-based—a trend that had been formally recognized with the creation of engineering schools in Europe in the eighteenth century, and the addition of science and mathematics courses to engineering curricula throughout the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. As science and technology grew ever more interdependent in the late twentieth century, historians of science and technology revisited the history of earlier eras in search of parallel developments. In some fields it was discovered that technological invention had actually preceded scientific ‘discovery’. Galileo’s use of the telescope to confirm the Copernican hypothesis is the classic example, but there are countless others, particularly in the history of chemistry and chemical industries.

One measure of the transformation of the two fields is the difference in approaches between two analyses of the Industrial Revolution. Economic historians A. E. Musson and Eric Robinson brought their social-scientific perspective to bear in Science and Technology in the Industrial Revolution (1969). Arguing against an earlier interpretation that identified craft knowledge and praxis as the sources of innovation, Musson and Robinson explored both the state of scientific knowledge in eighteenth-century Britain and the journals, books, societies, and institutions that promoted, communicated, and popularized that knowledge. Far from embracing the ‘linear model’ that saw technology as applied science, Musson and Robinson found a complex and interactive relationship between

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34 A joint meeting of the History of Science Society and the Society for the History of Technology in 1991 explored putatively common ‘Critical Problems and Research Frontiers’ without achieving much consensus or closing the intellectual distance between the two communities.

35 The development of the chemical dye industry has received particularly intensive study.
the two fields, while also noting that neither ‘science’ nor ‘technology’ was then understood or named in the modern sense of those terms. Anticipating the insights of social constructivists, they concluded that ‘psychology and sociology may have as much as economics to teach us’ about scientific and technological change.36

Margaret C. Jacob applied a cultural lens to the same topic in *The Cultural Meaning of the Scientific Revolution* (1988), reversing the lens to look at Enlightenment Britain from the perspective of the Scientific Revolution. Interested like Musson and Robinson in the relationship between the Scientific and Industrial Revolutions, Jacob concluded that the Scientific Revolution created in Britain, if not elsewhere in Western Europe, a culture of curiosity, improvement, learning, and communication that fuelled the Industrial Revolution. In many respects, her conclusions confirmed those of Musson and Robinson, but she focused far more on indirect, cultural, and contextual linkages than she did on the direct, causal connections that Musson and Robinson found between knowledge production and material production.

In 2007, historian of science Paul Forman took the argument one step further in a long, erudite, and iconoclastic historiographical essay, ‘The Primacy of Science in Modernity, of Technology in Postmodernity, and of Ideology in the History of Technology’. Forman asserted that around 1980 the science–technology relationship experienced a sea change.37 Reviewing Western historiography over the last two hundred years, Forman discerned a near-universal embrace of the belief that technology was applied science. Social scientists from Karl Marx, Thorstein Veblen, Werner Sombart, and Nikolai Bukharin to John Dewey, Lewis Mumford, Daniel Bell, and Jean-François Lyotard, all accepted this linear or traditional model. It followed naturally that science, the agent of technological change, was superior to technology. Science was on top, or at least it was perceived to be on top.38

Postmodernity (not postmodernism) changed that, said Forman. ‘In postmodernity science is reduced to technology’s servitor, while scientific advance is itself conceived to be, hence made to be, primarily the result of the application of new technology.’39 Without explaining the causal mechanism by which modernity slid into postmodernity, or by which technology toppled science in public consciousness, Forman presented extensive anecdotal evidence for the reversal. Historians of technology missed the transformation. Early in the twenty-first century, says Forman, historians of technology still approach their subject from a

38 Forman’s analysis is not about the reality of science and technology but rather the perceptions of science and technology.
‘pre-postmodern’ perspective. Why? Forman charged that historians of technology, especially the members of SHOT, were blinded by myopia and an ideology of their own making. Under the sway of Lewis Mumford, they assimilated his ambivalence toward technology, his belief in the linear model, and his tactic of ignoring science, of simply leaving it out of their accounts of the history of technology. Forman noted the early interest within SHOT in the science–technology relationship, but he argued that in the 1970s, historians of technology settled on two techniques for dismissing the linear model. They ignored science in their accounts of technology, and they claimed that technological knowledge was autonomous. This formula predisposed them to accept the SCOT programme (which Forman found vacuous) and to anathematize technological determinism, and even autonomous technology. Technological knowledge could be autonomous of science, but technology itself could not be seen as an autonomous force in society. In spite of what Forman saw as overwhelming evidence of technological determinism, progress, and autonomy, historians of technology condemned and eschewed them all.

Little wonder, then, says Forman, that historians of technology missed the postmodern turn. Refusing to see science on top, they failed to notice when it fell to the bottom. Unwilling to recognize the importance of technology in modern cultural production, they failed to notice when it became the dominant form of cultural production. Focusing on the social turn to SCOT, they missed the cultural turn to postmodernity.

CONCLUSION

Forman’s attempt to redefine the science–technology relationship highlighted the confused state of both historiographies at the opening of the twenty-first century. Though Forman is an historian of science, his analysis had less resonance in that field than it did among historians of technology, to whom it was directed. At the 2007 annual meeting of the Society for the History of Technology, a panel of four historians (two of science and two of technology) critiqued Forman’s analysis. While all praised its erudition and originality, none embraced its argument or predicted the widespread acceptance of its analytical framework.

Coolness to the paradigm shift proposed by Forman did not, however, mean that either field enjoyed consensus around a dominant paradigm. Indeed, both fields struggled to find unity of purpose and direction. In the seventy years since the epochal studies of Koyré and Merton were published, the history of science has witnessed comprehensive transformations that have vastly enriched the field and expanded its purview. But the very diversity in substance, perspective, and approach has also resulted in a loss of coherence and of compelling longue durée narratives. The case of the Scientific Revolution is iconic. Joel Shackelford noted this in his review of the volume of the *Cambridge History of Science* devoted to
early modern science. According to Shackelford, ‘the complex message that the contributors collectively voice’ is that:

The old narrative is abandoned with difficulty, that it no longer fits the historical record and must go, and that we all miss it very much and need a replacement. But creating that replacement is no easy task in a field endowed with a diversity of scholarly perspectives, which has produced histories that are in some instances difficult to reconcile and which itself has drifted away from history of philosophy and toward a broader cultural study.

So too are patterns in the recent historiography of technology similarly hard to find. In 2007, Robert Friedel offered a Western synthesis in A Culture of Improvement: Technology and the Western Millennium (2007), which put a new face on an old paradigm. Friedel took up the question that has consumed historians of technology since the 1970s, when they stopped focusing on the relationship with science: how does technology change? Friedel attributed the dramatic transformations of Western technology to a pervasive cultural predisposition to believe that ‘things could be done better’. He combined this insight with a concept he called ‘capture’, analogous to what the social constructivists called ‘closure’, to explain how competing innovations sorted themselves out. The result, in Friedel’s view, had been continuous and significant improvement in technology over the last thousand years, though not necessarily progress. The conceptual tent he staked out is large enough for all the paradigms and methodologies that historians of technology were pursuing at the turn of the twenty-first century, but it will probably not establish a new trajectory in the historiography, nor deflect any already under way. Like the history of science, the history of technology at the beginning of the twenty-first century seemed to eschew master narratives in favour of a rich amalgam of voices, perspectives, frames, and methodologies.

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Chapter 10
History and Social Science in the West

Kevin Passmore

In the 1970s and 1980s, advocates of rapprochement between history and social science lamented that after the Great War the interdisciplinary approach of Karl Marx, Emile Durkheim, and Max Weber gave way to mutual suspicion. They approved the increasing connections between the two disciplines since the 1960s, while regretting that some historians remained hostile to social science. For G. R. Elton, history and sociology had different methods and objects of study: history studied past politics; sociology studied society in the present. History was empirical; sociology was theoretical. Some social scientists accepted this division of labour: even when they studied long-term change, they did so as ‘historical sociologists’. Without denying these tensions, I would wish to argue that the two disciplines have shared important methods and assumptions. Indeed, we should avoid essentialization, for methodological disputes within disciplines are as important as those between them. Likewise, we should problematize the notion of national historiographical traditions; the relationship between history and social science was contested within nations too.

THE PRE-WAR LEGACY

In the inter-war years, sociological antipathy to history appeared greatest in the Chicago School, where Robert Park invented fieldwork. Park emulated European anthropologists, led by Bronislaw Malinowski, who had turned to participant observation during the Great War. Closer examination reveals that historians and social scientists shared two related sets of assumptions. The French Annales

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1 I would like to thank Pat Hudson, Steve Rigby, Lloyd Bowen, and Garthine Walker for their careful readings of this essay and their helpful criticisms and suggestions.
School was an exception insofar as it championed social history, yet similar assumptions were present there too.

The first supposition was of a world-historical shift from a traditional, hierarchical, religious society to a modern egalitarian, rational one. The elites led this process, while the masses, especially women and ‘inferior races’, modernized more slowly, if at all. Indeed, the elite was expected to act as the ‘midwife of history’, and those who understood this were ‘national heroes’ or ‘far-sighted modernizers’. Second, theories of progress owed much to Gustave Le Bon’s ‘collective psychology’, which was built on the same distinction between the rational, active elite and the passive-but-volatile mass. The implicitly feminine, racialized, mass could not control its irrational drives without guidance from the elite, but it could ‘internalize’ simple ideas through repetition and imitation. The masses possessed an innate good sense, which might inspire the elite, yet left to itself the crowd went to extremes, and was exploited by malevolent counter-elites. Third, history and social science assumed that progress occurred within nations possessed of unique ‘characters’, and that patriotism provided the social cement without which society could not function. Fourth, rapid change broke traditional bonds and caused disorientation (‘anomie’, for social scientists) in the mass, increasing its vulnerability to pedlars of utopias. 4

Academic history seemingly differed from social science in that it was untheoretical and predominantly political. Yet historians focused on the nation’s attainment of self-consciousness, homogeneity, and independence through struggle against internal and external enemies—a history in which great men were prominent. The historian’s own nation figured variously as exemplar, unfulfilled essence, or victim. 5 Some national histories drew more explicitly on social science. The Nazis’ Volksgeschichte used anthropology to search for the distant origins of nations. 6 Meanwhile, the liberal Eckart Kehr, in Schlachtflottenbau und Parteipolitik [Battleship Building and Party Politics] (1931), agreed with Max Weber that the anachronistic strength of the aristocracy explained Germany’s failure to develop along a normal democratic path. He criticized nationalism, but did not abandon the national framework. The Annales founder, Marc Bloch, was still more critical of nationalism, and explicitly drew on Durkheim’s anthropology. His Les caractères originaux de l’histoire rurale française [French Rural History] (1931) grappled with the idea of a special French pattern of historical development in terms compatible with progress narratives.

Historians and sociologists unwittingly shared versions of grand theory, in which change was an external ‘force’ driven by the functional needs of the system, and in which meaning derived from measurement against theory, rather than from protagonists’ actions and beliefs. And since historians’ debt to grand theory was unacknowledged, it proved recalcitrant to critique, while the apparent obviousness of progress made it easy for theories derived from the sociological canon to take root in Western historiography in the 1950s. Modernization narratives were all the more difficult to displace because they persisted in sociology, to judge by a recent introduction to the subject.7 We shall see that there were alternative strands in social theory and history, but sometimes they, too, struggled to cast off modernization assumptions. Perhaps unfortunately, the most insightful alternatives came to fruition just as post-structuralism diverted attention to other matters. Ironically, the cultural turn sometimes endorsed the questionable tenets of functionalist social science.

HISTORY AND SOCIAL SCIENCE AFTER 1945

After 1945, Western historians and sociologists used grand narratives to understand the origins of the present, to foresee the future, and if necessary to put history back on the right track. For many historians, the defeat of Nazism restored faith in the certainty of liberal democracy. British and American scholars produced optimistic narratives of their own histories. Their French, German, and Italian colleagues revived or invented narratives that treated the Vichy, Nazi, and fascist periods as parentheses in their countries’ histories, caused by the resurgence in the national psyche of traditionalism in conditions of trauma. These narratives shared much with modernization theory, then significant in ‘development studies’. Modernization theorists attributed decolonization to the diffusion of progress from West to East: rebellious colonies would eventually return to the Western model.8

G. R. Elton, whom we have met as champion of the notion that history deals with the unique, provides an example of the implicit influence of social theory in history.9 He accepted that historians could use ‘modest’ generalizations, such as ‘discontent needs a traumatic experience rather than continuous misery to flare into revolution’.10 Actually, this (immodest) generalization was intrinsic to the social science of his day. In his historical work, Elton narrated England’s development from the ‘traditional’ monarchy of Henry VII to modern

nationhood under Henry VIII. He saw English history as the realization of a felicitous balance between liberty and authority that was implicit in the English character (but not the Welsh). He recounted Thomas Cromwell's creation of a modern bureaucracy and the imposition of the rule of law in terms that were compatible with Max Weber’s process of rationalization. Elton implicitly contrasted the great Cromwell, who understood the direction of history, with Perkin Warbeck, who futilely resisted ‘the manifest direction of change’. Elton justified his political focus theoretically, arguing that history is change, politics is humankind’s active pursuit of change, and politics is therefore the true form of history. Indeed, political history was really social history, for government ensured that society was a properly structured organism. Elton unwittingly echoed collective psychologists, for whom the formless crowd-organism required guidance from the elite.

Miles Taylor shows that similarly conservative ideas were influential in early British social history, and we may extend his insights by further analysis of the types of social theory that were involved. George Kitson Clark interpreted Victorian society in terms that would have been familiar to Le Bon. It was in a state of transition from the old to the new, and so ‘promiscuity, animalism, brutality and grossness’ were common. Utopian evangelism, Romanticism, Chartism, and Gladstonian liberalism exploited this potential for evil. Kitson Clark contrasted these demagogues with the manufacturing class’s reasonable common sense. Kitson Clark influenced Geoffrey Best, who argued that a culture of deference preserved Victorian society from dangerous utopianism. Deference is a primary category in several later works of social history, including those of Patrick Joyce. Taylor also stresses the importance of Harold Perkin, appointed in 1951 as Britain’s first lecturer in social history. In his early work, Perkin conceived society in the same way as collective psychologists conceived the crowd—as an organism possessed of drives and a psychology.

That brings us to the sociologist Talcott Parsons, who was responsible for making known the work of Weber and Durkheim in North America, and for welding it together with psychoanalysis to form a coherent method. The dominant Anglophone sociologist of the post-war period has an unmerited reputation for ignoring history. Scholars divide his work into two phases: before the war, Parsons was concerned with social action; afterwards, with social structures. Yet

15 Ibid., 160–1.
16 Ibid., 161–2.
17 Ibid., 158–9.
18 Peter Hamilton, *Talcott Parsons* (Chichester, 1983).
the notion of progress from traditional to modern society was intrinsic to both periods.

Significantly, Parsons’s second sociology emerged just as he elaborated an explanation of the triumph of National Socialism in Germany. He argued that modernization in Germany had been so rapid that it had destroyed the bonds of traditional society, leaving nothing in their place. However, the effects were different for the elite and masses. The aristocracy and the bourgeoisie clung to status distinctions; their social and sexual relations were based on standing, not love or friendship. Consequently, they directed their romantic urges towards all-male groups and the nation and pursued impossible utopias. As for the masses, rapid change provoked anomie and rendered them vulnerable to the masculine racial utopia propagated by the Nazi elite.  

Parsons’s thesis was not original. Weber and Kehr before him had attributed Germany’s failure to modernize to aristocratic manipulation of the impressionable mass. Without having been influenced directly by Parsons, a generation of German historians worked this model into a sophisticated account in which the tragedies of German history resulted from its having followed a ‘special path’, or Sonderweg. According to this view, Germany’s ‘unification from above’ prevented the development of a genuine liberal society, but since modernization was inevitable, the old aristocracy’s efforts to preserve its status became increasingly desperate. Thus, Fritz Fischer argued that the aristocratic elite risked world war in 1914 to preserve its beleaguered social position. Others argued that the failure of the Weimar Republic to eliminate the aristocracy and its bourgeois imitators from positions of influence permitted the latter once more to exploit the mass disorientation that the Depression engendered, and to help the Nazis into power. Historians and sociologists applied the idea of a special path to so many countries that they ought to have wondered if there was a normal path anywhere.

Borrowings from social science produced histories of various types. Fischer married the assumptions of social science to quite traditional diplomatic history. The statistical measurement of economic trends—econometrics—more obviously assumed an objective structural development. Indeed, classical economic theory rested on an implicit periodization: only in the modern period did people behave in accordance with economic rationality, once the constraints of
despotism and religious dogma had been stripped away. Drawing more explicitly on modernization theory, W. W. Rostow saw British industrialization as an ideal against which development elsewhere could be measured.\textsuperscript{22}

Three methodological trends were important. Encouraged by the development of computing, the use of statistics reached its apogee in this period. For instance, in the 1950s and 1960s, Marxists historians and their critics fought a battle concerning the origins of the English Revolution with an array of statistics concerning manorial holdings, incomes, and expenditures. Both sides assumed that one could determine the relative power of contending groups by measuring their economic and political resources. Lawrence Stone, a chief protagonist and an advocate of social science, argued that quantification overcame the ‘shoddiness’ of earlier methods in which the historian was free to choose evidence that fitted his/her interpretation.\textsuperscript{23} Underlying Stone’s view was the conviction that the statistically most important trend represented an objective tendency, perhaps even a law. Stone accepted Ted Gurr’s contention that one could explain revolutions as the consequence of the law of suddenly disappointed expectations—the famous ‘J-curve’.\textsuperscript{24}

Historians also took the idea of comparison from social science; in 1958, the journal \textit{Comparative Studies in Society and History} first appeared. Whereas earlier historians rejected comparison on the grounds that each society was unique, comparativists held that national societies represented discrete cases that were also obedient to general laws. Therefore, comparison permitted the identification of tendencies common to each case, and thus the discovery of the ‘laws’ regulating historical development. Advocates of comparison also assumed that modernization had been so well observed that it was beyond question. One could therefore compare the responses of different societies to an ‘objective’ process of modernization.

Third, historians borrowed the notion of the ‘model’. Some historians looked to Max Weber, for whom one could use intuition to build an ‘ideal type’, an imperfect construction of a social phenomenon with which reality could be compared. Weber held that ideal types were distinguished from merely descriptive categories by their situation within an historical process, which he conceived in terms that anticipated modernization theory. Others felt that, through comparison of ‘cases’, the researcher could identify common elements in different cases. Commonalities could then be used to elaborate a model that could be applied heuristically to other cases. Scholars of fascism were especially concerned to construct models—a quest justified on the apparently convincing grounds that


historians should agree upon their terminology before conducting their research. Yet no consensus emerged. One difficulty was that what the researcher identified as ‘essential’ depended upon the initial choice of cases. Anyway, it does not follow that because an element is common to several cases it is ‘essential’. And since historical developments were not contained within nation-states, the isolation of cases for comparison proved problematic.  

THE NEW SOCIAL HISTORY AND THE SOCIAL SCIENCES

The tendencies described above did not dominate historical writing. They were long challenged by emphasis on the conscious and unconscious activities of people rather than laws and structures—even if these alternatives struggled to emancipate themselves from ambient notions of progress. In 1953, a group of left-leaning historians founded the journal Past and Present, thus marking the entry into the academy of British Marxist historiography. These historians rejected both Stalinist Marxism and ‘bourgeois’ social science. They pioneered a form of ‘history from below’, which emphasized the rationality of ordinary people, their acquisition of self-knowledge through pursuit of collective interests, and their influence upon the course of history. George Rudé exploded Le Bon’s interpretation of the crowd as a mob motivated by elemental passions. Instead, he researched its social composition, its members’ ideas and objectives, and the changing nature of the crowd in history. Participants in the crowd were not inordinately affected by anomie, but were respected members of the community.  

Advocates of history from below borrowed from symbolic anthropology. Thompson did so in his seminal essay on the moral economy of the poor, as did Robert Darnton in his equally important essay on ‘The Great Cat Massacre’. Social historians shared Clifford Geertz’s critique of functionalism, and his preference for uncovering the meanings of rituals. Yet they criticized the

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The national-modernization narrative also persisted in Marxist historiography. Gramsci viewed the Risorgimento as a failed bourgeois revolution—a ‘passive revolution’ that failed to produce a genuinely democratic national society. Like the Jacobins, Italian nationalists should have harnessed the peasantry to a thoroughgoing revolution that would have unified the nation. In the 1970s, historians of Italy systematized Gramsci’s fragmentary notes into an interpretation resembling the German Sonderweg, even if the ultimate goal of historical development differed. Gramsci urged the working-class movement to assume the historically necessary task of completing the bourgeois revolution. Similarly, Thompson argued that out of fear of the Jacobins, the English bourgeoisie had ‘betrayed’ the progressive cause, which the working class had then assumed.

Similar ambivalence characterized the work of the late Charles Tilly. This sociologically trained historian styled himself a Marxist, and yet challenged collective psychology without entirely abandoning modernization theory. Tilly rejected the liberal view that the Vendéen insurrection against the French Revolution was the work of a backward population whipped into a frenzy by priests and aristocrats. Tilly countered that, protagonists chose from ‘repertoires of collective action’ in response to changing economic and political contexts. Yet modernization theory survives in the form of an historical shift from reactive to

unhistorical nature of symbolic anthropology. Social historians used anthropological techniques—reading against the grain, thick description, and the interpretation of visual sources—to overcome the fact that their objects of study left few conventional sources, but did not necessarily accept anthropological theory.

Although Marxists were suspicious of social science, certain of its assumptions proved hard to root out. After all, Marxism shared some notions with the sociological canon. Like the collective psychologists, Thompson saw the achievement of working-class consciousness as entailing the predominance of male reason over feminine religious revivalism. His labour movement supposedly represented a synthesis of Irish excitability and English method. Marxists sometimes also emphasised the psychologized internalization of deference: Gareth Stedman Jones argued that Marxists’ misuse of Antonio Gramsci’s concept of hegemony rendered it practically indistinguishable from internalised deference as used in social science.

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31 Jones, ‘From Historical Sociology to Theoretical History’, 304.
34 Thompson, The Making of the English Working Class, 467–77.
proactive crowd behaviour, a notion related to the idea of the historical growth of reason. Tilly broke modernization down into quantifiable indicators, especially urbanization and the growth of the state. These vectors were irresistible forces, to which historical actors responded in increasingly organized ways.36

Some advocates of history from below openly embraced the modernization/collective psychology model, even as they warned against assuming a too linear view of history. Sir Keith Thomas’s work on witchcraft is a case in point. He accepted Malinowski’s view that magic met people’s innate need for explanation of phenomena that they could neither understand nor control, but rejected his contention that the spread of technology accounted for the waning of magic. Thomas argued that belief in magic declined because faith in man’s ability to find human solutions spread well before technical changes actually became effective. The elites embraced science first, but they did not abandon magic, which still provided the aspirations towards which scientific research was directed (just as the irrational mass would inspire the rational elite in collective psychology). The masses, especially rural, changed more slowly than the elite, and by the mid-seventeenth century there was a ‘great gulf’ between them. Even now, Thomas argues, the mass accepts science in the same way as it had magic—out of conformism and deference.37

SOCIAL SCIENCE’S HISTORICAL TURN

In 1976, Jones lamented that while many historians now used social science, the particular methods that they borrowed were unhistorical. He likened sociologists’ attempts to historicize their concepts to ‘the grating noise which accompanies the driver’s attempt to find first gear in a motor which had only been designed to run in neutral’. He urged historians and sociologists to work together against ‘positivism’ in their disciplines.38 Similarly, Thompson felt that social scientists could not understand change or class conflict.39

In fact, neither sociology nor anthropology were unified disciplines. Tilly developed his critique of collective psychology in the 1960s, both as a sociologist and historian. Moreover, while Thompson and Jones were penning their denunciations of sociology, the discipline was undergoing an intellectual renewal. Some sociologists endeavoured to ‘deparsonize’ Weber and Durkheim, suggesting that there was more common ground between Marxist and non-Marxist social theory than Parsons had allowed, notably concerning the importance of the ownership

38 Jones, ‘From Historical Sociology to Theoretical History’, 300.
39 E. P. Thompson, ‘Folklore, Anthropology and Social History’, *The Indian Historical Review*, 3 (1977), 245–65.
of property as an element of class division. Meanwhile, anthropologists critiqued both functionalism and symbolic anthropology for failing to allow for human agency, and cited Thompson approvingly. Some sociologists saw the opposition between history and social science as false. Rather than describe this new sociology in detail, I shall stress some important tendencies.

First, in France, Pierre Bourdieu’s complex sociology reworked, without entirely overturning, key features of the canon. His debt to linguistic structuralism reinforced the assumption that society depended on norms, but he paid greater attention to the way in which actors used social rules. He argued that politicians, novelists, academics, or those involved in any other ‘field’, unconsciously internalized its rules to the extent that they become an unconscious worldview, or ‘habitus’. Bourdieu especially emphasized competition between members of the field for advantage within it, using the forms of ‘capital’—material or cultural—available to them. His theory allows for change, for groups may draw on capital from outside the field; initially that may produce conflict, but gradually the field is transformed as new rules are internalized. Yet Bourdieu insisted that people rarely reflected on the rules of the field itself. Only academics could do that. His concept of habitus allows only for regulated improvisation, or ‘performance’. Thus, Bourdieu agreed with Le Bon that the elite reasoned while the mass imitated. Yet his sociology offered a new way of understanding the relationship between conflict and stability.

Second, an arguably more successful attempt to achieve that end was Frank Parkin’s development of Weber’s fragmentary theory of social closure. In closure theory, groups use criteria including property, lineage, kinship, qualifications, race, and gender to close off advantages to others. Subordinate groups, meanwhile, attempt to ‘usurp’ the advantages of the privileged, and may in turn enforce their own exclusionary principles. Thus, white workers may seek to undermine the property principle while excluding non-whites from the labour force. Closure theory sees conflict over scarce resources as the motor of change, without reducing this conflict to one concerning property. The outcome of this struggle is not predetermined.

Third, Anthony Giddens’s theory of structuration transcended the agency/structure dyad. Without agency, there would be no history, and structures could

not exist without human agency to create and reproduce them. Structures both constrain agency and make it effective. Giddens adds that the precise nature of the relationship between structure and agency varies historically, according to the extent to which people acted consciously or unconsciously, and the available knowledge of alternatives. People rarely foresaw correctly the consequences of their actions, but that did not mean that they acted blindly. Giddens developed his theory in explicit engagement with Thompson’s work. He argued that Thompson celebrated agency rather than analyzing it, and endeavoured to reconcile Thompson’s work with Perry Anderson’s Marxist-structuralist critique of it.

Fourth, in 1981, Nicholas Abercrombie, Stephen Hill, and Bryan Turner re-examined the concept of ‘norms’. Like Thompson, they noted the propinquity of functionalist social theory to then-fashionable Althusserian structuralist Marxism, and to concepts of social control, dominant ideology, and hegemony. All these notions, they said, rested on the problematic notion of ‘internalization’. Abercrombie, Hill, and Turner argued that the masses are actually distrustful of ideas propagated by the elites. In medieval society, supposedly suffused with religious norms, the Church lacked the means to enforce coherent ideas, and even if aware of church teaching, people did not necessarily live in the way that the clergy urged. In modern societies, ordinary people are often sceptical of democratic ideology. Even if the governed do accept the ruling ideas, they may turn them against the elites. The subjection of the masses does not depend upon internalization of ruling ideas, but upon the fact that the costs of rebellion usually outweigh the advantages. It is not, as Bourdieu argued, that alternatives are unthinkable, but that they are usually undoable, or rather that the costs of doing them appear too great. Abercrombie, Hill, and Turner do not dismiss the notion of a ‘dominant ideology’ altogether, but argue that it is important insofar as it reinforced the ‘immanent morale’ of the elites. In anthropology, James C. Scott advanced convergent ideas, arguing that the everyday resistance of the ‘subaltern’ showed that it did not absorb the dominant ideology. The dominated may be obliged to collude with the dominant ideology, but the ‘hidden transcript’ shows that they question, adapt, or reject it out of the hearing of their rulers.

47 See also S. H. Rigby, Marxism and History (Manchester, 1987), 283.
Meanwhile, there emerged a new wave of historical sociology, informed by some of the concerns described above. Theda Skocpol’s landmark collection of essays on key historical sociologists presented social structure as concretely situated in time and space. Social and cultural circumstances create different ‘paths’ leading to no particular end. Interestingly, though, many of the theorists discussed, even celebrated, in the collection, had not rejected modernization, functionalism, or the idea of national paths. Indeed, Skocpol herself used a conventional comparative method, assuming that autonomous processes happened within national frameworks, and that comparison permitted identification of patterns, and thus, a model of revolution.

One of the figures discussed in the collection who did break with modernization theory was Immanuel Wallerstein. In his history of the ‘world system’, he attacked both modernization and its Marxist variants, along with the national model. He charted the emergence of a single capitalist economy, crossing multiple polities and incorporating various production systems from feudal to socialist. Within this system, the ‘core’ did not provide a model for modernization; rather it exploited the ‘periphery’. Although Wallerstein denied that economic and political systems coincided, he did not dispense entirely with the national framework. Indeed, his view that nations competed to improve their position within the world economic system resembled a national version of Bourdieu’s theory of struggle within fields. Critics charge him with anthropomorphizing the nation and with assuming the primacy of foreign policy. Thus, as Russia was pushed to the periphery, it supposedly used communism to bid for admission to the core. Furthermore, Wallerstein uses organic metaphors to explain the ‘birth’, ‘maturity’, ‘ageing’, and ultimately the inevitable ‘death’ of the world system.

Less uncertain is Michael Mann’s ambitious ongoing multi-volume *The Sources of Social Power* (1986–), which claims to ‘refute Marx and reorganise Weber’, but which in reality is influenced by non-determinist Marxism. It sets out to explain non-teleologically the West’s military, economic, and cultural domination. Western ascendancy depends on conditions, which might potentially change, rather than laws. Mann breaks with the modernization and collective psychology paradigms, arguing that societies are not divided into bounded national entities. Human beings do not live in societies, but in multiple, loose social networks. From this proposition, Mann concludes that there are no systems, no totalities, no last-instance determination, no diffusion of

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49 Skocpol, ‘Sociology’s Historical Imagination’, 1–2.
organization between societies, no distinction between agency and structure. More positively, he follows Giddens in arguing that in pursuing their interests, human beings enter into social relations that both constrain and enable them. In line with Parkin, Mann identifies four forms of power—ideological, economic, military, and political—and their interrelationship informs the course of history. In given circumstances, any of these forms of power might be primary, depending on its capacity to organize its domination, although more often there is a compromise. He argues, for instance, that in medieval societies states performed narrowly political functions, while classes were economically based. A twentieth-century capitalist state is both political and economic, using currencies and welfare programmes as political resources. In line with the arguments of Abercrombie, Hill, and Turner, Mann argues that inferior groups are subordinated not simply by coercion or internalization of norms, but by relative lack of organization. Nevertheless, they may create new organizational networks in the interstices of power, for no form of power can control everything. In a striking example, he argues that the triumph in the fourteenth century of the Swiss and Flemish pike phalanxes over feudal knights should not be reduced to a single ‘factor’ such as military technology, or even a multitude of ‘factors’. Rather, the solution is organizational: the pike phalanx arose from free towns and peasant communities, which ultimately acquired the power to reconfigure other power networks and thus to undermine feudalism.52

Critics charge Mann with writing a top-down history. He does indeed assume that subordinate groups influence the course of history only when they acquire sufficient organizational power. He does not consider for example that the unorganized struggles of the peasantry against feudal rents might have played a part in the emergence of capitalism, as Robert Brenner did in his critique of Wallerstein.53 Likewise, the shape of the modern French welfare state owes much to women’s silent struggle to limit family size, in the face of a dominant, organized, natalist ideology.

Relatively few historians engaged directly with the new sociology. In 1977 and 1980 respectively, Lawrence Stone and Peter Burke both urged historians to reject grand theory and functionalism, and to use limited concepts for specific purposes. Neither showed much interest in new theoretical developments in sociology. Stone attacked modernization theory, but in his own work on the family he argued merely that traditional family patterns had survived for much longer than historians had hitherto allowed. He argued too that social change had disintegrated the lives of the masses, but less so those of the elites: factory workers

suffered from ‘anomie’, but not the squirearchy or upper bourgeoisie. Stone is typical of those who ostensibly reject modernization narratives, only to reinstate them with revised chronologies or through the notion of special national paths.

A rare example of a historian with a solid grounding in recent social science is S. H. Rigby. In his book on late medieval English society he explicitly combines the Marxist emphasis on change through conflict with the non-Marxist attention to non-property forms of social inequality. He uses Parkin’s closure theory to explain the nature of late medieval English society; or rather he uses a case study to test the usefulness of closure theory to historians. For instance, he argues that the major principle of closure for the aristocracy was wealth and property ownership, rather than lineage. The clergy, in contrast were an order, dependent on credentials and distinctive dress. Overall, medieval society was a ‘class society with orders’. He also argues that there was no ‘dominant ideology’ in late medieval society. The Church did not have the means to spread its message into society as a whole, and in any case peasants were liable to ask why prelates did not live humbly.

HISTORY, SOCIOLOGY, AND THE CULTURAL TURN

This renewal of sociology and anthropology had relatively little impact upon historical writing because it came to fruition just as post-structuralism posed a different challenge to all the human sciences. For social scientists, and especially anthropologists, post-structuralism called into question the power relationship between the researcher and her/his object of study—an issue less relevant to historians, who rarely confronted directly those whom they studied. Meanwhile, the linguistic philosophy of Jacques Derrida and the philosophico-cultural history of Michel Foucault transferred theoretically minded historians’ interests away from sociology. History now seemed to have more in common with linguistics.

The ‘cultural turn’ ought to have disposed of historical and sociological grand narratives once and for all, since it allegedly exposed the ‘metaphysical’ emptiness of truth claims. Historians and sociologists have indeed recognized that their disciplines originated in specific historical contexts, shaped by the prejudices of their day. Yet some of what postmodernists say about the transition from modern to postmodern resembles what historians once said about the transition from traditional to modern. The conviction that we live in postmodern times revives

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the idea that history moves through a succession of ages, each defined by a spirit that gives meaning to human action, and to which people must adapt. This transition allegedly causes disorientation and the temptation to revive old solidarities. The editors of a recent compendium of post-structuralist-influenced historical sociology argue that scholars have been ‘disorientated’ by the loss of modernism, ‘so it is natural that they react with nostalgia for old totalities’, a past of imagined theoretical stability. The editors’ belief that culture constitutes historical actors, and that actors are prisoners of available languages, owes as much to Durkheim and Parsons as to Foucault’s vision of disciplinary society.

Arguably, Foucault himself is indebted to the sociological canon. His *Surveiller et punir* [*Discipline and Punish*] (1975) uses a functionalist argument to explain the transition from exorbitant early modern punishment to the modern prison—a process conceived as one of rationalization. People internalize norms, and become self-regulating. His *L’ordre du discours* [*The Order of Discourse*] (1971) sees institutions as constraining through prohibition and division: they ‘give a person a place, honour, and disarm him/her’. Elsewhere, Foucault also emphasizes the importance of repetition in the way that power trains the body and forces it to ‘emit signs’—that is to say, to take its place in an economy of power. One may find similar assumptions in Judith Butler’s feminist philosophy: gender roles are culturally constructed through the repetition, or ‘performance’ of stylized acts, within regulatory discourses.

In volumes 2 and 3 of *The History of Sexuality, The Use of Pleasure* (1985) and *The Care of the Self* (1986), Foucault allows more room for self-creation and is unwittingly closer to Giddens. But whereas the latter sees self-creation as intrinsic to the social process, Foucault confines it to privileged persons within the ‘interstices’ of Greek society, whose subject position was one of ‘problematization’ by power, rather than marginalization, in a period of epochal shift. Anticipating postmodernists, he argues that since our faith in fixed identities and metanarratives is breaking down, we might learn something from the way that the Greeks handled identities.

Notwithstanding these potential meeting points, the post-structuralist critique of social science most threatened labour history. Post-structuralists attacked the Marxist concept of class, arguing that it was a linguistic construction, not a product of underlying social entities, however much these structures were mediated by Thompson’s culture. In 1983, Gareth Stedman Jones argued that

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social interpretations of Chartism were inadequate, and that attention should be paid to the fact that Chartist political language remained that of eighteenth-century radicalism. Likewise, Patrick Joyce argued that nineteenth-century workers and reformers shared a vision of ‘the people’, not of class.

Nevertheless, Joyce found it hard to cast off old methods. His prelinguistic turn research had been in the tradition of non-Marxist social science, with its emphasis on influence, deference, and internalization—workers accepted capitalism emotionally and materially. In *Visions of the People* (1991), Joyce abandoned Parsonian sociology for post-structuralism. He dropped the concept of deference, attacking the Marxist concept of class from another direction. He argued that workers embraced a universalist populism, broad enough to include trade unionism, the moral economy, and the music hall. Yet deference survived in the notion that populism derived from an existential experience of poverty and insecurity, which generated a need for order, boundary, and control. Populism was shaped by the cultural forms of the age, notably Victorian melodrama, a world of the poor-but-loyal and robber barons.

In his *Democratic Subjects* (1994) Joyce conceded the presence of ‘foundationalist’ contaminations in *Visions of the People*, and now denied that radicalism was derived from the experience of poverty. Yet even now, he struggled to break with his sociological past. He drew on Foucault’s *Care of the Self* to suggest that the subjects of his book, Edwin Waugh and John Bright, were situated in a historic shift from individual to social modes of thinking, which permitted them to draw upon the patterns in which they were situated to invent themselves. Once again we meet the notion of an epochal transition. Joyce remarks that this ‘linear’ notion of time ‘has its uses’. His discomfort points to a wider problem with some forms of post-structuralism. While post-structural historians emphasize instability of meaning, they often have recourse to external ‘forces’—the transition—to explain this destabilization.

The divorce between social history and post-structuralism was less sharp among historians of women and ethnic minorities, who had long been preoccupied by the relationship between class and other identities. These historians embraced Foucault’s idea of the relationship between language and power, which they often assimilated into a quasi-Marxist theory of ideology. For instance, in 1988 Herman Lebovics wrote a classically Marxist history of conservative politics

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64 Joyce, *Visions of the People*, 151–8.
65 Id., *Democratic Subjects*, 15.
in the early French Third Republic, following it four years later with an imaginative cultural study of the construction of French identity, without abandoning the notion that ‘true France’ served the interests of the capitalist order.67 Harold Mah’s critique of Robert Darnton’s ‘Great Cat Massacre’ provides another example of the persistence of functionalist sociology. Darnton had combined history from below with the techniques of Geertzian symbolic anthropology, suggesting that the implied cuckolding of a print-shop master through execution of his wife’s cat prefigured the revolutionary disturbances of 1789. From a post-structuralist perspective, Mah criticized Darnton’s assumption that signs possessed fixed meanings, while himself arguing that the significance of the cat massacre story was ‘ultimately’ one of neutralization of discontent and deference to the status quo.68

The impact of the cultural turn upon Annales history was less marked. Here, post-structuralism was less important than a revived emphasis on mentalité. François Furet’s critique of the Marxist interpretation of the Revolution of 1789 emphasized the political identities of protagonists, but like much Annaliste history, his work still contained a modernization subtext.69 In Germany, Hans-Ulrich Wehler still maintained in 1995 that, whatever their faults, modernization theories represented the best means to understand the ‘dynamic of the singular evolutionary process’ of history. Perhaps he felt that the collapse of communism had demonstrated that there really was a ‘normal’ path in history. Younger historians criticized Wehler’s normative and national assumptions. Their work was part of the general turn towards cultural history, but they drew upon a reworked sociological tradition.70

**HISTORY AND THE SOCIAL SCIENCES IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY**

In 2004, Peter Mandler asked why historians still cited Marx and Derrida, rather than exploring what contemporary sociologists and psychologists thought about production of meaning, and called for the reunification of history with social science.71 Arguably, however, historians and social scientists have never been

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closer. William Reddy concludes a recent survey of the relationship of anthropology to history with the suggestion that a good deal of recent work in the two fields is methodologically indistinguishable.\(^{72}\) There may not be much actual collaboration, but there are many common interests, while methodological differences cut through the disciplines.

Some historians continue to reject all theory, while unknowingly sharing features of grand theory. An example is Norman Davies’s *Europe: A History* (1996), which traces the self-realization of European identity through the parentheses of the Reformation and the Cold War. Other historians apply social science explicitly. Dror Wahrman, citing Mandler’s appeal, argues that by counting the resonances of a particular cultural form, one can identify a dominant trend, which in turn becomes a ‘thing’. To explain this object, Wahrman resorts to evolutionary biology: around the eighteenth century, Europeans became ‘mildly addicted . . . to the chemicals released in their brains by a variety of stimulating practices’. Wahrman accepts that this argument may be ‘problematic’, and we are indeed reminded of collective psychology and modernization theory, in which the activism of the West was responsible for progress.\(^ {73}\) In some fields the debt to collective psychology is still more explicit. The fashionable ‘political religions’ approach to twentieth-century dictatorship represents an updating of it,\(^ {74}\) combined with an implicit modernization narrative.

Among Annales-influenced historians, for whom the study of mentalities has long drawn upon functionalism, the cultural turn has shifted the object of study rather than theoretical assumptions. For instance, Stéphane Audoin-Rouzeau and Annette Becker situate their understanding of the Great War in relation to the modernization of warfare, its totalization, and soldiers’ regression to atavistic behaviour in conditions of trauma. They draw on Marc Bloch’s analysis of rumour, heavily influenced by collective psychology, and upon Norbert Elias’s unreconstructed modernization narrative. They use anthropological techniques to reconstruct ordinary soldiers’ views of the conflict, examining trench newspapers, objects, memorials, and visual images; in the Durkheimian tradition they interpret evidence in the light of the alleged need for faith of soldiers who had regressed to traditional behaviour. They ally functionalist anthropology with grand narratives.\(^ {75}\)

The notion of modernization itself has largely disappeared from historical writing. Yet the very similar concept of ‘globalization’ will doubtless influence


\(^{73}\) Dror Wahrman, ‘Change and the Corporeal in Seventeenth- and Eighteenth-Century Gender History: Or, Can Cultural History Be Rigorous?’ *Gender and History*, 20 (2008), 584–602.

\(^{74}\) Kevin Passmore, ‘The Gendered Genealogy of Political Religions Theory’, *Gender and History*, 20 (2008), 628–68.

\(^{75}\) Stéphane Audoin-Rouzeau and Annette Becker, 14–18: *Understanding the Great War* (New York, 2002).
historical writing in the future. Globalization is conceived as an objective historical force, driven by functional imperatives. It may accelerate or slow down, but it will never stop. Actors may only respond negatively or positively, or develop a ‘special path’. Phenomena such as the rise of nationalism after 1990 will perhaps be depicted as ultimately futile attempts to resist globalization. As with modernization theory, the error is to isolate one set of characteristics from the complex process of change, to define it as ‘essential’, and then to use it as a standard to judge events and behaviour. There are, of course, alternatives.

Since the turn of the century, Bourdieu’s sociology has become prominent in French historiography. Some of the best work has come from political scientists, influenced in particular by the work on crises of Michel Dobry. The latter has been engaged in a bitter polemic concerning the definition of fascism with historians at Sciences Po who defend the Durkheimian approach. In the field of intellectual history, Benoit Marpeau’s study of Gustave Le Bon explores his protagonist’s efforts to establish himself in the fields of publishing and the natural and social sciences. Such research assumes that historical actors have internalized the rules of their fields, and so its primary focus is on competition within the limits of the habitus. In effect, it is a form of performativity.

A small group of historians continues to advocate an explicitly Foucauldian history, with its social science resonances. Most recently, they have applied Foucault’s concept of ‘governmentality’. As Patrick Joyce explains it, this specifically modern form of power in liberal societies entails the paradoxical notion that freedom is a technique of rule, in that the self monitors the self. Joyce elucidates the microtechniques through which this power is practised and performed. Critics see this as a top down view of history, in which agency is absorbed into structure. As in functionalist sociology, the focus is on effects rather than motivations or causes. Mysterious ‘necessities’ regulate the social organism, usually evoked in the passive voice—‘It was necessary that . . . ’.

Other historians combine the gains of post-structuralism with an emphasis on human agency and reflexivity. The best works transcend the structure–agency dyad. They see cultures as contradictory and contested, as available scripts, which people use with a degree of consciousness that varies historically, transforming them in the process. The protagonists are not rational in a transcendent sense, and they conceive themselves in a variety of ways, collectively and individually, racially and sexually. Michel de Certeau’s convincing critique of Bourdieu, in which he argues that protagonists navigate among contradictory rules and use

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77 Peter Burke, ‘Performing History: The Importance of Occasions’, *Rethinking History*, 9 (2005), 35–52.
them both knowingly and unknowingly, is an early example of this type of work.\textsuperscript{80} This approach is influential in recent writing on women and gender, which emphasizes the ways in which women, from a position of relative weakness, use creatively the circumstances into which they are born, and partially reconfigure those contexts. In sociology, Charles Tilly’s \textit{Oxford Handbook of Contextual Political Analysis} (2006) sought a middle way between rational action and constructivism.

Mandler is right to say that historians rarely read social science. Yet they do read works written in other disciplines that impinge upon their own object of study, and by that route there is much interchange. Also, all scholars work in the same, contested cultural environment. They share more than they know with scholars they do not know, and disagree more fundamentally than they realize with their closest colleagues.

**KEY HISTORICAL SOURCES**


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\textsuperscript{80} Michel de Certeau, \textit{La possession de Loudun} (Paris, 1970).
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Chapter 11
From the Search for Normality to the Search for Normality: German Historical Writing

Stefan Berger

‘The German state is destroyed, further German territory will be lost. Foreign rule will be our fate for a long time to come. Will we succeed in rescuing the German Geist?’ Thus begins the final paragraph of Friedrich Meinecke’s Die deutsche Katastrophe [The German Catastrophe], first published in 1946. Meinecke’s book was an attempt at stocktaking which included modest doses of criticism of the historical profession and a re-evaluation of the path of German history. National Socialism, he concluded, had its origins in specific national traditions, which included Prussian militarism and the political weakness of the German bourgeoisie. Germany had to abandon its aloofness towards the West and become part of it. Many aspects of German history and historiography were wrong and in need of revision, but the German Geist ‘still has to fulfil its special and irreplaceable mission within the Western community’.1 Ideas of a German special mission, a Sonderweg, had not entirely disappeared, and they were now anchored within the perception of a ‘Western’ path, which the future Germany had to share with other ‘Western’ nations.

During the Cold War, only the historians in the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) followed that Westernizing path. Their counterparts in the German Democratic Republic (GDR) adhered to the Marxist-Leninist framework of history-writing prescribed by the ruling Socialist Unity Party (SED). The Cold War was crucial in incorporating West and East German historians into different transnational networks. In the West, cooperation developed through scholarships and exchange programmes, especially with North America, but also with Britain, France, and, to a lesser extent, other West European nations. In East Germany, bilateral historical commissions, of which the most important was the German-Soviet one founded in 1957, were established in most countries in communist Eastern Europe. The divided world of the Cold War ensured that

1 Friedrich Meinecke, Die deutsche Katastrophe: Betrachtungen und Erinnerungen (Wiesbaden, 1946), 119, 176.
history-writing in the FRG and GDR became highly polarized. Anti-communism remained the underlying rationale of much historical writing in the FRG during the 1950s, and anti-imperialism and anti-capitalism comprised the ideological backbone of the GDR’s historical profession. Levels of political instrumentalization of GDR historiography were far greater than in the FRG, where the historical profession always had a more pluralistic and autonomous outlook. This chapter will compare the reorganization of the historical sciences in East and West Germany, and analyze their interrelationship up to reunification. In some respects one might say that the two Germanies after 1945, as well as the reunified Germany after 1990, were attempting to regain some kind of national as well as historiographical ‘normality’ following major political and historiographical caesuras. The chapter will assess how successful German historians were in establishing such ‘normality’.

**THE PREDOMINANCE OF ‘TAMED HISTORISM’ IN THE FRG DURING THE POST-WAR YEARS**

Immediately after the Second World War, most West German historians did not follow Meinecke’s self-critical stance. Instead, they chose to write the history of National Socialism out of German national history. Gerhard Ritter, one of the leading German historians in the post-war period, set the tone by locating the roots of Nazism in modern democratic mass society. It was held responsible for the collapse of traditional religious and moral standards, which had paved the way for the nihilism and cultural destruction of Nazism. Hence Ritter saw the task of the historical profession after 1945, not in criticizing the German national tradition, but in strengthening it. National self-confidence was needed to lift the Germans out of the black hole in which they found themselves in 1945.

Ritter’s position reflected the traditional nationalism widespread in the German historical profession, which had led many to support Hitler and National Socialism. After 1945 the West German historical association never issued an official apology to those colleagues who had been forced into exile, and it rarely invited back those who had to leave. Of 134 historians exiled under National Socialism, only 21 returned to Germany after 1945, and many of those settled in the communist East. West German historians were busy constructing the legend of a historical profession which had remained largely unaffected by National Socialism. Only in the 1990s did German historiography undertake a

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more thorough investigation of the strong support given to Nazism by historians who subsequently made brilliant careers in the FRG.\footnote{Winfried Schulze and Otto Gerhard Oexle (eds.), Deutsche Historiker im Nationalsozialismus (Frankfurt, 1999).}

After 1945, conservatives like Ritter and Hans Rothfels dominated the historical profession in the West. Ritter had maintained contact with the resistance circles of 20 July 1944 and had been imprisoned by the Nazis thereafter. Rothfels, as a ‘Jew’, had been forced to leave his chair at the University of Königsberg and emigrate in 1938, and he was one of the very few to return to an outstanding career in West Germany after the war. Together, Ritter and Rothfels played a major role in exculpating the West German historical profession from any responsibility for Nazism and ensured, at the same time, that methodological or thematic innovation remained limited in post-war West German historiography. A ‘tamed historism’\footnote{Ever since 1995 I have deliberately used the term ‘historism’ rather than ‘historicism’. Whereas ‘historism’ (in German Historismus), as defined by Leopold von Ranke, can be seen as an evolutionary, reformist concept which understands all political order as historically developed and grown, ‘historicism’ (in German Historizismus), as defined and rejected by Karl Popper, is based on the notion that history develops according to predetermined laws towards a particular end. I would plead to follow the German language and introduce two separate terms in the English language as well, in order to avoid confusion. ‘Tamed historism’ is from Ernst Schulin, Traditionskritik und Rekonstruktionsversuch: Studien zur Entwicklung von Geschichtswissenschaft und historischem Denken (Göttingen, 1979), 140.} reigned supreme in most historical departments, where the themes of lectures showed little change. Only 20 of 110 full professors of history in Germany and Austria had to undergo any kind of denazification process, and for them the chances of getting away with their reputations and job prospects intact were good. When the Association of German Historians (VHD) was refounded in October 1948, its official statements revealed a marked hesitancy to embark upon any revision of German historiography, and an almost complete lack of methodological or topical innovation. History by and large remained political history, to be researched in state archives. It focused on great statesmen and the affairs of the state, and it was national history. The founding of the influential Ranke Society in 1950 was directly motivated by the desire to prevent negative perceptions of German history and immunize German historians against critical perspectives on national history. Several of its founding members had been prominent supporters of the National Socialist regime.\footnote{Manfred Asendorf, ‘Was weiter wirkt: Die “Ranke Gesellschaft—Vereinigung für Geschichte im öffentlichen Leben”’, 1999: Zeitschrift für Sozialgeschichte, 4 (1989), 29–61.}

Some attempts were made to reconfigure the most prominent historical figures in the pantheon of German national history to fit the post-war situation. The Freiherr vom Stein and the Prussian reformers, for example, were now portrayed as arch-liberals. The revolutionaries of 1848 were hailed as historical forerunners of the Bonn republic. The Bismarck debate of the 1950s brought some limited
attempts to break with the most blatant legends surrounding the ‘iron chancellor’ and the ‘founder of the Reich’, but it also confirmed Bismarck as one of the greatest German statesmen of all time. There were some attempts to provide European perspectives and move German history out of its (almost) purely national framework, for example at the Institute of European History, founded at Mainz in 1950. While the Institute contributed to the Westernization of West German historical writing, much European history-writing in the 1950s took place within the framework of a ‘Christian occident’ (christliches Abendland), which facilitated a conservative appropriation of Europe in the interests of anti-communism. The strong anti-communist perspective of West German historians was also evident in the popularity of totalitarian theory and the tendency to equate the ‘brown’ and ‘red’ dictatorships in Nazi Germany and the GDR.

The ‘loss of the German East’ was not only an important topic in post-war West German political discourse. It also became an historiographical focus with the establishment of several extra-university research institutes, of which the Collegium Carolinum, founded in Munich in 1956, and the Herder Institute, founded in Marburg in 1950, were arguably the most important. At the universities, many scholars researched the history of the ‘German east’, and Theodor Schieder fronted the massive attempt to document the expulsion of Germans from East Central and Eastern Europe. Ironically, the same Schieder had been supplying the Nazis with plans to purge East Central Europe of its Slav population to make room for German settlers. After 1945 he seemed to have few qualms about directing a research project, which amounted to a justification of the historical right of Germans to settle in the areas from where they had been removed as a result of the Yalta and Potsdam treaties.6

Organizationally, the VHD worked closely with the Association of German History Teachers, refounded in 1949 (originally founded in 1913), which also published an influential historical journal entitled Geschichte in Wissenschaft und Unterricht. Together they have continued to organize, up to the present day, the biennial Historikertag—a week-long conference with many sections presenting research, and attended by many university historians, students, and school teachers, the origins of which go back to the late nineteenth century. No major university reform upset the traditional organization of teaching and research at West German history departments. The ‘big’ professors and their chairs (Lehrstühle), which came with assistantships, secretaries, and student helpers, dominated the departments ruling them in the traditional autocratic and paternalistic fashion. The strength of the German Ordinarius (full professor) and the long period of formal qualification

(with a second doctorate, the Habilitation, being obligatory) meant that the dependency of younger scholars on the professoriate was strong, with particular networks of professors able to influence appointments and career progression to a considerable degree.

An important innovation of the post-war period was the institutionalization of contemporary history (Zeitgeschichte). The Institute of Contemporary History in Munich, founded in 1951, focused on the immediate prehistory, history, and aftermath of National Socialism and the Second World War. Its journal, the Vierteljahreshefte für Zeitgeschichte, became a major forum for research on contemporary history. The Institute’s library and archive developed into one of the most important specialist repositories for the history of twentieth-century Germany. Initially, contemporary history was eyed suspiciously and charged with presentism, but the high quality of the historical work produced at the Institute contributed to its acceptance and growing popularity in the FRG.

Contemporary history was not without its problems. German-Jewish historians of the Holocaust and their narratives were marginalized at the Munich-based institute, and there were frequent attempts to instrumentalize contemporary history politically. It was only from the 1960s onwards that the narrow focus on the German resistance to Hitler, the moralizing tone of many post-war analyses of National Socialism, and the demonization of Hitler began to give way to more comprehensive interpretations of the Germans’ entanglement with National Socialism and the social history of Nazism. The idea that National Socialism was a mere accident in an otherwise proud national history began to lose its purchase. The strong transnationalization of German contemporary history after 1945 contributed to this change. From 1960 onwards, a second extra-university institution, the Forschungsstelle für die Geschichte des Nationalsozialismus in Hamburg, contributed to research into diverse aspects of National Socialism.

A range of other institutions had an important impact on the West German research landscape in history. First, the Commission for the History of Parliamentarism and Political Parties, founded in 1951, was responsible for thoroughly investigating the historical foundations of liberal democracy in Germany as well as the mistrust and hostility that liberal democracy and pluralism aroused in German political culture. It was, in particular, the history of the Weimar Republic that served as a foil against which a more democratic and pluralist self-understanding of the Germans was to be explicated in historical studies. Second, the Max Planck Institute for History at Göttingen was refounded in 1955. It became the home of some prestigious projects of West German historiography including, for example, the bibliography of German history (the Dahlmann-Waitz) and medieval source editions of the Germania Sacra. Important research on early modern and modern history was carried out at the Institute before its eventual transformation into a research institute for multi-religious and multi-ethnic societies in 2007. Third, the Historical Commission at the Bavarian
Academy of Sciences, which had existed since 1858 (Leopold von Ranke was its first president), remained an important institution for historical research after 1945, among whose prestige projects have been the New German Biography, a variety of source editions, and the Year Books of German History. Fourth, the Historical Commission in Berlin, founded in 1959, focused on the history of Berlin and Brandenburg-Prussia, although its prestigious book series published much seminal research on German history and gained a strong international reputation. Fifth, the Research Office of the Bundeswehr for Military History, founded in 1957, became a centre for military history. From 1979 onwards it has been engaged upon a multi-volume history of the Second World War, which has been translated into several languages and has set international standards. Of particular importance for the international visibility of German historical research was, sixth, the foundation of German Historical Institutes in Rome (1888), Paris (1958), London (1976), Washington (1987), Warsaw (1993), and Moscow (2005). Financed by the West German government, these institutes fulfil important mediating roles between German historiography and the historiographies of their host countries.

ESTABLISHING A COMMunist HISTORIOGRAPHY IN EAST GERMANY

If we consider the origins of East German historiography, it is clear that institutionally and thematically, a more decisive break with the national tradition of historical writing occurred in the German Democratic Republic. At a Berlin conference on the reconstitution of the historical sciences in post-war Germany in 1946, Anton Ackermann, the communists’ chief ideologue at the time, postulated two central aims of any future historiography: first, to write social rather than political history and, second, to overcome historiographical nationalism. One of the lessons that the communists drew from the anti-fascist struggle was the need to rewrite the history of Germany, and in particular that of the German labour movement. Initially, the Marxist historian Alexander Abusch suggested viewing national history as a series of wrong turns and catastrophes. The SED, however, soon realized that no new state could be built on an entirely negative construction of national history. Abusch’s ideas, quickly dubbed ‘misery theory’ (Miseretheorie), gave way to an understanding of German history that was neatly divided into positive and negative traditions. The negative line ran from Luther to Frederick the Great, then to Bismarck and Hindenburg, and culminated in Hitler and the FRG. The positive line ran from

Thomas Müntzer to Karl Marx and the early German labour movement, and then to the Communist Party (KPD) of the Weimar Republic and the communist resistance to fascism, and culminated in theSED and the GDR. Subsequently, much of the research on German history in the GDR was forced into this interpretative framework.

The third party conference of the SED in 1950 and the reform of East German higher education in the early 1950s were milestones on the road to a transformed East German historical profession. Marxist exiles, such as Jürgen Kuczynski, Walter Markov, Ernst Engelberg, Leo Stern, and Alfred Meusel, played a prominent role in educating a first generation of Marxist historians, who dominated the history departments at East German universities from the 1950s onwards. In the period between 1948 and 1953 remnants of non-Marxist, ‘bourgeois’ historiography were purged. In 1958 a separate GDR historians’ association came into being, following the confrontation and subsequent walkout of the GDR delegation to the all-German Historikertag of that year, completing the transformation of East German historiography. The SED had set the institutional and discursive framework for historical studies, and it would continue to control and police the borders of that framework. In 1953 GDR historians founded their own journal, the Zeitschrift für Geschichtswissenschaft. Below the one ‘national’ organ there existed, like in West Germany, a variety of more specialized journals for particular aspects of history-writing.

The partisanship of GDR historiography created massive problems, a range of taboo topics, and many deformations of professional history-writing.8 Historians unwilling to legitimate SED rule and write a history which befitted communist views of the past, were purged, sacked, and persecuted. Until 1961, many of those ‘bourgeois’ historians who had remained in the GDR, fled to the West, either in anticipation of, or after, being sacked from their university positions. A Manichaean division of the world into friend and foe, good and bad became characteristic of GDR historiography. Marxism-Leninism became a straitjacket, constraining historians to adhere rigidly to a very narrative and unimaginative political history. And yet it never became entirely ossified, and even managed to challenge West German historiography by establishing social and economic history. Some Marxists, such as Walter Markov at Leipzig University, attempted to use Marxist theory productively for a new approach to global history. Later on, Wolfgang Küttler became a champion of ‘formation theory’ in order to modernize Marxist theory in the 1980s.9 East German historiography in the 1950s looked much more innovative and capable of breaking with the German traditions of history-writing than did its counterpart in the West.

The SED valued historical research and gave it ample resources. The number of historians at East German universities rose fivefold between 1949 and 1962.\(^{10}\) The institutionalization of a separate GDR historiography in the 1950s brought important changes to the organization of teaching and research. The history departments at the universities were reorganized following the Soviet model into sections for national history, for Russian and East European history, and for world history. The biggest and most important sections always remained those for national history. The major institutes for German history at the Universities of Berlin, Leipzig, and Halle were the classic examples. As the National Document of 1962 emphasized, history in the GDR had the task of illuminating the historical role of the GDR in creating the first socialist state on German soil. The abolition of the federal states (Länder) in 1952 meant that the traditional regional history (Landesgeschichte) remained marginal, with few resources dedicated to it. This was in marked contrast to the FRG, where the strength of federalism meant that Landesgeschichte could flourish.

In addition to the GDR universities, separate research institutes, employing hundreds of historians, were set up. Of particular importance was the Institute of History at the Academy of Sciences in East Berlin. Founded in 1956, it was later subdivided into four Institutes for German, General, Ancient, and Economic History respectively. It played an important role in leading and coordinating historical research in the GDR. More specialized research institutions included the research department of the Museum of National History and Jürgen Kuczynski’s Institute for Economic History—also both in East Berlin. At its Institute for Marxism-Leninism (founded in 1949) the ruling SED employed historians who researched in particular the history of the German labour movement, edited the collected works of Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, and acted as ideological guard dogs of the profession more generally. Historians also worked at the Academy of Social Sciences of the Central Committee of the SED, founded in 1951, and at the Party Academy (Parteihochschule), founded in 1946. The Institute of Military History at Potsdam was under the direction of the Ministry of Defence.

The almost wholesale replacement of the historical profession by a younger, GDR-trained group of historians in the 1950s meant that the new group was quite homogeneous and displayed a different habitus to that of the traditional German professor. The Habilitation (second doctorate) was abolished, but at the same time the so-called doctorate B (roughly equivalent to the Habilitation) became the qualification for those handpicked to undertake a university career. ‘Cadre plans’ ensured that job prospects were practically guaranteed. They took away the hunt for jobs and the competition that went with it, characteristic of the profession in the West. At university history departments, teaching and not

research was regarded as the most important task of faculty members. Research was carried out in groups, and publications by authors’ collectives often replaced the single-authored monograph. Loyalty to the GDR and the SED was a precondition for an historical career, which ensured the relative uniformity of political outlook among GDR historians. Some historians tried to evade the strong politicization of history-writing by moving to themes and areas in the more distant past, where such politicization was less marked.

WEST GERMANY SINCE THE 1960S: FROM THE BREAKTHROUGH OF SOCIAL HISTORY TO HAPPY ECLECTICISM

In West Germany, social and economic history was not entirely absent from the historiographical landscape. In the post-war years it received an institutional focus in the Arbeitskreis für Sozialgeschichte, founded by Werner Conze in 1957. The group’s interest in social history was rooted in the right-wing racialized people’s history (Volksgeschichte) of the inter-war period, and the conservative understanding of mass society. The ‘brown roots’ of West German social history were problematic, although the new generation of West German social historians, trained in the 1960s, were also inspired by French, British, and North American models of history-writing. In particular, historians who had been exiled during the Nazi years and who had found a new academic home at American universities now served as bridge-builders between American and German scholarship, and contributed to the Americanization, or Westernization, of German historical sciences.

Unlike 1945, the 1960s were a major watershed for West German historiography. First of all, the expansion of the higher education system in the FRG opened the floodgates to new appointments. It now became much more difficult for a handful of influential ‘gatekeepers’ within the German historical profession to control entry and ensure its social and political homogeneity. In addition to the sheer numbers of historians entering the historical profession, university reform in the 1960s and 1970s also dented the autocratic rule of the ‘big’


professors in many universities. Although the reform process was uneven and differed widely from state to state in the FRG, structures and procedures of decision-making were made more democratic, with lower echelons of staff getting some say in how departments were run and how appointments were made. This institutional sea change facilitated the pluralization of historical methods and made possible different interpretations of the past.

In the early 1960s the gatekeepers of the historical profession were still trying to silence those who stepped out of line. The most famous example of the latter was Fritz Fischer, the Hamburg-based historian, who caused a furore with the publication of his book *Griff nach der Weltmacht* [Germany’s Aims in the First World War] in 1961. Methodologically, the book was an extremely traditional, archive-based diplomatic history. But its interpretation of the First World War went against everything for which German historians had believed in and argued ever since the debate about German war guilt after the Versailles Treaty. Fischer claimed that the victorious Allies had been right in putting the sole blame on Imperial Germany and its elites, who had indeed deliberately provoked war in 1914. The reaction from the liberal-conservative mainstream of the German historical profession was strong. Some of their reviews were denunciatory, and they lobbied successfully to withdraw the financial support for Fischer’s tour of American universities, which only went ahead thanks to American funds.

The Fischer controversy demonstrated that a major generational divide had opened up within the German historical profession. A younger generation of historians often supported Fischer and endorsed the more self-critical and self-reflexive attitude to German national history that Fischer represented. In fact, when Fischer, in a second publication from the mid-1960s, claimed that a straight line could be drawn from German ambitions for world power in 1914 to German responsibility for the Second World War, he paved the way for the negative inversion of the German Sonderweg, which became accepted opinion in the left-liberal mainstream of German historiography during the 1970s and 1980s. If the creation of the German Reich in 1871 was no longer the telos of Prussian history, it was now a brief aberration of 75 years, which had brought nothing but utter misery to Germans and Europeans alike. The German lesson from the first half of the twentieth century was that a unified Germany was not good for Europe, and that Germans and Europeans would be happier with many Germanies than with one.

The debate surrounding the German Sonderweg was one of the most important and long-lasting in the historiography of the Federal Republic, starting just after the end of the Second World War and continuing well after reunification in 1990. In the 1950s and 1960s many conservative German historians tried to uphold notions of a positive German Sonderweg. The supporters of Fischer undertook a comprehensive reinterpretation of German national history from the 1960s onwards, which still made the German historical trajectory look special, but now disastrously so. The negative inversion of the Sonderweg was
heavily criticized by conservative historians, especially Thomas Nipperdey, who famously accused Hans-Ulrich Wehler of being a ‘Treitschke redivivus’ in his attempt to highlight one-sidedly the negative telos of Prusso-German national history. Arguably more influential was a seminal intervention by two British historians of Germany, David Blackbourn and Geoff Eley, who criticized any notions of a German *Sonderweg* and instead pleaded that the German historical trajectory be understood within a more Europeanized framework of modern history. *Mythen deutscher Geschichtsschreibung [The Peculiarities of German History] (1980)* encouraged a younger generation of German historians to investigate German history in a more comparative and transnational way, the outcome of which was an increasing abandonment of notions of a German *Sonderweg*.

The pluralization of the West German historical profession made possible the belated breakthrough of social history in the FRG. The Bielefeld school, or the Kehrites as its members were sometimes called in the English-speaking world, came to symbolize the turn to social history. Heavily influenced by modernization theory, they sought to merge the theoretical insights of Max Weber and Karl Marx to provide a framework for the study of modern societies. Hans Rosenberg and his blend of political and socio-economic history, as well as his idea of an illiberal German *Sonderweg*, was a major influence on the Kehrites. The fact that Rosenberg had been exiled by the Nazis, but returned to visiting professorships at the Free University Berlin in 1949/50 and Marburg in 1955 before finally settling in Germany again in 1977, added to his authority among a younger generation of historians more intent on dealing directly with the place of Nazism in German history.

The social historians’ institutional stronghold was the newly founded University of Bielefeld (1971), where two key representatives of German social history, Wehler and Jürgen Kocka, taught. The successful institutionalization of social history included the foundation of a hugely successful new journal, *Geschichte und Gesellschaft [History and Society] (1975)*. It also saw the beginnings, in 1972, of an important new book series with the publisher Vandenhoeck and Ruprecht entitled *Kritische Beiträge zur Geschichtswissenschaft*. Journals like *Geschichtsdidaktik* and *Journal für Geschichte* and book series such as *Neue wissenschaftliche Bibliothek, Arbeitsbücher zur modernen Geschichte*, and *Neue Historische Bibliothek* were also connected to the Kehrites. Apart from the University of Bielefeld, an early extra-university centre for social history, and in particular the history of the German labour movement, was the Research Institute of the Friedrich-Ebert Foundation in Bonn. Established in 1959, it had close ties to the Social Democratic Party of Germany (SPD). Its journal, *Archiv für Sozialgeschichte*, published from 1961 onwards, became one of the foremost journals for social and labour history in West Germany.

An important extension and enrichment of social history was provided by Reinhard Koselleck’s *Begriffsgeschichte* (conceptual history), which also became associated with the University of Bielefeld. Koselleck wanted to add to the
synchronic analyses of structural history the diachronic analyses of how terms changed their meaning and what this semantic change meant for human experiences and social change. Historical semantics of this kind went beyond a narrow history of ideas approach, anchoring terminologies in their legal, social, and political contexts. It transcended the older forms of Geistes- and Ideengeschichte and made intellectual history the bedfellow of the up-and-coming social history in West Germany, Koselleck’s Begriffsgeschichte found expression in the multi-volume Geschichtliche Grundbegriffe: Historisches Lexikon zur politisch-sozialen Sprache in Deutschland [Historical Concepts: A Historical Dictionary of Political and Social Language in Germany] (8 vols., 1972–97), and proved internationally compatible with attempts to draw attention to historical semantics, especially those of Quentin Skinner and the ‘Cambridge School’ of political thought.  

The new social history in the FRG productively took up the earlier challenge by GDR historiography. It became more difficult for GDR historians to claim that their West German counterparts ignored the histories of class and revolutions. Unlike their GDR colleagues, the Kehrites were not struggling with a ruling Communist Party setting the parameters for what could and could not be argued in historical studies. And soon the social science history in West Germany was outperforming the Marxist-Leninist historiography in East Germany as far as innovative and interesting new perspectives on German social history were concerned. There were exceptions to this rule: for example, the work of Hartmut Harnisch on agrarian history, the comparative work on revolutions by Manfred Kossock, and the urban history of Helga Schulz. But on the whole, GDR historiography looked increasingly stale under conditions of communist dictatorship. It continued to be characterized by a lack of innovation, a climate of fear and denunciation, and constant political control.

In West Germany, historians of the Bielefeld school would frequently talk about their achievements as a paradigm change in historical writing. Some predicted that the older conservative and historist political history was being replaced by a more left-liberal social history. But this was wishful thinking, often rooted in an unconscious rejection of pluralism and the desire to control the profession just as much as their conservative Üerväter (dominant father figures) had done before them. Due to the fact that many of the Bielefelders and their allies occupied important institutional positions relatively early on in their careers, they formed a ‘long generation’ which could become particularly influential within West German historiography. But they could not achieve the dominance that some of them had hoped for. From the 1970s onwards the social historians of the Bielefeld school found themselves challenged by a variety of

13 Hans Erich Bodecker, Begriffsgeschichte, Diskursgeschichte, Metapherngeschichte (Gottingen, 2002).
other histories—notably the history of everyday life, women’s and, later, gender history, and cultural history.

Historians of everyday life were unhappy with a social science history which paid attention to structures and processes but seemed to forget about the people and their everyday experiences. During the 1970s, history workshops sprang up in many West German towns and cities and started to research local history. In 1983 they formed the ‘Association of History Workshops’ (Geschichtswerkstatt e. V.), which organized annual history festivals. They paid particular attention to groups of people who had been neglected by historical studies, in particular to workers, but also to victim groups under National Socialism and to anti-fascist resistance groups. The history workshop movement was thus an important catalyst in the long process of ‘coming to terms with the National Socialist past’ that characterized German memory politics more generally from the 1960s onwards. Some members of these history workshops were working-class autodidacts, but overwhelmingly they recruited among teachers, trade unionists, and professional groups. They were broadly on the left.

The rising popularity of oral history was directly linked to the history workshop movement. Both shared an interest in how ordinary people perceived their historical experiences. They wanted to concentrate on the subjective perceptions of historical experience. This promised to be especially useful in relation to periods of dictatorship, when official archival material was less able to provide a perspective on historical experience. Lutz Niethammer’s studies on everyday life in the Ruhr under Nazism and in the post-war era, as well as his project on the communist GDR, became important studies, and set standards for oral history research. Oral history research was also prominent in the areas of local and regional history, and the history of minorities, workers, and women. Similarly, it proved extremely worthwhile for historians of non-literate (often extra-European) societies, and for those interested in tracing continuities and discontinuities across generational divides. The journal BIOS—Zeitschrift für Biographieforschung und Oral History and the Lüdenscheid-based Institute for History and Biography, founded by Alexander von Plato, have been particularly important for its development since 1988.

Women’s history also emerged out of the political turmoil of the 1960s. It aimed to make visible women in history, and began by concentrating on the history of women’s movements and the participation of women in movements for emancipation. From the 1980s onwards gender historians such as Regina

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15 A good introduction to German Alltagsgeschichte is provided by Alf Lüdtke (ed.), The History of Everyday Life: Reconstructing Historical Experiences and Ways of Life (Princeton, NJ, 1995).
17 See Ch. 7 by Julie Des Jardins in this volume.
Schulte, Ute Frevert, and others argued successfully that gender informed virtually all histories and historical processes as well as events, and should be included as a major category for historical investigation into all mainstream histories.  

Some of the leading practitioners of gender history, such as Karin Hausen, were successful in establishing centres for gender studies in the 1980s, although the institutional anchoring of women’s and gender history at German universities remained weak. Most of the practitioners of women’s and gender history were (and continue to be) women. They faced the additional difficulty that the historical profession in Germany was still a male-dominated profession.

The reception of cultural history in Germany took place within a thoroughly internationalized historical science, which nevertheless retained many national peculiarities. The interest in culture was strongly related to an interest in the constitution of identities and to the ‘linguistic turn’ in historical studies. How did people in the past make sense of the world? How did culture create representations and social practices? The theories of Michel Foucault, Michel de Certeau, Raymond Williams, Stuart Hall, Natalie Zemon Davis, Judith Butler, Hayden White, and Clifford Geertz were particularly influential on the new ‘cultural history’—an umbrella term used to describe many different types and approaches, including microhistory, historical anthropology, cultural studies, intellectual history, postcolonial studies, and transnational history. The turn to culture was also motivated by the disappointment about the abstract nature of structural social history, the neglect of personal and subjective levels of historical experience in grand theories of social change, and the hope that culture would allow a more immediate access to forms of representation, experience, and identity in highly complex and contested societies.

But the historical profession in West Germany throughout the 1970s and 1980s did not only consist of these new forms of history-writing, as the historist historiographical tradition was vigorously defended by prominent historians, including Golo Mann, Thomas Nipperdey, and Andreas Hillgruber. They argued that the high politics of states, classic diplomatic history, as well as the study of ‘great men’, all had to retain their place in German historiography. As a critic of historical social science, no historian was arguably more influential than Thomas Nipperdey, partly because he was willing to meet the Bielefeld school on their own terrain: social history. The traditionalists, who were often politically

18 For a good introduction to women’s and gender history in Germany, see Karin Hausen and Heide Wunder (eds.), *Frauengeschichte–Geschlechtergeschichte* (Frankfurt, 1992).
21 For some of these trends, see Ch. 1 by Chris Lorenz and Ch. 10 by Kevin Passmore in this volume.
conservative, were still strong in the historical profession and tended to dominate the historical institutions—in particular the German Historical Association and the *Historische Zeitschrift*.

Traditional historists attacked the new social history, not only for its allegedly undue politicization of the subject, but also for producing a dry and unreadable form of history, which withdrew from an engagement with the wider public. During the 1970s there was much talk about the ‘crisis of history’ in West Germany—a belief that history was losing terrain to the social sciences. There were even suggestions that history be dropped as a school subject, and replaced with the social sciences. Questions were being asked about the usefulness of history, and it looked as though the ‘lead science’ of the nineteenth century would be moved to the back benches. But talk of the terminal decline of history was premature. Historical exhibitions, such as the Staufer exhibition in the 1970s, or the Prussia exhibition in 1981, tended to find wide audiences. The popularity of historical biography also never waned. Joachim Fest’s biography of Hitler (1973), Lothar Gall’s biography of Bismarck (1980), Theodor Schieder’s biography of Frederick the Great (1983), Golo Mann’s biography of Wallenstein (1986), and Hans Peter Schwarz’s two-volume biography of Konrad Adenauer (1986, 1991) are just some prominent examples of biographies which made it to the top of the West German best-seller lists. In fact, the more recent popularity of history channels, and in particular the endless stream of historical productions by Guido Knopp, shown at prime time to millions of keen spectators, testifies to the fact that history still has a very dedicated following among a lay mass audience.\(^{22}\)

But the public voice of history was no longer uniformly conservative and historist. The Bielefelders in particular had access to the media and used it to intervene in what they regarded as important public debates on history. In 1981, for example, Wehler criticized ‘Prussomania’ as a ‘flight into a transfigured past’ which relied on a one-sidedly positive reassessment of Prussian values and achievements.\(^{23}\) The massive success of the television movie *Heimat* was partly due to the collaboration of the film-maker Edgar Reitz with the professional historian-cum-television-adviser Peter Steinbach. Other historians, including Eberhard Jäckel and Ian Kershaw, also used the opportunities of television to communicate history to millions of viewers.

What is extremely noticeable about social history, everyday life history, women’s and gender history, and cultural history, is their desire to foster interdisciplinary links to related subject areas, in particular sociology, economics, philosophy, literature, ethnology, and psychology. Apart from a pronounced interdisciplinarity, they also built transnational links and networks and moved


beyond the national framework of historical studies. Their leading practitioners move in line with international developments in the historical sciences as far as methods, theories, and subject areas are concerned, and in some respects one can talk about a loss of national specificity of the historical sciences from the 1970s onwards. But a loss of national specificity was arguably also the precondition for the marked upturn in comparative and transnational studies from the 1980s onwards. Comparison was seen by many younger historians of the 1990s as a means of moving beyond tired-looking notions of a positive or of a negative German Sonderweg and of establishing commonalities and differences in historical trajectories. In doing so, they still did not move decisively beyond national history, as they often used the nation-state as unit of comparison within their studies. But the national paradigm became more self-reflective and relative. This move away from an unquestioned national paradigm coincided with debates on the FRG developing a post-national identity. Once historians had established that the experience of Germans with a unified nation-state between 1871 and 1945 had not been a happy one for themselves and other Europeans, it was but a short step to look for alternatives to national forms of identity.

THE NATIONALIZATION OF GDR HISTORIOGRAPHY IN THE 1980S AND THE IMPACT OF REUNIFICATION

Just as historians in West Germany were becoming more self-reflexive about the national paradigm, GDR historians rediscovered national history in the context of the ‘heritage and tradition debate’ which preoccupied GDR historical sciences in the 1980s. Only briefly, during the 1960s and earlier 1970s, had the preoccupation of GDR historiography with national history given way to a more internationalist orientation. In this period, the GDR stressed its identity as a ‘socialist nation’. The concept gained currency in direct response to West German Ostpolitik. The need for stronger demarcation from the FRG meant that GDR history was now put into the context of the development of the socialist/communist world after 1917. But this internationalization was short-lived. From the mid-1970s onwards, the party and its historians underlined the GDR’s existence as a socialist German nation, and the insistence on national sovereignty went hand in hand with an exploration of historical national traditions which might serve to underpin that socialist national consciousness. From here it was only a small step to begin calls for a more wholesome exploration of German history. This was at the heart of the ‘heritage and tradition debate’. Historical studies in the GDR rehabilitated whole areas of national history that had previously been taboo. Historians argued that the GDR had a responsibility, not only for its progressive and forward-looking heritage culminating in the
GDR, but also for the other traditions, which were not immediately linked to actually existing socialism. Research on classes other than the working class now became possible; eras and personalities previously non-grata in GDR historiography were rediscovered; and the territories in the ‘German East’ that had become part of other East European states after 1945, were now for the first time becoming the object of GDR historical research.

Traditionalist conservative West German historians, such as Michael Stürmer, referred to this national turn of GDR historiography in their own attempts to revive the national tradition of history-writing in the FRG during the 1980s. Stürmer and like-minded historians argued that West Germany was in danger of becoming a country without history, meaning a country without identity. What was needed was a stronger and more positively accentuated historical consciousness underpinning national identity in the FRG. Stürmer was not only a professor of history at the University of Erlangen-Nürnberg; he was also a close advisor of the Christian Democrat Chancellor Helmut Kohl, who had come to power in 1982 promising a ‘spiritual-moral renewal’ of the country. A new patriotism was to be part of that ‘renewal’. However, National Socialism proved to be a major stumbling block on the road to achieving it. These attempts to relativize the importance of National Socialism and the Holocaust to German national history caused a strong reaction by left-liberal historians who denounced the ‘apologetic tendencies’ they contained, and confirmed the central place of National Socialism in a post-war German national identity that could not be positive. The Historikerstreit was not just about politics, national memory, and the role of National Socialism in it; it also highlighted the dearth of empirical research on perpetrators of the Holocaust in Germany, and kick-started a major research effort, which produced substantial studies in the 1990s and 2000s. But in the mid-1980s, for many German historians, the political lessons of the period in German history between 1871 and 1945 seemed clear: post-nationalism and the acceptance of the division of Germany.

Acceptance of bi-nationalism was also one of the reasons for an initial dialogue between West and East German historians in the 1970s and 1980s. Ever since the 1950s the relationship had been one of implacable hostility. GDR historians had accused their West German colleagues of complicity in the National Socialist crimes and thought them structurally incapable of a more

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25 There is an endless historical literature on the Historikerstreit. For good introductions and perceptive commentaries in the English language, see Richard Evans, In Hitler’s Shadow: West German Historians and the Attempt to Escape from the Nazi Past (London, 1989); and Charles Maier, The Unmasterable Past: History, Holocaust and German National Identity (Cambridge, Mass., 1988).
self-critical historiography that could come to terms with the National Socialist past.\textsuperscript{26} West German historians, in turn, by and large ignored East German historiography as propaganda and political journalism—until West German social historians picked up on it as a productive challenge. There was a noticeable and increasing recognition in the West that the GDR historical profession had become more professional, and that one might even discern a limited amount of pluralism among GDR historians. Ever since the 1967 seventh party conference of the SED declared the need to develop all the sciences in the GDR, there had been a marked tendency in the historical sciences to move beyond all-too-obvious propaganda exercises and develop historical scholarship in accordance with international standards. The foundation of the Council for Historical Sciences in January 1968 allowed historians, not autonomy from the party, but a limited say in the framing of their historical works. The integration of the GDR Historians’ Association into the International Commission for the Historical Sciences in 1970 marked a further step in the direction of dialogue.

While many GDR historians remained trapped in a stale and unproductive Marxism-Leninism, it was noticeable that some of them engaged constructively with West German research on the history from below, women’s and gender history, and cultural history. Hartmut Zwahr’s studies about the formation of the Leipzig proletariat are difficult to imagine without West German social history, and the ethnologists Sigrid and Wolfgang Jacobeit, as well as Hermann Strobach, practised a kind of ‘history from below’ within the GDR. Women’s history in the GDR was reduced largely to the history of the proletarian women’s movement. Only in September 1988 did the National Committee of the Historians’ Association of the GDR appoint a commission which was supposed explicitly to research the history of women and the women’s movement. Dietrich Mühlberg’s studies of working-class life in Germany, published in the 1980s, also went some way in the direction of a cultural history of the working class. The productive engagement of GDR historians of the First World War with the work of Fritz Fischer likewise testified to the positive impulses which GDR historiography received from its West German counterpart in the 1970s and 1980s.

It was among those social historians close to the West German Social Democratic Party (SPD) that the idea of a dialogue with their East German colleagues was taken furthest. In March 1987 the Historical Commission of the SPD organized a conference at which East and West German historians engaged in a lively debate about their differing interpretations of the national past. A climate of cooperation and relatively free discussion seemed to prevail.\textsuperscript{27} Cooperation spelt normalization of GDR–FRG historiographical relations, but it also


\textsuperscript{27} Susanne Miller and Malte Ristau (eds.), \textit{Erben deutscher Geschichte, DDR–BRD: Protokolle einer historischen Begegnung} (Reinbek, 1988).
threatened the separate identity of GDR historiography, as historians from East and West sought compromise over scholarly standards beyond the ideological Cold War struggle.

Along came German reunification in 1990. Quite unexpectedly, the nation-state was on the agenda again. During the first half of the 1990s, a self-styled New Right attempted once again to renationalize German historical consciousness and remove National Socialism from its central place in German cultural memory. Despite the fact that some conservative historians at times looked on these efforts sympathetically, the extreme right-wing views of historians such as Rainer Zitelmann or Karl-Heinz Weissmann, and their institutional weakness (none of them occupied a university chair), meant that they faded from view after 1995.

Instead, what came to dominate the German historical profession after 1990 was a ‘search for national normality’. Post-nationalism was now criticized as yet another German Sonderweg. Reunification offered the opportunity to unite the national principle with the ideas of liberty and pluralism which had been the underlying values of the FRG and had also informed the 1989 revolution in East Germany. Something akin to a new consensus arose out of this debate on national normality. And the new historical national master narrative was provided by one of the foremost left-liberal historians of the FRG, Heinrich August Winkler. For a while, historical investigations into the ‘second German dictatorship’ threatened to replace interest in National Socialist Germany. Ultimately, however, a strong interest in both dictatorships characterized historical research in the 1990s. Furthermore, it was noticeable that the reunified Germany saw the first attempts to historize the history of the FRG. While almost all historiographical debates in West Germany had dealt with the First World War, the Weimar Republic, and the National Socialist period, the 1990s also saw debates on the meaning of 1968 for West Germany, the impact of left-wing terrorism on the post-war republic, and the achievements and shortcomings of Neue Ostpolitik. This is not to say that the National Socialist years were not capable of producing major debates after reunification. The Goldhagen debate, the historiographical repercussions of the Wehrmacht exhibition, the debate on the role of German historians under Nazism, and to some extent also the debates surrounding the Holocaust memorial and German victimhood in the Second World War, still demonstrated the powerful hold of National Socialism, the Holocaust, and the Second World War over German memory debates.

And what about historical research in East Germany after 1990? Had the East German turn to national history in the 1980s and the dialogue of East German

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historians with their West German counterparts paved the way for a unified historical consciousness after 1990. As far as the historical profession is concerned, it is difficult to tell, as East German historiography did not survive the move to a unified Germany. After 1990 the opportunity to undertake a comprehensive reform of all German universities was missed, and the West German system was introduced across East Germany. East German professors were evaluated by their West German peers—and many were found wanting according to the Western benchmarks of quality. A second wave of dismissals followed when the remaining East German professors were politically evaluated and a great many of them were shown to have acted as informers of the infamous East German secret police, the Stasi. Only a handful of East German historians survived the Western onslaught. By the mid-1990s the history departments at East German universities had come to be dominated by Westerners. An older East German historiography survived in a kind of niche culture, which it carved out for itself. However, given that it has no institutional foothold in the world of higher education, it cannot reproduce itself and will die with the last generation of historians trained and educated in the GDR.

CONCLUSION

For much of the period between 1945 and 1990, German academic historiography travelled along two distinct paths in two separate states. In the GDR, the establishment of Marxist-Leninist historiography as a state historiography came at the high price of political conformism. At first, GDR historiography broke decisively with the tradition of German historism, and it developed historical studies in revamped institutions and with a new understanding of the historian’s role in society. However, its inability then to innovate and adapt to theoretical challenges and new methodologies, and its continued political instrumentalization by the SED, made it unattractive, even if individual historians did sterling work, and even if it served as a productive challenge to a nascent West German social history in the 1960s and 1970s. In contrast to the substantial historiographical change in the GDR after 1945, West German historiography changed very little in the immediate post-war years. Here the challenge to traditional historism arose only in the context of the 1960s. The expansion and reform of higher education made it impossible for the gatekeepers of the historical profession to keep control over entry into the Zunft. The net result was the pluralization of historical writing, which saw not only the breakthrough to social history but also the proliferation of new histories, including the history of everyday life, women’s and gender history, and the new cultural history. In methodological

30 As argued by Jan Herman Brinks, Die DDR Geschichtswissenschaft auf dem Weg zur deutschen Einheit: Luther, Friedrich II und Bismarck als Paradigmen politischen Wandels (Frankfurt, 1992).
terms, a second generation of social historians attempted to develop the social history of the Bielefelders in a way that would take up the productive challenges from history from below, gender history, and cultural history.

The Fischer controversy of the 1960s marked West German historiography’s break with historiographical nationalism. Following the negative inversion of the *Sonderweg*, German historiography moved in the direction of an acceptance of bi-nationalism and the normative endorsement of post-nationalism. The *Historikerstreit* of the 1980s and reunification in 1990 brought renewed debates about national history. Especially after 1990, the search for national normality is once again a ubiquitous characteristic of German debates on history. National history clearly dominates the popular forms of history in the media, but professional historiography in Germany has arguably moved away from a concentration on national history. The trend is towards transnational and comparative history and the history of cultural and political transfer, all of which aim to deconstruct notions of specific national developments. Furthermore, the more recent past has seen a vital interest in non-national history with the appointment of chairs in European and non-European history. Global history is on the rise also among German historians; university departments now include historians of Africa, Asia, and Latin America, and at long last it seems possible to make a career as a professional historian in Germany without being a national historian.

**TIMELINE/KEY DATES**

1945 (8 May) End of the Second World War in Europe; end of the German Reich; occupation of Germany, and division into four zones of occupation

1949 Foundation of the Federal Republic of Germany and the German Democratic Republic; Konrad Adenauer first Chancellor of the FRG; Walter Ulbricht general secretary of the SED in the GDR

1968 Student revolt in West Germany

1969 Willy Brandt takes office as first social democratic Chancellor of the FRG

1971 Walter Ulbricht is replaced as general secretary of the SED by Erich Honecker

1972 Basic Treaty signed between the FRG and the GDR, paving the way for the international recognition of the GDR

1981 Prussia exhibition in Berlin

1982 Thirteen years of social democratic rule in the FRG come to an end with the election of Helmut Kohl as Chancellor

1989 Revolution in East Germany ends SED rule

1990 Reunification of the two Germanies

1995 Gerhard Schröder becomes Chancellor of a red–green coalition

2005 Angela Merkel becomes Chancellor of a grand coalition between CDU/CSU and SPD
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Chapter 12
Historical Writing in Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary

Maciej Górny

The idea of gathering four East Central European historiographies within a common regional narrative is far from obvious. There is certainly no common Polish-Czech-Slovak-Hungarian history, though parts of the region share a number of similar experiences. As a matter of fact, it is probably only Slovak historiography that finds its main ‘referential points’ within the countries of the so-called Visegrád group (Hungarian and Czech history-writing). The rest looked to the West or—at some point and not always voluntarily—to the East, mostly over the heads of their nearest neighbours. The professional exchange of works and ideas within such a constructed region is much weaker than between its particular parts and other historiographies, be they French, German, or Anglo-Saxon. The diversity of languages does not make the exchange easier. Probably only the Slovak professional reader, owing to linguistic competence, may be equally aware of recent developments of Czech and—partially—Hungarian historiography. Yet the comparison of Polish, Czech, Slovak, and Hungarian historiography does make sense, if we take into consideration some secondary features. In short, even if the determinative ideas in any of the human sciences almost always come from outside of the region, the processes of applying them creates a sphere of possible comparison within East Central Europe. Polish, Hungarian, Czech, and Slovak historiographies are all intellectual importers, and since 1945 both the common features of those historiographies and their shared fate have become visible. Of course, the post-war history of historiography in East Central Europe is not limited to those countries, and it must be remembered that the absence of East German, Romanian, or Ukrainian historiography in this chapter derives from structural and compositional reasons only.¹

In a short outline of the history of historical writing in the region I will concentrate on long-term trends and phenomena; rather than analyze the

¹ For Romania, see Ch. 17 by Ulf Brunnbauer, and for East Germany, see Ch. 11 by Stefan Berger, both in this volume.
literature from over sixty years and three (now four) states, I will focus on turning points and main intellectual traditions. The first point of analysis is the coexistence during the immediate post-war years of communist policy, together with more or less nationalistic historical interpretations: this was signified in the first attempt at close cooperation between non-communist scholars and the Communist Party. The next stage is typified by attempts to control education and research, and to reshape the organizational structure of historiography. An output of both of these phenomena was the ‘final’ or mature Marxist interpretations of Polish, Hungarian, Czech, and Slovak history, the basic shapes of which were largely realized in the 1950s and early 1960s. The next regional stage to have a considerable impact on the region’s historiography is the ‘golden age’ of the 1960s (in the Polish and Hungarian cases lasting much longer than in Czechoslovakia), when most of the innovative and influential books were published, and historians from East Central Europe came into closer contact with their colleagues from the western part of the continent. I shall conclude by sketching the main features of the post-1989 historiography, focusing especially on its public role.

THE POST-WAR RECONSTRUCTION

The impact on historical scholarship of war and occupation between 1939 and 1945 varied considerably from country to country. Polish historiography underwent heavy losses in personnel. Moreover, with the death in 1945 of Marceli Handelsman, post-war historiography was deprived of its most innovative theoretician. However, the reorganization of research and education progressed even in an almost totally devastated Warsaw. There were also influential leaders of the historical discipline in contact with the new political power of the Communist Party—to mention only Tadeusz Manteuffel, the first post-war director of the Historical Institute of Warsaw University and, in subsequent decades, the first director of the Institute of History within the Polish Academy of Sciences.

None of the other countries’ historiographies examined here had to deal with such a drastic collapse of infrastructure and such devastating human losses. In Hungary, the inter-war emigration of Jewish scholars and the subsequent collaboration of the academic establishment with the authoritarian regime, and in some cases even with the Nazis, posed a far greater menace to the continuity of historical research than did the actual human losses. Slovak historians, in contrast, profited from the violent dissolution of Czechoslovakia. Subsequent expulsion of Czech professors from the only Slovak university in Bratislava opened positions for their Slovak colleagues during wartime. After 1945 only a small group of nationalist historical propagandists fled the country to avoid the approaching Soviet army. The rest proved to be much more self-confident and
sceptical towards the idea of Czechoslovak unity than had been the case during the inter-war period.

In the process of achieving power, the various national communist parties searched for legitimacy. Czech communists enjoying wide social support were rather an exception than a rule. Even in the Slovak part of the state, the Communist Party lost sympathy during the early post-war years. In this situation the communists looked in the first instance to national culture and national history in support of their assumption of power. This need decisively marked attempts to reshape the pre-existing communist historical narratives. The inter-war communist movements were extremely critical towards national traditions of any kind, and offered an internationalist counter-narrative in opposition to dominant nationalist interpretations. This partly changed during the second half of the 1930s and certainly during the war, evolving along with the Soviet historical narrative. Thus the adoption of the Soviet paradigm in 1945 did not mean adopting the native communist tradition of historical thought but rather searching for a new interpretation that would be ‘national in form and socialist in content’.

In their first attempts to attract the sympathy of the ‘common people’, Polish, Czech, and Slovak communists referred to recent history. A strongly anti-German sentiment was common currency in post-war Europe, and not only in the east. Poland and Czechoslovakia were among those countries that expelled German populations from their older or newly ‘reunited’ western areas. Both states referred to a long history of conflicts with Germans, stressing at the same time the importance of Slavic brotherhood in past and future battles.2

The need for widely accepted national communist policy was responsible for the development of a network of Polish research institutes, the most prominent of which was the Western Institute (Instytut Zachodni) in Poznań. Under the directorship of medievalist Zygmunt Wojciechowski, Instytut Zachodni was a significant point on the Polish historiographic landscape, publishing its own periodical Przegląd Zachodni [Western Review] and opening branches in several Polish cities. Wojciechowski was not only a gifted historian, but also a nationalist politician. In the inter-war period he had been a proponent of the concept of ‘Polish maternal lands’, more or less including, after 1945, those that were transferred from the collapsed Third Reich to Poland. Wojciechowski’s book Polska–Niemcy: Dziesięć wieków zmagania [Poland and Germany: A Thousand Years of Struggle], first published in 1933, reappeared in 1945 in a new edition considerably more critical of Germany than the first one. According to Wojciechowski the whole western branch of the Slavic world had been shaped by constant military struggle against German aggression. The Germans, he

2 See Edmund Dmitrów, Niemcy i okupacja hitlerowska w oczach Polaków: Poglądy i opinie z lat 1945–1948 (Warsaw, 1987); and Jan Křen and Eva Broklová (eds.), Obraz Němců, Rakouska a Německa v české společnosti 19. a 20. století (Prague, 1998).
contended, were unable to cohabit peacefully with Slavs, since they ‘biologically’ hated everything Slavic. Now, after 1945, ‘There is a new epoch of Slavic march to the west that has replaced the German Drang nach Osten. Who doesn’t understand it, won’t understand the new era and won’t see properly the place of Poland in the new international reality’.

The Przegląd Zachodni vividly supported Wojciechowski’s view of Polish–German relations. At the same time, the editors of the journal expressed their loyalty to the communist leadership and gratitude to Stalin for the new, and in their view, fair western border of Poland. As a mixture of political and scholarly arguments, this so-called Polish western idea was a mirror image of the German Ostforschung with a pinch of pan-Slavic sentiment thrown in. As such, it had no Czechoslovak counterpart. Although the German problem was crucial for the Czech national movement from its beginnings (and perhaps because it was so important) there was no separate Czech or Slovak ‘Western idea’, and consequently no person who could embody the movement in the manner of Wojciechowski, who in Poland provided a face for the whole political tendency. The expulsion of Germans from Czech lands was accompanied by texts that questioned the moral and cultural values of the defeated enemy. Historical writings described a thousand years of Czech-German struggle and an innately evil German national character, the aggressive inclinations of which had led inexorably to the emergence of the Nazi dictatorship. However, in contrast to the Polish situation, Germans were not a popular topic of post-war Czechoslovak historiography. But there was another motif that attracted the attention of Czech and Slovak historians: the idea of Slavic brotherhood. An editorial in the first issue of the post-war Česky Časopis Historický [Czech Historical Journal] claimed that ‘the Slavic idea in its new Russian understanding makes us sure that our motherland will never be a part of Great Germania and, with all our frank sympathy for Europe, we will be allowed to develop as an independent nation’. One of the most important animators of this Slavophile campaign was Zdeněk Nejedlý—musicologist, minister of education, the first president of the Czechoslovak Academy of Sciences, and the unquestioned leader of Czech Marxist historical science.

As in the Polish example, some Czech historians who were rather far removed from the communist camp nonetheless supported the pan-Slavic and anti-German line. In 1947 a liberal Moravian historian, Ladislav Hosák, published his history of the Czech lands—a rather typical example of inter-war Czech historiography. Nevertheless, we can observe nationalist elements here that

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5 Ladislav Hosák, Nové československé dějiny (Prague, 1947).
pushed against the more general liberal line. The Hussites were, according to
Hosáčk, ‘cleaning our country from a religious and national enemy’. Lajos
Kossuth was characterized as ‘denationalized Slovak’. But the most critical
remarks were saved for the Germans who were characterized as having, since
1848, chosen a path of hostility towards everything that was Czech—a path that
led straight to Munich, the Second World War, and, finally, to the expulsion of
incurably traitorous Germans. The book ends with an affirmation of the belief in
the ‘Slavic orientation’ of Czechoslovak policy, and predictions of the glorious
future of Czechoslovak-Russian brotherhood.

More or less the same picture was drawn by František Bokes, the Slovak author
of a history of Slovakia and the Slovaks (published in 1946). Both Hosáčk and
Bokes mixed the language of inter-war geopolitics with new, radical ideological
tendencies. Traditional references to Slavic mutuality, when placed in a new
political situation, gained new meanings.

When, in the late 1940s, both Poland and Czechoslovakia entered a period of
Stalinization, a rapid change in the orthodox historical outlook occurred. During
a conference in Wrocław in 1950, Zygmunt Wojciechowski was condemned for
his anti-German chauvinism. A local Marxist historian Ewa Maleczyńska com-
mented: ‘I think that those who understand post-war changes in a way, that once
then they were beating us and now it’s their time to be beaten—those who want
to replace the German Drang nach Osten with the Slavic “Drang nach Westen”—
that those people don’t understand the meaning of recent developments’. Consequently, though Polish, Czech, or Slovak Marxist historical writings
never lost their anti-German undertones, the open synthesis of nationalist and
communist interpretation of the past was for some time marginalized. The
Hungarian case can be situated somewhere between the Polish and Czechoslovak
narratives on the one hand, and East German historical scholarship on the other.
Though some changes in the dominant interpretations of Hungarian–Slavic
coexistence in the Carpathian basin appeared, the hegemonic communist narra-
tive was largely shaped by the interpretations of two historians: József Révai and
Aladár Mód. Both authors ‘presented an unholy mixture of superpatriotic kuruc
and proletarian internationalist historical analyses’. Thus the jump from the
post-war to the Stalinist vision of history proved less dramatic in the Hungarian
case than in Poland and Czechoslovakia. The post-war period had seen an

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6 Ibid., 421.
7 František Bokes, Dejiny Slovenska a Slovákov od najstarších čias po oslobodenie (Bratislava, 1946).
attempt at uniting the ‘revolutionary’ with the ‘national’, even at a price of reproducing explicitly nationalistic interpretations. Though short, this period was, then, indicative for the communist politics of history as well as for the reaction of the historical communities in East Central Europe. The communists learned how to approach a wider audience with a popular vision of national past; the historians learned how to secure at least part of their freedom for the price of close cooperation with new power.

**HISTORIOGRAPHIES UNDER STALINISM**

The 1950s are commonly perceived as the most disastrous period in the post-war history of the region—a conviction attributable in large measure to the cultural policies of Stalinism. ‘Historical science’ underwent serious institutional changes. A major Stalinist goal was to transform the social and political character of the educated classes of society while imposing party control over the academic community and creating a socially acceptable narrative of national history.

The first of these aims was to be realized, it was hoped, by reshaping university admissions policy. As György Péteri claims: ‘From this point, “class affiliation” became a legitimate criterion for selecting students and faculty, and fields of scholarship of high ideological significance were purged and populated with new, politically reliable, but often intellectually inferior personnel’.10 To allow students from workers’ and peasants’ families to reach the introductory university level, certain preparatory courses were created for which registrants could achieve matriculation in one to three years and then enter their chosen programme without a formal examination.

Despite local differences, some general phenomena in the organization of scholarship characterize a common Soviet-bloc experience. From the late 1940s, research was the subject of central planning. Although continuously criticized and even ridiculed, this practice has survived in the East Central European Academies to the present day. The division of research and teaching became one of the main tenets of the new historiography. Historical research was to be concentrated in the elite institutes of history within the respective academies of science (variously opened between 1948 and 1953). The principal aim of the institutes’ staff was to prepare a first compulsory Marxist university handbook for national history. The initial organization of the institutes reflected this fact rather mechanically: the research units were divided by time periods in accordance with the chronological divisions of the textbooks. The institutes also hosted editorial committees of the newly established or ‘reformed’ central

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historical journals: Századok [Centuries], Kwartalnik Historyczny [Historical Quarterly], Československý Časopis Historický [Czechoslovak Historical Journal], and Historicky Časopis Slovenskej Akadémie Vied [Historical Journal of the Slovak Academy of Sciences]. Marxism-Leninism was also, under different names, a major subject in the education of university students. There was an inherent contradiction in the idea of the academy, which on the one hand was supposed to catalyze changes in knowledge, but on the other hand was serving as a haven for numerous non-Marxist scholars. In effect the institutes gathered convinced Marxists and young researchers into the same house as older ‘bourgeois’ academics.

In historiography the determination to achieve substantial change was motivated by the wish to replace the older historical narratives with a new Marxist interpretation of history. On the other hand, the same goal served to moderate the scientific policies of the communist parties: it turned out that the supply of quality professional historians was not limitless. Even in Hungary, with a relatively strong group of communist intellectuals (including György [Georg] Lukács in the first instance), the initial determination was spent within months rather than years. As Erzsébet Andics (one of the ‘Stalinist’ leaders of the Hungarian historiography) predicted in 1949, without the assistance of some ‘bourgeois’ colleagues ‘the battle for the 5-year plan will be lost’. Thus the policy towards the historiographical establishment oscillated between the creation of new elites and attracting the prominent ‘progressives’ who were not party members.

Large-scale purges occurred in Czech lands during 1948. Their alleged ‘democratic’ character (students and professors were expelled not by the authorities but by special committees composed of their party colleagues) strengthened their impact on the academic environment, although the percentage of dismissed professors was by far smaller than that of the expelled students. In fact, the Czech purges decisively contributed to the terrorizing of the professoriate. Interestingly, the Slovak part of the common state did not witness such a severe ‘cultural revolution’, though, symbolically, Daniel Rapant—an historian who had an extraordinary impact on Slovak historiography—was dismissed. Similarly, no massive campaign against the professoriate was launched in either Poland or Hungary. There, formal acknowledgement of the superiority of Marxist-Leninist methodology was usually sufficient to secure one’s academic career, though central posts were often monopolized by party intellectuals. The

‘bourgeois’ remainder simply adapted to its new circumstances, though such complacency has been criticized in recent years.\textsuperscript{13}

Yet similar attempts at reproducing the model of Soviet science and the equally similar opportunism of most East Central European historians failed to result in a single, common shape for the respective historiographies. Once again, Lenin’s famous emphasis on the role of the cadres proved just as valid under state socialism. And it was cadres that made the difference between Czechoslovak, Polish, and Hungarian Marxist-Leninist historiographies. Everywhere some party functionaries were perceived as the new ‘natural’ leaders of the historical profession. Dozens of names elicit the popular notion of a ‘tsar of Marxist historiography’. There are some indications that the crucial posts of directors of the history institutes in the academies were initially reserved for the prominent members of the privileged communist elite, the \textit{nomenklatura}. Yet the developments were different. In Czechoslovakia three young scholars and party-members gained three most prestigious posts: Josef Macek, the first director of the Institute of History of the Czechoslovak Academy of Sciences; František Graus, the editor-in-chief of the newly created \textit{Československý Časopis Historický}; and Ľudovít Holotík, director of the Institute of History of the Slovak Academy of Sciences. The appointments of the three young men, who were around 30 years of age, had obviously interfered with the hopes and aspirations of their elder colleagues. In Hungary it was none of the influential party-propagandists but Erik Molnár, a Marxist jurist and historian held in considerable esteem far beyond the communist core, who would occupy the directorship of the Institute of History of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences. The most interesting deviation from the initial ‘revolutionary’ agenda was the nomination of Tadeusz Manteuffel, neither Marxist, nor party-member, to the directorship of the Institute of History of the Polish Academy. Such choices reflect the variations among Czechoslovak, Polish, and Hungarian policies towards the academic historical establishment. In Czechoslovakia, party functionaries followed the anti-intellectual traditions of the Czech left even at the expense of the quality of research. Many young ideologically driven functionaries were visible evidence that a new Czech and Slovak historiography was being created. This was not the case in Hungary or in Poland, where scholarly excellence was being preserved, and where there occurred a broader cooperation between Marxist and ‘bourgeois’ historians.

The relativity of the processes of Sovietization and Stalinization should be viewed in the proper historical context. As a matter of fact, the early 1950s were marked by political purges from which no Soviet-bloc country’s historical profession escaped untouched. Dozens of historians were imprisoned under various charges; and some of them were expelled from their faculties and forbidden to teach (as happened to the Slovak Daniel Rapant and the Pole

\textsuperscript{13} Deák, ‘Hungary’, 1055.
The progress of the Marxist coup is easy to follow in the pages of official periodicals. Within a relatively short time most connections to Western scholarship were cut while, conversely, the reception of Soviet historiography far exceeded the limits of ‘normal’ scientific exchange. Newspeak infected the language of the historical publications as well as almost all professional vocabularies. The leaders of local communist parties were honoured as prominent philosophers of history according to the example of Joseph Stalin. Many young historians initiated Marxist-inspired research of social and economic history. But the preponderance of historical publications in the 1950s consisted not of modern, methodologically advanced studies, but of rather traditional, even throwback narratives, dominated by old conceptions of the nation. The key intellectual tool of these narratives was the ‘progressive tradition’ which indicated permanent assessment of historical figures and phenomena. Such figures were divided into ‘progressive’ and ‘reactionary’ categories—a procedure which handicapped the analytical potential of Marxism. Thus, the main task of Marxist historians was to collect the comprehensive catalogue of historical facts and personalities preceding the teleologically understood ‘end of history’. At the same time it was important to identify the ‘reactionary’ forces within any nation’s history.

The outcome of these efforts differed from case to case. With reference to the scheme formulated by Lutz Raphael, two main models dominated. The first could be characterized as more ‘national’ (or ‘rightist’), the second as ‘a-national’ (or ‘leftist’). In general, some of the Marxist-Leninist interpretations were simply at odds with the national master narrative, while others reproduced it easily by employing a new Marxist vocabulary to tell an old national story. In every case the nation and the state overshadowed class. The method by which Marxist narratives were formulated was far removed from accepted scholarly standards. Instead of free competition among various interpretations, a unified and clear Marxist interpretation covering all important historical phenomena was demanded. While methodological discussions were silenced, however, debate did not disappear completely. Within the Marxist-Leninist historical sciences, there was a space for the exchange of views before the canonization of the final interpretation. Here in some cases more and less ‘national’ interpretations struggled to achieve the status of the sole Marxist interpretation of a given phenomenon. Such discussion was often accompanied by brutal polemic and by threats and political accusations, more or less masked, yet it was a scholarly discussion and all a part of the process in creating a unified narrative. The main aim of the combatants was to push through ‘their’ interpretation and to incorporate it into the official historical narrative. And, in fact, most of the Marxist

historiographies of the 1950s succeeded in creating a coherent ‘progressive’ national history.

In the Slovak case, Marxist historians reproduced many of the traditional interpretations rooted in the nineteenth-century national movement that expressed pro-Czech sympathies. The Slovak historical narrative started with the establishment of Great Moravia, ‘the first common Czechoslovak state’ as it was called with seemingly endless frequency. In fact, the symbolic sharing of this early state structure between Slovaks and Czechs would provide the main narrative contribution to the unity of Czechoslovakia, because older Slovak interpretations tended to preserve the Great Moravian heritage for Slovaks only. Later on, Marxist researchers searched for the arguments supporting the thesis of a decisive cultural impact by Slavic inhabitants of the medieval Hungarian kingdom. The next turning point of Slovak history was defined as the uprising of miners in Banská Bistrica in 1525–6, the identification of this moment in history being probably the most innovative Marxist contribution to Slovak history. The invention of historian Peter Ratkoš, the uprising was interpreted as a native Slovak early bourgeois revolution, a domestic counterpart to the German Great Peasants War of the 1520s or to the Bohemian Hussite movement of a century earlier. Even before 1989 it was clear to professionals that the author of this ‘discovery’ had played freely with the facts.

Apart from this notable exception, the early modern era did not hold much interest for Marxist historians, in comparison with the period when the Slovak ‘national awakening’ began. In that respect it was Marxist historiography which provided new directions, including the reinterpretation of the first codification of Slovak language by the Catholic priest Anton Bernolák. In the inter-war period, Bernolák had been perceived as a Magyarón, a denationalized Slovak, and it fell to the Marxists to effect his canonization. Subsequent developments in the nineteenth-century Slovak national movement provided by far the most important material for the new narrative. The crucial role here was played by L’udovít Štúr—a personification of the national movement. Subsequent Marxist research concentrated on the development of this movement in the second half of the nineteenth century, as well as on the origins of the Slovak working class. Finally, Slovak Marxist interpretation of the Czechoslovak state reproduced the position of Soviet researchers, critically commenting upon both the Slovak nationalist camp and the policy of the Czechoslovak state. The short-lived Slovak Soviet Republic, created during the invasion of the Hungarian Red Army, belonged to the last ‘positive’ phenomena of pre-1945 history.

The Marxist interpretation of Czech history overlapped in many places with the Slovak. The common origins of medieval statehood offered the first important research topic. What followed was paradoxically the most ‘contemporary’

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15 L’udovít Holotík (ed.), _Dejiny Slovenska (tézy)_ (Bratislava, 1955), 22.
(in a sense of its ideological actuality) part of the medieval history: namely, the Hussite movement. According to the president of the Academy, Zdeněk Nejedlý, the Hussites as a whole, along with their religious leader Jan Hus and military commander Jan Žižka, could have readily been admitted to the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia (KSČ), if it had been possible in the fifteenth century. Hussites were adduced also to strengthen the native ‘progressive traditions’ in a silent competition with the analogous traditions of the neighbouring countries. The interest in that epoch, now reinterpreted as a social and national rather than a religious movement, contrasted again with the general lack of attention to early modern history. Precisely as in the case of Slovakia, national history picked up speed in the period of the ‘national awakening’ dominated by the personality of the ‘father of the nation’: historian and statesman František Palacky. The subsequent activities of the ‘bourgeois’ national movement were interpreted more and more critically as the first organizations of the working class appeared in the second half of the nineteenth century. The creation of the Czechoslovak state was seen as a simultaneous victory and failure: it crushed the ‘reactionary’ Habsburgs but failed to install socialism in Bohemia, and the inter-war state belonged to the most condemned period of Czech history as it was with all other non-Soviet statehoods.

The dominant ‘national-communist’ interpretation of Hungarian history was in many respects similar to that of Czech and Slovak history. The place of the ‘progressive’ anti-feudal revolutionary movement of the Czech Hussites or of the Slovak miners was occupied in early modern Hungary by the György Dózsa uprising of the early sixteenth century. The reproduction of the kuruc narrative influenced the Marxist-Leninist picture of Habsburg rule over Hungary and of the opposition of the Hungarian gentry. The anti-Habsburg uprisings of Imre Thököly (1672–85) and Ferenc Rákóczi (1703–1711) were labelled as part of the ‘progressive heritage’ even though their ‘class character’ was ambiguous. Moreover, the ‘Jacobin’ conspiracy of Ignác Martinovics in the late eighteenth century attracted similar assessments. The peak in the continuous struggle for national and social liberation was the 1848–9 revolution, and its unquestioned leaders, Lajos Kossuth and the Romantic poet Sándor Petőfi. Finally, over hundreds of years of misery and exploitation from time immemorial to the end of the First World War, a chain of Hungarian progressive traditions had culminated in the 1919 Soviet Republic. Interestingly enough this state was associated with the current ‘Hungarian Stalin’, Mátyás Rákosi, rather than with its factual leader, Béla Kun (who had been executed at Stalin’s behest in the 1930s).

In comparison with all of the aforementioned cases, Polish Marxist interpretations of their national history can be more accurately perceived as ‘Bolshevik’. As in the Hungarian case, one of the dominating narratives of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries strongly influenced the new storytelling. In the 1950s and later, it was the so-called Piast theory (integral nationalist advocating the ethnic state), and not the opposite Jagiellon theory (perceiving the history of Poland as
an attempt at federalizing East Central Europe). Thus the history of Poland was more or less close to the ‘progressive line of development’ in its early period, and lost the sympathy of the Marxist historians as soon as the state failed to form exclusively around ethnically Polish territories. The Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth was accused of suppressing the Ukrainians and Byelorussians, who would rejoin their Russian brethren, if they had not been suffering under the yoke of Polish landowners. Thus one of the positive phenomena of seventeenth-century Polish history was the Pereyaslav treaty, which gave Russia control over part of Ukraine. The same ‘geopolitical’ handicap accompanied subsequent developments: as a matter of fact Poland and Lithuania had been in constant conflict with the Russian state from its very beginnings. Moreover, the Polish-Lithuanian state offered an alternative solution to the programme of ‘unifying Rus’, and was thus a direct competitor to the Russian historical narrative. The same disadvantage influenced Marxist interpretations of Polish national movements in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Although the writings of Marx and Engels contain hundreds of remarks supporting Polish nationalist endeavours, post-war Marxist-Leninist researchers established very high standards for progressiveness. As Andrzej Walicki comments, the Marxists saw the agrarian revolution as a necessary means to achieve the Polish independence. They criticized the ambivalence of the Polish national movement towards the awakening political ambitions of Ukrainians, Lithuanians, and Byelorussians. Similarly, East German authors assumed the lack of an alliance between workers and peasants during the 1848 revolution. All these expectations were absurd, since they were directed at people who had died before Marx and Engels completed their works, never mind Lenin and Stalin, and many were clearly contrary to the expressed opinions of Marx and Engels. Obviously the purity of Marxism was not a decisive concern in the historiographies of the 1950s. However, even though highly critical in general, the Marxist-Leninist interpretation of nineteenth-century Polish history admitted some positive developments that had disappeared with the refounding of the Polish state. Here, as in Czechoslovakia, the inter-war state was seen as a consequence of the Russian Revolution, which had unfortunately fallen into the hands of the bourgeoisie and landowners who shared a ‘biological hatred’ of the Soviet Union.

THE END OF STALINISM

The simplified Stalinist interpretations of national history were easy to adapt and digest even by unsophisticated minds. This feature made them extremely durable

and thus recurring even in post-1989 non-Marxist history-writing. But it was this same feature that also exposed them to professional criticism. In fact, even in the years preceding 1956, some Marxist theses were already being ridiculed by party-related researchers in Poland and in Hungary. The same processes in Czechoslovakia started in the mid-1960s, and sped up with the nomination of Alexander Dubček as first secretary of the KSČ. Interestingly enough, the end of Stalinism was ‘announced’ by those very historians who had helped to introduce it. By their public activities and research practices, Marxists such as Josef Macek, František Graus, Witold Kula, and György Lukács marked the approaching end of the old era. Methodological pluralism reappeared, revealing an unexpected fact: that contrary to official claims, not every East Central European historian was a Marxist. Those who had been silenced and prevented from teaching were now being rehabilitated. Along with the change in atmosphere, the door was now open to the international historical community. And this time ‘international’ did not necessarily mean Western, since Stalinism had not only eliminated professional communication with Western historical scholarship but also handicapped cooperation between countries within the Soviet bloc. It is telling that the first significant multilateral meeting of East Central European Marxist historians took place as late as 1953 during the congress of Hungarian historians in Budapest. In 1955, delegations from Eastern Europe, including the biggest Soviet delegation, took part in the congress of the International Committee of Historical Sciences (CISH) in Rome. From that time to the present none of the historiographies under examination could be perceived as fully isolated, even if the range and character of the international exchange differed locally.

Both Hungarian and Czechoslovak liberalization of their communist regimes were rapidly interrupted by force; however, the subsequent situation was very different. Even though the collapse of the 1956 revolution was a personal tragedy for many individual historians, the overall effects of the de-Stalinization process were beneficial. The experience of Czechoslovakia was quite different: there, after the intervention of the armies of the Warsaw Pact (including Poles and Hungarians), the development of historiography virtually ceased, and official research returned to the old Stalinist narrative. Thus in the 1970s and 1980s a qualitative difference between two ‘Western-oriented’ historiographies (in Poland and in Hungary) and two under strict political control (Czechoslovakia) existed not only in the opinion of local historical professions but also of external observers. Indeed, the situation of Czech scholars in the early 1970s was arguably even worse than in the 1950s. Hundreds lost their posts, and many were forced to move to peripheral academic institutions or to abandon the profession.

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18 This is as it has been formulated by Klaus Zernack in ‘Die Entwicklung der polnischen Geschichtswissenschaft nach 1945’, in Günther Stökl (ed.), Die Interdependenz von Geschichte und Politik in Osteuropa seit 1945 (n.p., n.d.).
19 See Jan Křen, Bílá místa v našich dějinách (Prague, 1990), 58.
altogether. Small groups emigrated to join the East Central European specialists abroad. It can be argued that the main historical works of the ’normalization’ period were remnants of the liberal atmosphere of the 1960s. This was not always the case in Slovakia where the political purges were not as severe, party control over the cohorts of historians was much weaker, and the local historical publications did not suffer such intellectual misery.

The return to Stalinism in Czech, and to some degree in Slovak historiography was a crucial problem, if we take into consideration the unexploited potential of the international exchange of ideas, from which most of Czech and Slovak historians were excluded. It was in the 1960s and 1970s that Polish and Hungarian scholars ‘caught up’ to the most influential and promising Western historical school: that of the Annales. Supported by personal ties of an unofficial nature, such Polish authors as Witold Kula, Tadeusz Manteuffel, Aleksander Gieysztor, Andrzej Wyczański, Bronisław Geremek, and Marian Małowist were not only inspired by Fernand Braudel and his colleagues and students, but also started to pay off this intellectual debt by delivering a comprehensive analysis of the development of capitalism in East Central Europe. This is the case with Kula above all, whose theses concerning Eastern Europe were included in Braudel’s panoramic history of capitalism. Similar research agendas were realized in the works of György Ránki and Iván Berend, Péter Hanák, and Jenő Szűcs. In general, the encouraging climate for comparative research in economic and social history of, and beyond, the region contributed to what may have been the most productive period in the modern history of Polish and Hungarian historiography. Along with these developments, a generation of researchers born in the late 1920s and early 1930s arrived on the scene, bringing with them new topics and interpretations. Under the influence of Kula a research centre for Polish social history was based in the Institute of History of the Polish Academy of Sciences. The impulses coming from economic history stimulated further research fields such as the history of ideas, mentalities, and culture. Later on, a so-called Warsaw school of the history of ideas (with Jerzy Jedlicki, Andrzej Walicki, Jerzy Szacki, Bronisław Baczko, and Leszek Kołakowski) sprang from this intellectual soil. Both in Poland and in Hungary, the liberal directors of the academy institutes (Zsigmond Pál Pach and Tadeusz Manteuffel) supported new, ambitious research programmes. The main research topic of the period has a symbolic, ironical meaning. The Stalinist narration of progress in East Central Europe was replaced by a perspective of regional backwardness. Both Marxist historiographies cooperated in a number of bilateral joint conferences and meetings debating problems of regional backwardness in historical perspective (sometimes hiding the notion ‘backwardness’ under euphemistic descriptions, such as the ‘Prussian course of agricultural development’).

21 Emil Niederhauser, Eastern Europe in Recent Hungarian Historiography (Budapest, 1975).
In the ‘normalized’ post-1968 Czechoslovakia, both the impact of the Annales in particular and openness to international cooperation in general were considerably smaller than in Poland and Hungary. The differences are also visible in the selection of research topics. In numerous works by Polish and Hungarian historians in the 1970s and 1980s a comparative perspective is often present, be it solely concerned with the East Central European region or with areas beyond. Cooperation with Western scholars to some extent forced Hungarian and Polish researchers to widen the scope of interests and to dare wider comparison. At the same time, relatively liberal conditions in the academies and universities made it possible to study the regions once belonging to Poland or Hungary without being suspected of political revisionism, as might have happened in the 1950s. On the other hand, if we follow the most interesting Czech and Slovak publications from the same period, we will find them most deeply rooted in national history, and often not even the Czecho-Slovak one. The impact of other historiographical schools is methodological rather than thematic. Otto Urban published brilliant analyses of Czech society in the nineteenth century.\(^\text{22}\) František Kutnar wrote an inspiring (and highly controversial)\(^\text{23}\) history of historiography, including Czech, Slovak, and German historiography in Bohemia (co-authorship of this work by the persecuted Jaroslav Marek was publicly announced only after 1989).\(^\text{24}\) František Šmahel, in the midst of the deepest crisis of his academic career during the ‘normalization’ period, managed to publish his fundamental works on the identities and mentalities in the Hussite period.\(^\text{25}\) The situation of a promising Slovak historian Ľubomír Lipták was similar: his introductory Slovensko v 20. storoči [Slovakia in the Twentieth Century] (1968) was for a long period the last book that he was allowed to publish.\(^\text{26}\) Significantly, the two leaders of the Czech historical establishment during the 1950s and early 1960s, František Graus and Josef Macek, were adopted into the international scholarly community. The former continued his research in medieval history as a professor at several German universities; and the latter, though in disgrace, was able to keep the international contacts he had established before 1968 and to work on new topics.\(^\text{27}\)

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\(^{22}\) Otto Urban, Kapitalismus a česká společnost: K otázkám formování české společnosti v 19. století (Prague, 1978); and id., Česká společnost 1848–1919 (Prague, 1982).

\(^{23}\) Kutnar’s book was brutally criticized as a non-Marxist by Josef Haubelt, ‘O výkladu dějin českého a slovenského dějepisectví Františka Kutnara’, Československý Časopis Historický, 26 (1979), 907–9.


\(^{26}\) Ľubomír Lipták, Slovensko v 20. storočí (Bratislava, 1968).

\(^{27}\) Josef Macek, Cola di Rienzo (Prague, 1965); id., Der Tiroler Bauernkrieg und Michael Gaismair (Berlin, 1965); id., Machiavelli e il machiavellismo (Firenze, 1980); and id., Michael Gaismair: Vergessener Held des Tiroler Bauernkrieges (Wien, 1988).
Czech historian of the period was probably Miroslav Hroch, whose model of the establishment of ‘small’ nations is a comparative project per se, though based on the experience of Czech national revival.\textsuperscript{28} Most importantly, Hroch’s attitude coincided with the birth of the new paradigm in Western studies on nationalism, based on the assumption of ‘created’ or ‘invented’ national identity (tradition).

The year 1968 was a watershed, and not only for the Czech and Slovak historical professions. Although not as drastic as the military intervention in Czechoslovakia, the consequences of the anti-Semitic campaign the same year in Poland were far reaching, both for Polish and international scholarship. The events of 1968 launched a significant change in the character of East Central European émigré historiography. The majority of these émigré scholars had initially consisted of refugees who had chosen to leave their country rather than face its Sovietization. The new wave consisted of scholars who had come up through the Sovietized university and/or academy system and were quite often still attached to the Marxist methodology. The cohabitation of these groups was not always easy, as it was difficult to find a common language between nationalist Slovak post-war émigrés and post-1968 political refugees from Czechoslovakia. The intellectual qualities of the newcomers were illustrated by their relative success in entering the Western academic environment, to mention such exemplary figures as Leszek Kołakowski, Bronisław Baczko, and Graus himself. In contrast to the case of the post-war generation, few new national émigré institutions were formed. The character of these émigré cohorts would again prove important to the development of East Central European historiographies after 1989.

What was characteristic of many Polish, Czech, and Slovak post-1968 émigrés and also of the most prominent representatives of East Central European historiographies during the 1960s and later, was their attitude towards Marxism. Contrary to many popular post-1989 opinions, it was Marxist methodology in general, and the new perspectives of social and economic research in particular, that enabled many of them to communicate with Annales scholars, as well as to absorb such recent Western developments as modernization theory into their work. It was also non-schematic Marxism that made Polish, Hungarian, and Czechoslovak historians intellectually interesting partners for the Western scholars. Understood as a useful tool, and not as an ideological burden, it helped historians escape the primordial national narrative as codified in the native nationalisms and then petrified by the official interpretation of history in the 1950s. In fact, despite party control over the research enterprise, the post-Stalinist period in Poland and in Hungary can be perceived as the most fruitful

in their recent pasts, if the intellectual level of the historical product is to be judged. This is reflected in numerous syntheses of world historiography, where a small selection of names from almost every national historiography is necessary. Ránki, Berend, Kula, Małowist, and Kolakowski, who usually appear in this context, were among the most prolific group of East Central European authors ever to be noticed by Western research and identified as ‘historians’. It is an open question if, and for how long, their influence will remain unchallenged.

**CONCLUSION: 1989 AND BEYOND**

If analysis of historical scholarship may be based less on its institutional and political frames and more on the research itself, it can be argued that the events of 1989 did not cause a substantial and immediate change in Polish and Hungarian historiography. Already in the 1980s new themes appeared in official publications, including the politically problematic inter-war period. It was significant, however, that an initially narrow research interest soon after 1989 became part of a broader and more general return to the inter-war period apparent in both the scholarly and public spheres, where old discourses were reintroduced while the communist period was ritually excluded. In Hungary, biographies and monographs on controversial personalities such as István Tisza, István Bethlen, and Kunó Klebelsberg appeared. It recently has been noticed that a ‘considerable number of popular historiographical works have been published, often by historians who were faithful servants of the official historiography under communism—seeking to forge a new narrative, which would somehow create a normative past for the emerging political order’. Similar developments can be observed in Poland, where in the 1990s a wave of monographs appeared, devoted to such topics as Józef Piłsudski and reinterpretations of Polish–Soviet relations, followed in subsequent years by the revival of a radical right-wing political tradition culminating in the government of Jarosław Kaczyński. As in Hungary and elsewhere, this ‘backlash’ polarized the historical profession, in some respects reproducing the state of historiography during the inter-war period: nowadays, as in the 1930s, many historians are simply defined as belonging to certain political orientations, either liberal, leftist, and ‘European’, or conservative, rightist, and nationalist. In Slovakia, the most drastic return to the nationalist narratives from the inter-war and war period was connected with the literal return of a group of Slovak right-wing émigrés. The peak of the process

was the introduction of Milan Šurica’s *Dejiny Slovenska a Slovákov* [History of Slovakia and the Slovaks] (1995) as compulsory reading in Slovak schools. The polarization accelerated in the face of the symbolic conflict of memories between two constitutive elements of Slovak historical identity: the wartime Slovak state and the Slovak National Uprising in 1944. The frontlines divide the extreme right apologists of the ‘clero-fascist’ regime of Jozef Tiso from the leftist tradition of the uprising that was directed against it. Between those groups, the ‘liberal’ milieu attempts to balance the positive aspects of Slovak statehood (besides the post-1993 republic) and common Czechoslovak state.

In the Czech part of the state and then in the new Czech Republic, the rediscovery of the heritage of the first Czechoslovak republic culminated in the characteristic mixture of belated progressivism (referring to the intellectual heritage of Tomáš Garrigue Masaryk) and nationalism. A thesis has emerged, most eloquently in the works of Eva Broklová, according to which the history of inter-war Czechoslovakia proves that Czechs (the Slovaks do not feature here) had come to democracy in contrast to their neighbours, including the Germans.

Within this context of the polarization of national history one question has remained of vital importance for most of the countries in East Central Europe: namely, the Holocaust and the complexities of the region’s Jewish history. On the one hand, in East Central European politics anti-Semitism appears in public discourse with regularity, whenever the fundamental conservative critique of the liberal elites is being launched. On the other hand, the question of the attitude of Poles, Slovaks, and Hungarians towards the *Shoah* is still an open wound. It was in Poland that this issue came to the surface in an especially knotty fashion thanks to the activities of the émigré researcher Jan Tomasz Gross. In two vivid debates respectively concerning the 1941 slaughter of the Jewish population of the small town of Jedwabne in Eastern Poland by Polish neighbours, and the phenomenon of post-war anti-Semitism in Poland, public interest was engaged by a complicated historical theme, and the discussion was led for the most part professionally, thereby influencing further research by Polish historians. As an external observer noticed, ‘the Jedwabne Affair’, as it was called, helped to publicize to a ‘broader audience... for the first time what happened to ethnic Germans who had survived World War II and who decided to stay in the Polish

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territories. Poland became an example for the other countries of the East Central European region that still do not want to face their past’. 33

The expulsion of the Germans could potentially have played a similar polarizing role to the question of the Holocaust. Yet, this turned out to be true only in the case of Czech and, partly, Polish historical discourse. Starting from the samizdat editions in the 1980s, Czech historians debated the interpretation and moral assessment of the _odsun_ (transfer). In the post-1989 historical debate two main groupings were formed by the question of the Czech role in the expulsion and the collective guilt of the Sudeten-Germans. 34 Some of the authors connected with the pre-1989 democratic opposition launched a severe critique of the Sudeten-German policy of the non-communist president Edvard Beneš. Others (among them Eva Broklová) have vehemently defended Czechoslovak post-war policy. At the same time, wider research into the topic has been ongoing.

Although a similar historical phenomenon occurred in Poland, it played a less substantial role. The internal debate achieved an international context when Polish and Czech discourses were confronted with the two German narratives of the _Vertreibung_ (expulsion). Whereas the opinions of Polish, Czech, and German professional historians generally do not divide along national lines, the popular and politically influential discourse of the organized representation of the expelled Germans has tended to equate the expulsion with the Holocaust, thereby imputing upon the expelling nations the moral guilt equivalent to that of the Germans. This again fuels the nationalistic groupings and tendencies within Poland and the Czech Republic. The debate is heated, too, because of the separation of the professional German, Czech, and Polish discourse on the expulsion from public opinion, especially in Germany. Even the active participants in German public debate tend to ignore the immense professional interest in the topic that had developed in East Central Europe even before 1989, and especially among Poles and Czechs. In fact, the thesis that Czech or Polish historians and public opinion abstained from accepting the facts and recognizing their moral responsibility for the expulsion is simply false and proves, rather, how little Western political discourse knows about its Eastern suburbs.

Finally, since 1989 the communist period itself has become a popular research topic. Here again a strongly politicized interpretation dominated during the 1990s. As many observers have noticed, instead of the comprehensive analysis of the interplay between various factors shaping the everyday cohabitation of people with the regime, a one-sided history of victims was constructed. In popular interpretations as well as in the professional literature, communist power was seen as something totally divorced from the societies it ruled:

a victimized nation was said to have struggled against communist (and thereby anti-national) oppression. In the Czech case, the number of studies of social resistance to the 1968 intervention exceeded by far the original scale of this phenomenon, leaving aside the question that the ‘normalization’ had been achieved by ‘native’ Czechoslovak forces. Since the end of the century, this stance has been criticized and challenged by anthropologists, sociologists, and historians dealing with the communist period, as is also happening in German research into the history of the GDR.35

Recent history is, of course, not the only branch of post-1989 historical research. Since 1989 hundreds of important volumes focusing on earlier epochs have appeared. It is impossible to give complete information on these developments in all four countries, but they have been repeatedly (if fragmentarily) summarized in the last few years.36 The general impression the post-1989 East Central European historiographies evoke is that of normality. No destructive waves of nationalism or totalitarian ambitions currently endanger freedom of thought; and no clearly identifiable ‘white spots’ exist any more. This does not mean that historiography after 1989 was finally freed from politics (to which it is always related). Naturally it is recent history that contributes mostly to the politicization of historiography. On the other hand, without these processes, the historians’ work could hardly count on any broader resonance—a fact that is valid beyond the limes of East Central Europe.

In the early 1990s the tendency to write a ‘positivist’ history dominated throughout the whole of post-communist Eastern Europe. A consequence of the recent collapse of Marxist-Leninist methodology has been that both this and any other methodology are now perceived with suspicion. Swarms of edited sources and conference volumes were published, not always finding any practical use. This phase seems to have sputtered out already. Considerable numbers of scholars participate in European and broader research networks, and the opportunities for historians to study or to work abroad have never been greater. Newish trends such as gender studies, oral history, and the analysis of local lieux de mémoire have entered into the region’s historiographical discourse. Older traditions survive in the combination of history and sociology, in intellectual history, and in research into the formation of national identities.

It is now commonplace within the region’s intellectual tradition to ponder how East Central Europe contributes to historical studies in general. Does it generate new research topics that influence historians abroad, and does it produce


36 See, for example, Alojz Ivanišević et al. (eds.), Klio ohne Fesseln? Historiographie im östlichen Europa nach dem Zusammenbruch des Kommunismus (Wien, 2002); and Antohi et al. (eds.), Narratives Unbound.
new methodological ideas fruitful for other fields of historical research? The answers formulated by local historians of historiography have so far been mainly sceptical.\(^{37}\) The success of any given historiography has been measured by its degree of ‘Westernization’ rather than its uniqueness. And all in all, this absorption of external influences and the transplanting of them to native soil has always been characteristic, not only of historiographies, but of nearly every aspect of East Central Europe.

**TIMELINE/KEY DATES**

1948–49 Communist regimes in East Central Europe are introduced; beginning of the Stalinist period
1953 Death of Stalin; beginning of the ‘thaw’
1956 Political unrest in Poland; Hungarian Revolution
1963–8 Czechoslovak reform movement culminates in Prague Spring
1968 Anti-Semitic purges in Poland; intervention of Warsaw Pact in Czechoslovakia; liberalization of Hungarian socialist economy
1975 The Helsinki Accords accelerate consolidation of political dissent
1980–1 Mass movement of Solidarność in Poland
1985 Mikhail Gorbachev leads the Soviet bloc into perestroika
1989 Poland’s Roundtable Talks and contested elections; Hungary opens the border to Austria; ‘Velvet Revolution’ in Czechoslovakia
1993 Slovakia and Czech Republic undergo a velvet divorce
2004 Visegrad states enter the European Union

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Chapter 13
French Historical Writing

Matthias Middell

French historiography played an important role for most of the twentieth century, and it counts among the most professionalized in the world, influencing global trends in the interpretation of the Middle Ages, of early modern social and political developments, of the French Revolution, of contemporary history (including collaboration with, and resistance to, the Nazi occupation), and of the comparison of civilizations and the history of colonial empires. While these focal points of French historical interest correspond to situations of the country’s glorious or painful past, its historiography contributed to more general methodological debates and has held for several decades a very powerful position in the international development of the discipline towards social and cultural history, thanks to the combination of widespread empirical work with openness to achievements in neighbouring disciplines such as geography, philosophy, social sciences, cultural studies, and anthropology. The annual bibliography shows a rising curve of publications yet demonstrates at the same time an astonishing stability of interest in themes on which we will focus our analysis here.

The period between the end of the Second World War and the late 1960s can be characterized as the era of full professionalization when the infrastructure of historiography as a research-driven discipline came into its own (with the creation of research institutes such as the IRHT, the IHMC, and the IHTP,1 but above all with the Centre national de la recherche scientifique [CNRS] as its main instrument); during this time, the number of professional historians nearly tripled. Research became more specialized—the principle of ‘publish or perish’ leading to a proliferation not only of monographs, but also of workshops and edited volumes. Nevertheless, the French Bibliographie annuaire [Annual

1 The IRHT (Institut de recherche et d’histoire des textes) which was already established in 1937 but became part of the CNRS later on, is specialized in the scientific edition of texts from Antiquity to the Renaissance. The IHMC—the Institute for Modern and Contemporary History—founded in 1978 and located at the Ecole Normale Supérieure in Paris, devotes its work to larger collective research projects covering mainly European history since the sixteenth century. The IHTP—the Institute for the History of the Present Times—created in 1982 in Paris, focuses on the specific features of twentieth century’s history and especially the history of wars, and of authoritarian, totalitarian, and colonial regimes, as well as on the role of historians in processes of remembrance.
Bibliography] shows that the number of publications only doubled at a time when the size of the community increased much faster. The astonishing expansion of the profession cannot hide the absence of any substantial reform of the teaching programmes both at high school and at the universities’ level. National history remains central, and a traditional periodization dominates the presentation of history to the next generation of students. Even from its most powerful position (with Fernand Braudel as president of the jury for the all-important aggregation) the so-called Annales School failed to influence the curriculum substantially.\(^2\) One of the effects of this bias is a fragmentation of the field such that the research imperative is only partly applicable to regional universities, and scholarly research is very much concentrated at institutions in the capital—this despite many efforts since the 1980s to decentralize the French academic system from above.

The ‘professionalization’ of French historiography dates back to the nineteenth century, and included not only the creation of an institutional setting that gave rise to a highly differentiated discipline (in terms of topics and approaches), but also an intense search for new methods among historians that guaranteed innovation and resistance to the ongoing process of fragmentation. Leading French historians were well-known trend-setters and their ideas became internationally influential. Some authors speak even of a hegemonic position,\(^3\) and one can argue that such a position has its origins in convincing and innovative ideas on how to analyze and to write history on the one hand, and in a powerful presentation as a coherent school of historical thinking on the other. (Even the concept of ‘presentation’ is itself part of the cultural turn proposed by French historians like Roger Chartier.) The label ‘Annales School’ helped to organize a bipolar discourse: it reduced a diversity of practices to the straightforward opposition of old-fashioned ‘positivist’ (Rankean) historiography versus a new historiography (nouvelle histoire). This successful labelling—mirroring the institutional hegemony that the Sixth Section of the Ecole Pratique and the Maison des Sciences de l’Homme exercised over large parts of the French academic system—was domestically counterbalanced by more traditional institutions such as the Sorbonne and the Ecole Normale Supérieure, or the Institute for Historical Research of the CNRS. But internationally it influenced the image of French historiography to such a degree that the ‘Annales’ became identified with the most valuable contributions by French historians to the discipline. As a result of this impressive collective marketing strategy, two main ideas persist even today. The first is the idea of an overarching continuity between three or even four generations of disciples of the Annales School—a belief which tends to hide the fundamental differences and conflicts between the early Annales d’histoire.


\(^3\) Carlos Aguirre Rojas, *Die ’Schule’ der Annales: Gestern, heute, morgen* (Leipzig, 2004).
économique et sociale founded by Marc Bloch and Lucien Febvre in 1929 (taking inspiration not only from the Belgian forerunner of comparative history Henri Pirenne, but also from the pre-war German debate on social and cultural history). The post-1945 developments until Fernand Braudel left the editorial board of the now renamed Annales: Economies, Sociétés, Civilisations; the so-called third generation of the 1970s and 1980s reinventing themselves as nouvelle histoire; and a more recent period (since 1989/90) during which an open debate has occurred about a crisis of the paradigm and how to overcome it. It seems legitimate to organize part of a discussion of French historiography along these chronological lines, testing the idea of continuity and looking for explanations of the clear breaks in that story.

It has been argued that the foundation of the Annales d’histoire économique et sociale in 1929 became—at least in retrospective to their success over decades—the sign of a fundamental shift (or even paradigmatic turn) towards a sort of history-writing which was in open conflict with a reductionist history of main political events and great men only.4 An innovative combination of the analysis of socioeconomic trends, the study of cultural transformations, and an interest in cross-border interaction had found its place in the new journal. The Annales ‘style’, systematically promoted by Bloch’s and Febvre’s review articles, by their firm strategy in selecting and commenting on submitted articles, and, last but not least, by their own books, in the long run influenced standards for the discipline well beyond French historiography. France became one of the forerunners of this new trend, encouraged by public interest in patterns of modern social life and driven by competition between historiography, sociology, economics, psychology, and anthropology over who interprets the present times in the most convincing way. Since France was characterized by a very centralized academic system, provincial universities like the one in Strasbourg were able to innovate much more easily than, say, the Sorbonne, while at the same time institutions like the Collège de France embraced successful new developments at the very top of the academic hierarchy, as the careers of Bloch and Febvre prove.

The concept of histoire totale for which the Annales founders argued, integrating, at least potentially, all aspects of human activity, demonstrated through the concrete organization of individual and collective investigations its superiority both to the specialized economic history practised in other countries (often within economics departments), and to the ethnopolitical concept of Volksgeschichte which related the interdisciplinary work of historians, linguists, and geographers to the political ambition to revise borders designed as a result of the Treaty of Versailles.

The approach propagated by the early Annales took inspiration both from a specific curiosity about the strengths of various neighbouring disciplines and

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Post-War Western Europe
from the observation of trends in different national historiographies around the
globe, but it remained marginal in the 1930s, even within France, and was
condemned to manifest itself somehow cryptically under the difficult conditions
of Nazi occupation until the end of the war. The premature death of Marc Bloch,
killed by the Gestapo in 1944, marks a caesura for the collaboration with his
friend Lucien Febvre in the management of the journal itself; and it also created a
sort of heroic myth which was (and remains today) a powerful weapon in the
hands of various groups of French historians claiming to be the true successors of
the author of the *Rois thaumaturges* [Royal Touch] (1924), *Les caractères originaux
de l’histoire rurale française* [French Rural History] (1931), and *Société féodal*
[Feudal Society] (1939/40). Bloch’s famous article on the understanding and
practice of comparative history, presented at the International Congress of
Historical Sciences in Oslo in 1928, inspired transnational and entangled histories
at several occasions. At the same time, Febvre, who assumed the editorial
functions during Bloch’s activity in the resistance movement, transformed the
prestige of the early Annales into powerful institutions, not only at a national
level, but also in UNESCO’s project of a history of mankind to which he gave a
decisive inspiration in an outline drafted in 1949. He proposed a kind of world
history that would be fundamentally different from the universal histories that
had been written until then. In order to dispel ‘the fatal virus of the war’, Febvre
envisioned a ‘non-political world history’ which would replace both the tradi-
tional separation of history into national units and the dominance of Eurocentric
accounts of the past.

Fernand Braudel presented his own magisterial work on the Mediterranean in
the age of Philip II and the later world history—*Capitalism and Civilization*,
published in three volumes (1979), as a realization of ambitions expressed in the
first decades of the Annales—while with André Burguière, a representative of the
third generation, he has argued more recently for the project of a history of
mentalities, which he sees as overcoming a ‘Labroussian moment’ of Marxist
socioeconomic determinism in French historiography, and would fit most with
the original ideas of Bloch and Febvre. Through these references to the first two
decades of the Annales, various strands of historiography have sought to legit-
imate their own theoretical claims and political positions: sometimes the history
of historiography transforms itself into the search for a founding myth. This was
by no means restricted to the French intellectual scene, but became more and
more international through the worldwide (but neither homogeneous nor simul-
taneous) reception of ideas either published in the pages of the *Annales* or
attributed to the master-writers of the school.

But after the 1950s—a key moment for the Annales’ achievement of an
international reputation—and the 1970s—when the so-called third generation

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5 Report of Lucien Febvre, May 1949, in UNESCO Archives, Paris, SCHM Papers, Box 4,
Fid. 2.111, before the fifth General Conference in Florence 1948–51.
occupied a truly hegemonic position—a sense of decline was expressed both by observers and by representatives of the school itself.

In 1988 and 1989, two influential editorial notes in the journal recognized the crisis of the social history paradigm, now confronted with concepts of postmodern thinking and with the new cultural history, but at the same time the bicentennial of the French Revolution reminded the international audience that there are other strands of French historiography, which are revising the field of colonial history and the study of France’s role in the slave trade and slavery. This process of diversification was supported by the ongoing debate among experts of contemporary history as to the role of France and Frenchmen during the Second World War (here interacting with the history-and-memory paradigm introduced by Pierre Nora and others). Thus, a balanced assessment of French historiography since the Second World War has to take into account much more than the success story of the Annales and the nouvelle histoire, regardless of how impressive its international influence may have been for several decades of the twentieth century.

POST-WAR DYNAMICS (FEBVRE, BERR, BRAUDEL)

The Second World War interrupted what had thus far been a linear development of the Annales paradigm. Bloch, who participated in the defence of France in 1940 and described in L’étrange défaite [Strange Defeat] his frustrating experiences with the organization of the French army, only returned to Paris for a brief period and, as a Jew, was soon forced to retire. He joined the Resistance and took an active part in its subversion of the Germans. At the same time he wrote his introduction to historical methods and theories that can be interpreted as his scientific testimony—a work best known to the English public by its English title, The Historian’s Craft (1953). Febvre, who stayed in Paris, edited the Annales on his own during this difficult period. Bloch never came back, and so Febvre took on the responsibility of continuing the journal.

After liberation, Febvre finally arrived at the top of the French academic system: he was nominated to propose a reform of the Ecole Pratique des Hautes Etudes (EPHE), founded in 1884, and in 1947 he was elected president of its newly founded Sixth Section, which was destined to incorporate the social sciences into the EPHE. Now Febvre was able to put into practice the old idea he had developed with Bloch in the 1920s, when a strong and well-equipped Centre des Recherches Historiques (of which he served as director for several years) was embedded within an institute of social sciences, and given a mandate to concentrate on research. Febvre became the key person in this institutionalization of the Annales paradigm, supported by Braudel (in close contact with Bloch and Febvre since 1937) in the administration of the Historical Research Centre, by Charles Morazé (an expert on nineteenth-century history) and Robert
Mandrou (a historian of the premodern era and of the absolutist state in Europe) in the editing of the journal.

The period between 1945 and 1956 (when Febvre died) was a time of reconsolidation and recovery: a once-heretical historiographical movement had been transformed by Febvre the institution-builder into something very established. The explanation for this success lies not only in Febvre’s personal qualities and interests, which were supported by a network of young and ambitious historians using the innovative image of the Annales to establish their academic careers, but also in the political circumstances after the Second World War.

France shifted from a vision of the recent past in which victims of Nazi occupation were liberated by a global coalition, to a vision of self-liberation owed to the cooperation of Charles de Gaulle’s army outside France with internal resistance forces that included a strong contingent of communists.

France compensated for its decreasing political role in a world now dominated by the United States and the Soviet Union, through an ambitious international cultural and scientific offensive. The country profited from the Cold War and in particular the American fear that Western Europe might drift into the communist zone of influence—a fear exacerbated by the success of the French Communist Party in the 1946 elections and the political situation in other countries such as Greece or Italy, where left-wing anti-Nazi movements evolved into strong political parties after liberation.

In this situation, both the Fourth French Republic and, even more its successor, de Gaulle’s Fifth Republic following the coup d’état of 1958, were able to enlarge their elbow-room, to transform their fading global political role into an intellectually influential position, and to develop Paris into a laboratory of social thinking about the competition between two divergent ideological systems and political blocs, on the ongoing process of decolonization, and on the country’s transformation into a more individualized and consumer-oriented civic society.

Material aid from American donors like the Ford foundation helped to finance the beginnings of the Maison de Sciences de l’Homme (MSH). Administered in a very intelligent way by Clemens Heller, this proved to be a nimble dinghy at the side of a great tanker—the Sixth Section of the EPHE (transformed in 1975 into the now better known Ecole des Hautes Etudes en Sciences Sociales [EHESS]). The MSH offered grants to visiting scholars from abroad, and funding for international conferences, projects, and publications when ‘national’ money was not available for such purposes. Under the same roof and with a coordinated strategy, the EHESS and the MSH merged the human resources of a French academic body with an international network under the patronage of Braudel.

Even before Febvre’s death in 1956 Braudel had become the key figure in French historiography, having taken over the leading positions of Fevbre in the Sixth Section of the ÉPHE and on the board of Annales. For more than a decade he was the undisputed representative of the Annales movement itself, which now
developed the characteristics of an academic school. Being accepted as an author in the journal and serving as a collaborator in the vast enterprises of the EPHE/EHESS was a virtual intellectual knighting, and offered splendid prospects for an internationally renowned academic career, either in French universities or, indeed, outside France.

The worldwide prestige of Fernand Braudel was built on his enormous history of the Mediterranean region in the sixteenth century, written in part in German POW camps and published for the first time in 1949. In this book, Braudel developed his basic tripartite scheme of (1) geohistorical foundations changing only over very long times (the *longue durée*), (2) up-and-down trends or *conjonctures* in the economic life and social relationships, and (3) the rather superficial history of political occurrences (*histoire événementielle*), which were not taken very serious by Braudel and his followers.

In the beginning, Braudel’s intent had been to devote his dissertation to the foreign policy of King Philip II of Spain, but having spent ten years (from 1923–33) as a teacher in Algeria he was more sensitive to the reciprocal influences of Europe and Africa in forming a common Mediterranean region. In 1937, when Braudel returned from a two-year stay in Brazil, he met Febvre who encouraged him to make the decisive shift in the book he was preparing and instead write about the influences of the Mediterranean world on the politics of Philip II and the Spanish society he represented. In the end, even this did not happen. Of the more than 1,200 pages only the last part was dedicated to classical political history: the Spanish victory at Lepanto or the occupation of Tunis by Don Juan de Austrias were in Braudel’s perspective only incidents of small importance for historical explanation when compared with the power of long-term factors like the natural conditions for communication, trade, and production. In continuation of Bloch’s analysis of the Middle Ages, or Febvre’s interpretation of the Reformation era, Braudel emphasized the role of collective structures such as economic systems, states, and societies moving forward only in the rhythm of generations. Economic upswings in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries were favourable to larger entities such as the Spanish or Ottoman empires, but later the cycle reversed, and the very size of empires became an obstacle to their rapid development, owing to the burden of communicating between all parts of their territories.

But even this part of Braudel’s book, on structures moving only slowly, is not the bedrock of his story. In his perspective there was another stratum which moved only over centuries but decisively influenced historical development. This was geohistory, which modulated the behaviour of people living in coastal regions (more open to innovation) or in mountain areas (reacting in a more conservative way). In Braudel’s interpretation, regions of specific cultural

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performance were not only influenced by, but determined by, those geohistorical factors for a very long time. (His analysis concerned only history before the twentieth century, and he was well aware that there had been important changes with industrialization and modern mobility.)

Braudel’s older contemporary, the economic historian Ernest Labrousse, together with his disciples, oriented their research toward the long-run cycles of prices and wages in order to calculate the economic conditions underlying the shift to modernity. Labrousse wrote two major books—one on the development of prices during the eighteenth century and the second on the crisis of the French economy at the end of the Ancien Régime and during the revolutionary period.7 Teaching at the Sorbonne, he was associated, more than Braudel, with the traditional historical culture of France, embodied in the teaching of history at school and at university. For that reason he was not so ill-disposed toward the history of the short run, and later on one of his disciples, Michel Vovelle, was to initiate the most important attempt to overcome the old conflict between the social and the political in his history of mentalities during the French Revolution.

The common project of Labrousse and Braudel was a social and economic history of France published in six volumes between 1970 and 1982.8 In the 1960s, ‘social structures’ and ‘economic cycles’ became the fundamental categories of the Annales movement’s historiography, and most of the books and articles were concerned with phenomena of the so-called longue durée and not with an individual political conflict. Historians of the Annales movement were convinced that the key to historical explanations could be found by an intelligent combination of structures and developments over decades or centuries. Quantification of data and the idea of a more convincing use of that data taken from economic and administrative archives by its serialization (histoire sérielle) was a new ideal supported by the use of computers. On the one hand, the disciples of Labrousse concentrated on a new cartography of the economic regions of France since the sixteenth century; while on the other hand, Braudel and his colleagues tried to establish a framework of economic world-regions (économies-monde) characterized by climate, morphology of landscape, population, and economic and cultural behaviour, in order to deal with the material conditions under which the region participated in a world increasingly connected by trade and technological exchange. Braudel used the outcome of these investigations to create a vast panorama of the emerging capitalist system underlining the role of the Mediterranean region for European expansion to the Americas, to Africa, and to Asia.

His three volumes on the progress of the material culture in the world from the

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fifteenth century to the end of the eighteenth century were an influential attempt to apply the Annales’ methodology to world history. \(^9\) Braudel found a successor in this field when Immanuel Wallerstein established the world-system approach in historical sociology. \(^10\)

Under Braudel’s directorship, both the Sixth Section and the Annales had become more hierarchically organized projects than previously. For the first time there was really an identifiable group of historians coordinating their efforts in collective research projects (linked to a specialized and research-oriented teaching at the EHESS), and the idea of *enquêtes* proposed by Bloch and Febvre in the 1930s was implemented in a kind of systematic and additive analysis of individual regions or a combination of case studies. On the other hand, all individual approaches were subjugated to the scheme developed by Braudel at the beginning of this period of the Annales’ historiography.

The era of Braudel was also the period in the Annales’ history when an interaction of competition and complementarity was established between the Annales and Marxism with some people within the Annales School—like the specialist in the medieval history of Western France, Guy Bois, or the historian of Catalonian capitalism, Pierre Vilar—declaring themselves to be Marxists. Braudel himself was recognizing the impulses he had taken from a (not very complete) reading of Marx’s writings on early modern periods of capitalist development in Europe and overseas, but at the same time he criticized Marxist historiography for its often dogmatically orthodox handling of causation in history, and above all for a tendency to overestimate the economic reasons behind political conflicts and decisions.

\[_Nouvelle Histoire_ (Le Goff, Le Roy Ladurie, Furet)\]

The year 1968 changed a lot in France, not only in society but also, and perhaps above all, in the academic world. Generational conflicts were characteristic of the period, and Marxism was now criticized, as an ideology linked to Stalinist regimes in Eastern Europe or to orthodox communist parties in the West, for hindering the emergence of new social movements. So, it was not totally unexpected that even within the Annales School a further generation was looking for its emancipation from the rule of the ubiquitous director both of the academic institution and of the journal. Braudel came under attack by younger scholars, and vexed by these conflicts, he retired from the board of _Annales_. One can date from this moment the arrival of a third generation of the Annales into power.

\(^{10}\) For aspects of world history, see Ch. 5 by Jürgen Osterhammel, and Ch. 6 by Peer Vries, in this volume.
Leading figures of the new generation included Emmanuel Le Roy Ladurie, Jacques Le Goff, Georges Duby, and François Furet—some of them former communists who were now explicitly demonstrating their distance from Marxism. In 1967 Le Roy Ladurie completed a great thesis on the history of climate in Europe over the last 1,000 years, arguing in the geohistorical manner which Fernand Braudel had used previously. Later on he became well known through his story of the *Carnival de Romans, 1579–1580* (1980)—a precise reconstruction of social and cultural tensions among people in a small French town, Romans, confronted with the Inquisition. Le Goff and Duby further developed Bloch’s globalizing interpretation of medieval civilization in Europe, complementing social and cultural history with a biographical approach, as was the case when Le Goff tried to integrate the world of medieval representations in a biography of King Louis XI.11 Furet, together with Mona Ozouf, came to the fore with an impressive analysis of the social history of writing and reading in eighteenth-century France, inspiring a history of French book production and of the alphabetization processes in the country. Furet, who became president of the EHESS in the 1980s, later on moved from the history of sociocultural phenomena to the new political history of the French Revolution, and became well known for his polemics against Albert Soboul’s more classical interpretation.12

It is noticeable that this generation was more concerned with national—that is, French—history than Bloch and Febvre, or Braudel and his disciples. To look for the ‘worlds we have lost’ and to assimilate them to the national *patrimoine* was one of the essentials for that generation who was, not least for that reason, so successful in the French society of the 1970s. The *Annalistes* of the third generation met the demands for a new national master narrative based upon new but widely recognized methods for researching and writing history. Le Roy Ladurie, Furet, Le Goff, Duby, and others were not only internationally renowned historians, but at the same time became media stars in France—inciting jealousy, when historians in other countries came under pressure from the rising social sciences. Le Goff and others have proudly labelled their own interpretation of the Annales’ methodology *a nouvelle histoire* (new history), implying an outmoded quality in any other approach, and they felt without any doubt that their achievements rested at the top of the international historiographical ladder. On the other hand, the comparative approach was neglected, and the international interest in the results of the Annales was limited to methodology. Furet, and later Roger Chartier and others, sought new transatlantic cooperation with American universities interested in the history of Western civilization, and in the heat of the *Bicentenaire* of the Revolution in 1989 the new French–North American axis proved reliable.

THE CRISIS OF THE ANNALES SCHOOL

In the two decades following the Second World War the number of historians in France more than doubled.\(^{13}\) This enlargement of the field happened at a time when French historians were successfully repositioning history among the academic disciplines. Probably with greater success than in other countries, French historians reimagined their discipline as a social science and no longer as part of the humanities, where literature and philosophy occupied the centre.

Much of the international impact which French historiography exercised in the 1960s and 1970s has to do with these two tendencies: much hope was invested in that reinterpretation of the *metier*, and it mobilized a new generation toward coordinated efforts in the description of the social composition of historical communities, based mainly on the calculation of wealth and income from sources on taxation. After a decade of collective belief in the integrative forces of such tools of quantification, the *classe et ordre* debate between Labrousse and his disciples on one side, and Roland Mousnier with Mandrou on the other, challenged the epistemological assumption that social hierarchies are a simple function of the repartition of fortune. This notion came under criticism, and a more ‘culturalist’ interpretation argued that hierarchy in society is caused much more by differences in social recognition (of professions, gender, cultural behaviour, and so on).

The optimistic tone of the social history agenda disappeared and was replaced, not only by a more sceptical evaluation of the possibilities of any *histoire totale*, but also by a concentration on smaller topics such as urban settings, single villages, the marginalized-in and the excluded-from society, as well as specific social situations such as the family, childhood alimentation, festivals, sexuality, private life, gender relations, and body and medical treatment, among other issues discovered for the first time from a social historian’s point of view. At the same time the now fully empowered ‘third generation’ of historians at the EHESS, claiming to be the legitimate successors of the founding figures of the Annales, took over editorial responsibility for the journal. In 1974 they published, as a sort of manifesto and as their reading of the French historiographical tradition, the ambitious declaration of a *nouvelle histoire* now centred on the notion of *mentalité*.

This new history promised to continue both the synthesizing force of social history and its openness to experimentation. The international visibility of French historiography was arguably never greater than at this time. The EHESS was not only a powerful research centre producing each year a couple of well-received monographs from theses defended at the school, but also

attracting foreign scholars to participate in its research seminars and to contribute to its workshops and conferences. Multi-volume histories of various aspects of modern social history have resulted, ranging from the history of the peasantry and of French cities, to the history of private life, the history of women, and so on.

But from as early as the 1980s an increasing number of critics focused much more on the weaknesses than on the successes of this new history. The rather vague notion of mentality, which was not always well anchored in social history and open to use as a catch-all category, has not saved history from fragmentation and compartmentalization. Critics such as Hervé Coutau-Bégarie actually saw it as an open rupture with the tradition of Bloch and Fevrière, and disputed the entitlement of Braudel’s successors to this historiographical pedigree.¹⁴ After a misalliance in the early 1970s with the mainly structuralist idea of an immobile history (Le Roy Ladurie), the return to eloquent but at the same time methodologically traditionalist narratives was seen as a reaction against the Braudelian preference for the study of the longue durée. The twist with postmodern philosophy and Foucauldian concepts remained marginal, despite the mounting interest in the history of the marginalized or in institutions like the prison or the hospital.

A third criticism addressed the international success of the new history and argued that it can be explained less by its own fecundity and more by the configurations in a North American historiography now extremely receptive to the ‘French style’ (imported by a few innovative historians such as Robert Darnton, Natalie Zemon Davis, Steven S. Kaplan, William Sewell Jr., Charles Tilly, Eugen Weber, and others). The fourth argument concerned the new role of media having more impact than any methodological shift for the outlook of French historiography in the 1970s. Publishing houses, encouraged by the enormous success of Le Roy Ladurie’s Montaillou (1975), with more than two millions copies sold, and the fascination with Michel Foucault’s Les mots et les choses [The Order of Things] (1966) now invited historians like Le Goff, Duby, Pierre Nora, Michelle Perrot, Maurice Agulhon, and Michel Winock to take the lead in large collections of books on historical events and developments—mainly French—aimed at a popular audience that included increasing numbers of students and also educated older readers entering retirement. Book series interacted with programmes on television and radio, and with newly resurgent political magazines. Thus, French historiography became partly driven by market forces alien to the traditional rules of the academic system, altering for example the power relations between ordinary university professors and the directeurs de recherche at the EHESS, who were less occupied with teaching, and therefore able to deliver what the media market was seeking.

The fascinating combination of new approaches, its realization in monographs or co-authored multi-volume series, and its attractiveness to a large audience allowed French historiography in the 1970s, and especially the nouvelle histoire, to deploy the myth of the Annales School and to present itself as the most representative part of that historiography and thus an international role model. The criticism of this model during the 1980s announced both a deep crisis in the epistemological foundations of the Annales and a period of transformation during which a new generation, and sub-disciplines other than the modernists, dominated the EHESS; those hitherto marginalized within the profession (like the practitioners of the new political history of recent times)\(^{15}\) were looking for new opportunities with the creation of new journals to compete with the Annales (such as Genèses), which from the early 1990s opened up much more quickly to emerging international trends than could the old flagship of French historiography: Annales: Vingtième Siècle, Mouvement Social, and later the Revue d’Histoire Moderne et Contemporaine all embraced innovation by inviting the younger generation onto their editorial boards.

With a manifesto calling for a fresh start that should be a turning back to some of the fundamental ideas of Bloch and Febvre, the editorial board of the Annales itself inspired a discussion among French historians in 1989. The outcome of this debate was a programmatic shift to new methods and topics: people and their agency were to replace structures as major explanatory factors; the significance of cultural representation for historical development was recognized; and a new interest in comparative history was declared. The cooperation of historians with social scientists was to be enriched by a coalition with other disciplines such as anthropology and with ‘area studies’ that straddled disciplines. Even if the premature death of Bernard Lepetit, a major driver of the reform movement, was a setback for fundamental change, it cannot be denied that the Annales: ESC of the last decade of the twentieth century was marked by important differences from the journal dominated by the third generation. Openness to results from other disciplines and other countries should again become a characteristic of what is perhaps the best-known academic journal in the humanities or social sciences worldwide.

It seems premature to judge the outcome of this endeavour as of early 2010, but the overwhelming influence of the Annales School on international historiography seems to have waned, and a more multipolar system of innovative centres is emerging—also as an effect of the postcolonial and post-structuralist approaches dominating much current historical discourse. Inside France there are now other groups of historians, linked in interdisciplinary work to other

fields, who dispute the dominant role of the Annales. Among these groups we can at least identify three tendencies.

The first is the rehabilitation of the historical event—the famous *histoire événementiel* so heavily attacked by Braudel as unimportant to any historical interpretation. It was a long ‘intellectual revolution since 1968’ as François Bédarida, one of the prominent historians of the now-ascendant *histoire des temps presents*, claimed, and it has some continuity with the return to biography and political history since the 1970s, but it has now been fully recognized by the profession.¹⁶

The second is the attempt to restore something like the original approach of Bloch and Febvre by editing their works carefully and by rethinking their polemical strategies and editorial practices in the context of the first half of the twentieth century.¹⁷ While the programme of the early Annales was interesting to the advancement of social and economic history, it has recently become the inspiration for comparative approaches and new epistemological debate on the tools for a history of cultural representations and practices.¹⁸ Daniel Roche, for instance, director of the IHMC and professor at the Collège de France, who started his career with a celebrated thesis on sociability in the age of Enlightenment, has now turned his efforts towards a history of consumption, of daily-life practices, and of symbolic worlds,¹⁹ while Alain Corbin has initiated the investigation of taste, noises, and the related history of emotions.²⁰ Roger Chartier, Frederic Barbier, and others followed in the footsteps of Henri-Jean Martin and intensified research in the history of the book (*histoire du livre*), of practices of reading, of book-selling, and the possession of printed materials in private collections, as well as the relation between trends in the book market and processes of nationalization and Europeanization.²¹ As for many other fields, this turn towards cultural history was not a departure from the research tools used in social history, but an appropriation of them. The same holds true for another trend which can be compared to the reimagining of time as a basic category for

historiography by Braudel in his famous article on the *longue durée*. Daniel Nordman and others now discussed the category of space against notions of territory, and participated in what is internationally known as the ‘spatial’ turn in the humanities, with original contributions on strategies in French history to order space anew.

The third trend concerns the ‘discovery’ of cultural interaction as the driving force toward modernity. In 1985, Michel Espagne and Michael Werner, both at the time researchers at the CNRS with a background as historians of literature, proposed a programme to investigate the mutual interaction of French and German culture, and developed in the following years the category of cultural transfer to overcome old-fashioned diffusionist theories. They started to study motivations, techniques, media, intermediates, and effects of cultural perception. From the bilateral French-German example they went to tri- and multi-lateral transfer-constellations, and discussed the fundamental challenges to theories of modernization, which they no longer understood primarily as the product of factors internal to societies alone but as driven by an ever-intensifying process of interaction. Here, the tolls for the study of cultural transfers became the basis for new understanding of transnationalization as a history of flows (of people, goods, and ideas), and the attempts to control them by institutions exercising social and political power.

The Annales School is no longer characterized by any coherent programme, and French historiography is nowadays much more pluralistic in its international presentation than some decades ago. But at the same time, this rich tradition is no longer at risk of becoming a suffocating orthodoxy. The hegemonic position resulting from the very specific conditions after the First World War (with the sudden disappearance of the German competitor), and the new Atlantic relations after the Second World War when American foundations supported the establishment of a powerful academic institution like the Sixth Section, is over. French historiography remains, however, an attractive source of methodological innovation, as is exemplified, for instance, by its contributions to the study of memory in Pierre Nora’s now oft-copied category of *lieux de mémoire*. As this case illustrates, the renewal of French historiography is occurring in greater proximity to international developments, and is less fixated on the nation’s history alone.

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Despite the importance of a glorious medieval past and the hegemonic position of French culture at the time of absolutist rulers such as François I and Louis XIV, the Revolution of 1789 is at the heart of the French national historical narrative. It separates from, and at the same time connects, the Ancien Régime to modernity and, not coincidentally, the Romantic period of the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries is studied by French historians more than any other period. The revolution and the declaration of rights of men and citizens were valorized by the political classes and by historians of the Third Republic as the foundation of modern political values, and for a very long time Napoleonic expansion over Europe was celebrated as the continental form of a civilizing mission that made France the forerunner of modernity, and legitimized its ambition among the great powers in world history. The circumstances of the 150th anniversary in 1939 gave leftist interpretations of the French Revolution a new dimension as the historical origin of a legitimate resistance to non-democratic regimes and foreign occupation.

Here again, we find some continuity to pre-war historiographical trends. The positive historical evaluation of the overall impact of the revolution on the subsequent history of France, and more generally of Europe, was the framework for a bitter controversy between Alphonse Aulard and Albert Mathiez on the role of Danton and Robespierre, but even more important was the turn towards a social history of the revolution, introduced by Jean Jaurès at the beginning of the twentieth century, and supported both by Ernest Labrousse, who wrote his history of prices under the old régime in 1933 (see above) also as a reaction to the great crisis in 1929, and by Georges Lefebvre, with a magisterial history of the peasant of Northern France, and a scrupulous analysis of the mentality of the French over the summer of 1789, in his book on the Great Fear. 26 The heritage of these pre-war tendencies consisted in, first, a large republican synthesis of the revolution as a founding moment of modern France covering a positive evaluation of the Jacobin phase of the Year II; second, a dominating interest in the history of social groups and their cultural behaviour, instead of a simplistic history of political events; and third, the very symbolic concentration of specialized research at the Sorbonne with its Institut d’histoire de la Révolution française as a sort of fortress in defence of the national patrimony. One of the striking features in this specific field is the effort to beware the unity of this

so-called classical interpretation of the revolution. A second feature is the complex relationship with the Annales, concentrated institutionally at the EHESS. At the CISH congress at Rome in 1955, where he reported on the development of categories for a socioeconomic history of the Ancien Régime that would not start from any anachronistic application of categories won from nineteenth-century class societies, Labrousse inspired a school of economic historians. Lefebvre organized a first wave of international collaboration with historians of the French Revolution from Japan to Britain, from Italy to the Soviet Union, from Norway to Hungary. At the 1960 Congress of Historical Sciences in Stockholm this group formed an international committee which became central to the development of the field.

Other comparative approaches were inspired by the combination of the American and the French engendering of a so-called Atlantic revolution, but this early attempt to put the Revolution of 1789 into a broader context failed to overturn the dominance of a leftist interpretation which insisted on the uniquely radical quality of 1793. While Georges Lefebvre was known as a specialist on the peasantry, and interpreted the revolution as the communication of a series of corresponding revolutions, his disciple Albert Soboul became the great authority on the Parisian sans-culottes, opposing their pre-industrial social structure and mentality to an anachronistic portrayal of a proletariat avant la lettre (both inspired by radical leftist and orthodox Marxist interpretations of the French Revolution). Soboul, while trying to integrate the findings of a new quantity of empirical research on the social history of the Ancien Régime, the revolutionary epoch, and the Napoleonic Empire into one holistic scheme of interpretation, came under attack for his membership in the Communist Party even after the 1968 Russian intervention in Prague, and for the authority with which he defended the homogeneity both of the ‘classical interpretation’ and the community of historians dealing with the French Revolution. François Furet became—after the publication of a rather traditional narrative of the revolution, and a violent attack on what he called a ‘Marxist vulgata’ or a ‘revolutionary catechism’—the most celebrated representative of a so-called historical revisionism. While Furet never wrote a proper research paper in the field of revolutionary history itself, he put his finger on a fundamental epistemological wound by opposing the idea of the revolution as an invention by revolutionaries to the

30 The best known example of French intellectuals’ reaction to their own communist past is without any doubt François Furet’s Histoire d’une illusion (Paris, 1996).
31 François Furet and Denis Richet, La Révolution française (Paris, 1968).
argument that the revolution was a consequence of structural contradictions within the Ancien Régime. Furet’s attack inspired a new interest in the political culture of the revolution, in the importance of semantics and symbols, in the social history of cultural practices, and, in short, in the role of representations and the related agency of historical actors. With Michel Vovelle, succeeding Soboul (who died in 1983) as director of the Institute at the Sorbonne, a specialist in exactly this history of representations became the main figure in the preparation of the Bicentenaire. While the confrontation between Soboul at the Sorbonne and Furet (who became president of the EHESS in 1979) has been seen as a prolongation of the conflict between two powerful academic institutions, the situation somehow changed when Vovelle, one of the most prominent representatives of the nouvelle histoire, entered the Sorbonne and took over the chair in revolutionary history.32 His book on de-Christianization in southern France had shown a fruitful combination of quantitative methods derived from serial history with a hermeneutic exploration of the symbols found at thousands of graves, representing the complex value systems of families over the long eighteenth century.33

At the same time, with Vovelle there came to the centre of academic power a scholar who had already established an internationally recognized research group at the University of Aix-Marseille. Paris remains even now the desired final destination of any successful academic career (a position that is protected both by the symbolic value and the excellent material research conditions in the capital compared to regional universities), but decentralization has begun to work, as examples such as the social history school of Pierre Léon in Lyon, the IRED in Rouen specializing in comparative revolutionary history, and the research group in economic history of the eighteenth century at Lille III, all demonstrate.

But while this shift from the interest in the history of social groups during the revolution to an analysis of cultural representations could be connected to Vovelle’s nomination to the Sorbonne, another development became much more powerful: the shift towards the era of commemoration and research on processes of remembrance. In 1984 Pierre Nora published the influential Les lieux de mémoire [Realms of Memory],34 and the French Revolution became the most visible object of this new trend—felt among others by Furet, who devoted several books to the way the revolution had been interpreted and represented since 1789.35 Furet’s intention was to demystify French history and to lead it from its Sonderweg to the ‘normality’ of Western liberal-capitalist development.

32 Michel Vovelle, La mentalité révolutionnaire (Paris, 1985).
Others, like Nora, were much more interested in the defence of a French patrimoine that they felt was getting lost amid modernization and internationalization. The Bicentenaire became the major battlefield for all political forces and an interesting case-study of the new challenges now influencing historiography: the massive intervention of the state into the celebration, as well as the new role of the media (and of historians using their connection to the mass media) made the notion of an autonomous historiographical field an illusion.36

The enormous politicization of the field at the moment of the bicentennial worked less effectively, and only in contradictory ways, at an international level. The Bicentenaire was at the same time a focal point in a very Francocentric dispute about national heritage and an enormous inspiration to the historiography of this event worldwide. While any attempt to construct a tradition from 1789 to 1917 failed in 1989 with the breakdown of communist regimes, the activists of the Velvet Revolution seemed, to the great surprise of Western observers, not to have been attracted for the time being by the message of 1789. The historical reference to the rights of men (and women) and the various models of democracy experienced during the French Revolution have become, to the contrary, increasingly attractive in Asia and Africa, not as a triumph of French superiority but as an invitation to rethink critically the role of France since 1789. Here, the matter of colonial history meets with the historiography of the French Revolution.

DEBATES ON THE COLONIAL ROLE OF FRANCE AND GLOBALIZATION

French historiography had to rearticulate its relation to the country’s colonial past in several ways. The development from a sub-discipline that was strongly related to the administration of an empire stretching from Saigon to Dakar, to a heavily politicized reflection of the historical roots of the decolonization process has given the non-European territories an increasing importance in French historiography. While findings from colonial history and area studies became integrated into the Braudelian concept of world history (and scholars from all over the world participated in that adventure in the 1960s), this relationship lost much of its force in subsequent decades when French mainstream historiography focused anew on national history, while area studies themselves developed into specialized disciplines. It has only been very recently that French historians have begun to investigate the place France occupies in a more globalized world.

While the Second World War can be seen as the start of a fundamental change in the relations between France and its colonial empire, French historians reacted

only slowly to this transformation. The interest in colonial history goes back to
the attempt to understand the geographical, political, and economic conditions
in Western Africa, Southeast Asia, and the Caribbean at French universities and
specialized research centres during the late nineteenth century. This interest,
however, remained for many years at the margins of the French academic
system.37 Even in the inter-war period, colonial history was written only partly
by professional historians, and the most representative publication—the six
volumes of the Histoire des colonies françaises et de l’expansion de la France
(1929–33) edited by Gabriel Hanotaux and Alfred Martineau—was the product
of a group of authors mostly related to the milieu colonial as journalists, teachers,
and administrators. Historians formed among them only a minority. The para-
digm of a French civilizing mission survived the deep crisis of the French state
and its power over the colonial empire during the Second World War, and it was
only in 1959 that the former Revue d’histoire des colonies, administered by colonial
officers and diplomats, became the Revue française d’histoire d’outre-mer, reflect-
ing the fact that more and more territories under French colonial hegemony had
become independent states. The impact of those engaged with the empire,
however, remained strong. A second transformation occurred ten years later,
when the self-description of the field as ‘histoire du monde extra-européen’
echoed the process of decolonization. The discussion of the inter-war period
on assimilation or association as appropriate strategies for the integration of
people living in the colonies had not challenged the idea of French superiority,
well anchored in its own and, more generally, in European history shared by the
vast majority of French historians.

Since the traditional Anglophobia had been partly overcome, a comparative
perspective on the European colonial past was now at least possible. Historians
now presented the French Empire as the concrete product of colonization, and,
at least occasionally, actors other than the French colonizers were portrayed—
thus reflecting the new political configurations after the conference of Brazzaville
in 1944, and the emerging debate on the relationship between France and the
non-European territories in a future union française. This was not meant,
however, as a substantial criticism of the dominant Eurocentric perspective.

While the influence of ‘practitioners’ remained important, colonial history
followed the general tendencies in French historiography. The first period,
mainly covering the 1950s, can be characterized by a first wave of professionaliza-
tion, with Charles-André Julien (publishing as early as 1931 a first draft of a new
colonial history) and Henri Brunschwig (who reported regularly on new findings
in the field for the Revue historique and followed Julien in 1948 in the chair
of history at what became later the Ecole National de la France Outre-Mer)

37 Sophie Dulucq and Colette Zytnicki, Décoloniser l’histoire? De l’histoire coloniale aux histoires
as leading figures. The infrastructure with special archives, research centres, and periodicals supported this professionalization, but at the same time it helped to refocus on the French imperial past by facilitating the access to colonial materials.

Taken together with linguistic barriers and the shared conviction of a common fate of the French-speaking community, even after all the conflicts of decolonization, one observes a certain parochialism that was not overcome even in the 1980s and 1990s: among the geographical zones of interest, there is a strong bias towards the Western parts of Africa and the Maghreb as well as towards Southeast Asia and the Near East, while regions without a French historical presence are largely ignored as fields of investigation. When characterizing Julien’s colonial history, Braudel expressed doubts about the methodological compatibility of this kind of narrative, focused on contemporary politics, with the paradigm favoured by the Annales (where, by the way, the history of decolonization was not much studied), but under the impulse of people like Gabriel Debien colonial history transformed itself slowly into a social history of tropical societies. At the same time, Tiers Mondisme with its question about the origins of underdevelopment has won prominence. The impression of Marxist categories and the aim of integrating the history of Asian and African societies into an holistic scheme of interpretation led to experimentation with the so far very Eurocentric concept of mode of production, while trying to answer the underlying question by an intensification of quantitative approaches to economic history.

In the climate of the late 1960s the debate about the responsibility of imperialist expansion and neocolonial exploitation for poverty, scarcity, and a failed development in the former colonies turned also into a wider discussion about the extent to which the metropolitan economy had suffered, or profited from, colonization. A new generation, socialized after decolonization, applied the now well-established instruments of social history to the colonial past. It was only at this basis that the enquête collective, one of the most interesting tools developed by the Annales historians, mobilized groups of researchers for date collection from, and comparative interpretations of, the development of African and Asian societies under colonial rule—for example, at the Institut d’histoire des pays d’outre-mer, at the Université de Provence, or at the research centres specializing in African history at the Universities Paris I and Paris VII. Here again, France

profited from an influx of young historians from developing countries contributing theses and books—published by L’Harmattan or Karthala, two publishers known for their anti-colonial editorial programme—to the emerging field of aires culturelles. This innovated especially in three areas: the reconstruction of collective memory and the cultural construction of communities of ‘belonging’ by historical anthropologists, based on the critical use of oral history methods (and thus opening historiography to a new coalition with ethnography); economic history and the study of the consequences that the slave trade held for future development; and, finally, the history of the Christian mission outside Europe. This has opened up new perspectives in the study of colonialism, since it focused on cultural interaction—situated it within a framework of asymmetrical power relations, but recognizing nevertheless the agency of the colonized in a complex system of communication, rejection, and silence. Colonial history has developed in France from a focus on the metropolitan interest into a history of the non-European world, but only very slowly has French historiography overcome its Eurocentric inclinations.

At the end of this period of specialization, research on African and Asian societies became more and more compartmentalized in separately institutionalized area-studies centres and lost its former contextualization within colonial or imperial history. But at the same time the metropolitan interest in the colonial past was strengthened in a third period that can be called the era of ‘commemoration’. This was inspired by the investigation of remembrance processes, but it also emerged under the pressure of interventions by the state and by lobby groups (like the pieds-noirs, those former French inhabitants of Algeria forced to flee to France after the bloody process of decolonization). From the defilée of 14 July 1989, when French president François Mitterand presented France as the source of a universal message of the rights of men, to a series of substantial works on the slave trade, on the end of slavery achieved in Saint Domingue in 1793 and declared in Paris in 1794 (and on its reintroduction by Napoleon in 1802), to the debate in 2005 about the new—and ultimately abandoned—law declaring that France’s colonial past should be taught in positive terms at school, there has been a twenty-year period of ideological battle and debate about how to reconcile the nation’s universalist ambitions with its past as a colonial power. In an age of globalizing memories when colonialism came to the centre of remembrance, this aspect of French historiography can be expected to gain more than a marginal position in the academic field.

**TIMELINE/KEY DATES**

1944 (6 June) Allied troops land in Normandy and defeat German occupational armies
1944 (August) French troops under General Leclerc free Paris and Strasbourg
1945 (8 May) Sétif massacre in Algeria starts a long-lasting conflict and results in a general uprising in 1954 and then in full independence of the former colony (Evian Accords)
1945 (13 Oct.) Constitution votes for the Fourth Republic

1954
First Indochina War leads to loss of colonial empire (independence of Laos and Cambodia while Vietnam was divided into two states)

1956
Suez Crisis; as a consequence France (as well as Britain) evacuate their troops from the Arabian peninsula

1958
Election of Charles de Gaulle as President of the now Fifth Republic (new constitution with dominant position for the president); this paves the way towards acceptance of decolonization

1960–1
Year of Africa; most former French colonies on the continent become independent but remain strongly tied to France by the organization of Francophonie

1966
Withdrawal of France from integrated military command of NATO

1968
Students and workers protest against authoritarian character of French government, but legislative elections strengthen the conservatives (presidency of Pompidou)

1974–81
Presidency of the social and economic liberal, Valery Giscard d’Estaing

1989–90
French government led by President Francois Mitterand accepts German unification as the price of stronger European integration and participates in the First Gulf War

1996
Strong engagement with NATO intervention into Balkan wars

2003
France refuses, together with Germany, to join the American-led ‘coalition of the willing’ against Iraq

KEY HISTORICAL SOURCES

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To enter on a detailed *description* of the material available in this congested period would be unthinkable in the space of a single chapter. A bibliographical ‘search engine’ for our period produces over 66,000 books and articles in English that contain the words ‘history’ or ‘historical’ in their titles, and reducing them to synthesis would prove chimerical even if we had time to read them all. Change over time offers one useful axis for discussion, however; so does the sense of place in an era when ‘devolution’ has altered the way we think about ‘British’ history, though we shall find no space for the internal historiographies of Ireland, Scotland, and Wales in this highly significant period of their development; so do a variety of structures which, though not historical in themselves, have significantly shifted the framework within which the historical enterprise goes on. Nor can we ignore what the ancient universities often used to call ‘foreign history’. European integration has integrated a British past into its concerns—or at least has often made the attempt—and we now face a globalized future with a demand for ‘world history’, the history of the global environment, the history of food, dress, and so on. We need paths into this seeming chaos of conditions and confinements, always aware of the increasing difficulty in isolating British from American or European developments. It may help to begin with an overview of salient trends across the period and then to pick our way through the chronology in order to detect and explain some key moments of transition.

**KEY TRENDS**

The Second World War had pulled many professional historians into the service of the State, both in war service itself and also in the enormous Official Histories run by the Cabinet Office which would dominate the post-war lives of many excellent scholars. That State—the vast machine of governmental interference in society—did not recede after 1945, but rather expanded in the hands of the first majority Labour Government, and came to dominate all institutions of higher education. Though registered as official ‘charities’, as they still are, universities
became creatures of the British State and increasingly susceptible to pressure from government to alter (and typically to make more ‘relevant’) their recruitment, syllabi, and modes of teaching. Labour governments in 1945–51, 1964–70, and 1997–2010 played a part in this process; but so did Conservative governments, and it is noticeable that the two major structural reforms that affected history-teaching in the United Kingdom—the Robbins Report of 1963 and the creation of so-called new universities in 1992—both took place under Conservative administrations. These initiatives produced two types of change: a radical shift in the social background of history students and teachers, with far more of both cohorts coming from the working class, and a parallel shift in subject matter, with lurches in the direction of economic and social history in the 1950s and an increasing demand for women’s history from the 1960s to remedy a long silence imposed by male institutions. Imposing a ‘national curriculum’ on British schools, in which the place of history has become seriously compromised, has more recently confirmed the penetration of historical education by the State—not always in welcome ways.

A generational narrative ran beside this structural evolution. Despite a strong drift towards Marxism embodied in the Communist Party Historians’ Group,¹ the bulk of the undergraduate history-population of the 1940s and 1950s remained as conventional as their physical appearance: normally conformist and apolitical, working in established universities with their traditional disciplines and hierarchical organization. The 1960s changed all that for reasons that had little to do with history, though the writing of Eric Hobsbawm and especially E. P. Thompson had begun to cut deeply into the culture. The universities became populated by students who sought to outrage their parents’ generation, who listened to music that was their own particular contribution, and who were manifestly political in their orientation in the days of US involvement in Vietnam and the beginning of the Irish ‘troubles’ after 1969. Their Marxism was often painfully naive and took them no further than the Communist Manifesto, but for a few years—perhaps from 1965 to around 1971—they celebrated ‘labour history’ and the first moves towards women’s history, enlivened seminars with aggression, attacked embassies and consulates, and spoke the discourse of ‘sit-ins’ and ‘lock-outs’. They were intelligent, engaged, stimulating, and infuriating. Then, quite suddenly, quiescence through the 1970s, and broadening in the years of Thatcher and Reagan, settled like a blanket on intellectual ambition. All passion spent, the students of history turned inwards to personal relationships, an embarrassed inarticulateness (their music itself silenced by personal sound-devices made available by new technologies), and a form of political indolence that would have been normal in 1950, unthinkable in 1968.

¹ For some details, see Harvey J. Kaye, British Marxist Historians: An Introductory Analysis (Cambridge, 1984); and Eric Hobsbawm, Interesting Times: A Twentieth-Century Life (London, 2002).
Not that *soixante-huit* had brought any of the excitements witnessed in Paris, with only the march on the American Embassy in Grosvenor Square as a milestone. But for those teaching through the period, these years of the 1970s mark a major caesura from the radicalism that came before. Where intellectual provocation was discovered at all it was found in Albert Camus (oddly), early Michel Foucault, and Roland Barthes. Discovery rarely included Hayden White’s *Metahistory* (1973), which made little impact at the time, but became scripture for a second generation of the theoretically minded after 1980 and inseminated Britain’s short and passing engagement with postmodern ideas that never penetrated the historical culture as successfully as they did in Europe and some parts of the United States, with only Patrick Joyce, among established scholars, consistently deploying them in historical work. But the radical young Marxists of the 1960s had by then grown up into the senior faculty members of the 1990s who made a distinctive past by living in one.

Intertwined in these narratives one might see another in the growing presence of technology as a force impelling historical method and providing new ways of disseminating research. Alan Turing’s Bletchley Park had made its giant step for mankind in producing the electronic computer which, in all its various generations since, has transformed what can be done by the historian without leaving the desk. Not only did the new hardware generate, inevitably, a sense of renaissance among historians determined to use their new power of counting and thus impregnate the cliometricians of the late 1950s and 1960s. It also revolutionized, through the World Wide Web, the idea of bibliography itself by bringing thousands of references within reach of a computer monitor and, once PCs and laptops became universal, at the touch of a button. Dissemination made a similar leap. The resort to radio as a form of popular contact had already become normal before the end of the war, and the combination of the BBC’s Home Service (1939) and the Third Programme (after 1946), together with its house-magazine, *The Listener*, brought new rewards for enterprising scholars. None of that impact prepared the British public, however, for the power of television and its ability to depict events of the past with riveting immediacy. It could perform effortlessly what Carlyle and Ranke had spent their lives trying to achieve in prose. Beginning in a conventional mode with A. J. P. Taylor’s brilliant television lectures in the early 1960s, the *genre* has expanded its scope and methods into the historical series of a Simon Schama or David Starkey, the docudrama, the biopic: television has made history visual with all the irreversible results achieved in the onset of printing. *History Today* and the *BBC History*

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Magazine, a highly successful initiative launched in 2000, bring the modes together as do so many coffee-table productions aimed at the intelligent general reader-viewer. By 1995 many of Britain’s most successful historians defined themselves as ‘public intellectuals’ or tele-dons commanding a wide audience in ways that no one could have dreamed of in 1945.

POST-WAR HORIZONS

One dead German brooded over British historiography as the war in Europe came to its end in 1945. A stylish and acerbic young English historian, Hugh Trevor-Roper, had been sent to find out what happened to Adolf Hitler, and in confirming his death he also produced one of the most widely read accounts in English of the Third Reich’s demise.4 He inaugurated, unknowingly, a trend in explanation which dominated British attempts to understand Hitler’s regime until A. J. P. Taylor’s spectacular reversal of it in 1961. Essentially the mode worked as explanation through agency: the disasters after 1933 could be visited on either one man or a finite collection of men. The Third Reich and Hitler amounted to the same object of study; the sources for the study included oral history and the Nuremberg Trials, and the point was to allot blame as in a criminal case. The theme dominated the later writing of Sir John Wheeler-Bennett, and it obsesses the most accessible journalistic account of the Hitler period by the American journalist William L. Shirer.5 But most of all it enveloped Alan Bullock’s seminal, and still-read, Hitler: A Study in Tyranny (1952). Fifty years later, schoolchildren and university students continue to produce its arguments without reference to its date or Bullock’s sources—a highly questionable outcome made worse by the degree to which the Nazi period has come to exercise its own death-grip on curricula throughout Britain. Taylor’s disingenuous attempt to make black white in The Origins of the Second World War (1961) failed to satisfy the demands of its title by showing no sense of what Nazism amounted to as an ideology, but it did uproot a certain complacency in Britain and France by focusing attention less on Berlin than on the culpabilities of London and Paris in meeting the Nazi threat. Only with Ian Kershaw’s distinguished work on the character of the Third Reich, culminating in his two-volume account of Hitler himself, did a serious move away from the crude agency-model become available in Britain.6 That model had played a significant role, all the same, in forming an understanding of biography and its relation to

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social forces. Historian of the Tudors, Sir John Neale, found it impossible to revise his life of Queen Elizabeth without reading back post-war instincts about ideology, and placing Churchill in the sixteenth century as an avatar of ‘romantic leadership of a nation in peril’. It is impossible to read Philip Magnus’s highly influential biography of Gladstone (1954), similarly, without seeing Bullock’s Hitler with colours reversed: the Great Man doing good rather than evil.

Of course, most historians wanted to turn away from the war’s miseries unless they had become involved in the Official Histories, whose steady production of volumes in both the civil and military series became a feature of the next thirty years. For many, the overwhelming urge was to return to projects and ideas that had spent the previous five years in a drawer or at the back of the head. One continuing project from pre-war days received a new boost of direction. Oxford University Press had brought its Oxford History of England to partial fruition in the 1930s, with Frank Stenton’s seminal Anglo-Saxon England appearing during the conflict. But major gaps remained both in its coverage and in adjusting its style and tone to modern conditions—something which the New Cambridge Modern History sought to remedy, with mixed success. In fact, the remaining volumes of the Oxford History followed a conventional pattern, with volumes dealing in the post-war years with the thirteenth, fourteenth, and fifteenth centuries and not discovering radical pathways until A. J. P. Taylor’s flawed but arresting volume on the most recent period, which appeared in 1965. The New Cambridge Modern History (1957–79) likewise monopolized the time and energy of some leading historians—R. B. Wernham, Albert Goodwin, G. R. Elton, Peter Burke, F. H. Hinsley, and many others. Joining all these collaborative projects together in the mind’s eye one can see a commitment to a scientistic notion of truth (except for Taylor’s iconoclastic vision of the subject) which gave such projections a heightened status as a place for correct answers and incontrovertible facts. No one gloried in the correct and incontrovertible more than (Sir) Lewis Namier, Professor of Modern History at the University of Manchester. He became drawn into another important collaborative venture, the History of Parliament, which received dependable funding after the war following an unsatisfactory beginning at the hands of an amateur enthusiast, Josiah Wedgwood MP. Namier already held a formidable position in British historiography as the popularizer of a technique that became known as ‘prosopography’: the stripping down of social phenomena to the consideration of its

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8 Two series of volumes, a military series edited by J. R. M. Butler and a civil series edited by Keith Hancock, contained much distinguished work, including W. K. Hancock and M. M. Gowing on The British War Economy (London, 1949) and Richard Titmuss’s classic enquiry into Problems of Social Policy (London, 1951).
individual participants with the assumption that their biographies would reveal the essence of social formations and political institutions. It was a bad assumption persistently prosecuted by Namier and his team, who worked on the biographies of MPs from the 1750s to the 1790s. Namier died prematurely, probably because of the strain under which he worked to complete his *tranche* of biographies, and he never saw his work in print. But the series again embraced some of the premier historians of their day, including J. S. Roskell, S. T. Bindoff, and (originally) J. E. Neale, and stood as testimony to the power of collaborative ‘research’ in a culture firmly attached to scientific models of discovery and explanation.

One can worry about this ‘pursuit of certainty’ from a position resting on social thought of various kinds. But the historians went further in their pursuit than others in the humanities through their love affair with the computer and the idea of ‘quantification’ that took its first tottering steps in American economic history in the second half of the 1950s and became a hegemonic model of enquiry in many fields during the 1960s. By the 1970s it had fused with a more sophisticated understanding of how to use quantitative techniques to test economic theories against wide ranges of data, and thus transmogrified into a science of ‘cliometrics’ that attracted its own clientele of *cognoscenti*. Through these years also, Fernand Braudel’s direction of the Sixth Section of the Ecole Pratique des Hautes Etudes in Paris offered encouragement to those who wanted to make historical writing an exercise in quantification, not least through the use of ‘serial history’ as a way of reaching the core of historical truth by constructing statistical series relating to historical phenomena. Much of the material generated in this evangelical fever had its own validity in exposing difficulties with conventional interpretation of economic history. Problems arose, rather, when, as with most evangelicals, they did not know when or where to stop. It became enough to say, in destruction of an historian’s work, that (s)he had failed to count. It became enough to argue, in praise of an historian’s originality and penetration, that (s)he had cut through the obfuscation of story and myth by feeding a computer with relevant data. Do-It-Yourself manuals appeared—the most influential and intelligent in Britain by Roderick Floud in 1973. The balloon swelled and threatened to engulf conventional historical method until, of course, it eventually rolled onto a sharp pin. This happened in the United States when Robert Fogel and Stanley Engerman’s *Time on the Cross* tried to subject American slave culture to cliometric analysis in 1974. The trashing that this

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12 For the literature, see Pierre Chaunu, *Histoire quantitative, histoire sérielle* (Paris, 1978); Jacques Le Goff and Pierre Nora (eds.), *Constructing the Past: Essays in Historical Methodology* (Cambridge, 1988); and Ch. 13 by Matthias Middell in this volume.
much-vaunted work received in the professional journals, and by commentators ever since, marked a turning point in the fortunes of cliometrics as sufficient explanation for social and cultural issues. It survives still in a postmodern world but has retreated into its appropriate setting of economic analysis or as an adjunct to other approaches. A related development that ran alongside quantification, but held the field for longer, lay in the direction of family reconstitution as the basis of revising conventional demographic history. Accomplished historians of the stature of Peter Laslett, E. A. Wrigley, and R. S. Schofield made their Cambridge centre for population studies a major node of activity in this dimension of the subject and produced monographs of lasting importance.14

Standing back from these essays in collaborative research, quantification, and grounded certainties, we can now see them conjointly as a summation (or sometimes reductio ad absurdum) of a version of British positivism that had begun in the inter-war period but which had now achieved the status of received truth. It rested on an objectivity/‘bias’ model of understanding, and its leading assumption was that truth about the past could be uncovered and confirmed so long as various distorting subjectivities could be eliminated from the enquiry. Though extremely powerful, however, that governing supposition did not monopolize views of the past and the possibility of its retrieval, and in the period before the mid-1970s, when the burden of the argument began to shift, at least two types of resistance worked against it. In Britain the first involved a Marxist (or at least intellectually radical) critique of historical method. The second owed much to a former ‘whig’ disposition, and sought to hold on to the idea that history consisted of narratives about change.

Among the younger generation who had fought in the war or commented on it from the sidelines, some way of accounting for such disasters, present and past, seemed more urgent than the ruminations of Wheeler-Bennett or Bullock promised to achieve. The collapse of Western economies after 1929, the manifest relationship between economy and war, and the heroism of the Soviet Union in resisting the Nazi invasion of 1941, combined to generate new energy on the left and to lend Marxist analysis of historical issues fresh urgency amid the austerities and shortages of post-war Britain. A circle around the socialist activist Dona Torr and a Marxist economist, Maurice Dobb, whose Studies in the Development of Capitalism (1946) acquired a benchmark-status for its devotees, helped to gather together the Communist Party Historians’ Group, which went on to play a crucial role in floating a new journal of radical historiography called Past and Present (1952). The success of Past and Present as the flagship journal of British historiography has been startling; it seemed not at all predictable at its inception when it cut across the grain of the culture. Perhaps two developments helped it

flourish. First, it quickly dropped the unfortunate suffix, *A Journal of Scientific History*, which could have beached it when that tide receded. Second, the culture grew towards it in its prevalent social theory, both with the emergence of interdisciplinarity as a mantra, but also with the feminist movement of the 1960s and the youth movement with its distinctive ambitions and a rejection of conventional norms. Above all, the sixties brought a widening horizon within the intelligentsia which beckoned towards a holist social history that owed nothing to G. M. Trevelyan and much to Marx, Durkheim, and Weber on the one hand, and Lévi-Strauss, Evans-Pritchard, and Edmund Leach on the other. Subterranean in the early post-war years, the authors associated with these tendencies emerged in the light of their radical or *marxiant* material that provided the platform for later celebrity in the headier years of the 1960s.

A second form of resistance stemmed from G. M. Trevelyan, or rather from the sense of history-as-story that he had spent his life in advancing. By now in the autumn of his life—he died in 1962—Trevelyan had spent much of the post-war period in revising and reissuing his vast earlier work to a public that seemingly never tired of it. Not all of his volumes had reached their twenty-first edition by 1949, as had the evergreen *England Under the Stuarts* (1928), but George Macaulay Trevelyan kept before the mind of the ‘general reader’ a vision of history as literature in the tradition of the great-uncle fossilized in his middle name. More muscular in this resistance, however, was a younger Cambridge colleague of Trevelyan who had spent much of the post-war period deprecating the mood in professional history that pointed towards a form of unreflective ‘analysis’ geared to missing the point of the historical enterprise. Trevelyan had once thought, wrongly, that Herbert Butterfield’s *Whig Interpretation of History* (1931) had been written in criticism of him. He had come to see that Butterfield in fact cleaved to many of Trevelyan’s most deeply held instincts about what history must be in order to remain worthy of the name, and during the 1950s Butterfield took the fight to the enemy which, for an eighteenth-century scholar, meant taking it to Namier. The story of that encounter has been told many times. Conventional wisdom in the 1950s had it that Namier won the contest and that Butterfield’s *George III and the Historians* (1957) had blown up in his face because it contained errors of fact. Later

15 See Keith Thomas’s influential article on ‘History and Anthropology’, *Past and Present*, 24 (1963), 3–24.
commentators have an opportunity to come at this quarrel from a very different place and see in Butterfield’s defence of history as a civilizing education from which citizenship takes its lessons a precursor of forms of criticism that sprang up after the death of both antagonists. In his later life, moreover, Butterfield championed the idea of ‘the history of historiography’ as an antidote to contemporary certainties and a way of seeing how understanding of the past remains partial and unfulfilled. 18 He was one of a mere handful of front-rank historians thriving in the 1950s who, had he lived long enough, would have regarded The Oxford History of Historical Writing as a good and necessary thing. It was he who organized a symposium on the current direction of historical studies for a special number of The Times Literary Supplement in 1956. To read too much into a single collection of opinions would certainly invite distortion: the choice of authors fell on those whom Butterfield knew and who were ‘of a certain age’ (three of them over 75); the symposium reflects a ‘senior view’ of current historiography, therefore, but remains suggestive precisely for that reason in its depiction of current concerns. Its dwelling on parliamentary and constitutional history attracted the attention of Geoffrey Barraclough who, ten years later, repeated the exercise in three numbers of TLS under the title ‘New Ways in History’, rejecting the ‘parochialism’ of Butterfield’s earlier compilation, and emphasizing, not the autonomy of historical writing, but rather ‘its interrelationship with cognate sciences’ as the way forward, and including radical historical minds such as Keith Thomas and Moses I. Finley as proof of his intentions. In just ten years a wider horizon had thus opened to excite or appal. G. R. Elton, embittered at having been passed over in the election to Cambridge’s Regius Chair in 1963, and revolted by the ‘arrogance’ of the 1966 symposium, dashed off one of his worst books in protest against a world gone wrong. 19

FRAGMENTATION AND REFORMATION

What had changed? Britain had. In the second half of the 1950s mass immigration disturbed the quietude of a placid generation. New music deafened it. Consumerism cheapened it. ‘Suez’ humiliated it. Was it accident that the first post-war revision of colonialism in Africa appeared in the same year as Taylor’s revision of the war’s origins and Peter Sawyer’s determination to find the Vikings peaceful? 20 It probably was, for history’s script is not written in the sky. The sense

18 I chart this process in my forthcoming biography of Butterfield.
19 G. R. Elton, The Practice of History (Sydney, 1967), esp. 18 for his denunciation of the TLS symposium that was ‘shot through with an engaging arrogance and historically invalid assertions’.
of disturbance and revision is no chimera, none the less. Besides, one should look
down rather than up. These are the years of ‘history from below’—a mood
informed by Marxism but wandering across the new populism and finding its
greatest icon in E. P. Thompson, whose The Making of the English Working Class
(1963) encapsulated its aspiration in a book of extraordinary appeal. He wrote
like a poet; he looked like a poet. The shivering tendrils of hair, swept back from
time to time with a theatrical gesture, crowned a speaker of enviable persuasiveness,
and the prose seemed so powerful that its content escaped criticism for a
while. Thompson’s vision of a class present at its own creation and participating
in history rather than spectating a world constructed by its betters made a new
period, and the years from 1790 to 1830 looked different until the critics regrouped.
Thompson embodied the post-Robbins university, not merely through taking a post at Warwick University but as an avatar of the new learning.
Bit by bit his edifice crumbled through the chipping away of lesser men who
knew how to read a document and knew how to restore the pieces Thompson
had left out, and by 1965 he and Perry Anderson and Louis Althusser had locked
horns in a three-way theological rut that signalled the end of effective Marxist
scholarship in Britain, and invited the triumph, not of the New Left admired by
the New Left Review, but of the New Right. Thompson meanwhile went to
America to become the acceptable face of Jacobinism, which he had been all
along. Hobsbawm ploughed an increasingly lonely furrow between Budapest in
1956 and Prague in 1968. Establishment history belonged to Cambridge in the
second half of the 1960s, as it sometimes does, and revelled in what one
prominent Marxist called ‘a mood of denial’. 21

What the Cambridge school denied—the ‘Peterhouse school’ if one wants to
provoke—was the centrality of class conflict as a determinant of any political
argument in Britain. Against the Left it explicitly slapped the gauntlet of
evidence: which evidence, from whom, and in which context? Concentrating
on small periods that might yield to intensive chronological scrutiny, Maurice
Cowling and John Vincent, followed by a number of their sympathizers, brought
a withering intelligence to, and contempt for, the Left’s projects, and displayed
how one might construct an entirely different story out of the events of British
political history. A backlash came, of course, not in the denial of class but in the
denial of politics itself as the sole location of historical explanation, and that, too,
had a Cambridge root. Throughout the 1950s, the tussle between Butterfield and
Namier had at least kept the flame of ‘ideas’ burning because Butterfield rejected
with some violence Namier’s view that ideas visited themselves on individuals for
reasons that they themselves did not understand, and that played no serious part
in public behaviour. 22 From the end of the 1960s, that rejection reignited in the

21 Professor Royden Harrison in conversation with the author in 1969.
22 Butterfield’s most powerful attack may be found in his George III and the Historians (London,
1957), 193–299.
hands of a collection of formidable British scholars who would go on to transform the nature of intellectual history and its relation to political thought, no one more significantly than Quentin Skinner.23 From the moment that ‘Meaning and Understanding in the History of Ideas’ appeared in History and Theory in October 1969, Skinner’s intellectual power, historical imagination, and a philosophical grasp unusual in historians played over early modern thought and permanently shifted receptions of Thomas Hobbes by insisting that contemporary discourses made only fractured sense outside their temporal location and time-stained language. Simultaneously, the writing of a no less powerful New Zealander, J. G. A. Pocock, and the often polemical statements of Cambridge’s John Dunn, brought a new vitality to the history of thought, which the American Journal of the History of Ideas also encouraged.24 It mattered, however, that this strand of historical work should not present ideas as an optional bolt-on: it wanted to become part of its texture and central to its explanation. That impetus drove the early work of a Cambridge historian towards a Butterfieldian defiance of Namier on his own territory.25 Even Maurice Cowling, as though in expiation, turned away from the closed world of high politics after 1975 to write his extraordinary three volumes on the history of religion and its relation to public discourse in Britain since 1840.26 Historiography lost its political heat in tandem with students losing theirs. It became, like the universities that produced it, a quieter place.

Yet beneath the placid exterior a quiet stirring seems discernible in retrospect. The move toward a more anthropological vision of their subject moved some historians into broader channels of investigation. Medievalists, whom one often thinks of as the more conventional coterie among British historical professionals, felt the impress of imaginative thinkers such as Peter Brown27 and began, some of them, to sense the allure of things Parisian when voiced by writers of the stature of Georges Duby, Jacques Le Goff, and Emmanuel Le Roy Ladurie. The American anthropologist Clifford Geertz, who introduced the historically minded to cock-fighting in Bali as an example of ‘thick description’, turned himself


into a cult figure for a time.\textsuperscript{28} And although the wilder fringes of post-structuralism attracted little attention in Britain, it became a noticeable (and boring) feature of historical colloquia that the title of every contribution should contain a reference to discourse, mentalité, praxis, textuality, semiotics, and the ubiquitous, often meaningless, ‘culture’. No less persistent became the idea of ‘gender’, which eventually outgrew its origins in the history of women to assume a more sophisticated understanding of situations involving relationships between people of opposite or the same sex.\textsuperscript{29} Some of this broadening of perspective rested on a reading of serious epistemology in the writing of Hayden White and an array of theoretical articles published in \textit{History and Theory}, but in Britain not much of it did. Driving it instead was a form of unconscious fashion, with historians wanting not to appear inarticulate in the Newspeak coming out of France and the United States.

Closer to home, the Thatcher years engendered an English nationalism—or among intellectuals a dramatic reaction against one—but also a more significant identity crisis within ‘Britain’ as a whole. With whose ‘Britain’ did Scots, Welsh, and the Northern Irish wish to associate themselves? The years after 1969 saw deep unhappiness and violence in Northern Ireland; the period after 1995 brought the prospect of a devolved parliament for Scotland and Wales within the bounds of practical politics. Various pressures carried by these movements had an assumed historical basis, and the subject could no more escape those pressures than could the politicians confronting them. Yet crisis about ‘British-ness’ and the vitality of ‘British history’ as an idea emerged (again) not from London, nor even Edinburgh or Belfast, but from New Zealand after Pocock discovered himself dismayed by Taylor’s dismissal of Britain as a meaningless term in his contentious volume of the \textit{Oxford History of England}.\textsuperscript{30} Pocock responded in the first Beaglehole Memorial Lecture at the University of Canterbury in 1973 with a plea for reconsidering British history by conceiving it in fresh ways. In particular, Pocock called for a ‘plural history of a group of cultures situated along an Anglo-Celtic frontier and marked by an increasing English political and cultural domination’.\textsuperscript{31} A few years later he reiterated the theme in a more systematic statement that implied the need for a sort of English Annales, but one that understood the preeminence of political structures in explaining the British case. He dwelled on the British Isles as an ‘Atlantic archipelago’, and introduced British historians to the unsightly descriptor ‘archipelagic’.\textsuperscript{32}

\textsuperscript{28} For an introduction, see Clifford Geertz, \textit{The Interpretation of Cultures: Selected Essays} (New York, 1973).
\textsuperscript{29} The bibliography is now enormous, but for guidance consult the genre’s dedicated periodical, \textit{Gender History} (1989–).
\textsuperscript{32} Id., ‘The Limits and Divisions of British History: In Search of the Unknown Subject’, \textit{American Historical Review}, 87 (1982), 311–36, at 316, 318, 336.
They did not feel archipelagic. Pocock, as a self-proclaimed Pacific islander, had transferred his own thought-world from the territories of Australasia to the British Isles, but continued to beat the drum for his new vision of their history even as he entered on his heroic conversation with Edward Gibbon.33

In any case, he had touched an exposed nerve. A feeling of dejection, a sense of drift, marked the mid-1980s among those teaching British history, as funding for their subject shrank and the status of the subject contracted. David Cannadine caught the mood in a widely remarked meditation that located the problem in a desiccated over-specialization that produced more doctoral theses than challenging books for a wider readership.34 At just the same moment, Keith Robbins’s Ford Lectures in Oxford complained that ‘British writers, with rare exceptions, have not been seriously interested in interpreting Britain’, and he launched on a programme of attempted re-education that would take him through many publications that tried to draw attention to the interpenetration of Scottish, Welsh, and Irish history with the story of England.35 In each of those countries, scholarship advanced the case and rejected implications that these separate histories had some kind of subordinate status as a narrative supplementing more significant English stories. The timbre could be shrill when manifesto superseded moderation, but examples abounded of level-headed scholars trying to bring the British picture into an expanded frame. In deeply troubled Northern Ireland, the calming perspectives of J. C. Beckett showed what could be achieved.36 In Scotland, the medievalist Geoffrey Barrow showed sensitivity to the problem of comparison, while Christopher Smout widened the perspectives of Scottish economic and social history in his move towards a more environmental study.37 Wales found her inspired biographer and ambassador in the self-effacing scholarship of R. R. Davies.38 England responded less enthusiastically to the suggestion of an integrated British history, and syllabi continued to reflect a concentration on English history tout court. A significant exception arose in the later work of Conrad Russell, who thrust Scotland and Ireland to the centre of attention in his explanation of the origins of the English Civil War.39

33 Id., Barbarism and Religion, 4 vols. (Cambridge, 1999—).
And for early medievalists, the status of ‘England’ brought its own traditional problems, as did the relationship between the territories so named and the Continent—problems that absorbed the energies of a talented generation, including James Campbell and David Dumville, or those of younger stars in Simon Keynes and the tormented Patrick Wormald.

Fragmentation ran far beyond mere geography in the two decades after 1970. Doubts over what a British history properly comprised expanded into a wider worry about the subject itself, and what it might reasonably be made to yield. Positivism had at least the virtue of engendering enthusiasm in the search for new truths and fresh evidence ‘for their own sake’. The onset of a postmodern frame of mind undercut rational modes of approaching the subject and, by dwelling on ‘presentism’ (the degree to which any past can only reflect the present from which it is observed), contributed to an impatience with constitutional history and the history of the Church which still dominated teaching in the older seats of learning. Resistance to relativism remained: research training in method and the evaluation of evidence provided a barrier to suggestions gaining ground elsewhere that the very basis of the subject had been called into question. Few in Britain read Foucault, and still fewer believed what he said about history, since his own incompetence as an historian had become palpable. But his willingness to engage with dangerous topics—sexuality, the body, madness, power as a cultural formation, knowledge as its acolyte—these ideas percolated through the membrane that protected British historiography from those it thought unhinged, and over the next couple of decades a string of investigations showed in their subject-matter if not in their modes of treatment, some staining from postmodern assumption—not least from those who would have been astounded to make the connection. The present itself made a more obvious impact in its new politics and the multi-racial, multi-faith realities within which everyone now worked. Histories of the marginalized and dispossessed arose, not out of any Marxist analysis of class oppression, but rather from a softer culturalism that seemed to offer a way of keeping traditional methods while aiming them at new targets that had greater ‘relevance’—a poisonous word—in current perceptions of how the world worked. By the time Keith Jenkins produced his Rethinking History in 1991, sufficient substantive history lay ‘on the ground’ to make his contentions—crude and questionable though many of them were—seem more like conventional wisdom than a subversive manifesto.

The 1980s had seen some bewilderment in British history but also some inspiration toward widening the bounds of the subject’s focus. Above all a sense of history’s having a theoretical aspect reached at least the younger generation of researchers. This unradical conclusion did not always involve a response to the ‘linguistic turn’: it could draw on a sense that social anthropology had much to offer as a way into certain problems, especially in premodern history; it could reflect an awareness of sociology; it could amount to little more than a sense that The Times Literary Supplement now contained articles of a certain
elusiveness in reviews of historical writing. Quentin Skinner’s much-remarked collection of pieces on the return of ‘grand theory’ in the human sciences generally amplified this inner sense and confirmed the date of an important transition. Roger Chartier’s work on print and culture made its mark, particularly among early modernists, and nudged authors towards what later came to be thought of as the ‘cultural turn’ of the nineties. Even among the conventional, a statement from the magisterial Michael Oakeshott in 1983 left an impression, among those who could understand it, that postmodern views of historical knowledge were not quite as novel as they had been made to appear. It was, of course, possible to ignore all of this and keep one’s head down in pursuing the forms of historical scholarship that had remained unchanged since 1945, and the majority of the profession in Britain did so out of a discomfort about—often a contempt for—what was going on around them, with Young Turks among their colleagues and graduate students speaking a language that they struggled to comprehend. But as the wall came down in Berlin, and continents apparently moved closer, a resurgence of confidence in the importance of the subject brought some scepticism to receptions of Francis Fukuyama’s *The End of History and the Last Man* (1992) in the early nineties, and opened a decade of revived optimism in the potential of history as a crucial instrument of civilization.

If the ‘linguistic turn’ made only an oblique difference to how historical writing proceeded in Britain, its subversive successor, the ‘cultural turn’, achieved a greater presence. Two thoughts may be relevant to explaining this. First, an understanding of language as a determinant of historical construction had required a familiarity with leading notions of epistemology, and a theoretical temperament which those trained in an Anglo-Saxon environment tend to lack. Second, the subject matter of cultural history seemed more open to the deployment of a familiar range of methods to explore uncharted ground. Whatever ‘cultural history’ was, it did not require philosophical training to do it, and it promised to disclose worthwhile, tangible (and often saleable) results without the twisting of intestines associated with analyses of ‘discourse’. Again the stimulus came from beyond Britain during the 1980s in well-known works such as Robert Darnton’s *Great Cat Massacre* (1984) and Roger Chartier’s manifesto *Cultural History* (1988). They led to statements on both sides of the Atlantic that codified, to a degree, approaches to the subject. This Anglophone permeability makes it hard to distinguish specific sources of the cultural turn as a national trope, but we can see at once that from the late 1980s an explosion of books whose titles carried the subtitle that became as clichéd as ‘and society’ had been in the 1960s.

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‘A cultural history’ followed the colon, whether one were writing about the history of any nation (ubiquitous in the many studies of emerging Third World cultures) or about Britain where nationalist Scotland came in from the cold to join a nationalist England. It could be applied to Europe as a whole, or to a slice of it such as the French Revolution. It could explicate an educational structure or the effect of total war. But why halt at the conventional? By the onset of the millennium, the bookshops could offer a ‘cultural history’ of food, sacrifice, ghosts, noise, handwriting, drawing, ventriloquism, skinheads, popular television, Parisian fashions, horror movies, plastic surgery, senescence, and euthanasia. The impetus led, inevitably, to annual conferences, a new academic journal, and serious royalty payments for authors ready to communicate with the wider historical public. It did not produce, but was undoubtedly a feature of, the rise of the celebrity-historian on television confecting long series for large cheques. Little has happened since the mad race into print of the 1990s to alter this configuration, which looks likely to remain a permanent part of historical study in Britain.

But caution should enter at once. These enthusiasms have tended to capture a younger generation of scholars far more than the established and senior figures within the historical profession, apart from Keith Thomas, with his long-standing commitment to radicalizing the focus of historical work, Peter Burke, with his devotion to Lucien Febvre, and Stuart Clark, who has done more than anyone to bring the work of the Annales School as a whole before the British public. The nature of traditional historical education in Britain—its concentration on inculcating careful empirical enquiry resting on a scrupulous attention to sources and an ability to exercise Quellenkritik, cultivated in the university Special Subject and dissertation which still form the core of most British syllabi—conduces to a native, negative disposition: the ability to see what is wrong with any argument and an unwillingness to commit to an alternative. This mood corrodes all ‘theoretical’ or ‘abstract’ propositions more readily than it gives rise to them, and the new millennium has not witnessed, outside the new wave of universities established in 1992, a retreat from positions painfully evolved over 150 years of training and experience. Some have found this

resistance rebarbative, and have departed from Britain partly for that reason: one
thinks of Lawrence Stone, Geoffrey Barraclough, Peter Brown, Geoffrey Parker,
and Simon Schama. Turning to those who did not, and recalling prominent
historians who reached the peak of their powers during the period we have been
considering—scholars of the stature of Hugh Trevor-Roper, A. J. P. Taylor,
Lewis Namier, Herbert Butterfield, R. W. Southern, G. R. Elton, Patrick
Collinson, and Keith Thomas. What marks them out is the depth of their
scholarship and their ability to write attractive and elegant prose, rather than a
commitment to turning the world upside down.

PRESENT PREOCCUPATIONS

And now? To form an image of one’s own environment is a doomed project: the
horizons are too close. But the difficulties go deeper still. When The Times
Literary Supplement attempted a tour d’horizon of British historiography in 2006,
fifty years after the special number of 1966, it disappointed in its failure
to find coherence. It is easy to spot current enthusiasms and some separation
from what had gone before. In 1966, for example, a Companion to Black British
History would have seemed surreal, just as a book on Queer London or a lesbian
history of post-war Britain might have been considered improper.47 It is equally
clear that traditional subjects still prevalent in 1966 now survive as part of the
‘cultural history’ syndrome, be they diplomatic, constitutional, imperial, or
ecclesiastical. Two of them established journals as their curve turned down-
wards—never a good sign.48 A passion for ‘national identity’, probably in the
wake of the Soviet collapse in Eastern Europe and the Balkan ethnic cleansing of
the 1990s, introduced a pervasive, and often confused, theme. Yet more powerful
in the millennium is a lurch towards what might best be thought of as materiality.
The concept of ‘material culture’, originally an anthropological category, played
a strong part in confirming this sense, and a plethora of books and articles dealing
with the history of artefacts of all cultures and periods, and their symbolic
significance, has characterized recent years. Some penetration from the German
idea of Alltagsgeschichte may be taking place in studies of modern consumerism,
from the history of vacuum cleaners to narratives of cake-making and tea-
pouring. Two inescapable facts about the world’s situation have also intersected
with historical accounts, meanwhile, in the presence of globalization and
the overwhelming preoccupation with the natural environment. The former
has fused with the older notion of ‘world history’ pioneered in Britain by J. M.

47 David Dabydeen, John Gilmore, and Cecily Jones (eds.), Oxford Companion to Black British
History (Oxford, 2006); Matt Houlbrook, Queer London: Perils and Pleasures in the Sexual Metropolis
(Chicago, 2005); and Rebecca Jennings, Tomboys and Bachelor Girls: A Lesbian History of Post-War
Britain (Manchester, 2007).
Roberts in the 1970s, and has had some awkward encounters with modernization theory. Environmental history has established itself, though long after it became a feature of American writing, and it has seen both significant funding and the beginnings of a firmly grounded academic apparatus. Feminism, a feature of British concerns since the 1970s, has elided into gender studies and taken a less aggressive stance, in Britain at least, than once it did. Speaking more generally, in contradistinction to the 1990s’ feel of postmodern flights of fancy, the book catalogues at the time of writing (2008) communicate a return to a steadier analytical focus.

Perhaps two further elements in our present condition deserve remark for their distinctiveness. The communication of an historical message to a wider public through television and popular magazines such as History Today and the BBC History Magazine has awakened, or serviced, a manifest need for a view of one kind of past. It is often a traditional project that takes the viewer or reader through the history of kings and queens or, for the millionth time, through the narrative of Nazi Germany. Effective communicators of the stature of Niall Ferguson or David Starkey have made a difference that no cloistered academic could ever make, just as the publications of major historians such as Sir Ian Kershaw and Richard Evans in summoning up the horrors of the Third Reich have extended the reach of serious books to the reading public. History has moved to the front of the bookshop and attracts a clientele unthinkable in 1970. Why this should be so provokes a compelling train of thought but no obvious answer. Second, history has acquired, almost despite itself, the self-consciousness or reflexivity for which postmodern authors had clamoured through the 1980s and 1990s. Publishers advertise books on historiography, historical method, and the philosophy of history. That sense of history as a deliberate making of something on the historian’s desk—a sense felt deeply by Butterfield and Oakeshott and those who thought like them fifty years previously—now expresses itself in compulsory courses in the universities and styles of teaching in the schools. Not all of this development need command affirmation. One does indeed become tired, as Blair Worden said some years ago, of pupils who know that Christopher Hill was a Marxist, but know none of the dates of the Tudors. Dawn remains more uplifting than darkness, all the same, and the arrival of a moment when the study of historiography becomes seen as an avenue into history, rather than an optional adjunct to it, can only help shine light on the subject and keep alive its interest in the minds of young people who often find

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50 The bibliography for this theme is overwhelmingly American, but see B. W. Clapp, An Environmental History of Britain since the Industrial Revolution (London, 1994); and John Sheail, An Environmental History of Twentieth Century Britain (Basingstoke, 2002).
51 For Ian Kershaw, see references above. Richard J. Evans, In Hitler’s Shadow (New York, 1989); id., Rethinking German History (London, 1990); Lying about Hitler (New York, 2001); and id., The Third Reich Trilogy, 3 vols. (London, 2008).
these issues compelling. Its teaching and public promulgation may also minister
to a nurturing for future generations of the importance of historical argument,
as the politics of education in Britain subverts history as an academic discipline
and threatens its sacrifice on altars before which no thinking historian would
contemplate kneeling.

TIMELINE/KEY DATES

1945 First majority Labour Government is elected
1947 Independence of India and Pakistan
1963 Robbins Report recommends the expansion of universities
1968 March led by Tariq Ali and Vanessa Redgrave on the American Embassy in
Grosvenor Square in protest against the Vietman War
1969 Beginning of the Irish ‘troubles’
1973 Britain joins the European Economic Community
1979 ‘Winter of Discontent’; in May, Conservatives win the first of three consecutive
majority governments with Margaret Thatcher as Prime Minister enacting a
programme of neoconservative economic policies
1981 Irish prisoners’ hunger strike
1982 Falklands War
1984 Miners’ strike
1990 Margaret Thatcher resigns
1992 Creation of ‘new’ universities
1997 The Labour Party wins the first of three majority governments with Tony Blair as
Prime Minister heralding the age of ‘New Labour’
2001 Invasion of Afghanistan
2003 Invasion of Iraq
2005 Tony Blair resigns and is succeeded by Gordon Brown
2010 Inconclusive election result; formation of a coalition government

KEY HISTORICAL SOURCES

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Chapter 15
Scandinavian Historical Writing

Rolf Torstendahl

In the period since 1945, Scandinavian historical writing has completely transformed. Historiography has developed in closely related ways in the three Scandinavian countries: Denmark, Norway, and Sweden. The main periods are 1945–60, 1960–85, and 1985 until today, 2010. In the first period, old struggles were brought to an end. In the second, historical research as an individual undertaking was succeeded by large, collective projects on social history relying on sociological theory. In the third, still another enlargement of the field of history became evident, which created a new strain on the unity of the profession.

This chapter will follow common developments (with small variations) in the three countries of Scandinavia.¹ In Finland, historiography had close links to the Scandinavian countries but was only rarely written in Swedish and thus mostly inaccessible for Scandinavian researchers. Therefore it is not included here.

INSTITUTIONAL CONDITIONS AND CHANGES

Scandinavian historians have had a closer cooperation during the post-war period than earlier. One occasional general meeting of Nordic historians had already been held before the First World War, in 1905, and in the inter-war years six meetings were held. After the Second World War such meetings were held regularly every third year from 1948. There, Scandinavian historians—plus Finnish and Icelandic historians—have met and discussed problems of a common nature. More short-lived, but in their time very influential, were the Nordic Conferences for Historical Methodology that organized meetings at regular intervals from 1965 to 1989. These thematic meetings included Finns and, in their late phase, Icelanders. From the mid-1980s, inter-Nordic meetings of researchers on women’s history have been arranged. The academic communities

¹ The author is indebted to Jan Eivind Myhre (Oslo), Thorsten Nybom (Örebro), and Uffe Østergaard (Copenhagen), for their comments on a previous version of this chapter.
of the five countries have tended to grow together. However, with more intense international cooperation and the role of the European Union for funding research, the Scandinavian framework has become a limitation and not only an asset. Though still important for the historical outlook, Scandinavian themes are no longer setting the agenda for Scandinavian historians.

As in Europe generally, the great growth of university education came to Scandinavia in the 1960s. Suddenly not only a small part of the youth wanted to have a university education, but numbers that were earlier unthinkable registered at universities. This meant, among other things, that the number of universities grew, mostly through the foundation of a number of regional colleges or other institutions for the dissemination of academic education, and some of them later became regular universities. Thus, the number of professors and other academic teaching staff grew enormously. The discipline of history was affected by this growth, but the social sciences were still more expansive. Suddenly the Scandinavian countries, which used to have only a handful of top posts for historians in each country, had tens of professors and other high-ranking teachers (readers, and so on, who were gradually transformed into professors), in addition to the still rather few top-ranking national archivist posts and a few other posts in archival administration. The academic community grew, and the strictly hierarchical nature of this community gradually became less severe. Around the turn of the new millennium, debates on historical problems could include both professors and doctoral students on equal terms—something that was almost unheard of before the war.

THE PERIOD 1945–60

Disregarding the continued and firm influence of the generation that had dominated historiographical debate in Scandinavia before the war, we may discern a new generation of leading historians in the first decade and a half after the war. Their common characteristic is that they tended to continue the thematic concentration of the earlier generation on medieval and early modern political and economic history. In the three Scandinavian countries and also in Finland there were such historians active in the first two decades after the Second World War, whose ideas and writings were constantly referred to in the following generation. Some of them had started their career in the 1930s but rose to fame and influence after the Second World War or during the war years.

The Swede Erik Lönroth’s writings from the 1930s, mainly *Sverige och Kalmarunionen* [Sweden and the Kalmar Union] (1934), gave a new view of the struggles in late medieval Swedish society. For Lönroth, these fights were focused on the command of economic resources which gave power. The emphasis on trade and taxation indicates an influence directly or indirectly from Max
Weber, which he has also personally confirmed. Lönroth further developed such ideas in his equally influential examination of the connection between taxation and the formation of military resources in the High Middle Ages in Sweden. This struggle was expressed mainly in the competition for domination of state fortresses, their armed forces, and their provincial taxation rights.

For decades, Lönroth’s two early works were the obvious starting point for research on Sweden’s medieval power structure, for or against his analysis. Some other researchers worked closely in the same tradition with a power system analysis based on command of military and financial resources. Foremost among them was Sven A. Nilsson, whose most important monograph deals with the sixteenth-century tussle between kings and nobles about resources such as the command of estate and fiefdom (län) and the fulfilment of settled military duties. After 1955, Nilsson devoted his research mainly to the seventeenth century and applied his ideas of command over resources to the wars of Gustav II Adolf, Karl X Gustav, and Karl XI. With his disciples he started a comprehensive project on seventeenth-century society in Sweden, and he wrote a series of very influential articles on the struggle between kings and nobles in this century. Another Swede who started her work in the same tradition is Birgitta Odén. Her early research dealt with taxes, customs, and excises of the state, and the state expenses in the late sixteenth century. In two following books she reasoned in depth about the importance of state trade policies. Later she dropped the resource theme and reoriented her interests. Thus she has continued to play a great role as a leader of several important research projects on environmental questions, the place of the aged in society, and, not least, the development of historiography tracing and encouraging the influence of the Annales in Sweden.

In the years that followed the Second World War, Swedish historians were divided by deep differences of opinions on historical scholarship and historical understanding. Nils Ahnlund was then a leading intellectual in the direction of historical study that stressed empathy and continuity in the evaluation of past events and persons. Ahnlund’s thorough knowledge of the sources and his analysis of the politics of the seventeenth century were respected also by his opponents, among whom Lönroth and Nilsson were prominent.

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3 Erik Lönroth, Statsmakt och statsfinans i det medeltida Sverige (Stockholm, 1940).
5 Most of them are collected in På väg mot reduktionen: Studier i svenskt 1600-tal (Stockholm, 1964).
Through family connections Sten Carlsson had close ties to the camp that Ahnlund headed at the end of the war. He was the son of Gottfrid Carlsson, who had opposed Lönnroth in the 1930s and advocated an extreme nationalist standpoint. Sten Carlsson wrote works in the tradition of political history, but he also made himself known as a social historian through an innovative approach in his examination of estates and their importance, *Ständssamhälle och ständspersoner 1700–1865* [Estate-Bound Society and People of Rank] (1949). There he analyzed the dissolution of the estate-based political life and its social foundations. Using statistics to an extent that was new in history, he also examined how Swedish society had changed after 1866, and opened up new perspectives in pointing out the different conditions of unmarried women of all estates in Swedish society. His interest in social history made it natural for him to initiate and back up the collective research project on emigration that was performed by his disciples.

Like social history, economic history advanced in the first decade after the Second World War. The discipline produced new professors, and among them Artur Attman in Göteborg and Karl-Gustav Hildebrand in Uppsala led Swedish economic history down new avenues. Attman’s enquiry of the Russian market in the sixteenth century and Hildebrand’s history of the city of Falun and his studies of bank history inspired young researchers. Their joint work on the Swedish iron industry in *Fagerstabrükens historia* [History of the Ironworks of Fagersta] (5 vols., 1957–9), for which they wrote one volume each, set a standard for industrial history to the younger generation. Under the leadership of Lennart Jörberg, economic history in Lund slightly later created its own profile, concentrating on price history, indexed values, and the establishment of long trends in economic life.

In Denmark, as in Sweden, the decade after the war was dominated by discussions on the medieval and early modern history of the country. Aksel E. Christensen, whose book *Dutch Trade to the Baltic about 1600* (1940) had brought him into conflict with Astrid Friis, immediately after the war published his overview of Danish feudalism and its interrelation with Europe, *Kongemagt og aristokrati* [Kingdom and Aristocracy] (1945). In spite of initial criticism, it made a breakthrough for a new conception of Danish medieval society and its fundamental social development in the struggle for domination over military and financial resources. Christensen was engaged in European research development, and he criticized Fritz Rörig’s thesis on the foundation of Lübeck. Kristof Glamann is another trade historian whose *Dutch Asiatic Trade 1620–1740*

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8 Karl-Gustav Hildebrand, *Falu stads historia* (Falun, 1946); and Artur Attman, *Den ryska marknaden i 1500-talets baltiska politik 1558–1595* (Lund, 1944).

(1958) soon became a classic investigation of the trade relations between Europe and the Far East. Glamann also became very influential in Danish research policy through his longchairmanship in Carlsbergfondet, which is the most important Danish funding agency for research in the humanities.

In the period up to 1960 there was hardly any common discussion among leading Danish historians. Each of them fulfilled his or her own personal agenda. Fridlev Skrubbeltrang directed his interest to the lower strata of the Danish agrarian society from the seventeenth century to the inception of the nineteenth century in an innovative analysis, and continued to work with such matters over the coming decades. Povl Bagge was an influential editor of the Danish Historisk tidsskrift for a long period, and was deeply interested in historical theory and methodology. Niels Skyum-Nielsen started his career as assistant to Lauritz Weibull in editing Dansk Diplomatarium, which led him into questions of source criticism in medieval history, and he published new solutions to some of the most famous problems in Scandinavian medieval history. He also wrote his dissertation on the struggle within the Church in late thirteenth-century Denmark—another pre-war grand theme. But he reoriented his interests, and his book on medieval women and slaves was a break with tradition. In the last part of his career he developed new interests in media and their trustworthiness, and wrote especially on the manipulation of films and pictures. Skyum-Nielsen was not alone in devoting his scholarly ingenuity to the well-debated themes of medieval history. Svend Ellehøj wrote his doctoral dissertation on the most ancient Nordic history-writing. After this well-received work, he more often organized commissioned research in large groups—for example, the important history of the University of Copenhagen—than wrote investigations of his own.

It is striking that few Danish historians did work on the recent past in the first years after the war. The limited availability of written sources was regarded as utterly detrimental for such research. Therefore, Jørgen Hæstrup met distrust and criticism when he based vital parts of his doctoral dissertation on Danish occupational history on interviews. This meant an introduction of oral history to Denmark. The achievement was disputed among historians, and Hæstrup’s standing was based more on his popularity with students and disciples than on his authority among colleagues. The continuation of his occupational study was called Hemmelig alliance [Secret Alliance] (1959), which established his position as the expert on the occupation, and he was the self-evident leader of a collective project on Denmark’s experiences during the war years.

Contemporary history was also the subject matter of Sven Henningsen, whose dissertation was to be examined in Århus during the German occupation.

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10 Fridlev Skrubbeltrang, Husmænd og Inderste (Copenhagen, 1940).
11 Niels Skyum-Nielsen, Kvinde og slave (Copenhagen, 1971).
12 Svend Ellehøj, Studier over den ældste norrøne historieskrivning (Copenhagen, 1965).
Instead, he followed his professor to Gothenburg in Sweden and obtained his degree there. His reputation is mainly attached to organizational work. As professor of modern history and social science (moderne historie og samfunds-kundskab) in Copenhagen from 1953 he led the Institute for Contemporary History and Political Science in the 1960s, and was also one of the founders of the Institute for Foreign Policy (Udenrigspolitisk Institut, 1967), which answered to his own research interests. 14

In Norway the dominating historians in the period immediately following the Second World War were already known before the war. Three became very important because of their ideas and their specific agenda: Andreas Holmsen, Jens Arup Seip, and Sverre Steen. Holmsen devoted his research mainly to medieval Norway, and his concern was primarily demographic changes and their relation to geography. He also launched a specific method, which he called retrospective, using later material to throw light over earlier settlements and the cultivation of land. His methods were disputed, but from the 1940s on he gathered several disciples who formed a ‘school’ in using his methods for the investigation of Norway’s historical demography. His overview of Norway up to 1660 related structural data to political development. 15 Thus he connected the economic development of the agrarian society, which he based on the names of farmsteads, provincial laws, cadastres, and similar sources, to the rise of the kingdom and its political relation to the aristocracy and owners of large estates. It was bold and gave rise to enthusiasm, but also to severe criticism.

Before the war, the second of the three, Jens Arup Seip, was an historian of the medieval period, but became famous when he took up nineteenth-century studies after the war. Seip combined a sense of dramaturgy and stylistic refinement with a thorough analysis based both on psychology and the political system of rules and norms. For a long time he worked on a biography of Ole Jacob Broch but, in working with this main subject, he wrote a few other works which were related to it and to each other. 16 The change in Norwegian politics in 1880 was the subject of the first study of this kind. 17 Later he often published in the form of articles, such as the very influential (and debated) ‘Fra embedsmannsstat til ettpartistat’ (‘From Civil Servant State to One Party State’) from 1963. This article formed the basis of his book on the Norwegian right, which also included elements from another booklet of his on the history of Norwegian conservatism and its normative foundations. 18 Seip also wrote a very personal survey of Norway after 1814 (he actually only covered the period up to 1884)

17 Id., Et regime foran undergangen (Oslo, 1945).
18 Id., To linjer i norsk historie. Fra embetsmannstat till ettpartistat: Høyre gjennom hundre år (Oslo, 1987).

While Seip was preoccupied with the relation between psychology and morality, Sverre Steen’s approach led him to analyze the social economy. However, theoretical economics was not his focus, but rather the concrete contrast between one social culture based on direct use of natural and cultivated resources, and another based on trade and monetary exchange. He developed this thesis of Norway from the late eighteenth century to the middle of the nineteenth century in *Det gamle samfunn* [The Old Society] (1957)—volume 4 of his five-volume study, *Det frie Norge* [The Free Norway] (1951–62). For Steen and several other Norwegian historians, the conditions of the minor farmers in Norway’s valleys and inland is also related to local history and local self-government.

A new generation of Norwegian historians won their fame only after the war. Ingrid Semmingsen was the first woman to obtain a full professorship in Norway (in 1963). She is notable for her studies of Norwegian emigration to North America. This was not a spontaneous interest of hers. It started as a commissioned work for a society, *Nordmanns-Forbundet*, but grew into a lifetime interest, and resulted in a path-breaking monograph on emigration.¹⁹

Knut Mykland, Alf Kaartvedt, and Edvard Bull, Jr., also belonged to the new generation, though their active period continued well into the 1960s and 1970s. Mykland was primarily occupied with the development within the Danish-Norwegian realm that led to the secession of Norway to Sweden in the peace treaty of Kiel, and he argued that many Norwegians were mentally prepared for a break from Denmark even though few were actively promoting this. Kaartvedt’s main subject has been the development of Norwegian politics in the nineteenth century and the conservative resistance against parliamentarian rule, where he distinguished three main currents of the conservative movement, which he continued to analyze in several other books.²⁰ Edvard Bull, Jr., was a pioneering analyst of the working class and the workers’ movement in Norway. His thorough analysis of three industrial areas in his doctoral dissertation was followed by several minor investigations and a couple of surveys.²¹ He also served as a source of inspiration for many younger historians in the period of growing interest in materialist theory.

These first fifteen years of post-war Scandinavian historiography were mainly characterized by the continuation of pre-war debates and the consolidating of the type of professionalism that had become prevalent before the war. In Sweden, the disciples of the Weibull brothers prevailed, but their agenda eventually diverged from that of their teachers. Other issues came to dominate the professional arena.

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²¹ Edvard Bull, Jr., *Arbeidermiljø under det industrielle gennembrudd* (Oslo, 1958); and id., *Arbeiderklassen blir til* (Oslo, 1985).
This happened earlier in Denmark and Norway, where old struggles were finished when peace came. The new challenges that emerged were related to the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries and bore fruit in the next two decades: studies on social structures based on vast materials, studies on the working class, and studies of the war years.

**THE PERIOD 1960–85**

Up to the early 1960s history-writing had been mostly an individual undertaking. When research councils were instituted with the funding of the humanities as their objective, it was possible to create groups that were collectively funded for special research purposes. This institutional change had important effects on historical research. In Scandinavia it came first to Sweden where collective historical projects became very important during the period 1965–85. In Norway the situation was almost the same, though individual research had stronger spokesmen who pointed to alternatives. In Denmark the institutional change towards funding from sources external to universities was less dramatic, as external funding was mostly given to individual researchers.

Collective projects could take on bigger tasks than individual historians could master. The questions of social history asked for mass data, and the ambition became first to describe past social structures and then to explain changes in them. Researchers wanted to find models for the description of social structure and social change. The Swedish projects on ‘The Functions of the Swedish Class Society: The Popular Movements’ and ‘The Emigration from Sweden to North America’ (later renamed ‘The Migration Project’) and the Norwegian project ‘Norwegian Social Development, 1860–1900’ (in fact mainly dealing with developments in Ullensaker and Kristiania) were typical for this type of research. In these projects the participants struggled with the difficulty of finding parameters for comparing the social composition of the group they investigated with the population in general. Occupational titles, recorded in membership records or passenger lists, had to be compared to census material or official population records and finally translated into social stratification. All categories also tended to change over time. Sociologists had struggled with the same problems and served as a source of inspiration. The questions of structure led further into explanations of actions—joining an association or taking the step of emigration and so on. Then theories of ‘push and pull’ or ‘diffusion of innovations’ or ‘social mobility’ were used, as they had been earlier by economists and geographers. These theories were applied by Scandinavian historians, who also profited from more anthropologically and demographically oriented historical investigations by the German Arthur Imhof, the Frenchman Louis Henry, and the Briton Peter Laslett. The influence from American social history was strong for a period and, in particular, Stephan Thernstrom’s investigations of social mobility and social
segregation in Boston served as a paradigm. A Scandinavian source of inspiration was found in Ingrid Semmingsen’s studies of Norwegian emigration.

Quite a number of doctoral dissertations and (in Norway) **hovedoppgaver** were produced and published from these research projects. They made Scandinavian historians in general aware that quantitative analysis and its theoretical implications had to be taken seriously. Sune Åkerman, the leader of the emigration and migration projects in Sweden for a long period, was eagerly interested in the methods for the statistical measurement of social dimensions of migration. His close collaborator Hans Norman brought the methodological sophistication in relation to these fields to a peak in his dissertation on the emigration from the Bergslagen region. In Denmark, with only a few research projects with several collaborators, individual research was carried on along the same lines. Particularly notable are the detailed and sophisticated studies on demographical questions, including geographical mobility and social redistribution, which were carried out by Hans-Christian Johansen in Odense in Denmark. For many years Johansen served as a mentor for this type of research around the Nordic countries. On the basis of individual research, another Dane, Kristian Hvidt, produced an extensive dissertation on Danish emigration, which paralleled in several respects what was done in Uppsala.

Within the Swedish project on popular movements the same methodological questions arose as in the emigration project. The interest was more closely related to questions of class, which was the area where the project leaders Carl Göran Andrae and Sven Lundkvist had their own main interests. Bo Öhngren wrote one of the major works, which related class to geographical mobility. The level of statistical sophistication was less than in the migration project, but the relation to social theory seems to have been the same. However, when the project was drawing to its close, one of its researchers, Ingrid Åberg, presented some new dimensions to the theoretical framework. In a slim volume she approached the question of the political activities of the popular movements in a local arena from hypotheses derived from the work of American political science theorists such as Paul Bachrach, M. S. Baratz, and W. Kornhauser, along with influences from the

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27 Bo Öhngren, *Folk i rörelse: Samhällsutveckling, flyttningsmönster och folkrörelser i Eskilstuna 1870–1900* (Uppsala, 1974).
Norwegians Stein Rokkan and Stein Kuhnle. Åberg’s new orientation was absorbed and transformed into another theoretical structure marked partly by historical materialism in the works of Torkel Jansson, where the ‘voluntary association’ is specifically present and thoroughly analyzed.

In the Norwegian projects on Ullensaker and Kristiania a similar development from stratification to theoretically oriented problems took place. Like the Swedish emigration project, these projects were intensely preoccupied with stratification. One of the great problems here was to give a sense to the census data on nineteenth-century Kristiania (later Oslo). From an early date project members were also concerned with social change on a macro level. The change brought about in Norwegian society by the labour movement and industry was compared with the transformation from Gemeinschaft to Gesellschaft in Ferdinand Tönnies’s terms, related to the orientations towards ‘ascription’ and ‘achievement’ as defined by Talcott Parsons.

In a profound study, Jan E. Myhre brought the descriptive analysis of the expanding capital to a high degree of sophistication. He concentrated on a part of the city, dominated by workers, and studied its structural change over a rather long period. Two other works are also especially noteworthy. One is Tore Pryser’s thesis on the Thrane movement—a political left-wing movement in the early phase of Norwegian labour history. Pryser tried to form a theoretical connection between social structure and political behaviour, and to identify the political movement by its social characteristics. The project leader, Sivert Langholm, concluded his huge volume only in 1984. It presents a very refined effort to connect social elites and political elections in Kristiania in the middle of the nineteenth century. Though these studies implied the existence of a theory connecting social structure with political behaviour, the theoretical basis was only partly discussed explicitly.

Among Swedish historians, projects with a vast scope became very common around 1970. One such project, based in Lund under the leadership of Sven Tägil, investigated boundary conflicts in Europe and had a very pronounced theoretical orientation towards the social sciences. Another project combined the forces of three established researchers: Gunnar Eriksson, Nils Runeby, and Rolf Torstendahl. They took up the role of scientists and engineers in the

29 Torkel Jansson, Adertonhundratalets associationer (Uppsala, 1985).
32 Sivert Langholm, Elitenes valg (Oslo, 1984).
33 Sven Tägil et al., Studying Boundary Conflicts: A Theoretical Framework (Stockholm, 1977). Several empirical studies were published in the late 1980s and the 1990s.
Industrial Revolution, examining the content and ambitions of scientific and technical education, and the careers and mobility of engineers. 34

It also became more and more usual to try to establish Nordic networks, comprising the Scandinavian countries plus Finland and sometimes also Iceland, in order to form a basis for comparisons of developments in Northern Europe. Some of them dealt with medieval and early modern societies and, contrary to what was the case with the projects on nineteenth- and twentieth-century societies, they found inspiration more from continental historiography than from social science. One such project was called ‘The Seventeenth-Century Society’s which concentrated on the effects of warfare on the civilian society in this period. The project initiator, Sven A. Nilsson, gradually established contacts with researchers in Norway, Denmark, and Finland, with Øystein Rian, Erling Ladewig Petersen, and Nils Erik Villstrand as national organizers in these countries, to undertake the project’s investigation of war costs, financing procedures, administrative organisation, and burdens of the people comparable and understandable. 35

Another such inter-Nordic project was devoted to waste farmsteads in the Middle Ages with Erik Lönnroth and Eva Österberg as Swedish organizers, Jørn Sannes as the Norwegian, Svend Gissel as the Danish, Eino Jutikkala as the Finnish, and Björn Teitsson as the Icelandic organizer. The organizers edited a comprehensive volume on desertion and land colonization. 36 A third inter-Nordic project was devoted to the theme of central authority and local community in the eighteenth century, making comparisons of, among other things, institutions for poor relief and care for the aged in the eighteenth century in all Nordic countries, including Iceland. From all these projects emanated a stream of doctoral dissertations and, most often, also comprehensive summaries of the work done and the implications of the findings.

One more type of collective project must be mentioned. The years of the Second World War were the object of specific projects, not only in Norway and Denmark, which had been victims of German aggression and occupation during the period 1940–5, but also in neutral Sweden. The three projects worked in parallel processes, although the developments to be investigated were too different to be really compared. The Danish project with Jørgen Haestrup as organizer focused on Danish underground resistance; 37 the Norwegian project, with

34 Gunnar Eriksson, Kartläggarna: Naturvetenskapens tillväxt och tillämpningar i det industriella genombrottets Sverige 1870–1914 (Umeå, 1978); Nils Runey, Teknikerna, vetenskapen och kulturen: Ingenjörsundervisning och ingenjörsorganisationer i 1870-talets Sverige (Uppsala, 1976); Rolf Torstendahl, Teknologins nytt (Uppsala, 1975); and id., Dispersion of Engineers (Uppsala, 1975).
35 Hans Landberg et al., Det kontinentala krigets ekonomi: Studier i krigsfinansiering under svensk stormaktstid (Uppsala, 1971); Sven A. Nilsson, De stora krigens tid: Om Sverige som militärstat och bondesamhälle (Uppsala, 1990); and Erling Ladewig Petersen, Magstav och godskrig: Det danske ressourcefremgangen 1650–1730 (Copenhagen, 2002).
36 Svend Gissel et al., Desertion and Land Colonization in the Nordic Countries c.1300–1600 (Stockholm, 1981).
several different parts and Magne Skodvin in Oslo as coordinator, dealt in the main with warfare, fights, and occupational hardships; and the Swedish project, formally led by a triumvirate of chair holders but in reality by Stig Ekman in Stockholm, tried to research the social effects of warfare in local politics, administration, economy, and so on. A huge output of dissertations and other books resulted from these projects.

Besides the major and minor collective projects, quite a number of researchers produced their historical works on an individual basis. Some of the internationally most successful researchers of the period worked alone or in a loose collaboration with foreign researchers. Most prominent were Kåre Tønnesson, a Norwegian who contributed with a celebrated dissertation to the discussion in France on the French Revolution; Niels Steensgaard, whose investigation of the Asian trade routes soon became a cornerstone in the international literature on this theme; and Magnus Mörner, a Swedish specialist on Latin American social history. Of course, there were also many historians in all Scandinavian countries who wrote important works on the history of their own countries on such an individual basis. There is especial reason to mention one Norwegian, Francis Sejersted, who first reformed Norwegian economic historiography of the twentieth century by stressing the domestic market, and then turned to synthetic overviews of Norway’s modern history in certain opposition to previous authorities. Two Danes should also be mentioned: Niels Thomsen, who pioneered thorough historical press studies in Denmark, and Ole Feldbaek, whose economic analyses of Danish eighteenth- and nineteenth-century history produced many new perspectives.

At the same time as the collective projects produced an enormous harvest in the form of printed volumes of historical content, they were challenged from the view of historical materialism. Marxism in a strict sense was never very strong in Scandinavian historiography, but the revival of Marxist ideas in the late 1960s and the 1970s all over Europe of course came to Scandinavia and convinced some historians. They most often referred to themselves as historical materialists, not wanting to be mixed up with the specific brand of Marxism that was the authorized version in the Soviet Union. Some of them were openly critical of the

‘big projects’. Such projects were accused of being too empirical and devoid of a theoretical approach. Materialists had ‘the theory’ and could derive hypotheses from it in all situations.

The most ardent historical materialists among established historians were found in Denmark. They often devoted their energy to overviews where a new interpretation of well-known sequences of events or whole epochs constituted their own contribution to historiography. Danish Marxists had a stronghold in Århus. They dominated the journal Den jyske historiker, which was founded in 1969 for internal criticism, but was transformed in 1972 into a journal for theory of history with an openly Marxist agenda. Marxist historiography was also presented in the Danish Historisk tidsskrift.42

In Norway and Sweden it is difficult to know which historians regarded themselves as historical materialists, for the difference between them and other historians is often one of emphasis rather than of principle. They wrote important works, often on their own, even though they sometimes also belonged to collective projects. In Norway, Kåre Lunden was a prominent example of such historians, openly inspired by historical materialism but at the same time non-orthodox and debate-provoking in his reasoning about the social conditions of farmers and workers in the Norwegian countryside.43 In Sweden, Lars Herlitz, an explicit historical materialist, wrote an analysis of the Swedish rent and tax system in the eighteenth century.44 Other historical materialists include Christer Winberg, whose dissertation on population growth and proletarianization from 1975 was one of the door-openers for materialism, and Jan Lindegren, whose interpretation of the demographic consequences of Swedish warfare in the seventeenth century has been often cited.45 Several others participated in different collective projects and tried to influence the project leadership in a materialist direction. However, in the total output of historical literature, only a fraction can be classified as clearly using arguments of a blatant materialist character and drawing on materialist theory.

The interest in the role of material conditions brought about an interest in the workers’ movement and its struggles. The pioneering studies by Edvard Bull, Jr., were complemented by many others, out of whom the Dane Niels Finn Christiansen and the Swede Klas Åmark worked intensely with trade union membership, strikes, and struggles in the twentieth century. Åmark’s great

42 On Den jyske historiker, see Claus Møller Jørgensen, Historiefaget 75 år (Århus, 1904), 80, 117. For the Danish Historisk tidsskrift, see for example, the review by Niels Finn Christiansen in Historisk tidsskrift (Danish), 12:6 (1973), 535–50; and Benito Scocozza, ‘Den borgerlige revolution i Danmark i slutningen af det 18. århundrede’, Historisk tidsskrift (Danish), 84 (1984), 198–216.
43 For example, the ‘potato discussion’ in Historisk tidsskrift (Norwegian) (1978).
44 Lars Herlitz, Jordegendom och ränta: Omfördelningen av jordbrukets merprodukt i Skaraborgs län under frihetsstiden (Göteborg, 1974).
45 Jan Lindegren, Utskrivning och usugning:Produktion och reproduktion i Bygdeå 1620–1640 (Uppsala, 1980).
study of the limits of solidarity in trade unions sums up his and his disciples’ earlier research in the field, and adds new dimensions.\(^46\)

Thus, in the period 1965–85 research often took the form of collective projects. In the three Scandinavian countries, such projects were formed to deal with all sorts of matters. In many of them, methods from the social sciences were used, and theories from the social sciences, especially from sociology but also from political science, guided the posing of relevant questions. Many collective projects had an inter-Nordic facet, sometimes through parallel but not coordinated projects. Medieval and early modern historians who used this form would rather link up with continental historiography and its conceptual framework than with social science.

Historical materialists were critical of the sociologically inspired projects, but did, in fact, often share the theoretical ambition of the ‘big projects’, though with other basic assumptions. The influence of the ‘new left’ was marked in all three countries, but only in Denmark did its main spokesmen have their own agenda. In Norway and Sweden they were using their materialistic starting points as a means of reviewing questions that were being analyzed in ‘big projects’ and putting them in a new light. Thus the materialistic influence became more lasting and integrated in Norwegian and Swedish historiography than in the Danish one, where it faded away when the best known representatives for such views changed their standpoints after some years.

**THE PERIOD SINCE 1985**

The popularity of comprehensive collective research projects diminished in all three countries after 1985, though least in Norway. One important reason for the decline of big projects was the cost. Research councils and other funding agencies began to ask for limitations in the scope of projects in order to make it possible to finance more projects with different research objectives.

The sociological impact on history had been linked to big collective projects with wide-ranging databases. A new model was fetched from ethnology or social anthropology. Anthropologists were less inclined to make defined criteria their object of research, and much more often turned to situational research based on participant observation or similar sources. Using such research as a model, historians became historical anthropologists. Soft data from observations took the place of tables and diagrams in their research reports. One trail-blazer in this change was Bo Stråth, whose early studies on workers in the ship-building industry were sociological in their inspiration, but who later published widely on postmodernism and its implications for historical research, beside his works

Another trail-blazer was Uffe Østergaard, who made himself known in the 1970s as an ardent historical materialist of the group around *Den jyske historiker* in Århus, but changed his approach and became a very active debater of national identity and aspects of European culture in a great number of articles in journals and anthologies.

The cultural turn of historiography was, of course, no invention by Scandinavian historians. Some of the historians of the Annales group in France had been early users of such approaches, especially in regard to mentalities. Generally, the specific history of mentalities came late and was never written about frequently in Scandinavia, but Eva Österberg in Lund has developed several themes in this direction—for example, on silence and on friendship. It was also possible to find models in German (*Alltagsgeschichte*) and Italian (microhistory) historical writing. Scandinavian historians drew from all these sources and from the traditions of understanding and empathy.

In the last twenty to twenty-five years, Scandinavian historiography has often been preoccupied with the history of cultural patterns and mental constructs, and then with throwing light upon the thinking and psychology of former generations, rather than with uncovering their material conditions. Social unrest and relations between groups in big factories have been the starting-point for analyses of the view of the oppressed, and ‘the Other’ has been a frequent metaphor. Small universes such as secluded early modern villages or nineteenth-century industrial plants have been examined as to the pictures the different members of such milieu had of each other. In short, a mentality approach has been fruitfully applied to different sorts of topics, and the researchers who have done this have strived, not primarily to do something quite original, but rather to be participants in an international community of researchers. Frequently, mentalities have been extended into the history of ideas, politics, or the Other.

Two thematic fields have grown extensively during the last twenty years—fields that were earlier far less influential: women’s history and biography. The field of women’s history and gender history is by far the most expanding field, and has vitalized all earlier fields of research. There has been a lively debate on women’s history in all the Scandinavian countries and in their historical journals. The *Historisk tidskrift* (Swedish) had special issues on women’s history in 1980, 1987, and 1992. Ann-Sofie Ohlander, who was one of the editors of the first special issue, was the driving force of women’s history in Sweden for a long time. She studied female pioneers and their achievements, and also many aspects of female life and its relation to politics. However, gradually the Swedish focus

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shifted from women’s history to gender history, to a large extent depending on
the influence of Yvonne Hirdman, who has made ‘the gender contract’ a
programme.\textsuperscript{50} Many historians utilized gender theory, and an important
model for others was Christina Florin’s dissertation on gender struggles in the
teaching profession.\textsuperscript{51}

A female historical perspective on history was by no means only a Swedish affair.
Nordic historians dealing with women’s history have, since the 1980s, gathered in
meetings on women’s history. If there is a difference between Scandinavian
countries, it may be that the difference between women’s history and gender
history was primarily a Swedish affair. This does not mean that female researchers
on women’s history, such as Gro Hagemann from Norway and Bente Rosenbeck
from Denmark, were less articulate in the other countries. Hagemann wrote a
dissertation on the formation of low-paid occupations during industrialization,
and gender differences in that process—a theme that she further developed in a
later book.\textsuperscript{52} In many articles and chapters in books she has developed her views on
the historical discrimination against women in Scandinavia. Bente Rosenbeck has
an approach more akin to history of mentalities. Her dissertation was published as
*Kroppens politik: om kön, kultur och videnskab* [The Politics of the Body: Sex,
Culture and Science] (1992), and she has approached the topic of femininity and
its role in several variations—for example, in a book on the female sex as a key to the
history of modern womanhood.\textsuperscript{53}

Women’s history and gender history have come to play vital roles in the
development of historiography in Scandinavia. The theme has been applied to
the female heroines of the Icelandic sagas, to early modern judicial practices, to
the division of labour in eighteenth-century protoindustry, to the rise of women’s
medicine as a medical speciality, to twentieth-century citizenship, and so on. In
spite of this applicability it has continued to be a field of its own. Like more
esoteric fields that have come up recently, women’s history is not firmly
integrated with an historical tradition in Scandinavia, in spite of its success. In
many ways it has formed a tradition of its own.

Biography is a second field that has received new attention, though biographi-
cal approach \textit{per se} is not new. For a long time such works were rather like
monographs, showing specific traits of a political or administrative sequence of
events through a person, than biographies in a strict sense. Since the 1980s, the
interest in biography has grown enormously, both on the book market and in
scholarly circles. In 1992 the value of biography was challenged in a discussion
that took place in the Danish *Historisk tidskrift*, where one of the professors in

\textsuperscript{50} Yvonne Hirdman, \textit{Genus: Om det stabiltas föränderliga former} (Uppsala, 2001). See also Ch. 7 by
Julie Des Jardins in this volume.
\textsuperscript{51} Christina Florin, \textit{Kampen om katedern} (Umeå, 1987).
\textsuperscript{52} Gro Hagemann, \textit{Kjønn og industrialisering} (Oslo, 1994).
\textsuperscript{53} Bente Rosenbeck, \textit{Kvindekøn: Den moderne kvindeligheds historie 1880–1980} (Copenhagen,
1987).
Copenhagen, Niels Thomsen, vigorously attacked a biographical dissertation in an article with the title ‘The History of Miss Zahle—Is That History?’ The author, Birgitte Possing, answered, and a debate ensued and was taken in different directions. There was less of a discussion in Sweden and Norway, but biography was confidently launched as a new and rewarding sub-discipline with rare contradictions.

It is notable, however, that many professors who were appointed around the turn of the present century have been modestly engaged in the turn towards cultural history and mentalities. While a few examples will not establish any definite argument, it will be useful to give a substantiated impression of the type of research that is presently up to date, even though such examples are not as yet typical. Let us therefore take a somewhat closer look at the research of three professors, appointed in 1994, 2001, and 2002.

Kristine Bruland has been a professor at the University of Oslo since 1994. She published a widely observed book, *British Technology and European Industrialization: The Norwegian Textile Industry in the Mid-Nineteenth Century* (1989) after receiving her Ph.D. at Oxford. Her research has continued to be concentrated on technology and its transfer, and she wrote a chapter in *The Cambridge Economic History of Modern Britain* titled ‘Industrialisation and Technological Change’ (2004). She also edited, together with Maxine Berg, an anthology called *Technological Revolutions in Europe* (1998) in which she wrote on ‘Skills, Learning and the International Diffusion of Technology’. Another volume that she has edited is entitled *Essays on Industrialization in France, Norway and Spain* (2005). She has been called upon as an expert by the European Union and others who want to learn about the field of technology transfer, conversion, and innovation. She has also written on ‘Education’ in *The Oxford Encyclopaedia of Economic History* (2003), and is redirecting her interest towards technological education from technological transfer. She is presently on leave from Oslo at the University of Geneva.

Maria Ågren was appointed professor at Mitthögskolan in 2001 and became professor at the University of Uppsala in 2002. She wrote her dissertation on landowning and debts in Sweden in the period 1650–1850, where juridical conflicts play a central role. She continued by taking up a specific institute of law, the ‘right by custom from times immemorial’, in her next book. In both these investigations the rights of women to ownership of real property was

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57 Ead., *Att hävda sin rätt: Syren på jordägandet i 1600-talets Sverige, speglad i institutet urminnes hävd* (Stockholm, 1997).
a sub-theme, developed further in her contribution to a book edited together with Amy L. Erickson, and in a later monograph. Her ongoing project, established through a substantial grant for her personally by the Wallenberg foundation, is on gender and work from 1500 to 1800, and within the network of this project are several American and European historians.

Gunner Lind became professor at the University of Copenhagen in 2002. He has published widely on different subjects, primarily from the early modern period. The organization of war-making is one topic on which he has published many articles, not only on Danish military matters but with a wider perspective. State-building processes and elites in the seventeenth century are his other research themes on which he has published articles. His research on these fields is published both in Danish and in other languages—primarily English but, in his early career, often in publications from the Netherlands, Poland, or other countries of Europe. He stresses that he also has the theory of history as one of his interests.

One point that is illustrated by these three examples is that for present-day historians in Scandinavia their country of origin often only serves to provide an empirical basis for their orientation towards specific problems of a general validity. They tend to seek collaborators from other countries, and then not only from the Scandinavian countries, in order to analyze more freely such processes and developments of the past that they find especially interesting. They may transfer their interests to similar social preconditions in other countries, and their orientation is primarily toward a type of problem in a given period. Thus, present-day Scandinavian historians are often preoccupied with clarifying patterns of behaviour in the past, rather than with singular events or with writing the history of their country.

CONCLUSION

The writing of history in Scandinavia has undergone many transformations during the last forty-five years. It seems inevitable to draw the conclusion that there is no common canon of historical problem-solving that is guiding historians in the entire period. While the first post-war fifteen years were mostly a continuation of the kind of historiography that had dominated before the war, the next twenty-five years saw quite new trends inspired by sociology, and Marxism become prominent. During the final years, different trends, such as

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the history of mentalities, historical anthropology, women’s and gender history, biography, and so on, have become dominant, and the links to a pre-war tradition are now almost imperceptible.

It is apparent that the coherent historical vision that still dominated in the first generation of historians after the Second World War has been dissolved during the last forty-five years. The ambitions to write comprehensive histories of what happened to a country during a given period of years no longer exist. The widening of the subject matter of history that became apparent in Scandinavia in the 1960s has gradually increased. Historians work in different fields, especially since the middle of the 1980s. They no longer have the same references in reading or theory.

Some of the new trends, such as gender studies, might serve as a form of bridge-building between social, cultural, economic, and political specialities. But there is hardly any sign that any such integration has been realized so far. The history of historiography is a link between specialists in a discipline with great difficulties of internal coherence. In Scandinavia, as in many parts of the world, the history of historiography has thus become a field of research of increasing importance. However, no well-established interpretation of the developments in recent years exists.

Historians of the Scandinavian countries not only followed the main trends in European historiography, but adapted them to the particularities of their countries and, in some cases, developed them further. Even though no major trends originated from Scandinavian historiography, historians in these countries were creative users and innovators within existing frameworks. New ideas are generally produced through new combinations of old elements. Scandinavians were good at producing such combinations that suited their historical work, and also received recognition from collaborators in other countries.

TIMELINE/KEY DATES

Denmark

1945 End of German occupation; Liberals win first post-war elections
1949 Denmark is one of the signatory powers of NATO
1953 New fundamental law with (among other things) female right to inherit the throne
1962–8 Jens Otto Krag’s first of two Social Democratic governments
1973 Denmark joins the European Community (later the European Union)
1973 First electoral success for the populist right-wing party (continued into the new century)
1979 Greenland acquires self-government and leaves the EC in 1985, still united with Denmark
The publication of caricatures of the prophet Muhammad in a Danish newspaper creates a wave of Islamic repugnance to Denmark over the world.

**Norway**

- **1945** End of German occupation; Social Democrats (Arbeiderpartiet) win election with a majority
- **1949** Norway is one of the signatory powers of NATO
- **1965** Election of a non-socialist majority in Stortinget and a non-socialist government
- **1970** Oil deposits found in the Atlantic at the Norwegian coast
- **1972** A referendum declines membership in the EC
- **1986** Gro Harlem Brundtland (Arbeiderpartiet) Prime Minister for the first time
- **1993** The Oslo Accords lay the basis for the Palestinian National Authority
- **1994** A second referendum turns down EU membership once more
- **2005** Jens Stoltenberg (Arbeiderpartiet) forms a coalition government with two other parties

**Sweden**

- **1945** Wartime broad coalition replaced by a pure Social Democratic government
- **1974** New constitution, which abolishes almost all power held by the monarch
- **1976** First non-socialist government since 1936
- **1982** Return of Social Democrats to government
- **1986** Murder of Prime Minister Olof Palme
- **1993–2006** Social Democratic governments, the longest one with Göran Persson as Prime Minister
- **2003** In spite of support by the government for a ‘yes’ vote, a referendum says ‘no’ to the Euro
- **2006** Another non-socialist coalition government under Fredrik Reinfeldt, conservative

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Chapter 16
Italian Historical Writing
Stuart Woolf

UNIVERSITIES AND RESEARCH CENTRES

The traumatic end of fascism, with Nazi occupation and civil war (1943–5), followed by a referendum that expelled the Savoy monarchy in favour of a republic (2 June 1946), inevitably had a direct impact on historical writing in Italy. This was apparent above all in the content and direction of research, but the organizational location of research merits a brief comment.

University structures and academic posts in Italy, as in most continental European countries, have always been directly subject to ministerial authorization and funding. In consequence, the institutional organization of historical research decreed by Giovanni Gentile and Gioacchino Volpe in the 1930s, above all the specification of academic fields and chairs in universities and privileged centralized research institutes, remained unchanged in post-war Italy. ‘The torpor of institutions’, the telling title of an article as late as 1984, remains appropriate to the present day.1 Academic historians were acutely conscious of their relative weakness in power relations within universities and organized themselves (ineffectively) as a pressure group through the creation of a Society of Italian historians.2 Their self-image and exclusive corporative sense effectively inhibited interaction with the wider world of school teachers, non-professional authors, and the history-reading public, such as existed in Britain and the United States with the Historical Association and the American Historical Association.3 Above all, tenure in university careers signified that established practices of history-writing—erudite narratives of national history studied mostly in the localistic context of a city or pre-Unitarian state—remained dominant long after the gradual entry of the new generation of social historians that began in the 1960s. In 1968, Arnaldo Momigliano, professor of ancient history at

3 In contrast to the Italian Society of Female Historians, founded in 1991.
University College London, commented negatively on the complacent and uncritical provincialism of Italian historians, who completely ignored international historiographical debates. Contemporary history, including fascism, was regarded with suspicion. It is emblematic that, in response to widespread political concern over the visibility of neofascism in the 1960s, public lecture courses of contemporary history, that attracted in particular the young generation, involved academic historians but were held outside the universities.

In 1945, in Italy as elsewhere in continental Europe, the end of censorship and sense of freedom was expressed in a ‘hunger for culture’, particularly among the younger generations. As Gaetano Arfè recalled: ‘We read like desperados, exchanging ideas and books, communicating our respective discoveries like explorers entering unknown lands, discussing and quarrelling. It was the most intense intellectual season of my life.’ The numerous studies of major historians and publishing houses—an important theme in Italian historiography of recent decades—make it possible to identify the multiple locations, forms, and themes of historical writing that were established in the early post-war years and were to remain influential into the 1970s. The political and ideological claims of fascism, as of other twentieth-century dictatorial regimes, had strongly influenced the orientation of historical research, particularly in the 1930s. The humiliating end of fascism and the monarchy discredited, for a generation and more, some of the central themes of Gioacchino Volpe’s direction of historical research during the regime—strongly nationalist, with a particular concern for Italian foreign policy—to which Volpe attributed primary importance as the formative expression of national unity.

Within the universities a number of Volpe’s former protégés offered guidance as established professors to a younger generation through their courses and seminars. There can be no doubt about the cultural impact of the war and the disastrous collapse of fascism and the monarchy in making these historians rethink previously unquestioned assumptions and investigate new fields: Delio Cantimori, a historian of ideas, fascinated by Counter-Reformation heretics and revolutionary Jacobins, had already turned to a systematic study of Marx before the war; Federico Chabod, before joining the Resistance movement, delivered a course in Nazi-occupied Milan (1943–4), vindicating the liberating idea of the nation and Europe in the nineteenth century; Carlo Morandi turned to the centrality of political parties and socialism in the history of unified Italy. The recent accessibility of the personal papers and correspondence of these historians, as of anti-fascist historians who returned from exile, such as Gaetano Salvemini...

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and the young Franco Venturi, often enriched by the personal memoirs of their former students, have rendered evident the importance of the training they provided, not just in the rigorous philological and contextual use of sources, but in widening perspectives through the renewed contacts with foreign historical writing, and (most important in a highly politicized country) in ensuring that the choice of themes close to political party loyalties should not condition the objectivity of historical research and writing.

Many of these historians had spent a training period abroad, usually in (pre-Nazi) Germany. Their research experience extended to the major European libraries and archives, and their cultural horizon was European. Chabod, whose primary research was on the administration of Spanish Lombardy, had spent periods working in the archives at Simancas. As editor of the Rivista Storica Italiana, he gave high priority to reviewing foreign historical works. For Momigliano, the end of the culturally long-dominant presupposition of a particular tie between German and classical Greek culture opened new research perspectives, particularly the methodological contribution of material sources collected by antiquarians. Venturi had been educated in Paris and, before joining the Italian Resistance movement, had already published his first book on the young Diderot. As Italian cultural attaché in the Soviet Union in the early post-war years he had pursued research and published what remains the standard work on the Russian populist movement, from Herzen to the assassination of Alexander II. Venturi’s lifelong work was on the Italian Enlightenment, studied through individual biographies of eighteenth-century reformers and utopians, that culminated in a multi-volume history that spanned Europe, from Spain to Russia, of the varying influence of the new ideas and political ideals on the reforms in different states.⁷

Outside the universities, an increasingly rich network of non-academic cultural organizations, publishers, political parties, and journals were important as autonomous bases in terms of research possibilities and collaborative initiatives. Publishers saw their role as a ‘public service’ to orient the Italian educated public, initially by translating foreign historians, by the 1970s through ambitious collective works such as the highly successful multi-volume Storia d’Italia [History of Italy] (6 vols., 1972–6) published by Einaudi. Older anti-fascist publishers, such as Laterza and Einaudi, were joined by many new ones, all of whom relied on intellectuals and academics as their advisers. Chabod, Cantimori, Venturi, and the communist intellectual Antonio Giolitti were responsible for Einaudi’s ambitious programmes of foreign historical studies, initially mostly French (Marc Bloch, Lucien Febvre, and Fernand Braudel, Jacques Le Goff, and the Annales School, with particular attention to French Revolution historians, such as Georges Lefebvre and Albert Mathiez), and subsequently

English, German, and Polish historians; and in the 1960s il Mulino published a series on American history. Few countries can have translated so many foreign historical works, chosen with the deliberate intention of introducing particular themes and methodologies.

Alongside such culturally committed publishers, research institutions with specialized libraries and archives, created and funded by independent entrepreneurs and political parties, emerged as focal points of new fields of research that were to widen and challenge the traditional liberal history of Italy. The most important foundations—the Feltrinelli Library and Institute, the Gramsci Institute of the Italian Communist Party, the Basso Foundation, the Sturzo Institute, close to the Christian Democrat party, and the National Institute for the History of the Resistance movement—encouraged research in areas previously neglected in the traditional Italian historical narrative. These institutes, independent of the universities (although later closely tied to university professors), functioned as a training ground and springboard to academic posts for the younger generation; and individual and group research on local case studies was strongly oriented towards the history of the popular classes, factory workers, and peasants. Conceptually, the contributions towards interpretations ‘from below’, strongly influenced by Antonio Gramsci, remained within the parameters of political history, in some respects a mirror image of the dominant political-institutional history of Italy that they challenged through their concentration on organizational structures (unions, political parties, Catholic associations). But such centres played a significant role in developing direct and strong links with historical research in other countries.

POLITICAL COMMITMENT AND HISTORICAL RESEARCH

Before and during fascism, historical writing had been conditioned by an underlying philosophical grid of idealist historicism propounded (despite their opposed political roles during fascism) by the two leading Italian intellectuals, Giovanni Gentile and Benedetto Croce. The latter’s ‘ethical-political’ approach to history (analogous in its optimism to the English whig interpretation) privileged the achievements of unification and the liberal ruling class. The posthumous publication of the reflections on his readings of the intellectual communist party leader Antonio Gramsci, during his long years in fascist prison, proposed alternative conceptual approaches to the optimistic inevitability of the victory of the liberal ‘bourgeois’ nation. These were scientifically significant and had a direct and strong link with historical research in countries other than Italy.

8 Croce’s Institute for Historical Studies at Naples, the first history postgraduate school in Italy, directed by Chabod and later by Romeo, remained within the established liberal interpretative mould of historicism, with primary emphasis on sources and methodology.

9 Historicism, intimately related to idealistic philosophy, interpreted historical reality as consisting of individual, unrepeatable expressions of universal values specific to each nation and period.
implicit in Croce’s historicism. Gramsci’s analyses, although primarily concerned with Italy, are in the grand tradition of pre-1914 Marxist European social democracy, in which class-based historical interpretation over the long term possessed a cultural value in its own right, as well as providing depth of analysis to the contemporary political struggle. For Gramsci, in his powerful and original interpretation of the Risorgimento and the flawed process of Italy’s unification that conditioned the successive history of united Italy as a ‘passive revolution’, the French Revolution provided a constant point of reference: the Italian democrats had lacked the courage of the Jacobins to support the peasants’ hunger for land, which would have enabled them to prise open the ‘hegemony’ of the traditional landed class; the ‘historic bloc’ of industrial capitalists with southern landowners then distorted unified Italy’s political and economic development.

It would be difficult to exaggerate the pervasive influence of Gramsci’s analyses as guiding indicators of fields and interpretative schema of historical research and writing in Italy, at least until the 1970s. It led not only to a political-institutional history of modern Italy interpreted through the perspective of the economic and social conditions of the subordinate classes, alongside their political organizations, but to the study of agriculture, economic growth, the problematic backwardness of the Mezzogiorno (southern Italy), and the difficult consolidation of a national identity. As Giorgio Candeloro wrote in the preface to his multi-volume history of Italy:

Gramsci’s thought offers a precious guide for the study of the internal contradictions of Italian society and of the repercussions on it of the general development of Europe and the World. It gives extremely useful indications for research; but it cannot and must not be considered simplistically as a scheme to be applied in order to resolve all the complex historical problems that confront the researcher.

*Studi Storici*, the Marxist historical periodical founded by Gastone Manacorda in 1959, immediately established a justified reputation through the Gramscian themes that distinguished it from the *Rivista Storica Italiana* directed successively by Chabod and Venturi. The political involvement in the Italian Communist Party of many Italian historians certainly influenced their choice of themes, as for example in Manacorda’s exemplary reconstruction of the crisis of the Italian state in the 1890s, or Ernesto Ragionieri’s model social-political study of socialism in a small Tuscan town and subsequent research on German social democracy. But

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10 Gramsci died in prison in 1937. Einaudi published Gramsci’s *Quaderni* [Notebooks], grouped by themes, between 1947 and 1951; a critical philological edition was published in 1975.


their publications remained independent of party pressure, at most responding, by research on the past history of the popular classes, to Gramsci’s insistence on the responsibility of intellectuals to establish a cultural hegemony. Nor was this particular to communist historians: Gabriele De Rosa’s researches on intransigent Catholic associationism in unified Italy and the Italian Popular Party offered an historical dimension to Christian Democrat populist success.

It would be misleading to ignore the close tie between party political identification and historical writing. Inevitably it was particularly evident for the period since unification, not least because of the cultural importance attributed to Italy’s history by its political class. The political divisions in the 1950s between the communist and socialist parties and intellectuals further to the left were reflected in the deeply researched and sharply disputed interpretations of working-class history and organization since unification in the short-lived periodical Movimento Operaio (1949–56) that led to its closure with the crisis of the left following the Soviet invasion of Hungary. Such militant politicized history, seen by its extreme left-wing exponents as a tool to understand the current class struggle, was again apparent in the tense political climate of the 1970s following the student protests of 1968–9, but by then already appeared marginal in the broader context of the shift towards social history. In general, the best histories of political parties or biographies of their leaders gave a cultural depth to contemporary political history through a contextualization that could challenge current party orthodoxy. Few countries can vaunt such major multi-volume scholarly works by historians of very different political ideologies, as Candeloro’s history of nineteenth–twentieth-century Italy, Venturi’s European Enlightenment, Rosario Romeo’s biography of Cavour, and Renzo De Felice’s biography of Mussolini.

The well-established Continental tradition of master–student academic relationships led to the multiplication of ‘schools’ of history that left an important imprint on Italian historiography. Such schools were less institutional than that of Volpe, but distinctive in their explicit or underlying political commitment, such as the liberal interpretation of the Risorgimento of Romeo, Ragionieri’s Gramscian Marxism, and Venturi’s conviction of the importance of reforming intellectuals. It is important to note that this could also have led to the introduction into Italy of new areas of research: Ragionieri broadened the study of Italian

13 Gastone Manacorda, Crisi economica e lotta politica in Italia, 1892–1896 (Turin, 1968); and Ernesto Ragionieri, Un comune socialista: Sesto Fiorentino (Rome, 1953).
14 Gabriele De Rosa, Storia del movimento cattolico in Italia (Bari, 1966).
socialists through their links with German social democracy; Romeo, as an anti-Marxist historian, introduced Alexander Gerschenkron’s comparative approach towards economic growth into Italy, against Gramsci’s thesis of the historic bloc of southern landowners and northern industrialists, by arguing that an agrarian revolution with peasant fragmentation of property would not have allowed the capitalist accumulation necessary for industrialization; and Giuliano Procacci, noted for his writings on the role and usages of Machiavelli in European culture, radically changed his research field and teaching to the study of the Soviet Union, into which he inducted a younger generation.  

SOCIAL SCIENCES AND ITALIAN HISTORIOGRAPHY

The impact of the social sciences on historical writing arrived late in Italy. Croce had famously dismissed them alongside other ‘pseudo-concepts’, and historicism provided the conceptual framework of Gramsci’s implicit dialogue with Croce. The entrepreneur Adriano Olivetti was alone in offering research possibilities to the first generation of young sociologists through his cultural foundation and publishing house, Comunità. For economists, sociologists, and political scientists, postgraduate training in Britain and the United States was an obligatory passage; less so for anthropologists who followed in the wake of Ernesto de Martino’s path-breaking research on southern Italian folklore. The dominant models of political-institutional and Gramscian-inspired historical writing discouraged intellectual exchange with social scientists, with the partial exception of economic historians. At the international congress of historical sciences held at Rome in 1955, the proposition of the French Marxist Ernest Labrousse, that it was time to study the social history of the bourgeoisie independently of their political and class role, was criticized by Italian Marxist historians as not relevant to the national historiographical debate. At the political-institutional level, the Italian university system, compared with other Western democracies, responded tardily to academic (and discreet international) pressure to introduce social sciences. The first chairs in sociology were authorized in 1962, and the handful of political science faculties of the fascist period only became established generally in Italian universities from the later 1960s.

It is evident that despite such institutional constraints, the post-war generation of Italian historians was participating actively in Western historical debates by the 1960s and had begun to extend the areas of research to economic and


18 Ernesto de Martino, Magia e civiltà (Milan, 1976).
social history. Economic history in Italy, as in other Western countries, was already well established, particularly for the medieval period, with scholars like Gino Luzzatto and Armando Sapori of international repute. What was new was the comparative analytical and theoretical framework of economic growth of the American school of historians, such as David Landes and Alexander Gerschenkron, in which to pose the longstanding question of the anomaly of Italy’s rapid but geographically distorted industrialization.

Italian historians have always been extremely open to the stimulus of foreign historiography, even though few of the first post-war generation studied abroad (unlike their social science compatriots). Initially they were attracted for the most part by Braudel and his Ecole Pratique at Paris. From Bloch and Braudel to Le Goff and Christiane Klapisch-Zuber, Emmanuel Le Roy Ladurie and Maurice Agulhon, French historiography has always been important for Italian historians and a major stimulus towards social history. From the 1960s on, leading French theoreticians, from Michel Foucault to Pierre Bourdieu and Jacques Derrida, were critically read to test the applicability of their interpretative models to the rich sources of Italian archives. British social historiography became a strong influence, particularly from the 1970s: Eric Hobsbawm and E. P. Thompson, the journals Past and Present and History Workshop, generated a broad interest in social and economic history. The economic theory of feudalism of the Polish historian Witold Kula was strongly influential in the 1970s, as were the studies of peasant families, the poor, and the comparative analysis of societies and revolts, by Alexander Chayanov, Bronisław Geremek, Teodor Shanin, and Eric R. Wolf. There can be few fields with new conceptual and analytical methodologies, from historical demography to oral history and proto-industrialization, gender history, and post-culturalism, that Italian historians have not explored, and in many instances improved on or adapted through a sophisticated level of analysis particularly appropriate for the highly varied historical experiences of Italy.

That said, it would be misleading to conclude that the enlargement of the range of historical writing in Italy derived essentially from the contact with foreign historiography and social sciences. At most, it is possible to identify an initial stimulus in some fields: for example, the anthropological categories utilized by Klapisch-Zuber in the study of medieval Tuscan social history or Le Goff’s mentalité approach; the themes of the Spoleto annual study week on the history of the early Middle Ages often appear to pick up on then currently fashionable historical or even political debates or recent works of eminent French

Economic historians, such as Giorgio Mori, started mapping out the contours and mechanisms of the process of rapid industrialization in Italy from the 1880s to the First World War through studies of specific industries, and then increasingly in the context of comparative economic growth. Conversely, some Italian historians, particularly migrants, have been internationally influential, from Arnaldo Momigliano and Roberto Lopez (both forced to leave Italy following the fascist anti-Jewish laws) to Carlo Cipolla, Carlo Ginzburg, and Procacci, with his *Storia degli italiani* [History of the Italian People] (1968).

Social history, in a broad sense, has characterized much of the most interesting historical writing in Italy since the 1980s for all periods. The new periodicals—*Quaderni Storici* (1966), *Società e Storia* (1978), *Storia Urbana* (1977), *Bollettino di Demografia Storica* (1979), *Memoria: Rivista di Storia delle Donne* (1993), and *Memoria e Ricerca* (1993)—encouraged, and in some respects oriented, the fields and approaches. Some important and influential themes relating to the early modern period and post-Unitarian Italian history can serve to illustrate the historiographical shift of perspective.

Research and writing on the history of the Counter-Reformation in Italy for long concentrated on the institutional sources of the proceedings of the Council of Trent (1545–63) and the episcopal synods that followed, and on biographical studies of the major ecclesiastical figures, such as Carlo Borromeo. Since the 1970s new perspectives have been opened, from the cultural influence of Erasmus in Italy to the study of the gradual application to the episcopacy of the decrees of the Council of Trent, and the agents and practices through which the Church undertook the slow and difficult process of ‘re-Christianizing’ the peasantry over the following two centuries. What has emerged are the multiple ways by which popular practices of religiosity, such as the cult of saints as protection against perdition, were introduced by missionary congregations, parish curates, and polemical literature that exalted Christianity against the encroachments of Enlightenment reformers. The implications for the political history of Italy in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries of this social exploration of the anti-progressive religious and cultural *reconquista* of its faithful by the Church remain to be investigated by lay historians of the Italian nation-state.

The second theme concerns the historiography of the Italian working classes, with an increasing shift from the mid-1970s towards social history ‘from below’.

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Working-class history inevitably (and not just in Italy) carries a close association with political commitment; in this instance, directly or implicitly, the historiography expressed the cultural legacy of the exceptionally widespread student and worker impatience and protests of 1968–9 against party and trade union authority. Stefano Merli’s reconstruction of the composition of the proletariat on the factory floor contested the assumption of class-based organizations on which the generalizations of Marxist (and positivist) history were based. Increasingly, socially oriented researches on the popular classes raised major questions distant from the earlier political-organizational history of the working class. The centrality in the Italian past of the rural world and of the role of the family emerged through the exploration of the close ties and flows between city and countryside that accompanied the industrialization of late nineteenth-century northern Italy. Franco Ramella’s highly original study of the impact and responses to early factory production of families in one rural textile village illustrated the limits of Franklin Mendels’s influential generalizing theory of proto-industrialization. The formation of the working class acquired new, complex, and often contradictory dimensions through the extension of the fields of research, from the study of factory and work conditions to daily life outside the factory, gender relations, popular culture and expectations, and spontaneous examples of collective conflictuality. The quality of the research owed much to the different theoretical and methodological approaches of the writings of leading foreign social historians. These served as a conceptual stimulus, to be tested in the historical context of specific, extremely varied urban and rural locations in Italy. The history of the working classes expanded thematically and methodologically: Maurizio Gribaudi’s reconstruction of individual life trajectories of workers in Turin, often immigrants from the countryside, raised fundamental questions about the process of the formation of working-class consciousness; Luisa Passerini’s use of oral history to explore the passive acceptance of domination during the fascist regime in Turin working-class family life raised basic conceptual issues in terms of the history of women and the conditioning impact of the public sphere on private life. An entirely new field of study soon developed on the mass overseas emigration from the countryside and the Mezzogiorno in the decades of Italy’s industrialization that has now extended from the family, village, and material processes of emigration to the multiple

26 The Basso Foundation at Rome followed a consistent policy of inviting leading foreign historians of working-class and popular movements, such as Georges Haupt, Michèlle Perrot, Jürgen Kocka, and E. P. and Dorothy Thompson.
facets of integration in the countries of immigration, primarily in the two Americas.28

Urban history needs little explanation in Italy, given the historically pre-eminence role of its cities, and the congruent richness of documentation. Storia Urbana brought together a range of disciplines, from social and economic historians to architects and art historians, specialists on poorhouses and factories, and many others. It is appropriate that the most wide-ranging comparative history of medieval and early modern European cities has been written by an Italian historian, Marino Berengo.29

More problematic was the history of regions, a series launched by the publisher Einaudi, following the introduction of administrative regions in Italy in 1976. Quaderni Storici strongly criticized the historical reality of regional identity after unification, difficult to define in terms of characteristic forms of settlements, economic structures, and social organization, and politically ignored by the centralizing ruling class of the new Italian state (in contrast to the encouragement of municipal patriotism), lest it encourage federalist aspirations.30 But the successive volumes of the series have opened up new approaches to the difficulties of creating the Italian nation-state, viewed through the perspective of the local elites. The periodical Meridiana (1987) renewed the study of the ‘Southern question’ by an interdisciplinary approach that queried the parameter of the northern European model of modernization. Taken together with the Einaudi series on Italian regions, this has significantly lessened the dominance of political history by interpreting the ‘political’ through social and cultural history, including the transmutations of historical pasts into popular myths and lieux de mémoire.

More innovative, although their fruits were slow to mature into environmental history, were the contributions of the geographer Lucio Gambi, who unremittently endeavoured to convince Italian historians of the implications of the environmental contrasts and constraints of the physical territory of Italy that had conditioned its historical settlements, and economic and social usages, visible for example in the marked regional differences in the architecture of peasant dwellings.31

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31 Id., Una geografia per la storia (Turin, 1973). Environmental history in Italy is recent: see Alberto Caracciolo, L’ambiente come storia: Sondaggi e proposte di storiografia dell’ambiente (Bologna, 1988); and Simone Neri Serneri, Natura, industria e società: Per una storia dell’ambiente in età contemporanea (Siena, 2000).
Historical demographers, in Italy as elsewhere, have always actively participated in the international debate, from the reconstruction of family size and composition initiated by the Cambridge Group to the current mathematical input in the study of demographic behaviour. By the 1990s the questions posed to the sources were directed increasingly towards the social and cultural history of family behaviour. Infant abandonment and mortality has attracted fruitful research in the archives of the city foundling hospitals that date back to the fifteenth–sixteenth centuries; and more recently, attention has turned to the social consequences of the death of the male head of the family.\(^{32}\) In a remarkable study of the composition and living conditions of poor families (porters, fishermen, labourers) in mid-nineteenth-century Venice, Renzo Derosas combined the classic registers of births, marriages, and deaths with those of change of residence to analyze the importance and gender distinctions of generational family and kin ties that query Peter Laslett’s theory of the self-sufficient nuclear family, and direct attention to cultural explanations of the precocious decline in the number of births among Jewish families.\(^{33}\)

Gender and women’s history has developed rapidly, particularly since the 1980s. The richness of the archival sources—ecclesiastic, judicial, and now also iconographic—has encouraged a rapid extension of the fields of research, particularly innovative in the early modern period, from marriage and patrimonial rights to patronage, networks of relations, and, most originally, the impact of the Council of Trent on female religiosity, sexuality, rites, ceremonies, and social behaviour.\(^{34}\)

**MICROHISTORY**

At the international level, microhistory is probably the best known Italian contribution to historiographical methodology over the past half century.\(^{35}\) This is not surprising, given that its exponents have proposed a radical challenge, not only to the traditionally dominant form of writing history from the viewpoint of the state and ruling elites, but more fundamentally to the generalizing

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\(^{32}\) Renzo Derosas and Michel Oris (eds.), *When Dad Died: Individuals and Families Coping with Distress in Past Societies* (Bern, 2002).


\(^{34}\) Lucia Ferranti, Maura Palazzi, and Gianna Pomata (eds.), *Ragnatele di rapport: Patronage e reti di relazioni nella storia delle donne* (Turin, 1988).

assumptions of the social sciences. Microhistory began to be discussed in Quaderni Storici in the mid-1970s, focusing on the methodological use of the archival sources of historical writing and their potential for a different and original approach to social history. Carlo Ginzburg’s primary source for Il formaggio e i vermi [The Cheese and the Worms] (1976), his original and highly influential study of the mental world of a miller, was an Inquisition trial.

Microhistorians place in doubt the basic conviction of historical positivism that political-institutional ‘facts’ constitute the subject matter of history, and that the archival documentation, subject to philologically appropriate methods, provides direct and reliable evidence. But they are equally critical of the influence on historical interpretation of the functionalist presuppositions on which social scientists construct their theories of the normative systems that regulate societies and economies, and the macroconcepts that are deployed to explain historical change over time, such as capitalist transformation, the evolution of the modern state, progress, modernization, class, and so on. For example, in the optimistic heyday of grand-scale structural explanations that prevailed in France through the 1960s, Braudel and Labrousse directed historical research towards the systematic collection of quantitative data identified and classified as appropriate, in accordance with the French social science tradition of François Simiand and Emile Durkheim.

For the initial proponents of microhistory—Ginzburg, Edoardo Grendi, Giovanni Levi—the macrosocial interpretative explanations of the social sciences created an impression of historical inevitability, consequential to their perspective of reading history backwards over the long term to its current point of arrival. Within such macroconcepts the responses within society were ignored as irrelevant, or at best classified by other macrocategories, such as revolt or class. It was necessary to invert the traditional focus of the historian—that of the acts of authority—and commence from the responses in order to explore how the social actors, in their different and multiple roles as individuals and communities, with their own preexisting customs and practices, perceived and interpreted, responded to and negotiated the presence and impositions of royal, seigneurial, ecclesiastical, judicial, or other outside authorities.

It is evident that given such an approach, anthropologists were of particular interest to microhistorians—on the theoretical level for their conceptualizations of the complexities and functioning of interrelationships, practices, and beliefs in small communities, and operationally through the example of their primary research technique of dense ‘participant observation’. Indeed, Grendi described the writings of E. P. Thompson and Karl Polanyi as both economic anthropology and historical microanalysis; and by the 1980s Clifford Geertz’s “thick

36 Il formaggio e i vermi (Turin, 1976), was translated into eight languages by 1989.
description’ had become a fashionable phrase among Italian microhistorians. More recently, interpretative anthropology and cultural approaches have influenced the microhistorians’ mode of presenting social themes of production and exchange through a new emphasis on language, representation, and symbols.

An obligatory practical consequence for microhistorians was to reduce the scale of research to local contexts, precisely defined by territory, family, profession, biography, or text. ‘Dense’ interpretative reading and linkage between different sources were essential to bring to light the social and cultural practices and beliefs of groups within a community, or of individuals. It is perhaps relevant to observe that microhistory as a method developed in a country where documentation, starting with notarial, judicial, ecclesiastical, and administrative archives, is particularly rich since the Middle Ages. Linkage between sources is also probably easier than in many countries, as individuals can be followed for much of their life course through their surnames, in parish registers, property cadasters and taxation lists, notarial and judicial acts, and (from the nineteenth century) administrative obligations of schooling, military service, and even registration of change of residence. But crucial for microhistorians is the anthropologists’ understanding and usage of the information they collect: archival documents are always partial, often indirect, but contain traces that cumulatively allow interpretation of social relationships and behaviour.

Microhistorians have stressed that they do not constitute a ‘school’, in the sense of sharing a common theoretical basis, but only the methodological conviction of the need to read the sources in a manner that will permit an understanding of essentially unwritten practices, assumptions, and behaviour. Ginzburg created his own particular itinerary, exploring the circulation and forms of expression of religious ideas and practices in popular culture through the lived experience of individuals, from fertility cults and accusations of witchcraft in the border area of Friuli to the heretical interpretation of the cosmos of a miller’s readings, and the biographical study of Piero della Francesca’s patrons and network of relations that explain political and religious elements in the iconography of his paintings.37 The ‘Microstorie’ series of monographs published by Einaudi from 1981 is described by its editors, Ginzburg and Levi, as ‘an experiment, a proposal, a verification of sources, a remixing of dimensions, personages, points of view’. Period and theme are irrelevant for the microhistorical approach, although the main body of research has been on social history. Giovanni Ricci explored the European obsession with the Turks through a series of episodes seen through the eyes of the citizens of Ferrara.38 Patrizia Guarnieri’s narration of the trial of a child murderer in later nineteenth-century Tuscany explains the influence on both judges and public opinion of the then

fashionable scientific theories of degeneracy of Cesare Lombroso. There is a firm belief in a narrative technique of exposition to illustrate, through the reconstruction of the facts or event, the functioning of certain aspects of society. Far more unusual in historical writing is the (refreshing) concern of some microhistorians to incorporate into the main body of their narrative their procedures of research, so that the reader is involved in a dialogue about the process of constructing the historical argument.

Central to the research on social history are the processes through which groups and networks of relations were formed and functioned, assuming collective identities that underpinned interpersonal relations and distinction from other groups, and expressing social practices and strategies that changed in form and behaviour in response to resources and constraints, within the community and in its relations with outside authorities. Initially, microhistorical writing was on the early modern period, in which the juridical pluralism of the state made negotiation a regular resource practised by the more experienced and powerful. Carlo Poni, for example, explained local market rules and practices in ancien régime Bologna through the transactions between the guilds of butchers, tanners, and shoemakers; Raul Merzario identified the constraints on matrimonial strategies in a small Comasco village; Giovanni Levi demonstrated how the ‘immaterial’ worldly knowledge of a local notary made him an effective mediator between his community and the state authorities in Piedmont; Osvaldo Raggio analyzed how the feuds between rival clans and their clienteles that controlled the transit of goods through the Apennine passes forced the intervention of the republic of Genoa. But the concentration on a single episode or location, and the research techniques of interpretation, have demonstrated the often innovative value of exploration of the nuances of power of chronologically later contexts that query passive acceptance of the inevitable march of progress: for example, Franco Ramella’s study of the effective response to factory industrialization of rural textile families in a nineteenth-century Biellese village, Maurizio Gribaudi’s reconstruction of the life trajectories of Turin factory workers, or Alessandro Portelli’s oral history of Terni, as seen by its steelworker families.

Few would doubt the innovative quality of microhistory. But substantial questions have legitimately been raised. How representative or generalizable can such microstudies be, given the small scale imposed by the method of

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40 Carlo Ginzburg and Adriano Prosperi’s *Giochi di pazienza: Un seminario sul ‘Beneficio di Cristo’* (Turin, 1975), is exemplary in proposing a seminar form of how to read critically a famous Italian religious text.
research? How can such studies be related to the broader historical experiences of social change? The mechanisms that are explored are essentially defensive, against what were seen as threats, at best utilizing what were regarded as opportunities for the best equipped. No answers have been provided so far on how to reconcile the daily practices of individuals with the irreversible social changes that have resulted from industrialization and urbanization, the steadily increasing presence of the state, and representative or dictatorial forms of rule, capitalism, and class organization. Perhaps it would be necessary to deploy the methods of micro-history to explore successful examples of social change: for example, generational integration of migrants.

**CONTEMPORARY HISTORY**

The political and institutional rupture of the overthrow of fascism, the victory of antifascism, and the creation of the Italian republic heavily conditioned historical writing about Italy during the fascist period (1922–45). As in other European countries, initially political and military history predominated, alongside personal memoirs. For long, the central themes concentrated around two poles—the origins of fascism in relation to the collapse of the liberal state, and antifascism and the Resistance movement of 1943–5. Outside Italy, the confiscated Nazi archives had enabled foreign scholars to make significant contributions to the political history of Vichy France, Nazi Germany, and Mussolini’s puppet Italian Fascist Republic of 1943–5. In Italy, documents in the state archives were only formally open after forty years. In practice, access to the archives of the fascist period was granted earlier, but apart from De Felice for his biography of Mussolini, and Paolo Spriano for his history of the Italian Communist Party (founded in 1921), the state archives only began to be used extensively from the 1970s, with the expansion of university courses on contemporary history.

The political master narrative that condemned fascism as a dictatorship imposed on the Italian people implicitly discouraged systematic research on the fascist regime, and explains the hostile reception of the first volume of De Felice’s biography of Mussolini (1965). As in France and the German Federal Republic, the passage of a generation was needed for historians to widen their fields of research and writing on fascism—in part in response to De Felice’s interpretative subordination of the fascist party to its leader, and his provocative thesis of a

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44 A national institute for the Italian Resistance (INSMLI) was founded by its former leader Ferruccio Parri in 1949, not least in order to collect and make the Resistance archives available.

45 The earliest studies of the fascist regime were on the institutional structures and ideology of the totalitarian state: Alberto Aquarone, *L'organizzazione dello stato totalitario* (Turin, 1965); and Paolo Ungari, *Alfredo Rocca e l'ideologia giuridica del fascismo* (Brescia, 1965).
popular consensus for the fascist regime, but also through widespread political concern that the young post-war generation knew nothing about fascism, not least through its absence from school curricula. Since the 1970s, both Italian and foreign historians have notably extended the fields of research and writing beyond the institutional and administrative organization of the fascist state to the impact of the regime on Italian society, through territorially specific studies of cities, of propaganda and control of the press, fascist leisure policies, the collaboration of intellectuals and fascist culture, indoctrination towards women, and the sacralization of politics. In recent years, notably sensitive issues have become important themes of historical analysis—in particular the social reception of the anti-Jewish racial laws of 1938, and the lived experiences of the civil population caught in the slow retreat of the German armies in 1943–5. Such was the sense of civic commitment that, with the new climate in the Catholic Church following Vatican Council II (1962–5), Giovanni Miccoli, a leading historian of the medieval church, turned his professional skills to the study of the silences of Pius XII in his policies towards Nazi Germany. Oral history has made a major contribution. Claudio Pavone’s writings on the Resistance movement, with his recognition that in these final years of the fascist republic and Nazi occupation, Italians were divided by a civil war, can now be seen to mark the distance that Italian historical writing had travelled from the official antifascist interpretation. Unlike the Historikerstreit in Germany, totalitarianism as an analytical category has not proved fruitful for historical writing on fascism in Italy. Although Italian contemporary historians have concentrated on Italy and the period of fascism, there has been a small but growing number of specialists on twentieth-century history in other countries: on Nazi Germany since the 1960s, on the Soviet Union from the 1970s, and more recently on the United States and Spain.

Historical writing on the immediate past—that of the Italian republic since 1946—has, until very recently, consisted primarily of a political narrative that ignored the profound transformations of Italian society which accompanied the country’s rapid economic growth and internal migrations. Initially, a major issue

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51 Enzo Collotti’s first book on Nazi Germany was published in 1962. Giuliano Procacci inducted a younger generation into the history of the Soviet Union in the 1970s.
was that of the continuities between fascism, the earlier liberal state, and the Italian republic. A sense of the historical periodization of the half century of the Italian republic, closely related to the end of the Cold War, only became apparent with the collapse of the imperfect Italian party system in the mid-1990s. History has always been very present in Italian politics. In recent years, representations of fascism, and specifically of the final years of the fascist republic, have revived as a divisive political issue of national identity. The contrast to Germany, where Nazism belongs to a negative past, is striking. From the point of view of professional historical writing, the recent appropriation of history by politicians and the media has led Italian historians to explore, on the one hand, the practical implications of the use and abuse of sources in the representation of the very recent past and, on the other-hand, the conceptual problems presented by personal or community memories that differ from and contradict the standard historical interpretation.

**TIMELINE/KEY DATES**

1922–45 Fascist regime
1943–5 Nazi occupation, Italian Fascist Republic, Resistance, and civil war
1946 (2 June) Referendum expelling the Savoy monarchy in favour of a republic
1947 (10 June) Peace treaty between Italy and Allied powers
1948 (1 January) Constitution of Italian Republic
1955 Italy joins United Nations
1957 Italy joins European Economic Community
1962–5 Vatican Council II
1984 New Concordat with Vatican; Roman Catholicism loses its status as state religion
1991 Dissolution of Italian Communist Party, following collapse of USSR
1992–4 Revelations of political corruption lead to prison sentences and collapse of major government political parties
1994 Silvio Berlusconi, leader of Forza Italia party, wins the general elections and forms his first right-wing coalition government

**KEY HISTORICAL SOURCES**


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Chapter 17

Historical Writing in the Balkans

Ulf Brunnbauer

In March 1968 the Politburo of the Bulgarian Communist Party passed a resolution on the project ‘History of Bulgaria’:

The Politburo greets the initiative by the Institute for History at the Bulgarian Academy of Sciences to start with the preparations of a multi-volume history of Bulgaria. . . . The ten-volume history of Bulgaria must be written on the premise of the Marxist-Leninist methodology and on the basis of all existing studies and new sources and documents. It must fully reveal the difficult but heroic way of the Bulgarian people from ancient times towards today, its permanent struggle against foreign rule and oppression, for freedom, independence, and for social progress, and its contribution to the treasury of world culture.

The publication . . . will be an inexhaustible source of education of the working people in the spirit of socialist patriotism and proletarian internationalism by highlighting everything that has been valuable, heroic, and revolutionary in the past of the Bulgarian people. And it will strengthen the love and respect for the Russian people—our liberators twice—and for the peoples of the great Soviet country. ¹

This decision represents characteristic features of history-writing under state socialism in south-eastern Europe. First, communist parties interfered in historiography. Second, history was to be written according to the principles of Marxism-Leninism. Third, history was to serve purposes that extended beyond the strictly academic. Fourth, historical writing was to be a national endeavour. Here, it is the Bulgarian ‘people’ whose heroic past was to be revealed.

However, despite the fact of communist rule in most south-east European countries after the Second World War (Albania, Bulgaria, Romania, and Yugoslavia), academic historiography developed along different trajectories. The Greek case was particularly exceptional because there, historiography did not operate under conditions of communist control. This chapter will trace the main trends of academic history-writing in south-eastern Europe after the Second

¹ Protocol of the Politburo session on 15 March 1968, in Central State Archive, Sofia (CDA), f. 1, op. 35, a.e. 199.
Eastern Europe during the Cold War
World War, paying particular attention to the communist era on the one hand, and the post-1989–91 period on the other.

‘COMMUNIST’ HISTORIOGRAPHY

When communists took power in Albania, Bulgaria, Romania, and Yugoslavia in 1944–5, the discipline of history in these countries—with the exception of Albania—had already been institutionalized. Originally inspired by Romantic nationalism, by the end of the nineteenth century the study of history was largely based on scientific methods. Historians built their research on the critical evaluation of sources and a firm belief in the possibility of revealing the ‘truth’ by scrutinizing the ‘facts’. This did not, however, sever the link between historiography and nation-building. On the contrary, most historians considered their profession a patriotic endeavour. Well-known south-east European historians, such as Stojan Novaković in Serbia and Nicolae Iorga in Romania, held important political positions.\(^2\) The nation formed the frame in which history was written.

The communists initially set about radically changing the way history was written in order to construct a more ideologically suitable past. They sought to establish ‘communist’ history based on Soviet models. Historians were urged to subscribe to dialectical materialism and the Marxist periodization, to stress the communist party, the working class, and the internationalist perspective, and to denounce the pre-socialist period and praise the Soviet Union. Party leaders demanded particular interpretations of major events. In Bulgaria, for example, future party leader Vúlko Chervenkov urged historians, in a meeting organized by the Committee for Science, Arts, and Cultures in March 1948, ‘to decisively eradicate the bourgeois concepts regarding the historical development in the Balkans’.\(^3\) At the meeting, guidelines for the correct communist interpretation of the major events in Bulgarian history were presented. In Yugoslavia, the editorial of the first issue of the new journal *Historijski zbornik* [Historical Collection] (1948) paraphrased Stalin: ‘Historical science must become a genuine science in our people’s state, which above all explores the past of the working masses, the past of the people…. In contrast to the hypocritical objectivism of bourgeois historiography, it will evaluate historical phenomena according to their relevance for the development of human society.’ In Romania, the Communist Party urged

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historians to form a collective for the rewriting of Romanian history on the basis of Marxism-Leninism.

Such calls amounted to a radical shift from pre-war paradigms and were followed by practical measures to change the institutions of historiography. Soon after the communist takeover, governments purged universities of historians deemed ‘bourgeois’ or ‘fascist’, though not uniformly so. In Yugoslavia, only openly anti-communist historians lost their professions, while eminent representatives of ‘bourgeois’ history were left in place. In Bulgaria, some prominent historians were marginalized and barred from teaching, and those with close relations to Germany were expelled from universities. In Romania, where the departure from pre-war historiography was especially radical, many professors were expelled from universities, and prominent historians, such as Constantin C. Giurescu and Victor Papacostea, were imprisoned for years. In a similar vein, ‘bourgeois’ and ‘fascist’ publications were banned and other forms of censorship were established.

However, there were not enough ‘communist’ historians available for any broad effort to write the new history; hardly any pre-war historian had had communist leanings. The ruling parties, therefore, compromised with those from the old guard who accepted the new conditions, and pinned their hopes on the new generation. For that purpose, the regime tried to establish control over universities and academies and also founded new institutions. In Bulgaria and Romania, the Soviet system of concentrating research at the academy of science was adopted, also because universities were suspected to shelter ‘bourgeois’ elements. In 1947 the Institute for Bulgarian History was established at the Bulgarian Academy of Science with the task of producing a ‘scientific’ history of Bulgaria. The Romanian Academy was reorganized in 1948, and its Section for History was supposed to write the communist interpretation of Romanian history. The Institute for Romanian and Soviet Studies in Bucharest (1947) was meant to contribute to the new historical narrative by extolling the beneficial role of Russia and the Soviet Union. Institutes for party history were established in Bulgaria (1953) and Romania (1955). New journals, such as Istoričeski pregled [Historical Review] (Bulgaria, 1945), Analele Româno–Sovietice [Romanian–Soviet Annals] (Romania, 1946), and Historijski zbornik [Historical Collection] (Yugoslavia, 1948) promoted communist history.

7 van Meurs, The Bessarabian Question in Communist Historiography, 227.
In Yugoslavia as well, the lack of trained Marxist historians forced the Communist Party to accept prominent pre-war historians back at the universities (such as Fran Zwitter, Milko Kos, Ljudmil Hauptmann, and Bogo Grafenauer in Ljubljana; Ferdo Čulinović and Jaroslav Šidak in Zagreb; and Vaso Ćubrilović, Jorjo Tadić, and Viktor Novak in Belgrade). These historians at least had a pro-Yugoslav inclination. Attempts by the party to control the Academy of Sciences in Belgrade, Zagreb, and Ljubljana did not bring about the desired effects. On the other hand, the Yugoslav communists felt a pressing need for a suitable past. The Fifth Party Congress in 1948 urged historians to collect material on the history of the party and the working class; and the party organizations in the Yugoslav republics established historical departments which in the 1950s and 1960s were turned into Institutes for the History of the Labour Movement (in Belgrade, Sarajevo, Ljubljana, and Zagreb). These institutes were to establish the communist narrative by focusing on the partisan struggle during the Second World War and the history of the Communist Party—topics shunned by ‘traditional’ historians. Hence a division of labour emerged between ‘bourgeois’ historians who worked on the more distanced past, and party historians, often with a partisan background, who wrote the founding myths of the regime.

Institution building was an even more pressing task in Albania and some of the Yugoslav republics, where no academic historiography had been produced before the Second World War. In Albania, the first systematic scientific institution was established in 1947 (Institute for Sciences) with two historians, Aleks Buda and Stefanaq Pollo, who would become the preeminent historians of communist Albania. The first Albanian university was opened in 1958 and the Albanian Academy of Sciences (with a history institute) in 1972, both in Tirana. In the Yugoslav republic of Macedonia, academic historiography was established from scratch as well, when the Institute for National History was founded in Skopje in 1948 as part of communist-driven Macedonian nation-building. In both cases, historiography’s primary task was to create a national narrative in the guise of Marxism-Leninism. In the Yugoslav republics of Montenegro and Bosnia-Herzegovina, the first institutions for historiography were also created in the late 1940s and 1950s. The Autonomous Province of Kosovo within Serbia acquired its own scientific institutions later: the Institute for History of Kosovo in

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Prishtina (1967), the University of Prishtina (1970), and the Academy of Sciences and Arts of Kosovo (1975), promoting the history of Kosovo from the Albanian point of view.

In terms of interpretation, the party initially expected communist history to be written on the premises of Marxism-Leninism and internationalism. New syntheses in this vein appeared in the 1950s, replacing the older master narratives. The break with pre-war interpretations was particularly remarkable in Romania: the new narrative extolled the role of the Communist Party and the working masses, but also the ‘friendship’ of the Romanians with the Russians, and the Slavic heritage of Romanian culture, whereas traditionally, Romanian historians had stressed the Latin nature of the Romanians. The redirection of Romanian history was headed by Michail Roller who, despite his lack of scientific credentials, was placed in top positions of Romanian historiography until his fall from grace in 1956. Roller, for example, called the unification of the former Russian province of Bessarabia with Romania in 1918 ‘robbery’. The last edition of Roller’s textbook, *Istoria Republicii Populare Române* [History of the Romanian People’s Republic] (1956; 1st edn, 1947), marked the apex of the Sovietization of Romanian history. The first two volumes of the *Istoria Romîniei* [History of Romania] (1960, 1962) were written in the same spirit, while the third volume (1964) was retracted before publication, because by then, Romania had already begun to distance itself from the Soviet Union. In Bulgaria, the new master narrative appeared in the form of the *Istoriija na Bu˘lgarija v dva toma* [History of Bulgaria in Two Volumes] (1954, 1955). The Slavic roots of the Bulgarians, their friendship with Russia and the Soviet Union, their struggles for freedom, and the role of the progressive political forces and especially the communists, were given prominent treatment. However, this seemingly authoritative interpretation of Bulgarian history proved short-lived because changing political circumstances would soon necessitate its revision.

Albania was to receive its communist-style history in the two-volume *Historia e Shqipe¨risë* [History of Albania] (1959, 1965).

The creation of a communist master narrative proved to be particularly complicated in Yugoslavia where historians had to integrate the histories of all constituent nations into a common history. The first attempt—Ante Babić’s *Istorija naroda Jugoslavije* [History of the Peoples of Yugoslavia] (1946)—was criticized for its lack of a Marxist spin. In 1949 the federal Council for Science
and Culture initiated the multi-volume *Istorija naroda Jugoslavije* [History of the Peoples of Yugoslavia], on which leading historians from all Yugoslav republics participated. The first volume appeared in 1953 and the second in 1959, reaching up to the end of the eighteenth century. The project then collapsed because the Yugoslav historians could not agree on the interpretation of the different nineteenth-century national movements that occurred within the Yugoslav territory.

A closer look at the historiographic production, however, reveals that even during the height of Stalinism, not all historians submitted to the new paradigm. Party leaders regularly accused historians of failing the Marxist cause. Even the national paradigm was not really eroded, because most history was still written within the framework of the nation, which was projected into the distant past—except that the nation was now mainly represented by the toiling masses. The shock therapy of dialectical materialism did not have long-lasting effects, also because those historians who were totally committed to party interpretations produced crude ideology and had less standing in the discipline. Non-committed historians would disguise their more traditional approaches with quotes from Marx, Engels, Lenin, and—until 1956—Stalin. They avoided party and contemporary history. Especially in Yugoslavia, the surviving pre-war historians not only produced abundant research but remained the most influential teachers. In Romania, where political pressure was more intense, non-party historians resorted to erudite studies on less ideologically contentious periods and the editing of sources.

### THE RETURN OF NATIONAL(IST) HISTORY

The Stalinist period in historiography lasted for about a decade. Marxism-Leninism remained the official paradigm but in a very formal way. Most of the scholarship produced between the late 1950s and the end of socialism adhered to traditional models of political history and was inspired by positivism. Ivan Elenkov and Daniela Koleva argue that this belief in ‘facts’ and the ‘historical truth’ was a means of protecting the discipline from ideological intrusion.¹⁶ The most conspicuous change was the demise of the class perspective, because the nation became again the most important historical subject.¹⁷ This historiographic shift reflected the increased leaning of the communists towards nationalism as a legitimating device, after the class struggle was declared to be finished. In Yugoslavia, the importance of the nation as an historical paradigm grew with

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consecutive constitutional changes, leading to far-reaching federalization in 1974.

The shift to nationalistic historiography was most radical in Romania, where historians had been particularly urged to stress the devotion to the Russians/Soviets. The re-emergence of traditional anti-Russian sentiments was marked by an ingenious event: the publication by the Romanian Academy, in 1964, of previously unpublished manuscripts of Marx on the Romanians, in which Marx appeared to be sympathetic to the Romanians and critical of Russian great-power imperialism.\(^{18}\) This marked the beginning of rapid de-Sovietization of Romanian cultural policies, reflecting the gradual emancipation of Romania from the Soviet Union in foreign relations. A surge in national history and the return to pre-war interpretations followed. ‘Bourgeois’ historians, who had been imprisoned, were allowed to return to academic institutions and became influential again. Late pre-war historians, such as Nicolae Iorga and Alexandru Xenopol, were rehabilitated. Until the early 1970s these changes were connected with hesitant cultural liberalization under Nicolae Ceaușescu which opened room for new interpretations. Contact with the West was re-established in the 1960s, which resulted, for example, in the adoption of some of the ideas promoted by the Annales School in France.\(^{19}\)

Liberalization in Romania was short-lived, however, and by the early 1970s the Communist Party again closely monitored history-writing which became an essential part of Ceaușescu’s national communism. The new party programme of 1974 laid down the pillars of Romanian history: the ancient roots of the Romanians, their continuity of settlement, the unity of the Romanian people throughout their history, and the permanent struggle of the Romanians for liberty. Under the guidance of historians devoted to Ceaușescu, ‘Party orders and excessive nationalism became the standards for Romanian historiography’.\(^{20}\) A typical result of the nationalist frenzy was the promotion of the idea that the Romanians were of ancient Dacian origin, which stressed their autochthonous nature. Ancient and medieval history became as politicized as contemporary history. Medieval Romanian rulers were cherished as personalities who had embodied the unity of the Romanians, and the exploitative nature of feudal rule was neglected.\(^{21}\) Romanian historians again praised the union of Bessarabia with Romania in 1918—a topic that was previously taboo due to Soviet sensitivities.

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19 Lucian Boia, Geschichte und Mythos: über die Gegenwart des Vergangenen in der rumänischen Gesellschaft (Cologne, 2003), 90; orig. pub as Istorie și mit în conștiința românească (Bucharest, 1997).
20 Papacostea, ‘Captive Clio’, 197.
While only the devoted party historians would go to nationalist extremes, and most historians worked on ideologically less charged topics, almost all Romanian historians dealt exclusively with Romanian history, and stressed the role of the Romanian state which contributed to the party’s historical vision.22

In Bulgaria also, de-Stalinization did not result in genuine liberalization, though the constraints on scholars became more relaxed after 1956. As in Romania, the Bulgarian communists turned to increasingly nationalist policies in the 1960s, which had an impact on historiography. Party chief Todor Zhivkov stressed that Bulgarians should be proud of their history, which had ancient roots and contributed significantly to the wealth of human culture. The emphasis on the nation was also an attempt by the party to extract loyalty from intellectuals who were not communists and had been critical of the, in their view, ‘anti-national’ course of the first decade of communism. Historians supported the party’s call to defend ‘national interests’ and fight ‘national nihilism’, which helped to raise their own social prestige.23 The most visible outcome of the new trend was the multi-volume Istorija na Bulgarija [History of Bulgaria], commissioned by the party in 1968. Ten volumes were initially envisaged, but that number finally rose to fourteen. The party promised to ‘mobilize the entire historical front’, and provided historians with additional funding, also for research trips abroad, and improved access to archives. In 1972, 126 authors and editors worked on the project—among them, 82 historians. The Istorija na Bulgarija followed the national perspective, despite its claimed devotion to ‘Marxist-Leninist’ methodology. Actually, ‘History of Bulgarians’ would have been a more appropriate title. The mega-project was linked to institutional reforms: in 1972 the government created the United Centre for Science and Higher Education in History, which encompassed five Academy institutes working on history, the Faculty of History at Sofia University, and other historical institutions, gathering some 300 historians, 90 of whom were from the Institute for History at the Bulgarian Academy of Sciences.24 Reflecting the overall trend of centralization in Bulgarian politics, the United Centre was to coordinate all historical research.25

One of the conspicuous changes was increased interest in medieval Bulgarian history and the rehabilitation of medieval rulers. They were no longer considered feudal overlords but embodiments of national unity. Also gaining popularity in the 1970s was Thracian studies, promoted by Ludmila Zhivkova, daughter of the

party leader and responsible for cultural policies. In 1974 the Institute for Thracology was established at the Academy of Sciences, which portrayed the ancient Thracians as one of the contributors to Bulgarian ethnogenesis. The nexus between politics and historiography was especially evident in the treatment of the Macedonian question. Since the late 1950s, Bulgarian historians fiercely reacted to the emerging Macedonian national narrative as promoted by historians in Skopje, the capital of Yugoslav Macedonia. The Bulgarian position was straightforward: there was no Macedonian nation, the Slavs in Macedonia were Bulgarians, and their history was part of the Bulgarian heritage.26

The national orientation did not necessarily mean outright nationalism, but rather the total preeminence of Bulgarian history. Of 426 research articles published between 1945 and 1978 in the leading historical journal, *Istoričeski pregled*, only 13 per cent dealt with the history of other countries, often written by foreign scholars.27 There was, though, room for new interpretations. Most significantly, several historians began to challenge the official description of the years 1923–44 as ‘monarchic-fascist rule’. Beginning with a debate in 1967, historians questioned the applicability of the ‘fascist’ label to several governments of the inter-war period, and proposed nuanced views based on new documentary evidence, whereas party-historians continued to call the whole period ‘fascist’.28 Other new interpretations concerned the nineteenth-century national liberation movement. In the 1970s, historians Nikolaj Gančev, Konstantin Kosev, and Hristo Gandev showed that significant parts of the Bulgarian (petty) bourgeoisie had supported the anti-Ottoman liberation movement, while the orthodox party view had accused the nineteenth-century bourgeoisie of opportunism.29

There was no room for diverging interpretations in Albania—the most repressive and isolated communist country in Europe. Albanian historians, who could not build on any pre-war tradition, were totally subjected to party interpretations. Their research developed in utmost isolation from international trends, concentrating on few major topics deemed important by the party: the autochthonous origins and continuity of the Albanians since ancient times, their role as defenders of European civilization against the Ottomans, their permanent and heroic struggle for independence, the decisive role of the masses combined

with the ingenuity of their leader, and the Albanian communists as the only genuine Marxist-Leninists. In the 1980s, historiographic efforts were concentrated on the multi-volume *Historia e Shqipërisë* [History of Albania], edited by the Institute for History at the Albanian Academy of Sciences. Volumes 2 to 4 were published in 1984, but volume 1 did not appear until 2002, and with the altered title *Historia e Popullit Shqiptar* [History of the Albanian People].

In Yugoslavia, the reassertion of the national paradigm in historiography had particular consequences. After their takeover, the Yugoslav communists had promoted ‘Yugoslav’ identity, which was expected to supersede the distinctive identities of the peoples (*narodi*) and nationalities (*narodnosti*) of Yugoslavia. The promotion of a common Yugoslav history stressing the joint struggle for freedom, especially during the Second World War, was a constitutive element of these identity policies. The never-finished ‘History of the Peoples of Yugoslavia’ was initiated for that purpose in 1949. The creation of the ‘Union of the Historical Societies of Yugoslavia’ in 1954, the ‘Congresses of Yugoslav Historians’ (first in 1954), the *Enciklopedija Jugoslavije* [Encyclopaedia of Yugoslavia] (vol. 1 in 1955), the establishment of chairs for Yugoslav history (the first at the University of Zagreb in 1952), and the re-establishment of the *Jugoslovenski istorijski časopis* [Yugoslav Historical Journal] served the same purpose. However, these efforts failed to establish a coherent all-Yugoslav master narrative. After the late 1950s, when the official promotion of ‘Yugoslavism’ ceased, historiography became fragmented alongside the different republics. The expression ‘Yugoslav historiography’ came to be a mere geographic denomination. Slovenian historian Božo Repe thus called his overview on historiography in Yugoslavia ‘The dissolution of an historiography, which has never existed’. This process was also facilitated by the decentralized organization and funding of research. As a result, historians from the different republics would work on essentially different pasts, tacitly accepting that historians should not focus on the history of different republics and their constitutive peoples. While the planned ‘History of the Peoples of Yugoslavia’ was never finished, multi-volume histories of the titular nations were. It seems ironic that three major attempts at a history of Yugoslavia were published in the mid-1980s, when the country was already in deep crisis. They were accordingly criticized, mainly from national viewpoints. Not even an authoritative history of the Yugoslav Communist Party was written, because historians from the different republics would not agree on its interpretation.

From the early 1960s, the overall ‘Yugoslav’ historical discourse was characterized by increasingly acrimonious debates. The major fault line was between Serbian and Croatian historians, but occasionally historians from other republics

would engage in polemics as well. Most of these came down to accusations that an historian had misrepresented the past of a people not his own. A case in point was the debate about the *Istorija Jugoslavije* [History of Yugoslavia], written by four eminent Serb historians in 1972 (English translation, 1974). Croatian and Bosnian-Muslim historians found the history of their nations incorrectly treated and accused the authors of pro-Serbian bias. The debate between Mirjana Gross, the eminent Croatian historian, and Milorad Ekmec´ic´, the author of the chapter on the nineteenth century, was particularly fierce because Ekmec ˇic´ had used different yardsticks for the evaluation of Serb and Croat nineteenth-century national ideologies. The Yugoslav communists were not happy with these developments. Already at the Eighth Party Congress in 1964, Tito had pointed to ‘negative trends’ in historiography and ‘the frequent direct adoption of certain bourgeois-nationalist assessments’. The party organization in Serbia discussed occurrences of nationalism in historiography several times in the 1960s. In the early 1980s the party made a last push against nationalistic tendencies in historiography. But to no avail: the party had little control over the historians and the national perspective had become too ingrained. By the late 1980s, after Serbian historians had begun to rehabilitate Serb nationalism, debates between historians became openly nationalistic and spilled over to the mass media.

The balance sheet of the development of historiography in south-eastern Europe under socialism was thus ambiguous. On the one hand, little genuinely Marxist scholarship emerged, and the historical mainstream remained devoted to the national perspective. Exceptions to the rule were centres for south-east European (Balkan) studies at the Academies of Sciences in Belgrade, Bucharest, and Sofia. Historiography also suffered from politically enforced ‘truths’ and constraints on international contacts, especially with the West. In Ceaus ¸escu’s Romania, institutes for humanities were not even allowed to keep computers and copy-machines, while typewriters had to be registered with the authorities.

On the other hand, historiography as a profession experienced a significant surge in terms of numbers of historians, institutions, and publications. The edition of sources also made huge progress. There was methodological innovation as well, even as only a few publications were devoted to issues of methodology and theory of history. Mirjana Gross’s monograph on the development of historiography is a rare example. Gross was also influential in disseminating the ideas of the Annales in Yugoslavia, where books from Annales historians were translated. From these attempts a notable surge in social history was recorded in

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Croatia in the 1970s and 1980s. Andrej Mitrovic in Serbia and Peter Vodopivec in Slovenia also published on the epistemology and methodology of history, and promoted new approaches. In Romania, historians began engaging with the ideas of the Annales in the years of tentative liberalization in the late 1960s. The range of topics of historical inquiry had broadened, also due to the communists’ stress on social and economic forces. Agrarian and industrial history, for example, found frequent treatment. In particular among historians of the Ottoman period the interest in social and economic history was pronounced. They were also among the first to apply quantitative methods in south-east European historiography. Historical demography developed well in Croatia, especially among historians of Dalmatia, and one of the finest monographs written by a Montenegrin historian also dealt with social history: Djoko Perovic’s *Izeshavanje crnogoraca u XIX vijeku* [Emigration of Montenegrins in the Nineteenth Century] (1962).

**THE GREEK EXCEPTION**

Historiography in Greece developed under different political conditions, since the country did not become socialist. However, Civil War with the victory of the British and US-supported conservative forces (1946–9), tentative liberalization thereafter, political turmoil, and the establishment of military dictatorship in 1967 (until 1974) meant that historical writing had to operate in a politically charged atmosphere, often with limits on the freedom of research, and in particular during the reign of the colonels. Eventual transition to democracy in 1974, therefore, had a strong impact on historiography. A parallel to the other Balkan countries can be found in the pre-war heritage, which in the Greek case weighed even more heavily, as there was no attempt to establish a new master narrative after 1945: academic historiography had developed in nineteenth-century Greece in close connection with nation-building, contributing especially the idea of continuity between the ancient, Byzantine, and modern Greeks. The master narrative of Greek national history for almost a century was created by Constantinos Paparrigopoulos in his multi-volume *Istoria tou ellinikou ethnous* [History of the Greek Nation] (1850–74). William McGrew summarized the pre-war heritage: ‘The most obvious consequences of this academic commitment to patriotic ideals were a

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37 For example, Nikolai Todorov’s *The Balkan City* 1400–1900 (Seattle, 1983); orig. pub. as *Balkanskijat grad XIV–XIX vek* (Sofia, 1972).

solipsistic and highly nationalistic tone to much historical writing and a preoccupation with diplomatic and political history to the exclusion of social and economic themes. Historiography also suffered from its relative marginality vis-à-vis archaeology and ancient studies: the first chair for Modern Greek History was established only in 1937.

Political conditions after the Civil War re-enforced the patriotic orientation of Greek historiography, after the communists’ ultimate defeat in 1949. Liberal and left-wing intellectuals either kept silent or went abroad: the Marxist historian Nikos Svoronos, for example, settled in France. The publication of his Histoire de la Grece Moderne [History of Modern Greece] (1953) cost him his Greek citizenship. Most research on the history of ‘modern’ Greece focused on patriotic topics such as the liberation war of the 1820s, the ‘Macedonian Struggle’, and the ethnic continuity of the Greeks. The divisive issues of occupation and resistance during the Second World War and of the Civil War were not treated by academic research: their interpretation was dictated by the victorious side of the Civil War.

Innovation in history-writing during the early post-war period was linked with Constantinos Th. Dimaras, who established the ‘Enlightenment School’. Dimaras was mainly interested in the ‘history of consciousness’ and in particular the Greek enlightenment, integrating the history of modern Greece in European currents. His influence became evident in publications of the 1970s and 1980s on Greek enlightenment intellectuals, science, the history of literature, and so on. Historians from this ‘school’ framed their interpretation of Greek history in concepts of Westernization, Europeanization, rationalization, modernization, and their opposite forces.

The end of military dictatorship in 1974 and the establishment of democratic rule eventually brought about a ‘revolution in Greek historiography’. The previously suppressed communist narrative of war-time resistance and the Civil War came to the fore. Marxist approaches gained strong influence in the social sciences and historiography. Furthermore, the recent experience of dictatorship and the lack of economic development initiated research on the causes of Greek ‘backwardness’. The two most notable post-1974 trends thus concerned research on the ‘problematic’ 1940s and on retarded modernization.

The interpretation of the events during the Second World War and Civil War became the litmus test for students of contemporary Greek history. After 1974 a ‘revisionist’ narrative emerged which examined communist-led resistance against

43 Kitroeff, ‘Continuity and Change’, 247.
war-time occupation, not only through the prism of the communists’ wish to take power. For academic historiography it took longer to tackle these issues, as the 1940s continued to be a sensitive topic. The first two conferences on these issues were organized in London and Washington in 1978, and the first extensive studies on war-time occupation were written by foreign scholars. The exploration of resistance and Civil War was also obstructed by limits on the access to archival records in Greece, and much of the new research was therefore based on foreign archives. The disappearance of the ‘communist threat’ from the north in 1989 further liberated the historiographic discourse about resistance and Civil War. In 1995, the first conference in Greece on the period 1935–49 took place, followed by other conferences on the Civil War. The social aspects of resistance and Civil War also came to be studied; Georges Margaritis’s best-selling *Istoria tou ellinikou emfylion polemou* [History of the Greek Civil War] (2001), for example, approaches the military events from the point of view of everyday life. Other studies on the Civil War and its aftermath touched on previously taboo subjects, such as the fate of political exiles in Eastern Europe and the position of the Slavic minority in Greece. At the same time, however, new studies with an anti-revisionist fervour were published which stressed the ‘red terror’.

The second major post-1974 trend was the study of the origins of Greek ‘backwardness’. In political history, clientelism emerged as the dominant concept to explain the particularities of the Greek political system after independence (1831). Other historians searched for answers in the economic development. In the 1980s, economic history became ‘trendy’ and experienced a significant surge. Cases in point were the conference ‘Economies Mediterraneennes: Equilibres et intercommunications, XII–XIX siècles’ in Athens in 1983 (published in three volumes in 1985 and 1986), and research projects funded by two major Greek banks on the economic development of modern Greece. This research aimed at identifying the historical impediments of modernization. The fact that such important research was funded either by the National Council for Research or by commercial banks is telling: the new approaches in Greek historiography developed mostly outside the major universities, which only hesitantly opened their doors to the new generation of historians. Nevertheless, during the last years Greek historiography has significantly broadened its methodological approaches and range of topics.

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In 1989–91, communist dictatorships came to an end in Bulgaria, Romania, Yugoslavia, and Albania. In 1991–2 Slovenia, Croatia, Macedonia, and Bosnia-Herzegovina declared independence, leaving Serbia and Montenegro in a rump Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. Years of war and ethnic cleansing would ensue in the former Yugoslavia. These upheavals impacted on historiography in different ways: on the one hand, the end of communist dictatorship brought freedom of expression; on the other hand, the region faced economic displacement (with the exception of Slovenia). During the 1990s, institutions had little money for technical improvement, staff and faculty were cut, subscriptions of journals were often discontinued, and the purchase of books was limited to the very minimum. Even at the beginning of the twenty-first century, wages at state institutions in most post-socialist countries remain very low. Political conditions were also not always favourable in the 1990s, as nationalist forces gained strength and put pressure on historians. In the former Yugoslavia, historians suffered from the wars, especially in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo. In Bosnia-Herzegovina, non-Serb historians were pushed out of the Historical Institute in Serb-controlled Banja Luka, and most Serb historians left Sarajevo after the outbreak of war in 1992. The Institute for Oriental Studies and the National Library in Sarajevo were shelled by Serb troops, and much of their unique collections went up in flames. In the town of Mostar, divided into a Croat and a Muslim part, historical institutions were segregated as well. In Kosovo (a province of Serbia until its declaration of independence in February 2008), Albanian scholars had been expelled from the official institutions when Serbia abrogated the autonomy of the province in 1989–90, and established their own, unofficial institutions. In 1999, when Serbian troops had to leave Kosovo after the NATO intervention, Kosovo-Albanian historians returned to the official institutions, while Serb historians left for Serbia proper.

The most significant positive change for historians was the establishment of freedom of expression. Notably, it was in Romania where ‘The Declaration of Free Historians’ was launched on 24 December 1989—only two days after the overthrow of the dictator Ceaușescu—demanding respect for the truth and rejecting nationalism. Historians and, more broadly, society felt a need for the

46 On the development of historiography after socialism, see Alojz Ivanšević (ed.), Klio ohne Fesseln? Historiographie im östlichen Europa nach dem Zusammenbruch des Kommunismus (Vienna, 2002); and Brunnbauer (ed.), (Re)Writing History.


48 Ibrahim Gashi, ‘The Development of Kosovar Historiography after the Fall of Communism’, ibid., 317–32.
‘renovation’ and ‘reconstruction’ of history and the ‘correction’ of deviations imposed by the communist regime. The public discourse abounded with historical references, as history became instrumental for the construction of post-socialist identities and political legitimacy. The public also longed for popular histories and juicy ‘revelations’: thus, much of the new historical literature came from outside the profession.

One of the challenges for historians was to provide interpretations of the socialist period and to tackle previously taboo subjects. Most of this research concerned the establishment of one-party rule, stressing the violent nature of the communist takeover. Political repression and the collectivization of agriculture during the Stalinist period were explored as well. In Romania, the ‘National Institute for the Study of Totalitarianism’ was established at the Romanian Academy in 1993; but, this proved to be an attempt by the post-communist government to establish control over this part of the past. This institute became a major force of historical revisionism by attributing responsibility for communist crimes to the Soviet Union and domestic minorities—Jews and Ukrainians—while the period of national communism under Ceaușescu remained untouched. It took the liberal Romanian president Traian Băsescu to commission a detailed report on communist repression, in April 2006, which stimulated new research on this topic. The Romanian example also shows how the interpretation of the socialist past became part of the political power game between post- and anti-communist forces.

In the other south-east European countries, research on the socialist period has been less extensive. Apart from the Stalinist years, no other development from the socialist period has attracted systematic attention. Even in journals for contemporary history, only a minority of articles deal with the socialist period, and usually only its early years. There has been very little done on the social, cultural, and everyday life history of the socialist period. Few historians proposed interpretations of the systemic qualities of ‘real’ socialism and discussed the state–society nexus. More

53 Notable exceptions include Igor Duda, U potrazi za blagostanjem: O povijesti dokolice i potrošačkog društva u Hrvatskoj 1950-ih i 1960-ih (Zagreb, 2005); Daniela Koleva, Biografija i normalnost (Sofia, 2002); Predrag Marković, Beograd izmedju Istoka i Zapada, 1948–1965 (Belgrade, 1996); and Husnija Kamberović, Prema modernom društvu: Bosna i Hercegovina od 1945 do 1953 godine (Tesanj, 2000).
recently, though, attempts at general histories of the socialist experience have appeared in some countries.\textsuperscript{54}

The pre-socialist period was re-evaluated as well. There was extensive interest in the inter-war period and in historical personalities who had been stigmatized by communist historiography. These revisions were often politically charged. This was most evident in the former Yugoslavia, where nationalistic historians demonized the Yugoslav period in order to produce historical legitimacy for the independence of their country. In Croatia during the 1990s, for instance, the nationalist regime of President Tudjman (a former historian himself) put pressure on historiography to confirm the president’s vision of Croatian history as a continuous struggle of the Croats for independent statehood. New institutions were founded for that purpose (such as the Centre for Croat Studies at the University of Zagreb in 1993), whereas institutions deemed disloyal faced disadvantages.\textsuperscript{55} Revisionism had a political angle in other countries as well. In Romania, for example, nationalistic historians, together with right-wing parties, attempted to rehabilitate war-time dictator Marshall Antonescu, denying his role in the Holocaust.\textsuperscript{56}

Revisions did not imply, however, a change of paradigm. On the contrary, the nation remained in place as the most important frame for history-writing. In most countries of the region, this meant the ethno-nation reflecting the prevailing ethnic definition of nationhood. The new multi-volume Albanian history was not called ‘History of Albania’ but ‘History of the Albanian People’, covering also the Albanians living outside of Albania.\textsuperscript{57} In Macedonia, the most important projects of the Institute for National History, the five-volume \textit{Istorija na make-

donskiot narod} [History of the Macedonian People] and the \textit{Makedonski istoriski rečnik} [Macedonian Historical Dictionary] ignore the multi-ethnic character of the country. Throughout the region, historians also authored explicitly nationalistic books. In Bulgaria, for example, the prolific director of the National Historical Museum in Sofia, Božidar Dimitrov (2009–10 he was a member of the government as minister for the ‘Bulgarians abroad’), authored popular books which present a patriotic, mythologized version of Bulgarian history. He is also host of an equally nationalistic weekly TV show on Bulgarian history.

The national master narrative, however, did not go unchallenged. One of the most notable deconstructionist attempts was Lucian Boia’s study of myths in the

\textsuperscript{54} For example, Iskra Baeva and Evgeniia Kalinova, \textit{Bulgarskite prehodi 1939–2002} (Sofia, 2002); and Zdenko Radelic’, \textit{Hrvatska u Jugoslaviji 1945–1991} (Zagreb, 2006). I should also mention the Bulgarian book series of the ‘Institut za iszledvane blizkoto minalo’ (Institute for the Study of the Recent Past) in Sofia, which includes several innovative volumes on the social, cultural, economic, and political history of socialist Bulgaria (see http://minaloto.org/).


\textsuperscript{57} \textit{Historia e Popullit Shqiptar}, 2 vols. (Tirana, 2002).
Romanian historical consciousness. He pointed out the political conditionality of historical ‘truths’ dear to Romanians, such as the continuity and unity of the Romanian people since times immemorial. In Bulgaria, historians proposed new readings of the Balkans in the nineteenth century, putting the Bulgarian nation-building process into historical context. Such new interpretations were condemned, not only by nationalistic historians but also by leading politicians. Aside from the deconstruction of national master narratives, the vision of the homogeneous nation was complicated by emerging research on the history of minorities. The International Centre for Minority Problems and Inter-Cultural Relations (IMIR) in Sofia, for example, published several volumes on the history of the Muslims in the Balkans. In Romania, the history of the Romanian Jews became a well-explored field in the 1990s, and the history of the German and Hungarian minorities was also studied.

The predominance of national history is closely related to the continuity of political history, focusing on events as the paradigmatic approach. However, beyond the mainstream, new approaches have been emerging, in some countries building on traditions laid during the socialist period. The most conspicuous methodological change was the interest in the history of everyday life, often from the perspective of oral history. The establishment of new journals evinced this trend: Zgodovina za vse—Vse za zgodovino [History for Everyone—Everything for History] in Slovenia, OTIVM in Croatia (discontinued), and Balkanističen forum [Balkanological Forum] in Bulgaria. In 1994 the first journal devoted to social history in south-eastern Europe was founded: Godisnjak za društvenu istoriju [Annual for Social History], edited by the Belgrade-based Association for Social History. Approaches to social history still owe much to the ideas of the Annales. A good example is Rabotnici, vojnici, duhovnici [Workers, Warriors, and Clergy] (1997) by the Serbian medievalist Sima Ćirković. An outstanding example of long durée and comparative history is Bogdan Murgeşcu’s Istorie românească—istorie universală 600–1800 [Romanian History—Universal History, 600–1800] (1999). A notable representative of regional microhistory is Miroslav Bertosa, the eminent historian of the Istrian peninsula. The most consistent efforts at historical demography in south-eastern Europe are carried out at the Historical Research Centre of the Croatian Academy of Sciences in Dubrovnik, which edits the series Prilozi povijesti stanovništva Dubrovnika i okolice [Contributions to the Population History of Dubrovnik and its Surroundings].

58 Boia, Istorie şi mit în conştiinţa românească.
59 Diana Miškova et al., Balkanskiat XIX vek: Drugi novi pročiti (Sofia, 2006).
CONCLUSION

Historians in south-eastern Europe after the Second World War faced difficult conditions. Most of the time they operated in conditions of communist one-party dictatorship or, in Greece, right-wing (semi-)authoritarian rule, with clear limits on the freedom of expression. State-socialist regimes displayed especially strong interest in history, considering it a pillar of their ideological legitimation. Communist parties, therefore, imposed definite interpretations and rendered other topics taboo. However, even the imposition of Marxism–Leninism as the obligatory paradigm did not significantly change the positivist outlook of much of south-east European historical writing. Continuity with the pre-socialist period can also be seen in the focus on the nation, with increasingly nationalistic tendencies in the later decades of socialism. Beyond the dominant trends, though, innovative approaches appeared as well, building on foreign influences such as the Annales.

All south-east European historiographies also experienced democratic transition. This led to the rapid dissolution of previous interpretations, but not necessarily to paradigmatic changes. National history remained dominant after 1989, as did positivist approaches. But an increasing number of historians verged on new avenues, including oral history, historical anthropology, and cultural history. History-writing in south-eastern Europe is thus characterized by increasing pluralism and integration into international discourses. These developments, both in terms of changes and continuities, have to be measured against the backdrop of very difficult material conditions and, in the case of the former Yugoslavia, the dissolution of the country and the wars between 1991 and 1999. Especially in the former Yugoslavia, but also in other countries of south-eastern Europe, historians have been subjected to political pressure to conform to nationalist interpretations of the past. While some met these demands or even encouraged nationalism, most have been defending the professional standards of their discipline—sometimes at considerable personal risk.

TIMELINE/KEY DATES

1944–5 Establishment of communist rule in Albania, Bulgaria, Romania, and Yugoslavia
1946–9 Greek Civil War; communist defeat
1948 Yugoslavia breaks with the Soviet Union and its allies
1952 Greece joins NATO
1955 Albania, Bulgaria, and Romania join the Warsaw Pact organization
1967–74 Dictatorship of the Junta in Greece
1974 New Yugoslav constitution introduces far-reaching federalization
1980 Tito dies (r. since 1944)
1981 Greece joins the European Community
1985  Death of Albanian dictator, Enver Hoxha (r. since 1944)
1986  Beginning of Slobodan Milošević’s rule in Serbia (until 2000)
1989  Overthrow of communist dictatorship in Bulgaria (Todor Zhivkov, r. since 1956) and Romania (Nicolae Ceaușescu, r. since 1965)
1990  Multiparty elections in the republics of Yugoslavia
1991  End of communist dictatorship in Albania
1991–2 Slovenia, Croatia, Macedonia, and Bosnia-Herzegovina declare independence from Yugoslavia
1991  Armed conflict in Slovenia
1991/2–5 War in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina
1997  Breakdown of political order in Albania
1999  War in Kosovo, and NATO intervention against the Former Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro)
2000  Armed conflict between Macedonian security forces and Albanian guerrillas
2004  Slovenia joins the EU
2006  Montenegro declares independence from state union of Serbia and Montenegro
2007  Bulgaria and Romania join the EU
2008  Kosovo declares independence from Serbia

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Chapter 18

Athens and Apocalypse:
Writing History in Soviet Russia

Denis Kozlov

In January 1987 Atheneum Press in Paris produced an inconspicuous but interesting book—a biography of a leading Soviet historian of classical antiquity, Solomon Iakovlevich Lur’e, known to Western scholars as Salomo Luria. Published under the pseudonym of his late sister, the book was actually written by Lur’e’s son—another eminent Soviet historian, Iakov Solomonovich Lur’e. Apparently sceptical about the book’s chances for publication in his home country, the junior Lur’e preferred the time-honoured path of publishing in France and under a pseudonym. He was a scholar of Russian medieval chronicles, and this must have inspired him to invent a ‘provenance’ for his text. A short preface ‘From the Publisher’ claimed that the manuscript had been ‘discovered among the papers’ of Solomon Lur’e’s sister, a construction engineer, who ‘had always shown an interest in the humanities’, although wrote with the help of unnamed ‘specialists’.1 This presumably explained how a non-specialist could have written a book so unmistakably showing the expert hand of an historian deeply concerned with the fate of his profession in twentieth-century Russia.2

For that is what this biography, modestly titled_Istoriia odnoi zhizni_[A Story of a Life], is about. Incisively analytical, it raises the problems of continuity and disruption in Russian academic culture and historical knowledge across the catastrophic divides of the twentieth century. Written by one intensely reflective scholar about another, Lur’e’s book opens an illuminating window on the world of Soviet historians—on scholarly existence and human survival in a culture shaped by decades of ebbing and flowing political violence, social mobilization and exclusion, revolutionary radicalism and statist conservatism, internationalism, nationalism, and anti-Semitism. The story of the book’s publication by itself speaks volumes about this world.

One chapter of the book, titled ‘Athens and Apocalypse’, describes the atmosphere of 1937–8 in the History Department of Leningrad University, where Solomon Lur’e then taught, and his son and future biographer Iakov studied. The late 1930s had a formative impact on the Soviet historical profession. It was then that the official academic culture of research and teaching took shape, definitive scholarly works and textbooks were published, and important subterranean intellectual currents emerged. These years also ineradicably affected historians’ lives, thoughts, and memories. Arguably, Lur’e’s metaphor of ‘Athens and Apocalypse’ applies to all of Soviet historical thought and writing during the rest of the twentieth century.

The word ‘Apocalypse’ is understandable. The late 1930s marked the peak of mass arrests and executions, when history professors and students disappeared overnight without trace, and when the History Department chair became a revolving-door appointment, whose holders (Grigorii Zaidel, Arvid Drezen, Sergei Dubrovskii) quickly succeeded each other on the path to exile, imprisonment, or, for the first two, death. And yet, remembering the pervasive fear of those years, Lur’e later wrote not only of Apocalypse. According to him, one former student thus described 1937–8: ‘Horrible years! ... But once you start recalling the History Department of the time—[it was] Athens!’

‘Athens’ meant that the History Department of Leningrad University then employed a constellation of eminent scholars, who had been educated or even famous well before the Revolution of 1917: Vasilii Struve (history of ancient Egypt and Assyria), Boris Grekov (medieval Russia), Sergei Kovalev (ancient Greece and Rome), Osip Vainshtein (medieval West), Ivan Grevs (ancient Rome, medieval Italy), Olga Dobiash-Rozhdestvenskaia (medieval West), Sergei Zhebelev (classical antiquity), Evgenii Tarle (modern Europe and Russia), and Mikhail Priselkov (medieval Russia), to name a few. Solomon Lur’e, a 1913 graduate of Petersburg University whose first book came out in 1914, belonged to this group.

‘Athens’ also meant that these old-school historians enjoyed some academic freedom. For all the horror of 1937, and despite the fact that a few of them (Grevs, Tarle, Priselkov, Kovalev) had gone through imprisonment and exile shortly before, Lur’e noted that in the late 1930s they again found some comfort in their job. The Soviet historical profession was going through a conservative shift, under Stalin’s close supervision. In 1934 compulsory history teaching was restored in schools, while universities re-established history departments and then the formal defence of dissertations. The heyday of radical theories of the 1920s was over, as a targeted campaign destroyed their embodiment, the

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4 Lur’e, Istoriia, 163.
Pokrovskii School. Instead of theorizing, students were to study history in chronological sequence, learning names, dates, and events. Theory was streamlined, with old-school historians crucial in formulating the new canon. Of those named in the previous paragraph, in 1932–4 Struve adapted Marx to produce the ‘formation theory’ of historical development, organizing all history into a progression of five socioeconomic formations. From 1938, notably after Stalin’s article ‘O dialekticheskom i istoricheskoi materializme’ (‘On Dialectical and Historical Materialism’) in Pravda, and the simultaneously published Istoriia Vsesoiuznoi Kommunisticheskoi Partii (bol’shevikov): Kratkii kurs [Short Course of the History of the All-Union Communist Party], the formation theory would, for decades, dominate the established historical reasoning. In keeping with this theory, in 1932–9 Boris Grekov coined the notion of Kievan Rus as a ‘feudal state’—an interpretation that would prevail until Igor Froianov’s challenge in the early 1970s. In 1937–8, two definitive textbooks setting the new theoretical framework came out under Stalin’s guidance: Andrei Shestakov’s Kratkii kurs istorii SSSR [Brief History of the USSR] and the abovementioned Short Course. Opportunities for historical theorizing dwindled almost into non-existence, with the practice itself increasingly discouraged and unsafe.

What comforted the old professors was that, with history training re-established in a conservative form, their expertise was again in high demand. Theory was beyond their reach, interpretation via socioeconomic factors, class struggle, and the citing of the classics of Marxism was a must, but this meagre explanatory diet was enriched with topical supplements. Historians could immerse themselves in empirical writing about personalities and phenomena of political, diplomatic, military, or even cultural history, especially since the promotion of Russian nationalism from the mid-1930s made it possible to appreciate certain statesmen and thinkers of the pre-Soviet past. Above all, scholars of pre-revolutionary training could research, teach, and to a degree also write history in the forms they had learned in the old days. At Leningrad (formerly Saint Petersburg) University, this came to mean adherence to the principles of the so-called Petersburg School of historical thought.

Dating back to the 1840s–60s, the Petersburg School was based on fundamentally positivist notions—meticulous study of sources, allegiance to fact, and
(presumably healthy) conservatism of hypothesis. An ill-defined, elusive academic entity, ‘Petersburg School’ often figures in historiography as opposing the similarly elusive ‘Moscow School’, both originating in the pre-revolutionary era. To this day some ‘Petersburgers’ rather condescendingly describe ‘Muscovites’ as prizing a priori schemes and theories above the sacred value of the source and fact. Even before 1917, this description goes, Moscow School historians used evidence as a mere illustration for theories, rather than deducing theory from the entirety of carefully verified data. Some ‘Petersburgers’ also parallel the imperial Moscow School with the early Soviet Pokrovskii retinue. In this representation, ‘Moscow School’ becomes a euphemism, if not for unprofessionalism, then for scholarly subservience to political interest and ideological diktat.

This portrait is an exaggeration. Late imperial Moscow historians, above all Vasilii Kliuchevskii, profoundly influenced their Petersburg colleagues (thus, Grekov was Kliuchevskii’s student), and the two groups shared many similar premises about source and fact. During the Soviet years as well, the principles associated with the Petersburg School characterized a far broader culture of historical knowledge. Both Muscovites and Leningraders carried the ideal of evidential veracity to perfection, transforming the study of primary sources into a science as precise as possible. Furthermore, these pursuits matched government interests: it was Pokrovskii who initiated the foundation of the Moscow Historical Archival Institute in 1930. But while Pokrovskii envisioned it mainly as catering to the state bureaucratic needs, after his demise the Institute grew into a centre of comprehensive and characteristic history training. It became a hub of istochnikovedenie—the study of primary sources that, in the political milieu of twentieth-century Russia, gained both official recognition and countercultural significance, growing into a fully fledged academic discipline on a scale unmatched in the West.

Istochnikovedenie dated back to the mid-nineteenth century but especially owed its origins to the writings of Aleksei Shakhmatov and Aleksandr Lappo-Danilevskii—notably the latter’s 1910–18 Metodologla istorii [Methodology of History]. After a period of relative disregard in the early Soviet years, the discipline’s inconspicuous revival began in the mid-1930s, when the growing

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11 Paneiakh, Tvorchesstvo i sud’ba istorika: Boris Aleksandrovich Romanov (Saint Petersburg, 2000), 21–3, 266.
state demand for conservatively trained historians returned old-school professors to the forefront of education. In 1936–40 one of them, medievalist Mikhail Tikhomirov, taught *istochnikovedenie* at the Historical Archival Institute, co-authoring the first university textbook in the field. Aleksandr Andreev, a 1916 graduate of Petersburg University and a disciple of Lappo-Danilevskii, published another such textbook. In 1939 the Institute established a department (headed by Andreev in 1943–49) under the modest name ‘Auxiliary Historical Disciplines’, among which was *istochnikovedenie*. Another student of Lappo-Danilevskii, Sigizmund Valk, taught the discipline in Leningrad. Sixty years later the historian Olga Medushevskaia, herself a specialist in *istochnikovedenie* and a 1944 graduate of the Historical Archival Institute, would call the revival of source study during the Stalin years ‘a silent battle for the historian’s professionalism’.

What she considered essential to professionalism was the survival and revival of intellectual approaches originating before 1917—above all, the supreme value of evidential knowledge established through a scientific exploration of primary sources. For Medushevskaia and many other historians of her age, these approaches crystallized into the notion of the Petersburg School—as much a reality of imperial Russian historiography as a scholarly ideal and legitimating myth of origins created by its Soviet academic posterity.

Although explicitly formulated in the 1990s, this retrospectivist and somewhat mythological view of the historian’s craft took shape much earlier. It was a defensive reaction to the personal insecurity, ideological supervision, and relative international isolation that characterized the profession, especially during the Stalin years. In response, historians adopted a set of conservationist, revivalist, and deliberately positivistic approaches to their craft. Evidence was not only safer than interpretation, but was also the only way of withstanding interpretations imposed from above. In the 1940s, one historian often portrayed as the perfect incarnation of the Petersburg School, Boris Romanov, described his writing method as ‘building an impenetrable dam of facts’. Scion of a professorial family and a pre-revolutionary graduate of Petersburg University, Romanov endured prison and concentration camps in 1930–31, remaining effectively unemployed and destitute until 1941. After the war, when he taught at Leningrad University, his life was by no means prosperous either: he lived in a communal apartment, which had once entirely belonged to his father. Twentieth-century upheavals led old-school historians to appreciate the pre-revolutionary era as a time of relative academic tolerance, not to mention the material stability, dignity,  

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15 Mikhail Tikhomirov and Sergei Nikitin, *Istochnikovedenie istorii SSSR* (Moscow, 1940).  
and physical safety of a scholar. From here lay a bridge to historical writing: setting up the imperial past as an object of nostalgia led to the conservation, restoration, and emulation of the positivistic approaches of late imperial historiography. To use Lur’e’s metaphor, faced with the twentieth-century ‘Apocalypse’, many historians turned pre-revolutionary Russian academia into ‘Athens’.

The ethos of loyalty to source and fact characterized not only scholars of imperial vintage but also many of their junior, thoroughly Marxist and Soviet colleagues educated in the 1920s and 1930s.\textsuperscript{20} Nor was politically motivated retreat from theory into the safety of data unique to Soviet historians. University professors of the 1880s–1910s had been far from seeing their environment as one of complete freedom. Ivan Grevs experienced political persecution, not only in the Soviet 1920s but also in 1899, when the minister of education, Bogolepov, dismissed him from teaching at Petersburg University. Before 1917 historians also chose empiricism to avoid extra friction with the authorities over theory.\textsuperscript{21} Rather than a story of clandestine resistance, deliberate subversion, or internal emigration, then, it makes sense to view the intellectual history of the Soviet historical profession as part of the evolution of the Russian intelligentsia’s values, which for several decades existed in a symbiosis with Soviet ideology, but which also contained the seeds of this ideology’s demise.

Positivism was one such seed, although many Soviet and late Imperial historians would refrain from openly calling themselves positivists. In the 1890s positivism entered a pan-European crisis as intellectuals, Russian Silver Age thinkers among them, attacked its scientistic aspirations.\textsuperscript{22} Factographic pedantry repelled Lappo-Danilevskii, the principal theorist of istochnikovedenie, who aspired to include his study of sources in an over-arching methodology of history based on cultural, psychological, and philosophical principles. He viewed primary sources not as unquestionable receptacles of facts, but as cultural phenomena subject to contextualization and critique.\textsuperscript{23} Soviet social scientists and philosophers, too, inherited a sceptical attitude to positivism, if not from fin-de-siècle critics then from Plekhanov and Lenin who had frowned on its anti-philosophical, ‘mechanistic’ nature.\textsuperscript{24} And yet, arguably, positivism was never displaced in modern Russian historical thought. The idea of a rational, scientific organization of knowledge and society had too strong an appeal, serving as the intelligentsia’s banner, at least since the times of Chernyshevsky.\textsuperscript{25} The clout of

\begin{flushleft}20\ Liubov’ Sidorova, \textit{Sovetskaia istoricheskaia nauka serediny XX veka: Sintez trekh pokolenii istorikov} (Moscow, 2008), 99–103, 252–3.
21\ Rostovtsev, \textit{A. S. Lappo-Danilevskii i peterburgskaia istoricheskaia shkola} (Riazan’, 2004), 58, 66.
23\ Rostovtsev, \textit{A. S. Lappo-Danilevskii}.
24\ Igor Narskii, \textit{Marksistskoe ponimanie predmeta filosofii i pozitivizm} (Moscow, 1959), 16–32.
25\ Norman Pereira, \textit{The Thought and Teachings of N. G. Chernyshevskij} (The Hague/Paris, 1975), 35–41.\end{flushleft}
the scientific method blurred boundaries between sciences and humanities, offering itself as a general mode of existence—a panacea for social evils and ethical ills.

Historians, too, professed the ideals of scientific objectivity and factual certainty. Lappo-Danilevskii envisioned his methodology as a comprehensive knowledge system that would turn history into an exact science. And Solomon Lur’e remained a lifetime proponent of historical determinism, ‘laws of social development’, and the transplantation of the methods of natural sciences into history. Until his death (1964), he kept a portrait of Charles Darwin on his desk. During the Soviet years, the scientific ideal became central to the officially endorsed culture of enlightenment and cognition. Fact was an important category in this culture, whether in hard sciences or the humanities. Indeed, there was no such distinction in the Soviet taxonomy of academic disciplines. All scholarly domains were called ‘sciences’, with added specifications of ‘exact sciences’, ‘natural sciences’, or ‘human sciences’ (гуманитарные науки). History, along these lines, was classified as a human science, and thus yet another domain of facts. Far beyond academia, all audiences generally presumed fact, scientific alias historical, to be a useful category of inquiry.

Although the resilience of positivism in the Soviet humanities may have had outward parallels with the West, where conservative scholars remained loyal to positivistic principles despite the twentieth-century fluctuations of intellectual fashion regarding the relativity of knowledge, the political and ethical connotations of (historical) fact were peculiar to the Soviet environment. In the Soviet context, the notion of fact was more loaded—and more explosive. Universal reverence for factual knowledge potentially endangered all politically authorized historical representations: an ideology professing loyalty to facts was vulnerable to a fact-based criticism of its own tenets. The critics championed the same ideals and spoke the same language as those whom they criticized, thus being nearly immune to censorship and censure. Memoirs about eminent Soviet professors trained by pre-revolutionary teachers often mention a programmatic, almost defiant rejection of theory and self-limitation to factography. This was factography with a meaning. Tongue-in-cheek evidential scepticism of a savant toward crass ‘theoretical’ pronouncements became a mode of scholarly and ethical survival. Allowing for logical manoeuvre, the flawless command of raw

27 Rostovtsev, A. S. Lappo-Danilevskii, 89–90.
28 Lur’e, Istoriia, 124.
data was both an established criterion of professionalism and a safe intellectual
haven for historians and their audiences. Positivism gained a new life during the
Soviet years—and we may say, a double life. Officially legitimate, the use of
evidence assumed qualities of unobtrusive sarcasm and *fronde*, allowing its
practitioners a legitimate niche for intellectual existence. This was not a concep-
tual positivistic stance—conceptualizing it was risky, and historians were not
necessarily against all the fundamentals of the established doctrine. By its nature,
too, positivism is ill-fitted for doctrinal revolutions and conceptual break-
throughs. But this was precisely its advantage in the Soviet context.

The above may explain why so many old-school historians welcomed the
conservative shift of the mid-1930s. Iakov Lur’ë remembered the pleasure that,
even in the most perilous years 1937–8, his father derived from teaching, espe-
cially from instructing students in the art of primary source exploration. In his
lectures and writings Solomon Lur’ë smuggled thoughts on the nature of tyrant-
ny, which, although inspired by Graeco-Roman history, were applicable to
modern times.32 Wondering why his father had not been denounced on making
these transparent allusions, the junior Lur’ë surmised that his words fell on
sympathetic ears. Indeed, from the late 1930s through the early 1980s, when the
last of them passed away, historians of pre-revolutionary training were remark-
ably successful in attracting youth and creating schools of thought. Old profes-
sors were exquisitely attentive to their students, building close personal ties with
them, inviting students to their apartments, and forming home-based ‘circles’ for
in-depth study. In doing so, they continued the tradition of imperial Russian
academia, where such private circles had been the norm.33 Students reacted with
appreciation, seeing their mentors as not only authorities in the field, but also
models of broad erudition and high ethical standards.34 The younger ‘red
professors’ educated during the 1920s and 1930s—for example, Militsa Vasil’evna
Nechkina—also practised this traditional circle-forming and passed on to their
students the same reverence for the source and fact.35

The immediate pre-war moment saw the writing of several influential works in
Russian history. In 1939–41 Boris Romanov wrote his *Liudi i nravy Drevnei Rus*
[People and Customs of Ancient Rus], sometimes described as a precursor of studies
in Western medieval history such as Emmanuel Le Roy Ladurie’s *Montaillou*
(1975).36 Romanov did not lay grand claims to the conceptual novelty of his
book, but his cultural history of pre-Mongol Rus went against the grain of the
predominantly socioeconomic reasoning of contemporary historiography.

34 Benjamin Tromly, ‘Re-Imagining the Soviet Intelligentsia: Student Politics and University
He also subtly questioned Boris Grekov’s dominant view that Rus was a feudal society, instead suggesting the archaic, pre-feudal nature of social relations during the twelfth and thirteenth centuries. His opposition to Grekov delayed the book’s publication: it came out only in 1947. Notably, Romanov wrote much of the book in exile, banished 100 kilometres away from Leningrad during the war against Finland.\(^{37}\) In 1941, Nikolai Rubinshtein’s Russkaia istoriografiia [Russian Historiography] saw the light of day. The magisterial 650-page volume traced historical writing in Russia from the seventeenth to the early twentieth century, for the first time treating appreciatively the work of many imperial historians. Characteristically, Rubinshtein devoted several chapters to the history of istochnikovedenie, and discussed at length nearly every historian’s approach to primary sources.

The recorded experiences of Soviet historians from the late 1930s and most of the 1940s do not support the opinion that this was a ‘barren’ period of ‘stifling intellectual climate’ in the historical profession, as opposed to the presumably dynamic, theory-packed 1920s, the Pokrovskii epoch.\(^{38}\) There are indications that many historians actually preferred the conservative, empiricist forms their profession took after the mid-1930s to the seeming dynamism and theoretical flamboyancy of the Pokrovskii years. Although during the 1930s and 1940s ‘revising history to suit political needs became a standard practice’,\(^{39}\) this observation equally pertains to the earlier Soviet years. Be it in the 1920s or later, history was heavily politicized, inescapably holding the historian hostage to present-day power games. It would be naive to think that experienced historians who had lived through decades of war, political turmoil, and privations did not realize this or believed in any absolute objectivity of their writings. And yet the Pokrovskii-style deliberate recruitment of political interest, purposeful extrapolation of contemporary ideas onto the past and theorizing at the expense of evidence, on the basis of a trendy idea, was something they detested as intellectually unsound and ethically unclean. Rather than simply an endorsement from above, it was this deep-seated professional aversion to Pokrovskii’s presentism and evidence-bending that explained why so many historians turned against his school with such vengeance in the 1930s. Even in the early twenty-first century one cannot but notice the satisfaction with which established historians—disciples and successors of the ‘Athenians’—describe the downfall of Pokrovskii’s theories.\(^{40}\)

Given the Soviet-era continuities with the positivistic tradition of imperial Russian historiography, I do not share the view that ‘Stalin’s war on historians

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\(^{37}\) Paneiakh, Tvorcestvo, esp. 177–80.


\(^{39}\) Ibid.

\(^{40}\) Andrei Dvornichenko, Vladimir Vasil’evich Mavrodin: Stranitsy zhizni i tvorchestva (Saint Petersburg, 2001), 16–17.
destroyed the great traditions of Russian historical writing.\textsuperscript{41} The relationship between political power, repression, and historical writing during and after Stalin was nuanced, with much carryover across the 1917 divide. In the final tally, the late imperial, Stalin-era, and post–Stalin historical thought shared fundamental intellectual premises. The commonalities were not only ideological (empire, nationalism, leader cults),\textsuperscript{42} but also, and primarily, epistemological—a similar culture of historical knowledge.\textsuperscript{43}

If the late 1930s brought together ‘Athens and Apocalypse’, the late 1940s and early 1950s were, to follow Iakov Lur’e’s formulation, ‘Apocalypse without Athens’.\textsuperscript{44} The nationalistic and anti-Semitic campaigns of 1948–53 did not match the scale of the physical extermination in 1937–8, but the moral climate of the new repressive surge compared to, if not eclipsed that of, the late 1930s. The post-war campaigns targeted the sciences, arts, and literature, creating the atmosphere of pervasive, suffocating intellectual conformity.\textsuperscript{45} Endorsed by the new party cadre, this conformity erased much of the ‘Athens’ of professional discussion. In 1949, Solomon Lur’e was fired from Leningrad University on the absurd charges of the lack of patriotism in publishing the first- to third-century AD Bosporic Inscriptions (following the traditional practice, he wrote comments to the inscriptions in Latin rather than Russian).\textsuperscript{46} In 1948–9, similar charges of ‘unpatriotic’ scholarship were brought against his colleague Boris Romanov, whose \textit{People and Customs of Ancient Rus} allegedly was too pessimistic and did not glorify the military exploits of medieval Russian warriors. Romanov lost his hard-earned job at Leningrad University.\textsuperscript{47} In Moscow, charges of ‘bourgeois cosmopolitanism’ hit, among others, prominent medievalists Evgenii Kosminskii and Aleksandr Neusykhin.\textsuperscript{48} In 1951 (as in 1937), Evgenii Tarle apparently escaped arrest only because of Stalin’s personal interference.\textsuperscript{49}

Repression was hard to predict. Anti-Semitism was the most obvious reason: many ethnically Jewish historians had their research, dissertation defences, and publications blocked. Some, like Sofia Feigina, Faina Kogan-Bernshtein (Moscow), Solomon Lur’e, and Osip Vainshtein (Leningrad) were fired; others, like Mikhail Rabinovich (Leningrad), arrested.\textsuperscript{50} But historians of other ethnic

\begin{itemize}
  \item Markwick, \textit{Rewriting}, 39.
  \item For example, Nicholas Riasanovsky, \textit{The Image of Peter the Great in Russian History and Thought} (New York, 1985).
  \item See also Sidorova, \textit{Sovetskaia}.
  \item Lur’e, \textit{Istoria}, 179.
  \item V. D. Esakov and E. S. Levina, \textit{Delo KR: Sudy chesti v teorii i praktike poslevoennogo stalinizma} (Moscow, 2001).
  \item Lur’e, \textit{Istoria}, 197–205.
  \item Paneiakh, ‘Boris’, 208–14.
  \item Aron Gurevich, \textit{Istoriia istorika} (Moscow, 2004), 34–46.
  \item Boris Kaganovich, \textit{Evgenii Viktortovich Tarle i peterburgskaia shkola russkikh istorikov} (Saint Petersburg, 1995), 98–100, 59–60.
origins could also be accused of ‘bourgeois nationalism’. Ermukhan Bekmakhanov, the first Kazakh ever to defend a doctoral dissertation in history (1946), was censured in 1948–50 for his allegedly nationalistic dissertation-based monograph on Kazakhstan in the 1820s–40s.\textsuperscript{51} Deprived of his doctoral degree and professorship at the Kazakh State University, Bekmakhanov worked as a rural schoolteacher until September 1952, when he was sentenced to twenty-five years in concentration camps. Ethnic Russians were not safe either. Fortunes reversed in a matter of months: thus, Romanov received an award for his book in 1947 but severe criticism the year after. Punitive action could also follow a too obvious revival of imperial historiographic traditions. In 1948, Rubinshtein’s \textit{Russkaia istoriografiia} became the target of a large-scale vilification campaign for its ‘bourgeois objectivism’, which in this case meant paying too much respect to pre-revolutionary historical writing.\textsuperscript{52} The discipline of \textit{istochnikovedenie} underwent a repressive campaign of its own. In 1948 charges of bourgeois cosmopolitanism and ‘objectivism’ hit Aleksandr Andreev who, along with Sofia Feigina, presumably overemphasized Peter the Great’s borrowings from the West.\textsuperscript{53} In 1949, Andreev, a vocal proponent of \textit{istochnikovedenie}, was fired from the Moscow Historical Archival Institute on charges of uncritically reproducing the ideas of his pre-revolutionary teacher Lappo-Danilevskii. In Leningrad, another former student of Lappo-Danilevskii, Sigizmund Valk, faced similar charges of bourgeois objectivism for his 1948 article, in which he cautiously reasserted a continuity of the Petersburg School method and \textit{istochnikovedenie} across the 1917 divide.\textsuperscript{54} In this situation, when just about anything could bring the authorities’ wrath, historians exercised extra caution. The late 1940s and early 1950s witnessed the stalling of several multi-volume collective histories, the main form of historians’ activity at the time.\textsuperscript{55} The writing became increasingly doctrinal and schematic.

Stalin’s death in March 1953 brought much relief. Several historians were released from prison camps and exile, such as the scholar of classical antiquity Aristid Dovatur (imprisoned 1937–47, rehabilitated 1955), the historian of Central Asia Lev Gumilev, and Sergei Dubrovskii, one surviving ex-chair of the History Department at Leningrad University from the 1930s. Some long-delayed books, such as Feigina’s monograph on the Åland Congress of 1718–19,


\textsuperscript{51} Ermukhan Bekmakhanov, \textit{Kazakhstan v 20–40 gody XIX veka} (Almaty, 1947).

\textsuperscript{52} A. N. Shakhanov, ‘\textquote{Bo}r’ba s “ob’ektivizmom” i “kosmopolitizmom” v sovetskoi istoricheskoi nauke: “Russkaia istoriografiia” N. L. Rubinshteina’, in \textit{Istoria i istoriki: istoriograficheskii vestnik: 2004} (Moscow, 2005), 158–85.

\textsuperscript{53} Sidorova, \textit{Sovetskaia}, 41–2.


\textsuperscript{55} Ivan Kuznetsov, \textit{Istoria i istoricheskoi nauki v Rossi i s 1917 g. do nashikh dnei} (Novosibirsk, 2008), 128–9.
were published. Many previously fired historians found jobs in the field, if not of the same calibre: thus, Romanov returned to teach at Leningrad University, but his colleague Solomon Lu’e had to move to Odessa and then to Lviv. Bekmakhanov was rehabilitated in 1954, but his doctoral degree and professorial rank were not reinstated, so he had to defend and publish a new dissertation. His first book remained in classified library depositories until 1991.

Known as the ‘Thaw’, the political and cultural shifts of the 1950s and 1960s set many trends in Soviet society that lasted until, and beyond, its collapse. One such trend was the gradual, uneven, yet visible decline of the conceptual paradigm in historical writing and teaching that had emerged under Stalin. The Khrushchev leadership was closely involved in revitalizing the discipline. However, histories written under Stalin could not be simply discarded: in order to stay legitimate, the regime had to maintain an image of continuity with its origins, and this dictated extreme caution in revising historical narratives. Apparently, few political leaders or historians knew how to proceed. As in many other undertakings of the Thaw, the shifts in the historical profession were not an orderly reform, but a matter of trial and error.

There was no absolute divide between the Stalin and post-Stalin years in Soviet history-writing. First, the main elements of ideology and historical theory remained largely the same before and after 1953–6. The ousting of Stalin-era historical narratives was not completed during the Thaw, or even long after. A few textbooks were shelved, notably the *Kratkii kurs* (1959) and its middle-school companion by Shestakov (1955), while new ones replaced them—above all, Boris Ponomarev’s *Istoria Kommunisticheskoi partii Sovetskogo Sotuza* [History of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union] (1959), which would remain, with additions, the staple party history textbook until 1991. Yet other textbooks survived longer: the last, twenty-second edition of the tenth-grade *Istoriia SSSR* [History of the USSR] edited by Anna Pankratova came out as late as 1963, the first one dating back to 1940. The more notorious passages were altered or removed, but textbook rewriting often took the form of patching up, with separate paragraphs, sentences, ideas, and names added, subtracted, or redone, but with the main body and message of the text surviving intact.

Second, some historians who became harbingers of change during the Thaw had established themselves during the Stalin years, and their revisionist work had originated in the late 1940s–early 1950s, or even in the 1920s. A famous example was Arkadii Sidorov, whose ideas about the uneven development of Russian capitalism, its coexistence with archaic economic structures and active state supervision dated back to the 1920s. In 1948–9 Sidorov taught a course on Russian imperialism at Moscow University, where among his graduate students were Mikhail Gefter, Pavel Volobuev, Konstantin Tarnovskii, Andrei Anfimov,

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Viktor Danilov, and Aron Avrekh—historians who would form the core of the so-called New Direction in the late 1950s–60s, challenging the Short Course interpretation of Russian capitalism and the origins of the revolution. Their first publications appeared before, or very shortly after, Stalin’s death.58

Third, and perhaps most important, the professional culture of Soviet historians, the toolbox they used in their craft during the Thaw and subsequent Soviet decades, had been formed in the late 1930s and 1940s and inspired by pre-1917 examples. In its positivistic aspects, this culture deliberately perpetuated important elements of the pre-revolutionary academic tradition and intelligentsia’s approaches to knowledge. Arguably, it was not so much a formal restructuring of the historians’ activities as this traditionalist professional culture that gave the post-Stalin shifts in historical writing and teaching a direction and lasting significance.

In May 1953 the Central Committee appointed a new editorial board for the only existing nationwide academic history journal, Voprosy istorii. During the next couple of years the new board, led by Anna Pankratova, published several programmatic articles calling for freedom of historical polemics, greater autonomy from political supervision, and easier access to primary sources. The journal made the first attempts to undermine the Short Course, calling, if not for revision then at least for a discussion of some of its themes, by itself a radical call at the time.59 Voprosy istorii also cautiously tried to rehabilitate some Western and pre-revolutionary Russian historical scholarship.60 Direct challenges to the Short Course came after Khrushchev’s attack on Stalin at the Twentieth Party Congress, primarily affecting the most politicized field, Soviet history, but benefiting other fields as well. Within a year after the February 1956 Secret Speech, the journal published several articles undermining the Stalin version of the revolution and the Civil War. Two articles by Pankratova’s deputy, Eduard Burdzhalov, argued that Lenin and Stalin had had strategic disagreements in the spring of 1917: Stalin siding with his future victim Lev Kamenev, and Lenin standing closer to another future victim of the terror, Grigorii Zinoviev.61 The reformist line in Voprosy istorii was nicknamed ‘Burdzhalovite’, with the journal’s readers (mostly professional historians) splitting into ‘Burdzhalovites’ and ‘anti-Burdzhalovites’. Throughout 1956 each party held meetings and conferences, with hundreds of people passionately debating controversial issues of the Soviet past.62

the springs of 1956 and 1957, Pankratova and her deputies frantically tried to publish as much as possible to disprove the Short Course. Historian Rafail Ganelin, who saw Pankratova during her summer 1956 visit to Leningrad, noticed her remarkable tension and nervousness: ‘One could sense that she felt at the very centre of a deadly, critical struggle, fully realized that, and would not retreat.’63 Before various audiences, she hastened to expose and compromise the behind-the-scenes machinery of Stalin-era historical construction, such as the production of the 1938 film _Alexander Nevsky_. In general, Ganelin observed, Pankratova’s behaviour was completely out of line with her status—one of the highest in the Soviet historical profession.

Although sounding like a rebel and dissident in 1956, Pankratova was a devoted communist—a member of the Central Committee who had for decades displayed ultra-orthodox behaviour. She was the principal author and editor of the high-school history textbook in use from 1940 to 1963. However, Reginald Zelnik’s telling biography of Pankratova suggests that her conduct in 1956 was the logical culmination of her life.64 A revolutionary, a disciple of Pokrovskii, a woman who had to break up with her husband as he was accused of Trotskyism, her orthodoxy had come at the price of deliberately subjugating private life and scholarly beliefs to the party ‘line’.65 She did so out of conviction rather than fear: under Stalin, she often boldly expressed her opinions directly to the top authorities, but in the end would always submit to party discipline, apparently more important for her than her individual opinion. After the Twentieth Congress, Pankratova must have felt that the leadership’s views were finally harmonious with her own, that the moment of truth had come. She probably suspected that this moment would be brief, and desperately rushed to do as much as quickly as possible. Ganelin remembers that in the summer of 1956 she openly mentioned the possibility of her arrest.66 It never came to that, but reprisals did follow. After the Hungarian Revolution in October, as the Khrushchev leadership adopted a harsher stance toward the press and the intelligentsia, _Voprosy istorii_ became a target of media criticism. On 9 March 1957 the Central Committee censured the journal for serious ‘theoretical and methodological mistakes’. The editorial board was reshuffled, and Burdzhalov lost his deputy editorship. Pankratova kept her post but, in the spirit of such campaigns, had to repent publicly in an editorial acknowledging her journal’s mistakes, the old ‘bourgeois objectivism’ foremost among them. This she did, once again submitting to party discipline—four days before her death.67

63 Ganelin, _Sovetskie_, 130.
65 Ibid., esp. 17–18.
66 Ganelin, _Sovetskie_, 131.
When measured against her biography, Pankratova’s self-sacrificial reformism of 1956–7 shows that even the most orthodox historians had been profoundly affected, indeed formed by their country’s twentieth-century upheavals. Orthodoxy neither came easily, nor necessarily brought peace of mind. Far from making them immune to reflection, by the end of the Stalin years (and probably much earlier), the historians’ life experiences and professional culture came into conflict with the ideological offices they had to perform. This inner tension may explain the paradoxical enthusiasm with which some of the previously most loyal and established historians greeted the Thaw.\footnote{Markwick, \textit{Rewriting}, 50.}

The \textit{Voprosy istorii} episode also showed the narrow limits of conceptual change in the historical profession, not only because of its tight ideological boundaries, but also because historians were unprepared for drastic reconceptualizations. Debates on whether Stalin had sided with Lenin or Kamenev in 1917 worked along the lines of the Thaw-era ‘back to Lenin’ drive, exempting Lenin’s image from a compromising association with Stalin, and to some extent casting a shadow on the Short Course historical doctrine. But Pankratova and Burdzhalov hardly had, or sought, a radical alternative to this doctrine. Although they recognized its flaws, for them it was not only dangerous but unthinkable to adopt the views of, say, liberal Western or émigré Russian historiography. A genuine reconceptualization of Soviet history needed decades to emerge.

Perhaps most importantly, the \textit{Voprosy istorii} controversy taught historians a lesson in the tactics of professional behaviour. The ‘heresy’ of Pankratova and Burdzhalov was not so much conceptual as \textit{conspicuous}. The path of large gatherings and passionate open debates was not something the academic, or any other, establishment would tolerate. Loud, scandalous calls for change were not an option, and disturbers of public peace would be prosecuted. In discovering this, the seasoned historians Pankratova and Burdzhalov proved not far from the young students imprisoned as ‘anti-Soviet’ activists during the same year, 1956–7, for quite innocent yet public outbursts of enthusiasm about the liberating spirit of the Thaw.\footnote{Kathleen Smith, ‘A New Generation of Political Prisoners: “Anti-Soviet” Students, 1956–1957’, \textit{The Soviet and Post-Soviet Review}, 32:2–3 (2005), esp. 193–200.} Something similar happened to other attempts at historical revisionism during the 1950s–early 1970s: the ‘New Direction’ thesis about archaic ‘multi-structuredness’ and heavy state impact in the late imperial Russian economy, discussions of collectivization, the debate about the ‘Asiatic mode of production’, Mikhail Gefter’s methodology seminar and polemics in the party committee at the Moscow Institute of History, or fiery arguments around specific books, such as Aleksandr Nekrich’s \textit{1941, June 22} (1965). Most such debates had, or eventually acquired, a political component, sometimes leading, as in Nekrich’s case, to grave consequences for the troublemaker.\footnote{Aleksandr Nekrich, \textit{Otrebi’s ot strakh: Vospominanii’ istorika} (London, 1979), 119–83, 211–351.} No one was arrested any more,
but conspicuous challenges to the established interpretation still translated into political accusations and administrative action. This applied particularly to twentieth-century Russian history, whereas historians of distant epochs and lands enjoyed less political scrutiny and greater autonomy, at times successfully defying academic orthodoxy. Thus, in the 1970s, Igor Froianov rejected the dominant notion of pre-Mongol Rus as a feudal society and a state, instead proposing an archaic, communal and city-state sociopolitical order. Recent historiography suggests that it was the New Direction’s concept of Russia’s ‘multi-structuredness’ that inspired Froianov’s hypothesis. Still, although his work was published, Froianov did face major extra-academic obstacles in advancing his ideas. 71

The stories of these revisionist efforts have been discussed in the literature. 72 Here I would like to focus on a less eye-catching but equally if not more effective path by which intellectual change took place in Soviet historical scholarship. With a radical revision of orthodox interpretations discouraged, new ideas could more safely advance via unobtrusive evidential reasoning, working slowly from within the existing interpretation, rather than attempting to refute it squarely. Not incidentally, the insistence on ‘facts taking precedence over schemas’ became almost a motto among historians during and after the Thaw, most visibly in twentieth-century Russian history. 73

Perhaps the most significant and lasting development in the Soviet historical profession during the 1950s and 1960s was the revival of istochnikovedenie. From the mid-1950s the number of scholarly publications and textbooks in this field grew exponentially. The term itself as the name of a scholarly discipline became a steady presence, not only in history but also in literary studies, linguistics, and ethnography. 74 In 1956 the Academy of Sciences revived an imperial tradition by re-establishing the long-defunct Commission of Archeography—the theory and methodology of publishing written primary sources. Led by Mikhail Tikho-mirov, the author of the first textbook on istochnikovedenie, the commission began publishing in 1957 its prestigious yearbook, Arkheograficheskii ezhegodnik [Archeography Yearbook]. 75 Academic publications quietly started rehabilitating


72 For example, V. V. Polikarpov, ‘Novoe napravlenie’ 50–70-kh gg.: Posledniaia diskussiia sovetskikh istorikov’, in Sovetskaiia istoriografiia, 349–400; Markwick, Rewriting; and Tsamutali (ed.), Konstantin Nikolaevich Tarnovskii: Istorik i ego vremia (Saint Petersburg, 2002).

73 Sidorova, Ottepel’, 18–19, 63, 172–5.

74 Pavel Berkov, Vvedenie v tekhniku literaturovedcheskogo isledovaniia: istochnikovedenie, bibliografiiia, razyikanie (Leningrad, 1955); Aleksandra Liublinskaia, Istochnikovedenie istorii Srednikh vekov (Leningrad, 1955); Viacheslav Strel’skii, Istochnikovedenie istorii SSSR (Moscow, 1962); and Lingvisticheskoe istochnikovedenie (Moscow, 1963).

Lappo-Danilevskii’s name. Methodic study of sources, with veracity of evidence as the top criterion of sound knowledge, took pride of place in historical research.77

Above all, historians wanted access to the sources that were in shortest supply—those on the country’s twentieth-century past. Although incomparable to the archival revolution of the 1990s, for their time the developments of the Thaw produced an archival revolution in its own right. Archives became more accessible: in 1957, 23,000 researchers were admitted there, as opposed to a mere 4,000 in 1947.78 In 1960, archives were transferred from the purview of the police (Ministry of the Interior) to the direct supervision of the USSR Council of Ministers. Archival citations in books and articles on Soviet history became a professional standard. In a remarkably short span of time historians produced an impressive array of documentary publications on the Soviet and Russian past. In 1955–62, the journal *Istoricheskii arkhiv*, now issued on a bi-monthly basis and not irregularly, as before, became famous for publishing new and often controversial archival documents on Soviet history—something for which the journal was eventually closed in 1962.79 If a recent (admittedly incomplete) guide is any indication, the Thaw years witnessed the highest intensity in the publication of historical document collections in the USSR and Russia between 1917 and 1991 (see Table 1).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Years</th>
<th>Book-length document collections published in Russia and the USSR, 1917–91, number of titles</th>
<th>Titles per year, average</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1917–24</td>
<td>179</td>
<td>22.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1925–32</td>
<td>450</td>
<td>56.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1933–40</td>
<td>271</td>
<td>33.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1941–45</td>
<td>186</td>
<td>37.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1946–53</td>
<td>217</td>
<td>27.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1954–61</td>
<td>825</td>
<td>103.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1962–69</td>
<td>759</td>
<td>94.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970–77</td>
<td>481</td>
<td>60.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1978–85</td>
<td>613</td>
<td>76.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1986–91</td>
<td>600</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>4581</td>
<td>61.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 1. Document collections published in Russia and the USSR, 1917–9176

78 V. V. Zhuravlev et al. (eds.), *XX s’ezd KPSS i ego istoricheskie real’nosti* (Moscow, 1991), 243; on the ‘archival revolution’ of the 1950s: Kuznetsov, *Istoriia*, 142.
79 Markwick, *Rewriting*, 264.
The rapid growth began in 1955, when seventy-one document collections were published—more than ever since 1927, and certainly more than the twenty-three titles published in 1952, sixteen in 1953, and sixteen in 1954. Given the length of the publishing process, many books that came out in 1955 had probably been put together and launched into production in 1953–4. But it was the year 1957, with no less than 252 titles, that marked the absolute annual peak in the number of document collections produced in Russia and the Soviet Union between 1917 and 2000. This year alone surpassed the total of such source publications for the late Stalin years, 1946–53 (217).\(^8\) Collections were just one of many forms of publishing sources, and the picture is numerical rather than qualitative (thus, collections on Soviet history routinely excluded various undesirable documents), but even this picture is telling. Although many documents published during the late 1950s and 1960s were less provocative than those published in the late 1980s–early 1990s, in the scope of publishing primary sources even the Gorbachev years may not have matched the Thaw.

The source publications during the Thaw era were characteristically inconspicuous, presuming the self-explanatory power of evidence, although editors occasionally inserted ‘politically correct’ comments. Similarly inconspicuous, yet important for the audience trained in reading for fine detail, was the penetration of unorthodox data into historical scholarship. Thus, in his 1964 monograph on revolutionary Petrograd at the outset of the Civil War the Leningrad historian Anton Fraiman quietly contradicted Stalin’s version of the origins of the Red Army. Fraiman treated with transparent scepticism the staple textbook claim (originating in Stalin’s pronouncements) that on 23 February 1918 the Bolshevik forces had defeated the German army near Pskov, thus giving the Red Army a symbolic military baptism. Except for one controversial memoir, Fraiman commented wryly, ‘It has not been possible to find other documents reflecting the military action in this sector of the front’.\(^8\) His description conveyed a clear impression of scholarly disbelief—something his well-trained professional audience was sure to notice. He might have had a personal stake in this evidential revisionism. Back in 1940, the young associate professor Anton Fraiman had occupied the precarious seat of the History Department Chair at Leningrad University. When a graduate student of his was expelled from the party for ‘ideological and political mistakes’ in a dissertation, Fraiman had to leave his post—an ominous precedent at the time.\(^8\) In the early 1950s his

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\(^8\) While many publications were occasioned by the revolution’s fortieth anniversary, other anniversaries yielded fewer such collections: 40 (1947), 125 (1967), 63 (1977), 126 (1987).

\(^8\) Anton Fraiman, Revoliutsionnaja zashchita Petrograda v fevrale-marte 1918 g. (Moscow/Leningrad, 1964), 101.

own doctoral dissertation was attacked by ‘Stalinists’—the term one historian-memoirist used.  

During the late 1950s and especially 1960s, historians of the early Soviet period began discreetly mentioning the names of major figures of the Revolution and the Civil War unmentionable earlier: those executed or imprisoned under Stalin. Fraiman’s 1964 book is a good example, as it fully displayed this tactic. With hundreds of archival references, yet without too much verbal rattle, he showed how crucial for the building of the early Soviet state and military had been those who would later perish in the purges. Unobtrusively, yet noticeably for his readers, he named Ieronim Uborevich and Ioakim Vatsetis, Aleksandr Egorov and Romual’d Muklevich, Vlas Chubar and Stanislav Kosior, Valentin Trifonov and Vladimir Nevskii, to list a few who had played a major role in the Civil War and were later executed and forgotten. Along with other historians, writers, and journalists of the 1960s and after, Fraiman worked in the tradition of positivistic revisionism, making evidence speak for itself, and appealing to the informed audience who had mastered the skill of reading the small print and between the lines.

Academic history seldom attracts many non-specialist readers, and it is safer to speak not so much of a direct societal impact of these scholarly efforts as, rather, of historians being part of larger processes in the cultural-intellectual landscape. For the broad Soviet reading audience during and after the Thaw, historical evidence was never just evidence. The desire for evidence as free from interpretive interference as possible, the distinct preference for raw data over the arts and crafts of textual construction was not an abstract or academically pure intellectual quest. The yearning for ‘facts’ originated in the political and historical context of twentieth-century Russia, first of all in the context of state violence, which from the early 1960s was firmly associated with Stalin’s name. With the massive, even if subdued, literary and journalistic polemic of those years on the legacy of twentieth-century mass political violence, something we may call ‘the Solzhenitsyn factor’, historical polemicists increasingly traced the Soviet historical doctrine and narrative back to the same source as the terror—to Stalin, thereby compromising the narrative and the doctrine beyond repair.  

A common premise was that the textbook rendition of history deliberately concealed authentic evidence on sensitive historical topics from the public, subjugating data to distorted, politically motivated interpretations. The most sensitive topics were the upheavals and calamities of the recent past—the Revolution, the Civil War, collectivization, the mass executions of 1937–8, and the Second World
War. Here evidence was most lacking, and a hunger for factual information most pressing. As new data became available, it immediately entered the fray of political debates. During the late Soviet decades, history enjoyed a broad audience that desired new unorthodox data, taking it as those facts which, by their sheer weight alone, were capable of undermining propagandistic historical dicta.

Furthermore, with the image of Stalin and his time severely undermined, the educated society of the late 1950s–80s was increasingly turning to the more distant past, first early Soviet (the ‘back to Lenin’ movement) and then pre-revolutionary Russian, in search of new continuities, origins, and sources of legitimacy. Building bridges to the past across the Stalin period became one of the most visible and important dimensions in late Soviet culture. The pre-revolutionary era had an increasingly powerful sway in this culture, with imperial and even medieval Russian legacies ever more widely revered.85 This broad historical turn interacted with retrospectivist trends in academia. Whereas in the late Stalin years, old professors looked more like endearing relics of the irrevocable past (although the endearment was symptomatic), from the Thaw the authority of pre-revolutionary intellectual culture grew significantly among the intelligentsia. To develop Iakov Lur’e’s metaphor, as the Apocalypse was named openly, the appeal of the bygone intellectual and academic Athens became increasingly powerful.

Fact remained a much-celebrated word in late Soviet culture, academic and otherwise. The legitimacy of the notion of scientific fact was not massively disputed in the 1960s or later, although scholars were, of course, mindful of its limitations. Soviet historians were aware of the contemporary polemic in the American historical profession about objectivity and the historical fact, but this awareness led them only to reconfirming the complexity of fact, and not at all to questioning or denying its existence. Moreover, reading about Carl Becker’s or Charles Beard’s struggle over the notion of fact produced a good deal of sarcasm among their Soviet counterparts. ‘The beautiful building of positivist historical methodology was blown up. Among the smouldering ruins, the historical fact was writhing in deathly agony’, the famous medievalist Aron Gurevich wrote somewhat jeeringly about these American debates in 1969.86 Gurevich, who always was a non-conformist (in the very same year, 1969, he lost his job at the Institute of Philosophy for a book disputing the established interpretation of feudalism), and whose innovative work introduced the ideas of the Annales School to Soviet medieval studies, cannot be suspected of ideological servility or anti-Westernism. Rather, his defence of the notion of historical fact, and

86 Gurevich, ‘Chto takoe istoricheskii fakt?’ in Sigurd Shmidt (ed.), Istochnikovedenie: Teoreticheskie i metodologicheskie problemy (Moscow, 1969), 74 (quotation), 75–82, 84, 86.
sarcasm toward its American critics, need to be interpreted in the larger epistemological context of the Soviet historical profession. The context was the mindset of the intelligentsia, in which, under the impact of twentieth-century historic catastrophes, the idea of precise factual knowledge assumed special political and ethical values—both official and culturally sceptical.

Late Soviet professional and popular historical conversations were often not so much about the text as about the subtext, and they were carried out with a rich subtext as well. As if having agreed to keep an open secret with regard to the widely known yet not fully mentionable tragedies of the past, informed authors adopted a public language of hints and allusions, euphemisms and understatements, suggestive parallels and transparent allegories. The subversive use of historical evidence was part of this language, producing a sarcastic strategy of small gains and inconspicuous steps, of piecemeal, gradual undermining of the propagandistic narrative, of cracking it here and there with small factual devices. This was not only an epistemological but also an ethical and political quest. Authors rejoiced when they managed to insert a small charge of factual explosive into their text, so subtle that even censors would not notice it and would let it make its way into print. Censors, for their part, excelled at catching those devices and plucking them out. And readers thoroughly enjoyed finding the little factual gems that had survived the censor’s office amidst the bulk of unremarkable printed matter, reading with an eye to nuances and between-the-lines intimations. The more significant the topic, the more satisfying the small victories would be.

In the late 1980s and early 1990s the attack on the Stalin version of history became considerably more radical, destroying much of the Short Course legacy in historical writing and teaching. This process, however, was rooted in the polysemantic retrospectivist culture of historical knowledge that had taken shape between the late 1930s and the 1960s. Not incidentally, professional and public approaches to the past during the Gorbachev years greatly resembled the ideas of the Thaw. Many influential proponents of Gorbachev’s reforms, such as Aleksandr Yakovlev and Iurii Afanasiev, were historians who had matured in the 1950s and 1960s, and saw the perestroika as a continuation of the Thaw’s unfinished business. 87 The language of the 1960s, when historical polemists described a departure from the Stalin-era narrative as the ‘restoration of historical truth’ (vostanovlenie istoricheskoi pravdy) or ‘return of forgotten heroes’ (vzvraschenie zabytykh geroev), came back in the late 1980s. Retrospectivist terminology at once highlighted the perceived abnormality of the Stalin period and illustrated the continued attention to the past as a source of explanations and legitimacy. 88 Evidence played a supreme role in this culture: the emphasis on discovering new data about the so-called blank spots of history—the terror, the

87 Zhuravlev et al. (eds.), XX s’ezd, 4, 414.
Civil War, collectivization, the Second World War, or formerly unmentionable or classified personalities—was crucial during the *perestroika*, just as it had been during the 1960s.

Despite its positivistic outlook, then, the late Soviet reverence for the historical fact was not entirely positivistic in nature. The desire for evidence was not innocent of interpretation, above all a political one, as authors and readers were predisposed to a critical, politically charged reassessment of established historical dogmata. Although this description primarily characterizes Russian history, historians of all fields were profoundly affected as individuals and professionals by the twentieth-century upheavals in their country—the Apocalypse about which Iakov Lur’ë wrote in the biography of his father. In this post-catastrophic cultural landscape, restoring a continuity of traditional, pre-revolutionary Russian academic practices and legacies acquired the significance of rebuilding intellectual and ethical normalcy.

What was the lasting impact of these processes on historical thought and writing? On the one hand, reverence for evidential knowledge enabled Soviet historians to produce a wealth of meticulously researched, factually rich scholarship that retains importance today. On the other hand, the cultivation of traditional intellectual approaches led to a conservation of historical thought, a programmatic neglect of theory, and a general lack of receptivity to new ideas and concepts even when those became available. The political functions of Soviet historical positivism probably explain why this approach to knowledge was not significantly challenged until after 1991, and why even in post-Soviet Russia the challenges have been limited. As late as the first decades of the twenty-first century, the traditional, effectively Soviet structure of professional training and curricula at university history departments, as well as the criteria for dissertations, have remained largely unchanged. Educational institutions that structurally, rather than occasionally, incorporate Western approaches to history, such as the European University in Saint Petersburg, are still fairly exotic. No doubt, with much greater freedom of publication and teaching, increased possibilities for travel and international exchange, translation of scholarship, and the arrival of a new generation of young historians, the gap between Russia and the West in approaches to history narrowed significantly during the two post-Soviet decades. And yet the gap has not closed. Russian historical writing remains epistemologically very distinct from its Western counterpart. In their reverence for fact, Russian historians, and perhaps Russian thinkers in general, have taken a manifestly different path from the one taken by contemporary Western intellectuals with their interest in the constructedness and conditionality of any, particularly historical, text.

Arguably, what explains the resilience of the fact-oriented Russian culture of historical knowledge is that, despite the collapse of the Soviet order and its historical doctrine, many political and intellectual factors that created this culture remain in place. The acute politicization of history and the polemic about the...
historical legacy of twentieth-century state violence are far from over in Russia. One indication is the Presidential Commission for Counteracting the Falsification of History Contrary to the Interests of Russia, created by the Putin–Medvedev administration as recently as 15 May 2009. The efforts of the Commission, and the government-sponsored history textbook projects, focus on reinterpreting the Stalin period from a nationalist-statist viewpoint, which feeds on new revivalist trends in society but also faces unyielding opposition among the intelligentsia. As parties trade accusations, historical evidence retains much political weight and public authority beyond academia. In this context, the positivistic emphasis on the fact, and the self-consciously traditionalist academic/public culture that promotes it, is unlikely to disappear soon. The legacy of ‘Athens’ in Russia continues to be strong.

TIMELINE/KEY DATES

1917 Russian Revolution
1934 Compulsory history teaching restored in schools
1937–8 Peak of the terror
1938 Istoriia Vsesoiuznoi Kommunisticheskoi Partii (bol’shevikov): Kratkii kurs published
1953 Stalin’s death
1956 Khrushchev’s Secret Speech
1991 Collapse of the Soviet Union
2009 Establishment of the Presidential Commission for Counteracting the Falsification of History Contrary to the Interests of Russia

KEY HISTORICAL SOURCES

Froianov, Igor, Kievskaia Rus’: Ocherki sotsial’no-ekonomicheskoi istorii (Leningrad, 1974).
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89 For example, Ekho Moskvy radio station: http://echo.msk.ru/blog/echomsk/597289-echo/ (accessed 7 June 2009).
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Several intellectual currents fused to produce the emergence of modern African historiography, such that by the 1940s a comprehensive preface had already been written. First, the global black intellectual movement, expressed in the politics of Pan-Africanism and in cultural developments such as the Harlem Renaissance of the 1930s, argued that the knowledge of African history was key to the understanding of the past and future of black people. W. E. B. Du Bois and a number of African-American writers had justified the need for African history tied to the notion of racial liberation from white domination. This was a powerful statement that regarded history as an agency of power; an extensive broadening of the historical imagination to make far-reaching political statements. What is now known as ‘Africana Studies’, a congregation of disciplines around the understanding of black issues, grew out of a sustained Pan-African political agenda spearheaded by activists to affirm the contributions of peoples of African descent to the emergence of the modern world.\(^1\) The centrality of African history in a comprehensive package of Africana Studies was crucial, thus creating one of the opportunities to insert the teaching of African history into American universities.

Second, within Africa itself, a tradition of indigenous writing had already demonstrated the richness of the continent’s history. Amateurs were writing about their peoples and cities, kings and queens, priests and diviners, genealogies and dynasties. They were also using their texts to make a case for rapid changes—a clear affirmation that knowledge was indeed a route to power. In some cases the argument was that the achievements of the past were being stalled, and a set of new leaders was needed to implement a host of new ideas on modernity.

The third current that moved writing about Africa to the mainstream academy began in the 1940s during the era of decolonization, the transfer of power from Europeans to Africans, and the creation of independent nations. This reality became mirrored in the historiography that was born when Europe’s control of

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The Chronology of African Independence
Africa was in its last stage. Africans wanted to assert themselves politically, create new nations, reject the idea of black inferiority and white supremacy, and attack the colonialist views that had debased their cultures. Europeans began to shape the future of African history, inserting it into a global academic framework. The success of the European expansion became part of national and international histories, while growing nationalism in Asia and Africa had to be studied as part of ‘overseas history’. The two compelling forces of overseas history in Europe and of nationalism in Africa combined to produce a new field of African history that was established in the 1940s as a stand-alone field, rather than as an appendage to colonial history. The study of Africa acquired legitimacy and it gained worldwide attention in the 1950s; it was expanded in the 1960s and beyond; and it has been in a permanent state of rethinking and revision since the 1970s.

In 1948 the University of London established the School of African and Oriental Studies (SOAS), which pioneered research and teaching about Africa in England. Roland Oliver was appointed as the first lecturer, and his impressive memoir has documented the history of this era. Establishing the academic foundation and reproducing the structures and institutions of teaching and research took a familiar academic pattern. A handful of universities and scholars interested in Africa successfully created a network between 1945 and 1960 that established academic journals, persuaded publishers to publish monographs and textbooks, sponsored conferences, and published proceedings. Courses on Africa were introduced to the curricula in various universities in the West. Similar steps were taken in Africa as new universities were established, leading to the production of undergraduates interested in Africa and an initial set of graduate students who pioneered several aspects of the field from the late 1950s onward. Journals began to emerge, such as the *Journal of African History* and *Cahiers d’Études Africaines*, both established in Europe in 1960, and gaining an instant reputation. By the 1960s the core of the Africanists at the time had become confident enough to initiate major works of synthesis that announced the fruits of research conducted in the previous four decades. In 1962 the International Congress of Africanists recommended to UNESCO the sponsorship of a ‘General History of Africa’ to be written from an African perspective, with a deliberate stress on the contributions of Africans to their history rather than the highlighting of European activities in Africa as most of the writings of the colonial period had done. A year later, the Organization of African Union promoted a similar proposal that was endorsed by UNESCO in the same year. Between 1981 and 1993 the UNESCO *General History of Africa* appeared in eight volumes, edited by leading African pioneer scholars who all subsequently also made a name for themselves as administrators and/or politicians. In 1965, Oliver teamed up with John Fage, who joined the institute in 1959 and also distinguished himself, to initiate the eight-volume

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Cambridge History of Africa, later published between 1975 and 1986. Both the UNESCO and Cambridge volumes, even when they were somewhat dated by the time the last volume appeared, captured the themes that dominated African history for the greater part of the twentieth century. In the 1950s and thereafter, other institutions for promoting African history emerged in Africa, Europe, and North America. In the United States the field expanded, sometimes along with black studies, in the context of struggles for civil rights. Key popular figures emerged who were able to promote the study of Africa to a broader market: Basil Davidson in England, Jean Suret-Canale in France, and Melville Herskovits in the United States. All European countries and those in the Western hemisphere joined in the study of Africa, making it a global academic project. Those who studied Africa became united by their concerns to understand the ‘Other’ (Westerners wanting to understand Africa, Africans wanting to understand the West), by the use of a variety of sources, and by belief in the need to study at least one African language.

The creation of the infrastructures to produce knowledge—some of which are itemized above—was as important as the knowledge that was generated. For, it should be asserted, the climate was strongly suggestive that African history was not even possible. Even at the very peak of the enthusiasm by a pioneering generation of Africanists, it was not unusual to dismiss them, as in the often-invoked statement by Hugh Trevor-Roper, the Regius Professor of Modern History at Oxford, who asserted in 1963 that it was not feasible to write about Africa beyond the areas touched by the European contacts that left written materials. As he concluded, ‘there is only the history of the Europeans in Africa. The rest is darkness and darkness is not a subject of history’.

When the possibility of African history was not being dismissed, a Eurocentric paradigm was being imposed on the knowledge about Africa: Africans made no contributions to civilization; whatever history they had was characterized by violence and migrations, and their recent progress was made possible by colonial subjugation. What the new generation accomplished was to affirm the possibility of African history. This was tremendous progress which ultimately inserted African history into the mainstream and made it an enduring academic field. By the 1990s it had become anachronistic to exclude Africa from many programmes or to eliminate it from the teaching of world history, and subsequently of globalization and ‘empire’ broadly defined.

With the achievement of legitimizing African history came another success: the use of a variety of new sources, most notably oral traditions. The widely held assumption before the 1940s was that without written sources, history-writing was not possible. African history sought the legitimation of oral sources. The methodology to use it (and also to prevent its abuse) developed and reached a level of sophistication by the 1960s. There was also the recognition of a

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3 Jan Vansina, *Living with Africa* (Madison, Wis., 1994).
multidisciplinary approach that would draw from archaeology, anthropology, linguistics, and other disciplines to reconstruct the past of preliterate societies. Methodology was emphasized as a critical preface to the historical narrative.5

The emergence of African history during the era of decolonization and the global politics of the Cold War influenced the choice of many topics, as well as their presentation. The premises of colonial historiography of the pre–Second World War era had to be challenged. The orientation during the colonial era was to legitimize the European conquest, to present Christianity as a superior religion, to attribute the important changes to colonial reforms, and to treat Africans as mere colonial subjects who were used and abused, and whose lands were conquered and occupied by a superior race. A new historiography began to reclaim the history of pre-colonial Africa, presenting it as transformative and politically progressive. It was connected with world civilization, as in the case of presenting the history of ancient Egypt as part of African history, or of the achievements of the entire Lower Nile. The negative characterization of Africans—docile, lazy, savages, and so on—began to give way to a more positive and nuanced treatment, and to the recognition that the societies that they created were neither monolithic nor static.

It was not that the history of the colonial period was rejected in preference for the pre-colonial. Indeed, the bulk of available evidence made it possible to write about the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. What had to be questioned was not the relevance of the era but its exaggeration as being the most important phase in African history, as bringing so many changes that a dichotomy had to be created between a so-called barbaric past and a modernizing present. Many studies examine the imposition of the colonial powers, the administrations, the changes and reforms, and the responses by Africans. Resistance to colonial rule became a fashionable subject, with Africans who collaborated in the system castigated as unpatriotic.6

The writings of the 1940s to the mid-1960s were infused with an infectious optimism. The underlying belief was that the continent, freeing itself of colonial rule, was about to ‘take off’ to a new era of economic and political progress and stability. The dominant modernization theories of the 1950s suggested that the historical transitions in Africa, from precolonial, to colonial, and then to the postcolonial were synonymous with institutional transformations for the better. The continent and its peoples, as various essays and books documented, were neither stagnant nor devoid of innovations, and the idea of a primitive continent began to fade from most publications. The cumulative scholarship that emerged is characterized as nationalist historiography—an approach that enabled Africa-nists to structure their narratives around a set of identifiable issues, and created

opportunities for African scholars to occupy centre stage in the reconstruction of the histories of their own people.

NATIONALIST HISTORIOGRAPHY

As Africans obtained their higher degrees and became pioneer educators in African universities, they not only broadened the knowledge of African history, but pushed it toward an ideological orientation that they called an Africanist perspective, or what is commonly labelled as nationalist historiography. The idea was that history must project the positive elements in the past and articulate the interests of the nation. Historical narratives should uplift the peoples, their identities, values, cultures, and vision. If the colonized subjects could use nationalism to struggle to get rid of their conquerors and governors, they should also use the same ideology to get rid of dominant imperialist ideas and replace them with local ones. Africans must take control of their histories, and the knowledge of the past must guide their future. It became a political issue for Africans to take the initiative in writing about themselves, creating new syllabi and generating a set of new textbooks. African scholars, like politicians and administrators, regarded themselves as nationalists with a self-appointed mission to create new nations.

The concerns of nationalist historiography shared much in common with the reasons that instigated the creation of the discipline in Europe in the context of decolonization. First, the motivation of nationalist historiography was clear: to produce new texts that would reveal the contributions of Africa to world civilization and to human development, and the leadership qualities that had led to the creation and management of states and had developed social, economic, and political institutions. New scholarship offered impressive ideas on the civilizations of Kush, Aksum, and ancient Egypt to support the claim that Africa was an instigator of civilization rather than a mere recipient. The latter is presented as an African civilization with the longest-lasting history of over two thousand years. Other kingdoms received considerable attention: Ghana, Mali, and Songhay in the Western Sudan, and Great Zimbabwe in southern Africa.

Second, the highlighting of African contributions was to demonstrate the historicity of precolonial societies and their integrity before the colonial invasions of the late nineteenth century. The emphasis of historical writing was on the large and successful kingdoms and their kings, clearly presenting evidence of state formation and successful leadership.

Third, non-written sources were to be accepted as both authentic and legitimate in writing about Africa. African history prides itself on the adoption of new approaches, most notably the use of oral sources and findings from archaeology, anthropology, and other disciplines. The argument is that voices that have been silenced in written records can become empowered to talk about the past in meaningful ways. A focus solely on written records, when it is recognized that many parts of the continent were lacking them, was regarded as an attempt to erase significant voices and thereby silence the past. Archaeological findings became integrated with history, more so as they yielded evidence on the antiquity of Africans. The works by Richard Leakey, Desmond Clarke, Thurstan Shaw, Peter Shinnie, and S. K. and R. J. McIntosh were integrated into methodologies that could interpret data in a way that reconstructed the precolonial past. These archaeologists contributed to the historiography, especially in correcting some of the colonial and Westernized views of Africa as the ‘Dark Continent’. For instance, McIntosh and McIntosh’s work on Jenne-jeno shows that the city predated Islam, contrary to the Arabic and colonial texts that referred to Jenne-jeno as a product of Islam and trans-Saharan trade. Similarly, Peter Schmidt’s (and others’) work on the history of iron technology in East Africa concluded that the production of iron and steel was an independent invention in Africa. These works have been very helpful in correcting the narrative of Africa’s backward technology. Archaeologists have also shown the richness of indigenous innovations in plastic arts in general, as Thurstan Shaw shows in Igbo-Ukwu and Frank Willett in Ile-Ife. The conclusions in other disciplines such as historical linguistics, anthropology, art history, and botany were similarly adopted and integrated into an historical methodology that led to the production of highly respected works such as those of Christopher Ehret and Jan Vansina.

The combined thrust of the adoption of non-written sources and a multidisciplinary approach was to make the argument that the histories of non-literate societies must be produced differently, especially in terms of the recovered evidence from the past. Africanist historians showed the value of oral traditions, promoted the writing of new chronicles by amateur historians as a way of expanding sources, and encouraged undergraduate students to pursue projects on local histories in order to reveal hidden data and the past of those ignored in

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12 Daniel McCall, Africa in Time Perspective: A Discussion of Historical Reconstruction from Unwritten Sources (Boston, 1964).
national narratives. The most famous apostle of the use of oral sources was Jan Vansina, who formulated a set of methodologies following his own study of the Kuba in equatorial Africa. His book, *Oral Tradition* (1961), was widely adopted and produced such loyal followers as E. J. Alagoa of Nigeria, who applied it to the study of his own people in the Niger Delta and dedicated a lifelong career to defending its tenets. The expectation that a new methodology and approach would lead to home-grown theories and models that would create a distinctive type of history-writing has yet to succeed. How history is defined and written—with all the apparatus of research and reporting—remain essentially Western.

The establishment of the first set of university colleges after the Second World War provided the needed intellectual space to develop African history. These universities, notably those at Ibadan in Nigeria, Legon in Ghana, and Makerere in Uganda, were themselves products of nationalist demands and agitations. As the first set of African scholars became lecturers, they saw themselves as the intellectual leaders of the new nations. The knowledge that was generated, variously labelled under the rubric of the Ibadan School of History, the Legon School, and the Dar es Salaam School, falls within a nationalist historiography.

At Ibadan, K. Onwuka Dike, who in 1950 became the first African to obtain a Ph.D. in African history, blazed the trail. His main book, *Politics in the Niger Delta* (1956), used largely archival data to reveal the nature of Euro–African relations, giving a lot of credit to African entrepreneur-rulers cast as ‘patriots’ defending the collective interests of their nationalities. He advocated the use of oral traditions, arguing that the lack of documentary records did not mean the absence of history, although it was not until much later, in the 1980s, that he co-authored a book that derived from extensive field interviews. In the 1950s he worked with others to create the Nigerian National Archives without which the documents to write on Nigeria would have been much harder to locate. More importantly, he and a small core of lecturers revised the syllabi at Ibadan to emphasize the teaching of African history, and also established the Ibadan History Series, later edited by J. F. Ade Ajayi, which published the revised theses of those who completed their Ph.D.s in the 1960s and 1970s, and a few non-Africans who adopted a nationalist tone. Along the same line, the Legon History Series was established under the eminent aegis of Adu Boahen, with distinguished titles on the Akan-speaking peoples and others.

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The primary concern of this group of scholars and their students was to convince the outside world that their people had a history. To demonstrate the depth of this history, they pointed to a long-established tradition of historical consciousness that preserved historical data in songs, proverbs, chants, ceremonies, and other agencies. The use of oral traditions became central to training a new generation of students, in spite of objections in some academic circles that they were not reliable or credible for reconstructing the past. The preserved traditions, in combination with Arabic documents and European-derived archives, were combined to create a new scholarship on African civilizations and kingdoms, and various principal historical events. Interest in precolonial Africa led to a host of significant publications by a crowd of talented historians such as Bethwell A. Ogot, who became a leader in the study of East Africa, Robin Law, Terrence Ranger, and Ivor Wilks. The celebration of the relevance of oral traditions, however, is not necessarily reflected in the majority of these writings. The best-studied areas of Africa and the leading themes have been those where written evidence had been generated, notably Islamic societies (for example, works produced on the jihads of the nineteenth century), areas with missionary and European penetration (for example, coastal areas such as the Bight of Benin, Lagos, Dahomey, Sierra Leone, Liberia), and the colonial era (countless works on European administrations in Africa).

The celebration of precolonial history allowed nationalist historians to make many ideological and polemical statements with far-reaching academic consequences. First, they argued that indigenous Africa exhibited enormous capacity for self-transformation. Africans were not passive, merely letting time pass them by without the capacity to change their lives and society. There were leaders—kings, chiefs, priests, queens—who had intelligence and leadership qualities to create and manage institutions. To create what was deemed an acceptable parallel to Western civilization, they adopted the labels and terminologies of the state in the West and represented Africans as doing similar things to create state structures, kingdoms, empires, and cities. Institutions of democracy, governance, and commerce had African equivalences as well, all presented to reveal that Africans, like Europeans, were endowed with the habits of civilization and statesmanship. In the same vein, aspects of culture, notably art and religion, were presented to

16 Toyin Falola has brought the leading essays of members of this generation together in accessible collections published by Africa World Press: Igbo Religion, Social Life and Other Essays by Simon Ottenberg (Trenton, 2006); Igbo Art and Culture and Other Essays by Simon Ottenberg (Trenton, 2005); Myth, History and Society: The Collected Works of Adiele Afigbo (2005); Igbo History and Society: The Essays of Adiele Afigbo (Trenton, 2005); Nigerian History, Politics and Affairs: The Collected Essays of Adiele Afigbo (Trenton, 2005); Africa in the Twentieth Century: The Adu Boahen Reader (Trenton, 2004); The Challenges of History and Leadership in Africa: The Essays of Bethwell Allan Ogot (Trenton, 2002); and Tradition and Change in Africa: The Essays of J. F. Ade Ajayi (Trenton, 2000).

place Africa on the same pedestal as that of Europe. That Africans did what Europeans did, had what Europeans had, and were capable of doing all that Europeans could do, represented a legitimacy- and respect-seeking approach that grappled with the contradiction of wanting to reject the West while borrowing ethnocentric models to write about Africa. Thus, the quest to challenge ethnocentrism could also be compromised by mimicking the West. As the study of Africa became consumed with the search for lost glories, unsung heroes, and undocumented achievements, the emphasis was on societies with large-scale centralized institutions of states, kings with enormous power, and trade routes that had connections with long-distance trans-Atlantic and trans-Saharan ones. The majority of people living in small-scale societies were marginalized for a long time, their systems and structures treated as less developed, and their people seen as inferior to those who lived under kings and queens. The idea of an evolutionary framework became fashionable in presenting societies as moving from a low stage to a higher one.

Second, nationalist historians wanted to turn the colonial era on its head by underplaying the significance of the changes supposedly brought about by colonization. If the colonialists presented Africa as static, the historians presented African societies as dynamic. If the colonialists claimed that they made the major changes possible, the historians saw change as a perennial feature of African life. Indeed, Adu Boahen argued that Africa was undergoing a process of modernity before the colonial invasion. Ade Ajayi argued further that the colonial era was rather short, describing the era as no more than an episode in a long history. The nationalist argument has been that, in spite of the changes brought by Europeans, Africans were active in shaping the events of their lives and continent. Rather than concentrate on European activities and policies in Africa, nationalist historians chose to look at African responses and resistance to them, as well as to detail the impact of changes on age-old institutions. African history, even during the colonial era, was transformed into the history of Africans themselves, rather than a history of Europeans in Africa. In speaking about precolonial state-formation in relation to the colonial state, the various ideas emphasized the importance of nation-building and the capability of Africans for leadership: if they managed themselves well in the past, they could do so efficiently if Europeans transferred power to them.

Third, treating resistance and nationalism as the major driving forces of contemporary history entailed a search for origins and the promotion of the conditions to sustain them. Cities where the Western-educated elite was concentrated, and the political activities of this tiny elite, became far more important than other places. Kings and chiefs who resisted invading colonial armies were celebrated as patriots and nationalists even when they were making cold calculations to protect their economic interests. The self-seeking politics of slave-trade dealers such as the case of the celebrated figure, Jaja of Opobo, had to be forgiven. The rulers who mobilized resources to protect their power became more important than peasants and common cultivators. Important women, such
as queens and entrepreneurs, were discovered and celebrated instead of broader topics of gender and social movements being discussed.

In the quest to create the nation-state in the image of the West, the postcolonial states needed to become united, and notions of citizenship and loyalty had to be invented to generate the patriotism to sustain the new nations. Nationalist historiography saw it as one of its most important missions to use academic history to generate patriotism and a viable citizenry. If the colonial rulers and colonial histories treated Africa as a collection of tribes that had to be divided and kept separate in order to govern them, nationalist historiography regarded them as nationalities that had to be united. To unite them, historical scholarship had to look for enduring cases of inter-group relations, positive images, and glorious examples of history. Certain topics, such as those on inter-ethnic rivalries, had to be avoided or cast in a different light. To prevent creating disunity or causing embarrassment to some ethnic groups, certain data on their past was ignored or core elements of their culture were not criticized nor scrutinized.

These preceding points reflect an understanding of modernity. Western education and academic history-writing were part of the package of modernity. African scholars began to use this package to address not just the problems of knowledge creation, but of the new nations that they inherited at independence. Although never stated in any of these writings, one can see an educated elite deliberately responding to how Western expansion had dehumanized them and their ancestors, and how they struggled to define themselves. There was certainly a compelling desire to create either new or alternative knowledge that would question the meaning, value, and impact of European modernity. The stress on the power of traditions was to make a compelling argument that continuity with the past and the changes of the present were critical to the understanding of Africa. The scholars did not want to mimic the West, even if they adopted its approach to writing history. Rather, nationalist historians, in combination with the cultural writings of poets such as Léopold Sédar Senghor or scholar-activists such as Kwame Nkrumah, were actually united in their thought processes and vision to challenge what Western imperialism represented: racism, domination, and exploitation.

If a modernist vision was embedded in these works, it should not be too difficult to understand why they demanded a relevance for historical scholarship. If those in the Western academy wanted to understand the past for its own sake, nationalist historiography demanded that the past should also be understood for the sake of the future. By the mid-1970s, some scholars, such as Terence Ranger, were already making a case for ‘a usable past’, which was along the orientation of adopting historical research to solve contemporary problems as well as dealing with non-political issues such as the study of rural areas, poverty, and worldviews. The search for relevance, sometimes presented as if

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nationalist historiography and the African nations had both failed the people, has contributed in part to the search for all forms of alternative and revisionist histories.\(^{19}\)

**POSTCOLONIAL CHALLENGES AND RESPONSES**

The challenges of the post-independence era, notably the twin problems of economic and political underdevelopment, led to new themes and ideas in the second half of the twentieth century. The context was the same everywhere: the failure of leadership to create sustainable development; political instability; a dissatisfied populace who lamented the pains of independence; the use of power solely to create wealth through visibly corrupt means; and the collective inability to overcome the challenges posed by dependence on the West.\(^{20}\) The optimism of the 1940s and 1950s that decolonization would enhance the capabilities of Africans to transform their continent began to give way, from the mid-1960s, to pessimism.

The impact of this context overwhelmed knowledge production: the discipline entered what can be called an era of disillusionment in the 1980s.\(^{21}\) Economic and political crises devastated universities in Africa, leading to the outward migration of many of its best minds. In Europe, there were severe cutbacks in faculty recruitment, research, and travel grants. In the United States, many began to question the relevance of their contributions. African historiography had to respond to all these challenges, especially to the crises in Africa: notably, the failure to generate economic development. The rapidity of the establishment of military regimes, cases of war and political instability, and massive economic mismanagement coupled with corruption, called for a new set of paradigms to understand the continent. The confident tone in nationalist historiography began to change to one of despair. The relevance of talking about the past began to be questioned by a new generation who wondered what the glories of that past meant for the underdevelopment of the contemporary era. If the current generation could not build roads and bridges, what did it matter if their ancestors built pyramids? Opinions were divided on how to evaluate the colonial era. If the current leaders were brutal dictators, what did it matter if colonial officers were also brutal and unjust? Questions such as these revealed pessimism, self-doubt, and nihilism. At the same time, the new generation questioned the evolutionary


notion of the inevitability of progress, and the relevance of placing too much emphasis on political history.

In spite of the efforts by nationalist historians to unite disparate groups and create strong nation-states, post-independence civil wars and political instability revealed the power of ethnic and religious identities in the context of capitalism and state formation in a global framework. In Nigeria, the contributors to the Ibadan History Series had to contend with the fall of the First Republic in 1965, the military regimes that followed, and a civil war from 1967 to 1970. Historiography responded to the crises in Nigeria and elsewhere through noticeable shifts in historical models that study cleavages suppressed by the anticolonial movements. Ethnicities could now be defended, occasioning the use of ethnic identities to organize historical units of analysis. As some groups regarded themselves as minorities dominated by others, or as victims of wars, national histories became very difficult to structure. The justification of holding the nation together led to authoritarian regimes, and modern leaders began to liken themselves to some of the precolonial kings and chiefs who had held power in both absolutist terms and as lifetime careers. Nations searched for heroes among people divided by ethnic politics, and the futility of the enterprise made it harder to create narratives around specific figures, in some cases making the writing of biographies a dubious undertaking. The Western-educated elite critiqued itself, with some admitting that they had contributed to the crises of the newly independent countries through images and models of the nations and historiographies they constructed, as well as through the privileges they placed on leadership and power at the expense of peasants and production. There was a consistent call to turn to the postcolonial leaders and expose their inadequacies.

Similarly, religious identities received prominence, and scholars joined in legitimating alternative models to academic history. Some even called for a search for models of writing and governance in Islam, arguing that European-derived economic and political models had failed and that Africa should not define its progress and future along European lines. Some scholars returned to the Islamic jihadist ideas of the nineteenth century, arguing that the modern state should restore some elements of theocracy into governance. Some others called for a combination of Islam and socialism, borrowing ideas from Abdallah Laroui’s widely read book, *The Crisis of the Arab Intellectual* (1976), which makes a powerful plea for the use of Islam to counter Western influence, attain decolonization, and promote a more meaningful nationalism.

In the United States, ideas around race, the civil rights movement, and the rise of black nationalism in the 1960s gave birth to a race-conscious historiography that borrowed from nationalist historiography: Afrocentricity. The intellectual origins can be traced to older ideas of négritude and Pan-Africanism, both of which called for the promotion of black pride and an emphasis on the contributions of black people to world civilization. In the 1960s the connecting link
between the political ideas and the historical ones was offered by Cheikh Anta Diop, whose work on Egypt argued that Egyptian civilization was created by black people and that ancient Egyptians were black. Later in the 1980s, Martin Bernal published a long book on Egypt in which he argues that Eurocentric thoughts have denied what ancient Greece owed to Egypt. The main thesis is that if Egypt created a civilization, and if the Greeks were inspired by it, then Europe owes its civilization to Africans. Although this idea of the African origin of European civilization has been questioned, it forms one of the essential elements of a group of Afrocentric scholars. It should be emphasized that not all Afrocentrists subscribe to the African origins of European civilization, nor insist that Egypt must be the starting point in African history, but all are united in seeking African-centred theories and reference points for the study of the African experience. Afrocentrists denounce Eurocentric methodologies and epistemologies with their claims to universality. Instead, they insist that Africa is central to the global historical process, and that to study it one must start with ideas generated in Africa itself, starting with ancient Egypt. Molefi Kete Asante has based his entire career on Afrocentricity, and continues to defend it in spite of strong criticisms. Many Africanists have yet to embrace it, in part because they do not see Egypt as central to the understanding of most of Africa, and they remain cautious in grafting a race-based discourse onto the historical narrative.

In addition to issues generated by fractured nations and contested nationalism, the bigger challenge was to emphasize issues around development. If some nationalist historians continued to stress patriotism so that the various countries could stay united, a new generation of scholars drew theoretical insights from dependency theories and Marxism to study Africa. Ideas drawn from modernization theories were being questioned or rejected, in part because of the failure of African development strategies, and also because of the biased premise that various elements of the past—called ‘traditional’—would give way to new changes—called ‘modernity’. A number of scholars began to adopt the application of dependency and Marxist theories. The thesis, as advanced in many studies, was that independence was limited since the former colonial powers retained their influence. Neocolonialism became a popular term of critique, along with foreign (neocolonialist) collaborators. Many questioned the values of borrowed Western ideas to transform Africa. Walter Rodney, who had previously published a book on slavery, wrote a popular text in 1972, *How Europe Underdeveloped Africa*, that became adopted as the leading opinion of a new school that combined dependency theory with Marxism. His arguments are that Africa has been damaged by the encounter with the West—notably, the

consequences of the Atlantic slave-trade and colonialism—and that its future cannot improve unless it breaks away from the ‘international capitalist system’. Examining Africa from a class perspective merged with the French Annales School on the ‘mode of production’ and *histoire totale*. Economic realities turned underdevelopment into the centre of most works. Marxian paradigms became appealing, with emphasis on economic history, production forces in precolonial nations, intense scrutiny of the European empire, and the devastating impact of Western forces on Africa.25

In seeking the data to validate the Marxist-derived theories, the colonial period received considerable attention for creating the structures and institutions of Africa’s backwardness. Among the cumulative impact of this intellectual tradition are the application of theories to historical narratives, the insistence that the West has exploited Africa, a more critical elucidatory examination of the indigenous power elite, and the assertion that the failure of postcolonial leadership should not just be attributed to Africans but also to the global context in which it operates. In choosing to write on aspects ignored by the nationalist historians (relations of exploitation, poverty, and so on), the Marxist approach broadened the scope of African historiography.

Critics of class and modes of production analyses argued that the application of such concepts as feudalism, peasant, and class, derived from the reading of European history, is misleading. Theories tend to generalize on patterns and thus ignore the diversity of societies and peoples in Africa. More importantly, concrete historical events and realities began to undermine the conclusions in many studies. By the 1980s and 1990s, socialist regimes in such places as Ethiopia, Tanzania, and Mozambique did not deliver on their promises to transform their countries based on the socialist model. Many scholars began to question the paradigms of modes of production, relations of production, and dependency. New theoretical paradigms became more influential, notably those of Antonio Gramsci, Michel Foucault, Edward Said, and E. P. Thompson, to analyze a wider range of ideas.

Both Gramsci and Foucault enabled those with a preference for a materialist approach to continue the strong tradition of focusing on the ideologies of power. In the 1980s and 1990s, theories associated with postmodernism circulated widely, energizing debates that divided the Africanist community. Such postmodernist views that the past is an ideological construct of the present, that the past cannot exist by itself, or that the past is unknowable and only invented by historians, and that facts and fictions are often indistinguishable, became the orientation that guided a new set of books. If a previous generation of nationalist historians had taken oral traditions as sources to understand the past, the postmodernist view suggests that they may be no more than contemporary

25 See Ch. 6 by Peer Vries in this volume.
ideas and opinions about the past. Nations and traditions, some argued, may be invented. Even the idea of Africa itself, a few argued, represents a false invention in Western discourse.  

Not all revisionism or new thematic choices were driven by prevailing economic and political structures or by the application of theories. Many have been about the need to create relevance, while others explore neglected subjects such as women, economic and social history, and modern history, even if the tone is a mix of nationalist historiography and the application of prevailing models and notions. For instance, the criticism that nationalist historiography focused too much on history from above—more about rulers than subjects, men than women, kingdoms than villages, political than social issues—argued for a history from below that generated many studies on gender, trade, agriculture, labour, trade unionism, and the working class, many of which are written in a celebratory tone. In spite of the various claims as to the value of oral traditions and pre-colonial history, most works of nationalist historiography concentrated on the colonial period and were driven by sources in European-derived archives, and not necessarily by a multidisciplinary approach. The criticisms emanating from this limited approach led to a new series of ideas and a rethinking of the discipline. By the 1980s, the cumulative achievements in various fields were analyzed in a series of essays commissioned by the African Studies Association and published in its widely circulated journal, the *African Studies Review*. Within a quarter of a century, a flourishing discipline had been created, its methodologies had been tested, and its contributions to the historical scholarship widely recognized.

**RECENT TRENDS**

Many elements that drive historiography have remained constant. Africa is still in search of economic development and political stability, which means that scholars have to respond to the challenges posed by the current context in choosing their themes and conducting research. Indeed, the search for development in Africa has led to arguments in many government circles that the discipline of history is not relevant. Resource limitation in Africa has affected the production of a new generation of young historians, the publication of research findings in

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journals and monographs, and the hosting of conferences. The difficulty of securing jobs with a humanities degree has led to a shift in emphasis to the technologies and sciences. Scholars have responded by defending the discipline and seeking the means to justify their existence. Some departments of history have been combined with international relations, strategic studies, and others, to enhance the marketability of degrees.

An orientation that seeks to respond to changes induced by politics and economy has led to a greater focus on contemporary periods, while less attention is now being paid to the precolonial. New works interrogate issues around development (such as economic planning, foreign debts, ideologies, and industrialization), power (such as democracy and leadership), the state, Islam and Christianity, cultural history, identity, gender, environment, and the postcolonial broadly defined. Lively debates revisit the role of indigenous traditions and the colonial state in Africa’s modernity, the difficulty of articulating African developmental processes along Western lines, the representation of Africa itself, and the definition of its component units and the national consciousness to sustain them. Political and economic peculiarities in different countries have encouraged comparative approaches, as in works that compare Nigeria with Ghana or Botswana with Zimbabwe to bring out differences in performance and success.

Current works attempt to understand the postcolonial states, making it possible to relate the past to the present. Free of the combative anticolonial traditions and the controversies between the Left and the Right in the 1970s, new scholarship frames the questions in less ideological terms and tends to see Africans as the most critical agency to shape the affairs of the continent in spite of the difficulties of withstanding the formidable power of Western companies and the superpowers that have lent them tremendous support. If the generation of scholars in the mid-twentieth century was critical of the colonial state, the contemporary generation is critical of the postcolonial state and leadership. To a reading public in the West, far removed from the products of scholarly works, the books that remain popular are critical of Africa, portraying it in less flattering terms. This negative perception of Africa has instigated the need to write scholarly books that can appeal to a broader market, to organize academic conferences to satisfy public interests, and to mobilize professional associations to be sensitive to hostile media presentations.

Old themes remain, especially in wrestling with the long-term impact of the colonial era. Activists, colonialists, radical Marxists, passionate nationalists, all continue to argue over the mistakes of the colonial era and the problems of the postcolonial states. No historical paradigm has been totally discarded: not even nationalist historiography. Indeed, where there is official support for the study of history in Africa, the expectation is that it should promote patriotism—an orientation that has led to many works on inter-group relations, biographies, and

nationalism. The process of historiographical renovation within Africa itself is pressuring historians to identify more with the agenda of the state, even when they may be critical of governments. Where the tone is positive, a label of ‘Afro-optimism’ has been coined to describe such studies, as in Patrick Chabal and Jean-Pascal Daloz’s *Africa Works: Disorder as Political Instrument* (1999). Where the tone is negative, it is characterized as ‘Afro-pessimism’ as in all the works of George Ayittey. Both labels complicate the ideologies of the historians and often give the impression that facts are being organized about the past and present along a predetermined line. While an Egypt-centred Afrocentricity may be waning, it is not a dead idea. Marxist theories continue to inform several approaches to development issues. Nationalist historians have their successors who maintain confrontational exchanges with neocolonialist historians. No one expects that a consensus should emerge on how to write about Africa’s past, which means that popular models in other fields and regions, as in the case of previous theories on modernization, modes of production, and dependency, and newer ones such as cultural studies will continue to be applied to Africa.

The study of ethnicity and identity has been energized due to a combination of reasons: the collapse of apartheid in South Africa and the resurgence of ethnic nationalism such as the case of the Zulu; the wars and genocide in Rwanda and Sudan; and brutal civil wars in countries such as Liberia and Sudan. These and other cases show that the attempts to undermine the power of ethnicity have been misplaced. Materialist analyses that tried to shift the focus to class instead of ethnicity have become undermined, while the socialist regimes in some parts of Africa such as Ethiopia and Tanzania did not erase the views and feelings regarding ethnic identities. Thus, recent literature on almost all African countries, including even such a monoethnic country as Somalia or dual one as Rwanda, includes some discussion of ethnic identities.

Wars, ethnic rivalries, and declining economies have led to population displacements and migrations. A process of brain drain is now consolidated, with many African scholars moving to the West. Since the United States has the largest share of this pool at a time when African Studies is declining in Europe, it enjoys an unprecedented lead in shaping the direction of African history. Scholars in the Western academy tend to respond to trends in other fields and disciplines, resulting in attempts to insert Africa into various fragmented themes and the application of various new theories. There are, equally, examples of rigid boundaries in current research, marking excessive professionalism along regional and thematic specializations. If the post–Second World War pioneers insisted that African peoples should be at the centre of concern, a new generation of scholars in Western academia tends to have a non-African audience in mind,

thereby generating debates of the kind that is most appropriate of historiography. Questions about who should write history, and how they should write it, are now being posed, giving particular poignancy to the politics around the production of knowledge.

Globalization and empire are two current issues, both in the context of the attack on the United States on 11 September 2001 and the subsequent American invasions of Iraq and Afghanistan. Scholarly attention has been focused on Islam and areas with large Islamic populations in Africa. The desire by a segment of the American political class to create an American empire has resurrected the ideas of imperialism and what it means for Africa and other parts of the world. China’s growing involvement in Africa has added to this interest, as well as fostering greater discussion on the role of international institutions such as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund. Discussions on Islam ultimately lead to the bigger issues of identity, with a number of recent studies linking both in the context of democracy in Africa and terrorism in the West. The impact of globalization on Africa has become a robust field, with attention to the consequences of economic domination and cultural appropriations. Issues around underdevelopment, with Africa as part of the large label of the ‘Third World’, ensure research of a comparative nature as well as a cohesion to organize syllabi for schools and television documentaries for the public.

As with the previous discussion on the trans-Atlantic slave trade and colonial rule, current discussions look at how African states can survive in a competitive global environment that overwhelms them. The study of popular cultures is arguably the most fascinating. On the one hand there are studies on consumption cultures, exposing the attractions for Western products and marketing images. On the other hand, current studies dwell on how wants have to be satisfied through participation in criminality such as Internet scams and networks of trafficking in drugs, guns, and diamonds. The struggles for access to the objects of modernity have empowered the search for survival strategies that have reinvigorated past traditions and popular cultures. Where access to food, jobs, and healthcare are on the decline, new studies show the re-creation of older economies and institutions to create survival strategies. Community and kinship networks have been strengthened to circulate goods and services. Scholarship reveals a rising trend in Islamic and Christian fundamentalism, within which belief in witchcraft, as a determined part of modernity, are often articulated to create new meanings to handle the complexities of living. The overall implications of the revival of traditions and the strengthening of popular cultures will surely provide many new areas of investigation, while asking Africa to rethink its Western-derived nation-state and institutions of modernity, which it has not definitely managed or controlled.

31 See, for instance, Brian Larkin, Signal and Noise: Media, Infrastructure, and Urban Culture in Nigeria (Durham, NC, 2008).
The presence of a large number of African scholars in the West is currently contributing to the transformation of the discipline. Being located in Western universities has compelled many of them to rethink notions of culture, tradition, modernity, and race. While some affirm the values of modernity, praising the inevitability of cosmopolitanism, the majority tends to call for Africa-grown ideas and the preservation of older traditions, thus making the claim for the ‘Africanization’ of history.32 In spite of competing ideological positions, some ideas cut across the divide regarding the need to make history relevant to solving the problems of Africa, to bring into history-writing the methodologies and conclusions drawn from the social sciences thereby creating an entente with various disciplines, and to expand areas of inquiries to such new areas as popular cultures, globalization, and public history.

Migrant scholars have also joined others in developing new ideas and themes on Atlantic history, Diaspora Studies, and transnationalism, to list the three ongoing trends. Creating a trans-Atlantic intellectual framework and dialogue has led to a number of new books and debates on issues around cultural continuities and discontinuities.33 The need to understand the diversity of the African experiences in the Americas and Europe has led to demands to also understand African ethnicities and identities. As the calls to integrate Atlantic Africa and the African Diaspora into a unit of analysis grow stronger, the writing of African history will be reshaped in terms of how we understand global networks and connections. Voices for the greater insertion of African history into world history are also getting louder.34

The future of the discipline will surely remain receptive to interdisciplinary approaches, sensitive to the political and economic conditions in Africa, and reflective of the ongoing encounters with the West and modernity.35 The theoretical underpinnings will continue to draw on many ideas formulated in the Western academy that are applied to African conditions and historical writing, a development which will also generate demands for scholars of African origins to formulate their own paradigms or alternative, if not autonomous, theories. Judging from the combined impact of recent publications, there remains in place a strong pluralist tradition that allows the representation of voices from the past (as in nationalist

33 Akin Ogundiran and Toyin Falola (eds.), The Archaeology of Africa and the African Diaspora (Bloomington, Ind., 2007).
historiography), from radicalism and social activism (as in Marxist historiography), and from the more recent orientation of comparative historians who study Africa in the context of the Atlantic world or of globalization. Historians will continue to tie the cart of African historiography to the horses of underdevelopment in African societies and Western globalizing forces.

TIMELINE/KEY DATES

1935 Italian invasion of Ethiopia energizes a worldwide anticolonial nationalism among black people
1945 Post–Second World War ideas of liberation and self-determination instigate colonial reforms and the process of transfer of power to Africans
1952 Mau Mau resistance against the British in Kenya
1957 Ghana gains independence
1960 Many African countries attain independence: Gabon, Senegal, Mali, Burkina Faso, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Congo, Côte d’Ivoire, Chad, Cameroon, the Central African Republic, Benin, Mauritania, Niger, Madagascar, Togo, Nigeria, Somalia, and Congo Brazzaville; a civil war begins in the Congo and lasts until 1965
1961 Patrice Lumumba is murdered in the Congo; the Eritrean liberation struggles begin; Sierra Leone and Tanzania become independent
1962 Rwanda, Uganda, and Burundi become independent countries
1963 The Organization of African Unity is founded in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia; Kenya gains independence; nationalists in Guinea-Bissau begin armed struggles
1964 Malawi and Zambia attain independence
1965 Gambia attains independence; the Unilateral Declaration of Independence is made in Rhodesia (now Zimbabwe)—a white minority government declares itself free of Britain
1966 Military coups in Nigeria and Ghana; Basutoland attains independence, renamed Lesotho; Bechuanaland becomes Botswana; the First Festival of Negro Arts (later renamed FESTAC) was held in Senegal
1967 Tanzania establishes a socialist programme, the Arusha Declaration
1968 Equatorial Guinea, Swaziland, and Mauritius become independent
1974 The imperial government of Haile Selassie is overthrown in Ethiopia
1974–5 The Portuguese colonies of Guinea Bissau, Angola, Mozambique, São Tomé, Cape Verde, and Comoros (without Mayotte) attain independence
1975 The formation of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS)
1977 Djibouti becomes independent
1979 Tanzania invades Uganda to end the dictatorship of Idi Amin
1980 White minority rule ends in Rhodesia, and the country is renamed Zimbabwe
1982 AIDS is reported in Africa
1989 The Liberian Civil War begins
1990 Namibia is the last colony to gain independence
1992 The civil war in Sierra Leone begins
1993 Eritrea gains independence
1994 Genocide in Namibia
2001 The creation of the African Union to replace the Organization of African Unity
2002 Many African countries begin to practise electoral democracy; civil wars in Burundi, Liberia, Uganda, and Sudan
2004 War and ethnic cleansing in Darfur escalates

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Chapter 20

Argentine Historical Writing in an Era of Political and Economic Instability

Joel Horowitz

The world in which historians live shapes the type of history that they write. Argentina’s recent past has left its mark on historians as well as on the institutions that they need to do their work. Coups, repression, violence, and economic turmoil changed the writing of history. Universities were purged regularly. History became a weapon to wield in political battles. With the return of democracy in 1983, despite profound economic crises, the writing of history has increased vastly and improved in quality. Although open to disciplinary currents from the outside world, recent Argentine historiography has a flavour all its own, in part propelled by the search for what is salvageable from the nation’s past.

An obstacle that has hindered historical production throughout the entire post-war era is the lack of institutional support. Libraries frequently do not possess important monographs or government documents, even the National Library and the Library of Congress that are by law supposed to acquire every book published in the country. Publications printed in the provinces are difficult to find in other regions. Archives often lack basic equipment and are frequently disorganized; papers from key ministries have never been made available to the public, if they still exist. University salaries are usually very low and professors frequently need to work in several universities simultaneously, in locations that are hours apart. These problems, plus the large number of Argentines writing from abroad and thus separated from sources, have helped to shape historical production.

BACKGROUND

In the period before 1945, historical writing was not particularly distinguished, and the end of the war did not change that. Two major approaches to the writing of history existed, the Nueva Escuela Histórica (New School of History) and Revisionism. The dominant force was the former, which by 1945 was far from
new. Founded by 1905, it had acquired its name in an article in 1916. Its principal members tended to be the children of immigrants and were the first generation of professional historians, although many acquired their professional degrees in law instead of in history. They had their opportunity to influence academic institutions after the university reform movement of 1918 modernized the structures and curricula of the universities. Several were important members of the Radical Party that dominated Argentina’s first move towards democracy.

In 1943, the year of the military coup that ultimately propelled Juan Perón into power, two members of the Nueva Escuela, Emilio Ravignani and Ricardo Levene, controlled almost all the major historical institutions in greater Buenos Aires. Both had ties to the governing elite during the 1930s: they were close to Agustín Justo, president from 1932 to 1938; and Ravignani was elected to congress in both 1936 and 1940. They used these connections to subsidize historical works. The governments of the 1930s understood the usefulness of history in generating political support. Ideologically the historians of the Nueva Escuela embraced traditional nineteenth-century liberalism, an ideology that was by the 1930s increasingly under attack. Correctly or incorrectly, the Nueva Escuela was viewed as the official history. Nevertheless, the dominant image of the Nueva Escuela hid a great deal more variety in approaches and interpretations of the past than its critics charged it with.

The Nueva Escuela historians did not challenge the liberal vision of Argentina pioneered by one of the key founders of the Argentine historiographical tradition, Bartolomé Mitre; that was not their focus. They were more interested in questions of methodology, and were informed by the ideas of the German historian Ernst Bernheim. They closely read their documents and eschewed wider interpretations, particularly those that seemed tied to the current national situation. They claimed to be focused on only the historical evidence. They rarely


stepped back and examined the broader story told by their sources. Many of the Nueva Escuela’s publications were edited collections of archival materials. Ravignani believed that published collections ‘spoke for themselves and had as much or more persuasive arguments than did the works of historians’. Within that framework there was little consistency in vision. The Nueva Escuela historians focused almost entirely on the period from the colonial era to the 1850s. In the 1930s the Academia Nacional de la Historia, under the direction of Levene, launched a general history of Argentina up to the 1850s, which totalled fourteen volumes, and was modelled on the Cambridge Histories of Europe and the grand synthesis inspired by Henri Berr. The Nueva Escuela also engaged in institution building, such as organizing archives, regular publishing of journals, and collecting information in Europe.

In the 1930s, Revisionism challenged the Nueva Escuela’s liberal vision of the past. Originally part of a right-wing rejection of the liberal consensus, Revisionism would later develop a left-wing version. Both wings shared a dislike of the liberal vision of the past. Revisionism was a rejection of Argentina’s cosmopolitan modernizing tendencies and an exaltation of its Hispanic past, stressing nationalism and rejecting foreign influence. Unlike the Nueva Escuela’s erudition, Revisionism usually paid little attention to methodology but concentrated on interpretation. Its key goals were political: to rethink the past in order to shape the future. Revisionism of the right and the left shared these tendencies despite their divergent political goals. Although unable to entrench itself in the academic world, Revisionism had by the 1970s become the popularly accepted interpretation of Argentina’s history.

Alternative versions of the past appeared in the 1920s, but only in the 1930s did a consistent version appear that can be called Revisionism. Revisionism’s attacks on what it called the official history was not methodological but ideological: specifically, it was based on a rejection of liberalism. Many Revisionists were provincial elites and seemed to resent the society’s openness to new ideas and people. They were influenced by the European right’s attacks on liberalism, especially those of Charles Maurras. The Revisionists stressed nationalism and attacked foreign influences particularly that of Britain, which remained the largest purchaser of Argentine goods; British corporations controlled many public utilities. One of the first works that could be called Revisionist was Rodolfo and Julio Irazusta’s *La Argentina y el imperialismo británico* [*Argentina and British Imperialism*] published in 1934 in the wake of a treaty that made major economic concessions to Britain.

A central feature of right-wing Revisionism was the lionization of the *bête noir* of the liberals, Juan Manuel de Rosas, governor of the Province of Buenos Aires from 1829–32, 1835–52, who had dominated Argentina with a heavy hand.

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4 Cited in Devoto, ‘Estudio preliminar’, 16.
Latin America and the Caribbean
Revisionists were attracted to Rosas because they saw him as creating a strong state opposed to foreign interests, unlike later Argentine governments that supposedly made Argentina semi-colonial. Rosas was also hailed for his firm control of the masses, while others saw him as allied with them.6

THE PERÓN ERA

In June 1943 the military seized power. The new regime was repressive, driving left-wing institutions underground and harassing unions, but an element within it, led by Juan Perón, rallied popular support by cultivating elements of the labour movement. After Perón won the presidential election in early 1946, universities were perceived as a political problem, because they were bastions of the opposition. By the end of 1946, 1,250 professors had either resigned or been fired, which represented a third of the teaching corps of the national universities. This included Ravignani and one of his more distinguished disciples, Ricardo Caillet-Bois. In early 1947, Mariano de Vedia y Mitre, a member of the traditional elite and a professor of Argentine history at the University of Buenos Aires for decades, resigned in protest of political interference in the university.7

The intellectual world for historians was bleak, as it was for other intellectuals. Journals that had appeared regularly for significant periods ceased to be published, frequently because of lack of funding. According to Tulio Halperín Donghi, a major force in the historiography of the post-1955 period, being a history student in a Peronist university yielded little of intellectual value. He only attended those few classes that interested him, especially two classes of the exiled Spanish medievalist Claudio Sánchez-Albornoz. For the rest, he tried to finish as quickly as was possible.8

In a sense the historical world was frozen. The two key trends remained locked in battle, constantly attacking one another with little real advancement. Because Peronism, after its fall from power, embraced Revisionism, it is often assumed that Revisionism had earlier won an official place. However, while in power, the regime made clear that it would not adjudicate between the contending parties. Historians from the Nueva Escuela continued to hold important positions, including Ricardo Levene who lost his posts at the University of La Plata,

7 Buchbinder, Historia de la Facultad de Filosofía y Letras, 158–63.
while retaining one in Buenos Aires. He remained president of the Academia Nacional de la Historia, but by 1955 it lacked funds. Another member of the Nueva Escuela, Diego Luis Molinari, took over the Instituto de Historia Argentina which had been Ravignani’s principal bailiwick. Molinari was an important Peronist politician, but as a historian he had ceased making major contributions. Most of those hired to replace fired historians wrote in the style of the Nueva Escuela, although a few Revisionists, such as José María Rosa, did receive university positions. In addition, after the nationalization of the railroads in 1947, Perón named the lines after nineteenth-century leaders despised by the Revisionists for their liberalism.9

A key book published during this period, José Luis Romero’s Las ideas políticas en Argentina [A History of Argentine Political Thought], was written by an historian who was not a product of either school. A medievalist who had been marginally connected to the universities before the Peronist purges, Romero was asked by the Mexican historian Daniel Cosío Villegas to write a volume for the Mexican publisher Fondo de Cultura Económica. Taking information from the Nueva Escuela, Romero provided the first real synthesis of that material and brought it to the present, unlike the works of the Nueva Escuela which stopped in the mid-nineteenth century. Underlying the work is the idea that during the colonial era two competing tendencies developed, authoritarianism and liberalism, and that these continued until the present. This had clear political implications in the Perón era.10

THE REFORM ERA, 1955–66

After the military removed Perón from office in September 1955, the teaching staffs of universities were almost completely replaced, and with this came new ideas and new curricula that some have labelled a golden age. Argentina had been isolated from the intellectual currents washing across the Western world, although this isolation should not be exaggerated. Many historians felt a pent-up desire for change. In that year, Halperín Donghi wrote an article that called for an overhaul of the historical profession. While dismissive of the Revisionists, it sharply attacked the apolitical and erudite refusal of the Nueva Escuela to take historical stands.11

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10 For an overview of the work of Romero, see Tulio Halperín Donghi, ‘José Luis Romero y su lugar en la historiografía argentina’, in Ensayos de historiografía, 73–105.

11 Tulio Halperín Donghi, Argentina en el callejón (Buenos Aires, 1995), 7–27.
Historians who wanted to open the field to new ideas had a major influence on the universities. Directly after the coup, Romero was appointed rector of the University of Buenos Aires at the suggestion of the organized students. He also served from 1962 to 1965 as dean of the Faculty of Philosophy and Letters of that university. Romero acted as the principal promoter of a reformed view of history by guiding the development of social history. Romero’s vision for the discipline is apparent in the editorial principles of the cultural history journal that he edited:

Thus will fit in *Imago Mundi* political history, history of ideas in general and the history of diverse forms of knowledge and creation: philosophy, music, literature, law, science, education, plastic arts, etc. But the general tendency will be to transcend each of these particular fields in order . . . to reach a richer image of reality and a deeper comprehension of reality. 12

Although the Nueva Escuela played a major role in the universities and Revisionism outside of academic history, Romero’s approach had a large impact even if, with the exception of the university in Rosario, it lacked solid institutional bases. The new wave saw history as dealing with problems that affected the nation.13 A crucial influence was the social sciences. Particularly important was the growth of ‘scientific’ sociology (largely North American) under the influence of Gino Germani, a refugee from Mussolini’s Italy who had been excluded from the universities under Perón. Sociology developed rapidly with the aid of external funding, and quickly attracted a growing number of students. The sociologists worked with the reforming historians on projects such as a study of immigration. Also influential was developmental economics that appeared in several economic histories written by economists. Aldo Ferrer explained current problems by discussing past stages of economic development and was influenced by the developmental theories of Raúl Prebisch and Celso Furtado. Guido Di Tella and Manuel Zymelman, former students of W. W. Rostow at MIT, took his stages of economic development and added an additional one, the long delay, to explain Argentina’s late industrialization.14 The ties between the social sciences and history can also be seen in the journal *Desarrollo Económico: Revista de Ciencias Sociales* [Economic Development: Journal of Social Sciences] which has been continually published since 1961. It has regularly published history produced by the reformers and their

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12 ‘Texto de presentación’, *Imago Mundi* (September 1953), 1–2.


successors. For example, in 1963 a double issue published articles by Argentine and foreign historians that were clearly part of the reforming schema.

The symbiosis between history and the social sciences can also be seen in collections published in 1965 and 1969. The collaboration’s extent is laid out in the introduction to the latter:

This collective work is the result of the labour of several years of an entire group of investigators who have been working upon the base of a driving force coming from the Institute of Sociology and the Centre of the Studies of Social History of the Faculty of Philosophy and Letters of the University of Buenos Aires. Much is owed to the pioneering work of their former directors, professors Gino Germani and José Luis Romero. With time, the work begun in those centres was amplified and received the help of other institutions. The Centres of Economic Investigations and of Comparative Sociology of the Di Tella Institute created a new environment for work... The Institute of Economic Development... contributed with the holding of numerous seminars, round tables... to the personal integration of many specialists that in other ways would not have entered into communication.

In that volume, the chapters written by historians do not differ greatly from those written by social scientists. Historians wrote four chapters of rural economic history. Two other contributions were part of a cross-disciplinary study of the impact of immigration, including one by political scientist Oscar Cornblit on immigrants and entrepreneurs in Argentine politics that could have been written by a historian.

The cooperation with the social sciences was not just intellectual: it was also financial. The studies on immigration mentioned above resulted from a joint project of the Sociology Institute and the Centre of the Study of Social History which had the support of the Rockefeller Foundation. The largely demographic work on the Valley of Santa María, an isolated and poverty-stricken region of the interior, resulted from a joint project of historians, sociologists, and anthropologists who had their base in Rosario and had funding from the Argentine science foundation (CONICET).

Another major influence was the Annales School, and especially Fernand Braudel. His work on the Mediterranean during the age of Philip II appeared in Spanish in 1953, just four years after its publication in France and long before it appeared in English in 1972. His influence was also personal. Braudel passed
through Buenos Aires in 1947, meeting Romero, and for some years afterwards there was considerable correspondence between them. A number of younger historians travelled to France to study, some with Braudel himself and later ones with Ruggiero Romano. Romano taught in Argentina for short periods in the late 1950s and early 1960s and established a strong influence. One reason for the identification of the reformers with the Annales scholars is that both felt that they were outsiders, struggling against the historical establishment. In the case of the Argentines, the reformers believed that the history departments were still dominated by the Nueva Escuela.

How much impact did the Annales have? Perhaps the classic work of a student of Braudel is Halperín Donghi’s study of the formation of a ruling elite in Argentina. The first section is a geographical and economic-social description of Argentina on the eve of independence. This is in many ways parallel to the opening section of Braudel’s *Mediterranean*, but the similarity is deceptive as the prologue opens with the comment that ‘This is before all a book of political history’. It goes on to say that the theme is not so very different from those of the founders of Argentine historiography, Bartolomé Mitre and Vicente F. López, in that it considers the creation of an autonomous centre of power by a group of men.  

The impact of the Annales, especially of Romano, can be seen in the attempts to create long series of economic statistics for the nineteenth century, some with financial support from France. Many were never completed or published. The attention to demography in studies such as that on the Valley of Santa María mentioned above also reflects the French influence. The long-term direct impact of the Annales is somewhat unclear because many of the influences on the French historians, namely the social sciences, also entered Argentina independently, and direct connections between Braudel and the Argentines were severed in 1965. Still, Marc Bloch’s essay on history, published in English as *The Historian’s Craft* (1953), was used as a manual.  

Marxism became a frequent part of historical analysis. This was far from a new influence, but its impact intensified after the Cuban Revolution and with the mood of the 1960s. The works of Maurice Dobb, Pierre Vilar, and Witold Kula had a great deal of influence. A large number of intellectuals, including historians, belonged to the Communist Party, but the growing importance of the writings of the Italian

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21 See Beatriz Moreyra, ‘La historiografía’, *Nueva historia de la nación argentina*, vol. 10 (Buenos Aires, 2003), 86–8; and Halperín Donghi ‘Un cuarto de siglo de historiografía argentina’, 496 n. 2.
Marxist Antonio Gramsci, which seemed to many to speak directly to the conditions in Latin America, helped lead to mass expulsions of intellectuals from the party starting in 1963. For many progressives, Marxism became a common frame of reference and many wedded it to nationalism and some to Peronism.22

Perhaps the best example of what the reformers wanted to do is the collective and comprehensive history of Argentina published by Paidós in 1972. The periodization is not unusual, but its goals were, at least for the time and place. The prologue stated:

The authors consider themselves professional investigators of history and of the social sciences and as such they want to be judged. Their first duty is therefore to practice a style of historical inquiry that is up to date not only in as much as making theirs the perspective that the problematic present imposes on the national past (and that this would not be, of course, the same as that which seemed justified a century ago) but also . . . look to use an historical culture that is less archaic than is still habitual among our historians and finally . . . that history is, in one of its dimensions, a social science.

The emphasis on demography and economics is notable: the latter in particular as statistics are abundant. The influence of the Annales is obvious. Guillermo Beato in his three-page introduction to his section mentions Lucien Febvre, Fernand Braudel, and Marc Bloch.23

Institutional conditions improved for the professoriate. In 1959, after a great deal of conflict produced by a fear of growing Catholic influence, private universities were permitted for the first time. Initially the number of private universities grew slowly but these did provide jobs for historians. Private universities would be a partial refuge for some who lost their positions after the military coups of 1966 and 1976. In the much more important and larger national universities, the number of full-time professors (dedicación exclusiva) increased dramatically due to the desire to create a professoriate that could dedicate itself to the universities and not depend on outside jobs for survival. At the University of Buenos Aires there were only nine such professors in 1958 and seven hundred in 1966. CONICET, which was founded in this period primarily to support science, provided some support for history. The profession benefited as well from a boom in the number of books published and sold. A shining example was the press of the University of Buenos Aires founded in 1958, which by 1966—when the military changed its editor—had published 802 titles with sales of almost twelve million copies.24

23 Tulio Halperin Donghi (ed.), Historia argentina, 7 vols. (Buenos Aires, 1972), esp. ii. 117–19. The quotation is from the Prologue which is in each volume.
24 Buchbinder, Historia de las universidades argentinas, 173–89; Sigal, Intelectuales y poder, 77–8, 100–9; and Beatriz Sarlo, La batalla de las ideas (1943–1973) (Buenos Aires, 2001), 69.
Surprisingly the teaching of Argentine history at the levels below the universities remained largely static. The texts from the 1930s written by members of the Nueva Escuela remained acceptable under Peronism, though there was increased stress on nationalism. The overthrow of Perón did not produce large changes either, since the interpretations of the Nueva Escuela did not clash with the views of the anti-Peronist political class.  

REPRESSION AND POLITICALIZATION, 1966–83

In June 1966 the military staged a coup, and a month later took control of the national universities. In Buenos Aires, students and professors responded by seizing university buildings. The government dislodged them with a good deal of violence, in what became known as the ‘Noche de los Bastones Largos’ (‘Night of the Long Truncheons’). The immediate result was the resignation of many faculty members, particularly those interested in reforming the nature of the university. In the Faculty of Philosophy and Letters (which included history) some 300 faculty resigned. Others attempted to resist from inside, but many lost their jobs in the coming months. Some went abroad; others found employment in alternative centres such as the Di Tella Institute which had been founded in 1958 and had received considerable funding from foreign foundations. Some found employment in the new private universities. Others were less lucky.

Despite the purging of the universities and attempts to repress the spirit of the ‘sixties’, that spirit still had an impact on historiography. The use of dependency theory in the two varieties associated respectively with André Gunder Frank and Fernando Henrique Cardoso reflected the desire for an independent leftist perspective. Marxist discourse became increasingly important and, especially in colonial history, questions such as whether the economy was feudal or capitalist, and what that meant, loomed large. By the 1970s Marxist thought and phraseology had become commonplace.

As a significant portion of the society became radicalized, the dominant form of Revisionism became more and more a combination of Peronism, Marxism, and nationalism. Still, elements of the political right continued to embrace the

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26 Buchbinder, Historia de la Facultad de Filosofía y Letras, 221; and Rubinich, ‘La modernización cultural y la irrupción de la sociología’, 260.
28 See, for example, Carlos Sempat Assadorian (ed.), Modos de producción en América Latina (Córdoba, 1973); and Tarcus, El marxismo olvidado.
more traditional version of Revisionism. Left-wing Revisionism had been developing since the 1940s with the initial authors emerging from the Communist Party. Strongly nationalistic, most such historians embraced Peronism. This wing expanded with the growing influence of the Peronist left. It shared with right-wing Revisionism the use of history to promote a political vision, as well as a rejection of liberalism and cosmopolitanism, but many left-wing Revisionists felt uncomfortable with the exaltation of Rosas, preferring to exalt provincial caudillos. For example, Rodolfo Ortega Peña and Eduardo Luis Duhalde claimed that the provincial caudillo Felipe Varela in his revolts against the national government between 1866–70 was part of an international struggle against British imperialism. They also claimed that their history was Marxist. Unfortunately, they do not present any real evidence of Varela’s anti-imperialism.29 There were exceptions to this reluctance to lionize Rosas. The important Revisionist historian José María Rosa claimed that, under Rosas, Argentina was a socialist state because there were no dominant classes, since proprietors, the military, and the clergy were all subordinate to Rosas.30

Bending briefly to popular mobilization and guerrilla activity, the military permitted elections and the return of Perón in 1973. The universities became critical centres of political activity and were for a brief moment dominated by a national left. Ortega Peña and Duhalde became truly popular authors and professors at the University of Buenos Aires. However, much to their annoyance, their course was outdrawn by a parallel course taught by Félix Luna, who was close to the Radical Party, wrote solid popular biographies and some excellent books such as his study of the year, 1945, when Perón had cemented his popularity.31 The nationalist left lost control of the universities even before the 1976 coup due to the strenuous and frequently violent efforts of right-wing Peronists.

History became increasingly politicized between the mid-1960s and the mid-1970s, as well as increasingly popular. In the interval between military regimes in the 1970s, an important street in Buenos Aires, Canning, which had been named for the nineteenth-century British Foreign Secretary who had recognized Argentine independence, was renamed for Raúl Scalabrini Ortiz, one of the founders of Revisionism. Within days after seizing power in March 1976, the military changed the name back to Canning and the street signs were ready.

The military again seized power in March 1976 and the repression was fierce. Most commentators have placed the number of killed or disappeared at 30,000. According to the official investigation, 21 per cent of the casualties were students. 32 Thirteen history students of the University of Córdoba disappeared or were killed during this period. 33 Faculty in large numbers were killed, arrested, or fired. 34 Books were burnt. The more fortunate went abroad to teach or to study. Many fled to Mexico, Spain, France, and the United States, as well as other countries. Others managed to hang on inside the country in private universities or in the institutes of social science. The less lucky lived a marginal existence, just hoping to keep their academic dreams and themselves alive. 35 The teaching of history at the secondary level shifted after 1979 with considerably more attention focused on the twentieth century and on the anti-Marxism that was a feature of the military regime. 36

The experience of living abroad, plus the worldwide shift in ideas on the left, the crushing defeat of the revolutionary movements, and the harshness of the dictatorship led to a rethinking of ideologies and a turn towards democracy. 37 In addition, living outside Argentina introduced historians to a much wider historiography than was available within the country, as well as to new sources, and separated them from others. Some historians turned to writing on Latin America in general or about their host country, especially Mexico. 38 Even those who were not exiled but preferred to live abroad changed the nature of their research. Halperín Donghi, for example, at first tried to have a well-defined topic for which documents could be easily microfilmed. This worked for his book on finances and war in the first half of the nineteenth century. However, he found few other such subjects that interested him, turning increasingly to the history of ideas and mentalities, which depended less on access to archives. 39

Some historians found a partial intellectual refuge in the centres of study outside of the universities run by social scientists. A good example of this was

32 Buchbinder, Historia de las universidades argentinas, 208.
33 From an e-mail of 20 March 2003 to the history department from its director Gardenia Vidal forwarded to the author on 23 March 2003.
34 For some idea of the scope, see ‘List of the accused in the trial for “ideological infiltration” at the National Southern University (Universidad del Sur) in Bahía Blanca, Argentina’, www.derechos.org/nizkor/arg/doc/argproject.html. A number were historians.
35 See, for example, interviews in Hora and Trimboi (ed.), Pensar la Argentina. See also Nora C. Pagano, ‘Las ciencias sociales durante la dictadura argentina (1976–1981)’, in La historiografía académica y la historiografía militante en Argentina y Uruguay, 159–69.
36 Romero (ed.), La Argentina en la escuela.
38 For examples of those who did not abandon the study of Argentina, Juan Carlos Garavaglia and Juan Carlos Grosso, Las alcabalas novohispanas (1776–1821) (Mexico, 1987); and José Carlos Chiaramonte, Formas de sociedad y economía en Hispanoamérica (Mexico, 1984).
39 ‘Tulio Halperín Donghi’, 40; and Tulio Halperín Donghi, Guerra y finanzas en los orígenes del estado argentino (1791–1850) (Buenos Aires, 1982).
PEHESA (Programa de Estudios de Historia Económica y Social Americana). Founded in 1977 to create a space for the study of social history, its initiators were influenced by the British Marxists, especially E. P. Thompson. The founders supported themselves with jobs outside history, though some received grants. The group’s early work focused on the working class between the mid-nineteenth century and the 1930s. After the return to democracy, its members obtained university employment and their subject matter widened.  

Those who were largely isolated from the academic world or who went to the university during the dictatorship feel a sense of being part of a lost generation. They see themselves as being different from those who had studied at the universities earlier or had managed to study abroad. Still, Ema Cibotti, a member of that self-described generation, has written that this generation does not address historical questions differently. However, the comment appears in a journal that is a result of the personal labour of a group from that generation. Perhaps because their entry into the field was delayed, or because they had more difficulty obtaining good academic positions immediately after the return to democracy, they continue to view themselves as different from other cohorts.  

THE RETURN OF DEMOCRACY

The return to democracy in 1983 initiated a flourishing of historical writing. Universities again saw a turnover of personnel; the new professors were determined to raise standards. Job opportunities multiplied as the number of national and private universities increased dramatically, as did the number of historians who received support from the state scientific institution, CONICET. For the first time, high-quality history was being written, not just in Buenos Aires, La Plata, Rosario, and Córdoba, but in universities all over the country, frequently in institutions that had not existed several decades before. Periodic congresses have permitted historians from around the country to exchange ideas. While economic crises have affected historians’ ability to work and distribute their writing, it has not prevented a surge in its quality and quantity.

Many who became influential historians and professors had lived abroad. There they were exposed to the full range of historical ideas current in the Western world and all major trends can now be seen to some extent in Argentina,  

42 See Buchbinder, Historia de las universidades argentinas, 214–34; and Beatriz Bragoni (ed.), Microanálisis: Ensayos de historiografía argentina (Buenos Aires, 2004).
though frequently with distinct Argentine twists. The Internet has greatly aided the continued interchange of ideas. The shifts in the nature of the writing of history began, after some delay, to be recognized in textbooks intended for secondary education.\footnote{Romero (ed.), \textit{La Argentina en la escuela}.}

What can be called the new political history emerged in the 1980s and flourished in the 1990s. It showed an awareness of foreign historiographical trends, but was rooted in the atmosphere created by the return of democracy in the 1980s. Massive and longstanding political failures had permitted the military to seize power in 1976, and many historians wanted to examine those failures as well as find elements of the country’s political culture that were worth saving. In 1982 the historians in PEHESA made a statement about the need to recover the nation’s reusable political past. Others stressed the need to tie history to existing problems. A new political history emerged that combined politics with social, cultural, and intellectual history. In contrast to previous generations of historians, much of the work has not focused on the national level but at smaller units, in order to better understand what happened.\footnote{PEHESA, ‘¿Donde anida la democracia?’ \textit{Punta de Vista}, 15 (1982), 6–10; ‘¿Por qué Entrepasados?’ 1:1 (1991), 3; and Tulio Halperín Donghi, ‘El resurgimiento de la historia política: Problemas y perspectivas’, in Bragoni (ed.), \textit{Microanálisis}, 17–30.}

A good example of this type of work is Hilda Sabato’s examination of politics in Buenos Aires in the 1860s and 1870s, which shows how the electoral process worked in an atmosphere of fraud, but also how public opinion made itself felt through a complex civic culture. Gardenia Vidal wrote a detailed discussion of how the Radical Party functioned in the Province of Córdoba after voting by males became mostly fair. She examined such topics as patronage, which groups support which faction and why. Mariano Plotkin, combining cultural and political history, examined how the Perón regime used culture in an attempt to establish legitimacy and expand its base of support. Ariel de la Fuente, using a wide range of sources including folklore, constructed a vision of why the average person in mid-nineteenth-century La Rioja followed caudillos.

The most impressive sign of change is the shifting vision of the rural economy of the pampas region during the late colonial period and the first half of the nineteenth century. Traditional historiography had the pampas being dominated by large estates dedicated to grazing, whose owners were not necessarily driven by capitalist motives and controlled the society. Change came from several directions. In the early 1960s and 1970s, Halperín Donghi had written two innovative works—an examination of the ranching frontier and a study of one estate—which started the process of rethinking rural structures. Also influential was Carlos Sempat Assadourian’s work on patterns of trade in the interior of
southern South America, which reminded historians of the importance of local markets.\(^{45}\)

The years after 1983 saw a reworking of the nature of the pampas economy, based on new types of sources: estate records, death inventories, wills, censuses, etc. The studies frequently focused on narrow geographical areas. The picture that emerged was of a rural economy that was truly capitalist and not dominated by large grazing establishments, but rather where farming and ranching co-existed, as did large and small estates. The stereotypical gaucho has turned out to be largely a product of myth.\(^{46}\)

Recent years have seen the publication of works that reflect most of the major trends in Western historiography from the linguistic turn to gender studies, to private lives, to intellectual history, to postmodernism. The best single example of the change has been the ten-volume collective history, the *Nueva Historia Argentina*. The chapters are written by different historians and they make no attempt to give an all-encompassing vision of a period: rather, each of the historians wrote on their specialty, and the volume editors chose the subjects. Articles on health, architecture, urban growth, and much more are included that would not have appeared in previous eras.\(^{47}\)

The structural problems that have faced historians still remain. Libraries and archives are inadequate and journals always struggle to survive. Many Argentine historians are still employed outside the country, but they are based abroad no longer for political, but rather for economic or personal reasons. Although their place of residence undoubtedly shapes their writing, the constant flow of people in and out of the country helps keep Argentina from intellectual isolation. Given the state of historical writing in 1945, Argentine historians have come a long way. Since the 1980s, the quality has been high and the amount impressive, and much more of it is focused away from the capital. There is no reason to believe that this will cease. As with any intellectual movement it will be challenged by those who want to carve out their own spaces or who have different agendas.\(^{48}\) One can feel hopeful.


\(^{48}\) See, for example, Campione, *Argentina*, for a generational and political challenge.
TIMELINE/KEY DATES

1916  First fair presidential election
1918  University reform movement which led to revised curriculums, a more merit-based faculty, and a broader student body, plus student participation in university governance
1930  Right-wing military coup
1932–43  Neo-Conservative era—governments with a façade of democracy but dependent on voter fraud
1943  Military coup establishes repressive government; Juan Perón becomes the dominant figure by 1945
1946  Fair presidential election won by Perón
1946–55  Perón era with a façade of democracy but becoming increasingly repressive
1955  Military coup
1958  Return of democracy but Peronists not permitted to participate in process
1959  Legalization of the establishment of private universities
1966  Military coup
1973  In response to guerrilla activity, labour unrest, and general agitation, elections permitted; Perón returns as president and is succeeded upon his death in 1974 by his vice president and third wife, Isabel
1976  Military coup and unprecedented repression
1983  Return of democracy
1989–90  Hyper-inflation
2001–2  Economic collapse

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Chapter 21
Brazilian Historical Writing

Marshall C. Eakin

The current high quality of Brazilian historical writing builds on five centuries of historical works, but the development of professional historical writing is largely a phenomenon of the last five decades. When the Portuguese accidentally stumbled onto the eastern coast of South America in 1500 on their way to India, they encountered highly dispersed, pre-literate indigenous peoples. During three centuries of Portuguese conquest and colonial rule the few important examples of historical writing largely represent the work of chroniclers—priests, royal officials, and elite functionaries. With the independence of Brazil in 1822—much like the rest of the Americas—gentlemen scholars began to produce the first notable historical works, and to begin to define the nation. By the 1920s and 1930s, a series of brilliant intellectuals produced some of the landmark works that helped define the nation’s history and identity, in particular focusing on Brazil’s culturally and racially mixed heritage of Africans, Native Americans, and Portuguese. Professional academic history began to emerge in the 1940s and 1950s, taking off after 1960. Over the last half-century, Brazilians have constructed a very sophisticated and vibrant community of professional historians writing for both academic and non-academic audiences. Although historical writing in Brazil over the last century has been deeply influenced by US and European (especially French) historians, Brazilian historical writing today is largely shaped by domestic issues and concerns.

ORIGINS

As with all of the Americas, Brazil was conquered and colonized by globally expanding European powers beginning in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries. Unlike the Spanish in their core American colonies in Mexico, Peru, and the Caribbean, the Portuguese did not construct institutions of higher learning in Brazil. While Spanish America boasted of universities from the mid-sixteenth century, the first university faculties were not created in Brazil until the arrival of the Braganza royal family (1808–21) when they fled Napoleon’s invading
armies. In the nineteenth century the only institutions of higher education were law, engineering, and medical faculties, and nearly all were concentrated in coastal regions of the north-east and south-east. Not until the creation of the Universidade de São Paulo in the 1930s was there anything equivalent to the modern university in Brazil.

As in Spanish America, priests and royal functionaries produced the most notable works of historical writing during the colonial period. These were few in number in Portuguese America, however. The letters of the Jesuits, especially Manoel da Nóbrega and José de Anchieta in the sixteenth century, and André João Antonil, are prime examples of these early chronicles of conquest, coloniza- tion, and Christianization. A handful of chroniclers produced what are widely recognized as the major accounts during the three centuries of colonial rule.

The arrival of the Portuguese royal family transformed high culture in Brazil after 1808 with the creation of the first faculties of law (São Paulo and Recife), medicine (Rio de Janeiro and Salvador), and engineering (Rio de Janeiro). Prince Regent João (later João VI) also established a number of other key elite institutions including what would become the national library. After the return of most of the royal family to Portugal in 1821, Crown Prince Pedro eventually assumed leadership of the independence movement, and declared Brazil’s separation from Portugal in 1822 and the creation of the Empire of Brazil. Under Pedro I (1822–31) and his son Pedro II (1840–89), royal patronage led to the creation of national archives and support for historical writing as the new country and its leadership attempted to forge an ‘imagined community’ around its own myths and images.

Throughout the nineteenth century (much like in the United States and Spanish America), gentlemen scholars produced the major historical works. The two giants of this period were Francisco Adolfo Varnhagen, a diplomat and the son of a German military engineer, and João Capistrano de Abreu. Many consider the latter’s work, especially his Capítulos de história colonial [Chapters of...
Colonial History] (1907), as a mark of the beginning of modern historical writing with its emphasis on documentary evidence and sophisticated analysis. Historians in the nineteenth century were writing for an elite audience. The population of Brazil in 1872 was ten million, with a literacy rate of around 10 per cent and an urban population of about 10 per cent.

As was common across the Western world in the nineteenth century, the Brazilians also established national and state archives and libraries, although they largely concentrated on collecting government documents. Nevertheless, the foundations of modern archival and library collections largely took shape under the Brazilian Empire (1822–89) and the so-called First Republic (1889–1930). From the early nineteenth century until well into the twentieth century, coffee production and exports drove the expansion of the Brazilian economy. By the beginning of the twentieth century, industrialization began to take shape, especially around Rio de Janeiro and the rapidly emerging metropolis of São Paulo. Throughout the twentieth century, these two cities would dominate intellectual and cultural life in Brazil. Most of the major intellectual and cultural leaders came from families whose wealth had emerged out of the coffee economy or the commercial networks that were built on that economic expansion. Those major intellectual figures who were not natives of these two dominant metropolitan centres, very often moved there to become part of the dynamic cultural, intellectual, and publishing centres.7

FROM THE 1920S TO THE 1960S

The 1920s and 1930s were years of striking political, economic, and cultural ferment in Brazil. Profoundly influenced by European transformations and a large wave of immigrants from southern Europe (Italy, Spain, and Portugal), the Brazilian elites were drawn ever closer to Europe physically at the very moment when intellectual elites declared Brazil’s cultural independence from Europe. Modernism, in particular, emerged in Brazil by the 1920s, and helped spark a fundamental re-examination of the very nature of Brazilian society, identity, and history. The collapse of electoral politics in 1930 initiated a quarter-century of transformations dominated by Getúlio Vargas. Under Vargas’s political rule—especially a period of dictatorship (1937–45)—the Brazilian state moved to appropriate historical production and consciously shaped the representation of the nation’s past through publishing, school curricula, museums, and national celebrations.8

8 Daryle Williams, Culture Wars in Brazil: The First Vargas Regime, 1930–1945 (Durham, NC, 2001).
Three major interpretive works laid the foundations for much historical writing over the rest of the century. Paulo Prado’s *Retrato do Brasil: Ensaios sobre a tristeza brasileira* [Portrait of Brazil: An Essay on Brazilian Sadness] (1928) is a deeply pessimistic and melancholic portrayal of the creation and development of Brazil. From a very influential São Paulo coffee-planter family, Prado concludes that the racial mixture, Portuguese political heritage, and the inequalities produced over centuries, had trapped Brazilians into social, economic, and political patterns that would be difficult, if not impossible, to overcome. In some ways, Prado’s work in the 1920s followed in the tradition of Euclides da Cunha’s epic *Os sertões* [Rebellion in the Backlands] (1902), long considered one of the two foundational texts on Brazilian national identity. Part journalism, part history, and part philosophy, da Cunha’s book sets out the fundamental dilemma facing Brazilian intellectuals at the beginning of the twentieth century. He vividly describes Brazil’s essence—the mixture of Africans, Indians, and Europeans—that produced a nation of non-whites. Unable to break from the racist social science of the late nineteenth century, da Cunha concludes that the only possible hope for Brazil is to ‘whiten’ the population through immigration and the gradual ‘eradication’ of the non-whites and their influence. In contrast, Sérgio Buarque de Holanda’s *Raízes do Brasil* [Roots of Brazil] (1936) sees the Portuguese traditions as the key to the ‘cordial man’—a Brazilian characterized by the ability to compromise, negotiate, and manoeuvre, thereby helping to make the first century after independence more peaceful and stable than in much of Latin America. Holanda emphasizes a national character that leads to conciliation and compromise in politics and makes Brazilians uniquely able to forge a bright future. Largely a self-taught historian, Holanda would become, in the succeeding decades, one of the most important historians in Brazil.

The second great foundational text on Brazilian identity is Gilberto Freyre’s *Casa-grande e senzala* [The Masters and the Slaves] (1933)—a brilliant, rambling, interpretive essay on the formation of colonial Brazilian society. Building on a long tradition (that includes da Cunha), Freyre also argues that the very essence of Brazil’s history and identity is to be found in the racial and cultural mixing of the Portuguese with Native Americans, and more importantly, with African slaves. In stark contrast to his predecessors, Freyre sees this mixture as the glory and greatness of a Brazilian civilization that is superior to all others. This ‘luso-tropical civilization’ (Portugal in the tropics), Freyre argues, is unique, culturally rich, and the key to Brazil’s past and future. Freyre’s vision of a Brazil forged out of racial and cultural mixture, of Indians, Africans, and Europeans, gradually became the heart and soul of a powerful variety of nationalism. Beginning with the dictatorship of Getúlio Vargas in the 1930s and 1940s,

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9 The pioneering essay on racial mixture and the formation of Brazil—published in 1844—was Karl Friedrich Philipp von Martius, ‘How the History of Brazil Should Be Written’, in E. Bradford Burns (ed.), *Perspectives on Brazilian History* (New York, 1967), 21–41.
and accelerating under the populist politics of the 1950s, especially during the
presidency of Juscelino Kubitschek, this Freyrian vision gradually became inte-
gral to the project of nation-building, especially Freyre’s notion that Brazil had
managed to forge a ‘racial democracy’. Ironically, it was under the military
regime in the 1960s and 1970s that this vision of a racially mixed—and racially
democratic—Brazil became official state ideology. This vision became central to
the creation of national identity under the military regime, and was consecrated
by civilian politicians in the immediate aftermath of military rule.\(^\text{10}\)

Holanda and Freyre were young intellectuals when they published their path-
breaking books (Prado was almost sixty). They did not hold academic positions,
although as Brazilian academia developed in later decades, Freyre and Holanda
would, at times, hold university positions (in Brazil and abroad). Holanda would
later serve as the general editor for the first six volumes of the massive and
fundamental *História geral da civilização brasileira* [General History of Brazilian
Civilization] (1960–71). All three were children of elite planter families from São
Paulo or, in the case of Freyre, from Recife. A number of the other major
historical works produced in the 1930s and 1940s followed this pattern. Caio
Prado, Jr.’s *Formação do Brasil contemporâneo* [Formation of Contemporary
Brazil] (1942) is another example. Part of the same eminent Prado family, this
book is a major reinterpretation of colonial society from a Marxist, materialist,
and economic perspective.

### THE RISE OF ACADEMIC HISTORY

Although some Brazilian universities today claim to be the first founded in the
country, the Universidade de São Paulo (USP), founded in the 1930s was the first
truly modern university in Brazil. The coffee export economy made the state of
São Paulo the richest and most populous state in Brazil by the 1930s, and
the spin-offs from the coffee economy would make metropolitan São Paulo
the most powerful industrial centre in the southern hemisphere by the mid-
twentieth century.\(^\text{11}\) The state’s intellectual, economic, and political elites
brought in European academics in the 1930s and 1940s to help create USP.
Fernand Braudel, Claude Lévi-Strauss, and Roger Bastide, among others, spent
the early years of their careers in Brazil participating in the creation of USP.\(^\text{12}\)
This process reinforced the elite’s longstanding preference for European and
especially French intellectual and cultural trends, over the United States. Only

\(^{10}\) Maria Lúcia Garcia Pallares-Burke, *Gilberto Freyre: Um vitoriano dos trópicos* (São Paulo, 2005).

\(^{11}\) Joseph L. Love, *São Paulo in the Brazilian Federation, 1889–1937* (Stanford, Calif., 1980); and

\(^{12}\) These years in Brazil yielded the fieldwork that formed the basis of Claude Lévi-Strauss, *Triste
in the 1970s did the enormous global influence of US culture and academia begin
to play a significant role in shaping the rapid expansion of a national system of
Brazilian universities, most of them directly supported by the federal govern-
ment.¹³

In the 1940s and 1950s some of the most important historical works continued
to come from the pens of non-academic historians and social scientists. Victor
Nunes Leal’s *Coronelismo, enxada e voto: O município e o regime representativo
no Brasil* [Coronelismo: The Municipality and Representative Governments in
Brazil] (1949) and Raimundo Faoro’s *Os donos do poder: Formação do patronato
político brasileiro* [The Masters of Power: The Formation of Brazilian Political
Patronage] (1958) are two outstanding examples. Both books provided very
powerful and influential analyses of the very nature of society and politics in
Brazil, while turning to the Portuguese colonial heritage as key to the develop-
ment of Brazil. Faoro emphasized the centuries-long development of a patrimo-
nial state and the use of political patronage. Leal described the development of a
locally and regionally based network of powerful landowners (colonels) who
dominated and controlled land, politics, and society. Developing over centuries,
this system of local rural bosses became the key to national politics at the end of
the nineteenth century and the beginning of the twentieth, as a weak central state
conceded local authority to the colonels in exchange for loyalty to the state and
federal governments. Both Leal and Faoro were trained as lawyers, and only after
publishing these works did they later spend part of their careers as university
professors.

By the 1960s Brazil had developed a vibrant intellectual community,
emerging universities, and national political leaders increasingly interested in
fostering a sense of national identity. In many ways the government became the
most powerful source of support for cultural, educational, and intellectual pur-
suits (reinforcing old patterns that would follow from Faoro’s analysis). In the
two decades after the Second World War, intellectual and cultural life in Brazil
ranged across a broad political spectrum from the left to the right, and much of
the historical writing produced reflected the desire of intellectuals across the
political spectrum to explain the nation’s past as a key to understanding the
present—and as a guide to future development.¹⁴ The works of Leal and Faoro
reflect this trend. The brilliant pioneering works of Celso Furtado on the
economic history of Brazil—such as *Formação econômica do Brasil* [The Economic
Growth of Brazil] (1959)—reflect a leftist vision of the origins of Brazil’s
underdevelopment, and the potential means for overcoming the obstacles to
development. A career in journalism, and then government in the 1950s and

¹³ Arnaldo Niskier, *Educação brasileira: 500 anos de história, 1500–2000* (São Paulo, 1989); and
1996).

1960s, shaped an historical vision that sought the path to future policy through the analysis of Brazil’s past.\textsuperscript{15}

Most of these classic historical works were written by men who did not have any formal training as historians, and whose higher education was in law, economics, or the social sciences. These works established a pattern that was to continue even after the rise of academic history—that of working across disciplines. Two major currents had a powerful influence on the works done after the 1920s and well into the 1980s: the Annales School and Marxism. Both contributed to the powerful influence of social and economic history, and Marxism (in a wide variety of forms) deeply shaped the works of historians of all persuasions throughout the second half of the twentieth century.

Tragically, amidst the bitter political divisions of the Cold War, Brazilian politics polarized and the military seized power in 1964, ending two decades of mass electoral politics, and initiating a wave of military coups all over Latin America over the next decade.\textsuperscript{16} Repression intensified in the late 1960s, driving many intellectuals into exile across Latin America, Europe, and the United States. Ironically, this political and intellectual diaspora enriched historical writing in Brazil, and in those regions where Brazilians settled into exile. Although the military regime purged universities of ‘undesirable’ faculty, the regime also funded a dramatic expansion in the federal university system, laying the groundwork for even more expansion after the military was finally forced from power in 1985.

As Brazilian academia expanded after 1960, Brazilian historical work reflected the larger patterns in Europe and the United States—the turn toward social and economic history and the influence of Marxism. Labour, workers, slaves, natives, families, and women became the focus of a growing body of historical writing, increasingly produced by academic historians. The work of Edgard Carone on labour, Boris Fausto on daily life, and Maria Sylvia de Carvalho Franco on slavery and free labour, are typical examples of these trends. One of the most influential works, Emília Viotti da Costa’s \textit{Da senzala à colônia} [From Slave Quarters to Colony] brought the study of slavery in Brazil to new levels of rigour and analysis. Soon after the military coup, da Costa moved to Yale University, and over the next thirty years trained a number of outstanding historians who now teach and train historians in major graduate programmes in the United States (such as Yale, Wisconsin, Duke, New York University).

As the number of universities expanded, doctoral programmes in history multiplied. By the 1980s virtually every state in Brazil (more than two dozen)

\textsuperscript{15} See Furtado’s autobiographical works, \textit{A fantasia organizada} (Rio de Janeiro, 1985); and \textit{A fantasia desfeita} (São Paulo, 1989).

had its own federal university, as well as other public and private universities. USP grew and retained its position as the best university in Brazil, but first-rate history departments emerged in other states and cities (such as Universidade Federal de Minas Gerais, Universidade Federal Fluminense, Universidade Estadual de Campinas, Universidade Federal do Rio de Janeiro). The prestige of USP derived not only from its head start in the 1930s, but also from the resources which the state could provide for a modern research university.

Even as the military dictatorship dominated national life in the 1970s, the historical profession matured and expanded, and many important works appeared. Perhaps the most important theoretical current in the 1960s and 1970s, in all Latin America, was dependency theory. During these decades many influential theories of imperialism and dependency emerged out of Europe, the United States, Latin America, Africa, and the Middle East, deeply influenced by different varieties of Marxism. Latin American writers, in particular, produced some of the most widely read works on dependency theory. The most influential work in this approach was produced by Brazilian sociologist Fernando Henrique Cardoso while in exile in Chile after he was purged from the USP faculty. Written with the Chilean, Enzo Faletto, *Dependency and Development* (1967) had enormous influence throughout Latin America and beyond. Although dependency theory came in many varieties, the essential argument was simple: the powerful economies of the North Atlantic world had emerged in the early modern and modern eras through their control and domination of the colonies and new nations of Latin America, Asia, and Africa. For the most radical of the dependency theorists, the economies and nations of Latin America were dependent—economically and politically—on those of the United States and Europe (mainly Great Britain) for their very survival and growth. Immanuel Wallerstein’s world systems theory was a close cousin of dependency theory. 17

Much of the historical work in Latin America from the 1960s to the 1980s was deeply shaped by dependency theory in some form or fashion. Fernando Novais’s *Portugal e Brasil na crise do antigo sistema colonial* (1777–1808) [Portugal and Brazil in the Crisis of the Old Colonial System] (1979) is one of the most prominent examples of efforts to place Brazil’s historical development under Portuguese colonialism within the framework of European expansion, Atlantic economic systems, and notions of development and underdevelopment. Throughout these decades, a good deal of historical writing probed economic issues, sometimes generating pioneering works. One group of works followed a path like that of Novais studying systems, often on a trans-Atlantic scale. Celso Furtado produced a series of works that took on all of Latin America in an effort

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17 Immanuel Wallerstein, *Capitalist Agriculture and the Origins of the European World-Economy in the Sixteenth Century* (New York, 1974). See also Ch. 6 by Peer Vries in this volume.
to explain the historical origins of the underdevelopment not only of Brazil, but of the entire region.\footnote{18}

Very different in approach from Novais and Furtado is Annibal Villanova Villela and Wilson Suzigan’s *Política do governo e crescimento da economia brasileira, 1889–1945* [Government Policy and the Growth of the Brazilian Economy] (1973), a landmark in the construction of key statistical time series on the role of Brazil’s governments in the process of economic growth. Economists and historians ignored disciplinary boundaries and produced a steady stream of outstanding studies, often built on previously unexploited quantitative data. As is true with so much of the historical writing in Brazil, studies of Rio de Janeiro and São Paulo dominated this scholarship. One of the most powerful issues driving a large number of works was how São Paulo became the world’s most important coffee producer and exporter in the late nineteenth century, and then the most powerful industrial centre in the Third World by the middle of the twentieth century.\footnote{19}

The diaspora of Brazilian historians, the growth of the Brazilian university system, and the greater ease of communication with Europe and the United States, led to a cross-fertilization of ideas, methods, and approaches. One of the striking features of the historical work produced in Brazil is a long tradition of outstanding scholarship that ignores traditional academic and disciplinary boundaries. Among the most heavily studied areas in these decades were slavery, plantation societies, race and relations, immigration, social rebellions, and labour. A number of Brazilian scholars did their doctoral work in the United States, and in the succeeding decades moved easily between the academic community there and in Brazil. Two prominent examples are João José Reis (and his work on slavery), and José Murilo de Carvalho, whose work has ranged across the past two centuries, including analyses of social revolts, imperial politics, and citizenship. (Reis did his doctoral work at the University of Minnesota and Carvalho at Stanford University.)

Brazilian historians have made major contributions over the last half-century to studies of slavery and race relations. Gilberto Freyre’s classic work from the 1930s was for many years the dominant view of Brazilian slavery outside Brazil. In many ways the ongoing criticism of Freyre’s vision of a benign form of slavery and race relations stimulated decades of works after 1960. Brazilian historians such as João José Reis, Emília Viotti da Costa, Kátia de Queirós Mattoso, and Júnia Ferreira Furtado were not only influential figures within the Brazilian academic community, but also shaped studies of slavery among European, North American, and Latin American historians.


Another important line of research and writing was intellectual and cultural history. To some degree this area had a long pedigree in the essayist tradition of Freyre, Prado, and Holanda. The works produced by the 1970s, however, were of a different style and calibre. A fine example is Carlos Guilherme Mota’s *Ideologia da cultura brasileira, 1933–1974* [The Ideology of Brazilian Culture] (1978). Mota’s book was a revision of his doctoral dissertation at USP. It provided a powerful and sweeping look at the emergence of the Brazilian intelligentsia from the Vargas years to the military dictatorship. Mota has gone on to become one of the major Brazilian historians of the last three decades. His powerful, synthetic work stimulated many others looking in depth at Brazilian intellectual and cultural history in the twentieth century.

**RECENT DEVELOPMENTS**

By the 1980s the Brazilian military began disengaging from power in a long, slow process of redemocratization that moved the country to civilian rule after 1985. In the past two decades, Brazilians have constructed a vibrant system of democratic representative politics. For all its flaws, Brazil has the third largest democracy in the world today. From a population of about 17 million in 1900 that was 10 per cent urban and 10 per cent literate, Brazil grew to nearly 190 million by 2010. More than 85 per cent urban and 85 per cent literate, the country looks very different than it did at the beginning of the twentieth century. The move toward civilian politics, until the mid-1990s, was accompanied by exceptionally high inflation (three and four digits per year) before economic stability was achieved in the late 1990s. This period of mass politics and economic transformation has been accompanied by the continued growth of the academic historical profession and graduate programmes in nearly every state in the country. Professional, academic historians have come to dominate historical writing at the end of the twentieth century, and a thriving market for historical writing for the general public has also developed.

Although Brazilian historians continue to be deeply influenced by French historians and historical trends, they are now also affected substantially by historical work in the United States and other regions of Latin America. The most obvious area of French historical influence has been in the ‘cultural turn’. Works such as Laura de Mello e Souza’s *O diabo na Terra de Santa Cruz* [The Devil in the Land of the Holy Cross] (1986) and *Os desclassificados do ouro* [The Dispossessed of Gold] (1982) are two prominent examples of the application of cultural history, especially the history of *mentalitê*s. Another major example is the study of ‘private life’ in four volumes coordinated by Fernando A. Novais.²⁰ The

The work of José Carlos Sebe Bom Meihy in the field of oral history reflects a long and close collaboration with the US historian Robert M. Levine.

The expansion of the university system, at first into the state capitals, and in more recent years into secondary cities, has also stimulated the proliferation of a large volume of local and regional histories. The overwhelming tendency of Brazilian masters degree students, and to some extent of doctoral students, is to do their primary research in local archives. The result has been a deepening of knowledge about the traditional power centres (Bahia, Rio de Janeiro, Minas Gerais, and São Paulo), and the publication of studies of many previously understudied states and regions. The creation of the Associação Nacional dos Professores Universitários de História (ANPUH) in 1961 (now known as the Associação Nacional de História) marks a turning point in the professionalization of historical writing. All states have their own regional version of ANPUH. The national organization publishes the Revista Brasileira de História, one of the most respected academic journals in Brazil, and the number of local and regional historical journals is enormous.

In the past twenty years, biography has become a major genre among both academic and non-academic historians. Driven by a growing market among the general public, biographies have become a regular feature on the best-seller lists. The quality of these works varies widely. In most cases the biographies of major political figures have been disappointing for their research depth and critical analysis. To some extent this is due to the failure of major political figures to accumulate and make accessible their papers. There is nothing akin to the system of presidential libraries, for example, in the United States, or a tradition of donating the papers of politicians to major archives. The most prominent exception is the Centro de Pesquisas e Documentação da História Contemporânea (CPDOC), under the auspices of the Fundação Getúlio Vargas in Rio de Janeiro. Over the last thirty years or so the CPDOC has accumulated an important collection of papers and oral histories of major figures in recent Brazilian history. Historians at the CPDOC, such as Ângela de Castro Gomes, have helped reinvent the political history of Brazil over the last generation.

Again, much like the rest of Latin America, much of the historiography produced in Brazil concentrates on national history and, although informed by reading the works of other Latin Americans, the works of Brazilians are only rarely comparative or cross-national. This nation-centric approach is also reflected in the relative scarcity of studies that deal with international relations, except the relationship of Brazil with Portugal (in the colonial period), Great Britain (in the first century after independence), or the United States (over the last century). Works by historians dealing with Brazil and other Latin American countries are rare.

As in the North Atlantic historical communities over the last generation, Brazilian historians have focused much of their attention since the 1980s on culture, identity, and politics. Murilo de Carvalho’s work on social revolts and on
citizenship, Sidney Chalhoub’s on Rio de Janeiro, and Francisco Iglesias’s on politics, are some of the outstanding examples of the historical writing of the last quarter-century. The great diversity of historical works, especially on race and slavery at the beginning of the twenty-first century, and particularly those on race and ethnicity, also indicate the end of the dominance of the Freyrian vision of Brazil, and a more contentious debate over the nature of Brazil’s past and the formation of national identity.

Since the 1980s, Brazilian historical writing has reached a stage of maturity, vibrancy, and quality that is impressive. Today, Brazilian historical writing is still influenced by historiographical trends in Europe and the United States but, as João Reis recently noted, the principal debates and influences in the Brazilian historical community are essentially domestic.21 The community of historians working on the history of Brazil is large and growing, although very few historians in academic departments work on topics outside of Brazilian history. Like many Latin American countries, the historical profession is overwhelmingly focused on national history, and only minimally on the history of the rest of the world. As universities and the community of historians continue to grow in the coming decades, Brazil will, no doubt, not only continue to produce high-quality work on national history, but will also expand the range and quality of works on other areas of the world.

TIMELINE/KEY DATES

1889 Overthrow of the empire and beginning of the ‘First’ or ‘Old Republic’
1930 Revolt overturns the government of the ‘Old Republic’ bringing Getúlio Vargas to power in a coalition of political interest groups
1937 Vargas takes complete control, creating the authoritarian ‘New State’
1945 Vargas dictatorship ends; beginning of era of mass, democratic politics
1956–61 Presidency of Juscelino Kubitschek
1960 Inauguration of Brasília as the new national capital
1961 Formation of Associação Nacional dos Professores Universitários de História (ANPUH)
1964 Coup by armed forces ends ‘experiment in democracy’ and begins two decades of military rule
1980 Creation of the Revista Brasileira de História
1985 Military hand over power to civilians
1989 First democratic presidential election since 1960
1994 Election of Fernando Henrique Cardoso to first of two presidential terms
2002 Election of Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva for first of two presidential terms

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Chapter 22
Mexican Historical Writing

Guillermo Zermeño Padilla

It is generally believed that history gained ‘scientific’ status in Mexico following the professionalization and institutionalization of history in 1939 at the Instituto Nacional de Antropología e Historia (INAH), and in 1940 at El Colegio de México. These events, however, are only two in a series of much wider developments which saw the founding of institutions for teaching and scientific research, created in response to both the challenges brought about by the international crisis of the inter-war period (1913–39) and the particular conditions within Mexico. Even more than the impact of the Second World War, the creation of new academic institutions were the result of the Spanish Civil War’s (1936–9) effects on Mexico, and the particularities of the political regime that emerged from the Mexican Revolution (1910–20).

In fact, one cannot understand the evolution of Mexican historiography after 1940 without taking into consideration the consolidation and political hegemony of the regime established after the Mexican Revolution in the 1930s, most notably in the government of president Lázaro Cárdenas (1934–40). In addition to these international and domestic economic, political, and cultural factors, it was the convergence of exiled Spanish republican intellectuals and intellectuals of the Mexican Revolution after 1938, which ultimately sparked the appearance of academic historiography in Mexico, and whose influence still dominates the current functioning of the principal institutions of history.

Without overlooking the importance of the creation of university centres in the professionalization of history, it is necessary to note that before 1940 a national-liberal historical rhetoric already existed, articulated primarily during the second half of the nineteenth century. One can already detect in this rhetoric some of the features which would characterize the historical sciences, even before they became an academic activity.

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THE INFLUENCE OF RANKE

It was during the same period that history began to professionalize and, especially after 1940, that the figure of the German historian Leopold von Ranke emerged as emblematic of the kind of historian that Mexican scholars wished to become. At the end of his life, Ranke had been revered as the father of academic history, due to his work on source criticism and his apparently uncompromising search for impartial and objective truth.\(^3\) The image of Ranke as one of the first university professors engaged in the investigation of the past through a deep study of archival sources while training new historians in small research seminars, still predominates today, though it has been challenged in various quarters. These aspects of Ranke’s approach would take hold in France, England, and the United States during the last third of the nineteenth century and the beginning of the twentieth, as part of a campaign of global university reform in the humanities and social sciences.\(^4\) In this way, the professionalization of history was in general identified with the normative Rankean forms of research.\(^5\) Mexico was not the exception, although it occurred there within the context of the 1940s, somewhat later than in other parts of the world.

From the beginning, the Rankean approach dominated the effort to professionalize history. This was due to the fact that his ideas were not completely unknown in Mexico at the time, as they had appeared with a group of exiled Spanish academics such as Rafael Altamira and José Gaos, who had prior contact with German universities. From their arrival in Mexico in 1939, these men created various seminars to educate new scholars, not only in the field of history, but also in anthropology, sociology, and philosophy. In particular, Silvio Zavala (who had been a disciple of Altamira in Madrid before returning to Mexico in 1936 at the outbreak of the Spanish Civil War to establish the history degree at El Colegio de México in 1940), recognized in various interviews that his model historian was none other than Ranke.\(^6\)

How does one explain how Ranke became the model for Mexican historians at a time when new historiographical theories, such as those represented in the United States by Carl Becker or the historical problem-solving of Marc Bloch and Lucien Febvre in France, were appearing? This is all the more remarkable

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\(^{3}\) This is also the view of Juan A. Ortega y Medina, *Teoría de la historiografía científico-idealista alemana* (Mexico, 1980), 56.

\(^{4}\) See Peter Novick, *Ese noble sueño: La objetividad y la historia profesional norteamericana* (Mexico, 1997).


since these new critical perspectives were not unknown to those promoting professionalization. In fact, they had at hand, thanks to an ambitious translation project, a wide and diverse bibliographic catalogue which included the analysis of, and critical reflections on, the scientific canon produced in the nineteenth century.

In fact, in the 1940s, at the beginning of professionalization, there was a methodological debate about what type of history was best suited to Mexico. In this context, two historiographical camps were formed, characterized as either ‘positivist’ or ‘historicist’. On the one side were the defenders of a ‘positivist’ historiography or of the facts of the past (in keeping with Ranke and his ideal of objectivity), and interested in ‘methodologically’ increasing knowledge about the past of the nation; the other situated itself as a defence of ‘historicism’, more concerned with ‘ideas’ than ‘facts’ (and identified with the idealist philosophical approaches of Benedetto Croce and R. G. Collingwood), and associated with the dangers of subjectivity and historical relativism.

An example of the confluence of Mexican intellectualism, historiography, and this contemporary debate is Edmundo O’Gorman, the most illustrious representative of the ‘historicist’ movement, whom his critics saw as more of a ‘philosopher’ than an ‘historian’. O’Gorman, as part of a general assessment of the historical scholarship produced over the fifteen years prior to 1940, published in 1947 a critical treatise on the postulations of Ranke entitled *Crisis y porvenir de la ciencia de la histórica* [Crisis and the Future of Historical Science] (1947). Like the debate which surrounded it, this text was ignored by ‘positivists’, who saw it as ‘philosophy of history’, and was applauded by those who saw history from a more theoretical perspective.

**WHY RANKE?**

Despite O’Gorman’s criticism, Silvo Zavala defended the Rankean model and made it a compulsory part of the curriculum for entry-level training in history. This does not mean that other understandings of the historian’s task were not present: it is only to say that up until now, a simplistic image of Ranke the historian and his reputedly obsessive relationship with the archive, dominated discussions. It is possible that the abandonment of a reflective dimension in academic historiography, despite its achievements, has led to the seemingly innumerable pronouncements that history is a discipline in crisis.8

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7 Some of the texts of this debate were compiled in Alvaro Matute, *La teoría de la historia en México: 1940–1973* (Mexico, 1974).

Starting in 1938, Mexico began to harbour a group of exiled Spanish intellectuals at the Casa de España.⁹ Many of these men quickly integrated themselves into Mexican universities and, inspired by the liberal reform, which was cut short by the triumph of Francoism in 1939, they continued the work begun in Spain on the renewal and updating of the social sciences and humanities.¹⁰ From this perspective, the opening-up of academic historiography in Mexico offered a way to give continuity—albeit on different soil—to an intellectual project initiated in Madrid. The founding of El Colegio de México on 8 October 1940, for instance, continued the work of similar research centres established in Spain in the early 1900s. In fact, a centre founded on 14 April 1941 under the direction of Silvio Zavala became the first to dedicate itself to teaching and research. Zavala, in fact, had already tried to shape such a centre at the Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México (UNAM) as a place to train scholarship students in palaeography and in the study of American colonial texts. With this goal, he kept his headquarters at the Museo Nacional where he was secretary. The project, however, did not succeed, primarily because of Zavala’s persistent absences, and a dearth of students prepared to dedicate themselves entirely to historical study.¹¹ It succeeded, however, at El Colegio de México.

The importance of this moment lies in the opening up in universities of new fields of study connected to literature, sociology, economics, and history. Within this constellation of events, Zavala emerged as almost a ‘Tsar’ of history by occupying various important administrative posts all at once: he was Director of the Centro de Estudios Históricos at El Colegio de México (1941–56), the Museo Nacional de Historia (1946–54), and the Comisión de Historia del Instituto Panamericano de Geografía e Historia (1947–65). Furthermore, with funding from the Guggenheim Foundation he would begin the project of publishing extant sources, such as his Fuentes para la Historia del Trabajo en la Nueva España [Sources for the Labour History of New Spain] (8 vols., 1939–46). Even before he had turned 40, Zavala had become a member of the Colegio Nacional (founded in 1943), and by 1946 of the Academia Mexicana de la Historia (founded in 1919). Very soon after that he also became member of the Junta de Gobierno of the Universidad Nacional (1949), and from 1950 onward he led the Comisión de Historia del Desarrollo Científico y Cultural for UNESCO. In 1953, Alfonso Reyes, a leading protagonist in the founding of El Colegio de México, identified Zavala as the model historian. Comparing him

⁹ Clara E. Lida (in collaboration with José Antonio Matesanz), La Casa de España en México (Mexico, 1988).
to the still-idealized image of Ranke, Reyes extolled Zavala for his diligent work with primary sources, his cautious interpretations, and especially for his staunch intellectual impartiality.  

Zavala had been inspired by Altamira, an historian of legal institutions, who in 1894 had expressly adopted Ranke as his model for objective history, and Rankeanism as offering the means to understand different peoples, and above all, to awaken a national spirit.  

Altamira also expressed a particular sympathy for what he understood as ‘methodological theory’ or the systematic science of history, capable of producing an organic conceptual knowledge.  

Such a conception of history was supported by Krausism—the dominant intellectual force that shaped Spanish liberalism in the nineteenth century. Karl Krause, a German Romantic philosopher, promoted the idea of a universal ‘world society’ that would transcend national boundaries—an idea that caught on in the Spanish-speaking world later in the century as a way to respond to the crisis in the colonial Spanish system of 1898, after losing its last American stronghold. In this setting, history was given the function of restoring the lost credibility of Spanish civilization.  

The implementation of the Krausist philosophy involved not only the reform of the humanities but of the whole educational system, and its importance only increased in response to the three great Spanish crises of 1898, 1927, and 1939. In essence, it involved the reception and adaptation of modern German historiography and philosophy to the Spanish arena. When it arrived in Mexico, this approach quickly adapted itself to the conditions of a Mexico emerging from the civil struggles of 1910–20 and the efforts of the ‘victorious revolution’ to rebuild or ‘regenerate’ Mexican society. This allowed for the institutionalization of new knowledge, history included, for the purpose of reconciling foreign influences with their own culture and values.  

Even Altamira, already in Mexico among the Spanish exiles and teaching a course on historical methodology in 1948, pointed to the need for the study of history to help re-establish harmony between civilizations in the midst of the emerging Cold War crises of the post-war era. In an affirmation not so distant from the Rankean approach to history, Altamira affirmed that historians, before judging events, must know them in order to situate them within their historical context.

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16 Ibid., 104. For the reception of Krausism in Mexico, see Antolín C. Sánchez Cuervo, *Krausismo en México* (Mexico, 2004).
The reform of historical studies, as proposed by Altamira and defended in Mexico by Zavala, by now implied, according to the intellectual trends of the time, the need to look to other areas of study beyond the political, military, and diplomatic history of the nineteenth century, to identify the factors that determined the spirit of a people. This would take into consideration environmental and geographic factors, the economy and ideas, culture and the material conditions of everyday life, and the appearance of popular movements in history. In this way, this project echoed some of the proposals of Lucien Febvre and Fernand Braudel regarding the need for a global history of civilizations.

With such theoretical-methodological premises as a foundation, Zavala and a group of Spanish historians such as José Miranda began teaching and supervising research seminars on the history of the legal institutions of the Spanish colonial period in America, and counted on the support of the Instituto Panamericano de Geografía e Historia, created in 1941, to publish their results. This new modality was also a response to the desire to overcome the ideological-political confrontations inherited from the nineteenth century between ‘hispanicists’—those who defended Spanish traditions and culture—and ‘indigenists’—propagators of the values of American cultures. This conflict had been reawakened in the 1920s in different parts of the country by the agrarian reform efforts of the revolutionary government. Zavala and others hoped that by writing an objective and impartial history, they would be able to make significant strides towards settling this dispute. In fact, this heuristic principle has apparently guided much academic history, especially when addressing heated questions such as the relationship between church and state.

This all means that after the armed phase of the revolution and its subsequent ‘institutionalization’ (the Partido Revolucionario Institucional or PRI was created in 1946 and would govern until 2000), and with the less socially and politically confrontational climate (at least within Mexico) that followed the Second World War, one can see the professionalization of history taking shape. Indeed, after 1940 the principle of national unity and the reconciliation of competing interests would dominate political and intellectual life in Mexico. In 1944 a new member of the Academia Mexicana de la Historia, in his inaugural address to the academy, asserted that one had to strive to avoid further breaking the spiritual unity or ‘soul’ of the Mexican people. In this task, history was fundamental in explaining who Mexicans were, and what their past aspirations had been.

[History] studied through broader criteria, and with true patriotism, will lead us to a better understanding of general aspirations... and will give much deserved justice to the

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18 I refer to such periodicals as Historia de América (est. 1938) and Cuadernos Americanos (est. 1943).
19 Silvio Zavala, Tributo al historiador Justo Sierra (Mexico, 1946).
diverse members of parties in conflict, and of the ideals and purposes that sustained them, and will surely lead to a better national understanding. Undoubtedly, if a people knows its past and knows how to value it, there will be a firmer form of union among the inhabitants of the country, and the desire to put all their efforts into cooperation, in the sense that all have set their sights on the well-being of the nation.20

A sign of both the times and the new political climate of the post-war era was the creation in 1949 of the first North American–Mexican conference in history. The Mexican side was organized by Zavala, and the North American by Lewis Hanke. On this occasion, Hanke reaffirmed the desire to create a professional esprit de corps around the history between nations to ease the tensions found in traditional Mexican-North American historiography and to be founded on the preservation and investigation of primary sources, aimed at the writing of truthful and honest history. This academic historiographic interchange between the two regions still occurs today. It was formalized in 1949, and subsequently expanded, with the help of the more recent free trade agreements of the 1990s, to include the participation of Canada.

THE HISTORY OF IDEAS

Though it did not break with the nationalist or patriotic impulses seen at the beginnings of professionalization, the history of ideas or a more ‘philosophic’ history, led by exiled Spanish philosopher José Gaos, and Mexican historian Edmundo O’Gorman, also emerged after the Second World War. Gaos, a disciple of José Ortega y Gasset, had been rector of the Universidad Central de Madrid (now the Universidad Complutense de Madrid), and translator of the German philosopher Martin Heidegger’s Being and Time, before arriving in Mexico in 1938, where he began teaching a seminar on the history of Spanish-American thought at the Casa de España. Gaos investigated the historical roots of Spanish-American thought, aiming to create a distinctive philosophy, and to highlight its differences from those found in Europe. This became the philosophic-historical basis of the search for a distinctive Spanish-American view in such disciplines as economics, sociology, history, literature, and theology. This programme was also related to that of Altamira and Zavala, insofar as it also concentrated its observation on the evolution of a Spanish-American culture and civilization.21

Gaos continued to pursue the projects he had begun in Spain on Mexican soil, and preoccupied himself with such varied questions as the impact of Christianity

20 Quoted in Atanasio G. Saravia, Obras: Apuntes para la historia de la Nueva Vizcaya (Mexico, 1978), 16.
21 José Gaos, El pensamiento hispanoamericano (Mexico, 1943).
on Spanish-influenced civilization. Various individual and group works emerged from his seminar, many of which are still cited today by those interested in the history of ideas, or intellectual history. These include Leopoldo Zea’s study of positivism in Mexico, and O’Gorman’s *La invención de América* (1958)—one of Mexico’s most celebrated works of history. In the latter book, O’Gorman explored the history of encounters between the European and American world from the sixteenth century onwards, and he did so in opposition to the historical methodology used by Zavala and Altamira. Despite the apparent division between legal-institutional history and the history of ideas, both were part of the same project to plot a comprehensive history of Spanish-American civilization.

It is notable that many works in this vein were produced in literature and art departments rather than in history departments.

Gaos’s seminar attracted a group of young students interested in familiarizing themselves with the new trends in modern philosophy—predominantly phenomenology, existentialism, and Marxism. Above all, however, they were interested in learning how to think for themselves, so that they could produce a genuine Mexican philosophy—a goal that was embraced by other Mexican philosophers such as José Vasconcelos, Samuel Ramos, and Antonio Caso. We can also see in this period the beginnings of historiographical scholarship—that is, studies concerning the work of historians in the past—most notably that of Ramón Iglesia, an exile at El Colegio de México (1941–5).

**THE RETURN OF POLITICAL HISTORY**

The many titles that appeared in the 1940s and 1950s may give the impression that there was a ‘golden age’ in the historiography of ideas, but the same could not be said for the 1960s, which would witness a sharp decline. The earlier burst

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22 Leopoldo Zea et al., *Trabajos de historia filosófica, literaria y artística del cristianismo a la Edad Media* (Mexico, 1943).
23 Leopoldo Zea, *El positivismo en México* (Mexico, 1943); and id., *Apogeo y decadencia del positivismo en México* (Mexico, 1944).
25 A few of the works that emerged from the circle of colleagues and disciples of Silvio Zavala include José Miranda, *Vitoria y los intereses de la conquista de América* (Mexico, 1947); José María Miquel I. Vergés, *La independencia y la prensa insurgente* (Mexico, 1941); and Moisés González Navarro, *El pensamiento político de Lucas Alamán* (Mexico, 1952).
26 Some of the most significant works are: Monelisa Lina Pérez Marchand, *Dos etapas ideológicas del siglo XVIII en México a través de los papeles de la Inquisición* (Mexico, 1945); Bernabé Navarro, *La introducción de la filosofía moderna en México* (Mexico, 1948); and Luis Villoro, *Los grandes momentos del indigenismo en México* (Mexico, 1950).
of scholarship, however, had been mainly the result of the appearance of a new
generation of historians with ties to the social sciences (see below). Moreover, one
can observe, from 1930, the impact of economic history coming out of the United
States and of the Annales School in France, particularly (after the war) the
writings of Fernand Braudel. Despite this, as a result of the post-war realignment
of international politics and the move towards a more internal focus on the
‘revolutionary family’ in Mexico, a certain disenchantment appeared among a
few intellectuals who questioned the developmental focus of the economic
policies that began with the presidency of Miguel Alemán (1946–52). Some active
intellectuals and politicians such as Daniel Cosío Villegas and Jesús Silva Herzog
inquired as to how the revolutionary government had fallen so far off course.29 The
Mexican Revolution as a unifying phenomenon had begun to lose credibility, and
this would affect the trajectory of historical study.30

In this context of ‘crisis’, and with the help of the Rockefeller Foundation and
other state-run Mexican agencies, Cosío began, in 1949, a research seminar
investigating the immediate antecedents of the armed movement of 1910.31
This academic setting brought together as ‘investigators’ some of the most
prominent representatives of the first generation of professional historians: Luis
González y González, Berta Ulloa, and Moisés González Navarro. The result of
their various years of study (1955–72) was the publication, in ten large volumes, of
the Historia Moderna de México. There was no other publication like it, except for
México a través de los siglos [Mexico Across the Centuries], edited by Vicente Riva
Palacio at the end of the nineteenth century.

The questions that guided their research into the pre-revolutionary past
revolved around the urgent affairs of the present. Inspired by the historical
philosophy of Wilhelm Dilthey, this project sought to proceed ‘pragmatically’;
that is, it tried to know what modern Mexico was—not introspectively, but
rather through its works and actions.32 Like Ranke, but not Hegel, its authors
tried to do so through direct contact with the sources and endeavoured ‘not [to]
allow for any affirmation or hypothesis without finding its documentary proof,
and [only using those] as authoritative as possible’, as Cosío put it. ‘Only in this
way’, he continued, ‘could one give all study a firm foundation, and only in this
way advance our knowledge and understanding of our history’. In this manner
Cosío led a crusade in favour of the style of history previously defended by
Zavala.33 Cosío was also a fervent admirer of the ‘American scholar’ and wished
to reproduce this type of study in the Latin American sphere. This model

29 See Stanley R. Ross’s contributions in ¿Ha muerto la revolución mexicana? Causas, desarrollo y
 crisis, SepSetentas, 21 (1972).
31 Id., Nueva historiografía política del México moderno (Mexico, 1966).
33 Daniel Cosío Villegas, Memorias (1976; Mexico, 1986); and Cosío Villegas, ‘Historia y ciencias
represented a way of counteracting the weight of the political and confessional ideologies in sociological and historical interpretations of both the left and the right. This position was shared by both academics and political functionaries such as Jesús Reyes Heroles, and is evidence of the close relationship that existed between intellectuals and the Mexican Revolutionary political regime. In this relationship the state emerges as the primary promoter of scientific activity, and it demanded of scientists and intellectuals—the creators of a public opinion—their loyalty and ‘amicable’ criticism.

Seminars on Modern History established a style of work and produced various volumes of general and regional histories, still popular today. Between 1959 and 1960 a seminar dedicated to rescuing contemporary history or that of the Mexican Revolution began, edited by Luis González, disciple and favourite of Cosío Villegas. Between 1977 and 1997, nineteen volumes were published on the years between 1910 and 1960, and included the participation of specialists in political science and international relations, economists, sociologists, and historians, and dealt with the various subjects of modern history: education, politics, society, the economy, and diplomacy. The culmination of these endeavours was the publication (with great editorial success) of the four volumes of the Historia General de México (1976) and the Historia mínima de México (1973). Further, from 1970 onwards, general histories begin to appear for each state of the Republic, as well as the Una historia contemporánea de México which appeared in four volumes (2009), edited by Lorenzo Meyer and Ilán Bisberg, who took as their axis not the Mexican Revolution, but rather the post-revolutionary phase that followed the student unrest of 1968.

Despite Cosío’s reservations about the advance of the professionalization of history and the social sciences, around 1960 Robert A. Potash, a Mexican historian from the United States, was celebrating the exact opposite. Potash lauded the fact that in a country like Mexico it was possible to overcome a religious or party-driven history, and progress to one that was objective and impartial. He offered as an example the work of Jesuit José Bravo Ugarte, author of a very popular reference book on the history of Mexico. Within this ‘objective’ school he also pointed to the work of his colleague and friend, Cosío Villegas. Potash saw these historians’ work in opposition to that of O’Gorman and the ‘historicists’, whom, despite their erudition, he saw as more in line with existential philosophy. In this way, Potash summed up the triumph of the Rankean school of methodology.

35 Ibid., 197.
36 José Bravo Ugarte, Historia de México, 3 vols. (Mexico, 1941–59).
By 1960 the history of ideas had been transferred to the faculties of philosophy and literature, while institutional history was practised, from 1940 onward, in departments of anthropology and ethnohistory. This trend was accelerated by a greater interest in associating history with the methodology of the social sciences. This is reflected in the increase in interdisciplinary journal publications. A bibliographic inventory of academic history for 1966 reveals a wide repertoire of subjects and contents.\footnote{‘Veinticinco años de investigación histórica en México I’, Historia Mexicana, 15:2/3 (1965–6).} In these works one sees above all the desire to replace political history with a new economic, social, and demographic history, in response to the challenges laid down by the accelerated development of cities and the population. At the same time, social history, understood as the history of social movements and the class structure of modern society, assumed greater importance. This echoed the impact of the Cuban Revolution (1959) on the one hand and, on the other, the new questioning of the authority of the PRI regime and their ‘institutional revolution’, especially after the massacre of Tlatelolco that had marred the 1968 Mexico Olympics.

The re-evaluation of the Mexican Revolution was among the preferred fields of study for a new generation of historians, both in Mexico and abroad. Several foreign doctoral theses even became best-sellers; for instance, Zapata y la Revolución Mexicana (1966) by the American historian John Womack at Harvard, and La Cristiada (1971) by Jean Meyer at the University of Paris. To these, one can add works by Mexicans such as Hector Aguilar Camín, Enrique Krauze, Adolfo Gilly, and Arnaldo Córdova. Such studies of the past and future of revolutions reached a climax (and a point of saturation) during the 1980s, with the works of Alan Knight (influenced by the sociologists Barrington Moore and Theda Skópol) and that of François Xavier Guerra (influenced by the revisionism of François Furet on the French Revolution). The study of social classes inspired by the Althusserian Marxism of Chilean scholar Marta Harnecker also provided a theoretical touchstone in explorations of the formation of modern Latin American states.\footnote{Sergio Bagú, ‘La historia social’, in Raúl Benítez Zenteno and Gilberto Silva Ruiz (eds.), El desarrollo de las ciencias sociales y los estudios de posgrado en México (Mexico, 1984), 35–42.} For Mexico, this meant, above all, a revision of the historiographic canon of the Mexican Revolutions.\footnote{See Alejandra Moreno Toscano, ‘El trabajo de los estudiantes’, Historia Mexicana (100), 25 (1976), 599–619.} Despite this, in almost all of the work concerned with contemporary history, little attention has been paid to the cultural phenomena associated with the process of accelerated industrialization, or the eruption of the new technologies of mass media.
THE INFLUENCE OF THE FRENCH ANNALES SCHOOL

One of the first works to signal the impact of the French historiography developed by Ernest Labrousse and Ruggiero Romano is the work of Enrique Florescano. Inspired by the serial history of Labrousse, and the works of Silvio Zavala and Luis Chávez Orozco, Florescano’s work establishes a precedent for works situating themselves between history, and those making use of the concepts, theories, and investigative techniques of the social sciences—in particular, economics. The Comisión de Historia Económica del Consejo Latinoamericano de Ciencias Sociales (CLACSO) was established and was based on this precedent. In order to help with its development, CLASCO counted on the expansion of the Departamento de Estudios Históricos (DEH) (created in 1959) of the INAH. Florescano, representative of this second generation of historians, assumed at the beginning of the 1970s the leadership of the DEH (which by 1988 had over one hundred researchers), and strengthened intellectual ties with the scholars associated with Fernand Braudel.

Within the context of the student crisis of 1968, historians began experimenting with a new direction—a search through the past for guidelines for action for an uncertain future. Furthermore, growth in historiography also occurred because of the official support of the Secretaría de Educación Pública, which funded the publication of innumerable doctoral theses in history produced in both Mexico and abroad. Without a doubt these types of initiatives popularized, especially at the university level, an interest in history closely linked to the methods and approaches of the social sciences. An expression of this was the publication of a manual on historical methodology by Ciro F. Cardoso and Héctor Pérez Brignoli, Los métodos de la historia [The Methods of History] (1977). In other such works one sees an interest in developing a Latin American history independent of European models.

The influence of the Braudelian school did not exclude the development of Marxist historiography, which was especially active in social science and economics departments at the UNAM, and was represented by, among others, Enrique Semo and Pablo González Casanova. Semo wrote Historia del capitalismo en México: Los orígenes, 1521–1763 [A History of Capitalism in Mexico: The Origins] (1973), and promoted a general history of Mexico, while

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43 Historia académica y situación actual de la Dirección de Estudios Históricos (Mexico, 1988).
González Casanova wrote a collection of histories on the Mexican workers’ movement. Both provided an alternative to those works published under Daniel Cosío Villegas at El Colegio de México. Notwithstanding the class commitment of the historian, Semo embraced the established rules of historiography. Moreover, at the same time that Braudel and Althusserian Marxism were influencing the theoretical design of historiography, other works circulated that were inspired by the ‘new’ economic history coming out of the United States. At present, this type of history is still influential, and it has had a greater impact than the serial history of the French Annales which has, by contrast, almost completely disappeared.

MICROHISTORY AND REGIONAL HISTORY

Pueblo en vilo: microhistoria de San José de Gracia [San José de Gracia: Mexican Village in Transition] (1968) is perhaps the most influential work of its time. In it, its author, Luis González y González, recovers the history of his native town. González deliberately presented his work as the historiographical equivalent to the classic works of Mexican literature of the period such as Juan Rulfo’s Pedro Páramo (1955). It is a history written in opposition to the modernizing projects of the Mexican Revolution, and one which tried to show the weight of tradition and local culture. It is a history of the ‘revolutionized’ rather than that of the ‘revolutionaries’, of the same sort that inspired the microhistories of the Italian Carlo Ginzburg. In fact, this history of a Mexican town created a new historiographical school centred around the writing of regional history. Recovering the temporal-spatial dimension (reminiscent of the Braudelian school) and deploying the sources of oral history, it introduced a new interdisciplinary genre that connected history to anthropology, literature, sociology, and geography. At the end of 1970 this regional history was institutionalized as new centres bounding the study of history with the social sciences were formed, including that of El Colegio de Michoacán, founded by Luis González in 1980, after the model of El Colegio de México.

Despite the institutional and editorial growth of academic historiography, the author of Pueblo en Vilo lamented the fact that the practice of historical criticism had not run the same course. In the context of the importance given to the

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47 Most notable is the work of John H. Coatsworth, El impacto económico de los ferrocarriles en el Porfiriato: Crecimiento y desarrollo, 2 vols. (Mexico, 1976).
models extracted from the social sciences, Luis González represents, in a certain way, the return of the literary dimension of history, and in the field of epistemology an apology of ‘eclecticism’, or what he called ‘common sense’.  

FROM THE ‘HISTORY OF MENTALITIES’ TO ‘CULTURAL HISTORY’

As early as 1969 one sees inscribed within social history the beginnings of the idea of a ‘history of mentalities’. Related to the history of ideas of José Gaos, it is still considered an imprecise field of study. It consists of the study of the collective psychology of the attitudes and behaviour of a population; and in this sense it has become a critical device with which to confront the official nationalism of the Mexican Revolutionary regime. Despite such developments, the full impact on Mexican historiography of one strand of this approach—that associated with Michel Foucault—was not apparent until the 1990s.

The history of mentalities was first given official status in Mexico in 1978, in a seminar established under the Dirección de Estudios Históricos of the INAH with the help of the Instituto Francés de América Latina. The majority of the seminar’s studies centred on the history of the family, daily life, and the relationship between social norms and religion during the Colonial period, while the remainder focused on the national period. In general terms this focus brought attention to subjects that had been deemed mere antiquarian ‘historical curiosities’ of social and economic history. These new subjects began to attract the attention of a younger generation of scholars, who focused on the rift that separates established social norms and their application, and insisted on the constant negotiations that mark the relationship between dominant and subaltern classes, reminiscent of Michel de Certeau’s notion of the ‘strategies of the weak’ in the face of a dominant culture.

In its first phase it privileged a history in service to a sociology of dissidence, or of transgression, in opposition to an historiography focused on elites. Of greater importance were the methodological problems that arose in the attempt to understand and explain the emotional or irrational reactions of social actors—reactions that answered more to the traditions and rituals of the past than to

50 Id., El oficio de historiar (Mexico, 1988).
52 A few key works include: Solange Alberro, Inquisición y sociedad en México 1571–1700 (Mexico, 1988); Serge Gruzinski, La colonización de lo imaginario: Sociedades indígenas y occidentalización en el México español, Siglos XVI–XVIII (Mexico, 1991); and, more recently, Pilar Gonzalbo (ed.), Historia de la vida cotidiana en México, 5 vols. (Mexico, 2005).
53 Michel de Certeau, La invención de lo cotidiano, vol. 1: Artes de hacer (Mexico, 1996).
those imposed by the strong arm of modernity after 1940. In this sense the project still had its origins in a *longue durée*, which slowly passes, and which manifests itself in the increasing gap between technology and mentalities postulated by Braudel and Pierre Chaunu in their projects of ‘total’ or global history.

At the Symposium on Mexican Historiography in 1988, Pilar Gonzalbo wondered why, despite growing interest in these subjects, such an approach was still considered a minor genre in historiography. Was it because it lacked a more theoretical basis, or was it not seen as relevant to the present? Some of these doubts and questions were taken up by what has become known as the ‘new cultural history’, in vogue since 1989, which sought to address questions related to the historical treatment of madness, the world of beliefs, death, the attachment to traditions, and the anthropological discovery of ‘alterities’. These questions were not exclusive to historians, but rather point to an epistemological transformation of greater scope, affecting even the coordination and traditional organization of the humanities and social sciences. Without a doubt, the appearance of this type of history, known in France since the 1970s as the ‘new history’, and established in opposition to traditional social and economic history, broadened the repertoire of traditional sources and subjects, and above all challenged the episteme of classic positivism.

**THE RETURN OF THE HUMANITIES**

A final assessment of academic history demonstrates that it has distinguished itself by becoming one of the most productive fields in the humanities and social sciences. This increase in production also corresponds with the increase, after 1970, in university centres with degrees and masters programmes in history, for in fact, almost every centre for study either has, or aspires to have, its own historical periodical. The expansion of the system related to history also has a paradoxical side due to the practical impossibility of having full control over the information produced and, in particular, the quality of its results. Such impediments have only further deepened the hyper-specialization at the heart of the system. Some of its more harmful effects are reflected in the tendency towards thematic fragmentation, and increased barriers to dialogue and peer review. This

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55 See Ch. 13 by Matthias Middell in this volume.
57 A survey of the periodical publications dedicated to history is found in *Historia Mexicana*, 50:4 (2001).
situation has frequently been questioned both by historians and by those in the public and private sector who see a general lack of leadership in the academy, and question what they deem to be the extreme obscurantism of the work being produced, and its sequestering in the university to the exclusion of a wider public.

Given such criticisms, the increasing number of publications does not reflect an improvement in the quality of debate or its content. As in the past, monographic studies still predominate and the works of synthesis projected at the beginnings of professionalization still continue to appear. This tendency in historiography, however, can be partially attributed to the criteria of evaluation established by leading research institutions such as the Consejo Nacional de Ciencia y Tecnología created in the 1970s, and the Sistema Nacional de Investigadores at the beginning of the 1980s. In their double role as both promoter and assessor, these institutions have, in many instances, actually impeded research from maturing. Also apparent is the fact that the discipline of history continues to suffer from ‘theoretical and methodological weaknesses, especially in the visualization and analysis of more global historical processes and events’. These failings are even more conspicuous in regional history, and have been cited to prove that history produced within Mexico is of little or no relevance internationally, with the exception of Latin America, where its accomplishments in social and political history have been recognized.

The Sistema Nacional de Investigadores (the Mexican equivalent of the French CNRS) actually situates history in the ‘humanities and behavioural sciences—an area that theoretically draws history closer to the wider world of ‘culture’, while distancing it from its traditional niche in the social sciences, dominant during the 1970s. This situation never fails to surprise historians who conceive of their discipline as a ‘science’ inspired by the methods of economics, sociology, political science, or demography. Nevertheless, at the same time there exists a significant group of historians who have shown a marked interest in once again bringing themselves closer to a critical dialogue with sociology, cultural anthropology, linguistics, literature, and philosophy. This coincides with what has recently been called ‘the return of narrative history’, including its implications on reflections about time, the substantive object of historical study. Its return was largely influenced by the reception of a distinguished group of historians, theorists, and philosophers of history such as Arthur C. Danto, Paul Ricoeur, Michel de Certeau, Hayden White, Roger Chartier, Reinhart Koselleck, and François Hartog, to name just a few. The rejoining of history

with the humanities has resulted in what is known as the ‘new cultural history’, the success of which has largely displaced the older ‘history of mentalities’.

Currently, there is almost no public or private institution within which one does not find an emerging, or already established, advanced programme of study devoted to cultural history. This is largely due to the discrediting of the classical theories of history, such as Marxism and functionalism, underscored by global events such as the reunification of Germany, the formation of the European Union, the fall of the Soviet Union, and the configuration of new regional alliances on a global level. Perhaps this is why it is currently hard to find an historian in Mexico who has an optimistic view of the future of historiography comparable to those professionalizing historians who were still around during the earlier debates of the 1970s. This may also explain why present-day historians appear to labour under the conviction that history is a more humble profession than was assumed by their predecessors, while at the same time they lament a lost ‘heroic time’ or ‘golden age’ of historiography.

In the face of globalization and its threat to national identities, one can distinguish two tendencies: those who adopt a defensive position of a nationalist tone, and those represented by the new generation demonstrating an openness to the challenges provoked by worldwide political and economic reconfigurations. Enrique Florescano, favouring the approach of Braudel and his France profonde, believes too that a ‘México profundo’ (a ‘Mexican heartland’) also exists that, despite changes, remains the same.61 In his criticism of professional historians he points to the fact that their high-toned scholarship is no longer resonant with Mexico’s collective memory. In this way, professional history is considered as almost extraneous to society.62

Currently there is a move towards the notion of a global history that was first projected at the start of history’s professionalization.63 Back in the 1970s, Pierre Chaunu held that economics, the social science of the twentieth century par excellence, could offer the best foundation for the formation of history as a science. After 1990, ‘culture’ seized this position. In fact, the renaissance of cultural history was a response to a certain ‘economicist’ excess. The challenge now faced by cultural history is how to not fall into the similar trap of a comparable ‘culturalism’.64

Translated by Kira von Ostenfeld-Suske

64 A few of these debates are collected in *Historia Mexicana*, 46:3 (1996), 563–80; and the *Hispanic American Historical Review*, 79/2 (1999).
TIMELINE/KEY DATES

1946 Establishment of the Institutional Revolutionary party (PRI); the PRI governs Mexico until 2000
1949 First Congress of Mexican/North American historians; the II General Conference of UNESCO takes place in Mexico; Cosío begins his research seminar on the Modern History of Mexico
1951 The first number of the periodical Historia Mexicana is published; the first Mexican television is organized
1952 President Miguel Alemán inaugurates the new campus of the Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México (UNAM)
1962 President Adolfo López Mateos gives El Colegio de México the rank of a ‘university type school’
1964 President López Mateos inaugurates the new National Museum of Anthropology and History and the Museum of Modern Art
1968 Student crisis, the massacre of Tlatelolco, and the Nineteenth Olympic Games in Mexico
1970 Establishment of the National Council of Science and Technology (CONACYT)
1972 Promulgation of the Federal Law on Monuments and Archaeological, Artistic, and Historical Zones
1973 Creation of the Universidad Autónoma Metropolitana (UAM)
1976 Devaluation of the Mexican peso from parity established in 1954
1982–3 New devaluation of the peso and bankruptcy of the Mexican economy; World Conference on the Cultural Policies of UNESCO takes place in Mexico
1984 The Sistema Nacional de Investigadores (SNI) is created by presidential decree
1988 Creation of the Consejo Nacional para la Cultura y las Artes (CONACULTA)
1993 Ratification of the Treaty of Free Commerce with the United States of North America
1994 The Zapatista rebellion starts in the state of Chiapas; assassination of the PRI candidate to the presidency, Luis Donaldo Colosio; new devaluation of the peso
1999 It is estimated that nine million Mexicans live in the United States as migrant workers
2000 For the first time since 1946 the PRI loses the presidency to the opposition, the Partido Acción Nacional (PAN)

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Chapter 23
Historical Writing in the United States

Ian Tyrrell

Do historical practices in particular nations have their own distinctive national formations? The modern version of ‘scientific history’ established under Rankean influence in the nineteenth century was conceived of as a universalistic discipline with standards of evidence, professional aspirations to objectivity, and an historicist philosophical apparatus. But as the discipline of history considered as a science spread in the late nineteenth century it took on distinctive national characteristics, because these general ideas had to be applied in different institutional and political circumstances. In the United States the legacy of the Progressive historians advocating a pragmatic study of the past in the interests of social and political usefulness was a powerful influence that continued to be evident after the Second World War. This Progressive agenda—words such as ‘relevance’, ‘useful history’, and ‘instrumentalism’ could be used to describe Progressivism’s driving forces—had flow-on effects that shaped other characteristics of American scholarship. One was recurrent but often misleading debates over conflict versus consensus on the issues of American national character, ideology, and politics; another was flexibility and innovation in interpretation, with receptiveness to new ideas derived from the influence of other humanities and the social sciences; still another was distrust of grand theory, and an instrumental and subordinate attention to historiography. Within US history itself, a tradition of national exceptionalism thrived, but the history of other nations was not neglected. Rather, such studies tended increasingly to be carved off into separate spheres to be compared to American history.

Though these distinctive features persisted, gradually American historiography regained by the end of the twentieth century the cosmopolitanism that distinguished it in the 1890s. The American position on the edge of European intellectual developments at the time of modern professional historiography’s inception meant that the nation’s historians were always well placed to engage in comparative history. Moreover, in developing interests in other national histories, American scholars could often be innovative in seeing connections across national boundaries regarding other societies, in ways that they were often not able to do for their own. In the post-1945 period these interests were supplemented by the growth of American material power and largesse that encouraged
North America
area studies of societies considered vital to strategic interests. From the 1960s onwards, intellectual currents such as Annales, Foucauldian ideas, and British Marxism combined with internal social and political controversies over race and politics, to revise and enrich American historiography. On the basis of these developments, by the turn of the twenty-first century American historians had embarked upon a new transnational, cosmopolitan, and comparative agenda. The accepted interpretation of post-war American historiography is very different from this sketch. Traditional interpretation emphasizes the break between the Progressives associated with Frederick Jackson Turner and Charles Beard, collectively active from the 1890s to the 1940s, and their counter-Progressive opponents of the 1950s. In this view, in the 1950s American historians repudiated economic class interpretations, leading historians such as John Higham to pronounce (with disapproval) a new ‘consensus’ scholarship in American society. This label was a convenient one, and it stuck, even though the consensus view was quickly swallowed up in the upheaval of the 1960s that produced, through New Left history, a renewed critical interest in social conflict. This chapter will argue that this division between Progressive and consensus interpretations has been exaggerated, and that more continuity than discontinuity was exhibited in American historiography after the Second World War. Major realignments in American historical practice have occurred only rarely. It is arguable that one seismic shift took place from the 1890s to the First World War, and another began in the late 1960s to early 1970s. Another may have been developing since the 1990s, centred around the internationalization of American history, but it is too early to tell how far the current changes will go. The approach in what follows is the study of historiography through the lens of historical practice. Rather than seeing historiography as either philosophy of history or descriptions of historical interpretation, this chapter explores the discourse of historians, but also takes account of the institutional and social context within which interpretation is situated. Continuities in interpretation reflected persistent patterns in the social practice of history, but changes in the external environment have, when these pressures have built up, produced key ruptures in historiography.\footnote{For the history of historical practice, see Peter Novick, \textit{That Noble Dream: The ‘Objectivity Question’ and the American Historical Profession} (New York, 1988); my \textit{The Absent Marx: Class Analysis and Liberal History in Twentieth-Century America} (Westport, Conn., 1986); and \textit{Historians in Public: The Practice of American History, 1890–1970} (Chicago, 2005).}

**PERIODIZATION**

The Second World War was not a turning point, but rather a point of culmination for trends within the older Progressive tradition. American historiography in the post-1945 era can be conveniently—though only roughly—subdivided into a
number of smaller periods. It must be kept in mind, however, that historical practice changed slowly and unevenly, due to what might be termed field-based and sub-disciplinary ‘lags’. Scholars whose work began under one period’s influence often continued to pursue their methodological, theoretical, and topical interests into periods that are commonly labelled ‘new’. In the first ten years after the Second World War, the Progressive interpretation persisted, followed by a growing reaction against that view from around 1955 to the mid-1960s, when so-called consensus views and social-science-influenced approaches became cutting-edge scholarship. Thereafter, the New Left gained prominence through to the early 1970s, though the influence of the social sciences continued to be strong. The rise of the new social history similarly came only slowly and unevenly in the 1970s and 1980s. At first this new social history movement seemed compatible with older traditions of social-science scholarship, but gradually developed under the influence of the New Left, Marxism, and cultural anthropology into something rather different, oriented towards collective behaviour, class conflict, agency, and social change. As this influence broadened in the 1980s it was accompanied by a growing perception of fragmentation and further specialization in historiography, and by the rise of post-structuralism and multiculturalism. Interest in the study of class had grown, but cultural conflict was more fully acknowledged, and contributed to the growth of cultural history. By the 1990s, US historiography and world history were battlegrounds of the ‘culture wars’, in which multiculturalism was alternatively celebrated or denounced, and in which historians worried about the decline of previously foundational topics such as political history. In the 1990s through to today (2011), another trend emerged. Overlapping the renewed concern with social diversity and internal conflict (approaches that followed very much in the steps of the Progressives), American historians began to focus on relationships with the wider world. This move had precursors in the 1950s’ interest in comparative history, but from the 1990s older approaches were challenged by ideas of a ‘new transnational history’. Internationalizing American history became a theme. Strangely, while American historical traditions were criticized as having been parochial, American historians had already made major contributions to the histories of other countries, notably to Latin American, European, East Asian, and African history. A movement known as world history, with its roots in the post–Second World War search for the study of comparative civilizations, had also arisen. A task for the future would be reconciling the new transnational history with the scholarship of world history, to which American historians had long been making important contributions.

FROM PROGRESSIVISM TO ‘CONSENSUS’

As a result of the Second World War, in the 1940s historians became more concerned with foreign policy issues and military history. In diplomatic history
the scholars who were rising in reputation before 1945, such as Samuel Flagg Bemis and Thomas A. Bailey, still dominated with highly nationalistic interpretations.2 Military history briefly thrived in the academy, but was exemplified institutionally in the ‘History of the United States Army’ series, edited by Kent Greenfield, and in the work of Samuel Eliot Morison, who wrote the History of United States Naval Operations in World War II (15 vols., 1947–62). Historians also continued to pursue political history, and developed a stronger interest in connecting academic history with the role of the federal government, which was seen as important in contemporary historical activities of the Cold War period by providing aid in the form of jobs for historians within the government. Thus would academics render useful service to the American people. The New Deal–Fair Deal state, legitimized by the Second World War and America’s expanding power abroad, won widespread support and study from American historians. In this period, Charles Beard and his economic interpretation remained a major intellectual influence. Though Beard’s last important work—on Franklin Roosevelt and the coming of the Second World War—would come under fierce attack as unbalanced and irrational in its conspiratorial interpretation and denunciation of the president, Beard and his disciples still had prestige after 1945, and they contributed to the 1946 report on Theory and Practice of Historical Study under the auspices of the American Historical Association.3

By and large historians continued to champion the cause of pragmatic domestic reform associated with the Progressive-New Deal tradition: witness Eric Goldman’s study of the reform tradition, Rendezvous with Destiny (1952)—a book that won a Bancroft Prize. In 1945 the Pulitzer Prize had gone to Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., for a book that famously interpreted President Andrew Jackson as a precursor to the liberal reform tradition of Franklin Roosevelt.4 While the scholars shaped by the post-war experience have become known as consensus historians, there was much more diversity and dissent than that simple label allows. C. Vann Woodward, the leading Southern historian of the period, studied the Reconstruction era and its aftermath, championing liberalism against conservatism. He and Schlesinger both emphasized conflict between rich and poor in their histories, while Merrill Jensen wrote on the American Revolution in terms which were more explicitly Beardian than consensual.5 Merle Curti wrote important works in intellectual and social history while favouring a Progressive

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2 Samuel F. Bemis, American Foreign Policy and the Blessings of Liberty, and Other Essays (New Haven, 1962); and Thomas A. Bailey, A Diplomatic History of the American People (4th edn, New York, 1950).

3 Charles A. Beard, President Roosevelt and the Coming of the War, 1941: A Study in Appearances and Realities (New Haven, 1948).

4 Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., The Age of Jackson (Boston, 1945).

interpretation. Not until the mid-1950s was there a significant shift from the Progressive, conflict-centred view, and even then, many historians continued to side in their writings with the FDR-Democratic Party tradition.

The leading figure subsequently labelled as a consensus historian was Richard Hofstadter. Like Beard, Hofstadter sought to address contemporary problems from a radical liberal position. He was, until the 1950s, greatly influenced by—and in intellectual debt to—Beard. Yet between The American Political Tradition (1948) and The Age of Reform (1955), Hofstadter had clearly broken from Beard in his assessment of the economic interpretation of history, in favour of one stressing status anxieties. Not only did he differ in this way; he had also distanced himself in his position as a self-consciously elitist intellectual vis-à-vis Progressive institutions and movements for social change. Hofstadter did not identify with the conservative politics of the 1950s, however, and was as critical of the right as of the extreme left. He simply viewed the national political spectrum as narrow, and ‘conceived in response to the political and intellectual condition of the 1950s’ a critical study of anti-intellectualism in American life, published in 1962.

In his path-breaking The Liberal Tradition in America (1955), Louis Hartz similarly found American political culture dominated by a liberal consensus that he regarded as ideologically impoverished. The only leading figure truly comfortable with offering a more conservative interpretation of history was Daniel J. Boorstin who, by stressing pragmatism and legal tradition, came closest to the consensus ideal. His major work’s title, The Genius of American Politics (1953), along with his three-volume The Americans (1958–73), conveyed the flavour of consensus history (also known as ‘counter-progressivism’). More monographic accounts such as those of Forrest McDonald and Robert E. Brown on the American Revolution criticized ideas that class conflict between farmers and merchants was integral to the revolution, and were openly critical of Beard’s formulations on that topic. Further indication of the growing conservative trend in American historiography was the rise of business history. Its most famous exponent was Allan Nevins, who reinterpreted John D. Rockefeller in a way that broke with the ‘muckraking’ anti-business tradition of the Progressives. In his and other business historians’ works, corporations were reassessed as part of the necessary reorganization and modernization of American life. Nevins had

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previously offered Beardian interpretations of history, but his multi-volume Civil War-era history, *Ordeal of the Union* (1947–71), moved away from consciously Progressive divisions between an agrarian south and an industrial north to reassert the moral dimensions of the conflict.

**COMPARATIVE HISTORY**

While the ‘consensus’ historians are seen as somewhat isolationist and concerned with national exceptionalism, this did not stop them from comparing the United States with other societies. Indeed, one of the by-products of consensus history was work on comparative history through the desire to define what in American traditions was different. One of the first to take this approach was Hartz. His *Liberal Tradition* drew contrasts between American and European political theory in political practice, to establish how the liberal element, though derived originally from Europe, gained exaggerated importance in the United States by the quirks of comparative development. This was the origins of his ‘fragment theory’. In 1964 he expanded this idea into the comparative study of settler societies in which places such as Australia were discussed as socialist or radical liberal fragments detached from the original European political culture, just as the American political culture was a seventeenth-century fragment of European liberalism nurtured in the new and different environment of America.\(^{10}\) Underpinning Hartz’s approach was the frontier theory of free land, reworked as a general theory of a culture of resource abundance by David Potter in 1954.\(^{11}\)

Comparative history included work on world frontiers, especially the controversial *The Great Frontier* (1952) by Walter Prescott Webb, and in this way perpetuated the concerns of the Progressives with environment and socioeconomic opportunity for the common people. Meanwhile, other strands of comparative history comprised work on the history of slavery in the Americas. Frank Tannenbaum’s *Slave and Citizen* (1946) was seminal in this respect, and the genre reached its zenith in Carl Degler’s 1971 study of race relations in Brazil and the United States.\(^{12}\) These works spawned further studies of Caribbean, Latin American, and United States’ slave history—studies that investigated the role of racial mixture across slave societies, and differential patterns of emancipation. Though the Americas was a strong source of material for comparative approaches, so too was the broader Atlantic region. In the comparative history of race, in the 1970s George Fredrickson worked on race relations in the United

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States and South Africa. Much earlier, trans-Atlantic history received a boost from the founding of the Institute for Early American History and Culture at Williamsburg in 1947, where work such as that of Englishman J. R. Pole explored trans-Atlantic transmissions of political ideas and institutions. The eighteenth-century democratic revolutions in France and the American republic were studied as a common process by R. R. Palmer, while Bernard Bailyn and Gordon Wood completed works on the ideological origins of the American Revolution and the constitution-making period. Some of the more sweeping works were not accepted by specialized historians, including those outside the United States. Europeans found Palmer’s work to be politically influenced by the spirit of Atlantic cooperation during the Cold War, while Webb’s study of frontiers was criticized for similar homogenizing and over-reaching interpretation. Yet the new genre of comparative history received important stimuli with the foundation of Comparative Studies in Society and History in 1958 and publication a decade later of C. Vann Woodward’s anthology, The Comparative Approach to American History (1968), which gathered much representative work together. Comparative studies did not, on the whole, undermine American exceptionalism, but rather proceeded from an attempt to find national differences. This was most notable in the work of historical sociologist Seymour Martin Lipset, but the resurgence of exceptionalism was also seen in the American Studies movement, with work centred on American Quarterly (founded 1949). This interdisciplinary field was strongly historical in approach in the United States, and produced the influential myth and symbol school initiated by Henry Nash Smith.

**AREA STUDIES**

American Studies complemented a widening of American historians’ horizons with the development of area studies’ programmes that responded to heightened US strategic interests abroad. Slavic and Russian history built on the work of Russian émigrés who had influenced academic studies of Russia and the Soviet Union in the inter-war years. Important contributions came from the comparative modernization paradigm. Latin America, already a US strength, continued to develop, with comparative histories of slavery and research by Richard Morse

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on Brazil and Lewis U. Hanke on Spanish colonial rule. This era also saw enhanced academic interest in major world civilizations, particularly China, through the work of John King Fairbank and his students. In the field of African history, a particular focus by the 1970s was the slave trade, with seminal quantitative work by Philip D. Curtin. Later studies in the 1980s by the Canadian Paul Lovejoy and others would refine the demographic history of slavery and shift the story more to Africa itself and to that continent’s cultural history, but the broad lines remained those pioneered under Curtin’s influence. Europe, too, received throughout the post–Second World War decades extensive treatment from American historians, where their major advantage was the perspective of the outsider. Historians such as Charles Maier saw commonalities across European societies, and made important contributions to rethinking the categories of European history as well.

SOCIAL SCIENCE HISTORY

A key feature of the 1950s and 1960s history had been the influence of newly fashionable social sciences, particularly psychology and sociology, but also organizational and economic theory. In general terms, these social science influences fortified a view of history congenial to political consensus. They played down social and political class divisions. Alfred D. Chandler’s work was important as regards business organization. Other works stressed individual problems or dysfunctional and irrational anxieties in social movements. Hofstadter used status anxiety theory in his critique of the agrarian tradition of the farmers whom Beard’s and Frederick Jackson Turner’s disciples had championed. Oscar Handlin wrote widely on social and psychological adjustment to urban and industrial civilization within immigrant society. Individual social mobility, including that of immigrants, became a popular topic by the 1960s, especially in the work of Handlin’s student, Stephan Thernstrom. Psychology was also

20 Charles S. Maier, Recasting Bourgeois Europe: Stabilization in France, Germany and Italy in the Decade after World War I (Princeton, 1975).
a source of theory, with Stanley Elkins giving a controversial interpretation of the psychologically damaging impacts of slavery. 23 Lee Benson pioneered ‘ethno-cultural’ histories that probed relationships among religious belief, ethnicity, and voting patterns. 24 Works following in this tradition critiqued the tendency in Beardian interpretation to see elections as conflicts over economic class interests. Disciplinary diversity and sub-field lag accounts for the persistence of these approaches, even though they were out of kilter with the central thrust of New Left history that flowered in the 1960s. Social mobility studies were faulted by new radical critiques for having exaggerated individualist motives and ignoring class and ethnic identities. But only in the mid-1970s did the ethno-cultural interpretation’s force begin to diminish, to be replaced by a social and cultural history approach under quasi-Marxist influence.

Part of the social science approach was the development of quantitative method in mobility and electoral studies, but other fruitful avenues for the manipulation of numbers were in economics and demography. Robert Fogel pioneered counterfactual econometric studies by arguing for the dispensability of railroads in the patterns of economic development. These studies ran computer models of economic growth in which the non-invention of the railroads was assumed. It was argued that canals could have served equally well as engines of American prosperity in the mid-nineteenth century. Then, with Stanley Engerman, Fogel controversially argued, not only for the profitability of slavery, but also for its economic efficiency as superior to free labour. Though some scholars in the 1950s had already established, from literary sources, slavery’s profitability, now the economics of slavery became a subject to be refined through technical expertise and theories of economic growth. That Fogel and Engerman’s most famous work, the two-volume Time on the Cross, appeared in 1974 again emphasizes the continuing influence of the social sciences, and the overlap between the work of counter-Progressive historians and those of the New Left.

THE NEW LEFT AND THE NEW SOCIAL HISTORY

The new American history and its emphasis upon political and ideological consensus had seemed strongly entrenched in the early 1960s, fortified as it was by the rising prestige of social science methods and the expansion of the universities as centres of expertise in American life. But quickly the leading practitioners of the late 1950s came under sustained and often devastating attack for a Panglossian reading of American foreign policy, and for being

unable to explain the sources and character of conflict within American society. The consensus label seemed to sum up roughly the complacency of the 1950s’ historians, even though the label homogenized diverse activity.

What brought the change in the mid-1960s was the New Left, stimulated by the Civil Rights struggle at home and the Vietnam War abroad. Faced with such upheaval, historians began to repudiate consensus histories, because these did not provide adequate explanations for conflict in American life, nor intellectual traditions for radicalism that New Leftists believed were necessary to right the wrongs they perceived in American society. The Progressives’ idea of history as a ‘useful’ discipline in bringing about social change returned to scholarly debates; young scholars championed a pragmatic approach to historical interpretation, with ‘truth’ forged in activity. It was *Towards a New Past* (1968), an anthology of work by New Left historians edited by Barton Bernstein, that best showcased the professedly radical scholarship of the late 1960s.

But, in reality, the New Left was no more united than the scholarship of the so-called consensus years. Indeed, not all of the New Left broke clearly with 1950s’ assumptions. This was seen in one of the two main strands of New Left thinking in history—that coming from the University of Wisconsin. *Studies on the Left* (founded 1959) published historians who wrote in an identifiably Marxist or Marxist-derived context, and included members of the ‘corporate liberal school’, such as James Weinstein and Gabriel Kolko. Kolko’s *The Triumph of Conservatism* (1963) identified Progressive Era reform as consolidating the modern Leviathan of the American state that New Left critics faced in their struggles against the Vietnam War and racism. Such works stressed corporate domination and business consensus. At Wisconsin there began the ‘Williams School’, established by William Appleman Williams and devoted to economic analysis of US foreign policy. Williams School writers adopted a *Weltanschauung* approach to analyze the ‘Open Door’ idea as the cornerstone of American foreign policy. Scholars such as Walter LaFeber tended to argue for a consensus of ideas coming from business, political, and other groups aimed at expansion and free trade access. Williams and his students were critical of both American foreign policy and the apologist approaches of the earlier scholars who emphasized idealistic motives and nationalist objectives, but did not truly break with consensus ideas.25

Another group of New Left historians, including the vocal critic Jesse Lemisch, did emphasize dissent and conflict.26 Yet even within this general grouping there

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were important divisions. To radicals like Staughton Lynd, calls for truth were irrelevant to social needs. ‘The times’ no longer permitted the indulgence of the detached intellectuals who could ‘restrict themselves to cloistered thought’. Lynd’s call had strong echoes of the relativism of Beard and other Progressives of the 1930s. Scholars such as Alfred Young were less dismissive of objectivity, but also believed that the study of the facts would advance the radical cause and provide traditions for contemporary activism. Meanwhile, historians of slavery broke away from Stanley Elkins’s stereotype of a docile ‘Sambo’ personality forged in oppressive conditions, and historians of American reform movements reinterpreted abolitionists as serious radicals, not as an anxious social elite. The Civil War once more became a moral struggle over slavery. Martin Duberman gathered together essays in *The Anti-Slavery Vanguard* (1965) that argued such points.

African-American history changed rapidly under the influence of the New Left, the Civil Rights movement, and the rise of black power in the second half of the 1960s. Whereas in the 1950s the liberal Kenneth Stampp called slaves ‘white men with black skins’, now African-Americans attacked ideas of empathy and sameness that this formulation connoted; they spurned the possibility of an objective history of slavery to which white men could contribute equally. But despite the rise of Black Studies’ programmes, most African-American history tended to be done by whites. The most important scholars came from left-wing backgrounds of the 1950s. They included Herbert Gutman, Lawrence W. Levine, and Eugene Genovese. Such people were influenced by E. P. Thompson and other British Marxists, and Genovese was instrumental in bringing Gramscian Marxist notions of cultural hegemony into the American academy. This circumstance signalled a resurgence of international influences in American historical scholarship. The Marxism that was adopted, however, was modified to suit American materials and conditions.

The result of this convergence of influences was a major rupture in the continuity of key sections of American historiography. Historians moved to study historical agency, ordinary people—‘history from the bottom up’, as the New Left put it—and cultural and social history centred on questions of race, slavery, and class. Thus the 1960s and 1970s constituted a shift in the discourse of American history—the first such major shift since the Progressive era. Historians influenced by Marxism and New Left politics studied working-class culture. Gutman’s *Work, Culture and Society in Industrializing America* (1976), and essays written in these years, were greatly influenced by Thompson’s insistence that

class was a process, and a cultural as much as an economic formation, though Gutman applied the idea to immigrant workers amongst whom ethnicity and religion were important factors of both cohesion and division. ‘Worker’ religion was also a topic in the study of slavery. Genovese’s *Roll Jordan Roll* (1974), which argued for the paternalism of planters and the containment of slavery within a planter-generated hegemony, set a high standard, but provoked much controversy. Though Genovese gave insightful attention to African-American religion as part of slave culture, he did so within the idea of planter domination as the controlling one.

White racial attitudes received magisterial treatment from Winthrop D. Jordan, but increasingly it was African-American social and cultural history itself which took centre stage. Many New Left and African-American historians objected to Genovese, and preferred ideas of black self-activity. They stressed an autonomous slave culture. Work with this emphasis came especially from Gutman, who in the mid-1970s turned from labour history to the history of slavery, but applied many of the ideas he had developed earlier. He and his students opposed the work of Fogel and Engerman as too narrowly economistic. He showed in *The Black Family in Slavery and Freedom* (1976) that slave family structures did not derive from whites, but were culturally transmitted through slave-naming practices and kinship networks. The slave experience was documented by an array of authors, but on black culture the most important conceptual advance came from Lawrence W. Levine, who used folklore and cultural anthropology to study slave songs and tales, showing that bondsmen had not internalized the cultural standards of white masters. Through the work of these three leading scholars, Levine, Gutman, and Genovese, the cultural history of slavery was advanced, and slavery brought to the centre of American historiography. By the late 1970s this approach had filtered through to the study of African-Americans more broadly. An important work was Leon Litwack’s *Been in the Storm So Long* (1979), which charted African-American experiences under Reconstruction. Gradually, by the 1980s, race relations in the Reconstruction era and after began to eclipse the earlier concentration on slavery itself, as Eric Foner explored new topics on which to make seminal contributions.

The shift in slavery studies in the 1960s and 1970s was difficult to dislodge once established, and it continued by and large to hold sway, though with modifications. The rise of cultural studies and postmodernism’s concern with discourse analysis actually reinforced the trends of the 1970s to treat the complexity and diversity of the slave experience. However, some historians in the

1980s and 1990s, notably Peter Kolchin, noted the tendency to romanticize slavery as an autonomous institution, and argued for a return to a more structural approach. The work of Gutman was significantly revised by one of his students, Ira Berlin, who depicted different generations of slavery, change over time, and variable structural conditions that determined master–slave relationships and the position of slaves in society. Berlin moved away from the essentializing and unidirectional flow of the previous historiography, and integrated slavery much better into the history of the Americas and the Atlantic.

Parallel developments contributing to the break in historiography occurred in the study of women and gender, with a similar trajectory from assertion of the cultural autonomy of a group to later attempts at embedding the history of the group in broader structures. Relatively little women’s history had been written within the academy before the 1960s, and the growth in this field in the 1970s registered the rise of feminism. Whereas slavery and race studies had spearheaded innovation in social history in the period 1965–75, women’s history took longer to get going. At first the work was highly cross-disciplinary, political, and instrumentalist in its attention to women’s liberation. The interdisciplinary journals Feminist Studies and Signs, appearing in 1972 and 1975 respectively, showcased some of the new work, though it was not until 1988 that a journal specifically devoted to the history of women signalled the consolidation of the field around professional academic history. By that time, Gerda Lerner and Joan Wallach Scott, among others, had made major contributions. Though US women’s history tended to be written almost exclusively by women, and to treat women as autonomous agents, just as slaves were depicted, attempts were now made to develop a broader theory of the subordination of women. Scott critiqued existing historiography as biased, and put forward the category of gender as a way of bringing together women’s history, power, and cultural explanation. This influential work challenged conventional types of evidence and connected to a growing trend towards looking at sexual practice as a form of discourse. Here the influence of French philosopher and historian Michel Foucault was evident.

Feminist history overlapped with a growing interest in the history of sexuality, on which Foucault wrote in the 1970s. However, the influence of Foucault was not quite as strong among US historians as in some other countries, and scholars Americanized and modified Foucault. Over time Foucault’s influence

33 Peter Kolchin, American Slavery (New York, 1995).
35 Journal of Women's History (1988–).
37 Joan W. Scott, Gender and the Politics of History (New York, 1988); and see Ch. 7 by Julie Des Jardins in this volume.
spread, but it was matched in the 1970s by work emphasizing either behaviourist or Freudian categories. Peter Gay’s five-volume study of the *Bourgeois Experience* (1984–98), an intellectual history focused on the Euro-American world, did the latter, while Carl N. Degler’s *At Odds: Women and the Family in America* (1980) showed, among other influences, behavioural interests in the history of women and sexuality. As Foucauldian influence strengthened in the 1980s, John D’Emilio and Estelle Freedman’s *Intimate Matters: A History of Sexuality in America* (1988) synthesized newer work. From the history of sexuality there also emerged gay and lesbian histories by the 1990s.  

**PUBLIC HISTORY**

If radical historians sought relevance through the study of race, slavery, women, and sexuality, another axis of activity was to reassert the Progressives’ interest in popular historical engagement. One wing of the New Left, influenced by new radical approaches to social history, made connections with working-class and minority social protests. With intellectual influences coming from the British History Workshop movement, radicals analyzed popular culture and studied mainstream film and television. Lawrence W. Levine extended the history of popular culture, and from like-minded writers influenced by the New Left came an organizational focus for this work, through the *Radical History Review* (1975–). More traditional aspects of public outreach were simultaneously re-emphasized in a countervailing trend. Connections with state historical societies and the federal government were reasserted, and the new public history became effectively professionalized as a sub-discipline. With the inception of public history training programmes and the establishment of the *Public Historian* in 1978, academic history’s links with government were enhanced. A National Council on Public History was incorporated in 1980. In the 1940s, state and local history had become divorced from national and internationally oriented academic history, but had remained an important autonomous group in American historical practice, and one in which most members of the public related to the discipline of history through museums, exhibitions, and state history journals. But state and local history was mostly peopled with academically trained historians, in contrast to some other countries where either amateurism or central government control was stronger, and the influence of the academic profession was indirectly enhanced.

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even though academic historians often had relatively little directly to do with state history groups.

THE FRAGMENTATION OF HISTORY

With the increased emphasis on social and cultural history, American historians tended to neglect traditional staples. National political history, which remained ascendant as a topic through the 1960s, dipped in the numbers of dissertations and published books as well as prestige in the 1970s. Economic history did not recover from radical critiques of quantitative methods, but remained a highly specialized and well-knit sub-discipline that no longer influenced the historiographical mainstream. One might have expected religious history to have thrived as part of cultural and social history, but this field declined in the 1980s as secular preoccupations grew, or was redefined as immigrant or intellectual history. Religious history revived at the turn of the twenty-first century, when studies about fundamentalism and evangelicalism—an old concern in American history—began to appear once more, as the political climate in the United States changed in a conservative direction. Political history had not died, however, and a lively group of so-called presidential historians, some inside and others outside the academy, showed that there was still a commercial demand and academic interest in that field. The history of political institutions revived in the 1980s as historically oriented political scientists embarked on a campaign to ‘bring the state back in’ to historical analysis. Stephen Skowronek and Theda Skocpol were the best-known scholars, though both were political scientists. In the 1990s and early twenty-first century, work in legal history also made important contributions to understanding of the American state. That work modified, if not completely overturned, older conceptions of a laissez-faire, non-interventionist state in the nineteenth century. But policy history, work that had made promising beginnings several times and spawned its own journal, took a back seat to the prominence of cultural history topics such as in ethnic, African-American, race, and gender studies in the 1990s.

This proliferation of fields greatly increased the volume of scholarship. By 1985, John Higham could describe history in the United States as ‘a house in which the inhabitants are leaning out of many open windows gaily chattering with the neighbours while the doors between the rooms stay closed’. In 1992,

Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr. attacked the implications of multicultural diversity in historical interpretation for standards of citizenship and national identity. More narrowly, professional concern over specialization grew and produced two responses, one of which was to look for synthesis in American history, often by recalling the Progressive version of an engaged publicly oriented history. Influenced by the theories of Jürgen Habermas on public culture, Thomas Bender’s work, ‘Wholes and Parts’, generated a considerable interest in the 1980s, but not an accepted new synthesis. Another response was the revival in historiography. The last major work in general historiography had been that of John Higham’s History in 1963. Now, in 1988, Peter Novick produced That Noble Dream—a work that covered the major American historical traditions and took the idea of objectivity as its central theme. This work was notably inspired by the proliferation of instrumentalist histories promoting new social movements such as anti-racism and feminism. Distancing himself from postmodernism, Novick actually reflected an agnostic approach to the topic of historical objectivity, and focused instead on how social and cultural factors influenced the history produced within the American academy under the rubric of objectivity’s ‘noble dream’. Thereby he relativized both American history and the postmodern conflict over it. Novick’s provocative book and the growth of postmodernism prompted revived interest in historiography and intellectual history, and important works in the latter genre included Dorothy Ross’s study of exceptionalism and the social science tradition. Defending the role for a chastened objectivity in this historiographical context was Telling the Truth about History (1994) by Joyce Appleby, Lynn Hunt, and Margaret Jacob. Intellectual history branched out into a new cultural history influenced by European historiographical concerns with the social construction of knowledge, discourse, and the history of reading. Though the traditional study of historiography continued to be marginalized within the profession, it found innovative outlets in more specialized ways under different guises, most notably in the study of popular memory. Moreover, the United States produced major theorists and practitioners of the ‘linguistic turn’, especially Hayden White’s work on historiographical tropes of knowledge, and in intellectual history the writings of Dominic LaCapra.

44 Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., The Disuniting of America (Knoxville, Tenn., 1991).
48 Hayden White, Metahistory: The Historical Imagination in Nineteenth-Century Europe (Baltimore, 1973); Dominick LaCapra, Rethinking Intellectual History: Texts, Contexts, Language (Ithaca, NY, 1983); and see Ch. 1 by Chris Lorenz in this volume.
NEW SEARCHES FOR SYNTHESIS

Implicated in the controversies over multiculturalism and synthesis was the growth of world history. The latter was sometimes criticized as excessively multicultural, and as taking attention away from the study of Western values that had contributed to the American liberal tradition. From a more positive point of view, however, world history offered a new synthesis to combat the fragmentation that many saw in the American history discipline. World history was certainly not new in the 1990s. Its origins could be traced back at least as far as the work of William H. McNeill and L. S. Stavrianos in the 1950s. Though this work was often thought to be merely a version of the old Western civilization courses that began in the 1920s, and McNeill’s most famous work was called *The Rise of the West* (1963), in these cases American historians developed intercultural perspectives, studying the meeting of civilizations as sources of innovation. World history gradually developed a more globally centred approach, and gave more attention to the non-European world, especially Asia. Establishment of the World History Association in 1982 and a *Journal of World History* (1990) indicated maturation of the field. Practitioners not only studied the third world, but showed, as Eric R. Wolf did in 1982, that non-Western societies were agents as well as objects of change. Increasingly in the 1990s and beyond, non-Western histories were shown to be connected to, and influential upon, Western civilizations. The theme of global connectivity in Wolf’s work could be seen in much innovative scholarship at the turn of the twenty-first century. Historian of China Kenneth Pomeranz ignited a debate by studying the comparative development of China and Europe. He examined why sustained industrial growth began in Western Europe, despite the earlier technological achievements of East Asian societies. Pomeranz integrated environmental and economic history, and showed how resource flows from the Americas and energy-intensive coal spurred north-western Europe’s labour-saving and capitalist development. Other world historians concentrated on the links between slavery and economic development in the Atlantic world. Here, studies of African history went beyond the earlier fixation with the quantification of the slave trade to discuss, for example, women in African societies, wider patterns of integration with world history, and the history of diverse regions of Africa, not just those of immediate relevance to the American colonial slave trade with West and Central Africa.

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49 For more on world history, see Ch. 5 by Jürgen Osterhammel in this volume.
50 Eric R. Wolf, *Europe and the People without History* (Berkeley, 1982).
This new intercultural history also spawned studies of American Indian societies that moved beyond the cataloguing of white domination, oppression, and near annihilation of indigenous societies. In the 1970s, the story of Indian–White relations had a strong presence, and included several studies of Jeffersonian and Jacksonian Indian policy. But historians, ethnographers, and anthropologists such as Anthony F. C. Wallace increasingly argued for treating the Indians on their own terms. This work paralleled the concerns with a deeper discussion of agency that powered the new social history. As in the history of slavery and women, complex patterns of resistance, resilience, adaptation, and cultural diversity were now stressed. Among the best work was Richard White’s *The Middle Ground* (1991), which treated the interaction of French, Anglo, and Amerindian cultures on the periphery of European empires in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. White and others such as William Cronon also studied Indian cultural interactions with the land, and enmeshed European advance within the story of ecological revolutions.

As this work indicated, another approach to a possible synthesis was environmental history, since environmental factors underlay all sorts of other developments. Environmental determinism had been a feature of the Progressive Era writing of Turner, but now environmental history was treated by historians such as Richard White as the study of the interaction of culture and nature. Ideas of hybrid landscapes flourished. Some environmental history studied small periods and places, and US environmental history was a sub-field of growing importance. As late as the 1970s, environmental histories often focused on wilderness issues or the political history of conservation, mirroring the American traditions of national exceptionalism in treating the grand influences of a distinctively American environment. But urban environmental history and the study of racial and gender issues in environmental history—‘social justice’ environmental history—began to flourish in the 1990s, influenced by theories of class and cultural landscapes. Environmental history also influenced world history. The best environmental history developed themes that were common with other national historiographies, and began to trace the impact of environmental factors across national boundaries, as in the work of J. R. McNeill; and in

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Alfred Crosby’s *Ecological Imperialism* (1986), which was as much a contribution to world as to environmental history.\(^{58}\)

The other development of the 1990s and beyond that attempted to address the issue of synthesis came from ‘transnational history’. Advocated by Thomas Bender and others, transnational history concerned the movement of peoples, ideas, technologies, and institutions across national boundaries. Advocates of transnational history generally distinguished their work from comparative history. Nevertheless, they had to make clear that comparative history could complement transnational approaches, even though these were not the same thing. According to the new view, one must be aware that what constitutes the spaces, institutions, and traditions of nations changes over time. Transnational history aimed to put national developments in context, and to explain the nation in terms of its cross-national influences. Despite these obvious caveats, critics charged that transnational historians wished to dissolve American history into vague schemes of interpretation, and others defended American exceptionalism vigorously. But defenders of exceptionalism were forced to offer more finely grained and sophisticated versions of the doctrine, in which the perils of making reified and purely national comparisons were acknowledged. As critics and supporters alike realized, transnational approaches in the context of American history provided a way of looking at the world, not a topic or sub-field. The United States, as Bender showed in his synthesis *A Nation among Nations* (2006), must be ‘deprovincialized’.

American historiography in the early twenty-first century was far too diverse to contain within any single label. But its reorientation did appear to have two salient characteristics. One was the effort to broaden American historical interpretation and see history as interconnected across nations and regions. The other was a recurrent concern with establishing the public usefulness of history. In some ways, these two aims were at odds. A gap separated the sophisticated, cosmopolitan scholarship on the one hand and, on the other, public *mentalities* of history—particularly nationalist sentiment over the shape and interpretations of the American narrative. The gap was evidenced in public controversies about the interpretation of American history in the Enola Gay exhibit at the National Air and Space Museum in 1995, over the Congressional dismissal of the academic-inspired National History Standards, also in 1995, and over later criticism of academic historians on issues of political bias and academic misconduct. Academic historians felt that their views were little cherished by the mainstream media or the general public. These anxieties were not entirely new, but the tensions between cosmopolitan trends in historical interpretation and the reliance on American national ideology remained as a central problem for American historiography.

\(^{58}\) J. R. McNeill, *Something New Under the Sun: An Environmental History of the Twentieth-Century World* (New York, 2000); and see Ch. 8 by McNeill in this volume.
TIMELINE/KEY DATES

1945  Dropping of first atomic bomb, Hiroshima
1947  Onset of Cold War
1950–4  Era of McCarthyism
1950–3  Korean War
1954  Brown v. Board of Education decision by US Supreme Court; beginnings of modern civil rights movement
1962  Cuban missile crisis
1963  Assassination of President John F. Kennedy
1964  Civil Rights Act signed into law
1966  Beginning of Black Power Movement
1963–71  Beginnings of Second Wave Feminist Movement
1963–75  Vietnam War
1973–4  First energy crisis
1974  Watergate crisis; resignation of President Richard Nixon
1981–9  Reagan era
1991  End of Cold War
1991  First Iraq War
1998  Impeachment proceedings against President Bill Clinton
2001  11 September attacks on World Trade Center and Pentagon
2001  War with Afghanistan
2003  Invasion of Iraq

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Chapter 24

Arab Historical Writing

Youssef M. Choueiri

In the second half of the twentieth century Arab historiography made notable strides, both in scope and content. As to its scope, it became more attuned to world developments and the multiple connections of Arab countries with both the West and the emerging bloc of what was called the Third World. At the same time, its content moved away from narrating political events and exhibited heightened awareness of social, economic, and cultural factors.

This chapter surveys the principal historiographical developments in the Arab world since 1945. It is divided into two major parts. The first part deals with the period extending from 1945 to 1970. During this period the discourse of either socialism or nationalism permeated most historical writings. Whereas in Iran and Israel different forms of nationalist or social narratives were produced in order to anchor the nation in a well-defined structure of glorious achievements, in the Arab world groups of historians began to articulate a socialist approach, albeit with pronounced overtones of nationalist commitment. Although it would be an exaggeration to subsume all historical writings produced in this period under one or two rubrics, nationalism and socialism were decidedly predominant trends that determined the treatment of a number of interrelated issues. In addition to social history, studies of culture, economies, and minorities will be noted. Furthermore, a special section will treat the emergence of feminist voices and how women began to influence, either directly or indirectly, the narration of events and certain historical episodes. If one label could be attached to this period, perhaps the term ‘secularism’ would best fit the general methodological direction. However, such a label will be redefined in its Middle Eastern context.

The second part broaches the various attempts made to decolonize, rewrite, or theorize history throughout the Arab world. Although such a treatment has to take account of varied national contexts, it tries to explore how a particular national and religious discourse began to make inroads into the secular trends within the domain of historical writing. Moreover, attention is paid to the conflict between such a discourse, with its nuances of authenticity, and the secular Arab state. Such a conflict had widespread repercussions, leading in the process to the advent of new categories that found their way into historical
narratives. These included the concept and practice of democracy, civil society, citizenship, women’s rights, and individual responsibility. It could be argued that the Arab state has, by and large, held its ground against such an onslaught. This relative success may explain the vehement confrontation which seems to characterize the encounter between Islam and the West in the last two decades.

NEW TRENDS

Arab historiography was professionalized between the two world wars, particularly in Egypt and Lebanon—the main centres of Arab culture at the time, and the sites of the seats of professional research: Fu’ad I University in Cairo, and the American University of Beirut. After 1945, other Arab countries were gradually drawn into this new wave of professionalism as they acquired their independence or became more conscious of the need to overhaul their education systems as an integral part of building modern state structures befitting their sovereignty and increasing responsibility towards the new citizens. It was in this context that both Syria and Iraq became the next Arab countries to embark on a programme of creating and disseminating a more rigorous and modernized narrative of their histories. Moreover, their ruling elites subscribed to a view of the world in which the Islamic heritage and the pioneering role of the Arabs in its construction and dissemination figured prominently.

In Syria, professional historiography was given its institutional form with the establishment of the Department of History at the Syrian University in 1948 (renamed Damascus University in 1958 upon the foundation of Aleppo University). The role of Qustantin Zurayq, together with Darwish al-Miqdadi, was crucial in setting professional Syrian historiography on a sound footing. One of the first Syrian professional historians was Muhammad Dahman, who like Zurayq, began his career by editing and annotating Arab historical manuscripts in the 1930s. Two other early Syrian historians, Jamil Saliba and Kamil Ayyad, began their careers by the same route. Although Syrian historical writing flourished to some extent in the 1920s and 1930s, professional historiography emerged only after the establishment of the Department of History at Damascus University in 1948. Among the founders of Syrian professional historiography were, in addition to Dahman, ‘Ayyad, and Zurayq, Nur al-Din Hatum and ‘Abd al-Karim Gharayibah, with the latter specializing in the history of nineteenth-century Syrian history, and the former dealing with the early rise of Arab nationalism. Another historian, Ahmad Tarabayn, is known for his writings on Arab unification and modern Lebanese history. Moreover, in 1970 he published al-Tarikh wa al-mu’arrikhun al-arab fi al-asr al-hadith [A Study of Arab Historiography and Historians in Modern Times]. Muhammad Khayr Faris was an historian of the Maghrib, Tawfiq ‘Ali Birru published a number of studies on the Arabs under Ottoman rule as well as a detailed study of Aleppo and
the early Islamic state under the first four caliphs and the Umayyads, Layla al-Sabbagh also specialized in the early Ottoman period, and Khayriah Qasimiyyah or Kasmieh was a distinguished historian of modern Arab nationalist movements. The majority of these historians were Egyptian-trained. Other Syrian historians were British-trained with Abd al-Karim Rafeq acting as their leading scholar. He studied for his Ph.D. with P. M. Holt, at the University of London in the early 1960s. His thesis was later published as The Province of Damascus 1723–1783 (1966). Rafeq is widely known as a social historian of the Arab provinces of the Ottoman Empire. His use of Ottoman court records has allowed him to reconstruct large slices of the social life of the neglected centuries of Ottoman rule, particularly in the eighteenth century.

Iraq was not far behind in appreciating the necessity of reintroducing professional historiography after the tumultuous years of the early 1940s and the reorganization of its education system. One of its first professional historians was Abd al-Aziz al-Duri, who studied for his doctoral dissertation at the University of London in the early 1940s. Another Iraqi historian, Ahmad Salih ‘Ali, who was destined to inaugurate, together with al-Duri, a new Iraqi school of historiography, also did his doctoral research during the same period, having as his supervisor the renowned orientalist Hamilton Gibb. Thus, a new trend was set in motion whereby Arab and Iraqi history was highlighted in its social and economic dimensions. One of al-‘Ali’s best known books was published in 1953 on the socioeconomic structures and organizations of the southern Iraqi city, Basra, in the first Islamic century. ‘Abd al-‘Aziz al-Duri, on the other hand, played a crucial role in introducing economic history, after his return from England, as an academic subject at Baghdad University (established 1937) and other Arab universities. His succinct analysis of the Classical period in Islam (600–1000) clarified a number of controversial issues relating to popular movements, guilds, neighbourhood organizations, and the nature of the taxation system. Moreover, one of his best known studies on classical Arab historiography, published in 1960, has been translated into English. Another work of his on the history of the Arabs as a nation, was also translated.

While al-Duri and ‘Ali were specialists in the formative period of Islam and its Iraqi component, ‘Ali al-Wardi devoted most of his sociological and historical output to the modern history of Iraq. American-trained at the University of Texas (1950), his books on the social history of modern Iraq and the characteristics of the Iraqi personality, in addition to his multi-volume history of his country, were designed to understand Iraq’s contemporary dilemmas by

1 For a good survey of Ottoman studies in the Arab world, see Abdul-Karim Rafeq, ‘Ottoman Historical Research in Syria since 1946’, Asian Research Trends, 2 (1992), 45–78.  
highlighting certain historical junctures or turning points. His analytical units of analysis highlights the endemic conflict in Iraqi society between nomadism and urbanism, with the culture of nomadism exerting a hegemonic influence, even in urban centres such as Baghdad, Basra, and Mosul. Consequently, modern Iraq is still torn between its inherited values and those of modernity which its elites profess to espouse.4 Another prominent Iraqi historian who specialized in Islamic culture and its cities was Naji Ma‘rif.5 His numerous publications, including history textbooks, added new knowledge to our understanding of the Islamic education system in its heyday.

Moreover, after the Ba‘th party’s rise to power in Iraq in 1968, and the rapid rise of oil revenues earned by the state in the early 1970s, Iraqi historians and intellectuals, encouraged by the financial muscle of their government and its pan-Arab ideology, began a new drive to turn Iraq into a vibrant centre of Arab culture. It was in these circumstances that the Union of Arab Historians was established in 1973, with its headquarters in Baghdad. It marked its foundation by an international conference to which prominent Arab and Western historians were invited to attend or to deliver papers. These included Sa‘id ‘Ashur, the Egyptian historian of medieval Islam and an authority on the Crusades, the Tunisian professor of Islamic civilization al-Habib al-Janhani, and Jacques Berque and Dominique Chevalier from France.

After its occupation by American and British troops in 2003, Iraqi national libraries, museums, and documentation centres were either looted or suffered severe damage. Although some items and manuscripts have been recovered, it seems likely that a large number of rare manuscripts and documents will never find their way back into Iraq as the property of its public archives. Moreover, most Iraqi academics, including historians, have been forced to migrate or have chosen to leave their country out of fear and the absence of security. Those who remained include Professor Abdul Jabbar Naji, chairman of the Historical Studies Department at Baghdad University. After studying for his BA and MA in history at Baghdad University, he earned his Ph.D. from London University (SOAS) in 1970. His research interests embrace urban life in Iraq during the medieval period, and the history of Islamic medicine.

In Lebanon, historical writing took on a life of its own after 1945. Whereas in previous years Lebanon as an historical entity was dealt with largely by Maronite writers, the early 1950s began to witness the gradual contributions of non-Maronite historians, both Christian and Muslim. Although Lebanese historians continued to broach broad Arab, Islamic, and Western topics, the history of the

country itself tended to become the focus of its most active historians. It is in this context that one can appreciate the contributions of a new generation of Lebanese historians, such as Kamal Salibi, Adel Ismail, Waddah Sharara (Charara), Massoud (Mas'ud) Dahir, and Wajih Kawtharani, who were all academic historians, and the diplomat and ambassador Adel Ismail. It was Ismail who inaugurated a new approach to the history of Lebanon by making extensive use of French and British official archives. Whereas Sharara opted for a neo-Marxist historical analysis of both Lebanese history and Arabic historiography, Kawtharani, who had studied in Belgium, followed in the footsteps of Ismail by using and publishing collections of diplomatic documents from the French archives, but with a preference for the methodology of the French Annales School—particularly the approach of one of its founders, Marc Bloch. On the other hand, Massoud Dahir belongs to a more classical Marxist school closely associated with the Lebanese Communist Party. However, his numerous publications on the various aspects of the social and economic history of Lebanon, as well as the Arab East, have added a new dimension to the understanding of the internal dynamics of these societies. This is particularly noticeable in his well-documented analysis of the emergence of the Maronite church and its affiliated monasteries as the largest landowner in Lebanon by the end of the twentieth century, in addition to his analysis of confessionalism as an expression of deeper socio-economic disparities. This last social institution, or the division of Lebanon into religious sects with their own different interests and structures, perhaps constitutes the focus of most historical narratives.

It is in this respect that the historiographical study by the French-educated Lebanese historian Ahmad Beydoun gains its importance. Initially submitted as a doctorate in 1983, it was later published in both French and Arabic. It tries to show how the sectarian identity of a particular historian determines to a large extent his approach to Lebanon’s historical turning points. Furthermore,

6 Ismail has published a number of archival collections, such as ‘Adil Isma’il, L’histoire des pays Arabes dans les archives diplomatiques: Thèmes et références 1535–1945 (Beirut, 1992); see also his thirty-volume collection of diplomatic dispatches on the history of Lebanon, Documents diplomatiques et consulaires relatifs à l’histoire du Liban: Et des pays du Proche-Orient du XVIIe siècle à nos jours (Beirut, 1975–2000); and his Histoire du Liban du XVIIe siècle à nos jours (Paris, 1955).


8 See, for example, Massoud Dahir’s work on the social history of Lebanon in Tarikh Lubnan al-ijtim’i, 1914–1926 (Beirut, 1974); and his history of the historical roots of Lebanese sectarianism, al-Judhur al-tarikhiyah lil-mas’alah al-ia’īfiyyah al-Lubnaniyah, 1697–1861 (Beirut, 1986).

Beydoun noted that most Lebanese historians treat events as mere embodiments of certain a priori essences, such as the contours of the country’s geography, its original culture, social classes, or the characteristics of its indigenous inhabitants. Consequently, the persistent identity of the country looms much larger than the idea of the march of time, or change over time, as a dimension of historical development.10

Prior to the outbreak of the last civil war in 1975, the historian Kamal Salibi seemed to represent in his narratives the new image of independent Lebanon—stable, democratic, and fairly prosperous. This image was summed up by the concept of a republic fashioned out of ‘a social contract’ between its diverse sects, but with the Maronites clearly accepted as the dominant party, owing to their historical role in pioneering a persistent national endeavour to create Lebanon as a separate state.11 However, after the eruption of the civil war, Salibi adopted a more nuanced approach characterized by his criticism of almost all Lebanese historical self-images, be they professional, official, or popular.12 Furthermore, despite his persistent interest in Lebanese history, Salibi published a number of scholarly works on the histories of medieval Syria, Saudi Arabia, and modern Jordan. His paradigm of a flawed social contract was refined in the 1970s by Sharara, who put forward the thesis that Maronite hegemony was neither an accidental occurrence nor a conspiracy hatched by foreign powers, but the result of the emergence in nineteenth-century Mount Lebanon of a new capitalist economy directly linked to the advanced economies of Western Europe. In other words, whereas the Druze community, which had dominated Lebanese affairs for centuries, had shunned the industrial entry of new Europe into its domains, the Maronites—merchants, the church, and peasantry—welcomed its arrival with open arms. In this sense, the Maronite ascendancy was an historical inevitability, rather than the result of a confluence of abnormal conjunctures.13

Since the outbreak of the civil war, and following its formal end in 1990, Lebanese historiography has largely fragmented into an array of local, familial, and sectarian narratives. Nevertheless, Lebanese historians continue to produce, in addition to narrating the history of their localities, towns, and sects, highly valued works on various topics relating to the Arab world and the Middle East at large.

10 See also Ahmad Beydoun’s book on the recent Lebanese civil war, Le Liban: itineraries dans une guerre incivile (Paris, 1993).
13 Waddah Sharara, Fi usul Lubnan al-ta’ifi (Beirut, 1975).
ARAB STATES RECLAIM THEIR HISTORY

Professional historiography in the Arabian peninsula lagged behind other Arab countries and did not begin to establish itself as an integral part of the cultural landscape until the 1970s. Although Saudi Arabia features as the dominant state of the region in many respects, it was Kuwait that took the lead as a result of the presence of well-qualified, educated members of the Palestinian community on its soil, following their expulsion from Palestine in 1948. Thus it was the Palestinian historian Darwish Miqdadi (see above) who, as head of the Kuwaiti Department of Education, overhauled the whole education system in Kuwait in the 1950s, introducing in the process the professional study of history, while at the same time writing the first scholarly study of the history of the emirate. Another scholar who consolidated Kuwaiti historiography as a professional discipline, after Miqdadi’s death, was the Syrian historian Shakir Mustafa, a specialist in Classical Islam and a prolific writer. Today the University of Kuwait boasts a thriving Department of History headed by an able scholar, ʿAbd al-Malik al-Tamimi.

As to Saudi Arabia, it was in 1972 that the Saudi state embarked on a concerted campaign to institutionalize the study and construction of history as a national endeavour designed to lend legitimacy to the rule of the Saudi dynasty, whereas prior to that date histories of the country had been composed by non-Saudi Arabs, such as Fuʿad Hamza, Hafiz Wahbah, Amin Rihani, and Khayr al-Din al-Zirkili. A new generation of Saudi and Gulf historians began to emerge in the 1980s and 1990s, after their graduation from Egyptian, North American, and British universities. These include Shaykh Hasan Al al-Shaykh, Professor ʿAbd al-Rahman al-Ansari of the University of Riyadh, and Dr Abdullah Masri, Director of the Department of Antiquities and Museums of Saudi Arabia. Ansari was educated in Cairo and England, whereas Masri earned his Ph.D. in antiquities and archaeology from the United States, and Al al-Shaykh is a direct descendant of Muhammad ibn ʿAbd al-Wahhab, the spiritual founder of the first Saudi state. Perhaps the most prominent Saudi historian is ʿAbdullah al-ʿUthaymin, a history professor at King Saʿud University, who flourished in the 1980s and 1990s. According to Madawi Al-Rasheed he is in virtual control of the history curriculum in both Saudi schools and universities. Another notable Saudi historian is ʿAbdullah ʿAli Ibrahim al-Zaydan, based at King Saʿud University and a

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14 I owe this information to my colleague, the Jordanian historian ʿAli Mahafza.
specialist in urban Islamic history and demography. He was one of the founding members of the Saudi Historical Society in 1984, and acted as its president. He graduated from Leeds University with a Ph.D. in 1978.

Another noteworthy Arabian historian is Shaykh Sultan Ibn Muhammad al-Qasimi, a graduate of Exeter University and the current ruler of Sharjah, in the United Arab Emirates. His thesis, published in 1986, was a refutation of the British claims of the pervasiveness of piracy as a factor in their decision to place Arab Gulf emirates under their protection or occupation.\(^{17}\) His argument, based on British diplomatic dispatches, highlighted the fact that the British used or created the myth of piracy as an excuse to bring trade in the Indian Ocean and the Arabian Sea under their control. Qasimi is an unusual historian who has devoted a considerable amount of time, despite his administrative and political duties, to publishing a number of monographs on the Gulf, including the British occupation of Aden and French–Omani relations in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. He has, in addition, built up an impressive collection of local and foreign documents and manuscripts relating to the Gulf, particularly those of the British East India Company. His example was soon emulated by other Gulf states in the 1980s and 1990s. Hence, all Gulf states now have their own ‘national’ archives, housing local, Ottoman, and Western documents. This is particularly the case of the National Centre for Documentation and Research (NCDR), established in Abu Dhabi in 1968. The NCDR is a member of the United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), the International Council on Archives (ICA), the International Federation for Libraries and Information (IFLA), and the Secretariat General of the Documentation and Research Centres of the Gulf Cooperation Council. UNESCO has rated the Centres as among the foremost of Arab cultural institutions.

In Jordan, professional history-writing did not fully emerge until the 1970s. Three Jordanian historians stand out: Sulayman Musa, who was originally a Palestinian, but chose to dedicate his time to studying the Arab Revolt of 1916, which was led by Sharif Husayn, the ancestor of the Jordanian ruling family;\(^{18}\) Adnan Bakhit, who graduated from London University, specializing in the history of the Ottoman Province of Damascus in the sixteenth century; and ‘Ali Mahafza who was German-educated and wrote, in addition to his history of modern Jordan, a number of works on modern Arab thought and the role of foreign powers in impeding Arab unification.\(^{19}\)

In Egypt, a new generation of home-grown historians began to emerge in the 1950s and 1960s, although some, like Muhammad Anis, were still being trained abroad. More importantly, following the 1952 revolution, Egyptian


\(^{18}\) See, for example, Sulayman Musa, *T. E. Lawrence, an Arab View*, trans. Albert Butros (Oxford, 1966).

historiography did not make much progress for almost a decade. This could be attributed to the transitional characteristics of the period, as well as the military nature of the new regime and its search for a new political and cultural identity. Be that as it may, it seems that by the end of the decade the President of the Republic, Gamal ‘Abd al-Nasir (or Nasser), had made a decisive shift in the direction of Arab nationalism and socialism. This gave an impetus to the construction of a new paradigm consisting of the Arab identity of Egypt and its espousal of radical socioeconomic reforms. That said, the primacy of the social question had asserted itself years before the military coup of the Free Officers. Historiographically, this was typified by a new history of Egypt published in 1950. Subhi Wahida, who obtained a doctorate in Law from Rome University, offered in his *Fi usul al-masʿala al-misriyya* [On the Origins of the Egyptian Question] a reinterpretation of Egyptian history since the Arab conquest in the seventh century, with scattered references to its earliest days under the pharaohs, and ending with his own time. In the introduction, Wahida made a sweeping criticism of Egyptian historiography by referring to its preoccupation with the relations between the Ottoman Empire and Egypt and then between it and Great Britain ‘to the exclusion of the economic, social, and intellectual factors which accompanied—on the Egyptian side—the emergence of these relations and their twists and turns, and how they stimulated these relations in the first place.’ It is in this context that he highlighted his intention to shift his historical focus away from diplomacy to a close treatment of the internal dynamics of Egyptian society, ‘relegating in the process the ruling class, its activities and opinions to a secondary position.’ He justified such an approach by invoking the contemporary crisis of Egyptian society and its need for finding a new way to achieve its full independence and economic progress. Although not an historian by profession, Wahida’s depiction of the various historical stages of his country in a panoramic tour de force could be said to have introduced a new paradigm in modern Egyptian and Arab historiography. It was widely reviewed in the Egyptian press and praised for its significance as a comprehensive and balanced interpretation of the root causes of the various problems of Egypt as a developing country.

It was in this context that Muhammad Anis, British-trained at the University of Birmingham and Professor of History at Cairo University, emerged by the early 1960s as founder of a new school of historiography, with a clear emphasis on social and economic factors in studying the development of modern Egypt and the Arab East. Anis and his own student, ‘Abd al-‘Azim Ramadan, and Ra‘uf ‘Abbas became dominant voices during this period and determined the

21 See, for example, Muhammad Anis’s works on the revolutions of 1919 and 1952, *Dirasat fi thawrat 23 yuliyu* (Cairo, 1962); *Dirasat fi wathbaʿ iq thawrat 1919* (Cairo, 1963); and his study of Egyptian historiography during the Ottoman period, *Madrasat al-taʾrikh al-misri fi al-asr al-ʿummani* (Cairo, 1962).
general contours of Egyptian historiography until the end of the century, despite the resurgence of Islamism. Perhaps Nelly Hanna, professor in the Department of Arab and Islamic Civilizations of the American University in Cairo, represents the sophisticated culmination of this trend. Working closely with Ra’uf ‘Abbas and the American social scientist Peter Gran, her studies on Ottoman Egypt brought to light the existence of a vibrant rather than a stagnant society, with its own urban dynamism and middle-class culture.22 Although trained as a judge, Tariq al-Bishri, a former head of Egypt’s State Council, was one of the first new Egyptian historians to offer a nuanced reading of the modern history of his country by showing how after 1945 the nature of the Egyptian economy and its dependency on the world market, coupled with the inadequate programmes and activities of its political parties, militated against the possibility of achieving peaceful or gradual change.23 Originally sympathetic to Marxism and Arabism, he shifted his allegiance to a new version of liberal Islamism by the early 1980s.

But it was Ahmad ‘Izzat ‘Abd al-Karim, a former student of Shafiq Ghurbal, who fostered not only a new approach, but, more importantly, a new school of students and disciples. He did so by launching, in 1955, a weekly seminar of Higher Studies for Modern History at ‘Ayn Shams University. It soon developed into the nucleus of a new cluster of historians with a delineated methodology and a clear dedication to their professions. Although largely in line with the radical policies of the Free Officers’ revolution, it produced independent research on a number of topics and periods. These historians included Ahmad ‘Abd al-Rahim Mustafa, ‘Asim al-Dasuqi, ‘Abd al-Rahim ‘Abd al-Rahman, and ‘Abd al-Khaliq Lashin. They all published works dealing with landownership, the working class, industry, and the social background of the political elite.24 Yunan Labib Rizq belonged to the same group, but he forged his own path by rehabilitating political history and the history of ideas. As professor of contemporary history and head of Al-Ahram History Studies Centre, he penned a weekly column in Al-Ahram, entitled ‘Diwan of Contemporary Life’. Rizq received a doctorate in history from ‘Ayn Shams University in 1967. His output consisted of at least forty books dealing with cultural and social life in modern Egypt, as well as its political parties. Rizq approached history from a secular point of view, while stressing at the same time the dynamic and changing nature of social conditions.

23 See Tariq al-Bishri’s history of the Egyptian national movement, al-Harakah al-siysiyya fi Misr, 1945–1952 (Cairo, 1972); and his history of Coptic–Muslim relations, al-Muslimun wa al-aqbat fi itar al-jama’a al-wataniyya (Cairo, 1980).
It should also be noted that Egypt has produced a number of non-professional Marxist historians, who were at the same time members of its Communist Party or one of its splinter groups. One such was the activist of Jewish origins, Ahmad Sadiq Sa’id, who wrote a number of studies on class struggle in Egypt as well as the Arab world, whereby he used as his unit of analysis Marx’s depiction of the Asiatic mode of production. By doing so, Sa’id meant to show how civil society was crushed by state structures in Egypt, given the ecological and economic conditions that allowed and called for the emergence of a powerful central political authority. Other amateur Marxist historians include Rif’at al-Sa’id, who published a number of well-researched monographs on the history of socialism in Egypt, shifting his attention in the 1990s to the ideology and activities of various Islamist groups, and Salah ‘Isa who produced in 1972 one of the most comprehensive studies of the ‘Urabi movement of 1879–82 and its significance in the struggle of his country against European imperialist powers.25

In the 1990s, historians with an Islamist leaning, such as Ahmad Shalabi, whose works cover the history of Islamic education and civilization, and ‘Abd al-‘Aziz al-Shinnawi, a vehement defender of the Ottoman state,26 began to be heard, after being relegated to the margins of the cultural scene since the mid-1950s. Following the collapse of the Soviet Union, the First Gulf War (1990–1) against Iraq after its occupation of Kuwait, and the Oslo Agreement between Israel and the PLO in 1993, a new language began to pervade Arab historical, social science, and media debates: the language of globalization and the advent of a new world order dominated by free market forces and the institutions of democratic rule. However, this new discourse was often defied by a counter-discourse whereby notions of cultural essentialism or authentic characteristics of identity were reproduced in the name of national sovereignty or Islam.

DECOLONIZING AND REWRITING HISTORY

In North Africa the emergence of schools of national historiography, particularly in Arabic, was a long drawn-out process dictated to a large extent by the pervasive French colonial presence since the occupation of Algeria in 1830. The first semi-professional Arabic histories of Algeria were written in the late 1920s and early 1930s.27 Morocco and Tunisia, on the other hand, did not fare much better, but they were better equipped to rewrite their own histories after independence,


given the persistence of their local education systems and the relatively less pervasive impact of colonial rule. Nevertheless, as first Morocco and then Tunisia and Algeria attained their independence, their first professional historians were still French-trained and used French to narrate their understanding of their own past. Moreover, as their main concern was to refute the negative approaches of French historians and their interpretations of certain episodes of Maghrebi history, it seemed appropriate that they would demonstrate the falsehoods of colonial images of ‘backward natives’ by using the same language and similar methodologies. Hence, it appeared for a while as if the main concern of North African historians was to conduct a dialogue or heated debates with their former masters, rather than communicate their findings to local audiences. However, viewed in its long-term and positive effects, one could characterize these endeavours as earnest attempts to create a different sense of history and reconstruct a new national identity based on a more positive reading of the nation’s past and trajectory. Hence, by reclaiming ownership of their history, Maghrebi scholars were affirming their entitlement to independence and their qualifications to furnish proof of such claims. Thus the chaotic, static, and stagnant Maghreb of the French colonial historians was replaced by dynamic, organized, and developing national regions, often unified under one state.

One of the first to do this was the Algerian historian Mohamed Sahli who in 1965 published a monograph on the biased and false methods used by a number of French historians. He refuted or singled out as absurd such themes as the Maghreb in its geographic formations and contours, its ancient pre-Islamic history, the passivity of indigenous Berbers and consequently the need of an external power to control their affairs, the resistance of Algerians to French occupation, the role of Emir Abdelkader (‘Abd al-Qadir), the Moqrani rebellion against the French in 1871, and the policy of assimilation, or its misconceived intentions and largely hypocritical and spurious pretensions. He called for no less than a ‘Copernican revolution’ to overturn all the suppositions, distortions, and prejudices of the French historians. Although he was criticized for his negative approach which prevented him from offering an alternative reading of the same events, his work, together with that of Mostefa Lacheraf, published in the same year, indicated a general dissatisfaction with the way history was still being taught and consumed. It is also worth mentioning that both Sahli and Lacheraf were political activists who participated in the Algerian

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resistance, whereby the latter suffered both persecution and imprisonment. These two works—opening shots in a long battle which continues to rage as of 2010—were turned into a sustained barrage at all levels, from official and professional sources as well as from the popular press and media. This was exemplified at the professional level by Abdallah Laroui’s magisterial *L’histoire du Maghreb: un essai de synthèse* (1970). Laroui, a student of Ernest Labrousse and Charles-André Julien, contends that the Maghreb has been plagued with a particular misfortune—that of having its past narrated by ‘inept historians’ who keep referring to each other without affecting any breakthrough in their basic assumptions, hypotheses, and theses. Laroui goes further in justifying writing a new history of North Africa by invoking the influence of French accounts on Western students, and the manner in which young Maghrebis seem to be more interested in other disciplines, thereby leaving the field to a ‘foreign’ monopoly. He also alludes to Sahli’s pioneering work, but announces his intention to go beyond pinpointing ‘the political presuppositions of colonial history’. He then informs his readers in a footnote: ‘Though following in Sahli’s footsteps, I differ from him insofar as I hope to provide not a radically decolonized history but only a “reading” of history. I feel certain that at the worst my reading will be no more ideological than that of the colonials.’ In this sense, Laroui performs his decolonization by conducting two parallel tasks. He criticizes almost all French historians of North Africa, and does not spare, in the process, the most eminent medieval Muslim historian, Ibn Khaldun, with this criticism running as a connecting thread from the beginning to the end, while offering, throughout the text, thick layers of historical narratives and analytical arguments. But perhaps more importantly, Laroui’s theoretical purpose is pitched as an exercise in reading the past in order to glimpse a more solid image of the future. It is in this context that one begins to understand this insistence on decolonization as a political statement and act, undertaken to pave the way for overcoming what Laroui calls ‘our historical lag’ by an operation of compensation considered to reside in achieving proper historical ‘consciousness’. Hence, by juxtaposing his criticism of ‘the evolution’ of French historiography and ‘the historical development’ of the Maghreb, Laroui wants to restore to his region its historicity and agency. In other words, his region ceases to be a theatre of foreign invasions and a battlefield of conquests and reconquests launched by outsiders with the indigenous inhabitants acting as onlookers at best, and collaborators at worst.

Decolonization of history continued to gather momentum for the next decade or so, exemplified in journal articles, academic conferences, and the publication of new studies. However, the advent of independence and the emergence of new

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31 It was translated into English as *The History of the Maghrib: An Interpretive Essay* (Princeton, 1977). All references are to the English version.
32 Ibid., 3–5.
33 Ibid., 348–88.
national states were bound to shift the debate to the internal development of these societies. Hence, a new generation of historians, often highly critical of the ruling political elites, began to articulate their interpretations of the various episodes of their national histories. Mohammad Harbi and Mahfoud Kaddache did so for Algeria, in addition to the US-trained Aboul-Kassem Saadallah. At the official level, almost a decade after independence, in 1971 the Algerian government founded the Centre National d’Etudes Historiques in order to determine how history-writing should be produced and propagated. In Tunisia, Hichem Djait offered new readings of Islamic history, European culture, and the past of his own country, while Abdeljelil Temimi led a concerted effort to rehabilitate the Ottoman Empire as a Muslim power in the Arab world at large, and Mohamed Talbi published a number of studies on the medieval period. In Morocco, Ahmad Tawfiq, Na’ima Harraj Tuzani, and ‘Umar ‘Afa have published a number of historical studies on Moroccan society and its economy. Laroui, on the other hand, has in the meantime published a number of theoretical works on historical methodology, Islam, and, most controversially, a history of Morocco under its monarch Hasan II (r. 1961–99).34

During the same period from 1970 to 1985, various official and semi-official proposals were put forward in Egypt, Syria, and Iraq, to rewrite Arab history, both local and general.35 Although some progress was made in elaborating theoretical and methodological issues, no concrete results have been achieved. This was particularly the case in rewriting ‘the history of the Arab nation’.

Libya is renowned today among historians of North Africa for its Jihad Centre of Libyan Historical Studies founded in 1977. More importantly, it also boasts a highly regarded section within the centre (the Jihad Oral History Centre), dedicated to recording and transcribing interviews with surviving Libyans who had fought or were involved in acts of resistance against the Italian occupation (1911–43) of their country. In Tunisia, Algeria, and Morocco, similar centres have been established.36 This project was initially launched with the aid of international scholars with particular expertise in, and passion for, oral history—a methodology which has now become part of a new Arab historiography. This is particularly so in the case of Palestinian communities within Palestine itself, in the Arab world, and throughout the Palestinian diaspora.37

37 See, for example, Ahmad H. Sa’di and Lila Abu-Lughod (eds.), Nakba: Palestine, 1948, and the Claims of Memory (New York, 2007).
Libya’s colonial legacy left an indelible mark on its development in the twentieth century. However, its resistance to Italian colonialism, then its brief occupation by the Allies (France in the south and Britain in the rest of the country), signalled the emergence of a Libyan national identity that corresponded with similar developments in other Arab countries. By the end of the 1940s, Libyan intellectuals and members of its political elites began to discuss their own national historical trajectory with its own specific heroes, events, and structures. One of the first to do so was Mustafa ‘Abdallah Ba‘you. Ba‘you was educated at Fu‘ad I University, graduating with a degree in Education in 1943. In 1956 he joined Columbia University in New York and obtained an MA in History. Upon his return and the foundation of the University of Libya in 1957, he was appointed Director of Education, then President of the University (1961). He became Minister of Education in 1967. However, he was dismissed from his post after the 1969 September Revolution, and left Libya in 1973, eventually settling in the United States. 38 He published a number of historical surveys and documentary collections dealing with Libya throughout the ages. One of his first works, *Mujmal Ta’rikh Libya: Min aqdam al-usur hatta al-waqt al-hadir* [A General Survey of Libya’s History: From Ancient Times to the Present], was published in Alexandria, Egypt, in 1947. This work, along with others produced in the 1950s, could be said to have inaugurated the professional phase of Libyan historiography. The next professional historian to leave his mark on the consolidation and development of Libyan historical studies was the Palestinian Ahmad Sidqi al-Dajani. He was a graduate of Damascus (BA 1958) and Cairo (Ph.D. 1970) universities. His doctoral dissertation, supervised by the Egyptian historian Muhammad Anis, covered the history of Libya under its last Ottoman phase from 1882 until the Italian invasion in 1911. His output included a history of the Sanusiyya as a religious and political movement and the early stages of the Libyan national movement. He also catalogued, translated with the assistance of the archivist ‘Abd al-Salam Adham, and published a collection of Ottoman documents dealing with the history of Libya, 1882–1911. His history of the Sanusiyya movement in the nineteenth century (published in 1967) is still considered one of the best studies on the subject. 39

In the Sudan, history-writing has been largely concerned with the country’s development since 1500 and the way its identity has been shaped by its Arab-Islamic heritage, African location, its religious movements, particularly the Mahdiyya in the nineteenth century, the legacy of British rule, and its struggle for independence. Its Central Archives, established by the British and gradually expanded under the able management of Muhammad Ibrahim Abu Salim after their departure in 1956, have been used as a main source by a growing number of Sudanese historians based in the departments of history and political science at

the University of Khartoum, as well as its Institute of African and Asian Studies. One of its prominent historians is Yusuf Fadl Hasan, who received his Ph.D. from the University of London, and is best known for his work on the Arabization of the Sudan and Sudanese oral history. Another is Mudathir ‘Abd-al-Rahim, who made his mark as a political historian with his well-documented study of British rule in the Sudan. His political analysis was clearly aimed at decolonizing Sudanese history by retracing the emergence of its nationalism as a modern movement. In other words, he showed how the Sudanese reclaimed for themselves what the British had repeatedly failed to deliver: namely, Sudanization and constitutional development. Muhammad ‘Umar Bashir, educated in Khartoum and at Queen’s University, Belfast, and Linacre College, Oxford, covered the same ground, but with a broad brush. He served both as an ambassador and Principal of the University of Khartoum. His political history, *Revolution and Nationalism in the Sudan* (1961), shows the interweaving of the various acts of resistance and revolutionary activities pursued by the Sudanese to achieve independence, and how they built their own state after independence, down to 1969, or the second *coup d’etat* led by Ja’far Nimeiri. Other Sudanese historians and anthropologists have shown great interest in oral history as a source, although most work in this area has been done by amateurs and non-specialists. Nevertheless, Abdullahi Ali Ibrahim, from his base at the University of Missouri-Columbia, has revived interest in the subject. Oral history has now also become an instrument to empower Arab women by allowing them to narrate their own pasts, which had either been ignored or were treated as the preserve of male historians. This is the case, for example, of a number of women activists and members of the Sudanese Women’s Union. According to Tomadur Ahmed Khalid, such an undertaking would make it possible to understand problems of a contemporary nature by trying to delve into their historical background and trajectory. This was done by conducting ‘intensive interviews’ using the techniques of oral history.

It is in this context that we can conclude this survey by highlighting the growing contributions of women scholars and organizations to the rewriting of Arab history. Among the most influential organizations in this field have been the Lebanese Association of Women Researchers, founded in 1992, the Institute

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44 See, for example, Hoda El-Sadda, Somaya Ramadan, and Omayma Abu Bakr (eds.), *Zaman al-nisaa wa al-zakira al-badila* (Cairo, 1998).
for Women’s Study in the Arab World, founded by the Lebanese American University in 1973, the Arab Women’s Solidarity Association, established by the Egyptian feminist Nawal al-Sa‘dawi in 1982, and the Women and Memory Forum, founded by Hoda El-Sadda and Omaima Abou Bakr in Egypt in 1997. Women historians writing in Arabic, French, or English include Fatima Mernissi, Leila Ahmed, and Lila Abu-Lughod. Their contributions have injected a note of objectivity and first-hand knowledge into gender studies and its associated fields.

In the course of the last half century or so, Arab historiography has thus become part of a worldwide professional movement, with its own specialist scholars, academic journals, university conferences, and workshops. Although the Arab world still lags behind other advanced countries in its research facilities and liberal environment, history has now become an integral part of university programmes and informed debates on almost all aspects of the past. Even though it is not yet the case that one can isolate clearly delineated and structured schools of Arab history-writing as established features of the cultural landscape, the general buoyancy and steady progress of Arab historiography in its main branches are no longer in doubt.

### TIMELINE/KEY DATES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Event</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1945</td>
<td>Foundation of the League of Arab States</td>
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<tr>
<td>1945–62</td>
<td>Most Arab states achieve independence</td>
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<tr>
<td>1948</td>
<td>Foundation of Israel and expulsion of 750,000 Palestinians</td>
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<td>1952</td>
<td>Egyptian Free Officers’ Revolution</td>
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<td>1954</td>
<td>Algerians (FLN) initiate War of Liberation against French occupation</td>
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<td>1956</td>
<td>The Suez Crisis and tripartite attack on Egypt</td>
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<tr>
<td>1958</td>
<td>Syro-Egyptian unity under Nasser; civil war in Lebanon; Iraq declared a Republic; Arab Nationalism under Nasser sweeps across the Arab world</td>
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<tr>
<td>1967</td>
<td>Israel attacks Egypt, Jordan, and Syria, and occupies Jerusalem, the West Bank, Gaza, Sinai, and the Golan Heights</td>
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<td>1970</td>
<td>Death of Nasser; Jordan’s suppression of PLO</td>
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<td>1973</td>
<td>Arab–Israeli war</td>
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<td>1975</td>
<td>Eruption of Lebanese civil war</td>
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<td>1977</td>
<td>Egyptian President Anwar Sadat visits Israel</td>
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<tr>
<td>1982</td>
<td>Israel invades Lebanon and evacuation of PLO forces</td>
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<td>1982–8</td>
<td>Iran–Iraq War</td>
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<tr>
<td>1989</td>
<td>Algeria introduces multiparty politics</td>
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<td>1992–2000</td>
<td>Algerian civil war</td>
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<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>Iraqi invasion of Kuwait; conclusion of Lebanese civil war</td>
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<tr>
<td>1991</td>
<td>Gulf War</td>
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<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>Death of King Hassan II of Morocco; death of King Hussein of Jordan</td>
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</tbody>
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2000  Death of President Hafiz al-Asad of Syria
2003  American invasion of Iraq and second Gulf War

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The end of colonial rule in 1947 was a turning point in Indian historical writing and culture. History emerged as a professional discipline with the establishment of new state-sponsored institutions of research and teaching. Attached to the institutionalization was the political imperative of a newly independent nation in search of a coherent and comprehensive historical narrative to support its nation-building efforts. The creation of a national consciousness through historical recapture—a theme articulated by Indian nationalists in the pre-independence era—did not cease to be important now that freedom had been achieved, but acquired greater urgency given the immense tasks that lay ahead. At the same time there was a desire to establish an autonomous Indian perspective, free of colonial constraints and distortions. Colonialist historiography had been coloured by imperialist concerns. Its portrait of a stagnant, backward, and fractious Indian society struggling under the yoke of an oppressive polity (the theory of Oriental Despotism) was intended to legitimate British intervention and rule. Post-independence historiography set out to challenge systematically these views. In this, it owed much to earlier strands of nationalist historiography, and a good deal of the historical writing of the early postcolonial years can be regarded as a continuation of older views and themes, although there are ruptures as well. There was also a growing awareness that critiques of imperial frames very often remained stuck in the very frameworks that were being questioned. Too much of what was being thought and written pivoted on earlier discourses, and pre-independence nationalist historians had perpetuated these assumptions. Therefore, scrutiny of the nationalist historiography became a significant task. Finally, and in contrast to both the nationalist and postcolonial historiographies, there were challenges to Western understandings of the historical enterprise itself. Nativist views regarding an authentic and alternative historical sensibility, found in oral traditions, myths, and folktales, argued for a different and older relationship with the past. Thus, investigation of the Indian past was combined with a search for Indian frameworks of interpretation in post-independence historiography.
During the first two decades after independence, three main trajectories of historical writing emerged: an official and largely secular nationalist historiography, a cultural nationalist historiography with strong religious overtones, and a critical Marxist trajectory based on analyses of social forms. State-sponsored initiatives began with large, multi-volume histories, such as the ‘Freedom Struggle’ project. According to its editor, Tara Chand, the series title was chosen to
reflect the Indian people’s agency in their own liberation. Modern methods of archival research were applied to the project. Its enormity necessitated the assistance of state governments in data collection and archiving. Thus the *History of the Freedom Movement in India*, with the first volume appearing in 1961, was the result of a truly national collaborative effort. State archival collections also generated state-sponsored official histories that captured the regional histories of the freedom struggle. Today there is recognition among Indian historians that this writing was mostly hagiographic in kind, celebrating India’s ‘glorious past’ and ‘heroic struggles’ with a good dose of reverence and sentimentality. Some of it was whiggish too, portraying the national movement as the outcome of an old, innate, and ingrained love of freedom and liberty, whereas contradictions in the nationalist movement were glossed over or even suppressed, such as the Nizam of Hyderabad’s support of the British during the Rebellion of 1857–8 and later. Government-sponsored historical writing was also directed towards biographies and collections of martyrs and leaders of the freedom struggle, with Gandhi’s voluminous writings and speeches receiving the greatest consideration. The first of the hundred volumes of Gandhi’s *Collected Works* appeared in 1958 and the last in 1994. They are now available on CD-ROM.

Among other large-scale projects of historical writing in the immediate postcolonial years was the eleven-volume series *The History and Culture of the Indian People* (1951–77). The first comprehensive history of India, it was commissioned by the Bhartiya Vidya Bhavan, a private educational organization with a strong cultural nationalist bent and dedicated to the promotion of Indian and, specifically, Hindu culture and values. Its founder, the Gujarati literary figure and scholar K. M. Munshi, desired a history of India that would capture her (Hindu) ‘soul’. The well-known Bengali historian Romesh Chandra Majumdar was appointed as editor of what came to be ‘the most ambitious history of India by Indians ever attempted’.

The Bhavan series revealed a manifest ‘communal’ or sectarian bent. Communal historical writing, of course, was not a new development, but the partitioning of the subcontinent could now be read into the past with a greater sense of inevitability and conviction. Hostile to mainstream nationalism, and especially critical of the Nehruvian ideal of India’s ‘composite culture’, the Bhavan volumes, under Majumdar’s attentive stewardship, proclaimed that India was primarily Hindu, prey to outside invasions, but in the end always resilient. Whereas other ancient civilizations and cultures had perished, in India there was a continuity of history and civilization. This notion of persisting origins was taken as proof of India’s

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2 Vinay Lal, *The History of History: Politics and Scholarship in Modern India* (New Delhi, 2003), 82.
Hindu character. Also, while Majumdar rejected negative colonialist stereotypes, he accepted the colonialist tripartite division of Indian history into Hindu, Muslim, and British periods, with the Muslim period representing a ‘dark age’ of oppression, cultural collapse, and decadence. This suggested an implicit acceptance of the Two-Nation theory, which assumed an irreconcilable antagonism between India’s Hindus and Muslims. Majumdar’s hostility toward India’s Muslim heritage led him to decry the official interpretation of the freedom struggle. The Mutiny of 1857 was not a fraternal uprising of Hindus and Muslims against the British, and the division of the subcontinent at independence was in part due to the mistaken and illusory faith in Hindu–Muslim brotherhood, for which Gandhi was blamed.

For nearly a generation the Bhavan histories were the mainstay of college texts, and versions of them circulated in schools as well. Many of their ideas became a kind of public common sense. Some of their more chauvinistic and fantastic claims, such as the notion that Indo-Europeans originated in India and from there migrated outwards, civilizing the world, came to be appropriated by the Hindu supremacist groups of the Sangh Parivar. Majumdar’s espousal of scientific history in the Rankean mode, his exhortations on stringent standards of factual verification, his long career as a scholar—all these helped towards establishing the truth claims of the communally inclined Bhavan series among the wider public.

The spread of a communal ‘common sense’ history also reflected institutional developments. Post-independence higher education was characterized by a vast gulf between elite level colleges and institutes, where advanced standards of historical research were pursued and taught by independent historians with an academic peer group in mind, and the substantial majority of colleges and schools where a dated and uncritical history was disseminated, either in its communal or secular nationalist versions, or sometimes incongruous combinations of both. In general, this history featured ruling dynasties in ancient and medieval India, viceroys and governors in modern India, good kings and bad ones, among the latter Muslim rulers like Aurangzeb. The communalist assumptions and inaccuracies in these histories did not go unchallenged. Romila Thapar, a prominent historian of ancient India, confirmed in her scholarship what the communalists hotly denied: namely, that the so-called Aryans came from outside of India, ate beef, and that Vedic culture was the result of an admixture of outside and indigenous elements. She and others pointed to the constructed character of the communal conflict, which was promoted by the colonial state.3

Thus a binary between ‘communal’ and ‘secular’ historians developed early on. The latter were heirs to the Nehruvian tradition, committed to complex, many-sided portrayals of the past. Their writing held to the best traditions of

3 Bipan Chandra, Harbans Mukhia, and Romila Thapar, Communalism and the Writing of Indian History (Delhi, 1969).
modern scholarship. Left-leaning to varying degrees, they represented a third trajectory, distinct from the various official and communal historiographies.

Much of this writing was in the Marxist tradition. Marxist methodologies had been used in the writing of Indian history since the late nineteenth century, but became more important after independence. Here the landmark event was the publication, in 1956, of D. D. Kosambi’s *Introduction to the Study of History*. An historian of ancient India with diverse scholarly interests (but without an academic appointment as an historian), Kosambi shifted the investigative terrain towards questions of class conflict, socioeconomic structures, and material life. By mining traditional sources such as inscriptions, land grants, and coins, he constructed a picture, not of kings, dynasties, and conquests, but of the broader ‘social formation’ that informed states structures. With Kosambi there was a veritable ‘paradigm shift’ (to quote Romila Thapar) and ‘from the mid-fifties to around the mid-eighties historical problematics centred around one aspect or another of this paradigm’. Kosambi was no dogmatic Marxist, however, and questioned Marx’s ethnocentric presumptions, such as the notion that Indian civilization was unchanging. Marx had never quite clarified what he meant by the Asiatic mode of production. A mechanical application of his ideas to the Indian context, such as stages of historical evolution, had to be avoided. Kosambi pointed out that ancient Indian society was not a slave society. On the other hand, the medieval/‘Muslim’ period could be regarded as an Indian form of feudalism, with a ‘feudalism from above’ and a ‘feudalism from below’ at different stages. Kosambi’s ideas stimulated a lively debate on the nature and possibility of feudalism in India, as Marxist historians struggled to reconcile the universal laws of historical evolution with the particularity of the Indian experience. R. S. Sharma’s *Indian Feudalism* (1965) gave a broad definition of feudalism based on surplus appropriation exercised by superior rights, which addressed objections grounded on European particularities such as vassalage. Later, Harbans Mukhia posed the question of whether there was feudalism in India, and answered it in the negative. Not all of Marx’s categories, Mukhia averred, were suitable for an interpretation of the Indian past. Even the fundamental concepts of class struggle and base/superstructure had to be applied in a careful and differentiated manner, taking into account Indian particularities. The Indian feudalism debate, however, generated lively interest among medieval historians studying other parts of the world. It is now recognized that there are many variants in the feudal mode of production, and this has both broadened and enriched the concept of feudalism.

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4 Harbans Mukhia, ‘Historical Wrongs’, *Indian Express*, 27 November 1998; and Romila Thapar, *Early India: From Origins to AD 1300* (California, 2004), 22 (‘paradigm shift’).

5 Harbans Mukhia, ‘Was there Feudalism in Indian History?’ Presidential Address, Indian History Congress, Medieval India Section, 1979.
The Marxist turn in Indian historiography owed a great deal to the strong presence of the Left in Indian political and intellectual life in the 1950s and 1960s. It stimulated some of the most creative departures in Indian historiography. The debate on feudalism, for instance, led to the first questioning of the tripartite periodization of Indian history, if social formations were taken as more realistic markers of historical time. From feudalism, the gaze turned to economic policies and agrarian systems, technological change, artisanal and commercial structures, castes (such as R. S. Sharma’s *Sudras in Ancient India* [1958]), occupational groups, and religious groups. There is no doubt that Marxist work has immensely enriched the study of economic and social history, with more and more sophisticated analyses, and approaches replacing earlier conventions. One result of this approach was the defusing of communal preoccupations. The personal bigotries (or lack thereof) of medieval rulers (such as Aurangzeb) became less relevant, if their actions were linked to material pressures and concerns. Religious movements, such as the Bhakti movement, were not only the outcome of a sympathetic encounter between Hinduism and Islam, but also expressions of social protest and resistance.

Marxist, anti-imperialist, and anti-capitalist perspectives also informed histories of colonialism and the ‘freedom struggle’. One area of inquiry, which went back to concerns raised by economic nationalists such as Dadabhai Naoroji at the turn of the century, pointed to, as Bipan Chandra stated, the ‘central contradiction’ of colonialism: namely, its failure to develop the Indian economy. Chandra, a professor at the Jawaharlal Nehru University, also drew attention to the relationship between the structures of international capitalism and underdevelopment, repudiating the American historian Morris D. Morris’s thesis, proposed in the early 1960s, that colonialism may have been economically beneficial for India. But Chandra disagreed with Marxist scholars’ dismissal of the nationalist movement as a bourgeois enterprise, and acknowledged the role of ideas and ideals in the nationalist movement. ‘Men and women make history’, Chandra submitted, ‘not only because of material forces and interests but also through and because of ideas’, and he warned against the ‘error of disregarding ideas and ideologies . . . of taking the mind out of history’.

Indeed, the nationalist movement became a favourite topic in the research departments of the universities. It became the focus of the modern period, often at the expense of the social and cultural, probably because ‘the social, inevitably constituted in large part also by ‘internal’ tensions, presented more intractable material for a nationalist historiography committed to a saga of a basically united people’. Of course Marxist historians did address worker and peasant struggles,

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although the frameworks of analysis veered towards a Leninist ‘history from above’, rather than a ‘history from below’. Additionally, there were rigorous non-Marxist studies in the area of ‘economic history’, such as Dharma Kumar’s *Land and Caste in South India* (1965), which used anthropological and quantitative techniques to demonstrate economic and demographic change under colonial rule. However, the social history of the modern period was, for much of the early post-independence years, the domain of social anthropologists such as M. N. Srinivas, whose concept of ‘sanskritization’ allowed for a formulation of social change within the parameters of a specific cultural practice. However, such ‘bland, tension-denuded’ structural-functional categories were not always satisfactory to historians looking beyond explanatory labels for more dynamic concepts of change. 8

The influence of the national framework extended to world history as well, where the Indian perspective dominated. The diplomat and historian K. M. Panikkar’s *Asia and Western Dominance* (1953) was a critical, though overly general, exposition of the reasons for ‘the domination of the peoples of Europe . . . over the affairs of Asia’. 9 For a generation, Panikkar’s work commanded a wide readership, not least because of the author’s fluent prose. Counterpointing the national frame were the various locality accounts that continued to pour out in the form of provincial histories (endorsed by the federal structure of the Union and to be distinguished from those promoting separatist politics) and various other ‘micro’ and regional histories, such as Satish Chandra Mitra’s Jessore-Khulna (in Bengal) studies, K. V. Krishna Ayyar’s work on Kerala history, and the more well-known Nilakanta Sastri, whose detailed studies of the South brought that much neglected area into the mainstream of Indian historiography. These ventures into the localities, districts, and regions brought a necessary corrective by focusing on the more heterogeneous aspects of the Indian past, although it should be noted that regional studies abounded in the pre-independence period as well—Bengal, Maharashtra, and Tamil Nadu being particularly prolific in this regard. In Maharashtra, scholars had long concentrated on putting together records on the Maratha rulers of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, and wrote histories of their patriotic battles against the British and Mughals. After independence these accounts took on chauvinistic and communal overtones, such as the various Shivaji histories that sought to canonize the eighteenth-century Maratha figure as a ‘national leader’ and liberator from Muslim oppression. 10

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8 Sumit Sarkar, *Writing Social History* (Delhi, 1997), 39–40.
9 Quoted in Michael Gottlob, *Historical Thinking in South Asia: A Handbook of Sources from Colonial Times to the Present* (Delhi, 2003), 227.
10 In Narayan H. Kulkarnee (ed.), *Chattrapati Shivaji: Architect of Freedom* (Delhi, 1975), Shivaji was celebrated as creator of the ‘Maratha nation’.
By the 1970s, standard anti-colonial nationalist interpretations had become somewhat repetitive, while other issues and concerns were coming to the fore. A conjuncture of developments such as the 1971 war with Pakistan, which pointed to the importance of language and ethnicity in nation-formation, the rise of extremist left-wing movements such as the violent Maoist Naxalite movement, the increasing authoritarianism of the state during the Emergency regime of 1975, lower-class protest and grassroots activism, all encouraged fresh areas of investigation. Additionally, institutional changes at home and abroad impacted historical writing. The establishment of centres of advanced study and research, such as the Nehru Memorial and the Indian Council of Historical Research, furthered the interests of the discipline. A number of reputable journals such as the *Indian Economic and Social History Review* and *The Indian Historical Review* appeared. In the meantime, Indian scholars and students visiting Western universities found a different kind of engagement and mentoring at newly established South Asia Studies departments in the United States, Canada, and Australia. This brought a shift in approach and perspective. American historical anthropology (particularly in the work of R. E. Frykenberg, Robert Redfield, and Bernard S. Cohn) stimulated new methodologies and thinking about small communities, while French historical and social theory (such as the Annales School) provoked interest in long-range changes, mental habits, marginal classes, material life, and environmental change. The multiple cultures of India were now probed from many levels and angles: pastoralists, ‘tribals’, forest-dwellers, peasants, artisans, merchants, religious figures, and so on, were found to inhabit a different mental and social space. For many historians coming from the left, the appeal of the Annales lay, as Harbans Mukhia stated, in its ‘ability to incorporate a surprising combination of sympathy and caution towards Marxism’. Annales perspectives also stimulated comparative studies of social forms. Caste, for instance, was compared to hierarchical social systems elsewhere in the ancient world.

By the 1970s therefore, internal political developments coupled with newer approaches in anthropological and social science models spawned a rich repository of writings on broader social structures and their cultural articulations. This period also saw the beginning of interests in questions of women, gender, and the environment, to be discussed separately. The colonial period and the nationalist movement continued to draw interest, but newer interpretations now opened up and challenged established trajectories. As we have seen, Marxist historians such as Chandra had explored colonialism as a structure located within international capitalism, and viewed India’s exploitation and underdevelopment within that context. The economic impact of colonialism thus remained a major theme, and colonial assertions that prior to the British, India was impoverished, backward, and incapable of development were countered with evidence of proto-capitalist

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11 Quoted in Rajat Datta (ed.), *Rethinking a Millenium: Perspectives on Indian History from the Eighth Century to the Eighteenth* (Delhi, 2008), 364.
forms, monetarization, technological innovation, urbanization, vibrant craftsmanship, and growth in the pre-colonial era. For the late colonial period, the dominant paradigm was the unitary, idealistic thrust towards freedom, at the head of which stood leaders like Gandhi and Nehru, colonial repression, and ‘divide and rule’ tactics ending with independence and Partition. This standardized version of the late colonial years now began to be questioned. Scholars in Britain stressed the role of indigenous collaboration in the spread of empire, counter-intuitively arguing that acquisition of territory took place only when native collaborators could not be found to preserve British trade and security interests. Thus ‘imperialism was as much a function of its victims’ collaboration or non-collaboration—of their indigenous politics, as it was of European expansion.’ The thesis shifted the ground of discussion from capitalist expansion to ‘indigenous politics’, localities, and local interests, particularly of the late colonial period with its richer archive. Namierite interpretations of individual motives and power struggles were brought into the equation by John Gallagher and his student Anil Seal. In 1968 Seal published his Emergence of Indian Nationalism: Competition and Collaboration in the Late Nineteenth Century, followed by, with Gallagher and Gordon Johnson, Locality, Province and the Nation (1973), where it was argued that when local patron–client political structures came up against the expanding activities and institutions of the colonial government—such as municipalities, district boards, and elected legislatures—the local political groups were forced to deal with the government. The process brought the isolated localities into contact with one another, creating horizontal and vertical alliances that aimed at pressurizing governmental agencies on behalf of local ends and ambitions. The process replicated itself from locality to province, to the national level. In the narrative of this Cambridge School, as it came to be called, politics in the Raj, or British India, was a function of interest maximization in an institutional set-up created by the government. It was the penetration of the colonial state into local power arrangements that defined political activity. *Ipso facto*, the whole nationalist enterprise was driven by the basic realities of political ambition: patriotism and ideals had no place in it. The protests, agitations, and strikes for freedom were but a guise for thwarted ambitions and desires of localities, castes, regions, and individuals. Later writings of the Cambridge School concentrating on the initial phases of the British conquest delineated a highly motivated interaction between the local and imperial. Collaboration or resistance to British expansion was closely linked to calculated decisions of loss and gain among ruling elites. In the expansion of the empire lay a combination of economic interests pertaining to the East India Company, private European merchants, and Indian merchants who financed

the British trade. Thus, ‘colonialism was the logical outcome of South Asia’s own history of capitalist development’.

Not surprisingly, the Cambridge School’s ‘animal politics’ and ‘neocolonialist’ vision of Indian nationalism did not sit well with Indian historians. Yet it rethought the terms of the old colonial/anti-colonial binary. To the nationalist valorization of a unified, cohesive Indian nationalist movement, the Cambridge School posited divisions, localities, and special interests. To the nationalist insistence that the transition to colonialism was a sudden and traumatic break, the Cambridge School suggested strong continuities and interactions between colonial and pre-colonial elements. The Cambridge historians were not suggesting a return to the old colonialist narrative of imperialism as benign intervention. They recognized that the constitutional and institutional reforms of the Raj, the sites of bargaining and trafficking by local politicos, were set up to prop up British rule. Narrow self-interest and power considerations characterized both sides of the equation. To be sure, intermingling and bargaining between the imperial and local in the eighteenth century did not render irrelevant the wide-scale looting by the Company, or the force that was used to establish its position. Nor was the choice between nationalism as opportunism, and nationalism as idealism, an either/or proposition. Nonetheless, the Cambridge School had shown that the picture of a unitary nationalist movement, without faults and fissures, did not ring completely true. At the same time, newer researches by younger scholars in India and abroad during the 1970s revealed the darker aspects of the Congress Party—particularly its harsh dealings with peasant and worker militancy when the latter exceeded the limits of the nationalist agenda. For these scholars, who would later go on to form the Subaltern Studies ‘collective’, neither the nationalist nor the Cambridge historians spoke to the turbulent political realities of the colonial and postcolonial eras.

In retrospect, what is today regarded as a distinct school of thought in modern historiography, the first from an ex-colony to receive international prominence and recognition, is said to have begun with a series of ‘interventions’ or critiques of the above outlined debates. Its goal was the establishment of a decolonized historical perspective. However, it should be noted that this interpretation of Subaltern Studies as ‘postcolonial historiography’ is questioned, particularly for the early phases of its writing, which presumably saw nothing more than ‘the
application in Indian historiography of trends in historical writings that were quite widespread by the 1970s under the impact of social historians such as E. P. Thompson, Eric Hobsbawm and a host of others’. Sumit Sarkar, an original member of the group who later broke away from it, also suggests that the project took inspiration from the ‘history from below’ approach of the British Marxists, but then took some undesirable postmodernist and postcolonial turns.

The ‘collective’, established in 1982, took its name from a series of volumes entitled *Subaltern Studies: Writings on South Asian History and Society*. The first six volumes were edited by Ranajit Guha, then at the University of Sussex, and a key theoretician of the group, whose membership included scholars from Britain, India, and Australia. These volumes had a wide range of themes including critiques of elite historiography, peasant belief systems, movements and insurgencies, tribal revolts, studies of Indian nationalism and its leaders, popular perceptions of Gandhi, the character of the state, and communalism. Later volumes were edited by other members of the group, and their content revolved around the categories of ‘nation’ and ‘community’, but also looked at Bengali middle-class culture, forest-dwellers, colonial prisons, the Partition, religion, and language.

The establishment of the collective was marked by a deliberate effort to rethink Indian historiography. Foremost was the necessity of breaking with the dominant historiography, whether of the nationalist or of the Cambridge variety, both of which were deemed as elitist. The ‘top-down’ model of Indian historiography had generally focused on the doings of the colonialist state and the nationalist leadership which fought the colonial state. But while it was useful for increasing our understanding of ‘the structure of the colonial state, the operation of its various organs in certain historical circumstances, the nature of the alignment of classes that sustained it, some aspects of the ideology of the [nationalist] elite as the dominant ideology of the period’, it was unable to explain ‘the contribution made by the people on their own that is, independently of the elite to the making and development of nationalism’. Recent studies had shown that far from being quiescent, until aroused by the nationalist leaders, the masses of India had been engaged in continuous popular resistance which made India ungovernable by the British. But conventional historiography had neglected these ‘subaltern’ elements of Indian society—the peasants, the lower castes, the marginalized—historical agents in their own right, with their own politics, traditions, motivations, and belief systems that were often at variance

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19 This view was submitted by Sumit Sarkar’s *Modern India, 1885–1947* (Delhi, 1983). Ranajit Guha’s *Elementary Aspects of Peasant Insurgency in Colonial India* (Delhi, 1983) also made a similar argument.
with those of the bourgeois nationalist leaders. Left historians had dealt with these groups, but only in class terms, as objects of organizational leadership or as an undifferentiated category. Subaltern historical analysis aimed to view them as subjects of history, makers of their own destiny.

Early volumes of *Subaltern Studies* considered the conditions of subalternity, the power dynamic between elites and masses, focusing especially on moments of resistance and rebellion. In distinction from conventional Marxist historiography, which situated the motivations of the subaltern in socioeconomic explanations, subaltern historiography viewed the activities of subalterns in terms of an evolving culture of ‘common sense’ and ‘instinct’ that was ‘modern’ in its engagement with a changing political and social environment, even when older, traditional, and frequently religious symbols were used. The struggle of the peasants, tribals, and so on were thus struggles against the colonial context, albeit of a different kind than those of the bourgeois nationalists. This indicated, as Guha argued, a redefinition of the category of the political. Whereas elitist historiography defined the political domain in terms of the formal side of governmental and institutional processes, the subaltern perspective emphasized an ‘autonomous’ domain in the politics of the people that was organized differently, spanning across traditional social forms of kinship, caste, and so on, and saturated with the experience of exploitation, whose natural outcome was violent resistance. Peasant consciousness was steeped in insurgency.20 This redefinition of lower-class politics represented a singular historiographical shift, distinguishing it from English Marxist historiography with which Subaltern Studies had much in common, but which at the same time regarded peasant consciousness as ‘backward’ and ‘pre-political’: not yet reconciled with the institutional logic of capitalism.21 The latter’s ‘Eurocentric’ conception of the political was contested by Guha, who argued that insurgency was not simply a naked expression of peasant distress, but represented conscious attacks on, or inversions of, recognizable symbols of social domination. Religion or the magical were factors in these revolts, but not at their centre. Guha added, ‘It was a political struggle in which the rebel appropriated and/or destroyed the insignia of his enemy’s power and hoped thus to abolish the marks of his own subalter-
nity.’22 These symbols of domination stood in a line of power extending from the colonial legalistic institutional framework (transformed) into the traditional apparatus and symbolic paraphernalia of social control. Far from representing the incomplete nature of colonial India’s historical evolution into capitalist modernity, the country still steeped, as it were, in semi-feudal torpor with its extra-economic mechanisms of domination and subordination, Guha described a model of colonial capitalism and colonial modernity, a selective adaptation to

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20 Ibid.
the challenges of modernity, for subaltern histories do not refer to resistance outside of capital. Further, Guha’s rejection of the category ‘pre-political’ implied a rejection of the stagist theory of historical evolution, from backwardness to modernity, from feudalism to capitalism, according to one prescribed (and Western) model.23 Far from capitalism failing to universalize its values as per Marx, it was necessary for colonial capitalism to build on a foundation of traditional social relationships of power and authority. This meant that the nationalist bourgeoisie did not really speak for the nation it claimed to represent. Unlike its European counterpart, it existed without a hegemonic ideology, as there were vast swaths in the life and consciousness of the people that lay outside its cultural reach. What this implied was that the history of Indian modernity, capitalism, and nationalism could not be studied according to Western analytics of the phenomena. Subaltern historiography was thus a postcolonial historiography.

Writing the history of largely non-literate peoples who left little by way of records posed a challenge. However, one could read the documents of the ruling classes, textually and ‘against the grain’, as it were, gleaning them for their assertions as much as for their ‘silences’. Guha formulated a strategy of multi-level textual readings in his essay, ‘The Prose of Counter-Insurgency’, in which official counter-insurgency records were deconstructed for their textual properties with respect to power, in order to uncover both biases of the elite and the ‘consciousness’ of the subaltern via the refractory medium—the ‘silences’—of the texts. A robust demonstration of this approach is seen in Gyanendra Pandey’s study of colonial discourses of communalism. Here, seemingly neutral official reports on ‘communal’ riots are found to be replete with falsifications and ‘constructs’ hinging on preconceived colonialist notions about indigenous propensities for violence and an eternal Hindu–Muslim ‘clash of civilizations’. As Pandey points out, such constructions legitimated the role of colonialism as the upholder of peace and law.24 This scrutiny of texts for their power/knowledge content brought subaltern historiography into a deep engagement with postmodern literary theory as well.

In 1988 Guha retired from the Subaltern Studies editorial team the same year that they published an anthology with a ‘Foreword’ written by the postcolonial critic Edward Said and an ‘Introduction’ written by the Indian-born literary critic, feminist, and historian Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak. While Said’s description of the ‘intellectually insurrectionary’ content of subaltern historiography emphasized the attention it was receiving in the wider profession, Spivak, also a member of the project, raised some concerns. She drew attention not only to the absence of gender issues (an absence somewhat remedied in later volumes), but asked, from a post-structuralist perspective, how it was possible to speak of a

24 Gyanendra Pandey, The Construction of Communalism in North India (Delhi, 1991).
subaltern ‘consciousness’ when academic assumptions of a subaltern collective identity ‘essentialized’ the subaltern as a category. Antonio Gramsci had characterized the history of subaltern social groups as necessarily ‘episodic and fragmentary’. Subaltern Studies had accepted this definition, not simply as a description but to avoid concepts of totality which would deprive the subaltern of the specificity of his experience and agency, subsuming the latter to a broader nationalist and/or Western teleology. It was important, therefore, to emphasize the fragmentary and transitory character of this agency. However, the concept of the subaltern as a ‘subject-agent’ with a distinctive consciousness implied an ethnocentric extension of Western logos—a totalizing, essentialist exercise that overlooked the heterogeneity of the colonized peoples. And in another well-known essay titled ‘Can the Subaltern Speak?’ (1988), Spivak indicated the inherent paradoxical position of intellectuals ‘speaking for’ the subalterns rather than letting them speak for themselves—a transaction that not only denied them their agency, but reinscribed their subordination.

Other criticisms of the project appeared. Drawing a distinction between the earlier and later phases of the project, Sumit Sarkar pointed to the increasing ‘culturalism’ of Subaltern Studies which not only assigned to the concept of subaltern fixed, decontextualized meanings, but also led to what Sarkar termed ‘The Decline of the Subaltern in Subaltern Studies’.25 Whereas the original agenda reflected a concern with the history of underprivileged groups, au courant postmodern and postcolonial theorizing enmeshed the project in Foucauldian/Saidian discussions of the ‘virtually irresistible’ power/knowledge of the modern bureaucratic nation-state, whose roots lay in the post-Enlightenment/colonial West—a development which Sarkar described as ‘debilitating in both academic and political terms’.26

Late Subaltern Studies contended that its engagement with textual analysis had revealed that subalternity was an effect of discourse whose agency lay within the framework of the dominant discourse. If this meant a deeper engagement with elite and canonical texts, as Gyan Prakash argues in this volume, it did not imply ‘an abandonment of the search for subaltern groups in favour of a fashionable obsession with discourses and texts’. It also asserted that the theoretical deficiencies of the project could not be overcome without paying attention to ‘the problem of universalism/Eurocentricism that was inherent in Marxist (or for that matter liberal) thought itself’.27 Herein lay the difficulties of postcolonial discourse. On the one hand, it proclaimed the historical agency of the colonial subject. On the other, it questioned the truth claims of post-Enlightenment

25 Sumit Sarkar, ‘The Decline of the Subaltern in Subaltern Studies’, in id., Writing Social History (Delhi, 1997).
26 Ibid., 85.
power/knowledge, of which historical writing is a part. The latter brought the project into the domain of postmodernist discourse, with its rejection of the Enlightenment, while nationalist historiography itself became doubly suspect, both for its hegemonic intentions as well as for its connection to Western power/knowledge. This prompted a critique of nationalism and the ‘nation-state project’, as the instrument of domination originating in the West, and then replicating itself in the postcolonial state of the Republic of India with its enshrined principles of secularism and rationalism inherited from the Western Enlightenment. Such a concept of domination implied that the realm of autonomous action could only be found in areas that lay ‘outside the thematic of post-Enlightenment thought’: that is to say, in the ‘fragments’ of society, the domain of community consciousness untouched by colonial/nationalist cultural domination. In the Indian context, the fragments were represented by ‘the smaller religious and caste communities, tribal sections, industrial workers, activist women’s groups, all of which might be said to represent “minority” cultures and practices’ that resist the ‘state-centred drive to homogenize and “normalize” in the name of a unitary national culture and political community’. Thus the original division of elite versus subaltern was extended to the nation-state and its binary opposite, the fragment. Critics claimed that the valorization of the fragment overlooked its internal contradictions and tensions, its own structures of domination and subordination, the wider social formation in which it lay embedded. It also betrayed a romantic, anti-modernist sentiment, since the fragment by necessity was pre-colonial in its identity. Almost all of the Indian historians of late subalternism shared a postmodernist aversion to the idea of progress derived from the Western Enlightenment and which relegated other cultures to an inferior position, as ‘underdeveloped’. Dipesh Chakrabarty asserted that the global history of capitalism produces different forms in different contexts. The European model, with its supposed secularism and forms of civil society, needs to be ‘provincialized’, and we must recognize that there are multiple modernities as well as multiple cultures.

Repudiation of Western models of progress and development also gave rise to postmodernist critiques of the Enlightenment tradition, of which the modern historical mode of interpretation was a part. Influential intellectuals outside the historical profession launched vigorous critiques of historical consciousness as a specifically Western mode of thinking as a detriment. For Ashis Nandy, the historicization of Indian thinking was a ‘second colonization’—one that suppressed non-historical modes of self-knowledge. Modern

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historical thinking arose in conjunction with the scientific method and rationalism of the Enlightenment. It only acknowledges the empiricist scientific model of understanding the past. This, however, suppresses other modes of self-knowledge, such as legends, myths, and epics that, moreover, carry a vital moral dimension that modern historical reason lacks. On the contrary, ‘historical consciousness has not only tended to absolutize the past in cultures that have lived with open-ended concepts of the past or depended on myths, legends, and epics to define themselves, it has also made the historical worldview complicit with many new forms of violence, exploitation, and Satanism in our times and helped rigidify civilizational, cultural, and national boundaries’. Nandy averred that Indian nationalists had felt that Europe had transcended its wretched past by acquiring an historical consciousness, and that this was the legitimate path for the Indians as well. Instead, ‘the domination of that consciousness has become . . . a liability’ as entrenched memories of multiple pasts, with their bitterness and hatreds, contend for the present. South Asian historians, Nandy claimed, ‘have sought to historicize everything, but never the idea of history itself’.

Most Indian historians (including the subaltern) do not go as far as Nandy and accept the legitimacy of the historical enterprise. There are exceptions, such as Gyanendra Pandey, who revisits familiar terrain and questions, on epistemological grounds, ‘the givenness of history and historical categories’, while for Vinay Lal, ‘the uncontested ascendancy of history has dangerously narrowed the possibility of dissent in our times’, and signalled ‘the defeat of India as a civilization and its ignoble triumph as a nation-state’. Like Nandy, Lal maintains that Indian historians must engage with ‘the mythic, the ahistorical and the folk if they are committed to the ecological plurality of knowledges’. Subaltern Studies had revealed the inadequacy of mainstream nationalist history, in so far as the latter had masked the divisions and tensions within the nation in order to prioritize national unity. Most certainly this was the case with the history of Indian women. There were only a few works on women’s history prior to the 1970s. Those that existed celebrated exceptional figures, such as saints or queens, or emphasized the participation of women in the freedom struggle, mainly to refute negative colonialist narratives about the inferior status of women in Indian society. A. S. Altekar’s *Position of Women in Hindu Civilization*, first published in 1938 and reprinted several times until the early 1980s, is an excellent example of this genre. Neera Desai’s *Women in Modern India* (1957) was an exception, being the only truly feminist history of Indian women for this time.

It was only during the seventies, when feminist concerns and politics became significant, that a more critical and systematic research agenda emerged. There began a concerted effort at locating and preserving women’s records, foregrounding women’s lives, and particularly the lives of non-elite women. From the beginning, this historical writing reflected the importance of activist agendas in its expression. Indian women historians were, and still are, deeply engaged in various women’s causes, and for that reason cannot escape the political and social consequences of their scholarship.34

The impressive advances made by Indian feminist scholarship are obscured by other, more well-known schools like the Subaltern Studies. But Indian feminist writing was also asking the powerful, searching questions, challenging the triumphant nationalist narratives, and laying bare their masculine agendas. The essay collection edited by Kumkum Sangari and Sudesh Vaid titled *Recasting Women* (1990) was immensely influential in reassessing women as a nationalist construction. Thus Mrinalini Sinha found that British reformers as well as Indian nationalists, both ‘liberal’ reformers and religious revivalists, became champions of Indian women’s causes as a means to legitimate their claims to power and to enhance their masculinity.35 Ideals of womanhood also changed during the colonial period. By the late nineteenth century, a new patriarchy and a new concept of womanhood had been constructed, based on a division between the home, a refuge from the world where male authority prevailed in an extended family structure, and the outside world, where colonial power ruled. Ideal womanhood in this altered structure of domesticity was based on a curious combination of Victorian values and Hindu values of suffering and self-sacrifice that effectively subordinated and restricted women.36 Tanika Sarkar, too, sees a reconfigured patriarchy based on the politics of religious revivalism, as reactionary values pertaining to women were championed in the name of Indian nationalism.37 While most of the feminist scholarship dealt with the colonial and postcolonial periods, there are also significant studies of ancient India that interpreted acts of female submission in subversive terms.38

Feminist scholars welcomed the Subaltern Studies’ commitment to challenging elitist historiography. However, the first eight volumes gave minimal attention to women’s issues, despite Spivak’s criticisms. It is only after the ninth volume (1996) that a change can be observed, with gender frequently appearing as a category of

36 Chatterjee, *The Nation and its Fragments*.
analysis. There are also essays critical of earlier subaltern discussions, which had overlooked the distinct and separate oppression of women, subsuming them under subalterns presumed to be male. Still, most of the emphasis is on gender *per se* or upper-class/caste women rather than subaltern and minority women. Postmodernist insistence on the specificity of the subject’s experience also raises troubling questions regarding the contradiction between an exclusive female agency and the wider patriarchal structures that limit women’s actions. One should also note that some of the more incisive postmodernist critiques had been anticipated by feminist historiography, in India and elsewhere. For decades feminist historians have decentralised homogenized notions of subjecthood, changed definitions of sources and the process of archivization, pointed to the importance of literary and non-conventional sources, and fruitfully mined texts for their tropes and concealments in relation to patriarchy. But Indian feminists find the wholesale rejection of Enlightenment humanism or nostalgia for pre-modern community problematic, especially when the latter carried with it oppressive patriarchy. As one feminist historian stated, ‘the postcolonial stance of subaltern history leads to defense of tradition even when these practices are clearly harmful and clearly violate the canons of justice. According to these scholars, who is to say that *sati* [Hindu widow sacrifice] is bad? It is the prejudiced Western eye which says it is.’

Outside of the subaltern project, the historiography of women has made notable advances. One topic enriched by the feminist perspective is the Partition. Urvashi Butalia’s *Other Side of Silence* (1998) stands as a compelling account of voices silenced and hidden—a history of the Partition ‘from below’ and different from the usual ‘road to Partition’ descriptions of the triangulated manoeuvrings of the Congress, Muslim League, and the British. There has also been some attention, though clearly not enough, to minority women from the Muslim, Christian, Dalit, and tribal communities.

On the other hand, there is an uncritical acceptance of the tripartite colonial periodization without considering its implications for women’s history. Nor has women’s history escaped the nation-state paradigm. While the latter’s significance cannot be ignored, the determining role of the political frame needs to be treated conservatively, since there is much in women’s lives that lies outside it.

In India, however, it is not easy for scholars to stay isolated from politics. Activist to begin with, Indian feminist historians must deal with the intrusion of state-sponsored communal and masculine agendas, not to mention violence, against women. The brutal attacks at Godhra in February 2002 which singled out Muslim women with particular savagery, dealt a severe blow to the idea

39 Maithreyi Krishnaraj, ‘History through the Gender Lens’, in Kirit S. Shah and Meherjyoti Sangle (eds.), *Historiography Past and Present* (Delhi, 2005), 130.

40 Among some of the histories of Muslim women are Shahida Lateef’s *Muslim Women in India* (London, 1990); Zoya Hasan’s *Forging Identities* (Boulder, 1994); Azra Asghar Ali’s *The Emergence of Feminism Among Indian Muslim Women*, 1920 (Oxford, 2000); and Gail Minault’s *Secluded Scholars: Women’s Education and Muslim Social Reform in Colonial India* (Delhi, 1999). Dalit women have received attention mostly in relation to male reformers.
that women have a separate existence apart from their communal identity. The growth of communal tensions in South Asia from the 1980s, which also included other religious groups such as the Sikhs, also prompted greater attention to the historical roots of religious conflict. Recent research has demonstrated that various nineteenth-century revivalist movements, such as the *Arya Samaj*, had a strong communal edge. The role of colonial reportage, narratives, and census-taking in the politicization of religion has also been explored. The rise of Hindu militancy in recent times has lent a greater urgency to these queries. As indicated earlier, ‘secular’ historians had already been contesting communalized distortions, stressing a plural, complex, and tensioned vision of the past, as opposed to Hindu narratives of internal purity and external threat. This often involved struggles against government-led initiatives to revise the content of school textbooks to portray a more appreciative picture of Hinduism (and also a more negative picture of Islam). A corollary to these exchanges was the heightened significance given to ‘history’ as the final arbiter of communal questions. Thus the discipline of history formed the space where the militant Hindu politics of the *Hindutva* movement pitted itself against the practitioners of academic history.

The conflict came to a head during the Babri Masjid (Babar Mosque) controversy. Proponents of *Hindutva* claimed that the mosque was built on the destroyed remains of a Hindu temple situated on the birthplace (*Ramjanmabhoomi*) of the Hindu god Rama. The all too familiar litany of charges accompanying this claim—that Muslim ‘invaders’ routinely destroyed Hindu temples (the ‘temple theory’), forced conversions onto Hindus, and so on—are less significant than the spurious ‘historical evidence’ cited to substantiate them. The subsequent destruction of the mosque by militants marked the onset of a long assault on the rationalist foundations of historical thinking. Hindu ideologues made free use of postmodernist doctrines to establish an equivalency of claims, since all narratives are expressions of power, and no narrative is objective, while subalternist valorizations of the pre-modern and the fragment were used to criticize the secular liberal nation-state. Meanwhile, there were attempts to bring the historical profession to heel. In states where the Hindu right Bhartiya Janata Party (BJP) ruled, and then, nationally after the latter’s victory in the 1998 national elections, efforts to push through a *Hindutva* version of history through aggressive control of research institutions and school curricula were made. Early in 2000 the BJP government also announced its decision to suspend publication of the *Towards Freedom* collection of documents authored by K. N. Panikkar and Sumit Sarkar on a flimsy procedural technicality. These documents contained evidence that the Hindu fundamentalist Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (an organization with close ties to the BJP) did not simply withhold participation in the nationalist movement, but actually collaborated with the British.

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41 The literature on the *Hindutva* movement is extensive. On the relationship between historical thinking, the historical profession, and *Hindutva* politics, Vinay Lal’s earlier cited *The History of History* is invaluable. Another excellent account is Martha Nussbaum’s *The Clash Within: Democracy, Religious Violence and India’s Future* (Cambridge, 2007).
While the defeat of the BJP in the next round of elections put a hold on these developments, the fact remains that communalized conceptions of the past persist. Among mainstream historians, the incongruous claims of Hindutva history would not even receive a passing nod. In India, however, there is a huge gulf between the understanding of professional historians and popular consciousness of the past. In part, this is due to extensive differences in school systems and curricula. Textbooks commissioned by the national education agency of the National Council of Education, Research, and Training (NCERT) which are written by professional historians are used only in a small number of schools, or in a limited manner. Additionally, there exist schools run by community organizations and political parties where a communally conscious historiography is disseminated. These schools glorify India’s Hindu past which is made synonymous with national identity, while Muslims are designated as the national enemy. Syncretic conceptions of Hindu–Muslim relations, or complex understandings of social relations through concepts and frames other than religion, are ignored. Meanwhile, outside the schools, cheaply produced tracts and booklets circulate a type of ‘popular history’ steeped in mythic imagery and Manichean battles between ‘good’ Hindus and ‘bad’ Muslims. Whereas the academic histories are written in English, these are produced mostly in vernacular languages.

Historical thinking in India today therefore exists at a variety of levels. A popular historical consciousness that appeals to familiar prejudices flourishes in daily life and discourse. It lives at the level of ‘common sense’ and ‘common knowledge’, outside the domain of the elite professional historical establishment with its peer review journals and contacts with the international community of scholars. It has, however, become a force to be reckoned with. Further, as Hindutva ideologues began to specify their principles of history, mainstream historians have had to revisit questions relating to criteria of historical writing, frames of analysis, the impact of relativistic philosophies, and the strength of deep-seated prejudices against which no amount of substantiated argument seems to prevail. Doubts have arisen about the inadequacies of secular mainstream historiography, the unwitting consequence of conventional frameworks of periodization, and so on. Historians have also begun to question the dominance of the colonial/anti-colonial binary with its insider versus outsider thematic which makes for easy appropriation by elements in search of a national enemy. It also, through the backdoor, reinscribes essentialized and unitary conceptions of the nation.

The strength of the modern Indian historiography lies in its self-reflexivity and appreciation for the role of the historian located in a conjuncture of tension-

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43 Partha Chatterjee, ‘History and the Domain of the Popular’, ibid.
ridden epistemological, political, and cultural influences. Starting from the premise that a critique of Western frames was a necessary prelude to independence and objectivity, it now recognizes that such critiques entail a paradoxical continuity with the very frames they seek to transcend. Rejecting the enterprise of historical writing as the tool of post-Enlightenment power/knowledge in favour of non-historical modes of understanding does not solve the problem. It seems clear, however, that adherence to any single interpretative framework in the name of anti-colonialism and cultural authenticity is equally unproductive, whether it is the ‘nation-state’ or the ‘fragment’ untouched by colonial modernity. Such categories, as has been pointed out, can be especially limiting for histories of underprivileged groups such as women or lower castes that made free use of ideas of empowerment derived from Western colonial-modernity, and even sought assistance from the colonial state. They minimize the internal tensions among colonized groups and ignore the occasional affinities with colonial rule. What is needed is, as Sumit Sarkar states, a ‘move towards a recognition of the possibility of many narratives or “histories”’. Such a move appears to be under way. The development of new areas of research, such as environmental history, demographic change, migration patterns, and the ‘human geography’ of nomadic modes of existence, the latter an underrecognized and significant part of the Indian past until the late colonial period, demonstrate that Indian historians are reaching towards other frameworks of analysis. The growth of regional history also appears to be playing a catalytic role by drawing attention to the constructed nature of present-day national and state boundaries. Debates around colonial historical paradigms still provoke the greatest interest, but the door to other histories and trajectories remains wide open.

**TIMELINE/KEY DATES**

1947 (August) India gains independence from the British and the subcontinent is partitioned into India and Pakistan
1947 (October) War breaks out between India and Pakistan in the disputed region of Kashmir
1948 Mahatma Gandhi is assassinated
1950 The adoption of a Constitution establishes India as a sovereign, democratic Republic
1952 The Indian National Congress headed by Jawaharlal Nehru sweeps into power
1964 The Vishwa Hindu Parishad (VHP, or World Hindu Council) is founded to defend Hindu interests
1965 Second war between India and Pakistan

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1966 Nehru’s daughter Indira Gandhi becomes Prime Minister
1967 Zakir Husain is the first Muslim to become President; Maoist movements break out in the countryside
1971 India and Pakistan fight a war over East Pakistan, which becomes the new nation of Bangladesh
1974 India successfully detonates its first nuclear weapon
1975 (June) Indira Gandhi declares a state of Emergency for 21 months, which allows the government to rule by decree and suspend elections and civil liberties
1976 A constitutional amendment declares India to be a ‘secular’ nation, implying equality of religions and religious tolerance
1977 Indira Gandhi holds elections and the Congress Party is defeated
1984 Four years after returning to power, Indira Gandhi orders troops to storm the Golden Temple, Sikhism’s holiest shrine, to root out Sikh separatists; Gandhi is subsequently assassinated by her Sikh bodyguards, and government-sponsored pogroms against Sikhs break out; Gandhi’s son Rajiv Gandhi succeeds her as Prime Minister
1991 Rajiv Gandhi is assassinated by a Tamil suicide; the new Congress government announces a programme of economic reforms and liberalization
1992 VHP rank and file tear down the disputed Babar Mosque in Ayodhya, leading to nationwide communal riots in which more than 3,000 die
1997 K. R. Narayanan becomes India’s first Dalit (low caste/untouchable) President
1998 A coalition government led by the Hindu nationalist Bhartiya Janata Party (BJP) wins office
2004 The BJP suffers defeat in the national elections and a Congress-led coalition wins power
2007 Pratibha Patil becomes the first woman President

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When the modern, scientific form of history was developing in the late nineteenth-century kingdom of Siam, the word for ‘history’ still used at the royal court was *phongsaowan*, literally meaning ‘lineage of the *avatar* (incarnations of the god Vishnu)’. This term originally referred to the dynastic records of the Thai kings—the *avatars* of Vishnu—first of the former kingdom of Ayuthaya (1351–1767), and then of the kingdoms of Thonburi (1767–82) and Bangkok (or ‘Ratanakosin’, 1782–present), composed by court chroniclers. As the limitations of the former term became apparent, eventually a new name, *prawattisat*, was coined, by which the discipline of history in Thailand has been known ever since. Yet despite its new name, modern history-writing in Thailand remained dominated by the presence of the monarchy. In addition to the quasi-divine status of the kings in traditional historiography, the kings acquired a newer significance in the tumultuous modern era. While European colonization was the great historical rupture that thrust other Southeast Asian kingdoms into modernity, Siam was not directly colonized. Credit for the modernization of the Thai kingdom and the preservation of formal political independence—two central ideas in the formulation of Thai nationalism—was written into official history as being due to the genius of the kings.

Siam was one of the world’s last absolute monarchies. It was overthrown in 1932 in a coup carried out by the People’s Party—a group of civil bureaucrats and military officers. Following a brief and tumultuous fifteen years of political struggle, a coup in 1947 brought the royalists back to power, this time in alliance with factions of the military. Over time, the military became the senior partner in the alliance, but the monarchy–military alliance, together with the royalist civilian bureaucracy, has dominated Thai politics until the present. Thai historiography since the Second World War has been shaped by this political framework.

Besides its position of political dominance, the monarchy is further guarded by a constitutional provision that ‘the king is sacred and inviolate’, while a draconian *lèse majesté* law makes criticism of the king or members of the royal family an offense punishable by up to fifteen years’ imprisonment. Thus criticism of the present monarch’s long reign (since 1946) by historians is
effectively unconstitutional, may count as a criminal offense, and in theory could also be regarded as an act of treason. Not surprisingly, a long list of books deemed critical of the monarchy, including histories, are officially banned in Thailand. Controversial events of the last sixty years involving the king are dangerous territory for Thai historians to tread, and are treated with a high degree of self-censorship.
Official historiography in Thailand during Bhumibol’s reign is thus characterized by an extraordinary position of hegemony achieved by the royalist school. Its dominance is supported and protected by the ratchakan¹ state—a state dominated by the military and civilian bureaucracy (including the universities and the education system), and whose legitimacy is based on the moral conception that it serves the king. This chapter traces the establishment of this remarkable royalist hegemony over Thai historiography, as well as attempts from alternative schools to challenge it.

DAMRONG’S SHADOW

Royalist hegemony over Thai historiography post-1945 is rooted in the era of the Absolute Monarchy, and in particular in the work of the officially recognized ‘father of Thai history’, Prince Damrong Rachanuphap. Damrong was the brother of the great modernizing king of this era, King Rama V or Chulalongkorn (r. 1867–1910), and one of the central figures of Chulalongkorn’s reign. As head of the Ministry of Interior between 1892 and 1915 he played a major role in reforming the kingdom’s territorial administration by removing the heads of the local ruling houses throughout the kingdom and replacing them with bureaucrats (often the king’s brothers or relatives) sent out from Bangkok to govern newly designated ‘provinces’. These new provincial heads were directly responsible to the Minister of the Interior—Damrong himself. Damrong was thus one of the architects of the centralized, absolutist state that emerged during the Fifth Reign. Following his retirement in 1915, Damrong set out to do for the Kingdom’s history what he had done for its administration—carry out a programme of implementing centralized control and standardization. He became the driving force behind the National Library (then known as the Wachirayan Library—after the name of Chulalongkorn’s father, King Rama IV), the institution that organized the collection, cataloguing, editing, and publication of the kingdom’s books and manuscripts.² Damrong edited and published hundreds of manuscripts on all aspects of the kingdom’s history, literature, and customs, each with a short introduction he had written directing how the text was to be read. One of Damrong’s major accomplishments was the publication of the series of histories in the Prachum phongsawadan [Collected Histories]. Between 1908 and 1943, the year of Damrong’s death, the series had run to eighty volumes. It became the principal collection of published primary source material for the history of the period up until the early twentieth century. Damrong is therefore directly

¹ Kha ratchakan is the term for ‘bureaucrats’, including the military. It means literally ‘servants of the king’s business’.
responsible for the production of a large proportion of the corpus of histories, chronicles, and legends of the preconstitutional period recognized today as ‘Thai history’. Historical narratives studied by millions of Thai students in school and university classrooms throughout the country over the last century are still largely based on Damrong’s work of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.

Besides the sheer volume of Damrong’s work his other great achievement was to establish the central historiographical structure and themes that would govern Thai nationalist history. He laid down the chronological sequence of the Thai nation’s historical development, which began with the establishment of the first Thai state in the kingdom of Sukhothai (thirteenth–fourteenth centuries), followed by the Kingdom of Ayuthaya, the short-lived kingdom of Thonburi, and the current kingdom of Ratanakosin centred on Bangkok. He subordinated the histories of other competing kingdoms or principalities such as Chiang Mai, the Lao territories in the north-east, or the Malay sultanate of Patani in the south to that of Thai kingdoms of the central plains, and justified their absorption into the Thai kingdom. He began the shift away from the kings and the royal capital as the central subject of Thai history by placing greater emphasis on ‘Siam’ and the Thai people. The kings were still the prime movers in Thai history, especially the kings of the ruling Chakri dynasty to which he belonged, but now as leaders of the Thai nation.

Most importantly, Damrong framed Thai history as an ongoing struggle for the independence of the Thai nation. This theme reflected the overriding political concern of the Thai court itself during the most active period of Damrong’s working life. His classic work, first published in 1917 and reprinted many times, Thai Rop Phama [The Thai Wars with the Burmese], describes how the Thais twice lost their independence to Burma but later won it back through the genius and heroic deeds of their warrior kings. At earlier periods of their history the Thais had struggled to free themselves from the Chinese, and later the Khmers. Most recently the struggle was against Western colonialism. A more specific statement of this historiographical theme was developed in Damrong’s final work, completed days before his death in 1943: a biography of the sixteenth-century king who had defeated the Burmese and won back the kingdom’s ‘independence’, Naresuan the Great.3 Damrong had presciently intertwined in history the two institutions that would dominate modern Thai politics through to the twenty-first century: the monarchy and the military.

This immense historiographical edifice that Damrong and the Thai court had constructed between the 1880s and 1932 was not easily shifted. One might have thought that the overthrow of the Absolute Monarchy in 1932 by the People’s Party would have ushered in a new historiographical model, but for the most part historians developed themes that were already forming in Damrong’s pre-1932

3 Damrong Rachanuphap, Phra prawat somdet phra naresuan maharat (Bangkok, 1976).
history. Luang Wichit Wathakan, a prolific and eclectic writer and chief ideologue of the People’s Party period, is a good example. Born a commoner into a Sino-Thai family of petty traders, Luang Wichit’s academic talents enabled him to enjoy a rapid rise in the bureaucracy. He showed a remarkable ability to serve regimes of different political hues at the highest level, testifying to the broad political appeal of his views. His long career stretched from the last years of the Absolute Monarchy until his death in 1962 during the royalist-military dictatorship of Field Marshal Sarit Thanarat. Luang Wichit’s works continued to be republished well after his death. Like Damrong and many other subsequent Thai historians, Luang Wichit combined historical scholarship with an active political life which added to the influence of his historical works.

Luang Wichit’s contribution to Thai historiography was as the great popularizer of a militaristic nationalism. In fact his work grew out of the historiographical soil that Damrong had prepared. His views were expressed in a huge output of works of history (both about Thailand and other countries), historical novels, articles, plays, and songs. In Luang Wichit’s work, the subject of his history was no longer the kings but the Thai nation. In his extremely influential Prawattisat Sakon [Universal History] published in 1930 just before the revolution, Thai history is set in an international context with comparisons with other countries. The Thais are depicted as a martial race, struggling for national independence against internal and external enemies, led by their warrior kings. This theme is developed in later works and in his very popular and influential historical plays. One of the most famous, Luat Suphan, set during one of the wars with the Burmese, emphasizes the Thai people’s willingness to sacrifice their lives in battle to defend the nation’s sovereignty. Also significant in Luang Wichit’s work is his development of a racial theory of the Thai people. Here he was influenced by a number of Western historians, in particular an unusual book by a long-time American missionary in northern Thailand and southern China in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, W. C. Dodd’s The Thai Race: Elder Brother of the Chinese (1923). Luang Wichit traced the roots of the Thai race back to a kingdom called ‘Nan Chao’ in southern China in the ninth–tenth centuries, from where the Thai were pushed out by the Chinese and forced to move south. According to Luang Wichit the Thai race extended well beyond the boundaries of the Thai state, and included the Lao, Shan, Khmer, Ahom, and other Thai groups living in southern China and Vietnam. In another play, Ratchamanu, Luang Wichit portrays the Thais and Khmers as belonging to the same race. Chaoying Saenwi [Princess Saenwi] made the same argument for the Shan of north-eastern Burma.

While Luang Wichit had made the Thai nation the subject of history he had not significantly altered the royalist narrative structure. The first work that truly broke from Damrong’s narrative was Phra Sarasas’s My Country Thailand, first published in Tokyo in 1942. Phra Sarasas had a long history as a radical intellectual and maverick politician. Like Luang Wichit he was a commoner,
born to a merchant family in 1889. He was educated in the military academy where he later taught mathematics and English. He claimed to have been involved in the failed *coup d’État* by a group of military officers against the monarchy in 1912. He later resigned from the military academy and joined the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, where he enjoyed a rapid rise, serving in the Siamese embassies in The Hague and Calcutta before later being appointed ambassador (*upathut*) to France. It was there that he met Pridi Phanomyong, the leader of the ‘Promoters’, who were planning the overthrow of the Absolute Monarchy. He became an enthusiastic supporter of the revolution, resigning from the Ministry in 1928 and writing anonymous articles attacking the *ancien régime*. Following the revolution he was recalled to Siam by Pridi and for a short time served in the government as Minister of Economic Affairs. Phra Sarasas, however, fell victim to the political turmoil that engulfed Thai politics at the time, and in 1935 was forced to leave the country, eventually settling in Japan, where he wrote *My Country Thailand*.4

Phra Sarasas’s *My Country Thailand* shares the basic historiographical structure and nationalist themes of the time. Periodization was based on the succession of royal cities and reign dates, the nation is the subject of the narrative, and the heroism of certain kings is praised. Sarasas also shared Luang Wichit’s racial theory of the Thai nation. However, Sarasas’s work is a radical break with Damrong’s history in two major respects. First, he directly criticizes the absolute monarchy, which he regarded as ‘despotic’ and an obstacle to the progress of the nation. He condemns the kings of Ayuthaya for their tyrannical government. King Taksin, who had driven out the Burmese following the fall of Ayuthaya in 1767 and resurrected the Thai kingdom, is singled out for praise, while the historians of the Chakri dynasty (which had overthrown Taksin in 1782) are accused of deliberately misrepresenting Taksin as Chinese for the political benefit of the Chakri dynasty. King Chulalongkorn is criticized for having modernized Siam for the principal purpose of strengthening the throne. King Vajiravudh (Rama VI) is portrayed as weak and ineffectual and surrounded by sycophants. King Prachathipok (Rama VII) is a major target of Sarasas’s criticism. He portrays the last absolute monarch as lacking in vision, who implemented the wrong policies, and who, following the revolution in 1932 had repeatedly tried to destroy the People’s Party before eventually fleeing to England, taking his riches with him.

*My Country Thailand* is also the first significant work of history to introduce elements from a Marxist historical framework. Sarasas depicts Thailand as being in a transitional stage from feudalism to capitalism, anticipating a major debate in Marxist circles for decades to come. He criticizes the ‘ruling class’ for

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neglecting ‘the people’ and desiring only to perpetuate its despotic rule. While acknowledging the importance of Buddhism, he regards religion as having been perverted by the absolute monarchy to serve its despotic interests. Education was similarly monopolized by the ruling class for its own ends rather than for the development of the country. Meanwhile, Thailand’s backward economy was the result of the governing class’s failure to promote industrialization for fear of losing power to the middle class.

By 1960 six editions of My Country Thailand had been published, running to a total of 7,000 copies. Yet it is remarkable that reference to the book virtually disappeared from the work of subsequent Thai and Western historians. In the case of Thai language scholarship part of the reason may be due to the fact that the work appeared only in English. But the more compelling reason is that political conditions for the production and dissemination of anti-royalist historiography dramatically worsened soon after the appearance of Sarasas’s book.

ROYALIST REDUX

In 1946 the young King Ananda Mahidol (Rama VIII) was found dead in his bedroom, of a gunshot wound to the head. The king’s sudden death set in motion a chain of events that led eventually to the political return of the royalists, the destruction of both the civilian and military factions of the People’s Party, and the discrediting, if not erasure, of the 1932 revolution and the People’s Party in official historiography. The royalists had already begun their political comeback during the war, after having been almost destroyed as a political force in the previous decade. Following Japan’s invasion of Thailand in 1941 and the Phibun government’s decision to ally itself with Japan, the royalists joined forces with Pridi Phanomyong, who had himself been politically marginalized, to form the anti-Japanese resistance movement, Seri Thai. As Japan’s defeat in the war loomed, Phibun was forced to resign. Pridi and his supporters returned to power, this time in a tense alliance with the royalists who, besides their bitterness at Pridi for overthrowing the Absolute Monarchy in 1932, also suspected him of communist sympathies. Within days of the king’s death rumours were circulating Bangkok that Pridi had had the king murdered with the intention of setting up a republic. The rumours were stoked in the parliament and the media by two young aristocratic politicians, Kukrit and Seni Pramot, who had earlier formed the Democrat Party as a political vehicle for the royalists. Pridi was forced to flee the country. In November 1947 a military coup took place which brought to power the royalist Democrat Party, supported by the military. A new constitution was enacted which dramatically reversed the democratic reforms that Pridi had introduced, and greatly increased the powers of the throne. In the years that followed, Pridi’s liberal faction was completely purged from the political scene. In 1957 the last remaining prominent figure from the People’s Party era, Phibun,
was himself overthrown in a coup by Field Marshal Sarit Thanarat, who in close alliance with King Bhumibol established a military dictatorship.

Earlier, in 1944, Pridi had released a large group of royalist political prisoners, some of whom had been incarcerated since 1933 for their part in the failed Boworadet rebellion, while others had been imprisoned on other charges, including attempted assassinations of People’s Party leaders. This group, styling themselves ‘True Blue’ because of their loyalty to the monarchy, included aristocrats, royalist politicians, newspaper owners, journalists, and intellectuals. As Natthaphon Jaijing has shown, following their release and return to public life, these royalist politicians and intellectuals played a crucial role in discrediting the history of the 1932 revolution and the People’s Party.\(^5\) They were responsible for a stream of publications excoriating the People’s Party and portraying them as the progenitors of dictatorship, including *Khai khum khang nak thot kan mueang* [Prison Camp for Political Prisoners] (1945), *Sokanathakam haeng koh tao* [The Tragedy of Tao Island] (1946), *Lakhorn kan mueang* [Political Theatre] (1949), *Nak kan mueang sam kok* [Deceitful Politicians] (1949), and *Lueat yot raek khorng prachathipatai* [Democracy’s First Drop of Blood] (1950). Many of the criticisms in these works remain standard fare of royalist political discourse today. One of the most popular of these works, *Prachathipatai 17 pi* [17 Years of Democracy] (1950), was written by Lui Khiriwat, the former editor of the anti-People’s Party newspaper *Bangkok Daily Mail*, who had been jailed in 1933 on charges of having supported the Boworadet rebellion. Lui paints a glowing portrait of the era of the absolute monarchy, emphasizing the great benefits that the kings had bestowed on the Thai people, including freeing the slaves and defending Siam’s independence. He depicts King Rama VII as a true democrat and refers to a passage from the king’s famous letter of abdication in 1935 which over the next sixty years would repeatedly be used by royalist politicians and historians to portray Siam’s last absolute monarch as a democrat: ‘I am willing to give up all of my traditional powers to the people but I am unwilling to give these powers to any particular person or group to use arbitrarily without listening to the true voice of the people.’\(^6\)

Lui believed that the 1932 revolution had been unnecessary and that Siam’s political development should have been left to evolve naturally. He rejected the comparison between 1932 and the French Revolution on the grounds that the Thai people were not oppressed and were loyal to the throne.\(^6\)

The aristocrat-politician Seni Pramot, who had not been imprisoned but in the mid-1940s emerged as a champion of the royalist cause by founding the Democrat Party, likewise portrayed the People’s Party as ‘rebels’. In a collection of newspaper columns published in December 1947 under the title *Bueang lang*

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\(^6\) Ibid., 98–111.
prawattisat [Behind the History], Seni attempted to distinguish democracy in the Thai kingdom from Western concepts of democracy. He argued that under the kings the Thais were already democratic. Thailand had in fact enjoyed a ‘constitution’ since the era of the thirteenth-century King Ramkhamhaeng of Sukhothai, which was superior to the Magna Carta since the king had bestowed it on the Thai people of his own volition. The significance of the 1932 revolution was not the introduction of a democratic regime but the destruction of Thai-style democracy. The democracy which the People’s Party had tried to introduce, with its emphasis on majority rule, was unsuitable to Thais. King Rama VII had in fact been preparing the country for real democracy. Seni’s long political career was a crucial factor in giving weight to this royalist definition of democracy and the powerful political myth that Rama VII was the ‘father of democracy’.

The work which undeniably had the greatest impact on popular perceptions of the last decades of the Absolute Monarchy and the People’s Party period after 1932 was not a work of history but an historical novel, *Si phaen din* [Four Reigns] (1953). It was written by the other major royalist politician of this era, Seni’s younger brother Kukrit Pramot. Kukrit is yet another political figure who has had a major impact on history-writing in Thailand. Like Seni, Kukrit graduated from Oxford before going on to build a career as a politician (including a period as prime minister in 1975–6), banker, businessman, journalist, public intellectual, novelist, classical dancer, and even one-time movie actor. A sworn enemy of Pridi, Kukrit began his political career towards the end of the war. However, in the late 1940s Kukrit was experiencing financial difficulty in funding his political activities. In 1950 he founded his newspaper *Siam Rat* [The Siamese State], and a year later he began publishing *Si phaen din* in serial form. *Si phaen din* can therefore be seen as a novel with a direct political purpose.  

*Si phaen di* is recognized as Thailand’s foremost literary classic of the last fifty years. It is studied in schools and universities, it has gone through countless editions, and it has been made into movies and television serials. The novel is the story of the life of a noblewoman, Phloi, told against the background of social and political changes during the period from the reign of King Chulalongkorn to King Ananda Mahidol. In the novel, Kukrit skilfully uses Phloi’s family as a metaphor for the nation: conflict within the family is a microcosm of the political turmoil in the nation caused by the overthrow of the monarchy. *Si phaen din* represents a brilliant dramatization of the key elements of modern royalist historiography: the greatness of the kings as the defenders and modernizers of the kingdom, the embodiment of the nation and the upholder of Thai moral and cultural traditions, King Prajadhipok

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as the real father of modern Thai democracy, and the People’s Party as ‘rebels’ who were responsible for destroying this ideal world by causing the Thais to fight amongst themselves and plunging the nation into disaster.

RISE AND FALL OF THE LEFT

While former members of the People’s Party, their relatives and supporters, and Pridi himself, wrote memoirs of the period, it is remarkable that these accounts have had little impact on Thai historiography. Like the political movement Pridi had led, left-liberal historiography was virtually destroyed by the beginning of the 1950s. The main challenge to the restoration of royalist hegemony over Thai historiography came from another source: the radical left and the Communist Party of Thailand (CPT) which had been founded in 1942. The spectre of communism had been haunting Thailand since Pridi’s failed attempt to introduce his Outline Economic Plan in 1933. But it was with the onset of the Cold War, and especially the victory of the communists in China in 1949, that Marxist scholarship began to analyze seriously Thai history. The most influential work (despite being officially banned between 1958 and 1973, and after 1976) was *Thai kueng mueang khuen* [Thailand: A Semicolony] (1950) written by ‘Aran Phromchomphu’, a pen-name for Udom Sisuwan. Udom had written for the CPT’s party newspaper in the 1940s and was jailed in the late 1950s for his activities. Following his release in the 1960s he fled to the jungle to join the insurgency before later being appointed to the Party’s Central Committee. The argument presented in his work later became a central pillar in the CPT’s theoretical analysis of Thai society. From a Marxist historical materialist framework, Udom argued that the driving force in Thai history was not the kings but economic forces. Thailand had formerly been a ‘feudal’ society where serfs were bound in an exploitative relationship to their feudal lords while all land was held by the king. With the Bowring free trade treaty of 1855, European capital began to dominate the country, albeit with the continued rule of the king and landlord class. Thailand’s status thus changed to that of a ‘semicolonial, semifeudal’ state—a characterization which Udom had in fact borrowed from Mao’s earlier description of the Chinese situation. But 1932 was not a revolution: it was merely a ‘coup’ that had not altered this status. Not only had the coup failed to achieve mass support, but it had been unsuccessful in destroying both the economic interests of the feudalists and the imperialists’ economic control over the country. It had simply elevated petty and mid-level capitalists into a position where they could share power with the landlord class.9 Despite its Marxist

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framework, *Thai kueng mueang khuen* ironically shared elements in common with the royalists: recognition of the threat to Thai independence posed by the Western powers, a critical stance towards 1932, and disparagement of the ‘politics’ of the post-1932 period. Udom’s work would influence a generation of Thai leftists.

The other seminal work in Thai Marxist historiography was Jit Phumisak’s *Chomna khong sakdina thai nai patchuban* [The Real Face of Thai Feudalism Today] (1957). Jit was a precociously talented scholar who, in the early 1950s, had already found himself in trouble as a student at Chulalongkorn University for his leftist, anti-establishment views. Apart from his Marxist-inspired writings, Jit also wrote numerous works of formal history still respected for their scholarship.10 A year after *Chomna khong sakdina thai nai patchuban* was published, Jit was arrested in Sarit’s anti-communist sweep of 1958. Upon his release from jail in 1964 he joined the communist insurgency in the jungles of the north-east. In 1966 Jit, aged 36, was shot dead by police. Following the 14 October 1973 uprising, Jit’s works (and those of other writers who had been banned under the Sarit-Bhumibol dictatorship) were reprinted and rediscovered by a new generation of radical students. Some of his poems were turned into folksongs popular among the left. He became a cult figure—Thailand’s ‘Che’. While somewhat limited by its mechanistic Marxist framework, *Chomna khong sakdina thai nai patchuban*’s significance in Thai historiography is its withering critique of *sakdina*, or ‘feudalism’. The glories of Thai dynastic history recounted by Damrong, Kukrit, and the royalists are in Jit’s work unmasked as ‘*sakdina*’: a backward and unjust system of economic and political exploitation no different from European feudalism.11

Following the 14 October 1973 democracy uprisings and the end of the Thanom–Praphat regime, a short-lived period of political liberalization opened up. The ban on leftist works was lifted, and Marxist analysis gained increased attention in the universities. One of the historiographical results of this change was the increased emphasis given to economic history. The key figure here was Chatthip Natsupha, who took up the work of Udom and Jit and developed their critiques with a series of empirical studies of Thailand’s economic history. His work and that of his students focused on the development of capitalism, the impact of the West on the feudal system following the 1855 Bowring Treaty, and the reasons for Thailand’s economic backwardness.12 The ‘Political Economy’ school that he founded along with his colleagues and students secured the place of Marxist economic history in the universities where it could challenge, if not supplant, the dominant royalist historiography.

11 Reynolds and Hong, ‘Marxism in Thai Historical Studies’, 85.
12 Ibid., 87–98.
But within a few years, Chatthip’s work took a significant turn. In his highly influential *Setthakit mu ban nai adit* [The Village Economy in the Past], published in 1984, Chatthip theorized about the economically ‘self-sufficient’ Thai village, which had escaped capitalist penetration and Western influence as well as the predations of the feudal state. This idealized village supposedly maintained egalitarian social relations and a strong communitarian culture. Chatthip’s theorizing had an impact well beyond economic history circles. The ‘community culture’ school which his work inspired later exerted great political influence among academics and activists in the powerful non-government organization sector, disillusioned by capitalist economic development. Besides this nativist turn, Chatthip’s later works also showed great interest in racial nationalism. He and his students conducted research into ‘Tai’ groups related to the ethnic Thai outside Thailand’s border, as far as Assam in north-east India. He even wrote an introduction for a recent reprinting of Luang Wichit’s work on the origins of the Thai race.

As Thongchai has argued, Chatthip’s work is emblematic of the fate of the Thai left following the collapse of the CPT in the early 1980s, now a blend of racial nationalism, nativism, anti-Westernism, and anti-capitalism. Ironically, in an era of neoliberalism this stance has transformed the left into the natural allies of their erstwhile enemies, the royalists and the king himself.

It was another historian who would take Thai historiography beyond the royalist–Marxist divide. Nidhi Eeosiwong was the dominant historian of the last two decades of the twentieth century. Trained in the royalist school of historiography at Chulalongkorn University, Nidhi was one of the first professional historians to receive his doctoral education overseas, at the University of Michigan, where he wrote his dissertation on Indonesian nationalist literature. Following Nidhi, the direction of Thai historiography would be set by professional historians, rather than politician-intellectuals. Nidhi’s most productive and influential writings began soon after the royalist backlash in 1976 following the 6 October massacre of students at Thammasat. At a time of intense polarization between the radical left and the royalist right, Nidhi’s work belonged to neither.

Nidhi’s earlier work—even before he left to study overseas—already had Damrong in his sights. It is likely that no historian has had such thorough knowledge of the chronicles and premodern historical sources, yet at the same time was able to use them in such critical and innovative ways. He criticized contemporary historians’ blind, uncritical treatment of Damrong’s work, and the state’s royalist and nationalist agenda which official history served. Above all he highlighted the politics of Thai historiography. In one of his most celebrated

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essays he transformed the standard understanding of the chronicles of the Ayuthayan kings by showing how they illuminated not so much the Ayuthaya period, as the politics of the Bangkok era in which they were revised and edited.\(^{16}\) Nidhi’s work also went a long way towards desacralizing the kings—at the very time that the personality cult of sanctity was being erected around King Bhumibol. His *Kan mueang thai samai phra narai* [Thai Politics in the Era of King Narai] (1984) portrayed the famous seventeenth-century King Narai as just another political animal. But Nidhi’s magnum opus was *Pak kai lae bai ruea* [Pen and Sail] (1984), a collection of essays on the economy, society, and culture of the early Bangkok period (1782–1851). Nidhi revolutionized the orthodox understanding of the Bangkok era by arguing that the modernization of the Thai kingdom had begun not after 1855, according to both the royalist and Marxist orthodoxy (for different reasons), but from the early Bangkok period in the late eighteenth century. Based on a highly original use of literature as historical evidence, Nidhi portrayed the Thai kings of this period, not as Bodhisattas on the path to enlightenment (as portrayed by the royalists), nor as feudal lords (as portrayed by the Marxists), but as the leaders of an emerging bourgeoisie. He demonstrated that Siam already had a thriving export market from the beginning of the Bangkok era (which had begun as early as the late Ayuthaya period), well before intrusion of the European powers after 1855. As a result of this prosperous, outward-oriented economy, Nidhi put forward the audacious argument that Thailand was already becoming bourgeois, rational, and humanistic in the *sakdina* period, before Western influence. That is, Thailand had found an indigenous route to modernity. Nidhi rejected the standard view that the era of the Fourth and Fifth Reigns was a period of reform and enlightenment, arguing instead that it was a time of cultural stagnation, identity crisis, and slavish imitation of the West.\(^{17}\) Nidhi’s last major book, *Kan mueang thai samai phra jao krung thonbui* [Thai Politics in the Era of the King of Thonburi] (1986), was yet another provocative work, with its positive portrayal of one of the most controversial of the Siamese kings, the half-Chinese Taksin. By the 1990s, however, new criticisms began to emerge as nationalism and the monarchy suddenly reappeared as topics of renewed historical interest.

**NATIONALISM AND THE MONARCHY REVISITED**


\(^{16}\) Nidhi Eeosiwong, *Prawattisat ratanakosin nai phrarahatnopongsa wadana ayuthaya* (Bangkok, 1980).

Historiography (1986), continued Nidhi’s critique of Damrong. He showed how the historical representation of the Kingdom of Ayuthaya was determined by the political considerations of successive regimes and historians: first the Chakri dynasty, later the hypernationalism of the 1930s, then the political left, and finally the successive regimes through the 1950s to the 1980s. Chatchai Khumthawiphorn continued the ‘deconstruction’ of Damrong with a ‘philosophical analysis’ of his writings in 1991.18

As Damrong’s long shadow over Thai historiography started to lift, light was thrown onto other problems. Foremost among these was the nationalist framework. The stimulus for this reassessment came from two sources. By the late 1980s Thailand had returned to parliamentary democracy and the Thai economy was growing rapidly. The Cold War was coming to an end. With the collapse of the Communist Party in the early 1980s, class-based analyses lost their most ardent advocate. Beneath the official façade of ethnic homogeneity the multi-ethnic character of the Thai nation was becoming too obvious to ignore. Second, Western revisionist scholarship on nationalism—in particular Benedict Anderson’s seminal work, Imagined Communities (1983)—began to make an impact on Thai historiography. This period also saw the growing influence on Thai scholarship of ‘deconstruction’ and postmodernism. The work of Hayden White was particularly influential among Thai historians, most notably popularized through an article by Craig Reynolds.19

Nidhi was also involved in the attack on official nationalism in history. One of his most influential articles was a critique of the nationalism in primary school textbooks.20 But the most important work in the assault on nationalist historiography was by Reynolds’s student, Thongchai Winichakul. His Siam Mapped (1994) is a ‘deconstruction’ of the notion of Thailand as a mapped, territorially bounded nation dating from the mists of history, which had become one of the most sacred elements of official Thai nationalism. Thongchai argued that the conception of the nation as a territorial entity (or ‘geobody’ as he calls it) is a recent construction, dating only from the late nineteenth to early twentieth centuries. Thailand’s prehistory also came in for renewed attention. The archaeologist-anthropologist Srisakr Vallibhotama published two influential books which rejected the prevailing racial nationalism in official history and decentred orthodox narratives of the early origins of the Thai nation: Aeng arayathanam Isan [North-Eastern Civilization] (1990) and Sayam Prateth [The Country of Siam] (1996). Srisakr’s specific purpose was to show that ‘Siam’—the more ethnically inclusive term he preferred to call the country—had multi-ethnic origins.

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He gave particular importance to the north-eastern region of the country, in contrast to official narratives that emphasized the kingdoms of the central region: Sukhothai, Ayuthaya, and Bangkok. He also highlighted the prehistory of local communities rather than the royal courts. Srisakr was an important figure in the ‘Local History’ movement that had gained momentum in the 1980s. He was joined by other prominent historians such as Thida Saraya.21 ‘Local History’ became a new trend in Thai historiography, even if it was mostly Bangkok-based academics who were pushing the agenda, often with state funding, and the character of the local histories for the most part did not upset the overall framework of nationalist history.22 Another academic prominent in the ‘deconstruction’ of nationalism in Thai historiography was Nidhi’s student, Saichon Satayanurak. In a series of books she attacked Luang Wichit Wathakan’s construction of the ‘Thai nation’ and ‘Thainess’ (2002), Damrong and his ‘construction’ of the concepts of Thai identity and ‘class’ (2003), and Kukrit Pramot and his ‘invention’ of ‘Thainess’ (2007).23

While nationalist historiography suddenly became remarkably open to criticism, the enhanced political position of Bhumibol since the Prem-led government of the 1980s and the mounting edifice of royalist propaganda meant that the problem of the monarchy in Thailand’s political history remained largely untouched. 1932, in particular, was still highly problematic for historians to interpret. The official version—taught in school textbooks and commemorated by monuments and even a research institute—still held the contradictory position that King Rama VII, the last absolute monarch, was in fact the ‘father of democracy’. However, the increasing importance of the parliament, elections, and political parties to Thai politics from the late 1980s and especially the political reforms following the violent pro-democracy protests of May 1992, opened the way for renewed study of the history of democracy in Thailand. In 1992, Charnvit published his 2475: Kan patiwat sayam [The Siamese Revolution of 1932], which attempted to explain the causes leading to the overthrow of the Absolute Monarchy in 1932. The work deliberately avoided the polemical tone and controversies of the earlier historiography of the period, instead arguing that 1932 was an unavoidable consequence of the opening of the country under King Chulalongkorn. Yet this and other works by Charnvit and his students contributed to a revival of interest in 1932 as a subject of historical study for a new, post–Cold War generation. Importantly it also continued the rehabilitation of

21 See Thida Saraya, Prawattisat thongthin (Bangkok, 1986).
23 Saichon Sattayanurak, Chat thai lae khwam pen thai doi luang wichit wathakan (Bangkok, 2002); ead., Somdet krom phraya damrong rachanuphap kan sang attalak ‘mueang thai’ lae ‘chan’ khong chao sayam (Bangkok, 2003); and ead., Khukrit kap pradithaham ‘khwam pen thai’, 2 vols. (Bangkok, 2007).
Pridi Phanomyong and to a lesser extent Phibun Songkhram, two arch-enemies of the royalists, both of whom had died in exile.

By far the most thorough study of the overthrow of the Absolute Monarchy was Nakharin Mektrairat’s Patiwat sayam pho. sor. 2475 [The Siamese Revolution of 1932], also published in 1992. Like Charnvit, Nakharin claimed that he wanted to avoid taking sides between the royalists and the supporters of the People’s Party. His study shifts attention away from the political leaders and instead focuses on the different social and occupational groups of the period and their response to socioeconomic changes from the end of the nineteenth century to the 1930s. He discusses their political thinking and the intellectual culture of the period, economic change and its effects, the spread of nationalist ideas, and the increasing influence of the print media. Also like Charnvit, Nakharin’s interpretation of 1932 emphasizes continuity with the past. He argues that this event was a consequence of the great reforms that Chulalongkorn had implemented in response to the unequal treaties imposed on Siam by the colonial powers. While he concludes that 1932 was an important ‘revolution’, the study’s method and framework tend to play down the significance of the People’s Party and the revolution. He reiterates the standard royalist criticisms that the People’s Party lacked a support base, and that the revolution had led to political turmoil and instability. Some of Nakharin’s later works show a much more overtly neo-royalist stance.

It would take a changed political environment and a different historical perspective to revisit the vexed question of the history of the monarchy and Thai democracy. For most of the 1990s the royalist Democrat Party had been in government. In 2001 the populist Thai Rak Thai party, led by the telecommunications tycoon Thaksin Shinawatra, won an overwhelming victory in the general elections. Within the Thai Rak Thai party there was an influential leftist wing which included former communist party members and student activists who had joined the insurgency in the 1970s. Space for discussion of the monarchy appeared to open up.

The scholar who has devoted most of his work to addressing this subject is the Thammasat University political historian Somsak Jeamteerasakul. Somsak was a leftist student leader at Thammasat who had been present during the royalist massacre of students at Thammasat on 6 October 1976. He was arrested and later spent two years in jail. His doctoral thesis, written in Australia, was on the communist movement in Thailand. Following his return to Thailand, from the 1990s he wrote a series of iconoclastic articles attacking virtually every one of the historical sacred cows surrounding the modern political history of the

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24 See especially Phu song pok klao pok kramom prachathipatai: 60 pi siriratchasombat kap kan mueang kan pokkhrong thai (Bangkok, 2006) and Korani ror 7 song sala ratchasombat: kan tikhwan lae kan san to khwam mai thang kan mueang (Bangkok, 2007), both written in the shadow of the confrontation between Thaksin and the Palace.
monarchy. Far from being the ‘father of democracy’, Rama VII had done everything possible to obstruct the introduction of democratic government before 1932. The oft-quoted passage in the king’s 1935 letter of abdication in which he declared he was willing to give up his traditional powers to the people, was shown to be clearly contrary to the facts. The king had in fact fought to retain the crown’s powers after 1932 while plotting to undermine the People’s Party. Somsak revisited the ‘mystery’ of the death of the king’s elder brother, Rama VIII (Ananda Mahidol) in 1946, which had destroyed Pridi politically and was the crucial event that had created the conditions for the political return of the royalists. He showed how King Bhumibol had refused to pardon the royal secretary and two royal pages executed for the former king’s death when it was widely believed that the three were scapegoats. He demonstrated how the king had reinvented the monarchy as a symbol of democracy following the 14 October 1973 mass student-led demonstrations to oust the ‘three tyrants’. In one of his most controversial articles, ‘Rao Su’ (‘We Will Fight!’), Somsak showed that the king had been at the forefront of whipping up anti-communist hysteria in 1975–6, and that it was the king who bore ultimate responsibility for the savage killings of students at Thammasat by royalist vigilante groups and police units linked to the Palace. The contrast in Somsak’s writings to the king’s public image was total.

Significantly, a number of Somsak’s articles were published in newspapers and news weeklies, in highly expurgated form, indicating how far the political climate had changed. A number were collected in his influential book, Prawattisat thi phuang sang [A History that has just been Constructed] (2001). More appeared later in a new left-leaning academic journal Fa Dio Kan [Same Sky], founded in 2002, which quickly became the leading forum for the re-examination of Thailand’s political history, and especially the position of the monarchy in Thai society. Also, by the beginning of the new millennium much of the most pointed academic debate was taking place on academic websites. The most popular were ‘Midnight University’ (formed by Nidhi Eeosiwong), and the online version of Fa Dio Kan. Somsak was more active than any other historian in utilizing this new media to promote his work and his ideas and to debate his critics.

Somsak’s writings, more than those of any other contemporary historian, demolished the façade that the modern Thai monarchy was democratic, above politics, and the king a paragon of Buddhist virtue. Somsak had made the case that the monarchy has been the major obstacle to the development of democracy in Thailand and that it has actively, and at times extremely violently, attempted to suppress democratic movements whenever they became a potential threat to the throne’s political position. With the collapse of the left in the early 1980s, and the acceleration of the state’s propaganda machine, greatly assisted by the new media technologies, a generation of Thai students had grown up not knowing any criticism of the king. Somsak, writing in Thai for journals, newspapers, web-boards, and blogs had preserved, expanded, and repositioned these criticisms close to the mainstream of modern Thai historiography.
CONCLUSION

The period discussed in this chapter covers almost exactly the duration of the reign of King Bhumibol Adulyadej (r. 1946—). Historiography written within this era, whether it uses the structure, motifs, and moral sentiments of royalist history or has attempted to break free from them, nevertheless bears the marks of his reign. Despite repeated challenges, the politics of Thai historiography, like the state itself, remains dominated by the monarchy.

This chapter, however, is being written as the hegemony of the fifty-year-old monarchy–military alliance is breaking down. From 2004 the populist Thai Rak Thai government under the flamboyant tycoon Thaksin Shinawatra began to run into conflict with the Palace and the royalist establishment. Tensions eventually led to yet another coup on 19 September 2006 carried out by a military junta styling itself the ‘Council for Reform of the Democratic System with the Great Holy King [phra maha kasat] as the Head of State’. The king’s privy councillor was installed as prime minister, Thaksin’s party was dissolved by a military-appointed tribunal and its leading members barred from politics, pro-Thaksin media were banned, and a new constitution was drafted and enacted, designed to reduce the power of elected politicians. A propaganda campaign re-emphasized all the classic themes of Thai historiography: the king as the head of the nation-family, defender of Thailand’s independence, the preserver of morality, and Thai identity. Yet at the new elections held in December 2007, Thaksin’s party, resurrected under the new name ‘People’s Power’, was again victorious and was able to form a new coalition government. Quite apart from the political challenges posed by a mass electorate brought into politics by Thaksin, the King himself, as of 2010, is 83 and is surely in the last years of his long reign.

Unmistakably, the intensity of the current political struggle is due to the fact that it is a battle over the future of the monarchy in the Thai political system. For most of the last seventy-five years that position has been lent an immense amount of legitimacy from the dominant school of royalist historiography. But if the political constraints on the writing of Thai history start to unravel it is likely that Thai historiography—and Thai politics—will soon be entering a new era.

TIMELINE/KEY DATES

1932 Thailand’s absolute monarchy overthrown by a coup carried out by the People’s Party
1946 King Ananda Mahidol found shot dead; his brother, Bhumibol Adulyadej, accedes to the throne
1947 Military-royalist coup against Pridi Phanomyong; new constitution restores many of the powers of the throne
1957 Military coup brings royalist General Sarit Thanarat to power
1958 Coup establishes Sarit’s military dictatorship in close alliance with King Bhumibol
1973 Mass pro-democracy uprising led by students ends in the leadership of the military regime forced to flee the country
1976 Police units and royalist militias massacre students at Thammasat University; a coup the same day brings a conservative royalist government to power
1992 Middle-class pro-democracy demonstrations; military power in Thai politics greatly reduced
2001 Thai Rak Thai elected; Thaksin Shinawatra Prime Minister
2006 Royalist coup overthrows the Thai Rak Thai government

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Chapter 27
Vietnamese Historical Writing

Patricia Pelley

In September 1945 Việt Minh revolutionaries led by Hồ Chí Minh declared Vietnam’s independence from France and Japan. They proclaimed the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV) and established Hanoi as the national capital. Although the revolutionary government claimed to control all of Vietnam, anti-communists and remnants of the French colonial government in the southern part of the country disagreed; in June 1946 they further undermined that assertion by forming the Republic of Cochinchina, which was nominally a free state within the French Union. Months later, in December, an already complicated situation became more complex when what turned out to be nine years of warfare erupted, pitting the Việt Minh revolutionaries against France and non-communist Vietnamese. In March 1949, in an effort to maintain—or create, some would insist—a non-communist state in the southern part of the country, the former Nguyễn emperor Bảo Đại and the French government proclaimed the semi-independent State of Vietnam. The war ended in May 1954 when colonial troops surrendered at Điện Biên Phủ.

Having already arranged to meet in Geneva in order to discuss the war, representatives of nine states (the DRV, the State of Vietnam, Cambodia, Laos, France, the People’s Republic of China, the Soviet Union, Great Britain, and the United States) assembled the day after the French surrender. Although the participants explicitly rejected the idea of a divided Vietnam, they did so in an ambiguous way. Instead of either formally recognizing or formally refusing to recognize the legitimacy of the DRV and/or the State of Vietnam, the representatives characterized both of them as ‘zones of regroupment’ that would be dissolved via national elections. In 1955, anti-communists led by Ngô Đình Diệm and supported by the United States founded the Republic of Vietnam (RVN) with its capital in Saigon. The elections to reunify the country, which were supposed to be held in July 1956, never took place. The twenty-year

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1 The statements in this paragraph and the following one are indebted to, but not fully in agreement with, two sources in particular: Viễn Sử học, Việt Nam: Những sự kiện, 1945–1986 (Hanoi, 1990); and Bruce Lockhart and William J. Duiker, Historical Dictionary of Vietnam (3rd edn, Lanham, Md., 2006).
standoff between the DRV and the RVN came to an end in April 1975 when southern forces surrendered. In July 1976 the two halves of the country were formally reunited in the Socialist Republic of Vietnam.

Throughout this period of nearly twenty years, historians in the DRV insisted that the government in Hanoi had authority throughout all of Vietnam. They were emphatic: from the mountain passes in the north to the tip of the Cà Mau peninsula in the south, Vietnam was a single country with a single government, and its national capital was in Hanoi. Opposing them, historians in the southern part of the country regarded the DRV and the RVN as homologous states. On one exceptional occasion, southern scholars published this statement: ‘South and North are one house, brothers in the same family, and surely cannot be divided.’

But they were quoting Hồ Chí Minh! They did so not because they agreed with him, but as an expose and to underscore the DRV’s determination to control all of Vietnam. Southern scholars, aware of the divisions of Germany and Korea and, after 1949, inspired by the nearly global recognition of the Republic of China, consistently imagined two Vietnams.

COMMON GROUND, 1945–75

The vitriolic oppositions of the Cold War have, by now, grown stale. And yet they may still tempt us to think of fairly fluid conversations about the past in static, merely dichotomous terms—as a shoot-out between two antagonistic blocs. This paradigm is unfortunate because it presents the north and south as two consolidated polities, which they certainly were not. The southern part of the country in particular was internally divided. The prominence of the Communist Party in the northern part of the country should not obscure the presence of oppositional forces. Moreover, the insistence on two opposing states obscures the experiences of Vietnamese from Huế and the central part of the country more generally. Over time, one hopes, the voices that have mostly been suppressed will become more audible. In the meanwhile, some suppleness can be restored to the discussion of post-war historiography by looking at the concerns that Vietnamese historians shared in the period after 1945.

The origins of Vietnam’s historiographical tradition can be traced to the thirteenth century. During the Trần dynasty (1225–1400), Lê dynasty (1428–1788), and Nguyễn dynasty (1802–1945), historians with royal appointments were tremendously prolific. In addition to writing monumental histories of preceding dynasties, they also produced biographies, geographies, encyclopaedias, and other texts that emphasized the accomplishments of reigning monarchs.

3 See, for example, Truong Nhu Tang’s poignant reflection on politics in Viet Cong Memoir (New York, 1985).
In this way, they also hoped to shape the way the monarchs they served would be represented by their successors. Decades of French occupation hardly diminished the output of Nguyễn historians. On the contrary, the occupation seems to have inspired them to even greater degrees of productivity. At the same time, the dramatic expanse of print culture during colonial times greatly invigorated historical research, well beyond the confines of the Nguyễn court.

To give a hint of the incredibly rich tradition of historical writing in Vietnam, I will identify three texts. In the fifteenth century, Đại Việt sử ký toàn thư [The Complete Historical Record of Đại Việt] was written by the Lê historian Ngô Sĩ Liên; but at its core was a chronicle written two centuries previously by the Trần historian Lê Văn Hựu. In the eighteenth century a group of scholars known collectively as Ngô Gia Văn Phái produced Hoàng Lê nhật thông chí [The Unification Records of the Imperial Lê]. In the nineteenth century, the historiographers’ office of the Nguyễn dynasty issued Đại Nam thực lược [The Veritable Records of Đại Nam]. These three works, each one magisterial in its own right, represent a small fraction of the magnificent body of work, over 700 years in the making, that was inherited by Vietnamese historians, who flourished in the period after 1945.

Instead of denigrating these chronicles as traces of a feudal or colonial past that both communists and non-communists rejected, historians in Hanoi and Saigon worked at a prodigious pace to translate them from Chinese into quốcn gữ, the romanized form of Vietnamese. The translation of dynastic texts responded to a logistical concern: by the mid-twentieth century only the romanized script was intelligible to most Vietnamese, including many of the scholars responsible for rewriting the national past in the period after the Second World War. While the translations were logistically essential, their significance was also symbolic. Because they were more focused and more systematic, in the 1950s, 1960s, and 1970s, northern historians established themselves as custodians of the canon by producing the first set of translations. Their efforts have had a lasting impact on the historiography of Vietnam; new editions of their translations are in Vietnamese libraries and bookstores today.

Historians in the north and south translated the same dynastic sources, but they used them in dissimilar ways. To get a sense of how the same canon could support divergent views of the past, we can look at the case of Nam Tiến. This term, which literally means ‘Southern Advance’, refers to the centuries-long process through which ethnic Vietnamese from the Red River delta migrated to, and settled in, what are now the central and southern parts of Vietnam:

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4 Nguyễn Thế Anh has explored the convergence of political impotence and historiographical power in The Withering Days of the Nguyễn Dynasty (Singapore, 1978).
5 The fate of southern translations is not so clear. Lê Thành Khôi, one among many talented scholars in the Vietnamese diaspora, has attributed a greater degree of accuracy to the texts published in Hanoi. See his Histoire du Việt Nam des origines à 1858 (Paris, 1981), 410.
regions where Cham and Khmer were once dominant. In contemporary times, as in the past, Vietnamese historians are reluctant, or politically unable, to examine the imperialist or settler colonialist dimensions of Nam Tiến. Instead, two other issues are at stake in the conflicting assessments of Nam Tiến: the question of agency and the sources of political authority in early modern Vietnam. Northern historians tended to see Nam Tiến as a project initiated by Lê monarchs in Hanoi. Like their counterparts in the south, they viewed the Vietnamese settlement of the central coast and the Mekong delta as a triumph, but they celebrated it as an extension of northern political authority, not a subversion of it. Historians in the south tended to regard the dynastic sources in ways that underscored the historical genealogy of the RVN. They depicted the actions of Nguyễn lords (beginning in the sixteenth century) and of Nguyễn emperors (beginning in the nineteenth century) as initiatives that led to the birth of a new Vietnamese state in 1955. In other words, northern historians traced the expansion of Vietnam’s national boundaries to Nam Tiến, whereas southern historians scrutinized the same phenomenon and saw the emergence of two separate states.

Regardless of their political convictions, Vietnamese scholars productive in the period after 1945 dismissed what they characterized as ‘bourgeois’ pretensions of objectivity. Whether they operated in a northern or southern setting, Vietnamese historians insisted on the political dimensions of their work. They understood that, as scholars, they were unavoidably engaged in political disputes. Historians in the north may have utilized a more militarized vocabulary, referring to history as a ‘weapon’ or a tool that elucidated the ‘laws of combat’ and clarified the ‘principles of revolution’. Minus the references to revolution, their southern counterparts would have agreed: they, too, thoroughly rejected the idea and even the possibility of intellectual non-alignment. Whether they were nominally communists or non-communists, Vietnamese historians had to approach the past in instrumental ways. Through a careful investigation or manipulation of the evidence, they had to prove that the past led naturally to conditions in the present. Northern historians had to legitimate a present that was only temporarily out of reach: a single Vietnamese state. Southern historians had to demonstrate that the past led irrevocably to two separate states.

Moreover, the disciplinary specialization that seems only normal today was not terribly relevant in either the DRV or the RVN. Regardless of their training in history, philosophy, folklore, ethnography, geography, archaeology, literature, or linguistics—or if they were principally autodidacts—scholars were expected to pitch in, to contribute to the consolidation of a new national past.

No doubt the state-centred vision of Vietnamese historians descended from the patterns established during dynastic times. This conviction also responded to the special exigencies of the post-1945 era. Scholars throughout Vietnam viewed

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6 For an example of a typically northern critique of southern perspectives of Nam Tiến, see ‘Vấn đề ruộng đất trong triều nhà Lê’, Tạp san Nghiên cứu Văn Sử Địa, 2 (1955), 53–67.
historical writing as a critical component of nation building. Communist or non-communist, Vietnamese historians were deeply engaged in the political differences that divided the nation in order to promote the views of constituted authorities—not undermine them. The process through which the DRV shaped historical research has been much more thoroughly documented than have the methods of the RVN. But the key point is that Vietnamese historians in the period after 1945 rejected the idea of historical inquiry as a private enterprise, linked perhaps to individual careers but unrelated to the affairs of state. On the contrary, regardless of their political affiliations, they tended to accept the state’s involvement in historical research as natural, and perhaps even necessary.

In the period after 1945, Vietnamese historians conducted research on an extremely wide range of topics, including land-holding patterns in Lý, Trần, Lê, and Nguyên times and during the colonial occupation. They examined agricultural practices in the two main deltas and in the narrow strip of land along the central coast. Historians wrote about artisans, the production of textiles and ceramics, and the appearance of guilds. They were deeply interested in poetry and analyzed the works of Nguyễn Trần, Nguyễn Du, and Hồ Xuân Hương. Postcolonial historians investigated the lives of railway builders and plantation workers. They were also attuned to uprisings, revolts, and rebellions, particularly those that were aimed against aggressive outsiders; thus anti-Han, anti-Tang, anti-Mongol, anti-Ming, anti-Qing, anti-French, and anti-Japanese rebellions were focal points in post-1945 historiographical projects. Some topics, it should be said, such as expressions of anti-Americanism, Stalin’s contributions to the science of history, or comparisons between the October Revolution in Russia and the August Revolution in Vietnam, were of interest only to historians in the north.

Considering the impressive range of research conducted by Vietnamese historians and their phenomenal degree of productivity, especially in the north, one can still argue that the topic of prehistory especially intrigued them. New impressions of prehistory allowed Vietnamese historians in the north, initially, and subsequently in the south, to reconfigure the Vietnamese national past in a truly dramatic fashion. During the colonial period, French and Vietnamese historians alike often mentioned Vietnam’s 2,000 years of history. For them, national history began when Vietnam first appeared in Chinese dynastic sources. Beginning in the mid-1950s, however, as they continued the archaeological excavations initiated by the French and other Europeans, historians in the DRV began to see a powerful link between the physical traces of prehistory

7 I would recommend these three monographs: Phan Gia Bền, La Recherche historique en République démocratique du Vietnam (Hanoi, 1965); and Viên Sử học, Sử học Việt Nam trên đường phát triển (Hanoi, 1981); and Ban Văn Sử Địa (1953–1959) (Hanoi, 1993).

8 And countless others, including Cao Bá Quát, Nguyễn Đình Chiểu, Nguyễn Xuân Ông, Nguyễn Thông, Hoàng Diệu, Nguyễn Quang Bích, Nguyễn Khuyên, Nguyễn Thương Hiền, and Phan Bội Châu.
and the apparently timeless traditions of folklore. By the end of the 1950s, northern historians routinely referred to their country’s 4,000 years of history. In the following decade their southern counterparts followed suit.⁹

At the centre of this new interpretation of the past was the Đồng Sơn bronze drum.¹⁰ Examples of this exquisite artefact, normally adorned with solar patterns, geometrical designs, abstract images of birds and deer, depictions of humans playing drums or pounding rice, were first unearthed in the 1920s. Because similar artefacts have been discovered in southern China and in Thailand as well, many scholars would argue that the evidentiary base is too slim, that one cannot make specific claims about the origins or longevity of the Vietnamese state based on widely dispersed bronze remains. For Vietnamese scholars governed by decrees, however, the implications were (and for the most part remain) clear: the bronze-age artefacts are the material traces of the once-legendary kingdom of Văn Lang. This position, it should be noted, also echoes the claims of the fifteenth-century chronicle written by Ngô Sĩ Liên. Before the material traces were uncovered and their significance revised, the kingdom of Văn Lang was viewed as a purely mythological phenomenon, outside the realm of genuine history. Even more striking than this reconstruction of the past, or the reversion to pre-colonial notions, is the response of historians in the RVN. Rather than criticize the perhaps hasty conclusions of historians in the north, they simply appropriated the new 4,000-year chronological span.¹¹

Regardless of their political differences in the period after 1945, historians throughout Vietnam used fragments of stone, pottery, and bronze to anchor national history in a remote, prehistoric past. Because they viewed decolonization as a doubled process of disconnecting Vietnam from France as well as from China, historians felt especially compelled to locate the roots of the national past in a setting that predated the millennium of Chinese occupation.

Despite their political differences, historians in Hanoi and Saigon staked their claim to a prestigious historiographical tradition; they accepted the role that the state played in guiding historical research; and they agreed to a radically new delineation of national origins. Furthermore, historians in the north and south promoted a new notion of Vietnam as a multi-ethnic state.¹² Today one

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⁹ In Ch. 32 in this volume, Henry Em discusses a similar dynamic in post-war Korean historiography.


routinely comes across the assertion that Vietnam is a country of fifty-four ethnic
groups. This claim is ubiquitous: it is impossible to avoid, and it seems to convey
a transcendent truth. Ethnic identities, it suggests, are primordial, outside of
time. In fact, this impression is genuinely new. Its origins can be traced very
precisely to a decree issued only thirty years ago by the central committee of the
Vietnamese Communist Party.13 The questions to which this decree officially
replied had circulated for decades and even hundreds of years.

In pre-colonial times, Vietnamese scholars were certainly aware of social and
cultural differences, but they were not concerned with nineteenth- or twentieth-
century conceptions of ethnicity, and they made no systematic attempt to
describe ethnic distinctions. Like their counterparts in other colonial settings,
French ethnographers were hyper-aware of ethnological differences in Vietnam,
and they sought to categorize them in a comprehensive, totalizing way. In
moments of perfect projection, denying in themselves what they attributed to
another, French ethnographers tended to depict the ethnic Vietnamese majority
as predatory and crudely intent on dominating less powerful others.

In the period after 1945, Vietnamese ethnographers recognized, of course, the
numerical superiority of the ethnic Vietnamese, whom they categorized as ‘Việt’,
initially, and subsequently as ‘Kinh’, which means ‘capital’, and carries with it the
sense of being civilized. But they disengaged the numerical superiority of the
Vietnamese from a colonialist framework of dominance and submission. Instead,
they recast the ethnic Vietnamese as the older brother (anh), and ethnic minori-
ties as younger sibling (em). In this paradigm, the older brother naturally
watches over younger siblings and tries to ensure their well-being; younger
siblings, also bound by reciprocal ties, behave in a deferential way, for the greater
good of the whole family (and the state). Colonial scholars left scores of
ethnographic studies that their successors could not ignore. In proposing a new
framework in which to interpret the ethnic diversity of Vietnam, historians in the
north and in the south responded to the ethnographic impulse of their French
predecessors. At the same time, they condemned colonial methods and rejected
colonial conclusions.

Because the cultivation of rice in the Red and Mekong river basins has so
profoundly shaped every aspect of politics and culture, Vietnamese historians
have traditionally written extensively on agricultural topics. In the period after
1945, however, northern and southern scholars broadened the framework of
their investigations to focus also on Vietnam’s involvement in the vibrant
commercial life of the South China Sea. For historians in Hanoi, this sea-centred
approach played a critical role in their efforts to rethink the contours and
trajectories of the national past. By focusing on Vietnam’s long coastline rather
than the river basins, by emphasizing the cosmopolitanism of Vietnamese port

cities such as Hôi An, and by writing about the industries that supported maritime trade, they were able to extricate Vietnamese history from an East Asian framework, which was always and inevitably dominated by the monumentality of China, and reposition it in the more dynamic and multi-centred context of Southeast Asia.14

Southern scholars also contributed to the ‘southeastasianization’ of the Vietnamese past, but in order to magnify the divergent histories of the northern and southern states. In a Southeast Asian setting, the DRV appeared as the contemporary embodiment of a conservative, traditional, closed, Sinitic-style kingdom governed, in this case, by the Communist Party. The RVN emerged as the maturation of a far more open and innovative society that, since the sixteenth century, had progressively taken shape. These two paradigms—the East Asian and the Southeast Asian—implied a whole series of comparisons: the patrilineal emphasis of Chinese culture versus the matrilineal and, in some cases, even matriarchal patterns of Southeast Asia; the ‘Three Teachings’ of East Asia (Confucianism, [Mahayana] Buddhism, and Daoism) versus the more variegated religious cultures of Southeast Asia, including localized practices of Hinduism, Theravada Buddhism, Christianity, and Islam; and political systems that privileged wet-rice agriculture versus those more oriented toward international maritime trade. Whereas historians in Hanoi denounced the political split between north and south and dismissed it as a temporary consequence of Cold War machinations, southern historians emphasized the maritime and commercial dimensions of southern Vietnamese history in order to naturalize the division.

In all of the obvious ways, explicitly southern representations of Vietnamese history were suppressed after 1975. One sees countless references to the ‘liberation of the south’, for instance, but the ‘fall of Saigon’ was not a part of the socialist lexicon and it does not appear in post-socialist speech. In less obvious ways, however, distinctly southern impressions of history figure conspicuously in contemporary explorations of the past. The project of disengaging Vietnamese history from an East Asian framework centred on China, and repositioning it in a decentred, Southeast Asian framework, was first articulated by historians in the south who sought to clarify the unique, independent, and autonomous trajectory of southern history. Historians in the Socialist Republic have appropriated this paradigm to speak about the unfolding of Vietnamese national history overall. To a striking degree, Vietnamese scholars in the diaspora as well as non-Vietnamese have contributed to this paradigmatic shift.

14 No one has articulated this theme more compellingly than Oliver W. Wolters in *History, Culture, and Region in Southeast Asian Perspectives* (rev. edn, Ithaca, NY, 1999).
In the first part of this chapter I emphasized the shared attitudes and interests of historians throughout Vietnam in an attempt to move beyond an overly dichotomized view of intellectual life in the period after 1945. This emphasis is not intended as a mask: it does not conceal the deeply divided politics—wars, in fact—between north and south and within the south. Many Vietnamese in the south, particularly, and also in the central and northern parts of the country bitterly criticized communism; they demonized Hồ Chí Minh and portrayed him as a monstrous traitor and a tool of the Soviets and Chinese. Many Vietnamese in the north, particularly, and also in the central and southern parts of the country caricatured Ngô Đình Diệm as a dangerous lackey. They blamed American imperialists and their Vietnamese accomplices for sabotaging national elections and for the bombs, defoliants, and napalm that devastated cities and countryside and ended so many lives. Whereas Vietnamese in the southern part of the country disagreed among themselves about postcolonial forms of politics, historians in Hanoi refused to see southern politics as a legitimate or authentic response to the turmoil of decolonization.

What about Marx? It is no surprise that most southern scholars were hostile to the idea of rewriting Vietnamese history according to Marxist paradigms. The exception was Nguyễn Thế Anh, the most distinguished historian in the south, and now one of the truly luminous figures in the diaspora, who expressed an openness to Marxist approaches to the past. In Hanoi, historians were obliged to rewrite the past in an explicitly Marxist framework, and for a few decades, northern historical discourse was saturated with references to Marx, but also to Engels, Lenin, and Stalin. And yet, as they set out to ‘build history’ (xây dựng lịch sử) along Marxist lines, northern scholars demonstrated a stunning reluctance to identify class conflict or internal divisions of any sort as the generator of historical change. On the contrary, they often asserted that for centuries, even millennia, Vietnamese had joined together against foreign aggressors. Repeatedly they returned to this idea: that national unity, not class conflict, was the animating force of history. So, in the end, what did all of the noise about Marxism, Marxism-Leninism, and materialist conceptions of history amount to?

In the 1950s, while they were still waging war against France, Trần Huy Liệu and his comrades began to imagine the new, general history of Vietnam that they would write once the conflict was finished, when they would be free to leave the jungle of the north-west, reposition themselves at the centre of

power, and get back to their desks. But when the war ended, or when that war ended, another, more deadly one started to unfold. Throughout the second stage of the combat, and until southern forces surrendered in 1975, northern historians published monographs and translations of dynastic histories at a phenomenal pace. And yet, year after year, as head of the DRV’s Institute of History, Trần Huy Liệu was forced to admit to the party’s central committee that the new, general history was not done; and when he died in 1969 it still was not finished.

The first volume of the Institute’s national history, Lịch sử Việt Nam [History of Vietnam], which begins with the kingdom of Văn Lang, was published in 1971. The second volume, which concludes with the August Revolution of 1945, appeared in 1985, more than thirty years after Trần Huy Liệu and others had first contemplated the new general history of the nation. In the bibliographies of these two volumes, the references to Marx, Engels, and Lenin are fairly abundant.16 This is also the case in countless other historical works. But in neither structure nor substance is the general history actually dependent upon Marxist theories of history. Of course, this work is only a small part of the postcolonial canon. One can argue that in the thirty-year period after 1945, other historians contributed in equally or more significant ways to the new historiographical corpus.17 But in their works, too, it should be noted, similar citations were always included, even when specifically Marxist theories of history played only a negligible role. Political economy, on the other hand, a field to which Marx made essential contributions, has had an enormous impact on historical writing in the period since 1945, even when the bibliographical entries one expects to see are missing.

In sum, historical writing in Vietnam in the period 1945–75 was marked by an extreme emphasis on the state, politics in the formal sense, and economic histories. Topics that lend themselves, at least in part, to a quantitative analysis, such as the commercialization of sex in colonial times, have not been examined, because from official perspectives, economic histories are relevant when they conclude with an indictment of the French occupation or an aggrandizement of the party.18 Thus the economic histories of non-normative groups—of women, for instance, ethnic minorities, Vietnamese opposed to communism, or critics of the party—have been minimally explored or entirely neglected.

16 As are the references to Hồ Chí Minh, Lê Duẩn, Trương Chinh, Phạm Văn Đồng, Võ Nguyên Giáp, and other political and military elites from the DRV.
17 Ðinh Xuân Lầm, Hà Văn Tân, Minh Tranh, Nguyễn Hồng Phong, Phan Huy Lệ, Trần Quốc Vượng, Trần Văn Giàu, Văn Thảo—among many others—deserve to be mentioned.
18 As an antidote to these limitations, see the path-breaking work of Peter Zinoman, ‘Venal Sex and Vietnamese Modernity in the Work of Vụ Trọng Phụng’, http://www.yale.edu/macmillan/transitionstomodernity/papers/VuTrongPhung-Yale.pdf.
Historical Writing since 1986

The term *đổi mới*, translated as ‘renovation’ or ‘renewal’, is used to describe the sweeping changes introduced in 1986 at the Sixth National Congress of the Vietnamese Communist Party. In terms of the economy, *đổi mới* has shifted the initiative from central planners to the private entrepreneurs of individual households, and joint ventures based on foreign capital, foreign technologies, local resources, and local labour. Whether the results are measured by consumers or modelled by statisticians, the changes in the Vietnamese economy are profound. The historiographical implications of *đổi mới* are mixed.

First, in some cases, the significance of *đổi mới* is slight: the twentieth century is still handled in ways that privilege the party; the mantra from earlier times (the tradition of resistance against foreign aggression) has not disappeared; and many conversations are still forbidden. There is no formal guide to off-limit topics, but one understands that what really happened during land reform cannot be discussed. One should also avoid the subject of re-education camps, and the taboo against critical references to Hồ Chí Minh remains in place. Moreover, one should not express any doubts about how he is officially portrayed. For example, to claim publicly that Hồ Chí Minh is the biological father of a son and not only the symbolic father of the nation is a serious offence.

Second, in other cases, the consequences of *đổi mới* are quite complex. For instance, the rapid expansion of the economy in the past few decades has meant that entire blocks of cities and vast expanses of countryside have been razed to make room for shopping complexes, office towers, and luxury hotels. The war on the built environment, and the natural one, as well, is extreme. As this destruction unfolds, preservationists try to counter it by exploiting the essentially economic idioms of *đổi mới*: they present the physical traces of the past, the communal halls, clan houses, tombs, temples, churches, pagodas, and shrines, as valuable commodities that need to be protected. Traditional rituals that revolutionaries once tried to suppress—the example of ancestor worship comes to mind—have also been reconceptualized as part of Vietnam’s cultural capital that should be saved rather than squandered.

19 Focusing on French colonial times, André Masson vividly describes the simultaneous destruction and reconstruction of the capital in *Hanoi pendant la période héroïque* (Paris, 1929). In *Hanoi: Biography of a City* (Seattle, 2000), William Logan explores the same phenomenon in post-socialist times.

histories on which these rituals are based, and specifically the examination of ancestral tablets (gia phả), regained their legitimacy.\(^\text{21}\)

Efforts to protect the physical and ritual traces of the past have been complemented by a new journal of history, Tạp chí Xưa và Nay [Past and Present].\(^\text{22}\) Its layout, which makes ample use of colour photography and eye-catching graphics, and the brevity of its articles, which run to no more than a few pages, have allowed this journal to reach a broad audience. But the journal’s popular appeal should not be misconstrued as evidence of a genuinely popular approach to the past. This journal is not institutionally linked to the Vietnamese Academy of Social Sciences—the conservative and bureaucratic colossus that so powerfully shapes intellectual life in contemporary Vietnam. But its editor, the venerable Dương Trung Quốc, has widely recognized ties to the Institute of History and, therefore, by extension, to the Academy. Nevertheless, the journal Xưa và Nay, which is now approaching its 300th issue, has made ordinary Vietnamese more aware of, and more nostalgically attached to, the physical traces of the past.

Meanwhile, the past that historians are now able to re-engage is not fixed or static. In their study of the Red River delta, three distinguished historians discuss the reintegration of traditional folk festivals into rural life.\(^\text{23}\) Compared with the genuinely traditional antecedents, the neotraditional variants are, in their words, ‘more sophisticated’. And whereas some festivals, such as the one in honour of the Hùng kings of Vàn Lang, were once purely local phenomena, they are now celebrated as they should be: that is, on a nationwide scale. Explaining why traditional methods of electing village heads have been revised, the authors remark that villagers cannot return uncritically to the past: they must approach it selectively, and here they are explicit, in order to build ‘civilized’ lives.\(^\text{24}\) The policies of đổi mới have made it possible for contemporary scholars to revisit traditional aspects of the past, but they must put tradition to good use. Traditional aspects of the past must be refashioned so that they reinforce, rather than weaken, the party’s dominant role.

Third, to a degree that would have been unimaginable decades ago, đổi mới has allowed Vietnamese historians to interact with foreigners and with

\(^{21}\) Historians at the National University of Hanoi, including Phan Huy Lẽ, Nguyễn Quang Ngọc, and Vũ Minh Giang, have played instrumental roles in new explorations of family histories. See, for example, Phan Gia Công Phát: Gia Thiền-Hà Tỉnh (Hanoi, 2006). Vietnamese scholars in the diaspora, including Vinh Sính (Canada), have also contributed to this research.


\(^{24}\) On this point they cite the 1993 resolution of the Fifth Plenum of the Vietnamese Communist Party’s Seventh Central Committee, p. 81 n. 124.
Vietnamese scholars in the diaspora. Certain centres of scholarly research, such as the Institute of Hán-Nôm Studies in Hanoi, have taken advantage of this new era of global interaction. By returning to the sources written in classical Chinese and nôm, the distinctly Vietnamese adaptation of Chinese, and translating them into romanized Vietnamese, these scholars have made critical aspects of the past accessible to new generations of readers. Their contributions to Vietnamese scholarship, and especially to our understanding of the Confucian legacy in Vietnam, have been profound. The history of Vietnam’s involvement in international maritime trade has also benefited tremendously from this kind of collaboration.

Since the 1940s and 1950s, the Vietnamese Communist Party has functioned in a powerfully censoring way. The constraints it has imposed are profound. Within this generally restricted environment, the policy of đổi mới has allowed historians to engage a wider range of topics. Recent scholarship on the Nguyễn dynasty provides the best illustration of this point. For scholars allied with revolutionary forces, the Nguyễn dynasty used to function as a repository for all things negative: it was feudal, reactionary, and worst of all, responsible for the French conquest of Vietnam and an occupation that lasted nearly one hundred years. To develop a broader perspective on the Nguyễn dynasty, Vietnamese historians are systematically revisiting the nineteenth century. For example, they have shifted their focus from France and Vietnam to a truly global framework that also includes the imperial ambitions of other nations, including Britain, Russia, Japan, and the United States. In this global and comparative framework, irrevocably altered by capitalism, violent conquests, and colonial manipulations, the Nguyễn kings no longer seem uniquely flawed, corrupt, and inefficient. Their failure to manage the French appears more normal, as part of a much bigger pattern. Similarly, this broader perspective allows historians to look at the shared experiences of colonial subjects in Africa and Asia, and not only in Vietnam. This global perspective, practically unheard of in the first few decades after 1945, is now a normal part of the historiographical terrain.

25 Among the foreign institutes that have collaborated with the Institute of Hán-Nôm Studies, two in particular stand out: the Harvard-Yenching Institute and the École française d’Extrême-Orient.
26 The multi-lingual volume Nghiên cứu về Nho giáo Việt Nam: Tư tưởng tiếp cận liên ngành/ Confucian Thought in Vietnam: Studies From an Interdisciplinary Perspective (Hanoi, 2009) may be the most spectacular result of these cooperative endeavours.
27 See ‘Chú Đức Sông Biển Trọng Lịch Sử Việt Nam’, at http://www.gio-o/NgoBac.html (last accessed on June 25, 2009). This website, apparently assembled in California by Ngô Bắc (pen name of Ngô Ngọc Trung), makes English- and French-language publications accessible to readers more at ease in Vietnamese.
29 Given the auto-ethnographic impulse of Vietnamese historians, the exceptional text was a history of the world published in 1944–5 in Saigon: Nguyễn Hiền Lê and Thiên Giang, Lịch sử thế giới, reissued in 2000 by the Culture and Information Publishing House in Hồ Chí Minh City.
TIMELINE/KEY DATES

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<td>1945 (Aug.)</td>
<td>August Revolution; founding of Democratic Republic of Vietnam; Chinese nationalist troops enter northern Vietnam to supervise the Japanese surrender; abdication of Nguyễn emperor Bảo Đại in Huế</td>
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<td>1945 (Sept.)</td>
<td>Hồ Chí Minh reads Declaration of Independence in Hanoi; British troops enter southern Vietnam to supervise the Japanese surrender</td>
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Chapter 28
Indonesian Historical Writing after Independence

Ann Kumar

CONTEXT AND BACKGROUND

At the time Indonesia became independent, knowledge of academic history-writing was virtually non-existent. In 1930, the date of the last census of the Netherlands Indies, the colony had an estimated overall literacy rate of 6.4 per cent—extremely low even by comparison with other colonized nations. Very few indeed of the 6.4 per cent would have had any secondary education; and the Netherlands East Indies government provided no tertiary education other than three schools (later Faculties) of Engineering, Law, and Medicine, established throughout the 1920s. In the Netherlands itself, study of Indonesia was undertaken primarily through philology and ethnography, as well as a strategic interest in Islam, with history playing a minor role. Such an approach often displayed the ‘orientalist’ bias later criticized by Edward Said.

European universities developed out of religious foundations, established either by orders such as the Benedictines, or under royal patronage, as in England where the ‘new learning’ took a more humanistic direction, for example, in the patronage of Margaret Beaufort which led to the establishment of St John’s College Cambridge in 1511. These universities developed a national role. Geographical, social, and ideological reasons precluded such a development taking place in Indonesia, where the religious foundations remained local and relatively short-lived. Indigenous history-writing was therefore produced at the various courts, and concentrated on the exploits of kings and other thaumaturgical characters. A major innovation took place in the early nineteenth century with the work of Yasadipura II, a scholar at the court of Surakarta who was impelled to analyze an unprecedented disaster—Dutch domination—through

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1 Indonesia: Selected Documents on Colonialism and Nationalism 1830–1942, trans. and ed. Chr. L. M. Penders (St Lucia, Qld., 1977), 169.
painful self-examination. This produced an analytical historiography that looked beyond the ruler and his courtiers to deal with the Javanese people as a whole and the organization of society.

The effect of the colonial predicament in stimulating an analytical historical consciousness continued to operate in the twentieth century, and this consciousness was central in the formation of an Indonesian identity. We can see it in the ironical article written in 1913 by R. M. Soewardi Soerjaningrat, a founder of the Indische Partij (Indies Party). In ‘Als ik een Nederlander was’ (‘If I were a Dutchman’), its author writes that if he were Dutch he would not allow the natives to join in the celebrations of the Netherlands’ independence as they currently did. He asks whether the Dutch actually believed that they had killed all human feelings in their colonial subjects, when in fact ‘even the most primitive peoples curse all forms of imperialism’—‘imperialism’ being a European concept quite foreign to traditional chronicles. In response to the implication that colonial rule was accursed, the colonial government exiled Soewardi and two other Indische Partij leaders to the Netherlands. In 1930, when an independence movement had developed, the nationalist leader Sukarno, on trial in Bandung, made a stirring appeal to history in his famous defence speech, Indonesië Klaagt aan [Indonesia Accuses]. He and his party, the National Party, were determined to raise awareness of the glory of the many earlier Indonesian kingdoms, most of them Javanese. Admitting that this was a feudal past, and disclaiming any desire to revive feudalism, Sukarno nevertheless saw it as a healthy feudalism containing the seeds of progress, whereas the present colonial era was sick and empty. He writes: ‘Although they are now almost as lifeless as a corpse, the Indonesian people who flourished and were so exceedingly great in the past must have sufficient strength and ability to rebuild this greatness in the future, must be able to rise again to the heights they achieved before, and indeed to surpass them.’ Sukarno saw knowledge of past great kingdoms as essential to raising Indonesia from its present state as a ‘nation of coolies and a coolie among nations’. However, another member of the political intelligentsia, the Sumatran Tan Malaka, argued that the village republics of the past, with their allegedly communal institutions, provided a better example for the future than did feudal kingdoms. Sukarno would later eliminate Tan Malaka from the political scene, which meant that it was Sukarno’s tripartite schema of Indonesian history—a glorious pre-colonial era of great kingdoms followed by the dark colonial age, in turn to be succeeded by a brightly beckoning future—that was most influential after Indonesia became independent.

Although history was not a major interest of the Indological departments, there was some Dutch colonial historiography that sought to legitimate and

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strengthen Dutch rule. This transcended the regional focus of the old court chronicles and provided a view of the whole Indies. But as the Indonesian nationalist Hatta commented in his 1928 defence speech answering charges of encouraging armed resistance, the history of the Indies was essentially written as Dutch colonial history, requiring Indonesian youth to ‘parrot its masters and call its own heroes, like Dipo Negoro, Toeanke Imam, Tengkoe Oemar and many others, rebels, insurrectionists, terrorists and so on’, whereas Hatta considered them to be national heroes comparable to ‘William of Orange, William Tell, Mazzini, and Garibaldi’. After Independence, Western historians such as P. B. R. Carey would make a more sympathetic reappraisal of these ‘rebels’.

So Dutch colonial historiography was abhorrent for its attitude towards Indonesians; yet, paradoxically, it was also exemplary, even well after Indonesia became independent, with citation of Dutch sources required to establish something as ‘factual’. The culmination of Dutch colonial historiography was F. W. Stapel’s Geschiedenis van Nederlandsch-Indië [History of the Dutch Indies], whose five weighty tomes appeared in 1938–40. By this time, however, the young Dutch scholar J. C. van Leur had mounted an incisive and perceptive critique of the approach exemplified by Stapel, which he characterized as the view from the deck of Dutch ships, producing a grey and undifferentiated picture. He also drastically reduced the period of time in which the Dutch could be said to have actually ruled the Indies. Generally speaking, however, Indonesian historians have continued to speak of ‘300 years of colonial rule’.

After independence, a strongly anti-aristocratic tide stripped rulers of their power, and a new style of history focused on the new nation had to be invented. This was in a context where different groups of Indonesians were making different claims to inherit power. The established Nationalist leaders felt that they, who had endured long years of imprisonment and exile by the Dutch for their principles, were the rightful leaders of the new nation, while leaders from the Left, equally persecuted by the colonial government, felt that the Nationalists were preventing them from carrying out the social revolution catering to the people’s needs that was the proper culmination of the winning of independence. The third vocal group, the military, claimed that the whole civilian leadership had been cowardly in allowing themselves to be captured by the Dutch and that only the military had

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10 Busthanul Arifin, Pelembagaan hukum Islam di Indonesia: Akar sejarah, hambatan dan prospeknya (Jakarta, 1996), 35.
stood firm—and they certainly did not wish to see the mobilization against the Dutch extended into a social revolution. Rather, they proclaimed military heroism as justification for a political regime that would provide them with wider powers than did Western democracies. These different points of view, which Western studies of the period chronicle, would lead in later decades to history wars.

**NATIONALIST HISTORY-WRITING AND ITS CRITICS**

Just after the Dutch withdrew, Muhammad Yamin published a book on the history of the Indonesian flag, *6000 Tahun Sang Merah Putih* [6,000 Years of the Red and White], pushing its origins back to prehistoric times, thus initiating a markedly nationalist approach to history-writing. In December 1957, as parliamentary democracy was replaced by Sukarno’s Guided Democracy regime (1957–65), the Ministry of Education convened the first national history congress in Yogyakarta to plan an official national history. At this conference, Yamin’s nationalist approach was criticized by Soedjatmoko, one of Indonesia’s most eminent public intellectuals, who argued that it was incompatible with a scientific approach to history. He also rejected the idea of a utopian past with collective values, and instead advocated individual responsibility. While awaiting the production of the national history, schools used a text published by the writer Sanusi Pane during the Japanese Occupation.

Sukarno himself had been influenced by Marxist history-writing, for example, in his 1932 analysis of the difference between British and Dutch forms of imperialism, and in his Guided Democracy regime there was room for Marxist approaches to history, as there was room for Marxists in politics. One of the foremost exponents of a Marxist-style history was Roeslan Abdulgani.

A number of Western historians began to carry out research on Indonesia from the time it became independent, and there was a shift from Indological studies to history. These Western historians, though generally sympathizing with Indonesian aspirations, were less fully absorbed by the project of providing historical depth to the fragile nation than were their Indonesian colleagues, and some proposed alternative ways of approaching Indonesian history, such as John R. W. Smail’s ‘autonomous history’ concept. This emphasized regional history, which fitted well with the organizing principle of Dutch archives, but less so

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with the strong feeling in Indonesia that regional culture and identity were potentially dangerous to national unity and should not be encouraged.

**HISTORIANS IN THE SHADOW OF MILITARY POWER**

In the momentous year of 1965, Soedjatmoko edited a volume that undertook a stocktaking of history-writing in Indonesia as a first step towards raising standards in the profession. It was written in a climate that in hindsight appears as the apogee of Western satisfaction with its uniquely ‘sound’ and ‘scientific’ historiography—a claim accepted by the cosmopolitan Soedjatmoko. There were eight Indonesian contributors, thirteen Western, and one Japanese. A number of Western contributors were concerned with evaluating the performance of indigenous history-writing in different parts of Indonesia. For example, a contribution by J. Noorduyn on the Buginese and Makassarese chronicles notes their sceptical attitude to myths and legends, matter-of-factness, dry prose style, and valuable data on technology and law—all seen as commendable qualities, though regrettably they lacked dates. 15

Rereading this volume today, there is something poignant about the expressed aspirations of the Indonesian contributors to a ‘sound’ and ‘scientific’ historiography under Western tutelage, which were about to be seriously undermined on two fronts. First, the overthrow of Sukarno’s Guided Democracy and installation of a military-dominated regime would bring back a highly statist history-writing, much like that produced by the Dutch colonial government, and this state control would last until the end of the century. Second, the imminent rise of new critical theory would increasingly call into question the scientific impartiality of Western scholarship from within Western academia itself. However, the impact of new critical theory has been comparatively slow and weak in influencing both Indonesian historians and Western historians writing about Indonesia.

It seems fair to say that the Western contributor to this volume whose work attracted most attention was C. C. Berg, one of a number of Western scholars of the period to make sweeping *ex-cathedra* characterizations of Indonesians. Berg claimed that the ancient Javanese believed in ‘verbal magic’. To him this implied that the fact that three different texts describe Erlangga as the legitimate king of Java is to be regarded, not as corroboration of this claim, but rather as proof that Erlangga was actually a usurper. Not content to discredit what was present in the written sources, Berg actually reconstructed what was *not* in them, for example, a putative regicide producing a putative change of dynasty, neither recorded in any

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source, thus arriving at a position where the only things we can say are historically true are those for which there is no evidence. This was going too far for some other Western contributors: for example, the Jesuit scholar P. J. Zoetmulder politely pointed out the logical difficulties of Berg’s approach, and his inadequate understanding of Indonesian languages. Another contributor, H. J. de Graaf, maintained that the Javanese chronicles (babad) actually exhibited a better sense of history than Berg attributes to them, despite their ‘sacral’ character and use as political weapons. Neither Berg nor de Graaf, leading experts on Java, had noted the rise of analytical historiography in Yasadipura II, whose work, like so much else available only in manuscript form, was little known. Another contributor, J. C. Bottoms, was rather in advance of his time in pointing out that the tendency of authors to please their patrons is not peculiar to Indonesian and Malay writings but is inherent in all historical writing.16

Even before assuming power in 1965, the military had been writing history. General A. H. Nasution had already established the Armed Forces History Centre in 1964 for the purpose of countering a communist history of the 1945–9 revolution: the history wars were beginning to heat up. After the coup attempt of 1965 and the ensuing military takeover, this History Centre assumed a far more assertive and prominent role in the representation of Indonesian history. The military-dominated regime, called the New Order, appropriated Sukarno’s three-age historical schema. But it added a further stage: one of internal discord that developed under Sukarno’s ‘Guided Democracy’, from which the country was ‘saved’ by General Suharto, who eased Sukarno out and took over as president. The fact that Nugroho Notosusanto, as head of the Centre, took over the planning of Sukarno’s half-completed National Monument History Museum project in 1969 provides evidence of the extent to which representing national history became military business in the early New Order period. The military used history to legitimize the overthrow of the Sukarno regime, to justify the killing of perhaps 500,000 alleged communists, to strengthen military unity, and to legitimize the military’s political role and the suppression of dissent.17

And so, despite the aspirations of Soedjatmoko and others, it turned out that Indonesian historians would have far greater restrictions on their pursuit of ‘scientific’ history than Western ones, and be required to slavishly follow state directions. Through the 1950s to the 1980s, and even beyond, the majority of academically licensed works on Indonesian history were written by Westerners.

17 Kate Macgregor, History in Uniform: Military Ideology and the Construction of Indonesia’s Past (Singapore, 2007).
They were free, and resourced, to explore topics closed to Indonesians. Some Western historians like de Graaf and Ricklefs continued to write about kings, while others turned to new topics such as the modern ideologies that transformed the Indies, particularly nationalism and communism, and a number of histories of Indonesia appeared. Islam was generally described in terms of who-brought-it-and-from-where (like another much-discussed influence from the west, Indianization, which was generally portrayed as a more civilizing influence than Islam). However, Christine Dobbin produced a sophisticated analysis of the intertwining of religious and economic imperatives in the Padri War, and Ann Kumar used Javanese sources to describe the world of the Islamic pesantren as seen from the inside. Other Westerners turned their attention to groups not much covered in pre-colonial and colonial histories, such as women in colonial cities, labour, and youth.

SARTONO AND THE NATIONAL HISTORY

The second national seminar on history-writing was held in 1970, and the next three decades saw the rise of the multi-dimensional social science approach pioneered by Sartono Kartodirdjo. Sartono was trained by the moderately leftist Dutch sociologist W. F. Wertheim, and influenced by the American historian H. J. Benda, the author of a monograph on Islam under the Japanese Occupation. His approach aimed to be national and Indonesia-centric, and was informed by the realization that historical events are the outcome of a complicated interplay among social, economic, cultural, political, and religious factors, on which the explanatory capacities of different disciplines must be brought to bear, in contrast to the basically non-theoretical and descriptive approach of earlier historians. He also aimed to observe standard, ‘scientific’ historical methodologies, and to be

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19 For example, George McTurnan Kahin, Nationalism and Revolution in Indonesia (Ithaca, 1952); and Ruth T. McVey, The Rise of Indonesian Communism (Ithaca, 1965).
20 For example, George McTurnan Kahin, Nationalism and Revolution in Indonesia (Ithaca, 1952); and Ruth T. McVey, The Rise of Indonesian Communism (Ithaca, 1965).
politically ‘neutral’. Rommel Curaming argues that the influence of the Sartono school is overstated in standard accounts of Indonesian historiography, and that it actually found little expression in academic works, textbooks, or popular media. The history department of Gajah Mada University was dominated by Sartono and his protégés, while the Universitas Indonesia history department was more influenced by Nugroho NotoSusanto (though there were also Sartono adherents such as Adri Lapian there), and has been accused of collusion with the New Order government to install a state-sponsored historiography. This approach tended towards a descriptive, non-theoretical narrative of political history like the nationalist historiography of Yamin, with military leaders given prominence.24

Sartono’s work was highly innovative (not just among Indonesian historians but also with respect to Western ones) in that it included peasants as well as the élite.25 This conflicted with the notorious New Order proclamation, rakyat masih bodoh, ‘the people are still stupid’, which was constantly repeated as justification for the wholesale depoliticization of the populace who, instead of mobilizing to promote their interests, were exhorted to devote themselves to ‘productive’ work and play a subordinate role in developing the country under the guidance of a ‘stabilizing’ and ‘dynamizing’ military.

Sartono’s national history was finally published in 1975. The six volumes covered: prehistory (before the Christian era); the Hindu kingdoms, to AD 1600; the Islamic kingdoms, to AD 1800; colonial rule in the nineteenth century; nationalism and the end of colonial rule; the Japanese Occupation; the Revolution (1945–50); and Liberal Democracy and Guided Democracy up to the events of the 1965 coup that brought in the New Order. Volume 6 added developments such as social change and social mobility, the structure of government and political life, and education and social communication to the narrative of political events. It provided a justification for dwifungsi, or dual function, the politically dominant doctrine that the military should have a sociopolitical as well as a military function.

In 1984 a revised version of the national history was published, this time without Sartono as editor. Changes included the addition of new chapters on the New Order, emphasizing the attainment of stability and development, the establishment of a new ASEAN-centred foreign policy and the necessary integration of East Timor, as well as the making of a New Order society and the legitimization provided by the elections of 1971 and 1977 (so-called festivals of democracy held in such restricted and manipulated circumstances as to guarantee the return of the government party). In the 1990s another revised version was

published, including a seventh volume which seems to have had a very limited circulation and followed the format of the five-year development plan.

**PROPAGANDA AND DEMONIZATION**

Sartono’s method had been to use various disciplines and perspectives in order to describe a slow process of cultural integration—a process that he saw as predating the colonial state, and which formed the backbone of national integration. Interaction between local history and processes at the national level was of central importance. This approach was abandoned when the military historian Nugroho Notosusanto took over. Nugroho’s account of the most contested historical event of all, the 1965 coup, is not a simplistic assertion that this was a communist bid for power foiled by the heroic army, and in fact falls well within the range of analyses of the coup by Western academics. However, a less nuanced message was presented in the historical discourse he presided over, which was centred on the military, and utilized not just written accounts, but also museums, monuments, films, and commemorations. This was a state-centred narrative describing threats to national unity overcome by the military, the promoters of development. Regional cultures were seen as static entities, as in the colonial period, without any dynamism of their own. Local histories were considered less reliable than the colonial archives, there was very little room for the agency of ordinary people, and the list of national heroes drawn up foregrounded royalty, in contrast to Maoist China’s ‘people’s heroes’.

In this discourse there was a total erasure of the 1965–6 killings of hundreds of thousands accused of complicity in the coup attempt. Only the murder of six generals was covered in intentionally horrifying—and as it transpired, fictional—detail. Saskia Wieringa has shown that contrary to official accounts and the dioramas at key sites such as Lubang Buaya and the National Monument, the generals were not in fact subjected to genital mutilation. In stark contrast, members of the leftist women’s organization accused of doing this really had been horribly tortured after they were imprisoned.

The high school (Sekolah Menengah Umum) history textbook published in 1994 downplayed social and political issues in favour of a heavy emphasis on material developments such as the Green Revolution, and developments in communication, transport, industry, and technology, with a concluding paragraph on caring for a healthy and clean environment (ironically, since the New

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29 Saskia Wieringa, Sexual Politics in Indonesia (Basingstoke, 2002), 298–309.
Order gave its crony businessmen virtually unlimited licence to destroy it. Professional historians were generally engaged in non-sensitive research projects, such as apolitical socioeconomic histories.\textsuperscript{30} Henk Schulte Nordholt comments that a tendency to use models derived from the social sciences in order to describe the past in terms of structures without processes and without ‘empirical imagination’ produced histories without people, as in the colonial period.\textsuperscript{31}

He also points out that there has been hardly any analysis of the late colonial state as a set of repressive institutions with significant influence on the New Order state,\textsuperscript{32} particularly in the use of illegal violence, which still today limits the effectiveness of parliamentary decision-making. He is correct in pointing out the dearth of historical analysis connecting the colonial legacy with the Indonesian present, but the conditions of the infant profession were such as to militate strongly against this. Indonesian historians had no tradition on which to call for such analysis, nor had they the opportunity to learn from historians elsewhere. Salaries were so low that most had two jobs to achieve subsistence, and there was no money to buy books or to travel. Finally, severe reprisals were visited upon any who criticized the government, even politely. An instructive example is the government reaction to the Petition of 50, drawn up in 1980, which pointed out that the Pancasila, or five principles of the nation, had originally been designed as a unifying ideology, and not, as it now was under the New Order government, to persecute and isolate political opponents. Its eminent authors were not imprisoned or killed as less distinguished Indonesians would have been, but were subjected to the subtler penalty of ruinous financial reprisals.

One historian who did develop a new way of seeing the past was Ongkokham, notably in his study of one particular region of Java, which provided an ironical picture of the personal interaction between high-ranking Dutch and Javanese officials, and also in his attention to the quotidian, such as food.\textsuperscript{33} He was willing to express unpopular, even dangerous political sentiments, and in his journalism (he was a columnist with \textit{Tempo}) he implied that the New Order was just a modern form of the \textit{jago}-ism (banditry) of the past. Though he headed the Lembaga Studi Sejarah Indonesia, Ong had a somewhat marginal role in the Indonesian establishment, partly due to his Chinese ancestry. And few other historians deviated much from the official line, let alone challenged it. Those who did challenge it were generally in the arts—painters, novelists, playwrights, film-makers, and even troupes of strolling players until these were taken over by the military. In this group none presented a more courageous and a more

\textsuperscript{30} See, for example, Masjuki and Sutrisno Kutoyo (eds.), \textit{Sejarah Daerah Istimewa Yogyakarta} (Jakarta, 1982).
\textsuperscript{31} Schulte Nordholt, ‘De-Colonising Indonesian Historiography’, 10.
historically grounded challenge than the extraordinarily gifted novelist Pramoedya Ananta Toer, whose incarceration in an extra-legal prison camp and subsequent persecution demonstrates just how severely those who challenged the official discourse were treated. His remarkable bravery in never recanting under duress enabled many other dissenting Indonesians to find courage.

Pramoedya is the writer who most meets Schulte Nordholt’s desideratum of an analysis of the late colonial state as a repressive regime whose practices the New Order government largely followed. His work evokes a penetrating picture of the cruel nature of this state, using his power as a storyteller to make turn-of-the-century Netherlands Indies the historical scene for a reading of the present. His portrayal of Tirto Adi Soerjo, the model for Minke, his main character, restored to historical memory one of the most important forerunners of Indonesian journalism. In his interview with GoGwilt, Pramoedya explained that he invented the character of the heroine Nyai Ontosoroh as a model of resistance, so that his fellow political prisoners would not be demoralized by the killings and cruelties of the prison camps.34

Pramoedya’s work is throughout informed by a strong historical consciousness, evident in his interview with GoGwilt, in which he claimed that Sukarno had given birth to the nation without spilling a drop of blood, unlike the New Order, and that the further Indonesia travels from the moment of independence in 1945, the further Indonesia is from real independence. He also saw the Indonesian and Vietnamese independence movements as initiating a global struggle for freedom that spread across Asia and Africa, freeing the world from colonial rule.35 So considerable is Pramoedya’s stature as the provider of an alternative Indonesian history that Adrian Vickers’s recent history of Indonesia is constructed as a dialogue with him.36

Pramoedya’s Buru quartet was banned for allegedly spreading communism, Marxism, and Leninism.37 This illustrates the state’s determination to control not just history-writing, but also more popular representations of history, such as historical fiction and films (for example, the film Max Havelaar, based on the nineteenth-century novel of the same name, which depicted the Javanese aristocracy colluding with the Dutch to oppress the peasantry) and the theatre.

However, not all history-writing was under state control, if only because the state did not have sufficient capacity to control all aspects of Indonesian society. Beneath the radar of the state, humble local histories appeared like wild flowers at many Indonesian localities, and were often handed out to visitors at historic sites. These histories represent the movement of oral traditions into the written

37 GoGwilt, ‘Pramoedya’s Fiction and History’, 148.
register, thanks to the massive advance in literacy in independent Indonesia. Unlike Pramoedya’s work, they did not contest the official version of national history, which was outside their field of vision. Though artless and far from the ‘scientific’ history desired by Soedjatmoko, they provided a perspective on the way in which the past was present in different Indonesian milieus, and the parts of its legacy that different writers thought it important to preserve, which is not to be found in more academic works.

**REFORMATION AND FREEDOM OF SPEECH**

Once the New Order was dethroned in 1998 following the Asian economic crisis and the Indonesian Reformation movement, there was a strong desire for the restoration of historical truth, often based on a relatively simplistic idea of realloving praise and blame. So there was a re-examination of the ‘Serangan Umum’, the major attack launched against the Dutch in Yogyakarta; of the events leading up to the 30 September 1965 coup; of the content of the document called *Supersemar*, in which Sukarno had allegedly signed over power to Suharto; and of the role of the military, especially in regional rebellions. Minister of Education Yuwono Sudarsono ordered an investigation of these issues to improve the content of school texts, a new edition of which was published in 2000. Suharto was given less credit for the Serangan Umum, and the Sultan of Yogyakarta more, and the reliability of *Supersemar* was also questioned. However, the role of the army in 1965 was not re-examined, and the victims of 1965–6 were still silenced, though in 1999 the Society of Indonesian Historians (Masyarakat Sejarawan Indonesia) made an appeal for investigation of this period. In the revised text the New Order was almost completely erased, except for statements about its developmental success and its eventual downfall due to KKN (‘Corruption, Collusion, and Nepotism’—the main targets of the Reformation movement). Part three of the textbook, on economic and technological development, remained more or less the same, though it was no longer attributed to the New Order. By contrast, twenty-five pages were devoted to an optimistic narrative of Reformation. Schulte Nordholt comments that the overall effect is of an eventless history disconnected from actors, political space, and time.

In the wider society the lifting of censorship rapidly led to the republication of leftist books by legendary figures such as Tan Malaka and the radical Javanese journalist and writer Mas Marco Kartodikromo, a revival of literature on Sukarno, ethnic-oriented regional histories (some reacting to representations of the Javanese as the heroic winners of independence by portraying them as in fact the new

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colonizers), and individual biographies. Books appeared on subjects hitherto taboo: for example, the mass slaughters of 1965–6.

The Society of Indonesian Historians made a formal and categorical declaration of independence from state control at the Seventh National History Conference held in Jakarta in October 2001. This meeting, and the next one held in August 2002 in Cisarua, saw the emergence of a younger generation of historians referred to as the Third Generation, Post-Sartono, or Reformation generation. Mestika Zed presented a paper, ‘Menggugat Tirani Sejarah Nasional’ (‘Criticizing the Tyranny of National History’), in which he represented the idea of a national history as tyrannical and oppressive. Bambang Purwanto criticized Indonesian historians for their over-emphasis on the colonial, to the neglect of internal and local dynamics, and for anachronism and disproportionate attention to ‘big men’. His solution was strict adherence to scientific historical methodology. Purwanto also accused Sartono of regarding things done by the Dutch East India Company (Vereenigde Oost-Indische Kompagnie [VOC]) as exploitation, while considering the demands of local elites as merely requiring the sacrifice one member of the family makes for another. This constitutes an implicit criticism of the central New Order ideal of the familial state, characterized by a natural and desirable obedience to the head of the family. He also argued that the VOC’s exploitation simply continued a venerable Indonesian tradition, and criticized the Sartono school for having an anachronistic framework in which pirates and bandits were portrayed not as criminals, but as anti-colonial fighters. Purwanto also rejected the popular demand to replace Suharto with the Sultan in the role of hero as simply the equivalent of the de-Sukarnoizing of history when Suharto took power, and was wary of the pelurusan sejarah (‘rectification of history’) project begun in 1998. He feared that this would just replace old historical orthodoxies with new ones, giving rise to yet another version of history satisfying the hunger for revenge and power, rather than one satisfying scientific norms for truth verification.

On the other hand, Asvi Warman Adam, who was actually involved in the pelurusan sejarah project, claimed that it intended to be inclusive, and not to install another monolithic interpretation of history—rather, it wanted to democratize history by allowing space for competing interpretations. Adam reported some successes, such as the stipulation in the 2004 curriculum that students should be presented with different interpretations of the 1965 coup. However, his report of success in curriculum reform proved to be premature. In early 2007 the Attorney General took legal action to withdraw the new school textbooks and overturn the 2004 history curriculum, which had embodied the efforts of teachers, university lecturers, and curriculum designers to introduce some sort of balanced coverage of the Madiun affair of 1948, with its ferocious clashes.

39 Ibid., 13.
40 Curaming, ‘Towards Re-Inventing Indonesian Nationalist Historiography’.
between hard-line Muslims and leftists, and of the 1965 coup. Rather than introducing counter-propaganda, they were merely attempting to show students that there are a number of different interpretations. This more open viewpoint is now undermined by a resurgence of fanatical anti-communism, according to some because of the continuing political influence of the military and Suharto supporters. Many prominent historians, such as Sartono and Onghokham, signed a petition against the bannings. Nevertheless, in May 2007 the Attorney General’s Office confiscated textbooks on the grounds that they covered the teachings of Marx, Lenin, Stalin, and Mao, which were supposedly in violation of the principles of Pancasila, particularly its affirmation of belief in God. Anti-communist historians continued to propagate the New Order’s official version of the 1965 coup and of the violence arising out of the land reform law that led up to it. For example, Aminuddin Kasdi published a book on land reform in East Java called Kaum Merah Menjarah [The Reds Plunder].

In mid-2007 a workshop on alternative history was held in Yogyakarta, bringing together younger intellectuals, including practitioners from outside the academy such as activists such as Hilmar Farid, who criticized Indonesian historians for retaining the categories and frameworks of the New Order, and journalists such as Maria Hartiningsih. Purwanto presented a paper on land ownership prior to 1965, showing how local religious leaders had reclassified land to increase their holdings, in contrast to the picture given by Kasdi of illegal communist seizure of land. By this time various NGOs, not all from academic circles, were trying to uncover the histories of the mass killings of 1965.

In a recent publication, Schulte Nordholt argues that as long as the history of Indonesia does not include the 1965 killings, it is not a true history with which people can identify: it is a pitiful history which remembers only official heroes and is silent about the thousands of victims, while centralizing the primacy of the state. He is of the opinion that Indonesians are momentarily ‘a people without history’, and the question that must now be asked is whether a new Indonesian historiography will succeed in liberating itself from the interests, perspective, and conceptual framework of the state. This criticism of Indonesian history-writing is a valid one. However, we must also take into account the fact that both the Indonesian state and the Indonesian people have greatly changed since colonial times, and this has major implications for the relationship between them, and also for history-writing in Indonesia. The state is no longer the monolithic colonial bureaucracy, nor the tightly controlled New Order state, but a state that has fractured into many competing groups—some legal, others not. The populace too is very different: the literacy rate is no longer 6.4 per cent but has been raised to 90 per cent, one of the highest in the Muslim world—above richer

42 Ibid.
states such as Saudi Arabia, Iran, and neighbouring Malaysia, and also above South American states such as Peru and Brazil. There are now around forty-four state universities and a couple of dozen private ones. Certainly, these are not Oxford or Harvard, but neither was the Bandung Engineering College that Sukarno attended, and if he could mount a critique of imperialism in its impoverished intellectual climate we can expect some critical thinking today. In addition, increasing numbers of Indonesians complete Ph.D.s in history at overseas universities, satellite dishes with access to world news have long been a feature of the landscape, and now YouTube provides vastly more information to the well-connected. Indeed, travelling in Indonesia reveals that even rural villages are surprisingly aware of what is happening in other countries. Unlike the Dutch, the New Order government actually used its increased resource revenues to pump large amounts of money into education. So, even if the present government would like to reimpose a statist historiography, it can no longer rely on the existence of an uneducated and credulous populace, as both the pre-colonial kings and the colonial government could. The written word has lost most of its intrinsic magic, rather like the batik patterns once reserved for royalty, because it can now be used by nearly everyone.

Indonesia is now enjoying, after nearly half a century of authoritarian government, the sort of freedom it enjoyed briefly in the 1950s. This has led to a rapid shift to a much more diverse landscape, both in the political sphere, with its dozens of parties, and in the diverse viewpoints now espoused by historians. The outpouring of different accounts of Indonesian history with the lifting of censorship testifies to the extent of interest in this subject, and it is hard to see how Indonesians are a people without history. Vickers’s database contains about 1,600 books on history published since the fall of Suharto. Nationalism is still by far the largest topic with seven hundred books. Islam comes in second with over three hundred books, many of them on ‘dissenting’ or indigenous forms of Islam. This is an opportune juncture to pay tribute to the pioneering work of Azyumardi Azra in tracing Islamic networks that, despite their powerful historical agency, are extraordinarily difficult for later historians to recapture. This work is certainly history with personal actors and within a clear political context. Nearly as numerous as works on Islam are those on social history, while the substantial output of regional histories is what one would expect in the wake of political decentralization.

Meanwhile, the Western historical profession has also changed enormously since the 1965 criticism of Indonesian history-writing as insufficiently scientific. Van Leur’s critique of Dutch colonial historiography has been extended, for

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45 Azyumardi Azra, The Origins of Islamic Reformism in Southeast Asia: Networks of Malay-Indonesian and Middle Eastern Ulama in the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries (Crows Nest NSW/Honolulu, 2004).
example in Schulte Nordholt’s deconstruction of the representation of the *pax neerlandica*, one of its central claims. Schulte Nordholt uses an unsolicited report, submitted to the colonial government by the tobacco planter C. Amand in 1872, that caused considerable unrest among colonial officials. Amand’s report overturned the prevailing colonial picture of the Javanese peasant community as a ‘palladium of peace’ by depicting a world in which cattle theft, extortion, opium smuggling, violence, and especially intimidation, were daily phenomena. The entire colonial government on Java was based, in fact, on an extensive network of rural crime, largely due to governmental inability to control all of Java. It was forced to recruit the services of local strongmen, called *jago*, in exchange for which they were free to carry out their own criminal activities. The *jago* were no noble bandits who stole from the rich and gave to the poor, and neither did they form a remnant of an old and decaying culture. Rather, they were the product of a new colonial relationship. The colonial government tried in vain to discredit Amand’s report, but was more successful in keeping from the public the shocking revelation that on Java, crime and the state were largely formed, and reinforced, by each other. Schulte Nordholt’s work reveals that the authoritatively written and expensively produced volumes of Dutch colonial history (so much more impressive than the cheap paperbacks in which local histories appeared) have their own form of ‘verbal magic’.46

Western historians in general are also now more inclined to recognize the validity of local and indigenous historical traditions and memories, even if these do not stand up to the sort of scholarly scrutiny that would once have been considered essential. This is true of Western attitudes to Indonesian history-writing. While this may be less arrogant and unreflective than earlier attitudes, it is not without its problems. A significant proportion of the local or regional or ideologically in-group historical accounts are not simply picturesque and colourful parts of a rich tapestry, but are highly polemical. To validate one view of the past is to invalidate or deny the truth of another—and Indonesian history is highly contested indeed. Deep divisions are found in the interpretation of bloody events of the past, and heroes of the past are often mobilized for the battles of the present. Conflicting interpretations are held with particular heat when they pertain to a history of violence springing from major fault lines in Indonesian society: ethnic conflicts, either between different *pribumi* (‘indigenous’) groups or between indigenous Indonesians and Chinese Indonesians, who are not included in the *pribumi* category; conflicts between different religious groups; and conflicts between hard-line Muslims and secularists or socialists. It is hoped that the Society of Indonesian Historians will be able to play a role in reducing the production, and inflammatory effects, of aggressively one-sided histories.

If there is to be another national history, it cannot be as ‘tyrannical’ as it was in earlier periods because it cannot have the same monopoly (unless there is a return to authoritarian rule, and even then it will be difficult to reverse the developments that have taken place in Indonesian society and internationally). And it will have to deal with the legacy of past political manipulation of history, particularly with respect to those previously treated as outside the pale. Historians will need to develop, as Adam stated, an inclusive history. The New Order state operated by designating certain groups as pariahs, from whose alleged nefarious activities it ‘protected’ the conforming population. The most obvious of these groups comprised those accused of left-wing activity, and now perhaps no single issue is a greater problem for reconciliation between antagonistic parties than the regime change of 1965—an issue that seems unlikely to go away if it is not addressed. President Abdurrahman Wahid broke the taboo on discussion of these events when he made a public appeal for investigations of the murders of 1965–6, and also offered an apology for the role that the militias of his own organization, the Nahdatul Ulama, had played in them. The issue is, however, far from resolved.

Indonesians of Chinese descent are another stigmatized group. They did not live in the extreme wretchedness of those accused of being communists, but they were pariahs in the sense of carrying the guilt for any economic hardship suffered by the populace, and have been widely regarded as thieving usurers without loyalty to Indonesia. Though the New Order generals themselves became rich by working with the Chinese, they did not hesitate to use them as scapegoats. After the economic crisis and during the regime change, there were attacks on Chinese and mass rapes of Chinese women allegedly instigated by a prominent general. In the aftermath of the New Order’s long-running strategy of caricaturing and stigmatizing many Indonesians (such as leftists or alleged leftists, Islamic extremists, and Chinese), it is to be hoped that both academic histories and textbooks will now move beyond this divisive and prejudicial way of writing history.

**TIMELINE/KEY DATES**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Event</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1942</td>
<td>(March) Japanese conquest of Indonesia</td>
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<tr>
<td>1945</td>
<td>(17 August) Declaration of Independence</td>
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<tr>
<td>1945–9</td>
<td>‘Revolution’ ending with failure of Dutch attempt to re-establish colonial rule</td>
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<tr>
<td>1948</td>
<td>(September) Madiun Affair</td>
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<td>1949–62</td>
<td>Darul Islam rebellion</td>
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<td>1949–57</td>
<td>Parliamentary Democracy</td>
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<tr>
<td>1955</td>
<td>First elections</td>
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<tr>
<td>1958</td>
<td>(February) PRRI rebellion</td>
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<td>1957–65</td>
<td>Sukarno’s Guided Democracy</td>
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<tr>
<td>1962</td>
<td>Dutch forced to cede West Irian to Indonesia</td>
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<tr>
<td>1963–5</td>
<td>Confrontation (with Malaysia)</td>
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1965 (30 September) Gestapu (coup attempt ended by military takeover)
1965–8 Establishment of ‘New Order’ with General Suharto as President
1975 Annexation of Timor
1976 Aceh insurgency begins
1998 Asian Financial Crisis; ‘Reformation’ and resignation of Suharto
1999 Restoration of free elections and increase in parliament’s authority
2002 Timor becomes independent

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Chapter 29
Settler Histories and Indigenous Pasts: New Zealand and Australia

Bain Attwood

Since 1945 the nature of historical writing in New Zealand and Australia has been transformed. In the 1950s and 1960s, as the number of academic historians increased exponentially and growing professionalization occurred, a project of constructing a progressive story of masculinist nation-making and nationalism became dominant, while in the 1970s and 1980s a younger generation of historians, many of them women and first-generation Australians, challenged this triumphant nationalist story of self-realization as they embraced social and cultural history and their emphases on the differences of class, gender, sexuality, race, and ethnicity. The story that could be told about this research probably resembles in large part the one recounted by many of the surveys of national historiographies in this volume. There is one area, however, in which historical writing in New Zealand and Australia has undoubtedly been distinctive, at least in terms of its public impact; namely, that concerning the pasts of the indigenous peoples.

Historical representations of the encounter between indigenous and settler peoples in New Zealand and Australia have undergone major changes since the Second World War. New histories have told a story that has reflected and informed major debates about the nature of the indigenous people’s rights and the very basis of national sovereignty. These were propelled in the post-war period by changes sweeping across much of the world. The growing interest in the human rights of racial minorities focused attention on policies and practices now deemed to be racially discriminatory, and led to the adoption of a programme of assimilation in order to address the indigenous people’s poverty and incorporate them into the nation-state as citizens enjoying the same rights and privileges as other New Zealanders and Australians. The challenge to imperial rule presented by colonized peoples in Asia and Africa focused attention on the indigenous rights of Maori and Aborigines, which principally comprised rights to the land they once owned as well as the right of self-determination they had once exercised. The claiming of such rights, and the histories of
discrimination, dispossession, and destruction that accompanied them, drew into question the moral legitimacy of the settler nation. Simultaneously, the settlers’ sense of themselves and their nations as British and white was challenged as the demographic make-up of both countries changed (largely as a result of immigration from southern Europe and the Middle East in Australia’s case, and an increase of Maori and Pacific Islanders in New Zealand’s). Also the place of these countries in the world shifted (since Britain decided that its economic and strategic relationship with Europe was more important than any community of British peoples, and the new postcolonial nations of Southeast Asia asserted their presence economically and politically in the Asia-Pacific region).

The impact of indigenous claims to rights and sovereignty, as well as the histories they prompted, has been most striking in Australia but more profound in New Zealand, the consequence both of their different pasts and historiographical traditions.

NEW ZEALAND

Prior to 1945, New Zealand historians narrated a story of progress around the themes of settler exploration, pioneering, self-government, and economic growth. Yet the co-option of the indigenous people was a cornerstone of this historiography. Writers sought to assimilate the indigenous people by constructing a tale about harmony between Maori and Pakeha (the settlers), and the nobility of the Maori. This became more necessary in the post-war years as a new field of historical study called ‘race relations’ was forged. It defined the encounter between settler and indigenous peoples as one primarily concerned with race, not nations, and it concentrated on European historical structures and agents, and the consequences of these for indigenous peoples.

Keith Sinclair, commonly regarded as the doyen of the post-war New Zealand historians, undertook nearly all his early work in this field. He was following in the footsteps of the previous generation of New Zealand historians who had done research on British colonial policy at the imperial centre, but his account increasingly differed from theirs as he adopted the analytical frame of the nation rather than the empire. One of his main themes concerned the country’s ‘racial relations’. In The Origins of the Maori Wars (1957) he recast the way the principal conflict in New Zealand had been understood. Whereas earlier generations of imperial-minded historians had represented the wars of the 1860s as an interruption in the founding of a new British state, he presented them as a formative struggle in an ancient Pacific nation’s history. He primarily blamed the conflict on settler greed for land, although he allowed that aggressive British ‘racialism’, the challenge of ‘Maori nationalism’ to the authority of the governors, and the failure of a humanitarian lobby to check these governors’ blundering or arrogant
approaches, had also played a part. Yet, however much Sinclair questioned the moral rectitude of the Pakeha, his desire to forge a distinctive national identity for the country led him to claim that the wars had resulted in the founding of a new nation that had uniquely embraced the two races. Indeed, in his *History of New Zealand* (1959) which was prefaced by a Maori origin story, he championed the national myth that ‘race relations’ were much happier than they were in comparable countries, especially Australia. He largely attributed this to imperial humanitarian idealists and the ‘experiments’ in ‘racial amalgamation’ they conducted after British annexation in 1840, just as he accepted the Treaty of Waitangi of that year as a symbol of their aspiration that New Zealand comprise two peoples living together harmoniously.\(^1\)

Sinclair stimulated much work on ‘race relations’ during the 1950s and 1960s, most importantly by Keith Sorrenson and Alan Ward. Yet their research was influenced by greater acquaintance with the fields of African and Pacific history respectively. This alerted them to the similarities between New Zealand and other sites of British colonization, and their studies acquired more of a Maori focus and perspective. The picture they painted was bleaker than Sinclair’s. The wars were not only caused by a struggle over the land: for Sorrenson, land in the Maori world was intimately connected with authority or government, and so the conflict concerned sovereignty; while for Ward, racialist attitudes of white supremacy were crucial, and the humanitarians were partly to blame because they were critical of Maori resistance to a hurried Europeanization and attempts to uphold their traditional order. Both, however, focused more on the consequences of the wars. Sorrenson examined the role that lawfare in the form of a land court had played in a massive alienation of Maori land, and Ward examined the imposition of British law and culture by the policy of ‘racial amalgamation’, which he characterized as liberal and progressive in intent but which, he argued, oppressed Maori as much as settler self-interest, though he claimed this settler project ensured that the citizenship rights of Maori were preserved and racialist segregation prevented. Sorrenson and Ward were intent on countering a myth of fatal impact, or at least contending that the disastrous consequences of British colonization were delayed by Maori resistance until the late nineteenth century, by depicting the Maori response as independent, adaptive, and positive, rather than imitative, reactive, and negative. According to Sorrenson, Maori chiefs had sought to repudiate the authority of the British, stop their people selling land, and resolve matters of law and order arising from relations with whites, first by using traditional tribal means such as *runanga* (courts), and then by adopting new pan-tribal ones such as *Kingitanga* (the King movement). According to

Ward, most Maori had sought full inclusion in the new colonial order, but in a way that retained their sense of being Maori.  

In this work, there was something of a turn away from the framework of ‘race relations’. Since its guiding beacon of anti-racism regarded racial differentiation as the enemy of racial equality, it had provided little opportunity to consider the role cultural difference played in the Pakeha–Maori encounter. By contrast, the anthropological concept of ‘culture’ enabled historians to register this and consider the relations between indigenous and settler in terms of ‘cultural contact’, and the indigenous responses in terms of ‘acculturation’ or ‘cultural adjustment’. This was most apparent in the work Judith Binney undertook in the 1960s on the encounter between the cultures of Maori and evangelical missionaries in northern New Zealand in the 1820s and 1830s. She sought to demarcate a sequence of Maori responses to the permanent advent of Europeans in their land, arguing that their pragmatic reaction to Christianity was primarily determined by their shifting perceptions of the political power, economic wealth, technological superiority (especially literacy), and the ‘peace’ and ‘love’ presented to them by the missionaries, in a context of the loss and despair caused by Maori tribal warfare. Similarly, a series of Maori prophetic movements, biblical rather than Christian in nature, which included the cult of Papahurihia, Te Ua Haumene’s Pai Marire, and the Ringatu faith, were interpreted as a means by which Maori had sought to adapt to the threat of colonization by holding onto their land, asserting their authority, and forming a pan-tribal identity. This research, done in the 1960s by both historians and anthropologists at the University of Auckland, was regarded as evidence of the potential benefits of cross-disciplinary work, although socioeconomic rather than cultural explanations still predominated in historical accounts. Other studies undertaken during this period considered the varying political strategies Maori adopted at the turn of the century, not only recounting the story of young so-called modernizers who largely took the path of ‘cooperation’, but also recovering the history of more traditionalist leaders who adopted the course of ‘protest’.

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If the writing discussed so far served to undermine both the myths of happy race relations and fatal impact, two studies of Maori warriors and warfare undertaken by James Belich in the late 1970s and early 1980s ensured its demise. He not only stressed the scale of the conflict, now cast (as Thomas Lindsay Buick had done in the 1920s) as ‘the New Zealand Wars’, but suggested that they featured one of the most efficient and effective acts of resistance an indigenous people had ever mounted against a European power. The settlers had only won because they had overwhelming numbers, yet this had then been forgotten in settler histories. Similarly, Belich challenged the myth of humanitarianism by contending that the outcome of the Pakeha–Maori encounter owed more to the strength of Maori. Most importantly, he reframed the findings of the two previous generations of historians. Whereas they had taken for granted the primacy of the present-day Pakeha order in New Zealand, and projected its power and authority back onto the past, premising their narratives on a Pakeha sovereignty whose origin and rise fell outside of their inquiry, Belich described a frontier world in which Pakeha and Maori communities interacted but were largely autonomous of one another, and so could neither coerce nor rule the other until around 1870. After this time, he argued, Maori autonomy continued to survive in some areas through collaboration and resistance, and this helped to preserve Maori language, culture, and identity and laid the basis for subsequent political and social resurgence.5

None of the writing discussed so far should necessarily be regarded as Maori history, though the studies framed in terms of ‘culture contact’ might resemble one of its features. Arguably, Maori history comprises work authored by Maori or Pakeha that attempts to understand the past from the perspective of a Maori worldview; and seeks to undertake research and writing in a manner that requires the consent and cooperation, if not collaboration, of Maori. The rise of this approach can be dated to the early and mid-1970s, and to the ‘Maori renaissance’, when protests such as the Maori Land March bespoke a politics deemed to be more radical in content and style than anything in living memory. As far as Pakeha scholars are concerned, the leading practitioners have been the historians Michael King, Judith Binney, Ann Parsonson, and Angela Ballara, and the anthropologists Anne Salmond and Jeffrey Sissons.

The first works published were biographical in nature. All were rooted in ‘oral history’ and ‘fieldwork’, and grew out of personal encounters between Pakeha scholars and Maori families. The most important were Salmond’s ‘as told to autobiographies’ of a Te Whanau-a-Apanui and Ngati Porou woman, Amiria Stirling, and her husband Eruera (1976 and 1980); King’s biography of the early to mid-twentieth-century Tainui leader, Te Puea Herangi (1977); and Binney’s biographical study of Te Kooti’s Ringatu disciple, the Tuhoe messianic leader.

Rua Kenana and his community at Maungapohatu in the early twentieth century (1979); her collective biography of several Ringatu women (1986); and her biographical study of Te Kooti (1995). They revealed that Maori accounts of the past differed in many respects from those recounted by European history. This was primarily because they belonged to an oral tradition. They were told by means such as myth, song, and proverb which, structured around kin and defined by whanau (extended family) and whakapapa (genealogy), sought to preserve mana (authority) and transfer it from one generation to the next. More particularly, it was apparent that some accounts amounted to ‘miraculous’ myth-narratives, which belonged to the parable tradition of the Bible, and had a purpose that was essentially moral, as they were prophetic or predictive stories of freedom told in an attempt to bring about changes in future Pakeha–Maori power relations. Consequently, these scholars began to sense that the ‘memory’ or ‘mythology’ presented by Maori historical narratives and the ‘facts’ provided by academic history belonged to radically different ways of knowing the past and being in the world. They carried divergent notions of causation and consequence, and shifted reality and temporality into realms unfamiliar to Pakeha. In other words, the project of oral history in this context not only revealed that Maori had experienced the past differently to Pakeha, but that they also had different priorities and different forms for remembering that past in narrative. This realization, not unlike that of the school of Subaltern Studies discussed by Gyan Prakash in this volume, led historians to question the European assumption that history was a universal phenomenon. In Binney’s case, she came to conclude that Maori oral narratives and European written texts amounted to two different ways of narrating history. Their contradictions meant that they could not be translated into one another or interwoven. Instead, it was best to juxtapose them in order to preserve their purpose and integrity, enable ‘an equality of perceptions’, and reveal how and why Maori and European pasts have been constructed in the way they have been.6

Binney’s technique owed much to Sissons’s reflections on his encounter with oral history among Tuhoe. He arranged the oral narratives he was told in accordance with the four different domains of their historical discourse, each of which was associated with a particular period of time and connected through whakapapa, and each of which had been transformed through the colonial encounter. He juxtaposed these accounts with a Pakeha archive, which primarily comprised official records such as judicial ones, and personal accounts, such as the famous writings of one of his anthropological predecessors in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries and his own fieldwork journal.7

7 Jeffrey Sissons, Te Waimana: The Spring of Mana: Tuhoe History and the Colonial Encounter (Dunedin, 1991).
At the same time that these scholars were doing research in oral history and oral tradition, Salmond, Parsonson, and Ballara were undertaking studies based on written sources. There is a considerable wealth of these, especially compared to Australia, and they include material in te reo Maori (the language), allowing studies of a depth for which there is no Australian equivalent. Salmond told anew the story of the early meetings between Maori and European by trying to recover how they might have seen one another and these encounters through the haze created by the Europeans’ own reflections, rereading the historical record by using the tools of both anthropology and history in the manner adopted by ethnographic historians such as Greg Dening. Salmond’s account of Maori and their encounter with Europeans concluded in the early 1800s, but Parsonson and Ballara considered the bulk of that century, the former studying Maori land selling, the latter Maori organization and warfare. According to their accounts, Maori culture remained a highly competitive one, the principal basis of which was small hapu rather than the larger iwi of which they might be a part. The pursuit of mana actually increased with the coming of the Pakeha, since the newcomers provided them with greater opportunities by bringing new artefacts (such as the plough), new foods (such as the potato), new technologies (such as literacy), new ideals (such as Christianity), and new markets (for food). According to Ballara, nearly all these played some role in provoking the tribal wars of the 1820s, but warfare was endemic in the Maori world since it was integral to the traditional political system, and these wars were fought in accordance with the same ancient cultural imperatives as before, as hapu and iwi battled to restore their mana by means of utu—an act of reciprocity whereby return or repayment is sought after losses caused by crime or violence. These wars nonetheless caused much death and displacement, and began a course of change which, furthered by conflict with Pakeha, saw iwi begin to replace the smaller hapu as the most important political groupings. According to Parsonson, these wars and introduced diseases had a considerable impact on the ways in which Maori continued their pursuit of mana. In the twenty years after British annexation, many Maori willingly sold a considerable amount of their ancestral lands—a point which tended to be obscured by the earlier studies that focused on Pakeha attempts to appropriate it. This was so, she suggested, for two reasons: by taking payment for the land and putting Pakeha into possession of it, Maori sought to vindicate their claims to the land as against those of their Maori foes as well as bring Pakeha into their midst and thus gain access to the skills they brought, the markets they offered for the goods Maori grew, and the employment they provided. In the period after the Native Land Court began its work, the first of these factors continued to be important. Later, as land sales spiralled out of control, Parsonson argued that the Kingitanga was in large part an endeavour on the part of chiefs to assert their mana, that it largely failed because its cry for unity sounded strange in Maori ears, and that in the wars that occurred in the 1860s many did not necessarily see the Pakeha government as the major enemy, or had their own

Pakeha historians were by no means the only players in Maori history. Their role was contested during the 1980s as Maori (who were now becoming academics in greater numbers) sought to indigenize the field. Many asserted that only Maori should write Maori history, or at least that Pakeha should do so only with the approval of Maori people and in accordance with Maori protocols. In the 1990s the terms of the debate shifted to the nature of history itself. Linda Tuhiiwai Smith claimed that the disciplines of history and anthropology were inherently European forms of knowledge that had been used to rule Maori. More specifically, historians such as Te Ahukaramu Charles Royal and Danny Keenan challenged the category of Maori history by asserting that the heart of their world lay in descent groups, and so it was more appropriate to formulate histories in terms of \textit{iwi}, \textit{hapu}, or even smaller communities. They contended that such histories would be undertaken by the members of such communities in particular ways since they were bound by the rules regarding knowledge in their own culture, such as \textit{tapu}; they argued that these accounts would be organized in terms of ancestry and \textit{whakapapa} and transmitted by oral tradition comprising stories, prayers, and song; and they asserted that these customary forms of Maori knowledge were of the greatest help in the task of understanding the Maori past.

Lastly, Te Maire Tau suggested there were two ways of representing the past: namely, \textit{Matauranga Maori} and history—that these were incommensurate systems of knowledge, and that any attempt to incorporate the former into the latter would destroy it. Since 1990 several Maori histories have been produced, most of which have been grounded in \textit{whakapapa} and oral traditions, and their methodological presuppositions, explanations of causation, and intended audience make them very different from the works of Maori history penned by Pakeha scholars.\footnote{Te Ahukaramu Charles Royal, \textit{Te Haurapa: An Introduction to Researching Tribal Histories and Traditions} (Wellington, 1992); Linda Tuhiiwai Smith, \textit{Decolonising Methodologies: Research and Indigenous Peoples} (Dunedin, 1999); Danny Keenan, ‘Ma Pango Ma Whero Ka Oti: Unities and Fragments in Maori History’, in Bronwyn Dalley and Bronwyn Labrum (eds.), \textit{Fragments: New Zealand Social and Cultural History} (Auckland, 2000), 39–53; and Te Maire Tau, \textit{Ngi Pikituroa o Ngai Tahu: The Oral Traditions of Ngai Tahu} (Dunedin, 2003).}

The intervention of Maori has a profound impact on matters of historical authorship, audience, and authority. King declared that his fellow Pakeha
historians should stop writing Maori history in favour of Maori historians. However, several continued to undertake major projects by accepting Maori protocols, assuming a sense of primary responsibility to those who have made their work possible, and declaring that they were Pakeha authors who worked in a European academic tradition but sought to ensure Maori understandings of the past were given something like their full weight. It has been claimed that a new generation of Pakeha students were deterred by such requirements and consequently chose less fraught areas of study. Research undoubtedly shifted away from the approach of Maori history, but there were several reasons for this.

The growth of intellectual and cultural history generally, and the rise of postmodernism and postcolonialism more particularly, saw a considerable number of studies concentrating on Pakeha in the context of colonialism, principally the anthropological and historical work of earlier Pakeha writers, though this work had actually begun already. Much of it concerned the men who founded the Polynesian Society in the late nineteenth century to encourage the study of Maori culture, and focused their research upon so-called Maori myths and legends, especially regarding Maori origins and migration. In studies undertaken by Keith Sorrenson, Michael O’Reilly, and Kerry Howe, the relationships of knowledge and power that functioned between metropole and colony, Pakeha and Maori, amateur and professional, were considered. This theme was integral to a broader historical project launched by Peter Gibbons. Noting that New Zealand historians since 1945 had treated colonization as no more than a prehistorical episode in the making of the nation, he suggested that a wide range of cultural productions could be interrogated for the role they played in an ongoing process of cultural colonization, rather than simply that of nation-building, thereby seeking to uncover the multiple discursive means by which Pakeha have claimed a sense of possession and come to regard the country as naturally theirs at the expense of the Maori. In this, Gibbons not only had in mind the use of the written and printed word in various forms, but also images of one kind or another.10

The most important reason for the shift away from Maori history, however, was the rise of ‘Treaty history’. Accounts of the Treaty of Waitangi, by Ian Wards and Ruth Ross in the late 1960s and early 1970s, had attacked the humanitarian myth-making that enveloped it, but their scepticism regarding the treaty was soon cast aside. A Maori protest movement abandoned its attack on the treaty as a fraud, and embraced calls by Maori parliamentarians for it to be honoured as a political compact guaranteeing Maori particular rights. In turn, many Pakeha

began to urge the government to right the wrongs of the past. Consequently, in 1975 a commission of inquiry, the Treaty of Waitangi Tribunal, was created by an Act of Parliament to enable any Maori to make claims regarding any future breaches of the treaty, and in 1985 an amendment empowered the Tribunal to hear retrospective claims dating back to the time the treaty was made in 1840. During those ten years the treaty came to be regarded very differently historically. Somewhat paradoxically, Ross’s work proved to be crucial to this. She had pointed out that the treaty consisted of two texts, English and Maori, neither a direct translation of the other; and that the two texts differed radically, since the Maori ceded sovereignty to the Crown in the English one but the British guaranteed the autonomy and authority of the Maori in the Maori one, which the vast majority of Maori signatories had signed. In the early to mid-1980s this argument provided the grounding for a tale of two treaties that swept the country, and which simultaneously unsettled the historical and constitutional foundations of the nation and resettled them on a basis that was both new and old.\(^\text{11}\)

In the wake of this, academic historians began to argue that not only were there two histories of the treaty to be told, but that two pasts had actually stemmed from the treaty—one from the English language version, the other from the Maori language version. This became a way of articulating an argument that Maori and Pakeha had had separate historical experiences since colonization had begun, that these histories had to be reconciled, and that an historical narrative about the treaty itself might perform this task, just as the Tribunal had suggested. The crucial work in this regard, Claudia Orange’s *The Treaty of Waitangi* (1987), once more told a story in which it was claimed that the treaty had lain at the heart of the history of Maori–Pakeha relations. On the face of it, her book seemed to be a work of Maori history. It told a story about the Maori text of the treaty, the impact of the Pakeha’s abrogation on Maori, the Maori remembrance of the treaty’s guarantees, and their calls for these to be respected. However, its principal subject was actually the Pakeha state. Orange’s book was impelled by an apprehension that there was a chasm between Maori and Pakeha histories of the country because of the state’s failure to honour the treaty; a conviction that traditional historical and legal accounts no longer provided the state with legitimacy, since its maltreatment of the Maori rights guaranteed by the Treaty was no longer considered to be morally acceptable; and a premise that this state of affairs could, and should, be put right by the settler state itself. In much the same manner as whig history, Orange suggested that a new foundation for New

Zealand could be found in the history she told. This placed the beginnings of the settler state in a contract—the Treaty of Waitangi—called it to account for its breaches of this, and urged it to redeem itself by honouring this agreement. By this means, the basis for a reconciled or reconciling bi-cultural nation would be forged, the colonial state renewing its legitimacy, and thus its power, by respecting Maori rights on the one hand, and repelling Maori sovereignty on the other.

Once the Waitangi Tribunal was able to hear historical claims dating back to 1840, nearly all Maori communities started to prepare these (1,200 by 2005). The nature of the Tribunal’s work became more historical, archival research became the order of the day, the role of empirical history increased, and that of Maori oral tradition and history diminished. A large number of academically trained Pakeha historians were employed, and they undertook much historical research on matters relating to ‘breaches of the treaty’. The rise of the treaty in public consciousness prompted numerous books, and increasingly the Tribunal’s work seemed to be influencing popular understandings of New Zealand’s past. The Tribunal’s reports of recommendation to government provoked considerable public controversy, but no conflicts resembling the so-called history wars in the United States and Australia. Instead, it prompted a rich academic debate about the nature of the historical work done by, and for, the Tribunal. Critics argued that its legal task dictated the agenda for this historical research by defining the questions and determining the framework in which these were answered, and called the historical work performed by the Tribunal ‘juridical history’: that is, a form of history that seeks to represent the past in such a way that legal and quasi-legal judgements can be made about it in the present, and contemporary problems can be resolved. This, it was argued, requires historians to discover in the past timeless norms and principles that constituted just and proper relationships but which had been breached. Thus, critics charged, such history is fundamentally presentist in nature. They have argued, too, that the Tribunal’s task creates historical accounts that necessarily focus on the Crown’s villainy and so tends to overlook the role played by many other actors or agents in the past, not least Maori themselves, and that its preoccupation with conflict means that it overlooks the attempts of Maori and Pakeha to accommodate one another. Last, critics have charged that the Tribunal’s work has distracted historians from undertaking more interesting research, and that in any case much of the research by its historians has not been made available publicly except for the Tribunal’s purposes. Yet, much of this criticism rested on a consideration of a small number of Tribunal reports or even particular parts of those reports. A more broadly based appraisal of Tribunal history suggests that the work undertaken by its academically trained historians can be largely regarded as sound. Furthermore, historians who worked for the Tribunal have since produced major historical studies. Most notably, Michael Belgrave has argued that commissions of inquiries and courts have been an enduring site of encounter between Maori and Pakeha, and has demonstrated the ways in which the
Tribunal’s work can best be understood as part of a long tradition of Maori presenting histories to legal tribunals in support of their claims and of these being considered by them. However, there can be no doubt that there are many matters that have been overlooked or neglected in recent decades. There has been a dearth of scholarship dealing with the twentieth century, and there have been few studies concerning Maori cooperation with colonial authorities, the adoption and adaptation of European economic modes, the ongoing impact of Christianity, population and depopulation, intermarriage between Maori and Pakeha, economic dependency, and migration and urbanization.12

The tale of two treaties or two histories not only had a considerable impact on the way in which the history of relations been Maori and Pakeha has been told, but it has also influenced the way in which national history has been written in New Zealand. This is evident in James Belich’s Making Peoples (1996) and Paradise Reforged (2001), and Michael King’s The Penguin History of New Zealand (2003), which have had considerable purchase on popular understandings as they became best-sellers. There has been debate about whether these narratives rework the history of New Zealand in a decolonizing manner, or whether they simply reform New Zealand’s history within a bicultural framework that serves to uphold the sovereignty of the Pakeha and undermine the claim of Maori to be the indigenous people.13

AUSTRALIA

The course that historical scholarship took in Australia in the post-war years largely resembled New Zealand’s, but for a while there was a considerable time lag. Until the mid-1960s the encounter between Aboriginal people and settlers was all but neglected by academic historians. An eminent Australian anthropologist, W. E. H. Stanner, damned this as ‘the great Australian silence’, and chastised historians for their role in it. By comparison, the historical encounter

had won the attention of a historical geographer (A. Grenfell Price), a couple of anthropologists (Ronald and Catherine Berndt), an archaeologist (John Mulvane), and an art historian (Bernard Smith). At the time Stanner spoke, the historians’ silence was coming to an end. A political movement for rights for Aboriginal people was gathering momentum through a call for land rights in northern Australia, a freedom ride protesting racial discrimination, and a referendum to change clauses of the nation’s constitution in respect of Aboriginal people, which had aroused interest in the indigenous past.¹⁴

Historical research was undertaken as part of a broad-ranging project on government policy and practice in ‘Aboriginal affairs’ sponsored by the Social Science Research Council of Australia. This was headed by an historian, Charles Rowley, who had been responsible for training administrators to work in the Australian colony of Papua New Guinea. He believed it was impossible to comprehend the so-called Aboriginal problem unless its historical dimension was grasped. Rowley authored a three-volume history framed by the concept of ‘race relations’, which had a major impact on a younger generation of historians, including Henry Reynolds, Raymond Evans, and Lyndall Ryan, who had a similarly political agenda. Their account revised the picture which academic historians had been presenting of a peaceful colonization in which Aboriginal people had receded before the advance of the white man and had become a dying race. They characterized British colonization as a matter of invasion rather than settlement, represented the conflict that occurred as a war, cast the Aboriginal response as resistance, blamed the violence of white frontiersmen on the destructive forces of capitalism and racism, and tallied the Aboriginal dead in the tens of thousands. They gave consideration to the role that humanitarians had played in attempting to ensure Aboriginal people’s rights as British subjects were upheld, but concluded that their impact had been limited. They argued that Aboriginal people were sooner or later forced to come into white settlement because their resistance had been relatively small and segmented (due to the nature of their organization) and had rarely posed a significant threat to the settlers, and that they had been devastated by malnutrition and introduced diseases. Apart from northern Australia, the Aborigines had little ongoing role in the colonial economy as they were unwanted as a source of labour and had nothing to trade. Pushed to the fringes of white society, it was argued that those who encountered missionaries spurned their attempts to civilize and Christianize them, and that most had eventually been confined to small and remote government reserves where they were deprived of capital, forced to live under the paternal eye of white superintendents, and denied their rights. This occurred especially as a raft of discriminatory legislation, passed around the turn of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, enshrined the colonizers’ racial prejudice, and gave administrators

the power to prescribe the Aboriginal people’s place of residence and conditions of employment, control any property they had, dictate who they could marry, and determine the care and custody of their children. Finally, it was claimed that in the total institution of the reserves, successive generations of Aboriginal people lost their autonomy and were stripped of their culture, becoming outcasts in white Australia.\textsuperscript{15}

By the late 1970s, there was already a sense that this work was yielding diminishing returns. The encounter between Aborigines and settlers was treated as though it had been the same across time and place. This prompted some corrective work, though for the most part it has simply filled in the picture that had already been sketched. More importantly, it was realized that the early research had been as Eurocentric as any of the studies of ‘race relations’ undertaken around the world. A new field of historical discourse called ‘Aboriginal history’ began to emerge among a group of anthropologists, archaeologists, and historians in Canberra who founded a scholarly journal, \textit{Aboriginal History}, the key figures being Diane Barwick, a Canadian anthropologist trained in the North American tradition of ethnohistorical research in the 1950s, and Niel Gunson, an Australian historian raised in a school of Pacific History that a New Zealand historian J. W. Davidson created at the Australian National University in the 1950s and 1960s.

In the early 1980s, Henry Reynolds completed what came to be regarded as the first significant work of Aboriginal history, a study of the ways in which Aboriginal people had seen Europeans and consequently acted towards them. On the basis of settler-written sources (but not oral history), and the insights provided by recent anthropological, archaeological, and linguistic studies, he argued that the Aboriginal people had often perceived these newcomers as returned kinsmen and tried to incorporate them into their kinship system and teach them its ethic of reciprocity. He contended that they were angered less by the newcomers’ trespassing on their land than by these intruders asserting an exclusive proprietorial right to it, and suggested that the Aborigines’ attacks on Europeans had shifted from a traditional form of Aboriginal warfare, namely small-scale revenge killings, to large-scale economic warfare. In short, Reynolds’s study emphasized continuity and change, and conservatism and adaptation, in much the same manner as ‘culture contact’ studies in Africa, the Americas, the Pacific, and New Zealand. Reynolds’ approach was a conventional one in any other context, but his study opened up the field of inquiry in Australian historiography.\textsuperscript{16}


\textsuperscript{16} Henry Reynolds, \textit{The Other Side of the Frontier} (Townsville, 1981).
During the 1980s, much research was undertaken in terms of a framework that was called Aboriginal history. First, studies by Bob Reece and Marie Fels, among others, some of which was informed by ethnographic history, challenged the overwhelming emphasis placed on conflict on the frontier and highlighted the accommodation that had taken place. This occurred by uncovering close relations between Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal men and Aboriginal women and non-Aboriginal men on the frontier and elsewhere, by considering how Aboriginal people had made sense of the colonial order and forged a place for themselves in it, and by suggesting that the ways which the indigenous people in the context of colonization had come to conceive of themselves and their fellows as a collective group called ‘Aborigines’ should be the subject of historical inquiry. Second, studies by Andrew Markus, Anna Haebich, Peter Read, and others, much of it based on oral history, challenged various parts of Rowley’s account of the post-frontier period. The attempts to move Aboriginal people onto or off reserves were foiled by a lack of government funding, racially prejudiced settler communities, and the resistance of Aboriginal people. Many Aboriginal reserve dwellers retained some of their traditional religious beliefs, language, and so on, and their communities were characterized by strong kinship bonds and the ethos of sharing and reciprocity that was integral to this, and new forms of community and belonging to country developed on and around these reserves. This work showed, too, that government officials, pursuing policies of absorption or assimilation that distinguished between Aboriginal peoples on the basis of racial descent, had attempted to remove people from reserves and break up these communities, and that this had resulted in the loss of a large amount of Aboriginal reserve lands, the decline of conditions on reserves, the prohibition of marriages, and the separation of children from their kin (‘the stolen generations’), all of which caused enormous suffering and considerable bitterness. Third, studies of indigenous and white political organizations, first formed in the early decades of the twentieth century, undertaken by myself among others, emphasized the influence of imperial and international forces, especially in Britain and the United States, considered the role of campaigners who were influenced by Christianity, communism, feminism, or cultural relativism (in the form of anthropology), and pointed to the differences and tensions between Aboriginal and settler campaigners.  

The emergence of ‘Aboriginal history’ owed much to Aboriginal people’s growing interest. An Aboriginal history movement swept Australia in the 1980s and 1990s. Most of the histories produced, such as Sally Morgan’s best-seller My Place (1987), were necessarily personal and parochial as Aboriginal people told their own histories and those of their families and kin, and did so largely for their own people. As the past became increasingly crucial to their political claims, the question of authorship and authority came to the fore, just as it had in New Zealand; but contestation over the right to tell histories about the indigenous past is especially important in the Australian context, since most non-Aboriginal people only know Aboriginal people through discourses that purport to represent them. In the 1980s many Aboriginal spokespersons sought to check the primacy of settler academics by claiming custodianship of the Aboriginal past, on the grounds that their people were its rightful guardians. More importantly, perhaps, it became apparent, as in New Zealand, that indigenous historians were presenting accounts of the past that differed markedly in form, and thus content, from those traditionally produced by academic historians, and so presented a profound challenge to the truth claims the discipline of history had conventionally made. In response, some historians undertook oral history projects that were collaborative in nature, and accepted the reliability of the memories of their Aboriginal informants. Other scholars, such as the anthropologists Jeremy Beckett and Howard Morphy, and the historian Heather Goodall, adopted a more sophisticated approach, considering Aboriginal oral histories not so much in order to recover past events, but rather to discover how these had since been understood by Aboriginal people, thus treating Aboriginal narratives as accounts of the past rather than accounts from the past, and regarding these as the means by which indigenous people have sought to make sense of their situation as a colonized people. Others, such as the anthropologist Deborah Bird Rose, conceived of their task in large part as one of facilitating the articulation of the different mode of history they had encountered in Aboriginal histories. Most importantly perhaps, it was evident by the early 1990s that many historians, especially among the next generation, had accepted the claim that Aboriginal history was Aboriginal people’s business, and a marked decline occurred in the number of studies considering Aboriginal perspectives, though this shift owed much to the impact of postmodernism and postcolonialism.18

This new wave of research largely focused on representation in one sense or another in order to consider the nature of European knowledge and its

relationship to power. It was primarily a way of contemplating the moral dilemmas that the return of the repressed or oppressed Aboriginal past had provoked among settler Australians. This work arguably had several strands, which focused upon the ways in which European explorers and discoverers sought to possess the land by discursive means, particularly through their naming practices; the work of scientists, especially anthropologists, and their relationship to government policy and practice, for example the evolution of the claim that Aboriginal people were a doomed race; the range of forms assimilation has taken and its outcomes, especially in reference to the governance of Aboriginal people; the relationship to colonialism of humanitarian figures such as those who acted as missionaries, guardians, or campaigners for the rights of Aborigines; and the ambiguous and ambivalent ways in which settlers have remembered or forgotten the past as they forged a sense of place in Australia. (Yet, other scholars considered more material matters, such as the catastrophic impact that diseases introduced by Europeans had on Aboriginal populations.) The work that had the greatest impact publicly was Reynolds’s search for a way to both advance the demands for Aboriginal rights and address a crisis of legitimacy that these provoked. In a study that has striking parallels with Orange’s book on the Treaty of Waitangi, Reynolds forged a new moral foundation for the nation by claiming that Aboriginal title to the land would have been recognized in 1788 had the imperial government acted in accordance with English common law rather than adopting the so-called doctrine of terra nullius, and by suggesting that a humanitarian-inspired Colonial Office had recognized these rights in the 1830s and 1840s.19

The renewed focus on the settler society was deepened by the growth in the number of practitioners in the field who worked in disciplines such as philosophy and literary studies, which previously had little interest in matters Aboriginal. The same phenomenon occurred in New Zealand, but to a much lesser degree. At the same time, historical consideration of the encounter between settler and indigenous people has been drawn more deeply into the public sphere by becoming more central to the national histories that have been penned, even by historians such as Manning Clark, who had scorned Aboriginal people as historical actors at the beginning of his multi-volume history of Australia (1962–87). This is most marked in a multi-authored feminist history of Australia, Creating a Nation (1994). The indigenous past has also entered the

domain of public history, though it has often been framed by multiculturalism that can undermine the status of Aborigines as the indigenous people. Alongside this, some non-Aboriginal public intellectuals have claimed authority for themselves as moral arbiters of the nation’s history. Although they have added little, if anything, to historical understanding, they had a major role in responding to the so-called history wars launched by radical conservatives in the mid- to late 1990s. This assault on ‘Aboriginal history’ has receded since the defeat of a radically conservative government, but its legacy remains as it overturned current Aboriginal policy by attacking Aboriginal rights and Aboriginal self-determination. 20

Australasia?

Although New Zealand and Australia have shared a past, they have rarely shared a history in recent decades. Their pasts were once connected by histories of Australasia or even the national histories produced in the 1950s (or at least the histories of New Zealand). Since the 1980s, however, there has been increasing discussion of the costs of national history. There have been many calls for historical work to be undertaken within frameworks such as global history, imperial history, and transnational history; some calls for regional histories such as Pacific history, the history of Australasia, or Trans-Tasman history (the Tasman being the sea between New Zealand and Australia); and a few calls for research that adopts a comparative framework. National history has been similarly challenged by calls for local history, and for histories that subvert national narratives by imagining their foundational narratives in different terms. 21

In the last decade or so, research has begun to appear that seeks to represent the past by adopting these frameworks, such as Donald Denoon and Philippa Mein Smith’s history of Australia, New Zealand, and the Pacific, and more specialized studies, such as Paul McHugh’s account of indigenous people’s status and the common law in Anglophone societies, Stuart Banner’s survey of possession in the Pacific, Tony Ballantyne’s history of Orientalism, Aryanism, and race, Elizabeth Elbourne’s portrayal of humanitarians, Tony Ballantyne and Brian Moloughney’s study of the connections between Asians, Pakeha, and Maori in Murihuki, Russell Stone’s history of Auckland prior to 1840, and a study of new forms of foundational

20 I discuss these matters in Telling the Truth About Aboriginal History (Sydney, 2005).


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\textbf{TIMELINE/KEY DATES}
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\textbf{New Zealand}

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Event</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1945</td>
<td>The Maori Social and Advancement Act</td>
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<tr>
<td>1960</td>
<td>Hunn Report on Maori Affairs</td>
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<td>1962</td>
<td>New Zealand Maori Council founded</td>
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<td>1967</td>
<td>Maori Affairs Amendment Act</td>
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<td>1971</td>
<td>Nga Tamatoa founded</td>
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<td>1975</td>
<td>Maori Land March</td>
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<td>1975</td>
<td>Treaty of Waitangi Act</td>
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<tr>
<td>1984</td>
<td>Te Hikoi ki Waitangi march</td>
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<tr>
<td>1985</td>
<td>Treaty of Waitangi Amendment Act</td>
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<tr>
<td>1988</td>
<td>Treaty of Waitangi (State Enterprises) Act</td>
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<td>1992</td>
<td>Treaty of Waitangi (Fisheries Claims) Settlement Act</td>
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<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>Foreshore and Seabed Act 2004</td>
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<td>2004</td>
<td>Maori Party founded</td>
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\textbf{Australia}

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<tr>
<td>1957–66</td>
<td>Repeal of discriminatory legislation by states and the Commonwealth</td>
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<td>1958</td>
<td>Federal Council for Aboriginal Advancement created</td>
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<tr>
<td>1963</td>
<td>Yirrkala bark petition</td>
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<td>1966</td>
<td>Wave Hill strike and land claim</td>
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<td>1965</td>
<td>Freedom ride</td>
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<td>1967</td>
<td>Constitutional referendum</td>
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<tr>
<td>1972</td>
<td>Aboriginal tent embassy formed</td>
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<tr>
<td>1973</td>
<td>Aboriginal Land Commission appointed</td>
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<tr>
<td>1975</td>
<td>Racial Discrimination Act</td>
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<td>1976</td>
<td>Northern Territory Land Rights Act</td>
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1987 Royal Commission into Aboriginal Deaths in Custody
1991 Council for Aboriginal Reconciliation formed
1992 High Court Native Title (Mabo) Judgement
1993 Native Title Act
1998 Native Title Amendment Act
2005 Abolition of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Commission (created 1989)
2007 National emergency declared by the federal government
2008 Apology by the Commonwealth Parliament to the stolen generations

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Chapter 30
Chinese Historical Writing since 1949

Susanne Weigelin-Schwiedrzik

Chinese historiography is divided into two political camps, and since 1949 located in two political entities which both claim to represent China as a whole: the People’s Republic of China (PRC) with its capital in Beijing, and the Republic of China (ROC) with its capital in Nanjing and its headquarters in Taipei. This fundamental divide was part and parcel of the Cold War, and dominated the field until the late 1970s when the Communist Party of China (CCP) decided to embark on a road of reform and opening, and the Guomindang (GMD) decided in favour of gradual democratization and the abolishment of martial law in Taiwan. Since then, historiography in mainland China as well as in Taiwan has been undergoing major changes, and these changes seem to drive the two republics further apart. Until the late 1970s, historians on both sides of the Taiwan Strait were focused on Chinese history, and the fundamental problems they confronted were very much the same despite the ideological and political hostility that separated the two camps. Since the end of the Cold War, however, different agendas have been pursued: those in the mainland are confronted with the necessity of rewriting the history of China since the last dynasty to adjust historical interpretation to the necessity of change in the present, and those in Taiwan are in the course of establishing a history of Taiwan that can serve as an argument in favour of the island’s independence from mainland China. Historians on both sides of the strait are in search of a new master narrative. This is what unites them on an abstract level; what separates them is that they are in search of master narratives for two different nations.

COMMON ISSUES OF WRITING HISTORY IN MAINLAND CHINA AND TAIWAN

The common questions historians in mainland China and Taiwan have to solve are those they inherited from the Republican era and the more remote past. The art of history-writing is part of the process of nation-building which China has been pursuing since the collapse of the empire. From that moment on, Chinese
historiography has had to participate in defining China’s new role as a nation among nations, and thus China’s position in the world. The focus of this debate has been the question of particularity versus universality in Chinese history. Even as historiography in mainland China was going through a period of cooperation with the countries in the socialist camp under the leadership of the Soviet Union, and historians in Taiwan were drawn into historiographical debates in the Western part of the world under US leadership, the question of whether or not Chinese history could be analyzed in terms compatible with European history remained debated. This is true, although in both cases the writing of history was strictly controlled by the respective governmental authorities. Nevertheless, it was much more diverse than outside observers would assume. Historians not only used the past to criticize the present, but also developed a field of professionalism defining the rules of the profession and the degree of autonomy it could claim. It is in this context that they discussed the relationship between historical theory and historical data, be it in the form of relating Marxism-Leninism or Western social theories to Chinese history.

With the death of Chiang Kai-shek and Mao Zedong the region entered the post–Cold War period earlier than the rest of the world and, as a consequence, historiography has been confronted with new challenges. As historiography was closely linked to the politics of the Cold War era it has had to re-establish its legitimacy and regain public confidence. While academic historiography is threatened by marginalization, popular interest in history is growing. The recent past plays a major role in this context, and the rewriting of contemporary history is the main challenge with which historians in mainland China as well as in Taiwan are confronted. This history is still in the making, and the writing of contemporary history is embedded into a process of social diversification, individualization, and commodification, in which academic history-writing has to learn to cope with a new diversity stemming from hitherto unknown forms of historiography, such as cartoons and films or computer games and weblogs. While the fragmentation and specialization of the field is rapidly occurring, the public demand for unity in history is more and more difficult to meet.

The institutionalization of historiography is another aspect that shows less difference between mainland China and Taiwan than most would expect. Already before 1949, academic life in China had been organized around two core institutions: the universities and their respective faculties on the one hand, and the Academia Sinica system with its specialized research institutes on the other. This system moved to Taiwan with the GMD government, and was


reduplicated by the People’s Republic of China, as it was common to all countries under Soviet influence. The scholars who took over leadership positions in the late 1940s belonged to the so-called May Fourth generation, with Hu Shi and Fu Sinian dominating the field of historiography on Taiwan, and Guo Moruo as well as Fan Wenlan acting as the directors of the Institute of Ancient History and the Institute of Modern History of the Academy of Science (today the Academy of Social Sciences) in Beijing respectively. However, while most of the infrastructure, both in terms of hardware and software, had to be rebuilt in Taiwan, the newly established communist regime in mainland China had to define a strategy of coping with the opposite problem. The majority of historians remained on the mainland. They were not ready or willing to build their research on Marxism-Leninism. That is why on both sides of the strait a form of historiography that was oriented towards the compilation of sources, and interested in historical facts rather than theories, dominated the field until the late 1950s when this traditional form of history-writing met with criticism. Students in history departments asked vehemently for historical interpretations and explanations, and thus helped a new generation of historians to take over the field. They introduced the idea of social history, and argued in favour of using social theories as a basis of historical interpretation. In mainland China, this new generation was trained ‘under the red banner of Mao Zedong’; and in the case of Taiwan it was influenced by US scholarship.

The turn towards theory generated a conflict with the idea of the particularity of history in China. It also generated criticism of an orientalist or colonialist view of Chinese history. As a response to this, both in mainland China and Taiwan the process of globalization is accompanied by an intensification of the search for particularity in history. For mainland China this implies remembering the greatness of the past as a basis for success in the future; for Taiwan this means defining the difference between the history of China and the history of Taiwan. Of course, these new trends in historiography meet with explicit and implicit resistance and have not yet grown to dominate the field. But they are likely to exert a major influence on the future development of historiography in China.

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4 See Susanne Weigelin-Schwiedrzik, ‘History and Truth in Marxist Historiography’, in Helwig Schmidt-Glintzer, Achim Mittag, and Jörn Rüsen (eds.), Historical Truth, Historical Criticism and Ideology: Chinese Historiography and Historical Culture from a New Comparative Perspective (Leiden, 2005), 421–64.
ESTABLISHING MARXIST DOMINANCE OVER THE FIELD OF HISTORIOGRAPHY IN THE PRC DURING THE 1950S

The master narrative which the CCP introduced to the field of history-writing in 1949 had been written in three steps. During the late 1920s, at a time when the CCP was still competing with the GMD for public influence, the discussion on the ‘character of Chinese society’ was used to convince leftist circles in China of the possibility of interpreting Chinese history in light of Marxism-Leninism. Guo Moruo played a major role in this context as he proved that China, like any other country in the world, had developed according to what was later canonized as the system of social development in five stages by Stalin. Guo Moruo became, from that time on, one of the most authoritative Marxist historians in China, which helps explain why he was later appointed director of the Institute of Ancient History at the Beijing Academy of Science. The second step took place during the Yan’an Rectification Campaign. In ‘On the Chinese Revolution and the Chinese Communist Party’ (1939), Mao had put down the main ideas later historians had to reiterate when writing a history of China since 1840. This text was a product of the sinification of Marxism-Leninism and widely studied among CCP cadres and intellectuals in Yan’an, the headquarters of the CCP during the Anti-Japanese War of 1937–45. Fan Wenlan was the first to incorporate Mao’s ideas into a book on modern Chinese history. He would later become director of the Institute for Modern History at the Academy of Science. Additionally, the Yan’an Rectification Campaign dealt with the history of the CCP. The CCP Central Committee passed a ‘Resolution on Some Questions of History’ shortly before the seventh party congress in 1945 that was to serve as a directive to party historiography in post-1949 mainland China.

According to this master narrative, China had gone through a period of early communism and slavery before entering the feudal stage upon the unification of the empire in 221 BC. China developed seeds of capitalism during the late imperial period, but because of the influence of imperialism they were unable to flower, and instead a semi-feudal and semi-colonial society developed during the nineteenth century. The Revolution of 1911 was read as an unsuccessful

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attempt to overthrow feudalism and establish a bourgeois republic. Therefore, the revolution had to be continued under the leadership of the Communist Party in order to achieve social justice and national independence. This revolution was successful because it combined ‘the general principles of Marxism-Leninism with the concrete practice of the Chinese revolution’ according to the official histories and Mao Zedong Thought. This implies that the CCP mobilized the peasants rather than the urban proletariat, and led a military fight in the countryside rather than a political battle in the cities. Upon victory, the CCP was to establish a ‘new democracy’ based on a coalition government between the representatives of the people (the CCP) and the representatives of the bourgeoisie, before entering the stage of socialism and then communism. Pre-modern Chinese history was to be the proof for the truth of Marxism-Leninism, as Mao Zedong Thought was at the same time the product of modern Chinese history and its innate truth. The writing of history was therefore closely linked to making the Weltanschauung of the newly established regime understandable as scientific in its relationship to the past, and visionary in its relationship to the future. It conveyed one message of central importance: the past was bad, and the present was good.

This master narrative was in many ways the very opposite of traditional Chinese historiography. It had a linear orientation as opposed to the cyclical cosmology so central to previous Chinese historiography. It revolutionized the present’s relationship to the past: whereas in ancient times the past had always served as a positive example, now the present was superior. It integrated Chinese history into world history, thereby replacing the idea of China as ‘everything under heaven’ with the idea of China as a nation among nations. It claimed to be based on scientific reasoning and written for the masses, thereby surpassing the convention of writing history by bureaucrats for bureaucrats in accordance with the interests of the ruling elite. By showing that Marxism-Leninism was at the same time the product of history and the underlying principle of historical change, it created an hermetic system of historical knowledge in which facts served to prove the theory, and theory served as the criterion for presenting facts. The historian no longer had to study history in order to know the past: he knew the past before studying history.

When the CCP first took over mainland China it did not impose this master narrative on the historical profession, and it took quite some time for it to reach students in high schools and universities. Historians usually held their pre-1949 positions and learned step by step to comply with the presence of CCP party organizations in their respective institutions. However, the master narrative was an essential part of the educational programme which the CCP developed for its own cadres and the personnel from the former regime who had to be integrated

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into the CCP-led administration. Party history and the history of the revolution were the main topics of this programme, with the training of the trainers coming from the newly established ‘People’s University’ and its department for Party history, under the leadership of Hu Hua.10

The first time the field of historical studies felt the power of the new regime was when the most prominent intellectual of the Republican era and most influential historian on Taiwan was criticized in a public campaign in 1953–4.11 With many under his influence, historians were asked to make a clean break by criticizing Hu Shi for his belief in positivism and pragmatism. Simultaneously, historians were asked to revise their ideas about traditional Chinese historiography. The past should no longer be seen as a reservoir of knowledge accumulated for the purpose of solving problems in the present. The past was to be criticized and rejected as the basis of designing a new future. The revolution was the turning point in this scenario. It represented the rupture between past and present and between bad and good.

This campaign was a prelude to what was later to develop in the campaign against rightist elements. When the movement to ‘let a hundred flowers blossom’ was redirected by Mao Zedong into a campaign to ‘criticize rightist elements’ in 1957, historians were assessed according to the degree to which they had accepted Marxism-Leninism and Mao Zedong Thought as guidance for their historical research. During this campaign, a set quota of university professors and intellectuals were expelled from their positions and replaced by a younger generation loyal to the Party and its Weltanschauung. The masses in universities, factories, and the newly established People’s Communes wrote their own histories, ‘white flags’ (representing bourgeois experts) were replaced by ‘red flags’ (representing political enthusiasts), and Marxism-Leninism, as well as Mao Zedong Thought, were established as the unquestionable guidance.12 This was aptly called ‘the revolution of historiography’.

While thousands of professional historians had to leave their positions and undergo thought reform, the establishment of leftist historians who had shown support for the CCP before 1949 took over leading positions in the field. It did not take long, however, for some of them to criticize the ‘dogmatism’ that accompanied this takeover. In the course of this debate it became clear that there was a major rift cutting through Marxist historians in China, and that the master narrative the CCP had put together before its takeover was highly

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10 See Weigelin-Schwiedrzik, ‘Back to the Past’; and Wang, ‘Between Marxism and Nationalism’.
contested among professional historians, despite their unanimous Marxist orientation.

‘China and Western Europe are two different places; both of them dispose of quite a number of particularities. But if we declare the particularity of Western European history to be universal, we lose whatever particularity there is in Chinese history.’ Fan Wenlan, who voiced this criticism in 1957, argued against the style of history-writing developed by Guo Moruo and his Institute for Ancient History that sought to replace the traditional way of using the facts and anecdotes of the past to perpetuate the moral standards of the ruling elite with a set of so-called basic principles of Marxism-Leninism. It would only be the facts and anecdotes from Chinese history that could make these principles plausible that would then be integrated into the narrative on ancient Chinese history. Consequently, Chinese history was bestowed with a totally new and different content, and the esoteric ritual of referring to the past was replaced by the esoteric ritual of referring to Marxism-Leninism.

The criticism was voiced at a time when many Chinese intellectuals turned against the Soviet Union and the imposition of Soviet orthodoxy. That is why they connected the demand for particularity in history with the criticism of ‘dogmatism’ and the dominance of theory in historical research. Fan Wenlan, Jian Bozan, dean of the Faculty of History at the renowned Peking University, and Wu Han, a prominent historian and vice-mayor of Beijing, were among the most outspoken critics of Guo Moruo’s dogmatism. They argued in favour of a form of historiography that was based on facts and refined by Marxist methodology. They believed that the particularity of Chinese history was embedded in the facts. That is why they wanted to reject the Soviet version of Marxism and rely instead on Marxism as a methodology that did not predetermine the outcome of historical research, but rather guided the search for meaning in the past by delineating what was particular about Chinese history. They summarized their method in slogans such as that ‘interpretation should be derived from facts’ (Wu Han) or that ‘facts and theory should be combined’ (Jian Bozan), and they condemned Guo Moruo’s style as one where ‘theory takes the lead over facts’.

The Soviet scholarship that dominated historical writing in post-1949 China was never uncontested. However, during the early 1950s both Guo Moruo and Fan Wenlan had accepted the idea that China would follow the five-stages development model. At that time they used the orientation towards Soviet scholarship to counterbalance the dominance of traditional scholarship in China’s universities and research institutions. As long as traditional historians safeguarded the particularity of Chinese history, Marxist historians stood together in favour of universalism. However, as soon as historians of the traditional kind had

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been expelled from their privileged positions, the situation changed. It was only then that Fan Wenlan and Wu Han realized that the dominance of Soviet scholarship would eventually eliminate the particularity and exclusivity of Chinese scholarship. That is why they wanted both: Chinese history as their point of reference, and Marxism-Leninism as a method that made the difference between them and those colleagues who just had to leave the field.

The only field of historiography in which Soviet scholarship was uncontested during the 1950s was that of world history. After the communist takeover this field was separated from Chinese history and given its own institution at the Academy of Science, its own programmes at the universities, and its own journal *Shijie lishi* [World History]. Zhou Yiliang, who was the most prominent historian of this field, published a two-volume study of world history, *Shiji tongshi*, in 1961, which complied to a high degree with the Soviet scholarship on the issue. However, under the pressure of the discussion on universalism and particularism that had been ongoing in the field of Chinese history since 1957, world historians started debating the problem of Eurocentrism. Zhou Gucheng, who had already published a multi-volume history of civilizations by 1949, was most outspoken in voicing his criticism of a Soviet version of Eurocentrism. Only ten years after the communist takeover, the idea that Chinese history could be integrated into world history by submitting it to the idea of society developing in five stages had thereby lost its overall authority.

**GENERATIONAL CHANGE AMONG PRC HISTORIANS DURING THE 1960S**

All this happened when Mao became more outspoken in his rejection of the Soviet model, and intellectuals in China felt safe to publish arguments in favour of the particularity of Chinese history. However, by the early 1960s the new generation of historians raised under the red banner of Mao Zedong was waiting for a chance to take over leadership. They realized earlier than the generation of intellectuals who had joined the communists during the Anti-Japanese War that Mao was heading towards a new theory of class struggle derived from what he observed as the danger of revisionism in the Soviet Union.

The discussion on ‘historicism and class viewpoint’ is closely linked to this question. It started in early 1960 and was aimed at defining the balance

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between historical evidence and class analysis based on Marxist-Leninist concepts. One of the key problems consisted in assessing eminent persons in history. Should they be evaluated according to a class viewpoint informed by Marxism-Leninism and its view on what was progressive and what was reactionary? Or should the historian proceed according to criteria that were valid at the time the person lived and left his/her influence on history? Ning Ke, a professor of history at Beijing Normal University, famously argued in favour of a careful balance between what Wu Han had demanded as evaluation ‘according to the then place and time’ and class analysis. Nevertheless, Guan Feng, later to become one of the most prominent critics of anti-dogmatism, denounced Ning Ke’s analysis as reactionary because of its lack of interest in class analysis.

Most of the prominent authors who voiced their anti-dogmatic opinions in the late 1950s and early 1960s also published articles concerning the teaching of history at schools in the PRC. In these articles they complained that the textbook image of the Chinese past was too negative. Instead, young people should be taught to be proud of their country because: ‘In the history of our country, there were outstanding historical figures in each and every époque and in each and every dynasty. . . . Among them are emperors, kings, generals and ministers. We should be proud of the fact that these outstanding historical figures are there.’ Ideas like these instigated discussions about other aspects of the past that had so far been rejected. The reassessment of Confucianism which had been repudiated for inhibiting China from entering modernity before the intrusion of the West by the majority of leftist intellectuals since the May Fourth Movement in 1919 was part of this wave of revisionism. In 1962, Zhou Yang, who was then deputy head of the propaganda department of the CCP’s Central Committee, opened the floor for a positive view of Confucianism. Under his influence, Liu Jie put forward the idea that Chinese history was different from world history because Confucianism had prevented class struggle from developing in Chinese society. Instead, as Jian Bozan and Wu Han explained, the policy of concessions was responsible for progress in Chinese history. As the ruling class knew how to make concessions because of the influence of Confucianism, peasants could ameliorate their living conditions without having to revert to overthrowing the system. The philosopher Feng Youlan and Wu Han even went so far as to argue that Confucianism had helped bring about a form of ethics that was placed above

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the interests of the ruling class and was therefore still valid in the present. They were immediately criticized for this argument.21

By 1964, what had looked like an open debate turned into yet another round of reshuffling the power structure of the field. Qi Benyu, almost unknown at that time, published an article in which he openly reproached Jian for attacking Marxism-Leninism and preparing the ground for eventually reintroducing traditional Chinese historiography in the form of the Qing dynasty style of evidential text criticism.22 Reconstructing the past on the basis of facts implied establishing continuity between past and present and thus relativizing the role of the revolution. With this article, Qi laid the foundation for the criticism with which all anti-dogmatist historians would eventually be confronted during the Cultural Revolution (1966–76). He reiterated the same arguments that had been used in 1957 to criticize traditional historians in order to get rid of the older generation of Marxist historians, and spearheaded this generational shift by going back to the master narrative that the CCP had put together before taking over mainland China. For this he would soon be backed by Mao Zedong, who vigorously demanded that determined people of a younger age should become the successors of the May Fourth generation. Yin Da, vice-director of the Institute for Ancient History and a member of this younger generation, responded immediately. He argued that: ‘We need to bring the revolution of historiography to an end’—a phrase that would be highlighted as the title of his article23—and a flood of publications followed his lead asking for everything that the anti-dogmatists had rejected a few years earlier: more class analysis, more theory, and more repudiation of the past. Even the renowned journal *Lishi Yanjiu* [Historical Studies], previously a stronghold against dogmatism, echoed the criticism, and many authors previously supportive of Fan Wenlan, Jian Bozan, and Wu Han saw the necessity of drawing a clear line between themselves and the anti-dogmatists.24 However, their change of sides did not help them. Their articles were all criticized during the latter half of 1966, and the main representatives of antidogmatism were driven into isolation and desperation. Jian Bozan committed suicide in 1968,25 and Wu Han died in prison as a consequence of maltreatment in 1969. Only Fan Wenlan survived the turmoil. He profited from Mao’s personal protection, and died in 1969 shortly after he had been elected member of the ninth CCP Central Committee.


25 See Ch. 3 by Antoon De Baets in this volume.

Maybe one of the reasons why the criticism of traditional Chinese historiography of the text evidential style did not come to a close in the PRC was the fact that Fu Sinian’s form of source-oriented historiography dominated Chinese historiography on Taiwan up until the middle of the 1960s. The Academia Sinica Institute for History and Language which Fu Sinian had founded in 1928 was the centre of the so-called school of historical materials characterized by a form of history-writing that combined traditional Chinese historiography of the Qing period with a special understanding of Ranke which is often summarized in China as ‘to write history the way it really was’. On this basis, the writing of Chinese history in Taiwan was not interested in developing a master narrative, but was focused on the critical edition of sources. Thus historians in Taiwan defined their difference from, and opposition to, the form of Marxist historiography which they called the ‘school of interpretation’ and which in their perception dominated the scene in mainland China.26

By the mid-1960s, when the first generation of US-trained scholars came back to Taiwan, students began to express their dissatisfaction with this kind of source-oriented historiography. Scholars such as Xu Zhouyun and Tao Jinsheng introduced theories of social history through their newly founded journal Si yu Yan [Thought and Language]. As Xu Zhouyun would soon become professor at Taiwan National University, the history department at this university emerged as a stronghold for the new orientation of Chinese historiography in Taiwan. Tao Jinsheng, Du Weiyun, and Li Enhuan joined forces to overcome the dominance of the ‘school of historical materials’. At the time when Marxist historiography in the PRC was going back to its orientation of the early 1950s by repudiating a source-oriented form of history-writing, the writing of Chinese history in Taiwan was going through a similar process. In both cases the idea was to overcome the tradition of Qing evidential text criticism by introducing theories of social history of European origin. In both cases this shift in historiographical orientation was accompanied by a generational shift. However, historians in Taiwan embarked on this new orientation as part of a growing interest in social history that is generally characteristic of the Western world in the 1960s, and nourished by the idea of the universal applicability of these theories. In mainland China, renewed interest in Marxist theory was paradoxically part and parcel of a distancing from Marxist orthodoxy.

26 See Wang, ‘Taiwan’s Search for National History’.
Qi Benyu’s first step in this direction was an article on Li Xiucheng, one of the leaders of the Taiping Movement, who Qi reproached for betraying the revolt. This argument was part of a reappraisal of peasant uprisings and historical figures in Chinese history, and an explanation as to why the period of feudalism had lasted for so long in China. In contrast to what Jian Bozhan and Wu Han had argued when they saw the concessions of the ruling elite as the motor of change in Chinese history, Qi Benyu argued in favour of peasant uprisings as the driving force in Chinese history. However, these uprisings never induced revolutionary change as their leadership betrayed the masses. It was Qi’s intention to use the example of Li Xiucheng in order to hint at the possibility that traitors of the revolution could sabotage the revolution from the very heart of its leadership.\(^27\) This idea was expressed years before the Cultural Revolution would be defined as a means of overcoming revisionism propelled by ‘capitalist roaders’ in the leadership of the CCP. No wonder that Mao pushed Qi into the editorial board of *Hongqi* [Red Flag], the then most authoritative theoretical journal of the CCP, and later on into the Cultural Revolution Small Group which replaced the leading party organs during the initial phase of the Cultural Revolution.\(^28\)

In his article on Li Xiucheng, Qi Benyu had done nothing but to reiterate an idea which Mao had already expressed in his article ‘On the Chinese Revolution and the Communist Party of China’ (see above). He had explained why Chinese history was not devoid of change as Hegel had stated. However, he also showed that fundamental change of the kind the French Revolution had brought to Europe was impossible in China. Not the bourgeoisie but the peasants were the driving force of history in China. This driving force was not revolutionary, as Marx had argued, and therefore needed the leadership of a truly revolutionary class. As the bourgeoisie was too weak for this leadership position, the necessary fundamental change could only be induced by the Communist Party. It is in this sense that Qi Benyu stuck to the master narrative of Yan’an times while adjusting it to Mao’s new ideas about the bourgeoisie inside the Party.

During the latter half of the Cultural Revolution, after Lin Biao as the designated successor of Mao Zedong had been ‘unmasked’ as a traitor of the revolution, Chinese historians turned to the only undeniable fundamental system change in Chinese history in order to gain knowledge of the present situation. They used the unification of the Chinese Empire as an example for the contest between revolution and restoration that inevitably occurs after a fundamental system change. Interestingly, this implied that the theme of particularity, as well as the problem of change in Chinese history, surfaced again. Yang Rongguo, a professor of philosophy, invented a new model for the interpretation of Chinese history. He argued that the battle between Confucian and Legalist

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\(^{28}\) See Ding, ‘Kexue shi wei zhenli er douzheng de shiye’, 118.
factions among the ruling elite was the driving force of Chinese history. As Confucianists were the representatives of a slaveholder society, they were the restorative force. Their adversaries were the Legalists, with Qin Shihuang, the first emperor of China, who unified the empire and established a form of feudalism superior to the slaveholder society of previous dynasties as their most outstanding representative. However, when he died, the Confucian scholars succeeded in restoring their rule over China. The pattern of revolution and restoration which is identified with this historical period is one that runs throughout Chinese history. The ‘two-line struggle’ which had come to a climax during the Cultural Revolution was a sign of the persistence of this pattern. The narrative of history as the struggle between Confucianists and Legalists was the particular form in which the development in five stages became reality in Chinese history, and that is how the past was linked to the present and party history rewritten into the history of ten rounds of two-line-struggles, with Mao Zedong emerging as the omniscient and ever-winning party leader in opposition to left and right opportunism inside the CCP.29

NEW DEVELOPMENTS IN HISTORIOGRAPHY SINCE THE LATE 1970S

In mainland China as well as in Taiwan, the political setting of the writing of history changed fundamentally when Chiang Kai-shek and Mao Zedong died. In Taiwan, already at the beginning of the 1970s, Taiwanese history emerged as an object of research,30 though much of the initial research was done as part of investigations into regional aspects of Chinese history. The first cohort of young researchers with a focus on Taiwan were trained under the leadership of Zhang Guangzhou, Li Yiyuan, Wang Songxing, Guo Tingyi, and Li Guoqi. Among them, Chen Qinian soon gained a prominent position as he developed the idea of the Taiwan population distancing itself from the mainland earlier than previously thought during the nineteenth century. This idea was repudiated by Li Guoqi, who stressed that what actually occurred in Taiwan was a form of ‘mailandization’, meaning that Taiwan developed in much the same way as the adjacent mainland provinces such as Fujian and Zhejiang.31

31 Li Guoqi, Qingdai Taiwan shehui de zhuanxin (Taipei, 1978); and Wang, ‘Taiwan’s Search for National History’.
However, Chen’s argument turned out to be more responsive to the ongoing political process in Taiwan, with the island becoming more and more isolated internationally, symbolized by the PRC taking over the representation of China in the UN and pushing for the so-called one China policy. This change in international relations forced the intellectual and political elites in Taiwan to redefine their identity and the identity of the population of Taiwan. The writing of Taiwan history has since then been part and parcel of this process.

Beginning in the early 1980s, Taiwan history attracted the attention of more and more young researchers and publications on the topic, and they have been growing in numbers. Institutions focused on Taiwanese history have been founded and conferences organized to propel the idea of Taiwanese history. Simultaneously, the above-mentioned criticism of the source and material-oriented form of historiography, which had dominated the scene for so many years, gained momentum. Topics related to local history and to socioeconomic problems became more and more attractive, replacing the political and institutional orientation of earlier periods. Additionally, traditional topics such as Taiwan during the Sino-Japanese War of 1895 or the reintegration of Taiwan into the Republic of China in 1945 became less important, with some historians explicitly rejecting the Sinocentric view.

While Taiwanization has taken the lead in nearly every aspect of cultural and political life and textbooks are being rewritten, the reorientation of historiography in Taiwan has so far not produced a generally accepted master narrative of Taiwanese history. In search of this master narrative, the idea of society and state in Taiwan being the result of a long-lasting process of colonization forms the basis of defining the particularity of Taiwanese history. This means that history is focused on the period of Hoklo and Hakka migration to Taiwan, on the Koxinga period after the founding of the Qing-dynasty, the Japanese colonization, and, finally, the domination of mainland China over Taiwan. As a consequence, the particularity of Taiwan is defined by its internationality as the result of long periods of foreign dominance. This version of a master narrative is highly contested, as it does not give enough space to the history of Taiwan’s aborigines and because it suppresses Taiwan’s relationship to the mainland.

Du Zhengsheng therefore proposes the idea of Taiwanese history in concentric circles, the centre of which is Taiwan surrounded by China and the world at large. While his idea reconcile the argument of internationalization with the idea of Taiwan being integrated into a China-dominated East Asian culture, critics stress that Du’s theory does not allow for due criticism of the Japanese occupation. Instead, Du praises the modernization that the Japanese occupation made possible, and overlooks the cruelty and oppression under which Taiwan

33 Du Zhengsheng, Taiwan xin, Taiwan hun (Taipei, 1998).
had to suffer during fifty years of Japanese colonization. Simultaneously, Du tries to downgrade Taiwan’s relationship to mainland China by arguing that Taiwan was independent of Qing China. Although this idea might be politically convincing, it conflicts with what is still a dominant concept among academic historians on Taiwan: the idea of historical truth.

With the end of the Mao era it was precisely the question of historical truth that stood at the centre of historiographical debates in the PRC. The master narrative that Cultural Revolution historians had tried to invent was put into question immediately after the dramatic change in the CCP leadership in 1976. However, the reason for the collapse of this master narrative was not related to the theoretical framework of Marxism-Leninism being put into doubt. It was a dramatic loss of confidence in the truthfulness of historical writing, generated by the fact that too many events from the past had been tabooed and too many facts ‘distorted’ in the political arena.

After the end of the Cultural Revolution the remembrance of the past was an essential part of the daily political routine as many rehabilitations were being carried out. Victims of the Cultural Revolution were fighting for their rights, and the evaluation of the seventeen years previous to 1965, as well as of the Cultural Revolution itself, was being undertaken. In this process, many so-called taboos of history were destroyed, up until then unknown historical facts made known to the public, the history of the CCP rewritten in many of its chapters, and the main events of nineteenth- and twentieth-century Chinese history reevaluated and reinterpreted. However, while historians still believed in the 1980s that they could regain public confidence if they fulfilled their task as historians in a more appropriate way, by the 1990s they started to understand that the role of historiography in society was undergoing massive change. Even though history was still a topic of public concern, academic historiography was marginalized. New forms of history-writing were developed, and a group of historians started to enter the field who had not gone through proper academic training and who were not tied to the system of historiography as it had dominated the scene for so long. Authors of journalistic background such as Dai Qing, Ye Honglie, and others, started to compete with officially institutionalized academic historiography, showing that they could support themselves by writing what the public wanted to know about.

As a result, academic historiography was going through a crisis. While historians in universities and academies were still in search of historical principles, rules, and regularities, unofficial historians departed from this pattern and showed that history can be written as a story without theoretical ‘guidance’. However, this way of writing history had long been regarded as belonging to the

34 For an interesting overview, see Unger (ed.), Using the Past to Serve the Present.
sphere of literature, and under the influence of the source orientation typical for traditional Chinese historiography, historians tended to downgrade the writing of history in the form of telling the story about the past as not complying with ‘what really happened’. The younger historians no longer accepted this idea and started questioning the objectivity of historiography. Three different standpoints were discussed: the most extreme form of questioning objectivity argued in favour of a radical constructivism and subjectivism; the proponents of this idea were accused of relativism by members of the elder generation proposing instead to stick to the claim of objectivity in historiography while acknowledging the relativity and subjectivity of historical knowledge; the compromise between the two extremes was represented by the idea that historical knowledge is based on historical facts which objectively reflect what happened in the past. Thus historical facts are not constructed but ‘given’, and the creative process of writing history starts when the historian organizes historical facts into a narrative or into historical explanations. The process of writing history always reflects problems of the present, and in this sense its results are relative.36

Under the influence of unofficial historiography, and as a result of gradually internationalizing the field, Chinese historiography has become a more diversified, open, and uncontrollable field. Quantitatively, the source-oriented version of history-writing is the most productive sector, as many historians engage in editing sources, dictionaries, and encyclopaedias, and in compiling sources of regional and local histories. Social history, gender history, economic history, and other fields of specialized historiography are gaining momentum. Whereas oral history was first introduced to circumvent the close control of the CCP and respective state organs on archives and sources, it is now often used to complement written sources, and to make use of memories accumulated among the part of the population that otherwise could not transmit its knowledge of the past. Especially when dealing with non-Han minorities, the combination of anthropology and history brings about important results. Simultaneously, historical understanding and consciousness among the younger generation is influenced by films, cartoons, and computer games which draw upon the reservoir of anecdotes from traditional Chinese historiography, and are often produced outside the PRC. Thus highly internationalized media disseminate a version of Chinese history that is globalized by its form and in particular by its content.37

The never-ending debate on particularity and universality in Chinese history is ongoing. One of the issues where it tends to surface is the question of reform and revolution in Chinese history since the nineteenth century. As a consequence of


the CCP deciding on its policy of ‘reform and opening’ in 1978, historians came
to think about whether or not ‘only the revolution can save China’—the central
idea of the earlier version of the CCP-invented master narrative—was still valid,
with its harsh criticism of the Qing court, criticism of the Revolution of 1911, and
the inability of the first Republican governments actually to change the situation
in China for the better. Since 1978, many people in China have come to the
conclusion that reform has brought about much more progress and success than
all the revolutions China had gone through since 1911. This leads historians to
compare the situation in China since 1978 with the situation of the late nine-
teenth century. In this context, the argument was put forward that revolution was
particular to China in the twentieth century, and whoever questioned the
necessity of revolution would rob China of its historical particularity. The
hybridism of the political and economic situation in China thus generates a
paradox for the writing of history: without particularity in history, the CCP’s
claim for ‘a socialism with Chinese characteristics’ would lack an historical
foundation. However, if the idea of revolution is the very core of the particularity
of modern Chinese history, the policy of reform and opening is devoid of
historical precedence. 38

Another area where the discussion on the particularity of Chinese history is
ongoing is the field of world history. Although organizationally still a field of its
own, world history and Chinese history have recently overcome their mutual
distance, and the debate as to the degree to which Chinese history can be world
history is now much more explicit. Yu Pei, the vice president of the Institute for
World History at the Chinese Academy for Social Sciences in Beijing, explains in
a programmatic criticism of historiography in the PRC that the traditional
cyclical view of history as reflected in dynastic histories is incompatible with
the linear view that dominated Western historical writings. Also, the traditional
way of writing history with China as the centre of the world can no longer be
upheld. Thus both the writing of Chinese history and the writing of world
history was changed into the logic of a linear view of history and of a world
without China at its centre. The result is a form of Chinese history-writing in
non-Chinese terms, and a world history without China at the centre. Up until
today, says Yu Pei, this problem has not been solved, and China has lost its own
way of looking at its own history. 39

38 Cui Zhihai, ‘Ping haiwai sanbu Liang Qichao sixiang yanju zhuanzhu’, in Qingnian xueshu
luntan (Beijing, 2000), 482–522; and Susanne Weigelin-Schwiedrzik, ‘Recent PRC Scholarship on
Liang Qichao and the Globalization of the Research on Modern Chinese History’, in Martin J.
Jandl and Kurt Greiner (eds.), Science, Medicine and Culture: Festschrift for Friedrich Wallner
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2005).
Other historians in the field of world history stress the fact that the ongoing globalization process forces historians into treating the history of all nations as equal, thereby overcoming the idea that history has to be measured against the European model of development. At the same time they argue that in times of globalization the writing of global history has to relate the history of a nation to the region, and the history of a region to other regions of the world. Nevertheless, history itself is the history of fighting for dominance and power and a history of a continuous repositioning of centre and periphery.40

The more recent controversy between global and world history is a controversy between the national and the transnational in the writing of history. While the idea of a Chinese version of world history reveals historians’ claim for an alternative to the European and American way of looking at the world, the advocates of global history try to reinvent a Marxist approach in the Chinese context that is more akin to Chinese Marxism before sinification. It is the continuation of earlier attempts to focus on the universal rather than the particular, but similar to the world history approach insofar as it is rooted in a critique of Eurocentrism, and aimed at defining an alternative universality that could enter the competition with what is regarded as global history from a European and American point of view.

Post-1949 historiography on both sides of the Taiwan Strait has accompanied political change and the change in the international position of China. Simultaneously, it has actively taken part in this change, not only because the respective governments seek support from historiography, but also because historians on both sides of the strait explicitly embrace the duty of bestowing the nation with a national identity.

### TIMELINE/KEY DATES

**People's Republic of China**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Event</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1949</td>
<td>Communist takeover; proclamation of Beijing as the capital of the People’s Republic of China</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1950–53</td>
<td>The CCP consolidates its rule</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1956–7</td>
<td>The Hundred Flower Campaign</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1957–61</td>
<td>As a consequence of the Great Leap Forward, the country is hit by a major famine</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1966–76</td>
<td>The Cultural Revolution</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1976</td>
<td>After Mao Zedong’s death in September 1976, the ‘Gang of Four’ is expelled from the Party and Hua Guofeng is installed as Mao’s successor</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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1978 The CCP decides on the policy of Reform and Opening and launches the ‘Four Modernizations’ of agriculture, industry, science and technology, and the military
1981 On 1 July the CCP Central Committee passes ‘The Resolution on Some Questions Concerning the History of the Party since the Founding of the PRC’ criticizing most of Mao’s policies between 1949 and 1976
1989 Suppression of the protests in Tiananmen Square
1992 Deng Xiaoping’s travel to the South is propagated by the media as the re-launch of the policy of reform and opening
1997 Hong Kong returns to the PRC, and exchange with Taiwan develops both in economic and intellectual terms
2004 Under the new leadership of Hu Jintao and Wen Jiabao, the SARS crisis is overcome and the Party is forced to focus on questions of sustainability and social equity
2008 Summer Olympics in Beijing; protests in Lhasa and among Tibetans

Taiwan

1949 The Kuomintang government and military retreats to Taiwan; proclamation of Taipei as the seat of government of the Republic of China
1952 In the Treaty of San Francisco and Treaty of Taipei, Japan formally renounces all rights to Taiwan and Penghu
1953 During the Korean War Taiwan is proclaimed to be part of the US security zone in the Pacific Ocean
1955 The US and the ROC sign the Sino-American Mutual Defense Treaty and the Formosa Resolution to provide mutual military support
1960–70 Taiwan’s Economic Miracle
1971 ROC loses its seat in the UN and the PRC takes over
1975 Death of Chiang Kai-shek; Chiang Ching-kuo succeeds his father as leader of the Kuomintang and the state
1978 Chiang Ching-kuo is elected president of the ROC; re-elected in 1984
1979 The US passes the Taiwan Relations Act to redefine the relations to ROC; Formosa Incident sees many oppositional intellectuals condemned to prison terms
1986–7 Steps towards democratization taken
1988 After the death of Chiang Ching-kuo, Lee Teng-hui succeeds him as the first native-born President
1996 Lee Teng-hui wins the first democratic President election
2000–7 The Name Rectification Campaigns for Taiwanese aborigines push the idea of Taiwanization which distances Taiwan from mainland China by emphasizing the uniqueness of Taiwan’s language, culture, and history
2000 Chen Shui-bian wins the national election and succeeds Lee as the first elected President from the Democratic Progressive Party
2008 Ma Ying-jeou of the Kuomintang is elected president, ending the eight-year-presidency of Chen Shui-bian
KEY HISTORICAL SOURCES

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—— ‘History and Truth in Marxist Historiography’, in Helwig Schmidt-Glintzer, Achim Mittag, and Jörn Rüsen (eds.), *Historical Truth, Historical Criticism and Ideology: Chinese Historiography and Historical Culture from a New Comparative Perspective* (Leiden, 2005), 421–64.


Chapter 31

Japanese Historical Writing

Sebastian Conrad

POST-WAR RUPTURE AND NEW HEGEMONIES

In the autumn of 1945, Japanese historical writing started virtually anew. Or so it seemed: in the schools, instruction in Japanese history was halted by the American occupation authorities and only resumed one and a half years later when new textbooks were available. In the universities, the wartime orthodoxy of kōkoku shikan—a Japan-centred view of history focusing on the imperial house, on a Shintoist moral codex, and on a vision of empire—lost its hegemonic grip on Japanese historians. Its main proponent, Hiraizumi Kiyoshi, resigned from Tokyo University, Japan’s most prestigious institution of higher learning, and his colleagues joined him or were dismissed in the context of the occupation purges. But more than that: not only the forms of ultra-nationalist historiography bordering on propaganda dissolved almost instantaneously, but also the large majority of conservative historians seemingly lost their voice and interpretative authority. Instead, Marxist historiography, which had been suppressed before 1945, soon emerged as the most powerful strand of historical interpretation. From then onward, a Marxist-oriented social history would be the dominant paradigm of Japanese historiography. More powerfully even than in France and in Italy, Marxism shaped the intellectual climate in the early post-war period. Within a few years, even months, the landscape of academic historiography in Japan had changed dramatically.¹

At first glance this was a Kuhnian paradigm shift in its purest, not to say paradigmatic, form that found no parallel in other defeated nations, such as Italy and West Germany. But it had its own genealogy that was less internalist than Kuhn’s model suggests. Marxism had already gained a foothold among Japanese intellectuals in the first years of the century, and in the 1920s it became

¹ For an overview on the early decades of Japanese historiography, see Tōyama Shigeki, Sengo no rekishigaku to rekishi ishiki (Tokyo, 1968); Nagahara Kei’i, Rekishigaku jōsetsu (Tokyo, 1978); and Sebastian Conrad, The Quest for the Lost Nation: Writing History in Post-War West Germany and Japan (Berkeley, 2010).
influential in economics departments. In 1922 a Communist Party was founded which, despite its politically marginal position, attracted great attention among the country’s intellectuals. Thenceforth, the heavily theoretical academic debates and the wrangles over party strategy maintained a symbiotic relationship. It is true that historical materialism endured an outsider position in history departments, and that its proponents were severely repressed and frequently ousted from the universities during the war years. Nevertheless, the debates conducted among Marxist economic historians in the 1930s—in particular the famous ‘controversy on Japanese capitalism’—played a decisive role in the development of post-war history-writing.²

After the war the Marxists were among the few academics whose record was not tainted by affiliation with the imperialist cause of the Japanese state, and as the only visible opposition to fascism, they were embraced by the American occupation authorities as natural allies. Indeed, an unlikely coalition emerged in which the occupation officers supported the re-entry of Marxists into the universities, while the Japanese Communist Party greeted the American occupiers as ‘liberators’, and Marxist historians celebrated the post-war reforms as a belated bourgeois revolution. This was a short honeymoon that ended in 1948 at the latest, when American policy took what is known as the ‘reverse course’ under the pressures of the encroaching Cold War. But in the early post-war years it contributed to an institutionalization of Marxism in the academy that was further enhanced by a massive expansion of the university system. In an effort to democratize higher education, the number of universities was expanded from 49 to 220 during the seven years of American occupation. This gave many young graduates an unexpected opportunity to gain a professorial chair, even if recruitment patterns that privileged the few so-called imperial universities did not change dramatically.

Although Marxist historians were at first a small minority, they soon exerted a virtual hegemony in the field of historiography. It is important to recognize, however, that the broad current of self-styled ‘progressive’ historians was by no means a monolithic block. This was the case, on the one hand, for Marxist scholarship that was beset by factional strife, frequently exacerbated by conflicts within the Communist Party.³ On the other hand, the different strands of Marxist historiography stood in opposition to the so-called modernists (kindai shugisha), such as the social historian Ōtsuka Hisao or the intellectual historian Maruyama Masao, who were strongly influenced by the work of Max Weber and stressed, pace Marx, the mental and cultural factors as driving forces of historical development. Between Marxists and the ‘modernists’—derided by the former as

³ The most important conflict was between the so-called rōnoha and kōzaha groups. See Tōyama, Sengo no rekishigaku; and Hoston, Marxism.
representatives of a ‘bourgeois’ view of history—there were many differences and conflicts. In many respects, however, they shared a common problematic and jointly contributed to the hegemony of critical social history.  

The discursive shift that these ‘progressive’ historians initiated can be observed on different levels, as it implied methodological, political, and interpretational transformations. First, Marxist (and ‘modernist’) historiography was directed against the prevailing methodological standards of the discipline, which had been influenced largely by German historism (*Historismus*). This essentially idealistic conception of history had focused on the political history of the nation and was seen by its opponents as a largely descriptive enterprise, heavily invested in the reconstruction of source materials and text critique. Against what they perceived as conservative positivism (*jisshō shugi*), Marxist historians drew on historical materialism to insist on the primacy of the economic ‘base’ over political and ideological ‘superstructures’, on the relevance of the category of class, and on a critical position vis-à-vis the nation-state. In historiographical practice, this translated into varieties of social history, frequently with an emphasis on macro-structures and the quest for large-scale causal explanations.

Second, Marxist historians saw themselves as political actors and their scholarship as a form of political intervention. Many of them were affiliated with the Communist Party, and in their research agendas they reacted immediately to political events. For example, the 1949 Communist Revolution in China suggested to them that American-occupied Japan was a long way away from the social upheaval they had at first witnessed in the post-war reforms. And the beginning of the Korean War in 1950 convinced the majority of Marxist historians that they were witnesses of US imperial expansion, which in turn led to interpretations of modern Japanese history as a reaction to a colonizing threat. They proclaimed a departure from the ivory tower, which also encompassed the transmission of scholarly findings to broad levels of society.

Third, the post-war Marxist hegemony resulted in the ascendance of a new master narrative of Japanese history. Drawing on social history analysis, the main storyline held that Japan’s path to modernity was deviant. After the abolition of the Tokugawa feudal regime in 1868, the story went, Japan embarked on a process of modernization based on models provided by the Western powers. The Japanese case diverged from the Marxist metanarrative, however, as the feudal regime was not replaced by a bourgeois-led society. Instead, a narrow oligarchy ruled the country in an absolutist fashion, limiting civil rights and popular participation. The Meiji state, then, did not witness the emergence of a class society with a democratic representation of interests, but rather displayed a series of ‘feudal remnants’ that perpetuated pre-modern social structures within a

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5 For more on German ‘historism’, see Ch. 11 by Stefan Berger in this volume.
rapidly industrializing economy. These forms of unequal development, propped by the institution of the emperor and imperial ideology, were carried over into the inter-war period, and they were at the root of what came to be called ‘Tennō System Fascism’ (tennōsei fashizumu)—an absolutist state that reacted to the international crisis of monopoly capitalism by instituting a form of fascism ‘from above’.

Within this paradigm of slanted if not failed modernity, the bulk of Marxist scholarship in the post-war decades was concerned with analyzing the structural deficits of the nation’s modern history. Consequently, the main focus of scholarly interest was not on the more recent symptoms of this failure—the years of fascism, war, and military defeat—but rather on the crucial moments of aberration. The most important nodal point in this respect was the Meiji Restoration as the moment of departure from the normative path to modernity.

The representative work in this context was the now classic work Meiji Ishin [Meiji Restoration] (1951) by Tōyama Shigeki. The book had an immediate success: the first edition of 7,000 copies was sold out in 1951, and the next 10,000 copies were printed the following year. A seventeenth edition was published a decade later. This success at the book shops was all the more remarkable considering that Meiji Ishin, with its comprehensive scholarly annotations and its abstract Marxist terminology and hermetic style, made few concessions to popular reading expectations. Nevertheless, Tōyama’s interpretation quickly joined the canon and continues to inform the framework of the presentation of the Meiji Restoration in Japanese high-school textbooks.

Tōyama’s Meiji Ishin can be seen as a social history of the politics of the Restoration. He saw the Restoration not as a coup d’état, not as a singular event of 1868, but rather as a long historical process that began with the reforms of the feudal states in 1841 and ended only in 1877 with the defeat of Samurai opposition to the new government. For Tōyama, the Meiji Restoration marked a transitional period which transformed Japan from a feudal into an absolutist state. Its leading actors were the lower warrior aristocracy (kakyū bushi) who initiated political reform in the feudal states and, after 1868, on a national level. They benefited from the numerous peasant uprisings that undermined the old order and revealed the internal contradictions of the feudal system. The oppositional class of the lower warrior aristocracy suppressed these uprisings, but at the same time it exploited the energies of the people in their struggle against the central government of the Shogunate. In addition, the reform-oriented Samurai used the person of the Tennō, in whose name the campaign against the Shogunate was conducted, and thus aroused the impression of a profound political transformation. But in reality, Tōyama claimed, the point was not to usher in the modern age (as the genuinely revolutionary forces were suppressed with the peasant uprisings), but rather to maintain the feudal order in a new guise. The oppositional Samurai quickly gave rise to an absolutist bureaucracy, which introduced a series of reforms and strengthened the power of the new government in the
following years. Since these measures were not imposed by a bourgeois class ‘from below’ but were ordered ‘from above’, their inherent potential to bring about modern sociopolitical structures did not come to bear. In Tōyama’s interpretation, relics from the feudal era remained characteristic of the Japanese society of the Meiji period. ‘While the (bourgeois-democratic) revolution was still maturing from below, the (absolutist) system was being established at great speed by reforms from above.’

In the years to come, Tōyama’s analysis remained a central point of reference. It was not undisputed, as other historians offered competing interpretations of the true subject (shutai) of social change. Also, partially as a result of the Korean War, historians began to reassert the positive dimensions of the Meiji Restoration by stressing its contribution to national independence vis-à-vis the imperialist threat by the West. But on the whole, the paradigm of deviant and incomplete modernization prevailed. The Marxist ‘transition narratives’ (Dipesh Chakrabarty) that screened the past in a quest for points of transition from a feudal to a bourgeois and modern society also continued to guide research into Japanese history in other fields: the movement for civil rights (じゆみんくらんどう) of the 1880s as a democratic alternative that was suppressed by the absolutist state, the land politics of the Meiji government that produced ‘parasitic landlords’ and impoverished peasants, the autocratic structures of the political system in which the parliament had no effective control of the executive, and the distorted emergence of party politics in the 1920s.

The meta-narrative of belated modernity—and this is a striking feature of scholarship in the early post-war decades—was closely interwoven with a universalist notion of history. The Japanese past was systematically inscribed into the framework of world history. History was assumed to evolve according to universal laws and within a set of given stages of development. From this perspective, understanding world history implied gaining knowledge of the fundamental historical tendencies that applied everywhere. Japanese history, accordingly, could then be narrated with reference to this universal process. In a sense, the bulk of discussions and controversies among different schools of Marxist and ‘modernist’ historiography can be read as one major attempt to inscribe the Japanese past into the frame of world history. The general plot was thus treated as a pre-existing mould; controversy arose only over the correct inscription of particular (Japanese) events into the universal narrative. The annual meeting of the influential Marxist historians’ organization (Rekishigaku kenkyūkai) in 1949 reflected this consciousness of the problem: the general theme for all sections was ‘the fundamental laws of world history’.

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6 Tōyama, Meiji Ishin (Tokyo, 1951), 182, 186–7.
7 For more on world history, see Ch. 5 by Jürgen Osterhammel in this volume.
These presumably regular patterns of historical development, however, could not be observed just anywhere. World history had not manifested itself to the same extent all around the globe. To arrive at the laws of world history directly and without contamination, historians turned to the European past. Takahashi Kōhachirō, a historian of France at Tokyo University, underlined the importance of understanding ‘the emergence of the structure of the modern world in Western Europe’, since these structures ‘embodied the stages of development of world history (universal history) in their “pure and classical” form’. Research into European history, accordingly, was a means of discovering the fundamental laws of world history, which seemed to be accessible only in their European incarnation. These laws could subsequently be applied to understand the Japanese past. ‘From the perspective of the classical European stages of development we can deduct a new point of view for the analysis of Japanese society as well.’

It is important to note that the framework of world history went hand in hand, paradoxically, with an internalist notion of development. The new paradigm implied not so much situating the Japanese past within world history, but rather interpreting Japan as world history. When a world historical perspective was invoked, what was called for was not a study of Japan’s entanglement with the outside world. The large bulk of historical scholarship made only superficial reference to international relations, to the pressure of the major powers or to influences from abroad. Instead, Japanese history evolved firmly within the boundaries of the Japanese nation-state; in these narratives, colonialism, the Second World War, and the Chinese Revolution had virtually no influence on the development of Japanese society. The world-historical character of these accounts did not hinge on an insight into the inextricable entanglement of the histories of the world. Instead, sekaishi (world history) implied interpreting the past with reference to a universal standard.

At the same time—and this is a second paradox—the category of the nation remained crucial, all universalist claims to class analysis notwithstanding. This is all the more striking since the world historical framework was explicitly employed in the early post-war period in order to transcend the nationalist and ultra-nationalist interpretations of the war years. But also for Marxists and ‘modernists’, the nation remained the privileged subject of history, and also figured as the prime object of historiography. We can speak of almost an obsession with national particularity—even if this uniqueness was defined through distortions, backwardness, incompleteness, and aberration. This kind of negative, left-wing nationalism was complemented, after the Chinese Revolution and the outbreak of the Korean War, with more positive references to the Japanese nation. In a context that was interpreted as neoimperialist, Marxist

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10 Takahashi Kōhachirō, Kindai shakai seiritsu shiron (Tokyo, 1947), 1, 16, 17.
historians frequently turned against the United States and interpreted Japanese modernization as the reaction against a foreign threat. The term nation (minzoku) now moved to the centre of debates, and a national perspective gradually began to replace the priority of class relationships.  

FROM MARXIST HEGEMONY TO A PLURALITY OF APPROACHES

The different strands of critical social history, both Marxist and ‘modernist’, established a discursive hegemony in the first two post-war decades. It was further institutionalized through the meetings of the Marxist historians’ organization (Rekishigaku kenkyukai) and a corollary scholarly journal (Rekishigaku kenkyu). It is important to recognize, however, that Japanese historiography was far from monolithic. In many departments, a methodologically and politically conservative form of political history survived. These historians typically formed a separate scholarly milieu, organized around the older historians’ association (Shigakkai) and the flagship journal of the discipline, the Shigaku zasshi founded in 1889 and modelled after the German Historische Zeitschrift.

More importantly, since the 1960s, the newly established Marxist dominance was increasingly challenged, and a plurality of scholarly approaches emerged. The theoretical and methodological trends were, on the whole, no Japanese particularity. The impact of modernization theory, history from below, women’s history, and cultural history developed in response to, and in close interaction with, international discussions. At the same time, developments in Japan had their own chronology, connected disciplinary trends with Japanese strands of scholarship, and appropriated theoretical influences under very specific conditions and with particular concerns.  

The year 1960 is an important point of departure for discussing challenges to the prevalent Marxist paradigm as it witnessed both the strategic import of American modernization theory and the heyday of popular political movements that facilitated the advent of a history from below. In that year, the Japanese-American Security Treaty was up for renewal, and this led to widespread violent demonstrations. Numerous Marxist historians joined with the Communist Party in resisting a policy they viewed as an expression of renewed American imperialism. In this context, the Ford Foundation financed the start of what can be called a wholesale importation of modernization theory to Japanese history departments. In a resort town near Tokyo the so-called Hakone Conference took place, at which American historians attempted to convert their Japanese colleagues

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12 For overviews of the pluralization of the discipline see Kano Masanao, ‘Torishima’ wa haitte iru ka: Rekishishiki no genzai to rekishigaku (Tokyo, 1988).
Toyama Shigeki, Maruyama Masao, and Kawashima Takeyoshi) to the new gospel. Modernization theory, which—in explicit contrast to historical materialism—elevated a non-revolutionary modernization to the status of a historical norm, was aimed at the Marxist conception of history underlying the popular protests.

From this perspective, Japan was no longer treated as the world’s problem child, but rather as a model for other Asian nations to follow. This example of successful modernization was not primarily ascribed to economic factors, but rather to the emergence of a modernizing elite and to shrewd political decisions made at the crossroads of historical development. Against the background of economic reconstruction, precisely those phases of Japanese development that had previously been interpreted as failures were now declared successes. The Meiji Restoration was no longer a failed bourgeois revolution, but now rather an example of the rejection of colonialism and a successful transition to a modern industrial state. The ‘Japanese tradition’ was no longer considered an ‘obstacle’ but rather a catalyst to a modernization which could stand on its own two feet.

The resonance that modernization theory found among Japanese historians can be attributed to a variety of factors. For a number of conservative historians, modernization theory allowed them to link traditional perspectives on diplomatic and political history to a new methodological approach. More importantly, modernization theory was not merely an import from the United States, even if American historians such as Edwin O. Reischauer, Japan specialist at Harvard University and also American ambassador in Tokyo, made it seem that way. Indeed, social scientists such as Kuwabara Takeo and Ueyama Shumpei had offered influential analyses of Japanese modernization long before Reischauer took office in Tokyo. Among historians, the analyses of the so-called modernists such as Ōtsuka Hisao and Maruyama Masao can be seen as a form of modernization discourse, just as its Parsonian counterpart was indebted to the work of Weber. Going back even further, recent studies have explained the extent to which these two paramount post-war thinkers of modernity had genealogies that reached back into the debates about mobilization during wartime. It is important to recognize, therefore, that the concept of modernization could draw on different genealogies and cannot be reduced to an import from the ‘West’. To be sure, these concepts were not identical—indeed, Maruyama was one of the staunchest critics of a Reischauer-style modernization theory. However, competing and contested visions of modernization coexisted, and the reception that the Hakone Conference had in Japan needs to be situated within this larger context.

13 See in particular Nakano Toshio, Ōtsuka Hisao to Maruyama Masao: Dōin, shutai, sensō sekinin (Tokyo, 2001).
14 For the larger debate on intellectual continuities between wartime and post-war Japan, see Yamanouchi Yasushi, J. Victor Koschmann, and Ryuichi Narita (eds.), Total War and ‘Modernization’ (Ithaca, 1998).
Finally, among the early adepts of modernization theory there also ranged several former Marxists such as Satō Seizaburō, Itō Takashi, and Banno Junji, who had been excluded from the Communist Party between 1955 and 1958. The internal conflicts of the Marxist camp, then, formed another important context in which the gradual dissolution of Marxist hegemony and the advent of new perspectives needs to be placed. In the wake of the Stalin critique and the insurrection in Hungary in 1956, both the Communist Party and Marxist historians had engaged in re-evaluations of the political situation and of historical interpretations. This crisis found its scholarly expression in the controversy about the book *Shōwashi* [The History of the Shōwa Period] (1955), jointly written by Tōyama Shigeki, Imai Seiichi, and Fujiwara Akira. The book was a standard Marxist version of Japanese history in the twentieth century, focusing on the role of monopoly capitalism, political absolutism supported by the Emperor, and state suppression of the proletariat. The account was soon severely criticized, both by conservatives but also from within the Marxist camp, for its rigid structuralism, macrohistorical approach, and its black-and-white evaluation of the past from the point of view of the Communist Party.

The deep dissatisfaction of a large number of younger historians with what they perceived as a new and petrified orthodoxy led to attempts to undermine the Marxist hegemony ‘from below’. The proponents of this challenge struggled for a grassroots perspective within the context of the broad social protests against the extension of the security treaty with the United States. They rejected Marxism and modernization theory and instead sought to appropriate indigenous historical approaches. Like E. P. Thompson, historians such as Irokawa Daikichi, Kano Masanao, and later, Yasumaru Yoshio, were interested in the description of everyday life, the transformation of values in the transition to modernity—in ‘the people’ (*minshū*). Even if the institutional hegemony of Marxist historiography continued, the Japanese version of ‘history from below’ became an important and influential current within historical studies. The field of *minshūshi* is heterogeneous and cannot be reduced to a single common denominator. However, many of its proponents shared a critical view of modernity and turned to the works of the anthropologist Yanagita Kunio, who in the 1930s argued against equating modernity with ‘the West’. They wrote to rehabilitate the individual as an agent of historical change, and to make the people subjects of history. In the process, the people’s actions became the driving force of modernization. The works of the historians of everyday life expressed a deeply rooted unease with contemporary society, and instead turned to studying the countryside. The Japanese version of ‘subaltern studies’ was expressly formulated against the modernizing centre and thus also contained an anti-nationalistic component.15

In the following decades, several other approaches further complicated the picture: the rise of women’s history, and later the advent of different strands of cultural history, were the most important. Women’s history that had become a broad current since the 1970s was clearly a transnational phenomenon as it was strongly influenced by American feminism. One salient trait of early women’s history was the claim that ‘general history’ was a fraud since it conceptually and representatively excluded half of humankind. The search for lost ‘heroines’ and preoccupation with forms of female powerlessness and repression were typical for these early years, which were dominated by the notion of difference.\(^\text{16}\) It is important to note that these imports encountered a flourishing Japanese tradition of women’s history, within which we can distinguish two trends. One direction can be traced to the works of Takamure Itsue, who made a name for herself during the war years with important studies leading to her four-volume masterpiece, *Josei no rekishi* [Women’s History], published in 1954–8. Particularly during the war, Takamure stood for a nationalist form of culturalism, which contributed to the legitimization of a pan-Asian ideology of the state. She used the words ‘women’ and ‘Japan’ as identity-creating metaphors, and defined Asian women by their alleged contrast to Western imperialism. Inoue Kiyoshi presented a competing approach in his Marxist *Nihon Joseishi* [Women’s History in Japan] in 1948. This book largely concentrated on the emancipatory women’s movement in Japan.

These two perspectives continued to shape Japanese women’s history in the 1970s and have continually led to discussions on the relationship between ‘Japanese’ approaches and imported (‘Western’) theories. Gradually, women’s history became an important field of research which also profited institutionally from the development of women’s universities in the 1980s. From the 1990s onwards, gender also began asserting itself in Japan as a category of analysis. However, a Marxist-oriented gender history remained influential alongside the approaches influenced by Judith Butler’s and Joan Wallach Scott’s post-structuralist studies.\(^\text{17}\)

Finally, the cultural turn of historical studies after the 1990s further contributed to a pluralization of historical method. The influence of Michel Foucault and Jacques Derrida, of Hayden White and the linguistic turn, was palpable in Japan as well, and led to a critique of the understanding of reality and scholarship shared by social history and the history of everyday life (despite their differences in method and content). The challenge of cultural history was primarily an epistemological critique of the essentialisms of ‘post-war historiography’ (*sengo rekishigaku*); the previously assumed concepts of nation, class, and subject were now hermeneutically challenged and ‘deconstructed’. Instead, the emphasis on

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\(^{16}\) See Ch. 7 by Julie Des Jardins in this volume.

the contingency of historical phenomena went hand in hand with an interest in strategies of representation. The epistemological challenges led to an understanding of academic historiography as a form of narrative. It implied that not only the object, but also the subjects (such as the historians) of the narrative came into view. The broad impact of cultural history, however, was due to the thematic innovations it brought to the field. The history of hygiene, sexuality, and the body were among the approaches that challenged the conventional understanding of the autonomous subject. Discourse history, postcolonialism, and memory were further keywords of a discussion that the proponents of social history at first viewed as a threat to their discipline’s methodological standards, but which has long since entered the historical mainstream.\(^{18}\)

**MASTERING THE PAST**

As in other defeated nations such as Germany and Italy, the shifting interpretations of Japan’s history formed an integral part of the larger attempts to come to terms with what was seen as a contaminated past. Historiography was structured by the methodological premises and the truth claims of its discipline, but at the same time it was embedded within the dynamics of public memory. Historians themselves were among the memory activists, and the political context of memory debates influenced the trajectories of historical analyses. It is important to recognize, however, that historiography and memory were not only fields of mutual influence, but also of contestation. Frequently, the point of view of (largely left-wing) historians was formulated against official memory as propagated by the political establishment.\(^{19}\)

Conventional wisdom has it that Japan has yet to master its own past and to reconcile its imperialist history with its Asian neighbours. As a sweeping generalization, this assessment is certainly flawed, in particular with respect to the early post-war period. Immediately after the war there was a broad consensus among the country’s elites that a thorough critique of the nation’s history was a necessary prerequisite for a successful democratization and modernization. Even the conservative establishment joined the chorus of those demanding a critical probing into the recent past. On 28 August 1945, two weeks after the surrender, Prince Higashikuni’s government demanded critical reflection on the part of the Japanese people under the slogan of a ‘collective confession of the 100 million’ (ichioku

\(^{18}\) For an overview see Rekishigaku kenkyûkai (ed.), *Rekishigaku ni okeru hōhōteki tenkai: Gendai rekishigaku no seika to kadai*, vol. 1 (Tokyo, 2002).

\(^{19}\) For an overview of public memory, see George Hicks, *Japan’s War Memories: Amnesia or Concealment?* (Aldershot, 1997); and Franziska Seraphim, *War Memory and Social Politics in Japan, 1945–2005* (Cambridge, Mass., 2006). See also Ch. 2 by Alon Confino in this volume.
sōzange. Intellectuals engaged in the influential debate on ‘subjectivity’ (shutaisei), in which not only questions of responsibility were raised, but in which the origins for the catastrophes of fascism and war were located in the mental and psychological make-up of the Japanese psyche. The narratives of deviant and failed modernity that many historians produced, and their quest into the long-term and structural causes for this failure, thus corresponded with broader social concerns.

In this context the Marxist interpretations of the war years focused on macro-structures and discussed the seeming paradox of how an absolutist regime with feudal remnants could assume the political function of a fascist state—according to Marxist orthodoxy the highest state of capitalism. Meanwhile, the most influential analysis of fascism was penned by Maruyama Masao, one of the foremost intellectuals of post-war Japan. Maruyama interpreted Japanese society since the 1930s as a form of fascism ‘from above’, unlike its European counterparts which were based on a fascist movement ‘from below’. Maruyama’s analysis differed from standard Marxist accounts as he located the origins of fascism not in socioeconomic structures, but in a particular ideological formation that in his eyes had prevented the emergence of a fully modern, self-responsible individual in Japan. Irrespective of the heated criticisms by Marxist historians, however, there was also common ground, as Maruyama too saw the Meiji Restoration as a failed bourgeois revolution as it did not bring about a thorough separation of public and private spheres. Maruyama’s analysis of fascism, then, was part of the larger set of narratives of a deviant path that prospered in the early post-war years.

Two observations are important to note in this context. First, military defeat also implied the loss of empire. In 1945, Japan relinquished her adjacent empire whose roots can be traced back to the late nineteenth century. Japanese returned in large numbers from the Asian mainland—soldiers, administrators, merchants and traders, settlers and their families. The renunciation of the colonial territories that had in official and legal discourse been part of Japan, and the concomitant loss of ‘Japaneseness’ of the Koreans and Taiwanese that had been incorporated into Greater Japan, had large repercussions for all involved. Not least, it implied a fundamental reconfiguration of the concept of the nation, even if the imperial past was on the whole ignored, and remained a largely unacknowledged undercurrent of post-war debates. It is possible to speak, in this context, of a ‘colonial unconscious’ that underwrote post-war Japanese discourse. Only since the 1990s,

as discussed below, did the imperial past resurface in discussions about Japan’s position in the world.24

Second, the intellectual quest for understanding the nation’s plight was not entirely an internal affair, but conducted under conditions of American occupation. It is clear that this fact alone cannot explain the dynamics of the debates, even if some commentators speak of occupied Japan as a ‘closed discursive space’ that effectively prestructured the limits of enunciation.25 But it cannot be denied that the thorough critique of Japanese history went hand in hand with interventions by the occupation authorities that were equally based on the assumption of deep structural deficits in Japanese society. The war crimes trial in Tokyo in which seven members of the ‘militarist clique’ that had led Japan into war were sentenced to death was the symbolic high point of a politics of pedagogy that also included the production of new history textbooks, the publication of an ‘American’ version of the Second World War, public radio programmes, and the purge of schools and universities. More fundamentally, the social reforms initiated by the occupation authorities—including a land reform and a new constitution—were premised on the conviction that feudal structures had survived in Japanese society and had facilitated the country’s militarist and fascist turn.

The impact of these American interventions did not dissolve immediately after the occupation ended in 1952, as a series of interpretive patterns lived on. But on the whole, the 1950s saw the beginning of a second phase of Japanese memory that lasted essentially until the 1990s. It was characterized by a gradual loss of public influence of leftist intellectuals, and the return of nationalist versions of the past that typically interpreted the Japanese nation as the real victim of the war. Indeed, the emergence of a victim consciousness—the Japanese as the victims of the militarist clique, of European imperialism, and of the atomic bomb—was the most striking feature of public memory in the decades following occupation.26

This victim consciousness was not limited to nationalist and conservative milieus. Indeed, it was appropriated by pacifist groups that portrayed Japan as the first and only nation that experienced the atomic bomb. In particular, after the so-called Lucky Dragon incident in 1954 (when a Japanese tuna boat was affected by radioactive fallout from a US hydrogen bomb test), Hiroshima became an icon of Japan’s past as a war victim and a rallying point for a pacifist nation. But the pervasiveness of victim consciousness also created a space for more outspokenly nationalist and revisionist accounts to gain public resonance.

24 See Komori Yōichi, Posuto koroniaru (Tokyo, 2001), 83–98.
At the far end of the spectrum there was the literary critic Hayashi Fusao, whose book *Daitō senso kōteiron* [Approving of the Greater East Asian War] was published in 1964 and provoked a public stir. Hayashi interpreted Japanese history since 1853, when American ships landed in the bay of Uraga, as a ‘Hundred Years War’ against the West. In this perspective the Second World War appeared as a mere episode in this encompassing struggle between Asia and the ‘West’. Closer to mainstream concerns was the seven-volume source edition *Taiheiyo senso e no michi* [The Path to the Pacific War], edited by Tsunoda Jun in 1962–3, that combined meticulous archival work with a narrative that interpreted the war, not as the logical outcome of long-term structural deficits, but rather, Japan was seen as having ‘skidded into’ this war against its intentions.

The victim consciousness, to be sure, was not uncontested. Critical voices, in particular in popular memory cultures, were never entirely silenced. The Japan Memorial Society for the Students Killed in the War (*Wadatsumikai*), for example, gave voice to the memory of high-school and university students who were victims of the war. And also the critical research of the journalist Honda Katsuichi, who since the 1970s had unearthed the unwelcome truth about the massacre that Japanese troops had committed in Nanking in 1937, attests to the simultaneity of nationalist apologetic and oppositional perspectives. The most important site in which these different positions clashed were the trials between the Marxist historian Ienaga Saburō and the textbook division of the educational ministry. After several instances of censorship of his history textbook, Ienaga sued the Japanese state in 1966. At issue were the question of responsibility for the war and an allegedly negative depiction of the Japanese state, but also the charge that Ienaga was questioning the homogeneity and cohesiveness of the Japanese people. The trials in which Ienaga was supported by numerous grass-roots groups, and was able to secure a partial victory, lasted into the 1990s.

On the whole, however, public memory in the decades of unprecedented industrial growth and the secure positioning under the umbrella of American security politics was dominated by calls for a ‘normalization’ of the past, and what critics denounced as collective amnesia. When Prime Minister Nakasone, at the occasion of his inauguration in 1982, declared his goal to overcome the ‘view of history of the Tokyo War Crimes Tribunal’ (*Tokyo saiban shikan*), he gave governmental sanction to a widespread public mood. Symbolic expression of this new discursive hegemony were Nakasone’s annual official visits to Yasukuni Shrine in which the Japanese war dead—including the Class A war criminals sentenced in the Tokyo trials—were revered as divine heroes. These pilgrimages...
were accompanied by angry reactions from Japan’s East Asian neighbours, but in the context of the Cold War division of the world the ensuing protests did not significantly reverberate in Japan.  

THE RETURN OF ASIA

In the course of the 1990s the landscape of Japanese memory changed dramatically. After many years of relative neglect the country experienced a virtual explosion of memory debates, conducted in a divided political climate that has led Kang Sang-Jung to speak of a ‘civil war of memory’. The reasons for this notable increase in public interest and awareness are manifold. Some of them are worldwide in character and have contributed to a global vogue of memory debates, while others are more specific to the Japanese archipelago. To begin with, the omnipresence of discussions about the past clearly had a generational dimension. Those who had experienced the war themselves and could still remember it were beginning to decrease in number, and this biological factor has contributed to the heated nature of some recent conflicts over issues like the compensation for forced labour and the ‘comfort women’ (jūgun ianfu) in service of the Japanese military.

Most importantly, the end of the Cold War and the emergence of the discourse of globalization helped to open up a new space for debate and dissenting voices. With the disappearance of the East–West dichotomy, the clear-cut framework within which all events were endowed with political meaning also disappeared. In many respects, the symbolic conflicts over the meaning of the past moved in its place and have substituted for the ideological antagonisms. The end of the primacy of the United States–Soviet antagonism has also considerably affected the political landscape in Japan. One of the consequences was the end of the political monopoly of the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) in 1993. The dissolution of the ‘1955 system’, based on the dominance of the conservative LDP and a foreign and security politics exclusively oriented towards the United States, corresponded with a renewed and contested debate about the national past that had been muted in the decades before. The end of the power monopoly of the LDP coincided with the crash of the ‘bubble’ economy in the early 1990s, and the ensuing economic recession has also motivated a more critical analysis of Japan’s history. One last factor may not be overlooked: the death of Emperor Hirohito (1989), head of state since 1926, who through his sheer presence had made an open discussion over war responsibility (senso


sekinin) and the failures of coming to terms with this past after 1945 (sengo sekinin) virtually impossible. 31

The most notable effect of the end of the Cold War and the onset of globalization was the change it spawned in Japan’s relationship to its Asian neighbours. Japan was again ‘homing in on Asia’. 32 This development had already begun in the 1980s and was influenced in particular through the economic upswing in South Korea. The political and economic contacts, as well as the exchange of popular culture, increased markedly, and in this context the interpretation of the national past underwent palpable changes as well. In particular, the voices of Asian victims of Japan’s wartime expansion were given an importance they had not had in the decades before. These complex and reinforcing shifts have opened up the possibility for new forms of contestation of the hegemonic versions of national memory.

On occasion of the fiftieth anniversary of the end of the war in 1995, in particular, the demand for an official apology on the part of the Japanese government was expressed by many Asian governments and civil society groups. The debates in Japan cannot be understood disconnected from this broader context. The conflicting interpretations of the Nanjing massacre were one of the subjects of public concern and academic dialogue. 33 The arena in which the Asian dimension of Japanese memory was played out most prominently, however, was the issue of compensation for former ‘comfort women’—more precisely, forced prostitutes in the service of the Japanese army. The forced coercion of women and girls into the system of sexual slavery had involved an estimated 80,000 to 200,000 victims from throughout Asia, particularly from Korea and China. This was a problem that—although by no means unknown—did not have a place in the heroic narrative of the war prevalent through the 1980s. The appearance in memory discourse of the prostitutes and sex slaves was the result of individual agency and institutional lobbying. Women’s groups in Korea and in Japan took up the issue, and while governments continued to slight the topic, these ‘memory activists’ created a public space that eventually also made it possible for former comfort women to come forward and speak of their personal past. Transnational NGOs played a crucial role—most visibly in the International Women’s War Crimes Tribunal that was conducted in Tokyo with the explicit aim of revisiting the War Crimes Tribunal of 1946 by addressing crimes committed against women. The media picked up on the topic, and the government found itself under immense pressure and devised schemes of individual compensation while not acknowledging state responsibility in fear of legal

31 Ian Buruma, Wages of Guilt: Memories of War in Germany and Japan (London, 1994).
consequences. Since the 1990s, then, the dynamics of memory production in Japan needs to be situated in a context of economic, political, and cultural integration in East and Southeast Asia.

Partially in reaction to these developments, the 1990s also saw the return of openly revisionist positions vis-à-vis Japan’s recent past. The most notable strand is related to the project of propagating a ‘liberalist view of history’ (jiyūshugi shikan) associated mainly with Tokyo University historian Fujioka Nobukatsu. Fujioka aims to replace what he sees as a ‘masochistic view of history’ allegedly forced onto the Japanese people by the American authorities, by a version of the past that allows the Japanese to feel pride in their history and culture. The project draws on earlier forms of revisionism, but it goes beyond traditional forms of nationalism in a quest to reinvent the nation under the auspices of globalization and the reemergence of Asia as a site of exchange and identity formation. A central element in the widely publicized campaign to revise national historiography is the attempt to establish new schoolbooks to inculcate the new gospel in the next generation.

In spite of trenchant critique by the leftist majority of university historians, the movement found broad public support, also within the political establishment, and it was able to secure ample private funding. Its resonance was enhanced by its association with the famous comic author Kobayashi Yoshinori and its appropriation of popular authors like Shiba Ryo¯taro. The sales figures of the first textbook volumes were considerable. Its publicity success notwithstanding, the project has made only limited institutional advance as the textbooks were adopted by just a tiny minority of school districts. The political and international reverberations of the movement, however, have been substantial. When the textbook was formally admitted for classroom use in 2001 and then again in 2005, this decision elicited hostile responses in the Asian neighbour countries and led to violent protests in Beijing and Seoul.

Debates about memory were thus situated in a contested and highly conflictual terrain that was shaped by what we could call, metaphorically, the return of Asia. This more general shift of public discourse has also affected academic historiography. Historians, too, have since the mid-1990s, begun to re-evaluate the nation’s past within the framework of a history of Asia. To be sure, national history continues to be the central concern in most university departments, and various forms of modified narratives of modernization, along Weberian or Marxist lines, still constitute influential narratives of the Japanese past. But the emergence of approaches in cultural history has facilitated the quest to challenge

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35 See, for example, Fujioka Nobukatsu, *Kyōkasho ga oshienai rekishi* (Tokyo, 1996).
the nation-state paradigm and to go beyond internalist interpretations of history. In this context, Asia has played an increasingly important role as a framework within which to situate Japanese modernity.

Three fields of inquiry have been particularly affected by this trend. First, historians of the Tokugawa period (1600–1868) have in the last two decades begun to rewrite the history of what has conventionally been known as the era of seclusion (sakoku). While earlier research stressed the isolated nature of the country and the limited contact with the West, recent scholarship has begun to paint a more complex picture. Instead of interpreting the regulations of cross-border intercourse as a reaction to the influx of Christianity and the threat of European colonialism, historians such as Arano Yasunori have placed the ‘system of maritime prohibitions’ (kaiken) within the context of East Asia, where limitations on foreign trade and intercourse were typical. Moreover, they have argued that the Shogunal control of tributes and trade needs to be understood as part of a Japanese attempt to construct its own sphere of influence, independent of China (not least as a reaction to the loss of power of the Ming dynasty in 1644, and the ascent of the ‘barbarous’ regime of the Qing). From this perspective, the limited trade with the Dutch in Nagasaki does not appear as the last vestige of relations with Europe, but rather as one part of a larger scheme to entertain tributary relationships in the region—not only with Holland, but also with the Ryūkyū islands and Korea.

Second, colonial history has emerged as an important area to rewrite Japanese history in Asia. For a long time, the colonies were treated as an appendix in narratives that focused on the internal dynamics of Japanese modernization. To the extent that it was mentioned, moreover, Japanese colonialism was interpreted as but an extension and copy of prior developments in the metropole. Under the influence of postcolonial studies, this has changed markedly, and recent scholarship has explored the extent to which the social transformations of modern Japan need to be situated within a broader, colonial setting. This includes, for example, Stefan Tanaka’s work on Japanese historiography of East Asia and the construction of a Japanese ‘Orient’, Kang Sang-Jung’s notion of the ‘Orientalising gaze’ as precondition for Japanese modernity, Komagome Takeshi’s work on the role of the colonial ‘Other’ in constructing Japanese cultural identity, and research into the standardization of the Japanese language (kokugo) under conditions of colonialism. More recently, scholars have moved beyond the realms of

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37 Sakai Naoki, Brett de Bary, and Iyotani Toshio (eds.), Nashonariti no datsubōchiku (Tokyo, 1996); and Komori Yoichi and Takahashi Tetsuya (eds.), Nashonaru hisutori o koete (Tokyo, 1998).
38 See, for example, Furuya Tetsuo (ed.), Kindai Nihon to Ajia ninshiki (Tokyo, 1996); and Yonetani Masafumi, Ajia/Nihon (Tokyo, 2006).
39 Arano Yasunori, Kinsei Nihon to higashi Ajia (Tokyo, 1988); Arano Yasunori et al. (eds.), Ajia no naka no Nihonshi (Tokyo, 1992).
40 Stefan Tanaka, Japan’s Orient: Rendering Pasts into History (Berkeley, 1993); Kang Sang-jung, Orientarizumu no kanata e: Kindai bunke hiban (Tokyo, 1996); Komagome Takeshi, Shokuminchi
discourse and representation, and have looked at the ways in which the colonies were treated by bureaucrats, the military, and reformist intellectuals as privileged sites where social interventions could be tested. Manchuria, in particular, thus appeared as a veritable laboratory for projects of urban planning, hygienic modernization, and new forms of agricultural production and community. In these studies, the formation of modernity in Japan and its colonies is increasingly analyzed within a shared analytical field.41

Finally, the history of the expansionist years between 1931 and 1945 is currently being revisited and recontextualized. On the one hand, a spate of work has been produced that reconstructs the ideological background that underwrote Japan’s imperialist drive in Asia.42 The concept of Pan-Asianism, with all its variations and ramifications, has been one of the foci of this research.43 On the other hand, interpretations of the war have recently shifted the focus to its Asian dimension, thus reversing the canonical view of the long post-war decades. Immediately after Japan’s capitulation, the American occupation authorities banned the wartime concept of the ‘Greater East Asian War’ and instead prescribed the term ‘Pacific War’. Corresponding to the ideological structures of the Cold War, the term—and historical scholarship in its wake—highlighted certain aspects of the conflict—the Japanese war against the United States beginning with the attack on Pearl Harbor in 1941—while the long period of fighting on the Asian mainland with its estimated toll of over twenty million Chinese lives was marginalized. A recent eight-volume compilation has now proposed to use the term Asian-Pacific War as an analytical tool to situate the war in its multiple contexts. In broad-ranging essays, the volumes explore the political and economic history of the war, social transformations and cultural representations, power and resistance, and the dynamics of post-war memory. Taken together, they offer a new perspective on the past in order to place the Japanese wartime past squarely within the Asian context in which it had unfolded.44

41 Koshizawa Akira, Matsukoku no shuto keikaku: To¯kyo¯ no genzai to mirai o tou (Tokyo, 1988); and Louise Young, Japan’s Total Empire: Manchuria and the Culture of Wartime Imperialism (Berkeley, 1998).
42 Oguma Eiji, ‘Nihonjin’ no kyōkai (Tokyo, 1998).
43 Yamamuro Shinichi, Shiō kadaī to shite ni Ajia (Tokyo, 2001); and Sven Saaler and J. Victor Koschmann (eds.), Pan-Asianism in Modern Japanese History: Colonialism, Regionalism and Borders (London, 2007).
CONCLUSION

Historical writing in post-war Japan was a complex and highly controversial affair. The discipline was strongly fragmented, and the short overview given here cannot do justice to the numerous competing groups and perspectives. Compared with most other countries, Japan in the post-war decades witnessed a large number of scholarly controversies and conflicts. They were fought out through a substantial output of scholarly literature and in a context of a high degree of institutionalization. When taking a bird’s-eye view, however, two features in particular stand out. First, the discipline of history in Japan was influenced by Marxist approaches to an exceptional degree. Historical research, as a consequence, was frequently highly politicized, and the left-wing orientation of many historians also contributed to an increasingly large gulf between academic scholarship and the views on the past in the larger public and in the political establishment. The Marxist hegemony of the early post-war years did not prevail, as it was challenged by oppositional perspectives from women’s history to postcolonial studies. In general terms we can observe a development from the dominance of social history to a multiplicity of approaches, frequently informed by variants of cultural history, in the 1990s. Second, historiography in Japan was deeply embedded in larger debates about public memory and coming to terms with the recent past. As in Germany, for example, this resulted in a virtual obsession with the national past, and this general concern also contributed to the reinforcement of the paradigm of national history.

While the interpretations of the past had their own dynamics, the discipline was also closely connected to international trends. Large funds and a lot of scholarly energy were channelled into translation projects, and thus many European and American standard texts in various fields became available. Frequently they were appropriated to very specific concerns in academia and society. The result was a general synchronization of Japanese and ‘Western’ historiography, although typically the methodological imports were grafted upon indigenous approaches, and their impact followed different temporalities. The return of ‘Asia’ as a spatial category in the context of globalization is just one example for the forms in which the national past is dialectically linked to larger processes, and at the same time shaped by their local inflections.

TIMELINE/KEY DATES

1926–89 Reign of Emperor Hirohito (Shōwa period)
1931 Manchurian Incident: Japanese invasion of Manchuria and installation of the puppet regime in officially sovereign ‘Manchukuo’
1937 Japan goes to war with China
1937  Nanking Massacre
1941  Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor
1945  Atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki; end of Second World War
1945–52  US occupation of Japan
1946–8  Tokyo Trials, officially: The International Military Tribunal for the Far East
1950–3  Korean War
1951  Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security between the United States and Japan
1952  Treaty of Peace with Japan (San Francisco Peace Treaty)
1954  Lucky Dragon incident
1956  The government declares the post-war period to be at an end, as the economy once again reaches the status of the pre-war period
1960  Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security between the United States and Japan, accompanied by widespread violent demonstrations
1970  Second renewal of the Japanese–American Security Treaty; broad social protests
1989  Emperor Hirohito dies
1993  End of the political monopoly of the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP)

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Chapter 32
Historians and Historical Writing in Modern Korea

Henry Em

Through much of the postcolonial period South Korean historians wrote about modern Korean historiography as consisting of three competing schools of thought. Nationalist historiography emerged in the first decade of the twentieth century as a narrative of empowerment for anti-colonial struggle, its representative historian being Sin Ch’ae-ho. Socioeconomic (Marxist) historiography, as it emerged in the early 1930s, sought to narrate Korean history as part of world history, unfolding in accordance with historical laws, and thus an historiography ‘that does not know despair’, its representative historian being Paek Nam-un.1 The school of positivist historiography, aiming for an objective, academic approach to history-writing, was institutionalized in the 1930s, its representative historian being Yi Pyŏng-do.

There are, of course, a number of problems with a typology such as this. The categories themselves distort as much as they explain, and much of modern Korean historiography does not fit neatly into these categories: to take but one example, historians influenced by the work of the Annales School. But this typology does offer a useful starting point for understanding how a majority of South Korean historians, until quite recently, thought about their intellectual genealogy, their political/ideological stance, and their relationship to certain modes of historical writing. For example, some nationalist (and Marxist) historians have been careful to distinguish between historiography that is based on critical empirical research, and positivist historiography. Historiography has to be grounded on firm empirical evidence, of course. But for these historians, positivist historiography too often meant capitulation to, or even complicity with, state power. Needless to say, within the category of nationalist (and Marxist) historiography there were very sharp ideological and political differences.

1 Paek Nam-un, Chosen shakai keizaishi (Tokyo, 1933), 9.
Starting in the last decade of the twentieth century, however, what might be called postnationalist historiography began to emerge in South Korea. Weary of nationalism’s totalizing power, a number of literary critics, along with historians outside the field of Korean Studies, drew on postcolonial theory and took aim at much of modern Korean historiography (that is, not just nationalist historiography) among other things for its fixation with narratives of linear development. But the principal target was nationalist historiography for its erasure of plurality, complexity, and difference. Criticism of nationalist historiography has also come from the so-called New Right, and strangely enough, the postcolonial critique of nationalism and nationalist historiography has been welcomed by the New Right as a way of reasserting the ‘individual’ and restoring legitimacy to South Korea’s anti-communist legacy.

This accommodation between the New Right and postcolonial scholarship provides evidence of how nationalist historiography, especially since the 1980s, has come to be associated with leftist politics and historiography. The nationalist histories targeted here, especially the work of Kim Yong-sŏp and Kang Man-gil, do in fact trace their intellectual genealogy to the Marxist historiography of Paek Nam-un. The aim of this chapter, then, is to unpack some of this complex genealogy.

To understand, for example, how and why Marxist historiography of the 1930s came to be reconfigured as nationalist historiography in the 1970s and 1980s, this chapter pays attention to both the affinities as well as the discontinuities that constituted this genealogy and, to the extent that it is possible, situates historical writing within (and against) the distinctive political and intellectual configurations that dominated a particular historical conjuncture. By unpacking some of this complex genealogy, the chapter provides a concise overview of historians and history-writing in Korea from the beginning of the twentieth century through to the beginning of the twenty-first, with special focus on 1980s ‘nationalist’ historiography on the colonial period and the Korean War, and the critique of nationalist historiography that emerged in the first decade of this century.

1910–45: HISTORY-WRITING UNDER JAPANESE COLONIAL RULE

While the scope of this volume is properly post-war historiography, it is important to understand its early twentieth-century prologue in Korea—especially the latter part of the colonial period, when nationalist, Marxist, and positivist historiography came to be established, not only as distinct modes of history-writing, but also of political identification. In 1930s colonial Korea a generation had already passed since annexation in 1910, and for a significant number of
Korean intellectuals assimilation into, and support for, the Japanese empire appeared the most sensible, realistic course. The 1930s began with the Great Depression and the Japanese invasion of Manchuria in 1931, followed by the invasion of China in 1937. Increased censorship, police surveillance, along with wartime mobilization set strict limits on scholarship, and by 1937 a number of leading intellectuals had come out in support of Japan’s imperial goals. For these intellectuals, the choice was not simply between resistance and collaboration. The writer Yi Kwang-su and the historian Ch’oe Nam-sŏn, for example, saw their support for ‘imperialization’ (kōminsha)—transforming Koreans into loyal imperial subjects—not as a forsaking of the Korean nation, but as the only realistic way for Koreans to obtain, in due course, full citizenship and equal status with the Japanese in the Japanese empire.

It was in this political and intellectual context, as ideological divisions among Korean intellectuals became much more pronounced, that Paek Nam-un wrote Chŏsen shakai keizaishi [Social Economic History of Korea] (SEHK) and Chŏsen hōken shakai keizaishi [Economic History of Korean Feudal Society] (EHKFS). In both SEHK (1933) and EHKFS (1937), written in Japanese and published in Japan to avoid the more stringent censorship laws in colonial Korea, Paek Nam-un took issue with ‘stagnation theory’, then prevalent in Japanese socioeconomic historiography on Korea, reacting specifically to Fukuda Tokuzo’s assertion that feudalism and private ownership of land had failed to emerge in Korea, and thus the level of development in late nineteenth-century Korea was comparable to tenth-century Fujiwara Japan. In opposition to the broader Japanese historiography on Korea which tended to view Korean society as truly ‘Asiatic’, Paek’s aim was to show that Korean society and economy had developed in accordance with universal stages of development, and as a result of socioeconomic forces internal to Korea.2

Paek Nam-un also took to task Korean nationalist historians such as Sin Ch’ae-ho and Ch’oe Nam-sŏn for their idealist view of history that posited a transcendent and distinct national consciousness. Paek cast their idealist view of history as a particularistic insistence on a unique Volksgeist, an ‘antique inheritance’ from the nineteenth century suited to the needs of emerging capitalist nations such as Germany and Japan in their confrontation with advanced capitalist powers such as England. But this historiography, which depicted Korea’s past as if it formed a unique ‘mikrokosmus’, did not suit the political needs of the people in colonial Korea. By grounding their historical narrative on idealist concepts like ‘hon’ or ‘öl’ (Spirit, Mind, or Geist), Paek argued that

idealist/particularist histories, in the end, only reinforced colonialist historiography by emphasizing Korean uniqueness, reinforcing the view of pre-colonial Korea as outside of world history and thus stagnant, requiring a push from the outside. For Paek, the particularity of Korean social formations represented only the particularity of universal history as manifested in Korea.

In *SEHK*, Paek treated the Tan’gun foundation story as a myth—a myth that nevertheless opens a window into social relations in Korea’s prehistoric era. A quarter of a century earlier, starting with Sin Ch’ae-ho, the nationalist response to the threat of colonization had centred on writing histories that would arouse, unite, and mobilize all Koreans. Sin Ch’ae-ho’s 1908 essay ‘Toksa sillon’ (‘A New Way of Reading History’) displaced traditional forms of Confucian historiography—*p’yonnyo˘nch’e* (chronicles) and *kijonch’e* (annal-biographies)—with the (tragic) epic form. In place of loyalty to the king, and attachments to the village, clan, and family, and in place of hierarchic status distinctions among *yangban*, *chungin* (middle people), commoners, and *ch’onmin* (base people), Sin Ch’ae-ho endeavoured to redirect the people’s loyalty toward an all-embracing identity of Koreans as an ethnic-nation (*minjok*). It was with this political intent—to redirect loyalty to the Korean monarch to a nationalism based on popular sovereignty—that Sin Ch’ae-ho traced Korea’s ethnic and cultural origins to a geographic area that extended far beyond the Korean peninsula into Manchuria, back to the mythical time of Tan’gun, and then forward through [Old] Chosôn, Puyŏ, Koguryŏ, Parhae, Koryŏ, and finally Chosôn.

Unlike nationalist or colonialist approaches to the Tan’gun story, however, Paek Nam-un’s interpretive intent in the 1930s was not to ascertain whether Tan’gun was an actual historical figure, or a mere story about a mountain deity in Korea’s shamanistic tradition. In the genealogy of Tan’gun, Paek saw evidence of the beginnings of both class differentiation and the privileging of the male over the female descent line. Through philological study, drawing on theories of phonological change in historical linguistics, Paek argued that the word Tan’gun was originally an honorific title for a male aristocratic chieftain. Moreover, Paek also thought he had found evidence of promiscuity and matrilineality in Korea’s primitive communal society. Drawing on the work of Lewis H. Morgan, via Friedrich Engels, Paek presumed that kinship terminology referred to consanguinity and matrilineality in Korea’s primitive communal society. Thus, Paek thought he had found evidence of a Punaluan family structure in Korea’s ancient past based on his philological study of kinship terms such as ‘menuri’ (daughter-in-law), ‘manura’ (wife), and ‘nui’ (sister): according to Paek, these terms all originated from an older Korean word—not derived from Chinese compounds—and meant ‘sleeping companion’.

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For Morgan, Hawaiian kinship terms like ‘Punalua’ referred to earliest marriage forms in human evolutionary history.\(^4\) Paek Nam-un did not refute this kind of historicism that rendered contemporary ‘primitive’ societies as remnants of early historical stages. For Paek, the Korean equivalent to the Punaluan family was the ‘tongsŏ kajok’ of Korea’s distant past. As in Morgan’s work, Paek’s could provide little evidence that specific nomenclature indicates consanguinity, rather than simply terms of address, or labels for social relations. Paek’s (erroneous) discovery of the Punalua family structure prior to the Three Kingdoms period and his study of slavery in the Three Kingdoms period were nevertheless significant not only in the sense that \(SEHK\) initiated socioeconomic studies of Korea’s ancient past, but also because it narrated Korean history as a sequence of universal stages, consistent with ‘historical laws’ at work in all societies. In narrating national history as a succession of modes of production, Paek Nam-un’s work established a precedent for historicizing and denaturalizing patriarchy, and monogamy for women, along with private property and the state in Korean history.

In \(SEHK\), Paek Nam-un located class differentiation and class domination at the very origin of the Korean ethnic-nation: that is, the effort to establish durable class domination drove the process of unifying various tribal federations by a centralizing state. This was followed by slave society in the Three Kingdoms period (first to seventh centuries), Asiatic feudal society beginning with the Unified Silla period (seventh to tenth centuries), with incipient capitalism emerging in late Chosŏn starting in the eighteenth century. In general agreement with Mikhail Godes’s critique of the Asiatic Mode of Production, Paek argued that Korean feudal society might have been ‘Asiatic’, but not in the sense that there could be a distinct mode of production particular to Korea, or Asia. In \(EHKFS\), Paek characterized feudalism in Korea, focusing on state ownership of land, as a particular (Asiatic) manifestation of the same form in Europe’s historical development. Paek added that the Korean people were a ‘precocious’ nation (\(chosuksŏng ūi minjok\)) because they developed quite early on characteristics associated with modern nationalism, that is, a unified culture, language, and customs.

In this way, Paek disposed of the notion of the ‘Asiatic Mode of Production’ that echoed the colonialist narrative of a dynamic and progressive West/Japan, contrasted with a static and despotic Orient. After the publication of volume 1 of \(EHKFS\) in 1937, however, Paek Nam-un was not able to follow through on the rest of his research agenda: that is, locating the ‘sprouts of capitalism’ in the latter

\(^4\) For a refutation of Morgan’s claims about the consanguineous-collective, communal-family sex-relations in Polynesia, see E. S. Craighill Handy and Mary Kawena Pukui, \(The Polynesian Family System in Ka-u, Hawai‘i\) (Rutland, 1972). See also Thomas Trautmann, \(Lewis Henry Morgan and the Invention of Kinship\) (Berkeley, 1987); and Paul Van der Grijp, ‘Pioneer of Untaught Anthropology: Recontextualizing Lewis H. Morgan and His Kinship Perspective’, \(Dialectical Anthropology\), 22 (1997), 103–36.
part of the Choson period, and delineating the historical development of ideology in Korea and ‘transplanted [colonial] capitalism’. In 1938, Paek was imprisoned for violation of the Peace Preservation Order, and was released in 1940. Forced to relinquish his position at Yŏnhŭi chŏnmun, Paek could not continue his research until the end of the Pacific war.  

Intimidation, along with the hope of securing a privileged place for Koreans in an expanding empire, led many Korean intellectuals either to endorse or at least acquiesce in Japan’s imperial project during the late 1930s. Among Korean historians trained at Japanese universities, especially Waseda, and later Keijō Imperial University in Seoul, many adopted the narrative framework of colonialist historiography: specifically, Man-Senshi, a Manchuria-Korea spatial conception that negated Korea’s historical sovereignty by presenting history as a movement, in waves, into Korea; and more generally that of Oriental history (Tōyōshi) which presented Japan as uniquely capable, in contrast to moribund places like Korea and China that were saddled with debilitating customs and a long troubled past.

Tōyōshi provided justification for Japan’s imperial expansion, and historians like Yi Pyŏng-do, the central figure in positivist/critical textual historiography, conceded a great deal to Tōyōshi, to its status as objective, academic, and uniquely legitimating historical scholarship. Starting in 1927, Yi Pyŏng-do began working for the Society for the Compilation of Korean History (Chŏnsensi henshukai), an organization directed and funded by the office of the Japanese Governor-General. Later, in 1934, Yi Pyŏng-do took a leading role in organizing the Chindan hakhoe, an academic society devoted to ‘pure scholarship’. Chindan being a sobriquet for Korea, Chindan Society was to provide the institutional base to ‘compete’ with the Japanese academe in the pursuit of rigorous and objective empirical research in Korean history, language, and folklore. While its chief function was to provide a venue for publishing academic papers written by Korean academics, an additional motivation for organizing the Chindan Society had to do, in part, with countering Marxists such as Paek Nam-un.

After liberation from Japanese colonial rule in 1945, and especially since the 1960s, the positivist/textual critical school represented by Chindan Society historians has been roundly criticized for its failure to challenge colonialist narratives and colonial rule.  Historians outside the academy such as An

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6 Stefan Tanaka, Japan’s Orient: Rendering Pasts into History (Berkeley, 1995).
7 Cho Tong-gŏl has suggested, however, that this negative view of positivist historiography stems more from the textual-critical school’s submission to, if not complicity with, authoritarian governments in post-1945 South Korea. Cho Tong-gŏl, Hyŏndaeshan’guk sahaksa (Seoul, 1998), 219. Through careful comparison of the work of Ikeuchi Hiroshi and Kim Sang-gi, Remco Breuker argues that while textual-critical historiography was highly derivative of Tōyōshi, Chindan Society historians such as Kim Sang-gi were still able to portray Koreans as historical subjects: relations between China and Korea had been based on reciprocity; Koreans participated in the tributary
Chae-hong, while also hostile to Marxist historiography, were much more courageous in challenging not just colonialist narratives but colonial rule itself. In contrast to historians like Ch’oe Nam-sŏn, who sought to invert colonialist historiography even while supporting the Japanese empire, An Chae-hong’s nationalist historiography hewed closely to his nationalist, anti-colonial politics.

Imprisoned nine times by the colonial authorities, An Chae-hong turned to history-writing in the early 1930s as open legal struggle became impossible. In opposition to Marxist historiography and anti-colonial struggle based on class struggle, An Chae-hong maintained that materiality and subjectivity was always mutually constitutive, and he sought to locate in Korea’s ancient past an intellectual, religious, and cultural chŏngsin (geist) that both identified and unified the Korean ethnic-nation vis-à-vis other peoples. Just as subjectivity could constitute a material force in history, universality and particularity was also mutually constitutive. In that sense, the particularity of Korea’s past was already universal, and Korean historians need not be self-conscious about accentuating the Korean nation’s distinctive subjectivity that linked contemporary Koreans to their (brilliant) ancient past.

An Chae-hong’s historiography focused on Korea’s ancient past to establish Korean claims to a national, sovereign past, and to identify an ethos that was not only transmitted down through time but also manifested concretely in institutions and practices. An Chae-hong identified this ethos as Tasarijūtī, from the ancient Korean word for the number five (all digits of one hand) that he claimed also meant ‘make all live’. This communitarian and democratic ethos produced in ancient times a democratic aristocracy—a community in which all free native males were active, participatory citizens. In contemporary times, Tasarijūtī could be the basis for a new nationalism and new democracy that would bring forth a harmonious union of workers, peasants, and the petty bourgeoisie.

As a counter-narrative to Man-Senshi and Tōyōshi, An Chae-hong refuted the notion that Kija was a Chinese nobleman of Shang who went east to establish (Kija) Chosŏn toward the end of the second millennium BC. According to texts such as the Shangshu dazhuan [Grand Tradition to the Documents] and the Shiji [Records of the Scribe], following Zhou’s conquest of Shang, King Wu of Zhou enfeoffed Kija as a ruler of Chosŏn. Such texts, written centuries after the event, when incorporated into the narrative framework of Man-Senshi and Tōyōshi, presented Kija Chosŏn as a ‘Chinese’ colony, undercutting any notion of an autonomous, sovereign origin for Korea. To counter this view, An Chae-hong,

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like Ch’oe Nam-sŏn and Paek Nam-un, turned to historical linguistics and the study of phonological change, and taking those texts as an interpretive springboard, arrived at the conclusion that ‘Kija’ must have been a common noun rather than a proper noun, denoting a feudal vassal of Tan’gun Chosŏn ([Old] Chosŏn). While An Chae-hong had little influence on Chindan Chosŏn historians during the colonial period, his narrative about Kija (as non-‘Chinese’) became commonplace in post-1945 Korean historiography.

1945–60: HISTORY-WRITING IN DIVIDED KOREA

For those who managed to keep some distance between themselves and Japan’s imperialist project, liberation from Japanese colonial rule presented an opportunity to take the leading role in reconstructing historical narratives and political discourse in post-1945 Korea. But liberation from Japanese colonial rule was followed immediately by the division of Korea along the thirty-eighth parallel—an American proposal which the Soviets accepted, with Soviet and American troops occupying Korea now divided into two. This presented a new, complex situation for intellectuals like An Chae-hong and Paek Nam-un. With US occupation forces relying on, and supporting, anti-communists south of the thirty-eighth parallel, which included Seoul, Paek Nam-un’s stance became more nationalist, calling for a New Democracy and a broad united front that would exclude former collaborators from the task of constructing a unified and sovereign nation-state.

In the months following liberation (15 August 1945), Paek Nam-un focused his efforts on laying the foundations for Korea’s higher academic institutions. The day after Japan’s surrender, Paek Nam-un began organizing the Chosŏn haksul-wŏn (Korean Academy of Sciences) with other leading progressive scholars to reorganize higher education and research institutions throughout Korea and across the disciplines, from engineering to literature, science, and the arts. In August 1946, when the US Army Military Government in Korea (USAMGIK) announced its plan to merge Keijō Imperial University with nine existing professional schools to form Seoul National University, Paek Nam-un was vocal in his criticism of the plan: university faculty would have little autonomy.

9 Recently, Shim Jae-hoon has argued that Kija should not be associated with Chosŏn at all. According to Shim, Kija does seem to be a nobleman of Shang, and did go east. But a political entity called Chosŏn should be dated much later: it was not until the Han Dynasty that sources clearly associated Kija with Chosŏn. Jae-Hoon Shim, ‘A New Understanding of Kija Chosŏn as a Historical Anachronism’, Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies, 62:2 (2002), 271–305.

10 In 1945 political and intellectual life was centred in Seoul. With Seoul in the US occupation zone, there were few historians north of the thirty-eighth parallel. In late 1945, according to Cho Tong-gŏl, there was just one noteworthy historian living north of the thirty-eighth parallel: Kim Kwang-jin.
vis-à-vis the USAMGIK’s Department of Education, and academics who had actively supported Japanese imperialism would be included in the faculty. With conservatives in control of the USAMGIK’s Department of Education, the Korean historians who became Seoul National University faculty were mostly Chindan Society members, including Yi Pyŏng-do.¹¹

On the moderate Right, the political strategy of An Chae-hong’s ‘new nationalism’ called for the creation of a left-right coalition that would exclude communists. As the ‘middle ground’ quickly disappeared in the context of a divided occupation by Soviet and American troops, An Chae-hong accepted the position of Director of the Interim South Korean Government under the USAMGIK. By 1948, many Marxist intellectuals had left Seoul and gone north of the thirty-eighth parallel, pushed by anti-communist repression in the South, and pulled by offers of employment and opportunity to take part in North Korea’s national democratic revolution. At the same time, historians who had taken a centrist position were becoming politically marginalized in the South. With American backing, then, those who had championed ‘objective’ empirical research and ‘non-political’ historiography during the colonial period came to seize nearly all the major academic posts in American-occupied southern Korea. It was not until the 19 April student revolution in 1960, which toppled the Syngman Rhee regime, that the Chindan Society’s grip on South Korean historiography was challenged by nationalist historians of a younger generation.

1960–80: NATIONALIST HISTORIOGRAPHY

Although the 19 April 1960 student revolution that toppled the Syngman Rhee regime was itself crushed by the 1961 military coup d’etat, that short-lived democratic opening nevertheless paved the way for a younger generation of historians to explore new ways of narrating history. In the ‘Introduction’ to Kuksa sillon [A New History of Korea], published in 1961 (just prior to Park Chung Hee’s coup d’etat), Yi Ki-baek, who had studied under Yi Pyŏng-do, presented a comprehensive critique of colonialist historiography. Yi Ki-baek identified four themes underlying colonialist historiography: Japanese and Koreans shared common ethnic origins, and thus Japan’s colonization of Korea represented the restoration of ancient ties; factionalism is deeply ingrained into the Korean political culture, as evidenced by successive literati purges and factional strife during the Chosŏn period; Korean history had remained stagnant (late Chosŏn had not even reached the feudal stage of development); and external forces (Chinese, Manchurian, and Japanese) had determined Korea’s historical development.

¹¹ These included Kim Sang-gi, Yi Sang-baek, Son Chin-tae, Yi In-yŏng, and Yu Hong-ryŏl.
Written as a history textbook, the aim of Yi Ki-baek’s *Kuksa sillon* was to dismantle such ‘prejudiced views and theories that impede a correct understanding of Korean history’.\(^\text{12}\) In *Kuksa sillon*, Yi Ki-baek used the word *kundaehwa* (modernization)—the first Korean historian to make reference to modernization theory being promoted by American academics and advisors. *Kuksa sillon*, in other words, created a narrative framework that was safely postcolonial: anti-Japanese, but uncritical of American intervention in post-1945 Korea. This type of historiography, a marriage of modernization theory with the textual-critical tradition, quickly became the dominant mode of narrating Korean history in the context of the Cold War. The question of neocolonialism (critique of the United States in South Korea), suppressed by the anti-communist state, would be sublimated through developmental time: South Korea was developing with American assistance, but also from its own sources of modernity.

As the effort to ‘overcome’ colonialist historiography gathered momentum, however, closet Marxists began to venture beyond the ideological boundaries imposed by South Korea’s place in the Cold War system under the banner of ‘nationalist’ historiography. It was in response to this ‘danger’ that Yi Ki-baek took to task historians like Kim Yong-sŏp for drawing on the work of Marxist historians such as Paek Nam-un, and for ‘turning a blind eye’ to the fact that Paek Nam-un had been hostile to nationalist historiography during the colonial period.\(^\text{13}\) Disregarding Paek Nam-un’s critique of nationalist historiography was a self-preservation measure. For progressive historians such as Kim Yong-sŏp and Kang Man-gil, Paek Nam-un’s historiography offered a way not just to overcome the legacy left by colonialist historiography, but also to reinsert class struggle in historiography.

But Paek Nam-un, the Marxist historian who went to North Korea before the Korean War, could not be cited in print nor claimed as an intellectual predecessor, and the only way to appropriate his work was by casting him as a nationalist historian who took part in the Korean Studies movement (*Choso˘nhak undong*) in the mid-1930s. Through their empirical studies of land tenure, growth of commerce (merchant capital), and the development of a commodity-monetary economy in the latter half of Chosŏn, Kim Yong-sŏp and Kang Man-gil revived and confirmed Paek Nam-un’s disclosure of the internal dynamic underlying Korea’s historical development, with class struggle central to that process.

Under a nationalist canopy, Kim Yong-sŏp and Kang Man-gil re-established intellectual links to a form of history-writing that had been suppressed in post-Korean War South Korea. Their view of history was based on an anti-colonial/oppositional nationalism, and their historiography contributed greatly to understanding the dynamic nature of Korea’s social and economic development in


\(^{13}\) Id., ‘Sahoe kyo˘ngje sahak kwa sîchûng sahak úi munje’, *Munhak kwa chisŏng* (Spring, 1971), repr. in id., *Yo˘ksa wa minjok* (1971; Seoul, 1997), 34.
late Chosŏn. In a very limited sense, Kim Yong-sŏp and Kang Man-gil shared common ground with nationalist historians who preferred modernization theory: their agenda was to write a Korea-centred history. But the implications of their historical narrative could not be more different. For modernization historians, the origins of Korea’s modernity was to be found in the cultural and scientific developments in the eighteenth century, and traced forward to Westernized/Westernizing elites of the nineteenth century, and to the non-communist nationalists in the twentieth century who would eventually establish South Korea.

In contrast, Kim Yong-sŏp, along with Kang Man-gil, laid the basis for the argument that there were two different paths to modernity: a relatively more egalitarian and autonomous path to modernity from below, with peasant rebellions providing the main impetus for progressive change, and a more exploitative, dependent path to modernity from above, led by elites who would ultimately capitulate to imperialist demands starting in the late nineteenth century. That is to say, Kim Yong-sŏp and Kang Man-gil located the Westernized/Westernizing elites within an historical trajectory that had roots in the cultural and political world of the landed class in the late Chosŏn period, and whose modernization efforts from the late nineteenth century to the present reflected their narrow class interests, and for that reason tended toward dependency on outside powers: that is, collaboration with the Japanese in the colonial period, and with the Americans after 1945. This, then, was a trajectory that paved the way for Korea’s colonization by Japan, formation of separate states in 1948, and dictatorship and dependent capitalist development in South Korea.


By the late 1970s the argument that there were two possible paths to modernity was an academic formulation compared to more bracing narrative strategies that were being employed by students and dissident intellectuals in South Korea as they reimagined the present as a conjuncture of conflicting historical trajectories. In the lead chapter of Haebang chŏnhusa ūi insik [Understanding Liberation History] (ULH) published in 1979, Song Kŏn-ho presented an ethical critique of how 1945 marked the beginning point of the most horrific chapter in Korean history.¹⁴ Liberation, coming after decades of living under colonial rule, should have marked the beginning of a new history where the oppressed masses could finally and rightly become the subject (chuch’ě) of history. Instead, with the

¹⁴ The first volume of ULH was published in 1979 and the sixth volume in 1989. Each volume was organized around one or more themes, with the author of the lead essay making the central historiographic arguments which gave each volume its distinctiveness.
partition of Korea along the thirty-eighth parallel coming simultaneously with liberation, former collaborators and those willing to serve the new occupying powers—the Soviet Union and the United States—diverted history from its true path and brought about such a terrible ordeal for the Korean people.

The primary target of Song Kôn-ho’s chapter was not American imperialism but rather Rhee Syngman, the arch-anti-communist, conservative politician who became the first President of South Korea in 1948. While avoiding detailed discussion of the role of Pak Hôn-yông and the Korean Communist Party (KCP; later Korean Workers Party, KWP), Song Kôn-ho reminded his readers that it was Rhee who allowed notorious collaborators to evade punishment, including former Korean police officials who had hunted down, tortured, or killed independence activists. As a whole, the chapters in ULH drew a link between Rhee’s refusal to punish collaborators with other acts that aborted justice and stripped liberation of any real meaning: delaying land reform and weakening its impact, sabotaging the work of the US–Soviet Joint Commission so as to prevent the formation of a unified coalition government, and taking the lead in manipulating anti-communist discourse to establish a separate state in the south, thus making the division permanent.15

Through this critique of Rhee Syngman, ULH reinterpreted post-1945 history in terms of powerful binaries that inspired opposition discourse: genuine nationalism vs mindless anti-communism, and minjung- (people-)oriented democracy vs mere formal democracy.16 Song’s chapter not only exposed the rather inglorious origins of the South Korean state; it also negated Cold War historiography by positing as nationalist, resistance to the UN-sponsored separate elections in 1948 on which South Korea claims its legal basis. Song Kôn-ho’s chapter was part of a sustained and courageous effort by dissident intellectuals in South Korea to constitute the subaltern (minjung) as a national (and nationalist) subject, and to imagine a subjectivity that could be an alternative to, and autonomous from, nationalist narratives authorized by either the North Korean or South Korean state.

It was the 1980 people’s uprising in the city of Kwangju, however, and the massacre perpetrated by South Korean troops in Kwangju, that broke the government’s ideological hold over the democratic movement. The magnitude of the state violence drove young intellectuals to search for the structural origins of their predicament. Whereas dissident intellectuals such as Song Kôn-ho had previously skirted the issue of communism (on the role played by Pak Hôn-yông and the KCP for example), by the mid-1980s such taboos no longer evoked automatic self-censorship.17 In introducing the second volume of ULH

17 Henry Em, ‘“Overcoming” Korea’s Division: Narrative Strategies in Recent South Korean Historiography’, Positions: East Asia Cultures Critique, 1:2 (1993), 450–85.
published in 1985, Kang Man-gil noted that history departments in Korean universities had until then avoided the modern period. Past attempts to write the history of colonial and postcolonial Korea from an ‘objective’ viewpoint had been repressed, while histories that did get published either consciously or unconsciously conferred legitimacy on the political forces responsible for the division of Korea. Such historiography naturalized the present: it was written from within the structure of division.

The historian’s most pressing task, then, was to write a history of modern Korea from a perspective unfettered by this structure of division. Such a perspective is accessible, Kang Man-gil argued, when historians come to understand the political struggles of the immediate post-liberation period not simply as the denouement of the colonial experience, but also as a struggle to overcome national division. Beyond objective analysis of the history that led to national division, a reunification-oriented historiography must pay special attention to efforts at creating a united front between the Left and Right at the end of the colonial period, and efforts to overcome national division after 1945. Similar to Song Kôn-ho’s 1979 chapter, this was an historical narrative that validated opposition to the establishment of separate states: that is, boycott of UN-sponsored elections in 1948, led by communists as well as nationalists such as Kim Ku, which created South Korea.

If Kang Man-gil’s narrative strategy aimed to recentre Koreans (rather than foreign powers) in post-1945 history, the lead chapter in the fourth volume of ULH, published in 1989 and co-written by Choi Jang-jip and Chông Hae-gu, looked at the Korean War in terms of its structural origins both domestic and international, while not losing sight of the dynamic character of political struggle. In describing this dynamic, Choi Jang-jip and Chông Hae-gu began with explanations of why liberation brought forth a revolutionary situation. Simply put, it was the breakdown of the colonial state at the end of the Pacific War which unleashed demands for revolutionary change. These demands were anti-imperialist and anti-feudal in nature: the vast majority of the people wanted former collaborators purged from government posts, factories and businesses owned by the Japanese and comprador capitalists nationalized, and land reform.

The appearance of People’s Committees throughout Korea immediately after liberation marked the first steps toward the establishment of a postcolonial government that would have carried out the anti-imperialist anti-feudal revolution. Thus, on the question of the American role in post-liberation

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19 According to a 1946 public opinion poll taken by the USAMGIK, in southern Korea, 70 per cent of 8,000 people polled supported socialism, 10 per cent communism, and 13 per cent capitalism. See Tae-Gyun Park, ‘Different Roads, Common Destination: Economic Discourses in South Korea during the 1950s’, Modern Asian Studies, 39:3 (2005), 661–82.
Korean politics, Choi Jang-jip and Chŏng Hae-gu agreed with the arguments made by Bruce Cumings in volume 1 of his *Origins of the Korean War* (1981): while Soviet troops did not need to force a revolutionary programme on northern Korea, the tide of revolution was reversed in southern Korea only with a considerable use of coercive power by the USAMGIK. Moreover, in the period 1945–7, even as the United States participated in the Joint Commission talks, which were to have laid the basis for a unified Korean state, the USAMGIK was pursuing a policy of containment as evidenced by the outlawing of the KCP, strengthening of the repressive state apparatuses, and support for anti-communist groups.

North of the thirty-eighth parallel, immediately after liberation, both the Soviet Army and Kim Il Sung wanted to establish the party centre in Pyongyang, and Choi Jang-jip and Chŏng Hae-gu linked this to what later came to be called minju kijiron, or the strategy of creating a democratic base area as a preliminary to seizing the whole.20 The use of conventional military force to overcome Korea’s division was not inherent to minju kijiron. But after the failure of the US–Soviet Joint Commission talks and the establishment of separate states in 1948, the formal leadership structure of the North Korean Workers’ Party (NKWP) and the South Korean Workers’ Party (SKWP) were merged into one, and thereafter minju kijiron came to be understood in military terms. Thus, from liberation to the eve of the Korean War, the intent and effect of this strategy produced, in sequence, an independent KCP leadership in northern Korea, political consolidation around this leadership to wage anti-imperialist/anti-feudal struggles, including the united front struggle against the US-sponsored movement to establish a separate state in the south, and finally, by 1950, North Korea as a military base from which a war of national liberation could be launched. 21

As ‘revisionist’ historical narrative gained currency through the 1980s, conservative historians became increasingly frustrated at historiography that conceded nationalist credentials to North Korea and denied historical legitimacy to South Korea.22 But the fall of communism in Eastern Europe in 1989 and the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991 provided an opening, and so did the emergence of postmodern/postcolonial theory in Korean academic scholarship. The New Right welcomed scholarship inspired by postcolonial theory for its refusal to narrate the colonial period as a Manichaean struggle between a colonizing Japan that was racist and exploitative, opposed by a resisting and

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21 Volume 4 of *ULH*, edited by Choi Jang-jip and Chŏng Hae-gu, was instructive in how it captured the dynamic nature of post-liberation politics even while pointing to the structural causes of the Korean War. For a more comprehensive discussion, see Em, ‘“Overcoming” Korea’s Division’.
enduring people/ethnic-nation (minjung/minjok). With this, the New Right turned to criticism of nationalism in general, and 1980s nationalist historiography in particular, attacking the latter for being ‘critical of South Korea’.

_Haebang chŏnhusa ŭ chae-insik_ [Reconsideration of Liberation History] (_RHL_) was published in February 2006, with enthusiastic coverage from conservative dailies like the _Chosŏn ilbo_. Compiled by four scholars identified with postmodern theory and the New Right, the title of this two-volume anthology deliberately evoked _ULH_, signalling the editors’ intention of restoring ‘balance’ to historical understanding of colonial and postcolonial history. In their ‘Introduction’, the editors charged that leftist-nationalist historiography, as epitomized by _ULH_, was responsible for the ‘dangerously distorted’ historical perspective held by a sizeable segment of the public (mostly the younger generation) as well by the left-leaning Roh Moo-hyun administration. For the editors of _RLH_, 1980s leftist-nationalist historiography, as epitomized by _ULH_, had achieved near hegemony in politics: in spite of subsequent research that should have corrected such a skewed view, leftist-nationalist historiography remains entrenched, discouraging the publication of more ‘objective’ scholarship, attacking those who stray beyond leftist-nationalist narratives of anti-Japanese resistance and privileging of leftist-nationalist struggles in the post-liberation period.

As Bruce Cumings points out, what the New Right sees as a ‘dangerously distorted’ historical perspective appears time and again in US classified reports authored by American military and intelligence officers who were critical of the US decision to divide Korea and were distressed about American complicity in political massacres prior to the Korean War (Yōsu in 1948, Cheju in 1948–9, and so on). But it should also be noted that _RHL_ brought together a number of essays, both old and more recent, that present evidence as well as compelling narratives on a range of issues that add complexity to narratives about the colonial experience as well as post-1945 history. Some essays challenged _ULH_ more directly. For example, Chang Si-wŏn’s chapter argued that South Korea’s land reform succeeded in transforming peasants into independent farmers, and helped put an end to status distinctions.

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25 Yu In-ho’s essay in _ULH_ was critical of the impact of land reform that finally got under way in 1950: up to 61 per cent of land that should have been targeted for land reform was sold to the tenant farmers, ownership transferred to family members, or even flooded (to evade compliance) prior to implementation of land reform. Yu In-ho, ‘Haebanghŭ nongji kaehyŏk ŭ chŏn’gaekwajŏng kwa sŏnggyŏk’, in Song Kŏn-ho _et al._ (eds.), _Haebang chŏnhusa ŭ insik_, i. 395–477. Chang Si-wŏn’s essay in _RLH_ argues that the average sale price of those lands sold to tenant farmers before 1950 was roughly equivalent to prices mandated by the land reform law. Chang Si-wŏn, ‘Nongji kaehyŏk: Chijuje haech’e wa chagaknongcheje ŭ sŏngnip’, ibid., ii. 345–89.
Soviet Union, as early as October 1945, was committed to establishing a separate state in the north.\textsuperscript{26} According to Kim Chul (Kim Ch’ŏl), one of the editors of \textit{RLH}, scholars who question leftist-nationalist narratives now face a backlash that is comparable to the anti-communist witch-hunts of the past.\textsuperscript{27} The immediate political context to which Kim Chŏl and the other editors were referring had to do with the twenty or so Truth Commissions established by the National Assembly to investigate past wrongdoings, from active collaboration during the colonial period to complicity in massacres and killings of civilians by US and South Korean military and police before, during, and after the Korean War. For the editors of \textit{RLH}, these investigations into the past were aimed at consolidating leftist hegemony and undermining South Korea’s legitimacy through a one-sided attack on anti-communist conservatives in South Korea—because conservatives were much more likely to have family members who had collaborated with Japanese imperialists, and close personal ties to authoritarian regimes of the past.\textsuperscript{28}

Thus, in the conservative press, \textit{RLH} was presented as a full-throated and much needed critique of leftist-nationalist historiography. That the leading conservative newspaper in South Korea has been at the forefront of criticizing nationalism and nationalist historiography, and actively cultivating (supporting) postmodern and postcolonial scholarship, testifies to how much nationalism has come to be associated with leftist politics and historiography. The New Right embraced postcolonial theory’s critique of nationalism and nationalist historiography as totalizing and undemocratic. Economic historians like Yi Yŏng-hun welcomed postcolonial theory for subverting unities such as class and nation imposed by nationalist narratives. For Yi Yŏng-hun, postcolonial scholarship provided the opening for recentring the ‘individual’, and a way to restore legitimacy to South Korea’s anti-communist legacy, now reconfigured as civilizational progress.\textsuperscript{29}

Intellectually, however, the accommodation between the New Right and postcolonial scholarship would have to be tenuous, resting solely on their common antipathy toward nationalism and nationalist historiography. For the New Right, intensely anti-communist and fiercely unapologetic about capitalism and capitalist development in South Korea, accommodation with postcolonial

\textsuperscript{26} Yi Chŏng-sik, ‘Naengjŏn ùi chŏn’gae kwajŏng kwa Hanbando pundan ùi koch’akhwa’, ibid., ii. 13–56.

\textsuperscript{27} Round-Table Discussion, Pak Chi-hyang, Kim Chŏl, Kim Il-yo˘ng, and Yi Yŏng-hun, ibid., ii. 611–84.

\textsuperscript{28} Two of the most important commissions are the Presidential Committee for Investigation of Collaboration under Japanese Imperialism (PCIC), and the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC), both established in 2005.

\textsuperscript{29} Yi Yŏng-hun, \textit{Taehan Min’guk iyagi} (Seoul, 2007).
CONCLUSIONS

The genealogies presented here were unavoidably schematic, but the historicizing of different modes of history-writing provides clues as to why there exist such stark differences in theoretical affiliations, narrative strategies, and political commitments in South Korean historiography that is nominally ‘nationalist’ and ‘post-nationalist’. The Korean War stopped with an armistice rather than a peace treaty, and with the South Korean state normalizing a near perpetual state of emergency, Marxist historiography could (re)emerge only as nationalist historiography. As the effort to ‘overcome’ colonialist historiography gathered momentum in the 1960s, in tandem with a vibrant and tenacious democracy movement, nationalist historiography (re)emerged on both sides of the faultlines over dictatorship, capitalist modernity, and national division. In the late 1990s, however, a decade after the transition to democracy starting in 1987, ‘nationalist’ historians like Kang Man-gil could tell his students that they should look forward to the day when nationalism can be dispensed with.31

Post-nationalist historiography, however, was not initiated by Marxist historians. Post-nationalist scholarship which emerged in the first decade of the new millennium began with studies of the colonial period. Rather than taking ethnicity, sexuality, and class as fixed, objective categories, a younger generation of historians and literary scholars focused attention on the process by which ethnicity, sexuality, and class came to be (re)constituted under colonial rule.32 As these scholars eschewed a simple colonizer–colonized binary, their work elicited hostile reaction from leftist-nationalist historians, but enthusiastic interest from the New Right, in large part because of their deployment of the notion of colonial modernity where the ‘colonial’ (and class exploitation) sometimes receded into the background, leaving only the modern—but not always as an

31 Kang Man-gil added, however, that nationalist historiography is ‘necessary’ until Korea is reunified. (Seminar at Korea University, 1998.)
32 See especially Kwŏn Podūrae, Yŏnae ūi sidae (Seoul, 2003).
object of critique. But as suggested here, the accommodation between New Right intellectuals and post-nationalist scholarship is also contingent, and it remains to be seen whether post-nationalist historiography can remain critical of the workings of power without strong links to socio-economic (Marxist) historiography.33

**TIMELINE/KEY DATES**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Event</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1910</td>
<td>Korea annexed by Japan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1919</td>
<td>Demonstrations for Korea’s independence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1945</td>
<td>Japan surrenders to the United States; Soviet Union accepts US proposal for a divided occupation of Korea</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1948</td>
<td>Republic of Korea (South Korea) inaugurated with Syngman Rhee as President</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1948</td>
<td>Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (North Korea) inaugurated with Kim Il Sung as premier</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1950–3</td>
<td>Korean War</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Subsequent dates for South Korea only**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Event</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1960</td>
<td>Student-led revolution forces President Syngman Rhee’s resignation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1961</td>
<td>Major General Park Chung Hee seizes power in a coup d’etat</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1979</td>
<td>President Park Chung Hee assassinated by the KCIA Director Kim Jae Kyu</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>General Chun Doo Hwan extends martial law to the entire country and dissolves the National Assembly; an uprising in the city of Kwangju is suppressed by the military, with hundreds of citizens killed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1987</td>
<td>Mass movement for democracy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1996</td>
<td>Former Presidents Chun Doo Hwan and Roh Tae Woo are put on trial for their role in the 1979 military coup d’etat, and for the May 1980 massacre in Kwangju</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>President Kim Dae Jung makes an historic visit to North Korea for the first-ever inter-Korea summit meeting</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**KEY HISTORICAL SOURCES**


33 On this question, see Yun Hae-dong *et al.* (eds.), *Kûndae rŭl tasi ignũnda*. See also the essays in Im Chi-hyun *et al.* (eds.), *Kuksa ŭi sinhwa rŭl nŏmŏsŏ* (Seoul, 2004).


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Han Yŏng-u, *Han’guk minjokjuu˘iy yöksahak* (Seoul, 1993).


Epilogue: On the Current and Future State of Historical Writing

Allan Megill

It is fitting that all men should ever accord great gratitude to those writers who have composed universal histories, since they have aspired to help by their individual labors human society as a whole.

Diodorus of Sicily, *Bibliotheca Historica* (c.60–c.30 BC), trans. C. H. Oldfather

One of the most important tasks of the historian is to help us see the world in which we live within the larger frame of human history. The greatest historians offer us a deep and striking insight into how human life in the present differs from human life in the past. As for those of us who are under-labourers in the discipline of history, we adhere to a set of practices that presumes close familiarity with historical sources. And so, fearing the charge of dilettantism, we feel driven to focus our research and writing on *one* country, *one* period, *one* theme. Consequently, the past of which we speak is usually a small segment of the entire known human past. Even when groups of historians collaborate with one another, their field of vision is usually quite limited.

Ideally, we ought to be able to produce a universal history, one that would ‘cover’ the past of humankind ‘as a whole’ (whatever that ‘whole’ might be). Sometimes, although less often in the last half century than in previous times, there have indeed been attempts to write such histories. But aside from the always increasing difficulty of mastering the factual material that such an undertaking requires, there exists another difficulty: the coherence of universal history always presupposes an initial decision not to write about the human past in all its multiplicity, but to focus on one aspect of that past.¹ Insofar as they have any real measure of coherence, works that might pass for universal history invariably

¹ It is no accident that Hegel, in his account of ‘The Varieties of Historical Writing’ (lectures of 1822 and 1828), declared that the form of history with the most general perspective is ‘specialized history’, which takes as its object one human pursuit, such as art, law, or religion. G. W. F. Hegel, *Lectures on the Philosophy of World History: Introduction*, trans. H. B. Nisbet (Cambridge, 1975), 23–4.
turn out to be restricted in theme or object. Writers of would-be universal histories have deliberately chosen a variety of foci, including the Christian salvation story, the development of the forces of production, the growth of political freedom, ‘challenge and response’ in the rise and fall of civilizations, disease in human history, and so on. Having made her choice, the would-be universal historian tries to cajole readers into allowing that choice to serve as a stand-in for ‘history as a whole’.

No doubt the lure of universal history will persist, even in the face of its practical and conceptual difficulty. Certainly, it is possible to imagine—however unlikely or undesirable this might be—a future ideological convergence among humans that would enable them to accept, as authoritative, one history of humankind. In the meantime, however, the *Oxford History of Historical Writing (OHHW)* gives us something else: a substitute for universal history that manages to conform to the historical discipline’s methodological standards. In its eventual five volumes and 1,500,000 words, it has the dimensions of a universal history. More than this, the 160 or so historians who have participated in the project are specialists in their fields, and the chapters that they wrote were critiqued by other historians, and then revised in the light of those critiques.

Still, there is a difference between a universal history and a collection of disparate articles, however well crafted. But note how the subject matter of the *OHHW* makes possible a coherence that we would not otherwise have expected, for these volumes offer not representations of the past, but representations of past representations of the past. In other words, this is a second-order, not a first-order, work. The *OHHW* does not ask whether the past representations that it discusses are true, but rather what they signify. In asking and in trying to answer this question, it offers a historical phenomenology of the relations of human beings to past time. This unifying concern can be posed as a question, which comes up repeatedly in these volumes: How did human beings in that place and time orient themselves to the residues of the past that they experienced in their present?

Since the specific object of this question changes as times and places change, the unity that the *OHHW* brings might be considered defective. But here we must turn to something else—not so much a question as a theme—that also runs through the *OHHW*. Especially (but not only) in the early volumes, the *OHHW* historian-authors write about people who approached the residues of the past in ways that diverge radically from the ways favoured by practitioners of the modern discipline of history. As a result, we see a dialectic displayed in the *OHHW*. One term in this dialectic is the commitment of the present-day discipline to its own standards of evidence and evaluation, standards that give history its status as a scientific discipline (I take the word ‘science’ in its broad sense: the pursuit of true

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2 Initial readers of this epilogue will find that only this volume and volume 1 are currently in print. The publication of volumes 2, 3, and 4 will follow. However, the author of the present epilogue read drafts of almost all the chapters in all five volumes.
knowledge). The other term is the commitment of this scientific discipline to understanding past realities ‘in their own terms’—that is, in terms of the standards and ways of thinking prevailing in the past times and contexts within which those realities were located. The *OHHW* often examines past modes of past-time consciousness that are inimical to the scientific commitment of the discipline. The dialectic between commitment to the standards of the discipline and commitment to the reality and values of the past does not resolve, for we present-day historians cannot abandon our ways of doing history without abandoning the rationale for history’s existence as a discipline. The resulting tension runs like a red thread through the *OHHW*, although it is more visible in the chapters dealing with modes of past-time consciousness that are distant from present-day professional historiography. A parallel dialectic runs between the historian’s disciplinary commitment and commitment to present politics.  

The historical discipline as we know it today first emerged in Europe in the nineteenth century, and in the twentieth century spread to many other parts of the world. The standards and practices of the discipline are now normative wherever one finds universities or academies of science devoted to the pursuit of secular knowledge, at least if these academies and universities dare to extend their scientific curiosity beyond the natural, technological, and biological sciences into the broad realm of the human world. In displaying forms of historiography alien to the modern discipline, the *OHHW* reminds us that the discipline is a recent and highly contingent development. I do not make what I take to be the silly claim that the multiple historical forms and practices existing in the past somehow point the way toward our future—although I do hold that every form of historiography is valid to the extent that it had existential authenticity for its producers and intended consumers. I do make the claim that these other historiographies have various things to teach us, albeit largely through our own appreciative and critical responses to them.

How so? First, reflection on these ‘other’ historiographies helps give us insight into the mental and material worlds of past human beings in various cultures, and thus makes it easier for us to see, and to reflect on, how we are both similar to, and different from, those other people. Second, such reflection helps us to see the ‘value added’ in a discipline that combines sensitivity to the differentness that marks off past from present with a commitment to trying to get the story right. Third, reflection on these ‘other’ historiographies supports a critical attitude toward the historical discipline itself, reminding us that much human reflection on the past was carried out—and continues to be carried out—quite apart from the historical discipline as we know it. Finally, by reminding us of the multiplicity of human values and perceptions, reflection on these historiographies supports a critical attitude toward present-day pundits, think-tankers, and overconfident

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3 This parallel dialectic is visible, in perhaps its most concentrated form, in Ch. 23 by Ian Tyrrell in this volume.
social scientists who offer prescriptions for future action based on a very narrow conception of how human beings exist in the world. For there exists a dangerous form of prescriptivism that implicitly universalizes the mores prevailing within our own small corner of the world, a form of prescriptivism that too often attempts to apply its prescriptions to the world in general.

The first volume of the *Oxford History of Historical Writing* is good at showing us how restrictive it is to speak unreflectively about historical *writing*, if by writing we mean nothing more than symbols, letters, or characters inscribed on a supposedly neutral surface. Several of the chapters in that volume make the point that we need to understand how past-time consciousness can manifest itself monumentally, often in ways we moderns do not think could amount to ‘history’ at all. In her chapter on history and inscriptions in ancient Rome, Alison Cooley argues that although the Romans did not start writing histories (as we understand the term) until the end of the third century BC, the architecture and other *monumenta* that the Romans constructed provided a ‘sense of the past’. In his chapter on ancient Egypt, John Baines challenges the belief that Egyptian culture did not possess anything resembling historiography before the time of Alexander the Great, a belief that he ascribes to a failure to see that ‘historical writing’ can appear in the form of monuments. Piotr Michalowski makes a similar point in his chapter on early Mesopotamia. And of course, many cultures have had poetic traditions that manifested a consciousness of past time before there was any thought in those cultures that history might be represented prosaically.

In helping us see the differences between past past-time consciousness and the past-time consciousness of modern historians, these chapters offer a kind of ‘yes, of course’ moment, encouraging us to ask questions about the representations of ‘senses of the past’ in our own public life. In the twentieth century, both authoritarian states of various kinds and democratic states promoted monumental forms of history. Recently, the production of ‘history’ for public consumption has tended to take place in a more anarchic and less monumental way, often in the name, not of history, but of ‘memory’. Indeed, one widely held view in the early twenty-first century is that history is essentially a matter of the recovery and preservation of memory. Historical ‘writing’ is always entwined, in various ways, with memory, but the scientific imperative also asks us to engage in a critique of memory. We need to recognize how memory can serve as a lens through which to gain insight into how people have experienced their pasts, but we also need to recognize how the experiences preserved and transformed by memory weigh upon the present and orient people unreflectively in particular ways toward the future.

We modern historians have excellent techniques for uncovering what most likely was the case in the past, and for assessing the relative certainty of the

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4 See Ch. 2 by Alon Confino in this volume.
conclusions we reach. We are skilled at assessing, in comparative terms, the plausibility of conflicting accounts of the past. At a further level of analysis, we are able to detect assumptions in the thinking of people in the past that those people may not have noticed, or that they noticed but did not adequately question—especially assumptions concerning their own pasts. But in general, we historians are poorly equipped to offer reflective critiques of the religious, metaphysical, and philosophical assumptions that others hold about the past and about human society, for we are simply not trained to see things of that sort, let alone to analyze them. Even less are we trained to analyze and criticize our own deep assumptions.

We—both historians and others—need to think not only about the considerable achievements of the historical discipline, but also about its limits. The fourth volume of the OHHW, in which the nineteenth-century roots of the discipline are explored, and the present volume, focusing on the second half of the twentieth century, give us an opportunity to engage in this double task of appreciation and critique. One general point arising from these two volumes is obvious, namely, that ‘official’ historical research and writing exists in a condition of persistent tension between two competing (but also, in odd ways, complementary) demands. By ‘official’ history, I mean not only historical research and writing carried out under the auspices of authoritarian political regimes, but all historical research carried out within the framework of the discipline of history. This research is ‘official’ in the broad sense that it is carried out by people who hold official academic positions. Characteristically, the research thus produced is evaluated according to procedures that are simultaneously academic and bureaucratic.

There is a well-known saying, ‘He who pays the piper calls the tune.’ We can connect this with a saying that I have often heard on the lips of non-historians, ‘History is the story told by the victor.’ This latter claim, although too cynical by half, conveys an important truth about historical scholarship in general. On the one hand, historical scholarship is a matter of commitment to scientific standards that are appropriate to history. These standards have to do with the gathering of evidence, with the relation between evidence and the claims made, with a weighing of likelihoods, and with an attempt on the part of each historian to grapple with the evidence collected and arguments put forward by other historians. In other words, history is not simply the telling of stories: it is the telling of well-justified stories in an intersubjective, disciplinary space. The historian has an obligation to offer evidentially defensible claims about the past, and reasonable speculations about the past’s significance for the present and future. While many of the evidential standards for history existed long before the historical discipline came into being, in the discipline they acquired a higher degree of formalization and institutionalization than they had had before.

On the other hand, none of this evidential work would make sense without an existential commitment that drives people to see the past as relevant to their present and future lives. Scientific historical research requires two things—commitment
to getting at the truth, and commitment to a community—whether this be a community that already exists, or one that is to be brought into existence. Commitment to the search for truth about the past has to align itself with what the people can be induced to see as the existential needs of the communities to which they belong. Here the claim that ‘history is the story told by the victor’ lines up with the claim that ‘history is memory’. There exists a nearly infinite number of possible memories of the past, but only some of those memories, the ones approved by the victors, find authorization in the public sphere. Ernest Renan, in his 1882 lecture, ‘What is a Nation?’, made exactly this point when he asserted that a nation needs a body of memories appropriate to it, and that this requires the deliberate forgetting of unacceptable memories, such as the memory of religious strife.\(^5\) Since history has no claim to be useful in any instrumental sense, its most compelling justification is that it somehow satisfies existential needs.\(^6\) In other words, the existential aspect of the discipline is no mere afterthought, for without existential commitment there would be no writing of history at all. History is not memory, but without memory, including some sort of communal memory, there can be no history. And it is clear that this communal memory can change in various ways: over a period of time, formerly suppressed memories can turn into ‘official’ histories.

What, then, are we to infer about the future state of the writing of history? In his first-volume chapter on historiography in ancient Egypt, Baines notes that, although the ancient Egyptians did not write history in our sense of writing history, their practices did involve ‘the use of the past through written means and the creation of written materials that look to the future so that they can be used as a society’s past’. In this sense, he suggests, they can be said to have had a historical consciousness. But if the creation of materials that ‘look to the future so that they can be used as a society’s past’ were to define the modern discipline, this would amount to the demotion, if not the elimination, of commitment to a scientifically oriented historiography. There is certainly an impulse today that goes in this direction: many people see history as having as its fundamental task the offering of politically, socially, ethically, or psychologically beneficial memories. Especially in the light of the existence of experientially compelling new media, it is conceivable that such a conception of history could displace the kind of history that strives to make justified claims about the past. But while it is conceivable that such a displacement might occur, barring a serious collapse of our knowledge-producing institutions, it is unlikely.

One striking theme in the present volume of the *OHHW* is its pointing out of a strongly propagandistic function in twentieth-century historiography. Indeed,

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the tension between history-as-science and history-as-propaganda comes close to being the present volume’s unifying theme. This theme is to be found, not only in the chapters on historical writing in the USSR, China, and Germany (by, respectively, Denis Kozlov, Susanne Weigelin-Schwiedrzik, and Stefan Berger), but throughout the volume. A second striking theme is the expansion and diversification of historical research and writing. Various chapters in the present volume have thematic foci that hardly existed in the discipline before the post–Second World War period: examples include Alon Confino’s chapter on memory, as well as Julie Des Jardins’s on gender, J. R. McNeill’s on environmental history, and Gyan Prakash’s on postcolonial criticism. Finally, a third theme, evoked by Chris Lorenz and Jürgen Osterhammel in their respective chapters on theory and world history, is the concern in recent years with global and transnational history. We can reasonably infer that these three themes will have a continuing presence in the near future of historical research and writing.

However, the question of the future state of historiography is more a normative than an empirical question—it concerns what should happen more than what will happen. The author of the present volume’s chapter on the censoring of history, Antoon De Baets, has published a book, Responsible History (2009), in which he puts forward arguments in favour of historians’ adopting an explicit code of ethics. Here I want to make a slightly different suggestion. Obviously, historians usually focus in their writing on what happened, and not on what might have happened but did not. Yet at the same time, this focus marks out a limit that requires correction by the asking of a further question: How might past institutions and practices have been different from what they were?

The ‘might have been’ question asks historians to engage in something that goes beyond what are usually taken to be the limits of historical imagination as classically described by R. G. Collingwood. It asks them to engage in an effort of theoretical imagination, in which we imagine worlds quite different from those that exist or once existed—as, for example, John Rawls did in his influential work of political philosophy, A Theory of Justice (1971). Some might object that the exercise of theoretical imagination in history is a category mistake, amounting to an attempt to do philosophy or political theory under the guise of history. But such objections are mistaken. I agree that the historian’s first task is to offer insight into actual pasts. Note, however, that the hypothetical reasoning in such works as A Theory of Justice has a family resemblance to the counterfactual reasoning that is a necessary part of any attempt on the part of historians to make causal claims. (By a causal claim, I mean an assertion as to why such and such an event or existent occurred or existed.) It is a well-known fact that counterfactual reasoning is central to all causal analysis.

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8 See John Lewis Gaddis, The Landscape of History: How Historians Map the Past (New York, 2004), 100–2; and Allan Megill, Historical Knowledge, Historical Error (Chicago, 2007), esp. 154–6.
Accordingly, engagement in hypothetical reasoning can be regarded an extension of the hypothesizing that historians normally engage in whenever they attempt to explain (and not only describe) things in the past. Second, sometimes historians engage in hypothetical reasoning by imagining alternatives to the historical objects about which they choose to write. A common motive for their doing this is their wish to criticize such objects—as, for example, C. Vann Woodward does in attacking segregationism in the southern United States in *The Strange Career of Jim Crow* (1955). Finally, from yet another perspective, sometimes hypothetical reasoning in history can be seen as an attempt to articulate a kind of theory that (unlike, for example, Rawls’s theory of justice) is not purely theoretical and abstract, but has a connection to historical reality.

The ‘might have been’ question concerns not only what might have been (but was not) in the past, but also what might be otherwise in the future of historical writing itself. Let us think, as much as we can, in a way befitting universal history, impossible though that project may be. It is manifest that the existential commitment that has most often driven the modern discipline of history wherever in the world it has appeared is commitment to the nation-state. This is a major theme in the fourth volume of the *OHHW*, covering the period 1800–1945 (see especially the chapters by Stefan Berger and by Antoon De Baets, both of whom also have chapters in the present volume). The theme continued and intensified in the second half of the twentieth century as is made clear in the present volume. Weigelin-Schiedrzik closes her chapter on Chinese historiography since 1949 with the observation that ‘historians on both sides of the strait explicitly embrace the duty of bestowing the nation with a national identity’. Ann Kumar, writing on Indonesian historiography after independence, notes that Indonesian nationalists saw Western historiography both as abhorrent and as an exemplary model of what Indonesian historians now needed to do, namely, offer the image of a unified Indonesia. Only a few independent-minded historians, she notes, dared to speak against ‘the tyranny of national history’. Kevin Passmore, in his chapter on social science and history, emphasizes the heavy focus in twentieth-century historiography on nation and nation-state, which were widely regarded as the frameworks within which progress and modernization occur.

As I write in early 2010, historians are increasingly showing an interest in matters that go beyond the nation-state. There is a growing concern with such genres as comparative, transnational, environmental, regional, world, and global history. These concerns are commented on, or exemplified by, many authors

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9 See also Stefan Berger, Mark Donovan, and Kevin Passmore (eds.), *Writing National Histories: Western Europe since 1800* (London, 1999); and Stefan Berger, Linas Eriksenas, and Andrew Mycock (eds.), *Narrating the Nation: Representations in History, Media and the Arts* (New York, 2008).

10 See also Dipesh Chakrabarty, *Provincializing Europe: Postcolonial Thought and Historical Difference* (Princeton, NJ, 2000), who argues that the historical discipline presupposes simultaneously the ideas of nation, progress, and modernization.
in the present volume, including Ian Tyrrell writing on the United States, Toyin Falola on Africa, Gyan Prakash on postcolonial theory, J. R. McNeill on environmental history, Rolf Torstendahl on Scandinavia, and Ulf Brunnbauer on the Balkans. Yet it is clear that, in spite of its dark side, so widely manifested in the twentieth century, the nation-state remains the historical discipline’s central point of reference. This is hardly surprising in a discipline that began as an apologetics for the nation-state. Indeed, from the second half of the nineteenth century onward, historians increasingly absorbed and contributed to the notion that the ideal nation-state ought to contain a population oriented to a single national identity supported by a single national memory (which historians have the assigned task of fostering). Many historians also absorbed and contributed to the equally problematic notion, promoted by the historian and US president Woodrow Wilson, that every proper national group ought to have its own nation-state. As a counterpoint to this nationalizing tendency, much that occurred in the period from roughly the 1880s onward can easily be interpreted as involving, on the level of ‘great politics’, the fall of polyethnic state forms (most notably the Ottoman Empire, the Austro-Hungarian Empire, and the USSR).

Surely we historians need to reflect more explicitly than we have thus far on the most disastrous idea to have come out of nineteenth-century Europe. Actually, the idea in question was really two ideas that mirrored each other—namely, the idea that a properly modern nation-state ought to be based on a single national identity, and the idea that every ‘people’ ought to have its own nation-state. What could possibly authorize the unquestioned conjoining of nation-state and popular identity? The nationalist idea, authorized by the Wilsonian settlement at the end of the First World War, was innocuous in those parts of Europe where state consolidation had taken place before subordinate groups within the borders of those states had come to see themselves, too, as peoples deserving of their own state. This idea proved disastrous in those parts of the world where state consolidation followed, rather than preceded, the rise of divergent national self-consciousnesses upon a single territory.

Even today, we are still trying to work out the consequences of the dilemma that arises when a state that sees itself as defined by a single, privileged ethnic identity governs, or tries to govern, a territory within which a significant part of the population does not accept that claim to privilege. Consider, for example, parts of the former USSR, the former Yugoslavia, and the former Ottoman Empire. One also notes, from the other side, the difficulties that often arise when national separatist movements are active. More often than not, the would-be

separators, and those who they are to be separated from, find themselves unable to agree as to whether a new nation-state ought to come into existence, or (a question that is often forgotten) exactly where the borders of such a state, if it comes into existence, ought to be (e.g. Tibet, Kurdistan). Rarely, if at all, does ‘nature’ tell us where the borders of states ought to lie.

Many historians have written, on the basis of impeccable historical research and often in quite moving ways, about the horrors of ethnic cleansing and genocide, above all in relation to the Holocaust of the European Jews. But where does lamentation take us, when there is little or no willingness to call into question the implicit, and hence not critically examined, normative foundations of the identity-oriented (‘identitarian’) nation-state? The nation state has up to now been central to the ‘disciplinary matrix’ within which historians work. In consequence, most historians ‘naturally’ take the nation-state as marking out the frame within which they work, albeit with lip service offered to the existence of other nation-states than their own. And yet the five volumes of the Oxford History of Historical Writing help us to see how tiny a part of recorded history is actually taken up by the kind of nation-state that came into being in the (late) nineteenth century.

Moving beyond the nation-state idea is not simply a matter of acknowledging that multiethnic states once existed, and that some still exist, or of pointing out the difficulties that the identitarian nation-state has brought with it—although both are important tasks. Rather, a two-fold critical examination of the nation-state idea is required, involving not only critique, but also an exploring of alternatives to the identitarian nation-state. The critique would of course involve an investigation of the historical emergence of the nation-state—not, however, with the aim of showing its ‘foundations’ and thus implicitly of justifying it, but with the different aim of showing its contingent and unjustified character. It would take as a ‘given’ the positive aspects of the identitarian state. After all, in order to triumph over alternative forms of the state, notably the multicultural empire, the identitarian state must have had some significant advantages over those other forms—for example, the greater ease of mobilizing a monolingual population ideologically committed to the Volk.

But the real focus of such a historico-theoretical effort would need to be on the negative practical consequences of this model of the state, a model that seeks to promote a monolingual and monocultural human ecology within its territory,

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13 A work that attempts the first of these tasks is Jane Burbank and Frederick Cooper, ‘Empire, droits et citoyenneté, de 212 à 1946’, Annales HSS, 3 (2008), 485–531, which offers a rapid survey of the imperial form from the Roman Empire to the end of the idea of a French Empire. A work that attempts the second task is Eric D. Weitz, ‘From the Vienna to the Paris System: International Politics and the Entangled Histories of Human Rights, Forced Deportations, and Civilizing Missions’, American Historical Review, 114 (2008), 1313–43.
removing cultural outliers as much as possible. Perhaps we can look forward to a new historiography, one that would support the legitimacy of a different kind of state—a state based more on allegiance than on identity, finding its justification less in an invented memory of past national unity and glory, and more in its capacity to deal pragmatically and imaginatively with the realities of the contemporary world. Here the writing of history, especially the writing of the quasi-universal history that we see in the five volumes of this work, comes into its own, for it invites us to think normatively and critically about what otherwise might appear to us as ‘natural’ and universal.
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